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24th Congress j^VT'tu 

2c? Session. k ****«iT<vri? /> ^tHa, 




!PROCEEDIN 

OF THE 

MILITARY COURT OF INQUIRY, 




iN THE CASK OF 



MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT AND MAJOR GENERAL GAINES. 

Printed in pursuance of a resolution of the Senate of March 3, 1837. 



Lv SEXATE OF THE l"\ITED STATES, 

March 3, 1837. 
Resolved, That Ihc President of (he United States be requested as 
soon as he shall have acted finally on the Proceedings of the Military 
Court oflnquirj lately held at Frederick, in .Maryland', to transmit a copy 
thereof to the Senate, or to the Secretary of the Senate, if the Senate 
• be not in session and that the Secretary cause the same to be printed 
without delay, and transmitted to the Senators respectively 



Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, March 29, 1837. 
Sir: Therewith transmit, by instruction of the Secretary of War, the 
Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry lately held at Frederick, in Mar ' 

S&of Ta?chTl8 W 37 ,h ^ 1 ' eS ° ,Uti ° n °' ^ *°«* ° f lhe United 

I am, sir, 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

A ~ R. JONES, A dm tant General. 

Asbury Dickins, Esq., 

Secretary of the Senate of the United States. 



I 

I o 



[ 22-1 ] 2 






MEMORANDA OF DOCUMENTS SENT, 



MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT'S CASE. 

PART FIRST. 

SZJl'saRr*!** 0fa C °" rt ° f Imiui,y in lhc case of *** 

["Failure of the Florida campaign in 1836."] 

PART SECOND. 

ofneftl ^ CeCdin§S ° f a C ° Urt ° f ] ^y - ** «• of Major 
[" Delay in opening and prosecuting the Creek campaign."] 

« Major General Scott's Address, or Summary of Evidence taken in 
nis Ccisc. 

MAJOR GENERAL GAINES'S CASE. 

gZJ <^ edings of a Court of U( ^y - the case ° f i&* 

"Defence of Major General E. P. Gaines before the Court of Inquiry 
of which Major General Macomb is President." • } 



ti o*VofeTo?t s Ll;,? ourtor ,nquiry in rcference <° Publi - 



[ 224 ] 



No. 1. 
PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY 



IX THE CASE OF 



MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT. 

[FAILURE OF THE FLORIDA CAMPAIGN IN 1836.] 
PART FIRST. 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS. 



Adjutant General, 
do. 



A. General Gaines's objections to tlie Court, 

B. Do. to the Court of Inquiry, 
No. 1 . General Scott to the Adjutant General, 

2. Do. do. 

3. Do. do. 

4. Secretary of War to General Scott, 

5. General Call to the President United States, 

6. Do. do. 

7. Colonel Fitzpalrick to General Call, 

8. Governor Eaton to Secretary of War, 

9. General Call to Governor Eaton, 

10. Do. do. 

11. Secretary of War to General Clinch, 

12. General order No. 7, 

13. Secretary of War to Governors of South Carolina, Georgia 

Alabama, and Florida, 

14. General order No. 9, 

15. Secretary of War to General Scott, 

16. General Scott (per Captain Canfield) 

17. Do. do. 

18. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

19. Lieutenant Van Buren to General Scott, 

20. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

21. General Scott (per Lieut. Johnson) to Adjutant General, 

22. General Scott to Governor McDuffie, 
^ do. 

do. 

do. 
to Governor Schley, 
to Governor Clay, 
to Governor Eaton, 
to Colonel Lindsay, 

30. Governor Eaton to General Scott, 

31. Secretary of War to General Scott, 

32. Do. to Governor Schley, 

33. Do. to General Scott, 

34. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

35. Do. to General Eustis, 

36. Adjutant General to General Scott, 

37. General Scott to Governor Eaton, 

38. Do. to Adjutant General, 



23. 


Do. 


24. 


Do. 


25. 


Do. 


26. 


Do. 


27. 


Do. 


28. 


Do. 


29. 


Do. 



October 
January 
July 
August 
October 
January 
December 
January 
January 
January 
January- 
January 
January 
January 

January 

January 

January 

January 

January 

January 

January 

February 

February 

January 

January 

February 

February 

January 

January 

February 

February 

February 

February 

February 

February 

February 

February 

February 

February 

February 



30, 1836. 

7, 1837. 

20, 1836. 
2, 1836. 

18, 1836. 

21, 1836. 

22, 1835. 
9, 1836. 

8, 1836. 

9, 1836. 

5, 1836. 

8, 1836. 
11, 1836. 
21, 1836. 

21, 1836. 
25, 1836. 
29, 1836. 
25, 1836. 
27, 1836. 

31, 1836. 
31, 1836. 

2, 1836. 

3, 1836. 
29, 1836. 
31, 1S36. 

1, 1836. 

2, 1836. 
31, 1836. 
31, 1836. 

1, 1886. 

2, 1836. 

3, 1836. 
2, 1836. 
2, 1836. 

6, 1836. 
6, 1836. 

9, 1836. 

10, 1836. 

11, 1836. 
16, 1836. 



224 



No. "9. Gen. Scott to Quartermaster and Commissary at W. Orleans, February 14, 1836. 

40. Do. to Quartermaster, Charleston, February 12, 1836. 

41. Do. to General Clinch, February 12, 1836. 

42. Major Clark to General Scott, February 26, 1836. 

43. General Scott (per Lt. Van Buren) to Adjutant General, February 19,1836. 

44. Do. to Adjutant General, February 20, 1836. 

45. Adjutant General to General Scott, March 2, 1836. 

46. General Scott (per Lt. Van Buren) to Adjutant General, February 22, 1836. 

47. General Scott to Adjutant General, February 26, 1836. 

48. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 2, 1836. 

49. Do. do. February 22, 1836. 

50. General Clinch to General Scott, February 24, 1836. 

51. Capt. McCall to General Clinch, February 22, 1836. 

52. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 2, 1836. 

53. General Scott's order No. 1, February 22, 1836. 

54. Do. do. No. 4, February 26, 1836. 

55. Notes on order No. 4, February 28, 1836. 

56. General Scott's order No. 5, February 27, 1836- 

57. Do. do. No. 6, February 27, 1836. 

58. General Scott to General Clinch, February 25, 1836. 

59. Do. do. February 26, 1836. 

60. Do. do. (No. 1,) March 1, 1836. 

61. Do. do. (No. 2,) March 1,1836. 

62. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 28, 1836. 

63. Do. do. February 29, 1836. 

64. General Scott (per Lt. Van Buren) to General Clinch, March 2, 1836. 

65. Colonel Smith to Captain Shannon, February 25, 1836. 

66. General Scott's order No. 11, March 4, 1836. 
67- Do. do. No. 12, March 5, 1836. 

68. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 6, 1836. 

69. General Scott to General Clinch, March 4,1836. 

70. General Scott (per Lieutenant Temple) to Gen. Clinch, March 6,1836. 

71. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 9, 1836. 

72. Two letters from Major Lytle to General Scott, March 5,9,1836. 

73. Governor Eaton to Lieutenant Van Buren, February 24,1836. 

74. General Scott to General Eustis, March 9, 1836. 

75. General Scott to Lieutenant Dusenbury, March 9,1836. 

76. Do. to Lieutenant Searight,' March 10, 1836. 

77. Do. to Adjutant General, March 14, 1836. 

78. General Gaines's order No. 7, March 9,1836. 

79. General Clinch to General Scott, March 12,1836. 

80. General Scott to General Eustis, March 14,1636. 

81. General Scott (by Colonel Gadsden) to Colonel Lindsay March 13, 1836. 

82. General Scott's order No. 13, March 14,1836. 

83. Secretary of War to Colonel Hogan, January 21, 1836. 

84. Colonel Hojran to General Scott, Februa'ry 1, 1836. 

85. Secretary of War to General Scott, April 12,1836. 

86. Colonel Hogan to Secretary of War, March 28, 1836. 

87. Secretary of War to Colonel Hogan, April 12, 1836. 

88. Governor Eaton to General Scott, March 7, 1836. 

89. General Clinch to General Scott, March 13, 1836. 

90. Do. do. March 13, 1836. 

91. General Scott's order, No. 14, March 14,1836. 

92. Do. do. No. 15, March, 16, 1836. 

93. General Scott (by Colonel Gadsden) to General Eustis, March 16, 1836. 

94. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 20, 1836. 

95. General Scott to General Eustis, March 20,1836. 

96. Do. Colonel Crane, March 23,1836. 

97. General Scott (per Lt. Van Buren) to Adjutant General, March 25, 1836. 

98. General Eustis to General Scott, March 22,1836. 

99. General Scott's order No. 16, April 6, 1836. 

100. Lieutenant Morris's return of subsistence, April 8,1836. 

101. General Scott's order No. 23, April 9,1836. 

102. Do. do. No. 26, April 10, 1836. 

103. Do. do. to Adjutant General, April 12,1836. 

104. General Clinch's report to General Scott, April 8, 1836. 



[ 224 ] 



No, 105. General Eustis's report to General Scott 

106. Colonel Lindsay's report to General Scott, 

107. General Scott's order No. 22, 

108. Do. No. 24, 

109. Do. No. 28, 

110. General Scott to Colonel Smith, 

111. General Scott's order No. 37, 

112. General Scott (by Col. Gadsden) to Paymaster Mapes, 
112-113. General Scott ( by Col. Gadsden) to Major Read, 

113. General Scott to Colonel Lindsay, 

114. General Scott's order No. 38, 

115. Secretary of War to General Scott, 

116. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

117. Do. to Secretary of War, 

118. Adjutant General to General Scott, 

119. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

120. General Clinch's report to General Scott, 
121 General Clinch to General Scott, 

122. Gov. Call to Gen. Scott, or commanding officer Fort Drane, April 

123. Adjutant McCants to commanding- officer Fort Drane, 

124. Council of War at Fort Drane, 

125. General Scott (No. 1) to General Clinch, 

126. Do. (No. 2) Do. 
127 General Clinch to General Scoit, 

128. General Scott to General Clinch, 

129. Colonel Lindsay's report to General Scott, 

130. Colonel Chtsholm to Colonel Lindsay, 

131. Lieutenant Colonel Foster to Colonel Lindsay, 

132. Colonel Chisholmto Colonel Lindsay, 

133. Colonel Smith's report to General Scott, 

134. Major Read's report to General Scott, 

135. General Scott's order No. 46, 

136. General Scott to Captain Dummett, 

137. General Scott's order No. 47, 

138. Do. do. No. 48, 
139 General Scott to Governor Call, 

140. Governor Call to General Scott, 

141. Secretary of War to General Scott, 

142. Honorable J. M. White to President United States, 

143. General Scott to Secretary of War, 

144. Hon. J. M. White to President of Court of Inquiry, 

145. General Scott (by Gen. Eustis) to Adjutant General, 

146. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

147. Do. to Major Heileman, 

148. Do. to General Eustis, 

149. Captain Hitchcock to Honorable Mr. Lyon, 

150. Captain McCall to Editor of New Orleans Bulletin, 

151. Extracts of General Clinch's letters to Adjutant General, 

referred to in testimony of the former. 

152. Major Clark to Quartermaster General, 

153. Captain Shannon to Quartermaster General, 

154. Do. do. 
155 Secretary of War to General Scott, 

156. Secretary of War to Governor Call, 

157. Governor Schley to General Scott, 

158. Secretary of War to General Scott, 

159. Do. to General .lesup, 

160. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

161. Secretary of War to General Jesup, 

162. Do. to General Scott, 

163. General order No. 34, 

164. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

165. Do. to Governor Schley, 

166. Do. to Commissary and Quartermaster at New- 
Orleans, 

167. General Scott to Major Beard, 

168. Major Baden to General Scott, 



April 


10, 


1836. 


April 


10, 


1836. 


April 


8 


1836. 


April 


9 


1836. 


April 


11, 


183::. 


April 


10, 


1836. 


April 


16 


1836. 


April 


12 


1836. 


April 


14 


1836. 


April 


14 


1856. 


April 


16 


1836. 


April 


15, 


1836. 


April 


30, 


1836. 


April 


14, 


1836. 


May 


5, 


1836. 


May- 


11, 


1836. 


April 


27 


1836. 


April 


27 


1836. 


April 


26 


1836. 


April 


11 


1836. 


April 


29, 


1836. 


May- 


1, 


1836. 


May 


1, 


1856. 


May 


5, 


1836. 


May- 


7, 


1836. 


May 


7, 


1836. 


April 


22, 


1836. 


April 


29 


1836. 


April 


30, 


1836. 


April 


26 


1836. 


April 


27 


1836. 


May 


11 


1836. 


May 


11 


1836. 


Mav 


16 


1836. 


May 


17 


1836. 


May 


17 


1336. 


May 


26 


1836. 


June 


1 


, 1836. 


May 


28 


1836. 


June 


21 


1836. 


December 


13 


1836. 


May- 


16 


1836- 


May 


20 


1856. 


May 


17 


1836. 


May 


20 


1836. 


March 


11, 


1836. 


May 


18 


1856. 


August 


16 


1856. 


March 


1 


1836. 


April 


11 


1836. 


May 


16 


1836. 


May 


16 


1836. 


May- 


18 


1836. 


May 


19 


1836. 


May 


19 


1836. 


May 


oo 


1886. 


May 


23 


1836. 


May 


25 


, 1836. 


May 


26 


1836. 


May 


26 


1636. 


Slay 


26 


, 1836. 


VV 

May 


26 


, 1836. 


May 


27 


, 1836 


May 


31 


, 1836. 



[ 224 : 



No. 169. Governor Schley to Major Baden, 

170. Duplicate of No. 166, with a P. S. dated 

171. Quartermaster Dimmock to Genera] Scott, 
172 General Scott to Adjutant General, 

173. Governor Clay to commanding officer of Georgia militia 

at Columbus, 
17-1. General Scott (No. 1) to Governor Clay, 

175. Do. (No. 2) do. 

176. Do. to General Jesup, 

177. Captain Harding' to Governor Chi}-, 
178 General Scott to Captain Harding, 

179. Captain Harding to General Scott, 

180. General Scott to Major Heard, 

181. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to General Irwin, 

182. Lieutenant Dimmock to Major Kirby, (No. 1,) 

183. Do. do. (No. 2,) 

184. General Scott (by Maj. Kirby) to Quartermaster Dimmock, 

185. General Scott's orders, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 

186. Major Heard to General Scott, 

187. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to Major Beard, 

188. Lieutenant Heintzelman to Major Kirby, 

189. GeneralJcsup to General Scott, 

190. General Jesup to Secretary of War, 

191. Do. do. 

192. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to Major Beard, 

193. Do to General Jesup, 

194. Do. to Adjutant General, 

195. Major Baden to Major Kirby, 

196. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to Major Baden, 

197. Do. do. Lieutenant Deas, 

198. Lieutenant Ileintzleman to Major Kirbv, 

199. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

200. General Scott's order No. S, 

201. .Ino. Crowell, jr. Esq., to General Scott, 

202. Major Beard to General Scott, 
2U>. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

204. Do. General Jesup, 

205. Do. Adjutant General, 

206. General Jesup to General Scott, 

207. Do. do. (No. 1,) 

208. General Scott to General Jesup, 

209. Do. Adjutant General, 

210. General Jesup, to General Scott, (No. 2,) 

211. Do. do. 

212. General Scott to General Jesup, 

213. Do. do. 

214. General Jesup to F. P. Blair, 

215. General Scott to Adjutant General (No. 1.) 

216. General Jesup to General Scott, 

217. Do. do. (copy) 

218. General Scott to General Jesup, 

219. Do. do. 

220. General Jesup to General Scott, 

221. General Scott to Adjutant General (No. 2.) 

222. Do. to Governor Call, 

223. Do. to Com'y Gen. Sub. and Lieuts. L'Engle, 
Dimmock, and Mackay, 

224. Lieut. Heintzelman to Major Kirby, 

225. Secretary War to General Scott, 

226. Do. do. 

227. Do. do. 

228. General Moore to General Scott, 

229. General Scott's order No. 8, 

230. Do. do. No. 11, 

231. Do. do. No. 13, 

232. Do. do. No. 15, 



Mav 


27, 


1836 


May 


28 


1836 


May 


29, 


1836. 


June 


2 


1836 


May 


28, 


1836 


May 


31, 


1836. 


May 


31, 


1836. 


June 


1, 


1836. 


February 


8 


1836. 


June 


3, 


1836. 


June 


14, 


1856. 


June 


3, 


1836. 


June 


2, 


1836. 


June 


2, 


1836. 


June 


2, 


1836. 


June 


3, 


1836 


June 


5, 


1836 


June 


7 


1836. 


June 


8, 


1836. 


June 


8, 


1886. 


June 


10, 


1836 


June 


11, 


1836. 


June 


10, 


1836. 


June 


10, 


1836. 


June 


12, 


1836. 


June 


11, 


1836. 


June 


14, 


1836 


June 


11, 


1836 


June 


12, 


1836. 


June 


14, 


1836. 


June 


16, 


1836. 


June 


16, 


1836, 


June 


16, 


1836. 


June 


17, 


1836. 


June 


16, 


1836. 


June 


18, 


1836. 


June 15 


16, 


1836. 


June 


17, 


1836. 


June 


17, 


1836. 


June 


21, 


1836. 


June 


17, 


1836. 


June 


19, 


1836. 


June, 


19, 


1836. 


June, 


21, 


1836. 


June 


20, 


1836. 


June 


23, 


1836. 


June 


20, 


1836. 


June 


12, 


1836. 


June 


21, 


1836. 


June 


22, 


1836. 


June 


22, 


1836. 


June 


23, 


1836. 


June 


17, 


1836. 


June 


20, 


1836. 


June 


22, 


1836. 


June 


20, 


1836. 


June 


20, 


1836. 


June 


24, 


1836. 


June 


25, 


1836. 


June 


16, 


1836. 


June 


20, 


1S36. 


June 


20, 


1836. 


June 


21, 


1836. 



[ 224 J 



No. 233. General Scott's order No. 17, 

234. Do. do. No. 27, 

235. Do. do. No. 23, 

236. Do. to Adjutant General, 

237. General Jesup to General Scott, 

238. General Patterson to General Jesup, 

239. Captain Parrott to do. 

240. General Jesup to Secratary War, 

241. General Scott to General Jesup, 

242. General Jesup to Adjutant General, 

243. General Scott to do. 

244. Do. to Gov. Call, 

245. Do. to Com. Dallas, 

246. Do. to officer commanding West Tennessee 
brigade, 

347. General Scott's order No. 22, 

248. General Scott to Adjutant General, 

249. Do. do. 

250. Do. to Gen. Moore, 

251. Do. to Lt. Johnson, U. S. N'. 

252. Do. by Lt. Lee to Adjutant General, 
353. Do. to General Wool, 

254. Do. to Major Hoxie, 

255. General Macomb to General Scott, 

256. 1)... do. 

257". Do. to General Jesup 

258. General Scott to General Macomb, 

259. General Scott's order No. 29, 

260. General Scott to Adjutant Genera!, 

261. General Jesup to General Scott, 

262. Do. to Adjutant General, 

263. Captain Lane's printed sheet, 

264. F. P. Blair to Judge Advocate, 

265. General Jesup's communication to the Globe, of 

266. General Woodward to Judge Advocate, 

267. General Jesup to Governor Schley, 

268. Do. do. 



June 


22, 


1836 


July 


6, 


1836. 


July 


6, 


1836. 


June 


24, 


1836. 


June 


23, 


1836. 


June 


9"> 


1836. 


June 


22, 


1836. 


June 


25, 


1836. 


June 


26, 


1836 


June 


28, 


1836. 


July 


2, 


1836. 


Julv 


L 


1836. 


July 


1, 


1836. 


Julv 


2 


1836. 


July 


2 


1836. 


July 


4*, 


1836 


July 


6, 


1836 


July 


4, 


1836. 


July 


5, 


1836 


July 


5, 


1836. 


July 


4, 


1836 


July 


6, 


1836. 


June 


25, 


1836. 


June 


28, 


1836. 


June 


28, 


1836. 


July 


8, 


1836. 


July 


7, 


1836. 


July 


20, 


1836. 


July 


7, 


1836. 


Septembe: 


9, 


1836. 


August 


8, 


1836. 


January 


8, 


1837. 


September 26, 


1836. 


November 


27, 


1836. 


August 


2, 


1836. 


August 


28, 


1836. 



PROCEEDINGS 



Of a Court of Inquiry, held at the city of Frederick, Maryland, by virtue 
of the following orders, to wit : 



War Department, 
Adjutant GeneraVs Office, Washington, October 3, 1836. 

General Order No. 65. 

The following order is published for the information of all concerned : 

By direction of the President of the United States, a Court of Inquiry 
to consist of Major General Macomb, President, and Brevet Brigadiers 
General Atkinson and Brady, members, is hereby ordered to assemble 
at the city of Frederick, in Maryland, as soon as the state of the military 
operations against the Indians will permit the witnesses to attend, (of 
which the President of the Court is to judge and determine, and to give 



I 224 ] 8 

notice to all concerned,) to inquire and examine into the causes of the 
failure ef the campaigns in Florida against the Seminole Indians, under 
tlie command of Major General Gaines and of Major General Scott, in 
1 83G ; and the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign 
in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians, in the year 
1836- and into every subject connected with the military operations in 
the campaigns aforesaid : and, after fully investigating the same, the Court 
will report the facts, together with its opinion on the whole subject, for 
the information of the President of the United States. 

Captain Samuel Cooper, of the 4th regiment of artillery, is hereby 
appointed to act as Judge Advocate and Recorder of the Court. 

LEWIS CASS. 



War Department, 

October 3, 1836, 



R. JONES, Adjutant General 



Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, October 14, 1836. 
General Order No. 68. 

The following order has been received from the War Department, and 
is published for the information of all concerned : 

War Department, 

October 13, 1836. " 

1. It appearing by the public prints that the official report of Brevet 
Major General Gaines, dated " Headquarters, Western Department, 
Camp Sabine, 4th July, 1836," made to the Adjutant General of the army, 
has been published, and the said publication being without the sanction 
of the War Department, or other proper authority, the Court of Inquiry 
of which Major General Alexander Macomb is President, will, in addi- 
tion to the duties already assigned to it, inquire into the facts as to the 
manner and by whose authority the said official report was made public. 

2. The Court will also report its opinion as to the violation of the rules 
of the service by such publication, and as to the character of said report, 
in reference to all its bearings and consequences, as it concerns general 
military propriety and the discipline of the army. 

3. And, further, the Court will examine and inquire into any other re- 
ports and publications made by Brevet Major General Gaines, or by any 
other officer of the army, having reference to military affairs, and published 
without the sanction of the War Department, or other proper authority, 
and give its opinion on the tendency of such reports and publications, in 
the same manner as it is herein required to do in the case referred to in 
the foregoing paragraph of this order. 

C. A. HARRIS, 

Acting Secretary of War. 
By order of Major General Macomb : 

R. JONES, Adjutant General. 



9 [ 224 ] 

Fredkrick Citv, Maryland, 

November 7, 1836. 

Agreeably to the above orders, and in compliance with notice duly 
communicated by the President of the Court, the Court met on this day. 

Present: Major General Macomb, President, Captain Cooper, Judge 
Advocate and Recorder. 

In consequence of the absence of Brigadiers General Atkinson and 
Brady, the President adjourned the Court to meet to-morrow. 

November 8, 1 v 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. 

Present : Major General Macomb, President, Brigadier General Brady, 
member, Captain Cooper, Judge Advocate and Recorder. 

General Atkinson not having yet arrived, the Court adjourned to meet 
again to-morrow. 

November 9, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. 

Present : Major General Macomb, President, Brigadier General Brady, 
member, Captain Cooper, Judge Advocate and Recorder, 

The Judge Advocate communicated to the Court a letter from Briga- 
dier General Atkinson, in which the general states that, in consequence 
of his illness, he is unable to reach the Court before the 22d or 25th of 
the present month : whereupon, the Court adjourned to meet on the 25th 
of November. 

November 25, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. 

Present: Major General Macomb, President, Brigadier General At- 
kinson, Brigadier General Brady, members, Captain Cooper, Judge Ad- 
vocate and Recorder. 

The Court adjourned to meet on Monday, the 28th instant. 



November 28, 1S36. 






The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. 

Present: Major General Macomb, President, Brigadier General At- 
kinson, Brigadier General Brady, members, Captain Cooper, Judge Ad- 
vocate and Recorder. 

The orders constituting the Court having been read, the Judge Advo- 
cate stated to the Court that he had received a letter from Major General 
Gaines, dated Mobile, October the 30th, covering a communication 
addressed to the Court, dated Mobile, October 29th, in which he makes 
objections to the organization and location of the Court. 

These communications (marked A) having been read to the Court, 
Major General Scott claimed the right of being heard, and addressed the 
Court to this effect : 



[ 224 ] 10 

" How far Major General Gaines, when his own case shall come up for 
investigation, may have a right to object, with or without cause, to a 
member of this Court, is a question which I shall not discuss, having my- 
self no such objection to urge ; but, when he proposes the adjournment 
of the Court to Mobile, or any other distant place whatever, I have the 
right to resist the proposition, on the ground of the delay it involves. 
Further delay, Mr. President, is positive injustice to me. I am ready and 
anxious for the investigation of every act of mine that has been com- 
plained of, having already suffered much in my feelings, and, perhaps, 
in public opinion, from the time that has been allowed to elapse, in de- 
spite of my earnest solicitations, since a judicial investigation into my 
conduct was threatened by the Executive. 1 shall, therefore, not vol- 
untarily consent to, but earnestly protest against the unnecessary loss of 
another day, in having that conduct, in every matter complained of, fully 
probed and investigated by this Court, which has at length been appointed 
for the purpose. 

" In all cases like those contemplated by the order under which this 
Court has assembled, the President of the United States has the unques- 
tionable right to appoint both the time and place of investigation. His 
order precludes all right of discussion on those points. 

" The strange proposition of Major General Gaines, that no testimony, 
written or parol, shall be taken by this Court, in his ivilful absence, which 
may, in any degree, allude to him or his conduct, would be less extraor- 
dinary if the only issue to be tried was between the United States and 
that officer ; but, to the issue between the United States and the humble 
individual who addresses you, General Gaines is, in the contemplation of 
law, as much a stranger as any by-stander in this Court. In this particular 
issue he has no right whatever to interfere. The Executive has a clear 
right to proceed against me, and I have as clear a right to defend myself 
by all legal and honorable means, without regard to the absence or pres- 
ence of General Gaines, just as in respect to the presence or absence of 
any other individual whatever. 

" If the evidence that may be adduced against or for me, before this 
Court, in the investigation of my particular case, should affect Major Gen- 
eral Gaines, he will stand, in respect to such evidence, precisely on the 
footing of any other third person so affected, with this advantage in his 
favor : the same Court, (or a majority of it,) stands instructed to take up 
his case as soon as he shall choose to present himself, and then he will 
have the full right to explain, to contradict, or to refute, by all legal and 
honorable means, any part of the record in. my case which he may deem 
unjust to himself. 

" The 74th article of the Rules and Articles of War permits depositions 
to be taken in cases like those to be investigated by this Court. To give 
validity to a deposition, legal in other respects, notice of the time and 
place for taking the same must always be given to the adverse party. 
Now, even if it were admitted that this Court were about to try an issue 
between Major General Gaines and myself, instead of two or more sev- 
eral issues between the United States and as many distinct individ- 
uals, still it would be sufficient to say that the orders appointing this Court 
and specifying the subjects for its investigation, give ample notice to Ma- 
jor General Gaines, that, in inquiring into my conduct, as one of the con- 
ductors of the still-existing war in Florida, the testimony might naturally 



11 [224 J 

be expected to touch, incidentally at least, his conduct in the same war, 
particularly as we were both operating against the same enemy at one 
particular time. The orders for this Court he acknowledges himself to 
have received. He has, therefore, even in this view of the subject, had 
sufficient notice that incidental evidence might be expected to be re- 
ceived against him by this Court, and at this time and place, in the act of 
investigating my conduct in the war against the Seminole Indians. All 
this is c'ear from his protest which has just been read. He has, how- 
ever, not thought proper to appear in person, either as a defendant or as 
a spectator ; but has appointed a commission of several individuals to 
represent him, it would seem, in the investigation of my conduct. In this 
particular investigation, Mr. President, I have already said, Ceneral 
Gaines cannot be allowed to take any part, other than as a sworn witness, 
either in person or by deputy ; for I do not understand that he claims the 
right to be m} r prosecutor before this or any other Court. If that could 
be supposed to be his wish, I should be happy to meet him. 

" In conclusion, sir, I have no sort of objection, even if I had the right 
to object, that the highly respectable gentlemen named by General Gaines 
to represent him before this Court should be permitted to be present as 
spectators to the investigation into my conduct, with the admitted right 
to make such notes and reports for Major General Gaines as they may 
think proper." 

Major General Macomb, President of the Court, then made the follow- 
ing answer to the objections offered against himself as member of the 
Court, by Major General Gaines : 

" Gentlemen of the Court : I do not entertain a doubt but that a chal- 
lenge, upon good and sufficient grounds, may, with propriety, be sus- 
tained before a Court of Inquiry, although, perhaps, this is the first in- 
stance of a challenge being made to a member of such a Court. It cer- 
tainly was not of my seeking that I was placed on the Court ; it is a duty 
from which I would most willingly withdraw, on a decision of the Court 
to that effect. 

" As it regards my having harbored against General Gaines, any hos- 
tile or unfriendly feelings, or feeling any disposition to do him any wrong, 
I do most conscientiously deny ; and as for interest in the issue of the in- 
vestigation ordered by Government, I have none other than that which 
concerns the honor and character of the army. 

" It is proper that I should state, that it was the desire of the Presi- 
dent of the United States that the Court should assemble at as early a 
day as possible; and I believed that the day appointed for assembling the 
Court was not too early for commencing the inquiry ; and it would seem 
by the attendance of the witnesses from a distance, and the fact of the 
receipt of General Gaines's communications, now before the Court, that he 
had ample time to get here, if he had set out for that purpose in season." 

The Court, being cleared, determined that a member of a Court of In- 
quiry may be objected to, for good and sufficient cause ; but this is not 
the proper time to consider the objections of Major General Gaines, as 
the party objecting is not, at this time, before the Court ; and, as the 
Court has been directed to inquire into subjects other than those referring 
to Major General Gaines, the Court determined to qualify and proceed to 



[ 224 ] 12 

the investigation having reference to the campaign under Major Gene- 
ral Scott, against ihe Seminole Indians, in 1836; pending which inves- 
tigation, Major General Gaines, it is believed, will have ample time to 
reach the Court, before any matters touching himself shall be brought to 
the notice of the Court. 

The Court, being resumed, was duly sworn, in presence of Major Gen- 
eral Scott, who had previously stated that he had no objections to offer 
to any member of the Court. 

The Judge Advocate then proceeded to read the documentary evi- 
dence which will be found with these proceedings. 

The hour for adjournment having arrived, the Court adjourned to meet 
to-morrow at 11 o'clock. 

November 29, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Court was occupied on this day, and on every subsequent day to 
the 3d of December inclusively, in the examination of the documentary 
evidence referred to in the proceedings of the 28th of November. 

Monday, December 5, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
The Judge Advocate presented to the Court the depositions which here 
follow : 

Deposition of Charles Dimmock, Esq., late captain and assistant quar- 
termaster of the United States army. 

Question 1, by Major General Scott. Where were you stationed, and 
in what capacity, during the latter part of the last winter and the follow- 
ing spring months ? 

Answer. I was stationed at Savannah, in Georgia, from the 7th of 
February to the 23d of May, 1836, in the capacity of assistant quarter- 
master. 

Question 2, by Major General Scott. Were you advised by a quarter- 
master of the army in the month of February, that a shipment of wagons, 
with harness, had been made, or was about to be made, to you, from Balti- 
more, for the use of the army in Florida ? Please annex the letters of 
advice to your answer. 

Answer. I was so advised, and here are the letters of advice from 
Major T. Cross, quartermaster, dated Baltimore, 30th of January, 1836, 
and Washington, 8th of February, 1836, both addressed to me at Savan- 
nah, Georgia. 

" Baltimore, January 30, 1836. 

" Sir : Enclosed is a bill of lading of two wagons, shipped on board the 
brig " Oglethorp." On their arrival please acknowledge them to me at 
Washington. 



13 [ 224 ] 

" I am ordered to send out ten wagons — only four new ones could be 
found in the city, and it becomes necessary to buy at second hand. They 
are the best I could pick up in a hurry. 

" The brig " Arctic" will sail in a few days, with three companies of 
troops, some provisions, and a large supply of corn. She will take as 
many wagons as she can stow, and the remainder will follow in a packet 
soon after. 

" { am, sir, very respectfully, 

" Your obedient servant, 

"T. CROSS, 
" Major and Quartermaster, U. S. army. 

" Lt. Charles Dimmock, 

" Assistant Quartermaster U. S. A., Savannah, Go." 

" Washington, February 8, 1836. 

" Sir : Annexed is a bill of lading of six wagons, shipped to you on 
board the schooner " Ida." On their arrival please send me a receipt 
for them, and also for the two previously forwarded. There are on board 
this vessel, two extra covers and two extra fifth chains, spreads, and sin- 
gletrees, for the wagons shipped by the Oglethorp ; thus making eight 
wagons complete. Some of them are poor things, but ill suited to the 
service for which they are designed. I could do no better, however, un- 
der the circumstances of the case. There are two more new ones in prep- 
aration, which will be shipped in a few days, making ten in all, and cor- 
responding with the ten sets of harness for five horses each, sent by the 
brig " Arctic." 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, 

" Your obedient servant, 

"T. CROSS, • 
" Major and Quartermaster, U. S. A. 
" Lt. Charles Dimmock, 

" Assistant Quartermaster, Savannah, Ga." 

Question 3, by Major General Scott. Did you communicate the advice 
so received to Major General Scott — where, and about what time ? 

Answer. I did so, at Savannah, soon after his arrival at that place, by 
showing him the letters of advice above mentioned. 

Question 4, by Major General Scott. What number of those wagons, 
with sets of harness, came to you at Savannah ; about what time were 
they respectively received and shipped by you to Florida? 

Answer. Two of them I found on my arrival at Savannah on the 7th 
of February ; these two were shipped on that or the next day to Picolata. 
On or about the 7th of March, I received six more ; they were shipped 
on or about the 8th of March, to Lieutenant Dusenbury, assistant quar- 
termaster at Picolata. About the 1st of May, I received two more wa- 
gons, which were shipped within a day or two thereafter to Lieutenant 
Dusenbury, at Picolata. All these were received from Major Cross, and 



[ 224 ] 14 

were those referred to in his letters of advice. All the wagon fixtures 
came with the wagons, but not the harness. By the brig " Arctic," which 
arrived on the 24th of February, there came fifty collars, fifty pairs of 
names, one box of harness, and other articles. These were passed im- 
mediately from the brig into a steamer destined for Picolata. The box 
of harness was, in consequence of haste, not examined. 

Question 5, by Major General Scott. About what time did the first 
shipment of bacon, destined for the army in Florida, reach you at Savan- 
nah, and when was the first trans-shipment of bacon for Florida made by 
you? 

Answer. On the 3d of April, I received the first shipment of bacon, 
which came by the ship "Newark" from New York; this was marked 
for Lieutenant Searight, assistant commissary of subsistence at Savannah, 
without invoice or instruction. The invoices addressed to Lieut. Sea- 
right went to that officer at Garey's Ferry, and were sent to me by that 
officer, ten days after the arrival of the bacon. The first trans-shipment 
of bacon made by me for Florida was on the 4th of April. The quanti- 
ty thus trans-shipped was very small, in consequence of the means of 
transportation being very limited at the time. No more was made, ex- 
cept upon order, as that was the instruction received from Colonel Crane, 
then commanding at Picolata. 

Question 6, by Major General Scott. Are you aware that any bacon 
had been previously shipped direct to the St. John's or St. Augustine ? 

Answer. I have no knowledge of any having been previously shipped. 

Question by the Judge Advocate. What amount of transportation in 
horses, mules, oxen, wagons, carts, or other vehicles was furnished by 
you, and sent to Florida, between the 7th of February, and say the first 
week in March ? Please specify the time the articles were respectively 
sent, and whether they were furnished on the requisitions or orders of 
Major General Scott; and, also, whether all the requisitions or orders for 
transportation, made on you by Major General Scott, were complied 
with ? 

Answer. All the requisitions or orders of Major General Scott, or 
other officer connected with the Florida campaign, for means of trans- 
portation made on me, were complied with, with the exception of two 
boats, which could not be obtained. 

From the 7th of February to the 31st of March, I purchased 7 wagons. 

Received from Major Cross, - - 3 u 

Making a total of - 15 " 

These were all the wagons required of me during that time. They 
were sent to Florida as follows : On the 7th or 8th of February, two were 
sent to Lieutenant Dusenbury, at Picolata. On or about the 4th of March, 
two were turned over to Captain Wharton, at Savannah, who was then 
on his march to Florida, across the country. On the 8th of March, six 
were sent by steamboat to Lieutenant Dusenbury, at Picolata. Finally, 
on or about the 16th of March, five were sent to Lieutenant Dusenbury, 
at Picolata. These were all four or five-horse wagons except two, which 
were two-horse wagons. 



15 [ 224 ] 

I received, on or about the 10th of February, from Augusta — 

Purchased there by order of Major General Scott, - 151 horses 
Purchased by me at or near Savannah, - - 65 " 

Making in all - - 216 " 

Of this number I turned over to Captain Gibson, of the South Carolina 
volunteers, on his march to Florida, across the country, on or about the 
2d of March, fifteen pack-horses. On the 4th of March, I sent across the 
country to Florida, in charge of conductors, fifty-eight horses. On the 
4th of March, again, I turned over to Captain Wharton, for his command, 
in all one hundred and six horses. On the 8th of March, I sent by steam- 
boat to Picolata, eight horses. On or about the 16th of March, I sent to 
Picolata eighteen horses, making in all forwarded two hundred and five 
horses. Two died under my charge at Savannah, and nine were re- 
tained sick and disabled, making in all the two hundred and sixteen as above. 
Harness in excess was sent for all the wagons, at the time the wagons 
were forwarded. This means of transportation was furnished at the time 
ordered, and forwarded as soon thereafter as possible. The horses re- 
ceived from Augusta, I was ordered by Major General Scott to retain, 
until Captain Wharton's command of dragoons should arrive at Savannah; 
out of them he was to select his mounts, w r hich he did, on or about the 
4th of March. 

Sworn to before me : 

S. COOPER, 
Judge Advocate and Recorder. 

Deposition of Colonel James Gadsden, late quartermaster general in the 

army of Florida. 

The undersigned having been summoned as a witness-e^n a Court of 
Inquiry in relation to the operations conducted by Generals Scott and 
Gaines, during the Seminole war in Florida, and being unable to attend, 
submits to the Court, in writing, the recollection of events, so far as they 
came under his personal observation. 

He joined the army as a volunteer, and, at the request of Major 
General Scott, on his route to headquarters at Picolata, on the St. John's 
river, he ascertained, at Newnansville, that General Gaines had march- 
ed from the bay of Tampa to the Withlacoochee ; was there intrenched 
with his whole force, and reduced to extremities by the enemy. The 
undersigned, therefore, turned from his direction and proceeded to Fort 
Drane. At this post he found General Clinch deliberating on General 
Gaines's communications, and, after some consultations with the officers 
in camp, it was determined to march to his relief. Provisions, to the 
extent of the transportation to be obtained, were taken with us. On our 
approach to General Gaines's camp, a party of Indians were seen moving 
with a design to turn our left flank, or to retreat before us. They were 
promptly charged by Major McLemore's mounted men, and driven into 
an adjacent hammock. While preparations were making for dismounting 
and continuing the pursuit, an officer appeared from General Gaines's 



[ 224 ] 16 

command, and reported that the general was in consultation with the 
Indian?, and about concluding a treaty with them. General Clinch, 
therefore, desisted from any further hostile movement, and took up his 
quarters un the left, on General Gaines's intrenched position. That 
ni (T ht, a messenger from the Indians hailed from the opposite side of the 
river, asking whether they should come on the next morning and con- 
tinue the talk, and whether Clinch's men would be pacific and not fire 
on them. Having been assured as to the latter, and replied to affirma- 
tively as to the former, an inquiry was then made whether the day after 
would not answer, as it was the wish of the Indians on the Withlacoochee 
to hold a conference with their head chief, Micanopy, then thirty miles 
off, before they could come to any terms with the white men. General 
Gaines replied, through his agent, that he would prefer their coming 
over the next morning ; but if that could not be done, the day after he 
would positively expect them. The next day and the day after expired, 
but no Indians made their appearance, and every indication in the vicin- 
ity of their camps was, that the hostiles had vanished. The army re- 
mained in position three or four days; when General Gaines concluded 
to transfer the command to General Clinch, and proceed with his staff 
to the Western frontier. On assuming the command General Clinch 
evacuated the post on the Withlacoochee and retired on Fort Drane. 
The army had exhausted their scanty supply, and were suffering before 
the movement was made. General Gaines's portion, which had been 
marched from Tampa, had endured heavy privations, and the officers and 
men were so reduced that it was by short marches, and at a slow pace, 
that they could gain the depot at Fort Drane. A day after our return 
General Scott arrived at Fort Drane, having moved from Picolata and 
Black creek, with all the disposable force at those places, and as much 
provisions as transportation could be provided for, with a view of sup- 
porting General Gaines, or of relieving him from his position on the 
Withlacoochee. Learning, however, that this had been effected, he 
halted these additional troops at plantations in the rear, where the sup- 
plies had not been exhausted, and recommenced the work of preparing 
for a campaign against the hostiles. The deposite of provisions at 
Fort King had been consumed by General Gaines, and those at Fort 
Dram were reduced to the last extremity. General Gaines's army 
added unexpectedly upwards of 1,100 officers and men to be provided 
for, on a frontier already exhausted, and which could only be supplied 
from depots from 65 to 70 miles distant, by land carriage. In deposite, at 
this time, at Fort Drane, the supply did not exceed six or eight days' 
rations, for about one-half of the force which was intended to compose 
Clinch's command, and General Scott seemed strongly impressed with 
the opinion that, to move against an enemy whose plan was conceal- 
ment and retreat, with less than thirty days' rations, would render the 
issue very doubtful. The provisions which he had thrown in advance 
had been unexpectedly consumed, and his remaining reliance was on 
what he could transport in time from the rear. To make the movement 
to accord with those ordered by the other portions of the army, moving 
from other quarters, on the Withlacoochee, after fifteen or eighteen 
days toil, with every thing put in requisition by the quartermaster, 
something like sixteen days' supply was brought to Fort Drane ; and as 



17 [ 224 ] 

the season was getting late for operating in Florida, General Scott con- 
cluded to move on this supply. Previous to leaving Fort Drane, he 
despatched a Major Watson, from Georgia, to the Creek nation, for a 
detachment of friendly Creek warriors, with directions to join him at 
Tampa, (early in April,) believing that they were essential, as blood- 
hounds would be, to trail out the liostiles, who had been too successful 
hitherto in eluding the white man. On the 26th General Scott, with 
the right wing, marched with the Withlacoochee, crossed that stream on 
the 28th and 29th, encountered a small party of Indians the next day, 
pursued them through the labyrinths of the Holathlekaha, and drove 
them across the Withlacoochee, and in the direction towards which the 
left wing of the army was supposed to be moving. As Eustis's signal- 
gun had been heard that morning, little doubt was entertained that he- 
would encounter the fugitives. Scott continued his examinations through 
the thickets and windings of the river and Lake Holathlekaha for three 
or four days, burning the deserted villages ; when, not meeting with or 
hearing from either Eustis or Lindsay, he presumed that, in flushing the 
enemy, they had been encountered by those officers, who were in hot 
pursuit of them to the Ever-glades. Having reached the south end of the 
lake, and our supplies nearly exhausted, Major Cooper, with his bat- 
talion of Georgia volunteers, was left with twelve or fifteen days' rations, 
in position, to watch the reappearance of the enemy in that quarter : 
while General Scott continued his march for Tampa, by the route of the 
Chickuchatty settlements, all of which were destroyed. At Tampa, Eustis 
and Lindsay's commands arrived on the same day. At this point, Scott 
expected, as he had ordered, fresh horses for transportation, and the ar- 
rival of the friendly Creeks ; but was disappointed in both. The for- 
mer denied, in consequence of a report at New Orleans, confirmed by 
his reception in Tallahassee, that Gaines had closed the war ; and the 
latter prohibited by the United States agent from joining us, as report- 
ed by Major Watson. Scott was, therefore, compelled to remain longer 
than he had intended, to recruit his animals, then not in a condition to 
resume operations. On the return hunt after Indians, the army was 
divided into several parts, so as to multiply the chances of success. 
Colonel Smith, with the Louisiana volunteers, was directed to Charlotte's 
harbor, where some depredations had been committed on one of the 
islands, and the custom-house officer murdered ; he was likewise direct- 
ed to penetrate Pease creek, and to give that coast a general examina- 
tion. To General Clinch was assigned the duty of relieving Major 
Cooper, and, on his march, to scour the south bank of the Withlacoochee. 
Colonel Lindsay was to penetrate between the Withlacoochees, the forks 
of which had been represented as one of the hiding-places of the Semi- 
noles ; and General Eustis, after making a detachment towards the set- 
tlements on the heads of Pease creek, was to return by Pelaklikaha 
and the Ochlawaha to Volusia. Major Read, with the Florida detach- 
ment, was assigned to the service of looking into the mouth of the With- 
lacoochee, and of penetrating that river, as far as was found practicable, 
or deemed prudent on his part. How these movements were executed, 
the reports of the respective commandants will explain. They were, 
however, without favorable results ; and after many weeks of trials, pri- 
vations, and sufferings, particularly among the Floridians and Carolinians, 
2 



[ 224 ] 18 

who were subjected to the additional affliction of sickness in camp, 
originating in measles, which assailed, without discrimination, nearly 
one-third of the respective commands, we found ourselves in the 
same position from whence we started : the enemy unsubdued, because 
he could not be found ; the season too far advanced for another hunt, 
and the times of service for the volunteers and draughted militia on the eve 
of expiring. They were dismissed, and such a disposition given to the 
small army of regular troops, reduced alike by sickness and suffering, as 
was supposed calculated to cover the frontier, until other arrangements 
could be made for resuming operations. 

The history of the blockhouse, on the Withlacoochee, in which a gallant 
body of men so nobly sustained themselves for upwards of six weeks, 
against the combined force of the Seminoles, is this : Major McLemore 
sought the service, by a private letter to the undersigned, stating that he 
had, on the Suwannee, a boat suitable for the expedition, and supplies, 
which he could bring with him to that point, if with the consent and 
approbation of General Scott. The following is the reply penned by me, 
and by the direction of the General, to whom it was read before trans- 
mitted : 

"Fort Drake, March 25, 1S3G. 

" Sir : I am directed by Major General Scott to inform you that this 
division of the army will advance to the Withlacoochee to-morrow. The 
other wings are approaching the same point from the respective rendez- 
vous at Volusia and bay of Tampa, and the whole army will probably 
form a junction at or near that river, by the 29th or 30th instant. It is 
impossible, at this time, to anticipate the ulterior operations of the army, 
after it has encountered and defeated the enemy in their probably strong 
hold, in the cove or swamp oi the Withlacoochee. It is more than prob- 
able, however, that we may be detained in that vicinity many days, 
reconnoitring the hammocks and searching for Indians in the jungles 
and thickets of that section of country. If so, your co-operation, 
and the supplies which you report you can bring, may prove of essential 
service. 1 am directed, therefore, by the general commanding, to say 
that, after securing the post on the Suwannee with an adequate garrison, 
you may proceed with the remainder of your command, in the boat you 
have prepared for the service, provided, in addition to your own sup- 
plies, you can transport from seven hundred and fifty to one thousand 
bushels of corn at least, for the use of the army. Should your boat be 
properly secured, as you report, with bulwarks, you may enter the river, 
and ascend to the rapids, at or near Lieut. Graham's old camp, which 
will be within ten or twelve miles at furthest, from Camp Izard, General 
Gaines's intrenched position, and where this wing of the army will prob- 
ably cross the Withlacoochee. You must be at that point by the 30th 
instant, or you will probably be too late to afford any aid to this wing of 
the army, the sole motive which sanctions the service to which you have 
been called. You will fire a volley of musketry as you enter the river, 
and volleys each morning at 9 o'clock, as you ascend, and after you have 
reached the point to which you have been directed, until responded to 
by a gun from the right wing of the army. It is expected that you move 



19 [ 224 j 

with great caution, in no instance exposing your men unnecessarily, or 
your boat or command to capture. It is possible that you may meet at 
or near the Withlacoochee, with the cutter Dallas, Captain Green, or- 
dered by the Governor of Florida on the same service now assigned 
you, and, if so, you will communicate with him, and co-operate in the 
<luties which may he so important to the military operations now carry- 
ing on in Florida. 

"As your movement is intended to assist and not to embarrass this 
wing of the army, you must not move without an adequate supply of am- 
munition, and from thirty to forty days' rations for your whole command, 
at the least, in addition to the corn you may transport for our relief. If, 
after providing for your own subsistence, and that of the detachment left 
for the defence of the Suwannee Old Town, (here he a surplus of pork 
or bacon at the posts, it would be very acceptable to this army, marching, 
as it has been forced to do, on supplies reduced below the quantity which 
otherwise would have been desirable. On reaching the point on the 
Withlacoochee designated, you will use all due precautions to secure 
your boat and command, by building a block-house, or by the construction 
of some other defence, until you hear from or of the army. If, after, how- 
ever, the 2d or 3d of April, you receive no tidings of or from this wing, 
underthe command of General Clinch, you maybe sure it has proceeded 
south, to unite with Eustis and Lindsay ; and having left the Withlacoo- 
chee, your detention or; its waters will be no longer necessary. You will 
therefore return, without delay, to your post on the Suwannee, and there 
await the future orders of the commanding general, or those which may 
he transmitted you by the Executive of Florida. 

" By order of Major General Scott. 

"JAMES GADSDEN, 
" Quartermaster General and Inspector General. 

"Major McLemore, 

"Suwannee Old Town." 

It appears, however, from information received from one of the men 
who was in the block-house, that the detachment did not reach the mouth 
of the Withlacoochee until the 4lh or 5th of April, two days after it had 
been ordered to quit it, and when General Scott had crossed that river, 
and was many miles south on his march to Chickuchatty. Notwithstand- 
ing, however, its fearless commander, and on his own responsibility, pen- 
etrated the river, established a block-house, and left it garrisoned, with 
a promise to return and relieve it in eight or ten days. Unfortunately, 
however, as he entered the Suwannee, he was assailed with a fever, and 
fell a victim to its effects. His successor, not advised of his intentions, 
never sent the boat back, and, to the above melancholy event (the un- 
expected death of Major McLemore) may be justly attributed most of 
the misfortunes and sufferings of the gallant little band in the block-house. 

The above are matters of narrative and fact. If opinions are sought or 
expected on this occasion, I can only give those as of a private individual — 
that the failure of the campaign is to be found in a combination of causes, 
of which the principal are — 

First. The premature, ill-advised, and ill-organized movement of Gen- 
eral Gaines ; his leaving Orleans without adequate transportation ; his 



[ 324 ] ■- 

abandoning the most ample resources at the bay of Tampa, and from 
ce a blow mighl have been struck with effect against the Pease, 
., and Tohopkelika Indians, to march upon an exhausted point- 
consuming supplies in depot for other troops, and demonstrating on the 
"\ ilacoochee, without decisive or favorable results. The route of his 
march to the Withlacoochee was unnecessarily lengthened, adding to his 
embarrassments, and by heading the river, placing that stream between 
him and the enemy — while at Tampa he was on the same side of the 
river with the enemy, and not mere than 72 miles from their supposed 
concealment on the Withlacoochee. By the route of Fort King he had 
131 miles to march, and was opposed, finally, by the river, to meet the 
enemy. Intrenching himself was strongly recommended as giving se- 
curity, particularly at night, to his men ; but not to sally out and offer 
battle, and drive the Seminoles from before his camp when annoying it, 
operated most unfavorably on the confidence of our own troops, while it 
emboldened that of the enemy. General Gaines had the opportunity of- 
fered him of striking a blow which might have terminated the war. 

Second. False and unfavorable positions assumed, on which to base 
offensive operations against the Indians. They were interior, too far 
h the supposed strong holds of the enemy, and too remote from the de- 
pot.-: iif supplies. Forts King and Diane being about 30 to 35 miles from 
I ithlaccochee, and the former 85 and the latter 65 from the points 

of deposite on the St. John's; the road likewise unfavorable, rotten, and 
muddy in some places, and exceedingly sandy in others. It was next to 
ible to supply an army under such embarrassments and from such 
remote points, with the limited means at command. The true positions 
would have been on the Withlacoochee, and higher up the St. John's; 
both points to be supplied by water, and both within the limits of the 
nation, from whence a hunt could have been taken at any time, and trails 
of Indians pursued with success whenever discovered. 

Third. Insufficiency of transportation, both in animals and vehicles — 
many of the latter furnished were ill calculated for the object. 

Fourth. Insufficiency of the proper ration for Indian wars ; flour, and 
pork, and beam, sent,irist< ad of hard bread and bacon ; the latter not only 
more acceptable to the troops engaged in the contest, but as lighter, ad- 
mitting of the greater quantity being carried in the smaller compass. Had 
\ id these, it is very possible the war might have been terminated, as 
we eouiu, with the tiansportation at command, have marched into the 
nation with 25 days' rations instead of but 16, on which we were com- 
pelled to move, and the army would have had nine days longer to ope- 
rate — multiplying the chances of falling in with and overtaking and 
beating the enemy. 

Fifth. The want of the friendly Indian allies, who were not only im- 
portant in communicating with the enemy and as guides, but indispensa- 
ble is blood-hounds, to trail the enemy to their concealments. There 
would have been no doubt of the issue could we have discovered the 
enemy; but understanding their game, they eluded our strong parties; 
took to the jungles and the hammocks of the country, and disappeared 
when pursued. The troops we had, though always ready for the combat, 
were little possessed with that instinct, so necessary in Indian wars, of 
finding and following the moccasin track. Had the Creeks been with us 



2 1 [ 224 J 

to search out the enemy, the while man would speedily have disposed of 
them ; but their aid was denied, and by the Government agent. 

Sixth. A general mistake as to the character of the contest, and a be- 
lief that the enemy would combine, and that the contest would be termi- 
nated by an operation or a battle. The Seminole understood his play 
better, and soon found where his strength lay — with great capacity for 
combining and for dispersing, he adopted at will that which would best 
secure him victory over small parties, or ensure retreat before the larger. 
It was an insurrection among the Indians, with a design of strengthening 
their power by a servile contest. Settlements were attacked, the negroes 
carried off, and the masters murdered. The guerilla warfare was resorted 
to ; every hammock echoed with the war-hoop, and from every bush 
flashed a rifle. The contest on our part degenerated, therefore, from a 
ivarinto a hunt, in which the enemy had to be sought as you would seek 
for the lion or the tiger, with the hazard of being sprung upon from every 
jungle or thicket. Our true game, therefore, was not to move in masses, 
but in parties of sufficient strength, thus multiplying the chances of flush- 
ing the enemy and of keeping him at bay, if you could not whip him, 
until reinforced by one or the other of the hunting parties. In this opin- 
ion, however, though often expressed, i was not supported in the array 
generally. The massacre of Dade and other successes of the enemy had 
produced impressions unfavorable to dispersion. General Scott's plan of 
campaign, therefore, was generally approved, and was certainly well de- 
vised to catch and enclose the enemy on the Withlacoochee ; but badly 
or not executed at all. The right wing, where Scott was personally pres- 
ent, performed its part ; was true to time in its movements, and not only 
flushed the enemy and drove them across the Withlacoochee, but scoured 
the south and west bank of that stream, with most of the swamps and in- 
tricacies of the Holathlekaha lake. The other two wings did not advance 
to the points to which they were directed, on the eastern and southern 
swamps of the cove — the causes explained, I presume, in the official com- 
munication of the respective commanders. 

This want of concert and co-operation was fatal to the plan, however 
well conceived. In the latter operations the army was divided into five, 
instead of three parts; but the lateness of the season, the reduced condi- 
tion of the men from privations and sickness, and of the horses from star- 
vation and work, all precluded those vigilant and active movements, so 
necessary to find an enemy determined to avoid us, and in possession of 
a country affording such facilities for concealment. 

JAMES GADSDEN. 

Sworn to before 

Thomas Gadsden, 

Notary Public. 

Deposition of Francis D. Newcomb, late a lieutenant of the 4th regiment 
of infantry, and assistant quartermaster at Tampa bay. 

Question I, by Major General Scott. What was your official connexion 
with the army at Tampa bay in April, 1830 ? 

Answer. I was assistant quartermaster, and in charge of all the duties 
of the department at that place. 



[ 224 J 22 

Question 2, by Major General Scott. If any, what meang of land trans- 
portation for array supplies had you received from the quartermaster, then 

at New Orleans, in March, and up to the 17th of April? 

Answer. I had received none within that time ; but subsequently to the 
departure of the army with General Scott, there were received at Tampa 
bay, about the 1st of May, 1G mules and a few cans or wagons. These, 
however, would not have been sufficient for the purpose for which they 
were required ; they were sent in answer to a letter calling for about 50 
wagons and 200 horse 

Question 3, btj Major General Scott. What was the cause, if you know 
any, why the means of land transportation which had been demanded of 
the quartermaster at New Orleans, expected at Tampa bay, were not re- 
ceived at the latter place before the l?th of April. If the witness re- 
ceived on the subject any letter from the quartermaster at New Orleans, 
please produce the letter, or state where it is at present, and give its 
contents from memory ? 

Answer. From a communication which I received from New Orleans 
in relation to transportation, I believed the reason for its non-arrival at 
Tampa bay was caused by an impression received by the quartermaster 
at New Orleans that the war had been terminated, and that impression 
I communicated to General Scott. The reason that this impression was 
conveyed to my mind, is this : In the same communication, speaking of 
other means of transportation, to wit, the schooner " Motto" and her 
equipment, the writer recommended a reduction of the number of hands 
employed on board of that schooner, assigning as a reason that he had 
understood from good authority that the war was over, or words to that 
effect. I received the letter alluded to above from the quartermaster at 
New Orleans, and I suppose it to be now with some papers belonging to 
me at my father's, in Massachusetts. I have written to my father to send 
the letter to my address at this place, ( Frederick, Maryland,) to the care 
of General Scott, who is authorized to open it in my absence. 

[The letter referred to was, subsequently to the taking of this deposi- 
tion, received by Major General Scott, and by him handed to the Judge 
Advocate of this Court. It is in the following words, to wit : 

" Assistant Quartermaster's Office, 

New Orleans, March 25, 1336. 

" Dear Sir : Enclosed you will find the receipts of Captain Gaty, of 
the schooner "Motto," for seventy-five dollars, which I have advanced 
to him on your account, as I have no papers to enable me to make a set- 
tlement with him. I fear he has not sufficient command over his crew; 
and as they say he knows nothing of navigation, perhaps on his return 
you can get a more suitable person. The crew can be very much reduced 
now, as the war is over. I wish you to look to the armament of the 
schooner. I am responsible for all. Please send me receipts for 75 
dollars. 

" I am yours, truly, 

"J. CLARK, 
" Assistant Quartermaster. 
" Lieutenant F. D. Newcomb, 

"AssistH Quarterm'r U. S. A., Fort Brooke ^ Florida."] 



23 [ 224 J 

Question 4, by Major General Scott. 'What was the quality or condi- 
tion of the corn received by you from the quartermaster at New Orleans, 
and by you issued to the horses of the army at Tampa bay in April last? 

Answer. A great part was very bat!, and had been damaged, some 
probably on board ship, and some probably before leaving New Orleans. 
It was all more or less damaged, except some bags, which were clean 
and sound. I was compelled to give the supply to the army, because 
there was none other. 

Question 5, by Major General Scott. State generally what means of 
water transportation and debarkation were provided by you, by order of 
Major General .Scott, for the expedition commanded by Major Read, and 
which proceeded by water from Tampa bay to the Withlacoochee river. 

Answer. I provided for the transportation of the troops under Major 
Read, two schooners of, probably, about 200 tons burden, at any rate 
amply sufficient for the number of troops to go on board. They had 
with them, each, a ship's boat, as means of debarkation. I also provided for 
the latter purpose, a small schooner of about three feet draught of water, 
equal to 200 barrels burden, having also with her a yawl. I further pro- 
vided for the same purpose, a small sloop of light draught of water, carry- 
ing a pilot for the expedition ; this sloop had also a yawl. As a further 
means of debarkation, I expressly caused to be built a scow, capable of 
carrying upwards of 100 barrels, which was put on board of one of the 
transports, in pieces, all marked so as to be put together in two hours 
time, by the ship-carpenters, who were hired expressly for the purpose, 
and who accompanied the expedition, being provided with pitch, oakum, 
nails, and every think necessary to make the scow complete. Before 
the scow was put on board, I had it put together, to be certain that every 
part fitted. In addition to these means, provided by me as quartermas- 
ter, there was a large ship's boat, furnished by the U. S. ship Vandalia, 
with a midshipman and crew. The pilot mentioned as being on board 
of the sloop was Captain Bunce, of Florida, one of the most intelligent 
men on the coast, in that country, and highly respectable. I was sent 
for by General Scott, to his quarters, and directed by him to make im- 
mediate and sufficient provision for the transportation for Major Read's 
command to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and provide the means 
for their debarkation. There was an unusual degree of earnestness in 
General Scott's manner of communicating this order. When I suggest- 
ed some difficulties that lay in my way, for such provision, he replied to 
me, " Sir, you must move heaven and earth to accomplish it." When it 
was first mentioned to me I did not think it was possible, but by borrow- 
ing a little spirit from the General, I succeeded. From General Scott's 
manner I satisfied myself that the expedition was of great consequence, 
and on which he had placed his strongest hopes. 

Question 6, by Major General Scott. With reference to the time and 
place, could better means have been provided to convey Major Reed's 
detachment by sea to the Withlacoochee, and to enable it to ascend that 



rivet 



■ ? 



Answer. I certainly could not have made better provision elsewhere, 
than I there made, nor should I have felt in necessary to make better, 
had I been where the most ample means could have been had. 

Question 7, by Major General Scott. At the time Major Read's ex- 






[ 224 ] 24 

pedition left Tampa bay, did you yourself entertain a reasonable doubt, 
or are you aware that any other officer doubted, that the means of trans- 
portation and debarkation were sufficient to give success to that expedi- 
tion ? 

Answer. I did not doubt the sufficiency of the means myself, nor do I 
know that any body else did. I do not think that Major Read himself 
doubted, although he attempted to find some fault with the means. 

Sworn to before me, 

S. COOPER, 
Judge Advocate and Recorder. 

Owing to the absence of two important witnesses, whose testimony 
General Scott was desirous of obtaining, before taking other parol testi- 
mony, and as these witnesses could not reach the Court before to-mor- 
row, the Court adjourned to meet at half past ten o'clock to-morrow 
morning. 

December 6, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Court was occupied to day in examining documentary testimony 
presented by Major General Scott, which will be found accompanying 
these proceedings. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half past ten o'clock. 

December 7, 183G. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Colonel Wm. Lindsay, of the 2d regiment of artillery, a witness on the 
part of Major General Scott, having been duly sivoi'n, tvas interro- 
gated as follows : 

1. Question by Major General Scott. Where was the witness station- 
ed at the commencement of present hostilities with the Seminole Indians, 
and what measures, in general, did the witness suggest and recommend 
to the authorities at Washington, and of Georgia, on account of those 
hostilities ? 

Answer. I was stationed at the arsenal, Augusta, Georgia, and hear- 
ing of the massacre of the party under Major Dade, together with a 
rumor that General Clinch was surrounded and beset, I deemed it proper 
to make a call upon the Governor of Georgia for 3,000 troops. I invited 
the assemblage of two volunteer companies, and ordered oft' to the re- 
lief of General Clinch. These companies were from Augusta, and 
were Robertson's and Bone's. They were forthwith sent off. I made an 
application to the War Department for 3,000 knapsacks, to be forwarded 
to Savannah or Picolata, I don't recollect precisely which, for the 3,000 
men,, should the Governor of Georgia send them into the field. I re- 
ceived, for answer to this application, from Major Garland, having 
charge of the clothing bureau, that my application for knapsacks had 
been referred to the Secretary of War, who decided that there was no 
law authorizing the furnishing the militia or volunteers with knapsacks. 
The corporation of the city of Augusta, through the banks, v 'the bank of 
Augusta principally,) advanced 10,000 dollars for the purchase of the 
necessary equipments for the two companies mustered by me into ser- 



25 [224 ] 

vice, and sent off to the relief of General Clinch. I also sent to General 
Hernandez, in East Florida, a number of cartridges, such as the arsenal 
afforded, which he reported to be unfit for use. I had furnished also, on 
the requisition of Governor Eaton, something like 600 or 700 stands of 
arms, together with ammunition for them, and the transportation, by 
wagons, for them to Tallahassee. 1 take occasion here to observe, that 
this transportation, which I then procured from Tallahassee, were the 
only wagons or teams I saw on the campaign — none other were furnish- 
ed by the quartermaster's department to my portion of the army. These 
wagons and teams which I sent to Tallahassee, were taken up by Colo- 
nel Gadsden and sent to Tampa bay. These were the only arrange- 
ments which I recollect to have made prior to the arrival, at Augusta, 
of Major General Scott. 

2. Question by Major General Scott. In asking for the knapsacks, 
was it because you knew that the militia in that part of the Union were 
generally without knapsacks, and do you consider knapsacks as neces- 
sary for militia as for regular troops ? 

Answer. I knew they were without knapsacks, and that they could 
not procure them. I consider knapsacks as necessary for militia as for 
regular troops; even indispensable. 

3. Question by General Scott. What was the amount of fixed musket 
cartridges in the Augusta arsenal at the beginning of this year, and what 
was the quality of the musket powder there ? 

Answer. I cannot answer the first part of the question precisely as to 
the number. The musket cartridges which I found there, and which I 
distributed to General Hernandez, and sent to Governor Eaton, had 
been in the arsenal, as far as I could trace, about sixteen years, the pow- 
der out of which they were probably made was subjected by me to the 
proof of the eprouvette. A good deal of it was found to be proof pow- 
der, but it was so much decomposed by age that it was not rapid enough 
for muskets or rifles ; in fact it would hang fire so much as to destroy its 
utility for small-arms. 

4. Question by General Scott. Did the witness purchase powder for 
musket cartridges, and why that purchase ? 

Answer. I did cause to be purchased powder for muskets and rifles, 
for the reason that the powder at the arsenal was unfit for the use of 
muskets and rifles, although it might answer for cannon. 

5. Question by General Scott. Did the witness serve in the Seminole 
campaign of 1818 ? 

Answer. I did. 

6. Question by General Scott. You have also served against the same 
Indians in the present war; state the comparative difficulties presented 
to our troops in the two wars, by the difference in the nature of the 
country west of the Suwannee and southeast of the Withlacoochee ? 

Answer. I have. The country east of the Suwannee is infinitely more 
impracticable than the country west. In the first place the country is 
intersected by a river, the St. John's, running from south to north, nearly 
its whole length, which is exceedingly difficult to pass under any cir- 
cumstances, but almost impracticable in the presence of an enemy. No- 
thing is more easy than for the natives of the country to evade an army 
operating upon either side of the river, say the western, by passing over 
to the eastern side of the river. The country is also intersected in its 



[ 224 J 26 

greatest length, by the Withlacoochee river, which is also an impracti- 
cable stream, difficult to cross under any circumstances, but more partic- 
ularly in the presence of an enemy. The banks of both these streams 
are lined with extensive marshes and hammocks, and the whole coun- 
try is interspersed with extensive hammocks, savannahs, and marshes. 
These hammocks constitute so impenetrable a thicket, as that an Indian 
who gets perhaps ten feet in them is not to be seen afterwards, and 
cannot be overtaken. The country west of the Suwannee had, partially, 
some of these features, but the hammocks, swamps, and savannahs arc 
comparatively insignificant. As regards facilities for obtaining forage, 
the country west of the Suwannee abounded with reed-brakes, which 
constitute fine food for horses. I have never seen one east of the Su- 
wannee. The only resource we found for our horses east of the Suwan- 
nee was fresh burns, as they are termed, affording a very scanty supply 
of young grass. 

Question by the Court. Do reed-brakes furnish food for horses at all 
times of the year ; if not, at what periods ? 

Ansiver. They furnish food for horses at all seasons of the year. 

8. Question by General Scott. On the arrival of General Scott at Au- 
gusta, towards the end of January last, had you a very particular conver- 
sation with him on the subject of the war he was about to conduct — on 
the possible numbers of the enemy — his mode of warfare — the number 
and description of troops necessary to put down the war — and what was 
the information and advice you gave on that occasion ? 

Answer. I had a conversation with General Scott on the subject of 
the war he was about to conduct. Our conversation was directed to a 
consideration of the probable force of the enemy. I thought it seemed 
to be the impression of General Scott, as derived from the War Depart- 
ment, and, as I understood, explicitly communicated to him by the War 
Department, that a small force and a small expenditure of money would 
only be required to put down the Seminole Indians. From my previous 
knowledge, that one of our most successful commanders, General Jack- 
son, for the purpose of conducting a war, the principal object of which 
was to drive the Seminoles from the Georgia frontier, had carried into 
the field a force amounting to, perhaps, 6,000 men, I was induced to 
represent to General Scott that the nation had not diminished in numbers, 
and that if such a commander as General Jackson deemed it necessary 
to cany such a force against the Seminoles, I begged him not, by any 
means, to attempt the reduction of that nation or tribe with a much in- 
ferior force, and that I thought he ought to have at least 5,000 in the 
field, a large portion of which should be mounted infantry. I then asked 
him for what term of service he had been permitted to call out his troops ; 
he answered that he was permitted to call them out for three months 
only. I earnestly requested him to try and obtain an extension of the 
term, alleging that nothing but defeat and disaster could follow military 
operations which were to be carried on by men having only three 
months to serve. He replied that he was not permitted to make a tequi- 
sition for a military force for a longer term. 

9. Question by General Scott. What advice did you give General 
Scott on the subject of detachments in the proposed campaign, and on 
whose practice was that advice founded ? 



27 | 224 j 

Answer. I advised him never to detach under any circumstances. I 
believe I mentioned to General Scott at the same time that I had derived 
that advice from General Jackson, who, upon some occasion, when I 
wanted to go upon detached service, made use of this emphatic expres- 
sion, " Sir, I never detach against Indians." I had landed with a regular 
force at Fort Gadsden, which I thought competent to take the garrison of 
St. Mark's. General Jackson's destination was at that time in another 
direction, and I begged permission to go and take the garrison of St. 
Mark's, which -was a Spanish post. I was left at Fort Gadsden with my 
force, which was about 130 or 140 regulars, and the general directed me 
to stay there, and not move until I was joined by 1,200 mounted Tennes- 
seans, and he then observed that he never detached or never suffered 
small parties to march through the Indian country. I don't think that 
the post of St. Mark's was defended by more than sixteen men at that 
time. It was taken three or four days afterwards by General Jackson's 
array, and I don't think we found more than sixteen men in it. 

10. Question by General Scott. Among the examples of General Jack- 
son's practice in respect to detaching, did you not in the same conversa- 
tion and advice, mention the case of sending a detachment with the sick 
of the army ; and what were the circumstances of this particular detach- 
ment ? 

Answer. I did. After the battle of Mickasuky, as it was called, I 
was ordered down Iron) the neighborhood of the Mickasuky ponds to 
assume the command of Fort St. Mark's, and was directed to take charge 
of the sick and wounded of the army, amounting to about sixty, and carry 
them to St. Mark's, where there were hospitals and comforts for the sick. 
I received my order about reveille in the morning from General Jackson 
in person, who said to me, " I put the sick and wounded in your charge, 
and require you to take them to St. Mark's. As you are marching with 
so small a force, (I had the same command, about 130 or 140,) I think it 
proper to inform you that you will be perfectly safe from attack, as Cap- 
tain Gordon of the spies has explored the route on both sides of you, 
from here to St. Mark's, (distant about thirty-live miles,) and has seen no 
sign of the hostiles." 

1 1. Question by General Scott. Was no additional force added to your 
own 130 or 140 men, for escorting the sick on that occasion ? 

Answer. I think not. Out of the sixty sick, it was calculated by my- 
self that probably forty would be capable of bearing arms in case of at- 
tack. 

12. Question by General Scott. Was your march on that occasion to 
the rear of the main army ? 

Answer. Precisely : for the main army had just before marched from 
St. Mark's to Mickasuky ; had an engagement there with the enemy, and 
was passing on to the Suwannee river, when I was detached back to St. 
Mark's. 

13. Questionby General Scott. In your first advance from Tampa bay, 
in March last, what were your means of land transportation ? 

Ansiver. I carried over thirty horses, which I purchased in Mobile 
myself. I think I found there perhaps eight or nine wagons, being the 
same which I had sent from Augusta to Tallahassee. It required two 
wagons to conduct the ordinary business of the post of Tampa bay, as 



[ 224 ] 28 

the wood was two or three miles distance, and a great deal of hauling at 
the post required. I think I found there six wagons for the purposes of 
the campaign, capable of averaging about 1,600 or 1,700 weight a-piece, 
with the teams which we had. ft was reported to me there that General 
Gaines had carried off all the available horses; and, if it had not been 
for the horses which I brought with me, I could not have used the wagons 

at all. 

14. Question by General Scott. Were your means of transportation for 
your expedition into the interior from Tampa bay in the month of April, 
about the same, or greater ? 

Answer. 1 think I had one or two wagons more. Every thing was 
called a wagon ; some two-horse wagons, and some nondescripts, which 
might have been pedlers' carts for what I know. 

15. Question by General Scott. Had you, on either expedition from 
Tampa bay into the interior, all the necessary means of transportation 
required by your column ; and, if not, what proportion of your wants had 
you, in the means of transportation ? 

Answer. These wagons constituted, together with a few pack-horses, 
my whole means of transportation : one of them for each expedition was 
devoted to the carriage of ammunition, (musket-ball cartridges and rifle 
powder, ) the rest, after carrying as many rations as they would carry, 
each had to carry the corn and hay for its horses — the tents for the party. 
such as we could procure — camp equipage for the command, consisting 
of camp kettles and a variety of cooking utensils — such spades as might 
be wanted, if any — and, with my command, axes, for I was afraid to trust 
the militia with them, because they would lose them or throw them away. 
The consequence was, that the only provisions which could be carried 
on a march, consisted of what could be packed on the soldiers' backs, 
together with what could be carried in these wagons. As the militia in- 
variably threw away their provisions, more particularly when they were 
required to carry more than say four rations, 1 had to look to these six or 
seven wagons for carrying the provisions for my army, to enable my army 
to keep the field. On my march to Chickuchatty, my provisions were out 
on the tenth day ; and had it not been for accidentally killing Indian 
cattle, 1 should have been compelled to return to Tampa bay without 
reference to the enemy or his movements. 1 was unable to keep the 
field for want of transportation. 

16. Question by General Scott. In the arsenal at Augusta, at the time 
you left, in February, were there any musket accoutrements; and, if so., 
how many ? 

Answer. I think there were none. 

17. Question by General Scott. What does the witness know of the 
quantity of hard bread and bacon at Tampa bay, between the 5th and 
17th of April, 1836, (independent of what the witness brought with him 
from Mobile ; ) and was the hard bread and bacon equal to more than a 
few days' supply for the different columns ? 

Answer. I had brought a supply of hard bread and bacon for my own 
command. General Scott, in failure, I presume, of adequate supplies for 
the armies of Generals Clinch and Eustis, ordered me to give up to the 
common stock the hard bread and bacon which I had brought for the use 
of my own force. I don't know what supply General Scott had, but I do 



29 [ 224 ] 

know that I had not more than five days' supply, after the redistribution 
made by General Scott of the bacon and hard bread which I had brought 
with me. 

IS. Question by General Scoft. Is the witness aware that General 
Scott tailed in any particular, in point of zeal, activity, and judgment, to 
do all that was possible, under the circumstances, to give success to the 
war against the Seminole Indians? 

Answer. In respect to General Scott's activity and zeal, I bear testi- 
mony to his unbounded devotion to the interests and honor of the service, 
disregarding, on his own part, every sacrifice which was involved by the 
calls upon him for labor and privation, in a course of the most severe 
and perhaps arduous duty in which an officer could be engaged. With 
respect to his judgment, I cannot conceive a more judicious plan of oper- 
ations than that which was concerted in the movement of the three 
columns ; and had it been possible to coerce such an enemy, who fled 
before us in all directions, into an actual conflict, the measures adopted 
by General Scott would seem to me to have been the only ones which 
were capable of producing that result. I therefore cannot consider that 
there was a failure of the campaign, but that the public was necessarily 
disappointed, when they formed the belief that a country four hundred 
miles long and one hundred and eighty broad, could be reduced by a 
coup de main, with troops called out for only three months, but who ac- 
tually served only thirty days, and the means of transportation for keep- 
ing which in the field, and in the presence of the enemy, even during 
that thirty days, were always inadequate. 

19. Question by General Scott. It has been said that the war against 
the Seminole Indians was successfully ended on the west bank of the 
Withlacoochee, before the 10th of March last. Did the Seminoles met 
at different times by your command, show that they had been previously 
subdued, or the reverse ? 

Answer. I had nothing but evidences of unabated hostility from them, 
to the very last moment I staid in Florida. 

Question by the Court. Will you state to the Court your opinion of the 
causes that prevented the subjection cf the Seminole enemy, in the cam- 
paign conducted by Major General Scott, in 1836 ? 

Answer. I have already stated that, to reduce a nation occupying such 
an extent of territory, with the peculiar topographical features belonging 
to it, was necessarily a work of more time than was allotted to General 
Scott for the performance of it. I mean in respect to the term of service 
of the militia. I will explain what I mean by the limit of time : this con- 
sisted, first, in the short duration of the term of service of the force with 
which he was operating. It would have been, however, limited, also, by 
the nature of the climate, which is so prolific of disease from the month 
of April, as that military operations, could they be carried on, would be 
necessarily attended with great waste of human life ; but, in all prob- 
ability, would be necessarily suspended by the climate. But, in addition 
to these circumstances, General Scott found himself hampered by acting 
upon a scale of things which had been laid down for him by others, and 
which scale of things he could not alter. For instance, he was acting 
upon a base-line of operations of two hundred miles in length, with the 
single advantage of a depot at each extremity of this line ; say one at 



f 221 ] : ? 

Picolata and the other at Tampa bay. His intermediate depots, if any 
such had existed, must necessarily have been supplied from either Tam- 
pa bay or Picolata. The only means of carrying these supplies, as there 
was no water communication on the whole route of two hundred miles, 
was by wagonage, in a country which had neither horses nor wagons, 
other than such as the quartermaster's department might supply. 1 my- 
self attempted, with the inadequate transportation which I found at Tam- 
pa bay previously to receiving any definite instructions from General 
Scott, to establish two depots in advance of my position : one on the 
Hillsborough, twenty-three miles from Tampa, and one on the Withla- 
coochc 'e, twenty-five miles beyond the Hillsborough. Could I have suc- 
ceeded — had I had adequate transportation, 1 should have enabled Gen- 
eral Scott's army to keep the field as long as he might think proper, and 
also General Eustis's army, as long as he might choose to keep the field ; 
but, for want of the transportation to establish these two depots, I could 
not effect the object; and General Scott, for instance, having no inter- 
mediate depot between Fort Diane and Tampa bay, nor General Eustis 
between Volusia and Tampa bay, both were prevented, by the exigency 
of ciicumstances, from continuing as long on the fighting-ground as would 
have been necessary to strike the enemy with any considerable effect. 
It is a fact that most of our parties were capable of carrying not more 
than about ten days' provisions ; that it generally took us five days, say, 
to get within striking distance of the enemy, who had only to keep him- 
self in covert for two days, before his invader was forced to retire from 
his presence to avoid starvation. It is my belief that General Scott, hav- 
ing found this base of operations, thus constituted, had not the means of 
altering the position of things beneficially — he had not the means of estab- 
lishing the intermediate depots, or the time, if he had had the means, to 
(ffect the change in the existing disposition of things. As it regarded 
the country covered by General Scott's troops, I do not hesitate to say 
that no army ever sent out by the United States, has ever covered more 
ground, and made more active and painful marches; but, from the simple 
lact that the Indians had only to remain two or three days under cover, 
without fighting, until our provisions were exhausted, we were never 
able to bring them to battle. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half past ten o'clock. 

Decembkr 8, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Colonel Lindsay's testimony continued, in answer to the last question. 

Amongst the causes which would operate to prevent the reduction of 
the Seminole nation by rapid military movements, it may be stated that, 
from the nature of the climate, they have no towns or villages, and very 
little agriculture, as the earth and the waters spontaneously produce all 
the food necessary for their subsistence in the field. They were hemmed 
in on no frontier by the whites. In this respect they differed from the 
Creek Indians, for instance, who, if beaten on the Georgia frontier, 
would be equally repulsed on the Alabama frontier, should they seek 



31 [224 ] 

refuge there ; but the Seminole Indians might rlee from the Gulf of Mexico 
to the Atlantic, and from the Wacassa to the Ever-glades, without meet- 
ing with a white enemy. In consequence of the climate they could con- 
struct temporary habitations with the palmetto, which would keep out 
the sun and turn the rain, in less time than a white man could pitch a 
tent, if he had it. Heretofore our operations against Indians have been 
successful, in proportion as we could move in upon their villages and 
corn-lields, and burn or destroy them ; but the Seminole climate and 
country left us no such means of military coercion. Another cause of 
the failure of our operations against the Seminole Indians, may be found 
in our total ignorance of a country which, although near to us, was as 
much unknown as the interior of Africa ; neither could we procure guides 
who were at all acquainted with the country ; the friendly Indians alone 
presented themselves to us for that service, who I conscientiously believe 
were interested in misleading us; consequently, as it regarded my own 
movement, I never knew any tiling of the country in advance of my 
pioneers. In the conversation with General Scott, at Augusta, I sug*- 
gested to him the propriety of organizing a spy corps, to consist of some 
two hundred or three hundred mounted men. 1 endeavored, in reference 
to my own movements, to form a spy corps, in order that I might see a 
little in advance of my pioneers. I issued an order to organize such a 
corps, and I found, from the scarcity of horses, that 1 could not mount 
nine men. So small a corps being totally inadequate for the purposes 
which I wished to effect, I abandoned the attempt. I was also so scarce 
of horses that, though frequently, on my march, I could see to the right 
and left droves of Indian cattle, I was compelled to suffer them to pass; 
and only in a few instances, where the officers of the command lent their 
horses to the persons ordered to drive these cattle into camp, could I 
obtain any at all. I do conceive that the transportation was totally in- 
adequate to the wants of the campaign. 

21. Question by General Scott. The witness spoke of the want of a 
sufficient number of competent guides. Was it practicable for the wit- 
ness to have found at Tampa bay, or in Florida, better or more compe- 
tent guides than those he actually obtained ? 

Answer. When I arrived at Tampa, it was stated to me that General 
Gaines had taken oil* all the guides, Indians and others, upon his march 
to the north, I found actually none there, although I hired some indi- 
viduals, who pretended to some knowledge of the country, in the capa- 
city of guides, though they were actually as ignorant as myself of the 
topography of the country, and none better or other could be obtained. 

22. Questionby General Scott. Did you find any road open in your 
operations in Florida, (other than the Fort King road,) or had you to 
open roads for your marches ? 

Answer. I found no other road open than the Fort King road, and 
my pioneers early opened all the roads over which I marched. 

23. Question by General Scott. What was your observation in re- 
spect to the capacity of troops, regular or militia, to march, each man with 
a knapsack, musket, ammunition, and four days' subsistence on his per- 
son, as late as the 20th or 25th of April, in reference to the heat of the 
climate in the country southeast of the Withlacoochee ? 

Answer. I think about that time both description of troops became 



I »4 J 32 

so much exhausted by four o'clock in the day (for both had been bivou- 
acking for about ninety days, and whether they were marching or at rest 
were equally exposed to tbe weakening influences of the climate) that a 
much inferior force at that hour of the day, fresh, would have had deci- 
ded advantages in a conflict with any portion of the army with which 1 
was in contact. The heats of Florida from April out are exhausting and 
desolating. 

Question by the Court. If the country furnished ample means of 
cover and of subsistence by the spontaneous productions of the earth 
and water for the Seminole warriors, why could not the white troops in 
the same country cover and supply themselves by the same means, and 
thus pursue the enemy or keep the field ? 

Answer. The subsistence said to be obtained by the Seminoles con- 
sisted principally in a root called " conte," which, by certain prepara- 
tion unknown to soldiers, and which is withal very tedious, yields a far- 
inaceous substance called arrow-root. Few of our troops were ac- 
quainted with the plant when they saw it. nor do I think va\\ but an In- 
dian could have subsisted upon it. The Indians, besides, have resour- 
ces of fish and game which we had not leisure to take. With respect to 
the habitations constructed of the palmetto leaf, I anxiously endeavored 
to induce the company officers to have their men instructed in the con- 
struction of these habitations, but, after weaving the thatching for a roof, 
we found in no instance that they would turn rain, and we abandoned 
the attempt for want of skill. One other resource of the Indians con- 
sisted in large herds of cattle, which were driven into the swamps and 
hammocks, in advance of all our movements, for concealment, and so 
successful had they been in hiding this property that although I subsisted 
my own army on junk beef for four days, all that time I never killed a 
bullock or any thing but a milch cow. 

25. Question by General Scott. Were not many of the Alabama re- 
giment discharged by you in the month of April, on account of disabili- 
ty ; and was not that disability produced by the effects of the heat and 
the climate ? 

Answer. Yes. 1 marched out with the Alabama regiment something 
like 812 strong on my first march ; on my last, the same regiment con- 
sisted of about 460, and at this last period there were 400 sick with the 
dysentery at Tampa bay, all of which I attributed to military movements 
in a malignant climate. 

26. Question by General Scott. The witness has spoken of the dis- 
persion of the Indians — was not that state of dispersion favorable to the 
subsistence of the enemy ? 

Answer. Highly so. They had only to retreat upon their swamps, 
where they had plenty of cattle ; upon the ponds, where they had plenty 
of fish ; and upon the woods, where they had plenty of the " conte ;" 
and in no instance did I ever learn that any portion of the hostile force 
carried provisions with them on their march. 

27. Question by General Scott. In reference to the surface of the 
Seminole country, what were the facilities of the enemy in concentrating 
after dispersion ? 

Answer. They were very great, as connexions of hammocks and 
swamps would enable them to traverse the country in almost any direc- 
tion, concealed from us. 



33 [ 224 ] 

88. Question by General Scott. In any instance was the column lan- 
der your command, or any part of it, on meeting the enemy, defeated, or 
repulsed, or was the enemy, in every case, repulsed or driven ? 

Answer. In every case the enemy was repulsed and driven. 

29. Question by General Scott. What sutlers' stores did the witness 
find at Tampa bay ; did any arrive during his stay there, and did not the 
troops, officers, and men suffer much from the want of such stores ? 

Answer. When I first arrived at Tampa bay, which was about the 
6th of March, there were the remains of the sutler's stock, and I under- 
stood that the sutler had gone to New Orleans-to replenish that stock. 
On my march to Fort Alabama and return, I found the stock had dimin- 
ished considerably. On my march to Chickuchatty and return, about 
the 4th of April, I found the stock entirely gone, that is to say, I could 
get a gill of whiskey for half a dollar, and with regard to all those arti- 
cles of comfort which a soldier might want, whether of clothing or diet. 
there was literally nothing in the sutler's store. I did understand that 
Mr. Morris, the sutler, had gone to New Orleans to replenish his stock, 
and learning there that General Gaines had subdued the Indians and 
forced them to sue for peace, he did not think it necessary to bring on 
another supply, and none was brought during my continuance at the 
post. There was considerable suffering among the troops and officers 
lor want of sutlers' supplies. There was not, within my knowledge, any 
other shop or store of any sort at the post. 

Brevet Brigadier General Abm. Eustis, a ivilness on the part of Major 
General Scott, being duly sworn, teas interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. How many days' subsistence was the 
witness enabled to take with his column on its advance from Volusia up- 
on Pelaklikaha, and why was the quantity limited to days? 

Answer. Thirteen days ; no more could be carried for want of means 
of transportation. Five days' rations were carried by each individual, 
and subsistence for eight more for each man was carried in the wagons. 

2. Question by General Scott. Was there a full supply of hard bread 
for witness's column on the St. John's, at the commencement of his ad- 
vance on Pelaklikaha, or was he obliged to substitute a portion of flour, 
and had any bacon arrived before the commencement of that march? 

Answer. The column under my command never had a full supply of 
hard bread. It was not to be obtained. I had no bacon. I was of course 
obliged to take a portion of flour. 

3. Question by General Scott. Did the enemy met with by the troops 
under the witness's command show a disposition to treat or surrender, or 
the reverse ? 

Answer. The appearance of an enemy was always announced to me 
by their firing upon my advanced guard. There was no disposition 
shown to treat with us, or to have any communication with us. 

4. Question by General Scott. In respect to hard bread and bacon, 
what were the means of supplying the witness's column found at Tampa 
bay? 

Answer. I received at Tampa bay, by dint of great solicitation, from 
3 



[ 224 ] 34 

the commanding general, about five days' rations of bacon for the column 
under my command. There was still a deficiency of hard bread ; but it 
is my impression that I marched from Tampa bay with about eight days* 
rations of bread and some flour. A considerable portion of the hard 
bread was baked by the men of my command in ovens which were con- 
structed at Tampa bay while we were there. 

5. Question by General Scott. Had not the witness reason to believe 
that the hard bread and bacon issued to his column were in exact pro- 
portion to the issues made to the other troops ? 

Answer. I believe so. I know that a portion of the bacon was taken 
from Colonel Lindsay's command, which he considered as belonging ex- 
clusively to them. 

6. Question by General Scott. What part of your column was march- 
ed by you to Tampa bay, and what portion halted in the interior; how 
long did your mounted men and wagons remain at Tampa bay ; and 
did you consider that delay as indispensable in order to recruit your cav- 
alry horses and those of the baggage train ? 

Answer. The part of the column that was marched into Tampa bay, 
consisted of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted South Carolina 
volunteers ; the portion halted sixteen miles distant from Tampa bay con- 
sisisted of a battalion of 1st regiment United States artillery, under Major 
Kirby, about 190 men; a company of South Carolina volunteers, (Cap- 
tain Elmore's,) about 100; and Colonel Brisbane's regiment of South 
Carolina volunteers, about 500. The horsemen remained at Tampa bay 
about 12 days, from about the 5th to the 16th of April, inclusive ; during 
that time the wagons belonging to my column, or a portion of them, 
made one trip from Tampa bay to Fort Alabama, on the Hillsborough, to 
make a depositc of provisions and forage, and one trip to the camp of the 
foot soldiers, with provisions for them. When I reached the camp, with- 
in sixteen miles of Tampa bay, the horses of the mounted Carolina re- 
giment, of the wagon train, and of the artillery, (for I had two pieces of 
artillery,) were so much exhausted for want of forage, that I found it ne- 
cessary to cause them to be led, not ridden, to Tampa bay, for forage. I 
consider the delay at Tampa bay as having been indispensable, in order 
to recruit those horses, and that they were not fit to move one day earlier 
than they actually did move. 

7. Question by General Scott. How 7 did you find the grazing for 
horses, generally, in your marches through Florida ? 

Answer. Almost none. The grass was so scanty upon the burns that 
it required a range of at least three acres to afford subsistence for one 
horse. This was on the march downward. It was somewhat lessened 
on the return march. 

8. Question by General Scott. What was the quality of the corn and 
long forage issued to the horses of your command at Tarnpa bay ? 

Answer. The hay was very good, generally ; the corn, much of it, 
heated, and so bad that the horses refused it. 

9. Question by General Scott. Do you recollect any thing of a prop- 
osition submitted through the officers of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment at 
Tampa bay, to take on the horse of each officer and man, three bushels 
of corn, in the next movement from that place ; and what was the result of 
that proposition ? 



35 [ 224 ] 

Answer. I remember such a proposition being made, and conversing 
with Colonel Goodwyn about it. The result of the conversation was, 
that, if such order were given, it would not be obeyed, and could not be 
enforced. 

10. Question by General Scott. What quantity of corn was finally 
taken upon an average, by the mounted men of your column, on the march 
from Tampa bay ? 

Answer. They were ordered to take five pecks for each horse, but 
it is my belief that they did not actually carry more than three. 

11. Question by General Scott. What detachments were made from 
the witness's column, on the return march from Tampa bay ? 

Answer. Colonel Goodwyn's regiment was detached to Pease creek, 
about fifty miles from our line of march, to the south. I do not recollect 
any other detachment until we arrived at Volusia, when a detachment of 
two companies of mounted men, and about sixty in boats, was ordered 
to Spring Garden, on the St. John's. The party in the boats did not suc- 
ceed in reaching the point of destination; the horse, however, did suc- 
ceed, and scoured the neighborhood. General Scott also moved himself 
with a detachment in a steamboat up the St. John's. I had forgotten to 
mention that two days before I marched for Volusia, General Scott had 
gone in advance, with two companies of mounted men, to Volusia. 

12. Question by General Scott. What does the witness recollect of 
General Scott's wish that the left wing should extend its search for the 
enemy as far to the east as Lake Tohopkelika ; and, was it possible, with 
the means of transportation and subsistence at the witness's command, to 
make that swamp without imminent hazard of being several days without 
subsistence ? 

Ansiver. General Scott more than once expressed a wish that the 
wing under my command chould strike a blow upon the party of Philip, 
the Indian chief, who was said to reside near to the Lake Tohopkelika. 
During my stay in Florida, I never was able to find an individual who 
had ever been at that lake. I am not sure now that it is not an imaginary 
lake. I am certain there was no individual with the left wing of the army 
who knew where to find it. With the means of subsistence and trans- 
portation within my control, and without a guide, I thought it little less 
than madness to attempt to go in pursuit of a lake of which nobody knew 
any thing but by report, and I feel quite sure that the troops under my 
command would not have gone. 

13. Question by General Scott. The witness has spoken of the prop- 
osition made to his mounted regiment, in respect to corn to be taken on 
horseback. Was not that proposition connected with the proposed march 
around the supposed Lake Tohopkelika ? 

Answer. My impression is, at this moment, that Colonel Gadsden, 
who was the chief of General Scott's staff, and who appeared to be bet- 
ter acquainted with the topography of Florida than any individual I saw 
there, wished the column under my command to march southerly from 
Tampa bay, by a lake which he described to be the head-water of Pease 
creek, and thence round the head-waters of the Ochlawaha, so as to en- 
deavor to find this said Lake Tohopkelika ; but he did not pretend to 
know precisely where Lake Tohopkelika was. I think it was in accord- 



I 224 ] 36 

ance with this wish of Colonel Gadsden, that the proposition was made 
to Colonel Goodwyn. 

14. Question by General Scott. What guides had the witness for his 
movements in Florida ; were they in sufficient number, and qualified for 
the service, and could the witness have obtained better guides? 

Answer. The only guide whom I could procure, was a drunken ne- 
gro, named Ben Wiggins. I offered high prices but could obtain no 
other. His knowledge of the country extended as far as Pelaklikaha. 1 
had not an individual with me who could lead my column one step be- 
yond the load to Fort King, southwest. I had no friendly Indians with 
me, no scouts, no spies, no guides, except the one named, and he would 
get drunk whenever he could get liquor. 

15. Question by General Scott. With a full supply of hard bread and 
bacon, how many days longer could you have kept the field in your 
march upon Tampa bay, with your means of transportation, and how 
many days longer on your return march to the north ? 

Ansiver. I could, as it was, have kept the field longer than I did, in 
marching to Tampa bay ; my subsistence would have lasted two days 
longer ; I could have kept the field with bacon, I suppose, about three 
additional days. I mean that the weight of nine days' rations of pork in 
barrels would have been equal to twelve days' rations of bacon 1 think. 
I tried to lesson the weight of the pork by drawing off the brine, and also 
by taking it out of the barrels and carrying it in bulk in the wagons ; 
but the heat of the climate at mid-day spoiled a good portion of that 
which was thus treated. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at ten o'clock. 

December 9, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

General Eustis in continuation. 

The detachments which I have, already mentioned as being made from 
my column on the return march from Tampa bay, were made by the ex- 
press command of General Scott. When Colonel Goodwyn received an 
intimation that his regiment would be ordered to Pease creek, he came 
to me to request my intercession with General Scott that they should be 
excused from that duty, expressing great doubt whether his horses would 
be able to accomplish it, and the extreme reluctance of his men to go 
upon the expedition, assuring me, however, that if they were ordered 
they would obey. After conversing with General Scott, I informed 
Colonel Goodwyn that my intercession was in vain, and advised him to 
wait on General Scott in person on the subject. He did so, and imme- 
diately after his interview with the General, he informed me that General 
Scott was bent on the expedition, and that he must obey, however re- 
luctant. The companies composing the detachment spoken of from 
Volusia for Spring Garden, were designated by General Scott himself, 
before I reached Volusia ; and it was only with great difficulty, by an 
urgent appeal to the patriotism and State pride of the South Carolina 
brigade, that I could induce them to obey the order, the terms of service 
having nearly expired, and all being anxious to return home. 



37 [ 224 J 

16. Question by General Scott. What sutlers' stores did the witness 
rind at Tampa bay ; did any arrive during his stay there, and did not the 
troops, officers and men, suffer much from the want of such stores ? 

Answer. I found no sutlers' stores at Tampa bay when I arrived 
there ; none arrived while I was there, and both officers and men suffer- 
ed for the want of them. For myself, from the time I marched from 
Volusia to my return to it, I had nothing but the soldier's ration ; carry- 
ing no personal supplies for the want of transportation. 

17. Question by General Scott. Was there any suffering among the 
troops of your column, volunteers and regulars, for the want of shoes, 
jackets, shirts, &c, articles usually found in sutlers' shops or stalls? 

Answer. Not to my knowledge. 

18. Question by General Scott. What practicable road, other than 
the one from Tampa bay to' Fort King, did the witness find in his oper- 
ations in Florida, or did he cause roads to be opened by his troops ? 

Answer. I found a tolerable road from St. Augustine to Picolata,and 
from St. Augustine south to Tomoca creek; none other than those I 
have mentioned, except the Fort King road. I did cause roads to be 
opened by the troops and bridges to be made. The bridge over the 
Ochlawaha cost me one entire day or eighteen hours' incessant labor, in 
going to Tampa bay, and about half that time in returning, part of the 
bridge being destroyed by the enemy. I had also great difficulty in cross- 
ing the two branches of the Withlacoochee and the Hillsborough. The big 
Withlacoochee I bridged. The banks of the line branches of the With- 
lacoochee and the Hillsborough were so precipitate, that horses could not 
be used in crossing the wagons ; they were obliged to be hauled over by 
the soldiers. The same difficulty also occurred in a palmetto swamp of 
considerable extent, where horses could not be used on account of the 
bog. The difficulty of crossing this swamp was such as to consume near- 
ly the whole day in getting the wagon-train across it. The column start- 
ing at an early hour was, on account of the difficulties presented by this 
swamp, unable to accomplish more than four or five miles march on that 
day. 

19. Question by General Scott. Some of the witness's troops were a 
little delayed in arriving at his advance depot, Volusia, and the column 
delayed beyond the time first proposed for its reaching its position at Pe- 
laklikaha. Will the witness state to the Court the accidents which caused 
these delays ? 

Answer. Before I had received the orders of General Scott to con- 
centrate my force at Volusia, a portion of the troops constituting the left 
wing had been extended through a chain of posts as far south as Wil- 
liams's plantation, on Musqueto inlet, where a small depot of provisions 
had been established, and where Major Kirby, with two companies of 
artillery, was posted. A few days after the arrival of the mounted regi- 
ment of South Carolinians, at St. Augustine, I detached Lieutenant Col- 
onel Butler with four companies, (mounted,) with orders to pass by the 
four posts occupied by Colonel Brisbane's regiment, and proceed on to 
Kirby's post, and thence pursue his route, taking Kirby with him, to 
Spring Garden, with orders also to follow any fresh Indian trail, until he 
could come up with the Indians supposed to be in that neighborhood. I 
had myself proceeded by water, in a steamboat, by the Musqueto inlet, to 



[ 224 ] 38 

Kirby's post, expecting to meet Colonel Butler there, and to give him 
further instructions. After waiting there twenty-four hours, and Col. 
Butler not having arrived, I hastened back to St. Augustine, and there 
found General Scott's instructions of the 14th of March, directing me im- 
mediately to concentrate my force at Volusia. Orders were immediate- 
ly sent to the advanced posts to hasten their march, and an express was 
despatched in pursuit of Colonel Butler. I then proceeded to Picolata 
to execute the instructions of General Scott at that post, and thence by 
steamboat to Volusia. I reached Volusia about the same time that the 
head of the column from Tomoca arrived there. The route from Tomoca 
to Volusia was so very difficult that several wagons were destroyed and 
left on it, and many of the horses completely knocked up. On my arri- 
val at Volusia, I learned! that Colonel Butler with his battalion had been 
there, and gone off with the only guide, nobody knew where ; neither had 
any thing been heard of Kirby's battalion. After waiting several days, 
and having crossed a considerable portion of my force and baggage-train 
over the St. John's, I ordered a detachment of twenty mounted men, un- 
der a subaltern, to pursue Colonel Butler's trail, until he was overtaken, 
and deliver him my order for his immediate return. This was on the 24th 
of March. This detachment, after proceeding about four miles, fell in 
with a small party of Indians, and after a skirmish with them, returned to 
my camp without having executed the order. The next day a second 
detachment was sent on a similar errand, which met Colonel Butler's 
battalion a few miles from my camp, on their return. On this day also, 
the 2oth of March, Kirby's battalion reached me by a forced march, hav- 
ing abandoned all its baggage in the swamp. Colonel Butler informed 
me that, on his arrival at Tomoca from St. Augustine, with his battalion, 
he reported himself to Brigadier General Bull, of South Carolina volun- 
teers, who was then in command at Tomoca, and communicated to him 
my orders, directing him to proceed on to Kirby's station ; that General 
Bull countermanded those orders, and peremptorily directed him to 
proceed immediately to Volusia ; that, in obedience to the order of Gen. 
Bull, he had come to Volusia, and thus having executed General Bull's 
orders, he left Volusia to execute mine, and proceeded by the way of 
Spring Garden to Williams's plantation on Musqueto. On his arrival there, 
he found the post had been evacuated by Major Kirby ; but finding for- 
age, and provision for his men, he remained there a day or two to scour 
the country and refresh his men and horses. During the week that I was 
thus detained at Volusia in waiting for the detachments under Colonel 
Butler and Major Kirby, I was daily receiving accessions to my means 
of transportation, to wit: wagons and horses, sent by steamboat from Pi- 
colata, without which I should not have been able to have carried more 
than four days' subsistence for the troops under my command. The last 
of these wagons and horses reached me on the evening of the 25th, and 
I marched from the west bank of the St. John's on the 26th. The weather 
for a month preceding had been so very rainy that the whole country 
was under water, and the first night, after crossing the St. John's, every 
man in my camp literally slept in the water. 

20. Question by General Scott. In the witness's operations south 
of Volusia, had he reason to believe the enemy to be collected into a few 
considerable bodies, or dispersed into many small parties ? 



39 [ 22i J 

Answer. It is my belief that the enemy was not concentrated in any 
considerable party. Very small parties and the trails of such were dis- 
covered by the troops under my command; but I have no reason to be- 
lieve, at any time during my operations in Florida, that a party larger than 
one hundred ever approached any portion of my command — perhaps J 
should speak within bounds if I were to say fifty. The enemy appeared 
to be gifted with ubiquity ; he was to be found every where and nowhere. 

21. Question by General Scott. What were the witness's observations 
on the capacity of troops to execute marches south oftheWithlacooch.ee, 
loaded with arms, ammunition, and knapsacks, and four days' subsistence, 
as late as the 20th of April ? 

Answer. On the return march from Hillsborough river to Volusia, which 
commenced, I think, about the 20th of April, the troops under my com- 
mand suffered exceedingly from the heat of the weather, and though the 
column was generally in motion at the rising of the sun, I was obliged to 
make long halts at noon, so that I could rarely accomplish more than fif- 
teen miles per day. 

22. Question by General Scott. In your operations southwest of the 
St. John's river, from what sources did your men and horses generally 
derive water for drinking, and what was the state of the ponds on your 
return march upon Volusia ? 

Answer. The water was generally obtained from ponds, or, as they 
are generally termed there, "sink-holes ;" and on the return march, the 
water was very bad, from the ponds being much dried and the great 
growth of the vegetation around them, the water being nearly a mass of 
animal life. 

23. Question by General Scott. About what number of sick and dis- 
abled were left by your column at Volusia, Tampa bay, and Fort Ala- 
bama ? 

Answer. I cannot speak with any certainty; but imagine about three 
hundred. The measles prevailed more than any other disease. I think 
that in the course of the three months' service of the South Carolina bri- 
gade, (consisting of at first sixteen hundred men,) there were nearly five 
hundred cases of measles. I should think about one out of five or six 
who had had the measles was able afterwards to perform duty. 

24. Question by General Scott. Is the witness aware that General 
Scott failed in any particular, in point of zeal, activity, and judgment, to 
do all that was possible, under the circumstances, to give success to the 
war against the Seminole Indians ? 

Answer. I am not aware of any deficiency in the conduct of General 
Scott, as commander of the forces. I believed that he did all that man 
could do under like circumstances. 

25. Question by General Scott. In reference to the surface of the Sem- 
inole country, what were the facilities of the enemy in concentrating 
after dispersion. 

Answer. The facilities were very great, owing to the numerous cov- 
ers, such as hammocks and swamps, which were generally connected as 
a chain, through which the Indian trails led, so that if small parties were 
discovered in the pine openings, they could generally take cover before 
they could be attacked. 

Question by the Court. What were the principal causes that prevented 



[ 224 ] 40 

the subjection of the Seminole enemy in Florida, in the campaign con- 
ducted against him by Major General Scott, in 1836? 

Answer. The want of time during which operations could be car- 
ried on in the Seminole country; the deficiency of all supplies appertain- 
ing to the quartermaster's department, especially the means of transport- 
ation ; the peculiar nature of the country, and of the climate, and the 
character of the enemy, exhibiting the finest traits of partisan warfare; 
the peculiar nature of the principal part of the forces employed, and their 
very limited term of service ; the country which was the scene of oper- 
ations bring one entire unexplored wilderness, furnishing neither sub- 
sistence nor shelter for man nor horse, the want of depots of provisions 
and forage, prevented the operations of the army being continued to any 
considerable extent ; the entire want of guides and an impossibility of 
procuring them at any price or by any inducement. When I said the 
country was unexplored, 1 meant to convey the idea that it was utterly 
unknown to the whites in all its features. I have objected to the kind 
of troops employed during the campaign under General Scott in Florida. 
Eight-ninths of the troops under my command were militia volunteers, 
mustered into the service of the United States for three months ; more 
than half of which term had expired before they crossed the St. John's 

march into the enemy's country. There were very few individuals 
among them who had ever seen an Indian, or had ever passed over an In- 
dian boundary. I have said that 1 had but one guide; there were, how- 
ever, five other individuals attached to my command, who were paid as 
guides, but who knew literally nothing of the country west of the St. 
John's, having, I believe, never been there, with the exception of one 
who had driven a carriage from Fort King to Tampa bay, on the mili- 
tary road, but had never deviated to the right or left of the road. I have 
heard the testimony of Colonel Lindsay to a similar question, and I con- 
cur fully in the opinion he has expressed. 

Question by the Court. Was there a sufficient number of troops at the 
disposal of General Scott, and under his immediate command, to subdue 
the Seminoles, had the operations been commenced at an earlier day, 
and the supplies of every kind amply furnished for the war ? 

Answer. It is my opinion that there was a sufficient number of troops 
under the control of General Scott for any operations in Florida against 
the Seminole Indians. As to the power of subduing them I cannot an- 
swer, for they never could be found in numbers to combat ; neither do I 
believe they ever will be found concentrated again. 

Question by the Court. Was the supply of arms and ammunition abun- 
dant and of good quality. 

Answer. So far as related to the troops under my command, yes. I 
cannot answer for others. With regard to the ammunition, a large pro- 
portion of it was prepared at the State arsenal in Charleston, South Car- 
olina, and by Captain Van Ness's company of artillery, which had been; 
detained at Fort Moultrie for the purpose of making cartridges. All my 
tents and most of my camp equipage, including knapsacks, were obtained 
on a loan from the State of South Carolina. 

Question by the Court. Were the provisions furnished the troops as 
rations, good, wholesome, and abundant ? 

Ansiuer. I believe so. 



41 [ 224 ] 

Charles M. Thruston, Esq., late a captain in the army, a witness on the 
part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, teas interrogated as 
follows : 

1 . Question by Major General Scott. In what capacity did the witness 
serve with the Florida army, between, say February and June, 1836 ? 

Answer. Up to about the 15th of March, I was commanding a battal- 
ion at Fort Drane, and about that time I began to act as assistant adjutant 
general of the right wing of the Florida army, and continued so to act 
until about the middle of May. General Clinch was the commanding 
officer of that wing of the army throughout the campaign ; though Gene- 
ral Scott, the commanding general, in person, marched with it to Tampa 
bay. 

2. Questionby General Scott. What was the condition of the troops 
brought by Major General Gaines from Tampa bay, on their arrival at 
Fort Drane from Camp Izard, and Was their strength sufficiently recruit- 
ed for active operations before the 20th or 25th of March ? 

Answer. Those troops appeared to have suffered very much by ex- 
posure, fatigue, and want. Many of them, upwards of one hundred of the 
sick and wounded, were left behind at Fort Diane, when the army marched 
on the 25th of March. The troops of General Gaines's army that did 
march with us, were never, in my estimation, sufficiently recruited to un- 
dertake that march. This impression I derived from my own observa- 
tion, and information derived from the officers belonging to those troops 
on the march to Tampa bay. 

3. Question by General Scott. When the right wing of the army 
commenced operations from Fort Drane, what was the general belief at 
the headquarters of the wing, and at General Scott's headquarters, as 
to the enemy's then position and concentration ? 

Answer. I did not entertain a doubt, myself, that the enemy was still 
concentrated about the Withlacoochee, where, I believed, and I think 
it was the impression of others who had the best opportunities of inform- 
ation, that the women and children were there placed for security by 
the enemy ; that they would defend the passage of the river with all 
their force, as they had done when threatened by General Gaines. I 
heard no other supposition than that there we should be resisted, and 
that there the principal battle would be fought. That impression con- 
tinued with me and others, and I believe generally throughout the wing, 
until our advance had landed on the opposite bank. I will mention, in 
support of this opinion, the fact that one of our men was cut off by a 
small party of Indians, said to be five, within eight miles of Fort Drane, 
on our first day's march. 

4. Question by General Scott. Was not the general impression just 
stated by the witness, increased by the bravado discharge of arms by the 
enemy on the arrival of General Clinch's column on the Withlacoochee ? 

Answer. When we arrived on the Withlacoochee, a single discharge 
of a six-pounder was given as a signal gun. It was immediately replied to 
by a rifle on the opposite side of the river. In the course of that after- 
noon, some volleys were fired by the enemy on the opposite side 
of the river, and during the night they fired into the camp, from what 
point I do not know ; but, I presume, a distance of from three hundred to 
four hundred yards. 



[ 224 ] 42 

5. Question by General Scott. About what day did the last train of 
wagons, with subsistence, arrive at Fort Drane, prior to the march of 
General Clinch's column to the southeast? 

Answer. I don't remember the precise day. The wagon-trains, from 
the 5th day of January, when the train consisted of not more than five 
wagons, were kept plying between the St. John's river and Fort Drane, 
with the greatest activity and despatch posssible, with our means, avera- 
ging a trip, I think, once in eleven or twelve days, for the purpose of 
subsisting the few troops there during the great part of the winter, and 
accumulating a supply to open the campaign with whenever reinforce- 
ments might arrive. The train alluded to in the question must have ar- 
rived at Fort Drane within two or three days before our march ; because 
it had been arranged that not a single day's subsistence should be con- 
sumed there, if it could be avoided. The day appointed for the march 
was the 25th day of March ; but a torrent of rain fell the whole of that 
day, and prevented until the next morning. For a month, or perhaps 
more, before the 25th of March, the train had been increasing in strength, 
by horses and wagons supplied at Picolata and Black creek. 

6. Question by General Scott. What was the general character of the 
weather from about the 25th of February to the 25th of March at Fort 
Drane ? 

Answer. We had, between those points of time, several, at least 
five or six northeast storms, very distressing to troops exposed, accompa- 
nied with a great deal of rain. We had some cold weather, with ice an 
inch thick. I will go on to state that there is only one other condition 
of circumstances (the summer climate) connected with that country, so 
hostile to military operations as that produced by these rains. In the 
portion of Florida of which I am speaking, there may be said to be but 
one road, that from Tampa bay to Fort King, which would be greatly in- 
jured by them ; but where new roads are to be made and marches to be 
performed, the difficulties are immensely increased by them, as we 
found by subsequent experience. 

7. Question by General Scott. At Fort Drane, and thence on the 
march of the right wing upon Tampa bay, did not the witness participate 
much in the conferences between General Clinch and General Scott, 
and in the confidence of both ? 

Answer. I was honored by the confidence of both those gentlemen. I 
was very frequently present, by invitation, at such conferences, and at 
other times both Generals Scott and Clinch expressed themselves, inform- 
ally, about the condition of things, and the operations of the campaign, 
to me. 

8. Question by General Scott. What did the witness understand to be 
the motives and calculations upon which the post called Fort Cooper was 
established ? 

Answer. According to my understanding at the time, that post was 
established as a post of observation. In passing up the Withlacoochee 
river, on the east side, a country of great impracticability against military 
operations, and therefore highly advantageous to the enemy for his posi- 
tion, presented itself to us. This country, until we saw it, was entirely 
unknown to us. Not having found the enemy concentrated in any large 
force, it was thought by General Clinch, I am sure, certainly by myself, 



43 [ 224 J 

that they were still secreted in this pond or cove country. I understood 
the object of establishing that post there to be, to make observation of 
the enemy's country. Another inducement may have been that many 
men began to report sick, and became applicants for transportation in the 
wagons ; which state of things, had it increased in the ratio of the pre- 
vious day, would have prevented our reaching Tampa bay without estab- 
lishing a post some where on the route. On the morning of the day of 
establishing that post, the wagons began to be so loaded down with sick, 
and some wounded, that it became necessary to eject from them every 
article of camp equipage, of the small supply of camp equipage that we 
had with us, to reduce it to the lowest possible quantity for troops. A 
strict scrutiny was ordered by the surgeons to discriminate between 
those of the sick who could march and who could not. General Scott 
himself, in person, superintending that examination. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at ten o'clock. 

December 10, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Brigadier General Euslis again before the Court. 

26. Question by General Scott. Had you any regular staff officer of 
the adjutant general's, inspector general's, quartermaster's or commissary's 
departments, with your wing or column ? 

Answer. No; with the exception of the adjutant of the 1st regiment 
of artillery, who was charged with the duties of assistant adjutant gene- 
ral. There were so few officers attached to the battalion of regular 
troops, that 1 could not withdraw one to serve as quartermaster; but was 
compelled to intrust all the duties of the quartermaster's department to 
the regimental quartermaster of one of the volunteer regiments. 

27. Question by General Scott. In the operations of your column, did 
it, or its detachments, meet with any repulse or check from the enemy, 
or was the enemy on every occasion repulsed or driven ? 

Ansiver. The column under my command never met with any check 
from the enemy, and the enemy was always repulsed whenever he ap- 
peared, unless the attack upon the post of Volusia, as reported by Major 
Gates, be considered an exception. 

Captain Thruston again before the Court. 

9. Question by General Scott. About what time did General Clinch's 
column reach Tampa bay ; how many days did it remain in that vicinity, 
and was that delay greater than was absolutely necessary to recruit the 
men and horses for renewed operations ? 

Answer. It reached the Hillsborough river, opposite to Tampa bay, on 
the morning of the 6th of April. It remained in position there until the 
14th. The delay was not greater than was absolutely necessary to re- 
cruit the men and horses. The horses were very little, or not at all, re- 
cruited ; the corn received at Tampa bay was so bad that many of the 
horses refused it ; I know that several died in consequence of eating it, 
and the horse-power of the train was not stronger when we left the po- 
sition than when we reached it. On the morning of the day before 



[ 224 J 44 

leaving Tampa, all the sick and all the feeble who might be considered 
unable to undergo the fatigues of another march, in the advanced stage of 
the season, were carefully selected out and left at Tampa bay. For the 
purpose of this selection, a board of medical officers was appointed. Ma- 
ny of the volunteers were discharged on account of sickness ; such as 
preferred returning home by water to remaining at Tampa. I don't recol- 
lect the number left at Tampa ; but I think of" C'and " H" companies of 
the 3d artillery, twelve or fourteen men were left at Tampa. I mention 
this fact in order that it may be judged of the number of sick generally 
left there, as I can't recollect the number. These companies were re- 
duced by the action on the 31st of December, in which they had about 
twenty-five wounded ; and some left behind sick at Fort Drane. I think 
they wanted one-third of being full, each. 1 speak entirely from memo- 
ry, without reference to any notes, in respect to all the numbers in this 
answer. 

10. Question by General Scott. The wing or column under General 
Clinch entered and scoured the cove of the Withlacoochee about the end 
of March. When that column withdrew from the cove, what was the im- 
pression of the guides and of headquarters, as to the column having scour- 
ed the cove to its head ? 

Answer. I will remark, in the first place, that we had no guides who 
knew any thing of that part of the country. We entered what is termed 
The Cove of the Withlacoochee on the 31st of March, when we were met 
by the enemy. They were driven across the river some three or four 
miles, when, believing that we had passed through the ground which ap- 
peared to be the most difficult to us and most favorable to them, we re- 
turned to pursue our original route, it being impossible to pass any kind 
of vehicle over the ground through which we chased the enemy. In 
pursuing our route, we discovered a continuation of the same difficult 
and impracticable country. Finding that description of country continued 
for twenty miles, and believing then that the body of the enemy might 
be still secreted there, the post of Fort Cooper was established. There 
was another motive for leaving a battalion in that country, as we might 
there deposite the remains of our subsistence, and by leaving them, re- 
turn with a larger supply in our train from Tampa, to what we then sup- 
posed would be the scene of further operations. I will state, generally, 
as to guides, that the only person with us who had any knowledge of the 
country, was Colonel Gadsden, who, several years before, had run a line 
from the Withlacoochee to Tampa ; but not by the route which we pur- 
sued. We were so ignorant of the country that we arrived and encamp- 
ed within a mile of Tampa bay, without knowing of our proximity ; 
and it was only by accident that we discovered that night that we were 
within a quarter of a mile of the Hillsborough. 1 have heard, from indi- 
viduals in Florida, that no white man was ever known to have been ad- 
mitted into what is termed The Cove of the Withlacoochee ; that the 
Indians had always been jealous of exposing that country to the knowl- 
edge of the white man. That cove is not farther from Fort King, at its 
nearest point, than eighteen miles. Troops have been stationed at Fort 
King three or four years during the friendly intercourse with the Indians, 
and not one of them had any knowledge of that cove country. The cove 
appeared to me, from the knowledge I had of it, to be a large shallow lake, 



45 [ 224 ] 

about twenty-two or twenty-three miles in length, occupying a bend of 
the river, and communicating with the river by cypress swamps on its 
banks at many places. The breadth of the lake is generally from one to 
five miles, interspersed with islands of hammock growth and apparent 
fertility. The peculiar impracticability against military operations 
arises from the water being too shallow for boating, and the impossibility of 
passing to the islands, except on foot, through morasses of such depth 
that our troops, at the three points at which it was passed, were nowhere 
less than up to the middle. After seeing something of this country, I 
remember asking General Scott himself, if any description could have 
given him an adequate idea of the difficulties which presented against a 
military approach. He replied, it could not. 

1 1. Question by General Scott. Was the enemy, met in the cove, de- 
feated, driven, and dispersed ; and what were his probable numbers? 

Answer. The enemy was driven and dispersed, at all points, instantly, 
and chased until he fled across the Withlacoochee river, between three 
and four miles from the ponds at which the skirmish began ; making a 
stand on his retreat at some two or three points most favorable to him. 
I estimated the numbers by the firing and by what I saw at about one hun- 
dred and twenty. 

12. Question by General Scott. Could the cavalry and artillery have 
followed the foot of our column in the pursuit; and were not the mount- 
ed officers, generally, obliged to dismount and leave their horses ? 

Answer. The difficulty was so great, although we passed at the most 
favorable point of the three at which the morass was passed, that only 
one horse was got over, and he was dragged through by the men. Eve- 
ry officer was obliged to dismount and wade through. The depth of the 
morass where I passed was about up to the middle, and miry, so that 
some of the feebler men were obliged to be assisted through by the 
stronger. General Clinch himself was assisted through by the aid of 
two men. At the other two points at which the morass was passed, they 
had still greater difficulty. This appeared to be the character of the ap- 
proach to the islands in the lake which we afterwards saw in passing up 
the outer border of it. These morasses are wet savannahs, grown up 
with tall saw-grass, ten or twelve feet high in most places. 

13. Question by General Scott. State to the Court the roads, if any, 
found by General Clinch's column in the Seminole country ; and what 
roads, causeways, and bridges, the column had to open and to construct? 

Answer. The road from Fort Drane to the Withlacoochee was known 
to us, having been made, by General Clinch's command, in the two 
former expeditions. Beyond the Withlacoochee, towards Tampa bay, 
we had to cut out and bridge every step of the road, our route being pur- 
sued by a compass. On our first day's march from Fort Drane, the road 
had been rendered so nearly impassable by the heavy rains which I have 
spoken of, that it was only by the united exertion of the whole column 
that the train could be passed, being obliged to lay down a considerable 
portion of the road with small pines. A march of twelve miles on the 
first day injured the horses and teams more than three days' march would 
have done over average roads. The route to the Withlacoochee was in 
very bad order for nearly the whole distance. The route afterwards, to 



[ 224 ] 46 

Tampa bay, was hilly and sandy, and of course very exhausting to the 
horses of the train. 

14. Question by General Scott. Please state to the Court the quality of 
grazing, and generally, the water for men and horses found by General 
Clinch's column in its operations upon and from Tampa bay ? 

Answer. The grazing was very meager and insufficient on every part 
of the route ; the Indians had been very cautious that the country should 
not be burned, as is the immemorial custom annually, and without which 
the grazing generally amounts to nothing. Orders were given on the 
march to Tampa to fire the country at every half mile, that we might 
find giazing on our return. On the march to Tampa, the water we found 
tolerable ; on the return from Tampa very much worse, unfit for use where 
any other might be had. A difference of twelve or fourteen days of hot 
sun occasioned a great difference in the quality of the water. Our de- 
pendance for water was on the wet savannahs and lime-stone sinks, 
" sink-holes," as they are termed in that country, all of them grown up 
with vegetation and teeming with insects. For the want of wholesome 
water, I ascribed, in a great measure, the sickness which occured on our 
return march. The number of sick was such, that, on the third day, on 
our return march from Tampa, although every thing was ejected from the 
wagons, by a board of officers appointed for the purpose, except such 
articles as were absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the troops, 
and retaining only one-tenth per company, (three having been the num- 
ber per company originally allowed,) that the wagon-train could not 
transport more than two-thirds of the sick ; many of the sick horsemen 
who could ride on horseback not being taken into the account. 

15. Question by General Scott. In respect to heat after the early part 
of April, what was your observation as to the capacity of men and horses 
to take on each, say, four days' subsistence, and to execute ordinary 
marches thus loaded ? 

Answer. On our first day's march from Tampa, thus loaded, we had 
not proceded five miles before the men began to be greatly fatigued, and 
although men and horses had been recruited at Tampa by eight days' rest, 
our return to the Withlacoochee occupied one day more than our march 
from the Withlacoochee to Tampa. We had not proceeded ten miles on 
the first day's march before the broken down footmen began to be taken 
into the wagons. This arose from the heatof the climate and the insufficien- 
cy and bad quality of the water. The horses suffered equally with the men ; 
several died on the road in the first three days, and on the morning of 
the fourth day, I remember that five or six were found dead in camp — 
some were turned out as of no further use. 

16. Question by General Scott. From what you saw and knew of 
General Scott's plans, arrangements, and personal conduct, is the witness 
aware of his failing to do or to attempt all in his power under the cir- 
cumstances, to give success, if possible, to the campaign with which he 
was charged against the Seminole Indians? 

Answer. I can only answer that every thing which I saw about General 
Scott evinced the greatest zeal and devotion for the service. His anxiety 
appeared at times to amount almost to distress. I believe that no man 
could have done more. I know that no man could have labored more for 



47 [ 224 ] 

success. The deky of a day at Fort Drane, occasioned by the rain, he 
considered and spoke of at the time as a misfortune to him. 

17. Question by General Scott. The witness became acquainted with 
the general plan of operations projected by General Scott, with the 
benefit of the witness's subsequent knowledge of the enemy and the 
country occupied by him — what is the witness's opinion of that general 
plan of operations ? 

Answer. When I first heard General Scott detail his plan of operations, 
] thought he had taken more than necessary precautions for advancing 
into the country with three columns from different points of the peninsula, 
not doubting that our wing of the army would be met by the enemy in 
force on the Withlacoochee. Nor did I believe that a nation of five 
thousand people could conceal itself so effectually in the peninsula south 
and east of the Withlacoochee, that they could not be traced and found by 
our army. My subsequent experience taught me my error, and to con- 
sider General Scott's plan of operations as the only true one. 

18. Questional/ General Scott. What, and probably how many Indian 
villages were destroyed by General Clinch's column, and if any were 
spared, what was the motive of sparing them ? 

Ansiver. I don't remember the precise number destroyed ; there were 
few, probably five or six — I think not so many, The most considerable, 
and the greatest number of villages which we saw on our route, had be- 
longed, as it was said, to the families of friendly Indians at Tampa. 
Those villages were spared, because it was thought that their destruction 
might give them pain. Indian villages are such trifling structures, and 
so easily replaced, that I did not deem their destruction of the least con- 
sequence. 

The Court adjourned to meet on Monday morning at half past 10 o'clock. 

December 12,1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Colonel William De Peyster, a citizen of Florida, and ivitness on the pari 
of Major General Scott, being duly sworn,was interrogated asfolloius : 

1 . Question by General Scott. In what capacity were you with the army 
in Florida, and were you not much about the headquarters of General 
Scott, from his arrival at Tampa bay till towards the middle of May ? 

Answer. 1 was a volunteer aid to General Eustis ; and was frequently 
in company with General Scott at his quarters after his arrival at Tampa 
bay, sometimes during the presence of General Eustis. 

2. Question by General Scott. Did the witness happen to be present 
when Major Read called on General Scott on the subject of the expedition 
to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and what were the instructions reiter- 
ated by the said Scott on that occasion. 

Answer. I was present when Major Read called there the day before 
he embarked. On the subject of transportation, he wished to procure 
more. After that subject was discussed, General Scott commenced giving 
him instructions concerning the examination of the mouth of the Withla- 
coochee, and its soundings and course up to the first obstruction, which, 



[ 224 J 48 

I believe, is twelve miles. General Scott tried to impress on him the 
extreme importance and absolute necessity of having a sketch of the rivei 
to the falls, or obstruction. He requested him to make a sketch of it; if 
he could not do it himself, he might have some one under his command 
who could, and however rough it might be, it would be of importance. 
General Scott likewise, in the most impressive manner, particularly so, 
urged the importance of selecting a situation where wood was convenient, 
to establish a post or depot for a future campaign. General Scott's manner 
was- such as was likely to have great effect on Major Read, and was evi- 
dently so intended. 

3. Question by General Scott. Was nothing said to Major Read of se- 
lecting a site as high up the river as practicable, ( with reference to wood, ) 
for any post that might become necessary in future operations ? 

Answer. The instruction given to Major Read was to select a site for 
a post as high up the river as the obstruction or falls — twelve miles from 
the mouth ; the object being to have a post as far up the river, in the in- 
terior, as practicable. 

4. Question by General Scott. Were there sutlers' stores and sup- 
plies found by the troops with which you served at Tampa bay, and if 
not, did you learn the cause of the deficiency ? 

Answer. There were very few sutlers' stores there, and on inquiring 
of Lieutenant Morris, the commissary, and brother of the sutler, how it 
occurred, he told me that information had been received at New Orleans, 
whence the stores where to be shipped, that the war in Florida had been 
terminated by General Gaines on the Withlacoochee. I got the same 
information from a storekeeper at Tampa, who stated to me further, that, 
but for the disappointment in not receiving goods, he might have made 
ten or twenty thousand dollars. There were no stores there except a 
very scant supply of groceries, which did not last two days. 

5. Question by General Scott. Was the witness in the way of learning 
the wants, on the part of both officers and men, of sutlers' good at Tampa 
bay, and the complaints made on this subject ? 

Answer. I saw and felt the wants. We had absolutely nothing but the 
ration. We were in want of clothing of every description, both officers and 
men. Our transportation was so limited that I was forced to carry my own 
clothing and bedding, which consisted of a coat and blanket, on my horse. 
The soldiers suffered extremely for want of shoes, jackets, hats, and other 
articles. We were, consequently, much worse off on our return march 
from Tampa. 

Question by the Court. What soldiers suffered for the want of hats, and 
shoes, and shirts ; were they the regular or volunteer forces ? 

Answer. The volunteers suffered more than the regulars, on account 
of not having a knowledge of campaigning, and were less provident of 
clothing. I am not certain that the regulars suffered from want of cloth- 
inn, perhaps they did in the article of shoes. 

(j. (Question by General Scott. Did not the volunteers suffer from the 
want of thin jackets and pantaloons in the place of the woollen brought 
from the North ? 

Answer. The volunteers and regulars both suffered on that account ; 
they had no thin clothing. 

In consequence of the absence of several important witnesses the Court 
adjourned to meet to-morrow at half past 10 o'clock. 



49 [ 2U J 

December 13, 183G. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Owing to the absence of several important witnesses, and in order to 
save time, the Court determined to go into the investigation relative to 
the Creek campaign, and was occupied until the 15th instant in examining 
the documentary testimony offered by the Judge Advocate, having 
reference to that campaign. 

December 16, 1836. 

The Court met. All present. 

The investigation into the failure of the Seminole campaign was again 
resumed. 

Captain Green, of the revenue service, a witness on the part of Major Gen- 
eral Scott, being duly sworn, ivas interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. In what capacity was the witness em- 
ployed in the months of February, Match, April, and May, 1836? 

Answer. In the months of February and March last I commanded a 
revenue cutter on the coast of Florida, and was generally in the neigh- 
borhood of Tampa bay and St. Mark's, and on the coast between those 
two points. The object of my being there was to co-operate with the 
army, and to render every assistance in my power. From April to May 
I was employed in conveying transports containing the Louisiana volun- 
teers from Tampa bay to Charlotte's harbor. From thence we went on 
an expedition up the Miaca or Pease creek. 

2. Question by General Scott. Did the witness happen to be at Talla- 
hassee about the 16th of March last ; and what propositions were made by 
him to the territorial authorities respecting the lower part of the With- 
lacoochee river? 

Answer. I was at Tallahassee about that time, and at different periods. 
I made an application to the adjutant general of Florida, who was acting 
in the absence of the Governor, for permission to visit the Withlacoochee 
and to reconnoitre in that vicinity. I was desirous that he should furnish 
me with small vessels for that purpose. He gave me full authority to do 
so, and I proceeded immediately to St. Mark's, and was making prepar- 
ations to proceed on the expedition, and obtained a pilot, who was famil- 
iar with the waters in that neighborhood. I had contracted, likewise, 
for a vessel, and was ready to proceed. 

3. Question by General Scott. Was it the purpose of the witness to 
enter and explore the Withlacoochee for some distance up, and with 
what views ? 

Answer. I was anxious to explore the Withlacoochee and in that vi- 
cinity, as I thought it an important position in the operations of the army. 
I thought it the best point that supplies could be taken to the army in its 
operations at that particular time, in consequence of General Gaines's po- 
sition. We had just received information from Tampa bay, just before I 
4 



[ 224 ] 50 

arrived at St. Mark's, that he was on the Withlacoochee, surrounded by 
Indian-., without provisions, and cut off from all communication. 

4. Question by General Scott. What prevented the witness from pro- 
ceeding from St. Mark's, on his proposed expedition to the Withlacoo- 
chee ? 

Ansivcr. The day that I should have proceeded I received letters from 
Tallahassee, from the adjutant general, informing me that it was then 
unnecessary to visit there, and directing me to another quarter, to con- 
vey a letter to Tampa bay. I sent that letter, however, by one of my 
boats, to Tampa, and still kept the cutter at St. Mark's. 1 received, like- 
wise, a letter from Major Willis, the collector at St. Mark's, but who re- 
sided at Tallahassee, stating that it was unnecessary to proceed on the 
expedition ; that General Gaines had beat the enemy, and put an end to 
the war, and would be in Tallahassee on that or the next day. 

5. Question by General Scott. Does the witness mean to say that his 
purpose in wishing to go on the expedition to the Withlacoochee was 
merely to convey supplies to the troops of General Gaines, or was it also 
to reconnoitre that river with a view to the pending war in general ? 

Answer. It was for both reasons. In the neighborhood of the With- 
lacoochee is the Anclote keys, and we were some time in doubt whether 
the Withlacoochee emptied itself into the Gulf just at the Anclote keys, 
where there is a fine harbor. I have since discovered, however, that 
that is not the case. I wished to reconnoitre the place for information 
generally in reference to the campaigns. We could get no information 
unless by actual observation, as the maps and charts, I found, were all 
very inaccurate. I was induced to think, from one of the maps in my 
possession, that the Withlacoochee emptied itself into the Gulf near the 
Anclote keys ; but that is incorrect ; it does not enter there, but, on the 
contrary, about thirty or forty miles from them, and in the direction of St, 
Mark's. 

6. Question by General Scott. Was not the report mentioned by the 
witness that the war had been finished by General Gaines, generally be- 
lieved at St. Mark's and Tallahassee, and particularly after the arrival of 
that officer at Tallahassee ? 

Answer. I returned from St. Mark's to Tallahassee, and there I un- 
derstood generally that the war was terminated. General Gaines arrived 
while I was at Tallahassee, and I saw his entie into the town. There 
was much rejoicing, and every thing was calculated to induce the belief 
that the war with the Indians was terminated. This was the prevailing 
opinion, although I myself was not decidedly of that opinion. 

7. Question by General Scott. But for the belief that the war had ter- 
minated, would not the witness have proceeded on his expedition, not- 
withstanding that General Gaines's troops were no longer on that river? 

Answer. Certainly ; I should have proceeded but for this belief. 

8. Question by General Scott. To what place did the witness next pro- 
ceed in his cutter from St. Mark's, and for what purpose ? 

Answer. I went from St. Mark's to Tampa bay. I had with me one 
of General Gaines's staff, Captain McCall, and Captain Armstrong, of the 
transport schooner " Motto." I took them to Tampa bay. Captain 
McCall had accompanied General Gaines on the campaign in Florida, 
and had arrived with him in Tallahassee. 



51 | 224 ] 

10. Question by General Scott. Did not the witness, on a subsequent 
visit to Tampa bay, state to General Scott generally the substance of his 
testimony relative to the witness's desire to visit the Withlacoochee, for 
trie purposes which have already been stated by the witness? 

Answer. When 1 met General Scott at Tampa bay, I found him ex- 
ceedingly anxious to obtain information respecting the Withlacoochee 
and the coast along and in that direction. 1 informed him that I had made 
repeated application to be directed to reconnoitre in that direction, and 
was once on the eve of proceeding from St. Mark's to do so ; but that my 
destination was altered in consequence of information received respecting 
General Gaines's movements on the Withlacoochee — I mean, I was pre- 
vented at the time 1 was at St. Mark's. I was always anxious to make 
this reconnoissance, but some contingency or other prevented it. 

Question by the Court. You stated that you had letters from the adju- 
tant general and Major Willis, informing you that General Gaines had 
terminated the war, and that in consequence it was not necessary for you 
to proceed. Have you these letters with you? 

Answer. I have not. I believe these letters are with my baggage, 
which is expected daily in Baltimore. The letter from the adjutant gen- 
eral did not state that the war was terminated, but that the expedition 
was unnecessary. The letter from Major Willis stated that the Indians 
were flogged, or something to that amount, and that, "thank God, the 
war w r as over/' 

Captain Thistle, a citizen of Louisiana, and witness on the part of Gen- 
eral Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows: 

1. Question by General Scott. In what capacity did the witness serve 
in the war against the Seminole Indians, and between what dates did the 
witness serve in that war ? 

Ansiver. I commanded a company from Louisiana, called the Louisiana 
volunteers, Colonel Smith's regiment. We commenced raising on the 
23d of January, and we were on our march the 3d of February. I think 
it was on the 4th I was introduced to General Gaines, on board the steam- 
boat, on our way to Florida. I continued under the command of Gene- 
ral Gaines until the 9th of March, when he turned his command over to 
General Clinch. I continued in the campaign in Florida until sometime 
in May, when I embarked at Tampa bay on my return home. 

Question by the Court. What knowledge have you of the campaigns in 
Florida? Be pleased to state, by way of narrative, what you saw, and 
what part you took in those campaigns ? 

Answer. We took up our line of march from Tampa bay to the Alafia 
river, and from thence to Fort King. Nothing particular happened on 
our march; we saw no enemy. We buried Major Dade's command on 
the 22d of February, and arrived at Fort King on the 23d. We were all 
destitute of provisions ; some companies had been out of provisions three 
days before our arrival at Fort King. This was because we were in want 
of transportation from Tampa bay. We had been informed before we 
arrived at Tampa that there was plenty of transportation there. On our 
arrival at Fort King we found the fort destitute of provisions and ammu- 
nition, except a few barrels of sour corn meal and a few barrels of rusty 



[ 224 ] 52 

pork, which did not add much to the health of our half-starved men. 
General Gaines, at Fort King, sent a despatch to General Clinch, at Fort 
Drane, for provisions, and General Clinch arrived at Fort King with 
seven days' supply. I understood from General Clinch that these pro- 
visions were sent on for the use of General Scott's army, and that he 
(General Clinch) did not know of our being in the country until a few 
days previous. I understood also from General Clinch and from his aids, 
that every effort was making to get provisions from Picolata to Fort 
Drane, and that the roads were at the time almost impassable. We 
started from Fort King on the 26th of February, with seven days' rations ; 
we had received no ammunition there. On the morning of the 27th we 
arrived on the bank of the Withlacoochee. The advance guard, as they 
were reconnoitring the bank for a crossing-place, were fired on by the 
enemy; one man was killed and several wounded. On the 28th a de- 
tachment, under Lieutenant Izard, was sent down five miles below, at 
camp Izard, for the same purpose. That detachment was also fired on, 
and Lieutenant Izard killed. On the 29th I was called on early in the 
morning by General Gaines's aid to take command of a detachment of 160 
strong, (50 volunteers from the regulars and 110 from the volunteers, 
part from my own and part from other companies. ) I was charged by 
General Gaines to use a good deal of caution in getting on the river bank 
undiscovered. We were sent there for the purpose of watching the 
movement of the enemy, while we were erecting a block-house near the 
river bank. I had succeeded in getting my men well secured, (hidden,) 
when I heard a heavy fire in the rear, which I took to be an attack on 
the camp, and it proved to be such. After one or two volleys the enemy 
made their appearance on the opposite side of the river, in front of the 
men I had secreted. The fire was immediately opened by my men, and 
a very brisk fire from the enemy was returned ; they numbered, I sup- 
pose, at that time, about 400 Indians. About half an hour after a recall 
was sounded, but the fire was continued so briskly that I did not think it 
prudent to withdraw my men from their cover. About half an hour after 
a second recall was sounded, when the enemy having withdrawn, from 
the river bank, I returned to camp with my detachment, and there learned 
from Colonel Twiggs that the camp had been surrounded (on three sides) 
by the enemy, and that they had come to the conclusion that my party 
had been cut off, and was massacred. On my return to camp there 
were 250 to 300 Indians firing scattering shots into the camp from a con- 
siderable distance. General Gaines was wounded on that occasion. We 
were fired on also that evening and the next day, (1st of March.) It 
appeared to me that on the 1st of March there were about 1,200 Indians 
and negroes surrounding the camp. Some scattering shots were fired on 
the 2d of March. I think it was the evening of the 2d or 3d that the 
negro Abraham hailed the camp, and said that they were tired of fight- 
ing and wished to make peace. He requested that the next day, being 
Sunday, we should do no work : he then withdrew, and afterwards hailed 
us a second time, and remarked that on Monday they would meet at 10 
o'clock, and have a big talk and make peace. On Monday they met about 
250 yards from the camp. Captain Hitchcock and Captain Barron went 
out and held a conversation with them ; they inquired particularly as to 
our situation ; whether we had provisions, and brandy, and tobacco ; they 



53 \ 224 ] 

said they could supply us with provisions in abundance ; that we could 
fish on the river bank if we choose, and that they would fight no more if 
they were permitted to keep the opposite side of the Withlacoochee, 
making that river the boundary. Our provisions gave out about the 1st 
of March, and it was on the 2d we commenced killing our horses, and 
one dog, for subsistence. The men all appeared in good spirits, and 
willing to bear starvation if they could have the honor of conquering the 
Indians. On the 4th the Indians again met, and wished to hold a con- 
ference with us ; but they were informed by General Gaines that he could 
not make a treaty unless they laid down their arms. He advised them 
to keep peaceable, to kill no more inhabitants, and to submit to the agents 
who would be sent on by the Government ; that a large army was ex- 
pected on every day, which would kill and destroy the whole of them if 
they did not submit. During tbe different parleys held with the enemy, 
they had always from about 250 to 400 of their people in the neighbor- 
hood. During the time we were in Camp Izard, we had no more than 
about twenty-three rounds of ammunition to a man. We had many 
w r ounded, in all about forty or forty-three. It was on the 5th or 6th, per- 
haps the 9th of March, while General Gaines, through his staff officers, 
was again holding a conversation with the Indians, that General Clinch's 
advanced guard came up and fired upon the enemy, who immediately 
withdrew. The Indians hailed us again that night about 10 o'clock; 
their object was for peace, as their conversation seemed to denote : they 
requested two days to enable them to go and see their governor, Mica- 
nopy, which would take that time to consult with him. During this 
time our men fished on the river bank without being molested. I was 
informed about this time, by many of the Florida volunteers, that our pre- 
sence in the country had diverted the attention of the Indians from their 
families, and was no doubt the means of saving many from massacre, as 
well as their property from destruction. We remained at Camp Izard 
three or four days, and not hearing any thing further from the Indians, 
the command was turned over to General Clinch by General Gaines, and 
we took up our march for Fort Drane. I had a conversation with Gen- 
eral Clinch about provisions at Fort Drane. He said he had a small sup- 
ply there, and that General Scott w r as at Picolata sending on provisions 
as fast as possible, and that he himself was collecting all the transporta- 
tion he could for the same purpose ; and that what provisions had been 
furnished us had been drawn from supplies furnished for General Scott's 
army, which circumstance would keep General Scott's army back proba- 
bly ten, fifteen, or twenty days longer, on account of the difficulty of 
transporting provisions. The main army from Camp Izard arrived within 
three miles of Fort Drane on the second day, about sundown, aftd it was 
ten o'clock before I got up with the rear guard. We received a small: 
supply of provisions the next day. About the 13th or 14th I made some 
inquiries of General Scott about provisions and ammunition. He inform- 
ed me that he was doing all in his power to procure provisions ; but the 
roads were so bad, and he was so short of transportation, he could not 
get provisions on as fast as he w-ished ; that he had to detain his own army 
on account of our arrival, and of our using the supplies furnished for his 
own troops ; but that he would issue to us freely as long as he had a 
mouthfull. I know of a provision wagon being six hours in endeavoring 



[ 224 ] 54 

to get from Fort Diane to Camp Smith, a distance of three miles, and then 
the wagon was obliged to be left, and the load shifted to a lighter wagon. 
Court adjourned, to meet to-morrow at half past 10 o'clock. 

Frederick, December 17, 183G. 
The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Lieutenant Colonel James Bankhead, of the 3d regiment of artillery, 
aioitncss on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sivom, was 
interrogated as follows : 

1 . Question by General Scott. In what capacity did the witness serve 
in Florida, against the hostile Seminoles, say from about the middle of 
February till towards the end of May last ? 

Answer. About the middle of February I was ordered by General 
Scott from Savannah to Picolata,on my way to take up the battalion of Geor- 
gia volunteers, at Darien, to muster them into service, and to take the com- 
mand of the troops that might assemble at Picolata. I remained at Picolata 
in command until the 9th of March. I believe about that period, per- 
haps that day, 1 received an order from General Scott to proceed with 
expeditious haste with a body of troops, consisting of two companies of 
United States artillery, and several companies of mounted men, to Fort 
Drane, with the wagon-train of provisions, to give succor and relief to 
General Gaines, General Scott having about that time heard it rumored 
that General Gaines was in a very precarious situation, and destitute of 
provisions. I immediately, on that day, commenced the movement by 
Black creek, having understood that the route from thence was better 
than the route from Picolata, which was almost impracticable. Some 
short distance before we arrived at Fort Drane, I learned that General 
Gaines had been relieved by General Clinch, and had turned over the 
command of the troops to General Clinch. I served up to this period, 
in command of the troops, as chief commandant of artillery. On my 
arrival at Fort Diane, General Clinch assigned to me the command of 
all the troops encamped in the neighborhood of that post. I remained 
in that command until the army moved from Fort Drane, when I was 
assigned to the command of the left column of the right wing of the 
army, which command 1 continued to hold until the end of the campaign. 

2. Question by General Scott. Were you accompanied in the move- 
ment from Picolata by General Scott, and to what point? 

Answer. I was accompanied by General Scott to some point a short 
distance north of the Santa Fe river, and General Scott, anxious about 
the rumor respecting General Gaines, moved on to Fort Drane, with a 
detachment of mounted men. Some four or five miles this side of Mica- 
nopy, I received an order from General Scott, sent back to me, directing 
me to send the mounted men in the neighborhood to a plantation where 
there was corn, and to move slowly on with the artillery, as the object 
for the haste which I had been previously directed to make, had been 
accomplished. 

3. Question by General Scott. On what day did the movement from 
Picolata commence ; on what rumor, and were not certain letters receiv- 
ed some hours after the rumor, which confirmed that rumor ? 



55 | 224 J 

Answer. I think on the 9th of March. I was ordered to make this 
movement on that day, in consequence of a rumor which had reached us 
by a steamboat from Jacksonville, that General Gaines was surrounded 
by the enemy, and in a starving condition. There were some letters 
received after this rumor by an express, confirming the rumor. General 
Scott manifested great anxiety and solicitude that the greatest expedi- 
tion should be made by me in giving this relief to General Gaines. 

4. Question by General Scott. Were you not fully, at the time, in 
the confidence of General Scott, and what did he state to you to be the 
object of the forced movement upon Fort Drane, and his purpose of 
taking from the latter place the wagons loaded with subsistence to the 
relief of Generals Gaines and Clinch ? 

Answer. I was at the time in the confidence of General Scott, and 
was living with him. I understood from him that the object of this forced 
movement upon Fort Drane was for the purpose of extending relief to 
General Gaines. 

5. Question by General Scott. As chief of artillery, what were the 
expedients resorted to at Fort Drane, to have a sufficient number of 
rounds of ammunition fixed for the two six-pounders which accompanied 
the army from that fort ? 

Answer. We had little or no fixed ammunition at Fort Drane, nor 
had there been any at Picolata when we left there, except some for the 
howitzer, and we had no horses to convey that howitzer with us. I had 
to procure flannel shirts and gowns belonging to the officers and men, to 
make bags for the powder, and to cut up bars of lead as a substitute for 
grape shot. This was the principal ammunition which we had for the 
artillery. General Scott offered his own flannel for this purpose. 

6. Question by General Scott. From what you saw and knew of Gen- 
eral Scott's plans, arrangements, and personal conduct, is the witness 
aware of his failing to do or to attempt all in his power, under the cir- 
cumstances, to give success, if possible, to the campaign with which he 
was charged against the Seminole Indians ? 

Answer. I was made acquainted by General Scott with his plan of 
operations, and, in my judgment, I thought it the best that could have 
been devised, and I believe, but for unforeseen accidents which General 
Scott could not control, more likely than any other to ensure success. 
General Scott's zeal and activity were constant and unabating to the end 
of the campaign. General Scott failed in nothing, in my estimation, to 
give success to the campaign. 

Question by the Court. What, in your opinion, were the causes that 
prevented the subjection of the Seminole enemy, in the campaign con- 
ducted by Major General Scott, in Florida, in 1836. 

Answer. The first cause, in my opinion, was the lateness of the season 
in which operations could be commenced under General Scott ; the 
delay in receiving the necessary supplies for the army ; and I think the 
most powerful cause which prevented the success of the campaign was 
the movement of General Gaines ; that delayed the commencement of 
operations from early in March to the latter part of the month, as General 
Gaines had taken or consumed a large portion of the supplies (provisions) 
in depot at Fort Drane, the most difficult point of the Territory to which 
supplies could be conveyed, from its distance from water communication, 



[ 224 ] 56 

and the almost impassable state of the roads between the St. John's river 
and that point. These causes delayed the commencement of operations ; 
and the failure to receive fresh horses and refreshments for the army at 
Tampa bay, prevented more continued operations from the time we left 
Tampa hay. The limited term of service of the militia ; the extreme 
heat and insalubrity of the climate in April, as was proved by its eifects 
on the troops ; the scarcity and impurity of the water throughout the 
the country, and the general character of the country. 

Question by the Court. What prevented the reception of the supplies 
that were expected at Tampa bay ? 

Answer. I heard, I think, Lieutenant Morris say that he had received 
a letter from his brother, who was, I think, sutler at Tampa bay, and 
then in New Orleans, that he had declined forwarding his stores in con- 
sequence of the information he had received that the war had been ter- 
minated by General Gaines. 1 learned also from several sources, partic- 
ularly from Captain Shannon, that he had heard that the quartermaster 
at New Orleans had declined sending the horses for the same reason. 

7. Question by General Scott. Did any conversation take place be- 
tween the witness and General Gaines, on the subject of the termination 
of the war, and what was the substance of that conversation? 

Answer. The day that General Gaines left Fort Drane for Tallahas- 
see, I met him between Micanopy and Fort Drane, when he said to me, 
" You may go on, Colonel, there is nothing to be done now ; it is all fin- 
ished;" understanding that the war was at an end. 

Captain Thistle, again before the Court, was interrogated as follows : 

2. Question by General Scott. The witness was in Camp Izard du- 
ring the attacks made upon it by the enemy, at the end of February and 
the beginning of March last. Did the witness conceive that the war 
was terminated at that time and place ? 

Answer. In my opinion it was not. Having been among the Indians 
a good deal, and knowing their character, it was my opinion that they 
wished to lull us into an idea (finding our camp too strong to storm) 
that they wished for peace, for the purpose of getting a good opportunity 
to massacre the whole camp. It was also my opinion that they had 
spies out and had discovered the reinforcement of General Clinch ; and 
that if they failed in their first object, their next was to get their women 
and children out of danger. 

3. Question by General Scott. It has been said that the Louisiana 
regiment would not have proceeded beyond Pensacola, without being 
accompanied by Major General Gaines. What does the witness know 
of the dispositions of that regiment in this respect ? 

Answer. For my own part, when I was raising the men for my com- 
pany, I did not know there was such a man as General Gaines in the 
country. Colonel Smith and Colonel Lawson, I understood, were to 
take the command. I speak only in reference to my own company, my 
own officers and men. When at Pensacola I never heard any thing of 
the kind mentioned ; nor did I ever hear there that General Gaines was 
about to leave us. When we got acquainted with General Gaines, the 
officers and men were well pleased with him. 



57 [ 224 ] 

4. Question by General Scott. Did your regiment, as far as you know, 
obey with equal cheerfulness every officer of superior rank, whether of 
the regulars or volunteers ? 

Answer. They did so. I never heard the least murmur, neither among 
the officers nor men, nor the first word of dispute. They were always 
ready to obey orders, both the regulars and volunteers, from all officers 
placed over them. 

5. Question by General Scott. What sutler's stores did the witness 
find at Tampa bay, and what does the witness know of the sufferings 
among the officers and men, from the want of light clothing, and groce- 
ries generally ? 

Answer. We found nothing there in the way of sutlers' stores, ex- 
cept a little whiskey, which sold for fifteen to twenty dollars a gallon ; nor 
clothing of any description, not even a pair of shoes, was to be found in 
the place. I know that many of the men had to go barefoot in conse- 
quence. Some of the men, who, in New Orleans, were worth $25,000, 
were so badly off for shoes that they had to tie them round their feet 
with strings in order to keep the soles and upper leathers together. I 
marched two days myself in my stocking-feet. I had the means about 
me to buy shoes if any had been for sale. I believe, also, the regulars 
suffered in a gieat degree for want of clothing. I have seen them badly 
off for want of shoes. I went to General Scott myseif and told him that 
my own men were in want of shoes ; that there were about twenty who 
were generally in want, some barefoot, and others nearly so. He told 
me there were no shoes to be had ; that shoes and clothing had been ex- 
pected, and also that horses had been expected, but that he had been 
disappointed in all. 

Question by the Court. Why did not your men provide themselves 
with sufficient clothing for the campaign when they set out from New 
Orleans ? 

Answer. The men were all provided each with a new pair of shoes, 
and a new suit of clothes throughout, and they also took extra clothing 
with them. When we took up the line of march from Tampa bay, we 
had to leave our clothing, such as we could not carry on our persons, for 
want of transportation, which we buried ; it was afterwards dug up by 
the Indians, and of course we lost it. My own clothing I sent back to 
New Orleans, expecting we should not return by Tampa bay, and so 
did a great many other officers and men. The palmetto cuts the cloth- 
ing in such manner that it will not last in marching through that country 
more than four weeks. Shoes are destroyed in the same way by expo- 
sure to the sand, mud, and water. 

6. Question by General Scott. Has the witness had any conversation 
with the officer (Captain Morrison) who was commissary at New Or- 
leans during the past winter and spring, relative to subsistence which 
that officer ought to have sent to Tampa bay, and what was the reason 
given by Captain Morrison for not having sent ail the supplies required 
of him for Tampa ? 

Answer. 1 had a conversation with him after my return from Florida 
sometime in May, about the 16th. I went to draw back-rations that 
were due to the men of my company, and he turned over a hogshead of 
bacon and remarked that he had pnrchased this to send to Florida ; that 



f 224 ] 58 

he had bread likewise, which he turned over to me several barrels. On 
his saying that this was for Florida, I asked why it was not sent, and to 
the best of my knowledge he said there had been some delay on account 
of there being a report that the war was at an end. He further told 
me that he had been to a good deal of trouble in getting the bread baked, 
and he could not send previously to this as fast as he wished. 

7. Question by General Scolt. When Captain Morrison said that he 
had not sent all the bread and bacon purchased for the troops at Tampa, 
because he had heard that the war was at an end, where did he say that 
he supposed the war had been terminated ? 

Answer. I don't know that I asked the question, and I have no recol- 
lection that he made any reply to that effect. 

8. Question by General Scott. What did the witness himself under- 
stand by what Captain Morrison said about the war being at an end ? 

Answer. I understood that it was from the report in Camp Izard. It 
was generally believed by the officers and men in our camp ( Camp Izard ) 
that the Indians would not lire another gun in the way of hostility. On 
my return, under the command of General Scott, from Fort Diane to the 
Withlacoochee, Adjutant Barron offered to bet a hundred dollars that the 
Indians would not fire another gun. My reply was that I had not money 
to stake, but that I should not like to make money faster than by taking 
such bets. 

9. Question by General Scott. On your return to the Withlacoochee 
under the command of General Scott, did you find the enemy subdued or 
ready to surrender, or did you find the reverse ? 

Answer. I found the reverse ; ready to fire upon the rear guard the 
best opportunity that suited their convenience. Previous to this, they 
fired upon our baggage wagon, seven miles from Fort Drane ; they kill- 
ed a negro, w r ounded a horse, and carried away and destroyed the pro- 
vision that was in the wagon. 

Major General Scott here presented to the Court a paper, (document 
No. 65,) being a letter from General P. F. Smith, dated 25th February, 
as evidence that the Louisiana volunteers were under no pledge to Gen- 
eral Gaines or to any other person, in proceeding to Florida. 

The Court adjourned to meet on Monday morning at half past ten 
o'clock. 

Monday, December 19, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Judge Advocate read to the Court the letter (document No. 144) 
addressed by the honorable Joseph M. White, delegate in Congress from 
Florida, to the President of the Court ; which the Court determined should 
accompany the record. 

The Court was occupied the remainder of this day in taking testimony 
having reference to the Creek campaign. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half past ten o'clock. 

December 20, 1836. 
The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 



59 [ 224 ] 

Captain G. A. Mc Call, of the 4th infantry, a witness on the part of 
Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows : 

Question by General Scott. In the Army and Navy Chronicle, printed 
at Washington city, dated Thursday, August 11, 183G, and bearing the 
number 84, there is a letter with your signature. Was the original of 
that letter written by you ? 

Answer. It was. 

[The paper referred to in this question accompanies these proceedings, 
and is numbered — .] 

Captain E. A. Hitchcock, of the 1st infantry, a witness on the part of 
Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. In the Army and Navy Chronicle, print- 
ed at the city of Washington, " whole No. 67," and under date April 14, 
1836, there is a letter addressed to the "honorable Francis S. Lyon, M. 
C," and signed "E. A. Hitchcock, captain U. S. army." Was the ori- 
ginal of that letter written by the witness ? 

Answer. It was. 

2. Question by General Scott. Was the " staff officer" therein men- 
tioned in that letter the witness now before the Court ? 

Answer. He was. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at half past ten 
o'clock. 

December 21, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Captain G. S. Drane,of the 2d artillery, a witness on the part of Major 
General Scott, being duly sworn, teas interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. Has the witness any recollection of a 
conversation with Major Read, then in command of a battalion of Flori- 
dians, relative to a detachment it was said had been sent by Major Mc- 
Lemore, from the Suwannee to the Withlacoochee river, and what was 
the substance of that conversation ? 

Answer. I distinctly recollect a conversation I had with Major Read 
at Tampa bay, I think two days before the right wing of the army marched 
from that place. We were passing from Fort Brooke down to the en- 
campment of the right wing of the army, where Major Read wished to 
have an interview with General Glinch, to solicit that his battalion might 
be attached to the right wing of the army, that he might the sooner 
cross to the Withlachoochee to the relief of the Floridians. In the course 
of that conversation, I informed him myself that there was a detachment 
of Floridians at the Withlacoochee with provisions ; that I believed that 
Major McLemore was there with them, but was not certain. He said 
he was sure they could take care of themselves until -the right w T ing of 
the army passed on that route again, and that was one great reason why 
he wished to join the right wing of the army. He informed me that he 
had heard at Fort Brooke that morning that a portion of the right wing 
of the army was to go by boats to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and 
pass up the mouth of that river. His remark was, " I should like very 
much to be placed on that command." I laughingly told him that I 



f 224 ] 60 

thought it would suit him better than me, as I did not consider it a very 
desirable duty. He remarked that he was content himself, and that he 
should like to go. He expressed some uneasiness about the frontier set- 
tlements. I informed him there was no danger ; that the Florida volun- 
teers, who had been assembled at Fort Drane, had been sent to their 
homes. I don't recollect that I had any other particular conversation 
with him respecting that matter ; but it was generally understood that 
that duty had been assigned to him. 

2. Question by General Scott. How, or in what manner did the wit- 
ness learn that it was likely that Major McLemore had sent a detach- 
ment from the Suwannee to the Withlacoochee ? 

Answer. I heard it at Fort Drane, and I think General Clinch stated 
to me that Major McLemore had volunteered his services to go to the 
mouth of the Withlacoochee in boats with subsistence and forage. On 
the march it was frequently spoken of, and frequently mentioned also at 
Tampa bay ; and I recollect Major Dill's mentioning the subject to me 
before I left Fort Drane, that McLemore had gone. 

The Court was occupied the remainder of this day with the subject of 
the Creek campaign. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half past 10 o'clock. 

December 22, 1836. 
The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Joseph L. Locke, Esq., late an officer of the army, and a witness on the 
part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as 
follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. In what place and in what capacity 
was the witness on duty in the months of February, March, and April ? 

Answer. I was in those months," from the 7th of February to the end 
of April, stationed at Picolata, as assistant commissary of subsistence. 

2. Question by General Scott. About what period did the first bacon 
sent by the Subsistence department arrive at Picolata ? 

Answer. My memory does not serve me accurately on that subject. It 
was somewhere between the 15th and 25th of April. It was not cer- 
tainly before the 15th. 

3. Question by General Scott. Had the witness sufficient hard bread 
to supply the columns commanded by Generals Clinch and Eustis, re- 
spectively, before the march of the former from Fort Drane and the march 
of the latter from Volusia ? 

Answer. By referring to my monthly returns, I find that I invoiced to 
the commissaries of those columns of the army in the interior, both hard 
bread and flour, my instructions from General Scott being to furnish as 
much hard bread as could be procured. I was also instructed not to sup- 
ply the troops at Picolata with hard bread, but to reserve it for the march- 
ing army. I cannot state the ratio between hard bread and flour sent to 
Volusia. That sent to Lieutenant Dancey, at Fort Drane, during Feb- 
ruary, was in the ratio of 27 barrels of flour to 73 of hard bread ; and 
in March, 49 barrels of flour to 112 of hard bread, to the same officer. 



01 [ 224 J 

My impression is, that the bread stuff sent to the Volusia consisted prin- 
cipally of hard bread. 

4. Question by General Scott. In the weight to be transported, what 
is the difference between pork and bacon ? 

Answer, It is about 51 per cent, in favor of bacon ; that is, a wagon 
which is capable of carrying 2,000 pounds of nett pork, would carry 
3,000 pounds, or a little more, of bacon ; the difference is in the wood 
and brine. 

General Duncan L. Clinch, late of the army, and a witness on the 
part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, icas interrogated as 
follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. Was the delay, after the arrival of 
General Scott at Fort Diane, more than the witness deemed necessary 
to enable the troops, which had marched with General Gaines from 
Tampa to recruit their health and strength, and to enable the last train 
of wagons, loaded with subsistence, to arrive from Garey's ferry ? 

Answer. It was not. 

2. Question by General Scott. In reference to the term of service 
generally, of the volunteers of your column, and the temperature of the 
weather, could that column have kept the field with any prospect of ad- 
vantage later than about the 25th of April ? 

Ansiver. In reply to the first part of this question, I state that the 
term of service of the most part of the volunteers expired on or about 
that time. As respects the temperature of the weather, I believe, with 
experienced and acclimated troops, a campaign might be carried on du- 
ring the month of May, without any great risk to their health, but no 
longer. The state the column was in at the time we reached Fort 
Drane, nothing more could have been done. 

3. Question by General Scott. What was the general quality of the 
water, other than river-water, drunk by yoUr men and horses, on your 
return march from Tampa towards the north of Florida ? 

Ansiver. It was generally excessively bad, taken from stagnant pools 
and ponds, and frequently so thick with mud and scum that it was drunk 
with difficulty. Taken from ponds or pools, it was of course in a warm 
state, and by no means palatable, and often very scarce. In fact, both 
men and horses suffered very much for the want of even such water as 
was generally met with. There were animalcula occasionally in this 
water. Most of the water in those pounds have more or less of ani- 
malcula. 

4. Question by General Scott. Were there many sick in the witness's 
column, both in his operations south and those returning north, and does 
the witness attribute that sickness to the warmth of the weather, and 
generally to the badness of the water. 

Answer. There was a good deal of sickness in the column I command- 
ed, in both going to and returning from Tampa. It was attributable, in 
my opinion, to several causes : excessive fatigue and exposure in scour- 
ing through the swamps and hammocks, opening and bridging the road, 
and in some measure to the bad state of the water and the heat of the 
climate. 



[ 221 J 62 

5. Question by General Scott. Was the column under the command 
of the witness, or any detachment from that column, on any occasion 
beaten or repulsed by the enemy, or was the enemy, as often as met, re- 
pulsed and driven ? 

Answer. The column was never beaten or repulsed by the enemy. It 
was always successful whenever it met the enemy. The troops always 
evinced the greatest gallantry, both regulars and volunteers, in pursuing 
the enemy through hammocks that were almost impenetrable by man. 

6. Question by General Scott. The witness's column lay at or near 

Tampa days. What was the principal object of that halt ; and 

was it more than sufficient to recruit the health and strength of men and 
horses ? 

Answer. The column remained at Tampa several days ; but not longer 
than was absolutely necessary to recruit the men and horses. 

7. Question by General Scott. Whilst he was within your observa- 
tion, did you observe any deficiency in the zeal, activity, or judgment of 
General Scott, in the prosecution of the campaign against the enemy ? 

Answer. I did not. He was always active, and sometimes, I thought, 
rather over-zealous or restless in pushing on the operations of the cam- 
paign. 

Question by the Court. What were the causes, in your opinion, 
that prevented the subjection of the hostile Seminoles in the campaign 
conducted by Major General Scott in Florida, in 1836? 

Answer. In reply to that question 1 am compelled to state that I am 
of the opinion that the failures of and the disasters attending the opera- 
tions in Florida, were mainly to be attributed to the want of energy and 
military forecast in the late head of the War Department; and in failing 
to order a larger force and a greater quantity of military supplies, &c, 
into that country in 1S35 and early in the year 1836. In illustration of 
this opinion, and to show that the late Secretary of War was not entirely 
uninformed as to the state of things in Florida, I beg leave to submit to 
the Court extracts from several letters addressed to the Adjutant General 
of the army by the officer then commanding in Florida. When, at last, 
the late honorable Secretary awoke from his dreams of political prefer- 
ment, and turned his attention to bleeding and suffering Florida, it was 
too late, owing to the peculiar nature of the country, to effect a great, 
deal before the hot and sickly months set in : hence, in a great measure, 
may be attributed the failure, as it has been termed, of the campaign con- 
ducted by Major General Scott in Florida. 

[The extracts alluded to in this answer were here read to the Court, 
and accompany these proceedings, document No. 151.] 

Question by the Court. What did you estimate the force of the Sem- 
inoles, including negroes ? State the number of each. 

Answer. It is very difficult to come at any thing like the number they 
have in the country. 1 never believed, however, that they could have 
concentrated more than from 1,200 to 1,500, including negroes. 

Question by the Court. What is the character of the Seminole Indians 
as warriors ? 

Answer. I think they have proved, whenever they have had any ad- 
vantage, that they are good soldiers. They never fight without decided 
advantage. 



63 [ 224 



Question by the Court. How and by what means where they equipped 
and furnished with arms and ammunition ? 

Answer. I am not able to answer that question. There were a num- 
ber of arms furnished them, I believe, by Government, and they were 
permitted to purchase whenever they pleased. Their arms were gene- 
rally kept in good order by the Government agents, as far as came under 
my observation. 

Question by the Court. Do you think that hard bread and bacon were 
absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the troops in prosecuting the 
campaign in Florida ? 

Answer. It was desirable to have it ; but I believe the army could 
have got along with good fat pork and good flour, with a plenty of good 
transportation. 

8. Question by General Scott. In a former answer made by the wit- 
ness to a question put by the Court, the witness spoke of disasters. Is 
the witness aware of any disaster that befell our arms during the opera- 
tions conducted by the witness or General Scott? 

Ansiver. I spoke generally of the disasters that had befallen the coun- 
try. I know of no disaster which befell the army commanded by General 
Scott, or by myself, except the melancholy one which resulted in the 
massacre of the command under Major Dade. 

9. Question by General Scott. Do not Southern troops very generally 
prefer bacon to pork, and with or without vegetables ? 

Answer. I believe they generally prefer it. 

10. Questionby General Scott. Is it not extremely difficult for troops 
in a wild country to execute full marches and bake their own bread. 

Answer. It is very difficult for troops to make full marches in Florida 
with or without baking their bread. I don't think hard bread absolutely 
necessary to carry on a campaign, although it is desirable to have it. 

11. Question by General Scott. Cannot troops execute full marches 
with more sleep and less fatigue to themselves with hard bread, than 
with flour to be baked into bread ? 

Answer. Yes. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half past 10. 

December 23, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
The testimony of General Clinch resumed. 

Question by the Court. What influence had the movement of General 
Gaines against the Seminole Indians in 1836, on the results of the cam- 
paign conducted by Major General Scott against that enemy in Florida 
in the same year? 

Answer. I am of the opinion that the movement of Major General 
Gaines's command through Florida did not materially affect the operations 
of Major General Scott. General Gaines's command did consume several 
thousand rations ; but the material of that command was of the best 
kind, and would have been of advantage to the commander of any 
army. 



[ 224 ] 64 

12. Question by General Scott. The subsistence drawn from the de- 
pot at Fort Drane by General Gaines's troops, was not the train obliged 
to replace from the St. John's, and did not this extra labor contribute 
much to break down and to weaken that train ? 

Answer. The provisions furnished General Gaines were drawn from 
the St. John's, and the train must have been more or less affected in per- 
forming the route. 

13. Question by General Scott. By the addition of the troops of 
General Gaines to your column, was not the right wing rendered some- 
what stronger than had been intended, and stronger than was found to 
be necessary ? 

Answer. I thought myself that the addition of those troops strengthen- 
ed the column I commanded very much ; but I believe the troops com- 
posing the right wing, independent of that number, could have performed 
the route they did. It was rendered stronger than was the original in- 
tention of General Scott. I, myself, think that they were an acquisition, 
as they were experienced regulars, and gallant and efficient volunteers 
from Louisiana. 

Owing to the absence of witnesses, (several of the most important 
not being expected to reach here before the early part of January,) the 
Court adjourned to meet again at this place on the 4th of January next, 
at half past one o'clock. 

January 4, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. 

Owing to the absence of Brigadier General Atkinson, the Court ad- 
journed to meet to-morrow at 1 o'clock. 

January 5, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
The witnesses expected not having yet arrived, the Court adjourned to 
meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock, A.M. 

January 6,1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Judge Advocate presented to the Court the following deposition of 
General Clinch, taken during the recess of the Court : 

1. Question by General Scott. Did not General Clinch visit Major 
General Gaines at Fort King, about the 24th of February, 1836, soon 
after the arrival of the latter at that place from Tampa bay ? 

Answer. Yes. 

2. ({uestionby General Scott. Did not the witness, at that interview, 
communicate to Major General Gaines the outline of Major General 
Scott's impending plan of operations against the hostile Seminole In- 
dians, together with the probable force that the said Scott expected to 



65 [ 224 [ 

employ in his operations ; and was not that outline substantially the same 
as that which the said Scott subsequently pursued against the said In- 
dians? 

Answer. During the short stay I made at Fort King, I had various 
conversations with General Gaines on the subject of our Indian difficul- 
ties, and believe I showed him a letter from General Scott containing 
the outline of his impending plan of operations against the Seminole In- 
dians, as well as the probable force he expected to have in the field. 
There was no material change in the original plan, as well as I recollect. 

The Judge Advocate also read to the Court the following deposition 
of Major Leon Dyer, of Louisiana : 

1. Question by General Scott. In what capacity did you serve in the 
Louisiana volunteers, in the Florida campaign ? 

Answer. I served as private, in the first instance ; afterwards was pro- 
moted to be regimental quartermaster and assistant commissary, and also 
went out on several occasions as aid-de-camp to General Smith. 

2. Question by General Scott. What did you hear of an unwillingness 
among the Louisiana volunteers to serve, except under the command of 
General Gaines, either at Pensacola or any other place on the passage 
between New Orleans and Tampa bay ? 

Answer. I never heard of any unwillingness on their part to serve 
under the command of any officer whatever. 1 never heard of any 
pledge given by any of the Louisiana volunteers to serve under the 
command of General Gaines. 

Sworn to before the Judge Advocate. 

[Major General Gaines here presented himself before the Court, and 
addressed the Court to the following effect : 

The undersigned, having been notified by the Department of War that 
his protest, bearing date the 29th of October, 1S36, objecting to Major 
General Macomb as President or member of the Court, had not been 
complied with, and being convinced that the President of the United 
States possesses the only power to change the organization of this Court, 
the undersigned has now the honor to notify the Court that he attends its 
sessions for the purposes prescribed in the order of the Department of 
War; and he claims the right, pursuant to the 91st article of war, to 
cross-examine and interrogate the witnesses, and of examining the rec- 
ord of the Court, with a view to ascertain what measures have been 
adopted by the Court, in order to enable him to prepare his list of wit- 
nesses, and arrange his vindication. Respectfully, 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General by brevet. 

The Court was cleared, and determined that Major General Gaines can- 
not take any part in the matter now under consideration ; that when the 
subjects, referring especially to his campaign in Florida, shall come be- 
fore the Court, he will be at liberty to examine witnesses and documents, 
and even the testimony which has been taken in the present investiga- 
tion — the Court considering the two campaigns under Major General 
Gaines and Major General Scott separate and distinct subjects of inves- 
tigation.] 

5 



■ 224 ] 



GO 



The Court being resumed, General Scott presented to the Court, in 
evidence, certain papers which will be found accompanying.these Pro- 
ceedings. 

Lieutenant Gouverneur Morris, cf the 4th regiment of infantry, a witness 
on the part of 31ajor General Scott, being duly sicowi, ivas interrogated 
as follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. Where was the witness stationed in 
March and April last, and in what capacity? 

Answer. At Tampa bay, as commi-sary of that depot. 

2. Question by General Scott. What amount of hard bread and bacon 
was received at Tampa bay from the commissary or quartermaster at 
New Orleans for the use of the army in March and April, up to General 
Scott's departure from Tampa with the troops, April 17th? 

Answer. I made a return to General Scott at the time, which shows 
the amount received and issued from the 10th of February to the 8th of 
April, 1836. 1 submit the return as the best evidence on the subject. 
It shows the amount of hard bread on hand on the 8th of April to be 
about 12,720 pounds; and of bacon, 21,600 pounds. After this return 
was made out, on the 8th of April, and, I think, after General Scott left 
Tampa bay, there was received, within the month of April, about 15,000 
pounds more of hard bread. 

[The return alluded to in this answer will be found among the papers 
accompanying these Proceedings. See document No. 100.] 

3. Question by General Scott. Was the issue of hard bread and bacon 
at Tampa bay confined to troops about to march, and by whose order ? 

Answer. Yes, it was, and by General Scott's order. 

4. Question by General Scott. Were new ovens commenced at Tam- 
pa soon after General Scott's arrival ; by whose order ; and were they 
completed much before the departure of the troops with him ? 

Answer. Yes, they were, and by General Scott's order. They were 
only completed two or three days before his departure. Colonel Lind- 
say, commanding the centre column, was directed to cause them to be 
erected. There was a difficulty among the volunteers who were at work 
on the ovens, between them and the commanding officer of the garrison 
at Tampa bay. After that difficulty, I believe the volunteers did not 
continue on the work, and it was finished by the regular troops. 

5. Question by General Scott. How much bread in a day could the 
old oven supply, by ordinary working ? 

Answer. Of hard bread, I suppose it might make up a barrel of flour, 
about 300 pounds. It would make more of soft bread, as it would not 
take so long to dry. 

6. Question by General Scott. What sutlers' stores were on hand 
when General Seott arrived at Tampa bay with the troops? 

Answer. There were scarcely any : a very limited supply. 

7. Question by General Scott. About what time did the sutler leave 
Tampa for New Orleans, and for what purpose ? 

Answer. On or about the 3d of March, to purchase a supply of sutlers' 
stores. 

8. Question by General Scott. Did the sutler return with or send a 
fresh supply of goods in March or April, and, if not, what did the wit- 
ness understand was the reason ? 



07 [ 224 | 

Answer. He did not send the supply of stores. I received a letter 
from Mr. L. Morris, acting sutler, on the subject, which letter, I have 
reason to believe, has been destroyed among other papers which belong- 
ed to me. This letter enclosed a paragraph from one of the New Or- 
leans papers. I don't recollect exactly the words of the paragraph ; its 
purport however was, that " the war in Florida was ended," which de- 
terred the sutler from sending the supplies. 

The Court adjourned, to meet to-morrow morning at 1 1 o'clock. 

January 7, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Owing to the indisposition of Major General Scott, and the absence of 
witnesses, the Court adjourned to meet on Monday morning, the 9th in- 
stant, at 12 o'clock. 

January 9. 1S37. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

[The Judge Advocate presented to the Court a communication from 
Major General Gaines, dated the 7th January, (document B,) whereupon 
the Court was cleared, and directed the Judge Advocate to furnish Major 
General Gaines with a copy of the decision of the Court made on the Gth 
instant, in answer to his application of that day to become a party in the 
case now under investigation, and to inform the general that that de- 
cision will not be' departed from. Ail which was accordingly done.] 

Owing to the indisposition of Major General Scott, and his request 
that his case might be laid over till Monday next, to enable him to make 
his final address to the Court, his case was accordingly laid over to that day. 

Monday, January 1G, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Judge Advocate presented to the Court a letter from Major J. Clark 
to the Quartermaster Genera!, dated August 1G, 183G, which, being re- 
ceived as evidence, was placed among '.he documents, and is numbered 152. 

Captain A. Van Buren, of the 1st regiment of dragoons, a witness, being 
duly sworn, rrogated as follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. What does the witness recollect as to 
the time of arrival of the first train of wagons at Picolata (opposite to) 
from Fort Drane, after General Scott reached Picolata 4 ? 

Answer. The train of wagons from Fort Drane arrived on the west 
side of the river (opposite to Picolata) about the 1st or 2d of March. 

2. Question by General Scott. Who was charged with the loading of 
that train ; what exertions were made by that officer to get over some 
wagons and horses to add to that train, and to get over subsistence and 
other stores for loading the wagons ? 

Answer. The officer charged with the loading of that train was cap- 
tain and assistant quartermaster Shannon. His exertions were unremit- 
ted in passing the subsistence and other stores across the river, as well 
as in passing over some wagons and horses to add to the train. 

3. Question by General Scott. What does the witness recollect of the 
state of the weather, and the difficulty of passing the St. John's, at Pico- 

l, about the end of February and the first eight or nine days in March ? 



[ 224 ] G8 

Answer. There was an unusually severe storm at about that time ; so 
severe as to render it impossible to pass the subsistence across the St. 
John's in the flats prepared for that purpose. One of these flats, loaded 
with subsistence, was sunk in attempting to get across. A small steam- 
boat, the "Essayons," was then used for the purpose; but considerable 
delay arose from the fact of the boat not being able to get near to the 
opposite shore. A battalion of artillery, under Major Gates, which ar- 
rived at Picolata about that time, was seven or eight days in passing from 
Savannah to that place, in consequence of the severity of the weather, 
as I was informed by Major Gates himself. 

4. Question by General Scott. When did that train, loaded for Fort 
Drane, leave (he St. John's, and what did the witness understand Gen- 
eral Scott's motive to be in marching with a small detachment on the 9th 
of March, in respect to that train, and the joint forces of Generals Gaines 
and Clinch, on the Withlacoochee ? 

Answer. The train left (he point opposite Picolata about the 6th of 
March. The motive of General Scott, as I understood it from what he 
said, was to reinforce or rescue the forces of Generals Gaines and Clinch 
on the Withlacoochee. The subsistence sent by the train was intended 
for those troops and the detachment which marched. 

Colonel De Peyster again called. 

Question by General Scott. Did the witness happen to be at Picolata 
once or oftener pending the storms about the end of February and the 
beginning of March, and what were the difficulties of passing the river 
at that time in boats and scows ? 

Answer. I was there twice during the stormy weather. The river 
there is about two miles wide. There is a long stretch of the river which 
enables the northeast wine's (o have a full sweep, and, consequently, 
raise a very heavy swell. 1 crossed the river in a very fine boat, I think 
belonging to the cutter; was coxswain of her myself in crossing, and had 
a great deal of difficulty in preventing her shipping the sea. I saw a flat, 
or scow, which had been towed there by a steamboat, empty, and sunk. 
in towing, and it was in my opinion impossible for a loaded flat to cross 
the river at that time with any chance of safety, owing to the storm. The 
storm continued six or seven days. 

Major General Scott represented to (he Court that he would not be 
prepared with his final address until Friday, the 20th instant. Where- 
upon his case was laid over to that day. 

Friday, January 20, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The following deposition from Colonel Gadsden was here presented to 
the Court by the Judge Advocate : 

1. Question by General Scott. In what capacity did you serve in 
Florida with Major General Scott, say between the 14th of March and 
the end of April, 1836? 



G9 [ 221 J 



Answer. I held the commission of Quartermaster General of Florida, 
but within the periods named was attached to General Scott as chief of 
his staff. 

2. Question by General Scott. VV« re you not in that period fully in 
the official confidence of the said Scott, and was lie not almost constantly 
in your view, or within speaking distance ? 

Answer. I answer in the affirmative. 

3. Question by General Scoti. As far as known to you, and in refer- 
ence to the number and description of his forces — their respective terms 
of service — the season of the year — the character of the country — and the 
means of subsistence and transportation provided — did the said Scott fail, 
in any particular, to adopt the best plans and movements, according to the 
information possessed at headquarters, or fail in zeal and diligence to 
bring the war to a successful conclusion ? 

Answer. General Scott labored under many and complicated embar- 
rassments in maturing the plans of his campaign, growing out of an in- 
sufficiency of transportation ; the want of supplies adapted to Indian war- 
fare, (having received pork and flour, instead of bacon and hard bread ;) 
the lateness of the season, it being late in March before lie could com- 
mence operations; the limited period (three months) for which the vol- 
unteers and militia had to serve ; and the uncommon prevalence of de- 
bility and sickness among the troops, particularly in the commands under 
Eustis and Lindsay. The measles made their appearance in camp, and 
from one-fourth to one-half of the effective force of the South Carolina, 
Alabama, and Florida requisitions, were, at an early period, rendered 
unfit for active service. At the bay of Tampa, after the three divisions 
of the army met there, the spectacle was more that of a camp of hospi- 
tals, than of an assemblage of troops preparing for the active operations 
which were necessary to circumvent and subdue a vigilant and active 
savage foe. General Scott was active, zealous, and anxious; failing in 
no degree to adopt and execute those plans which circumstances would 
permit, and his own judgment approve. Trammelled in many instances 
by insufficiency of resources, he was compelled to abandon operations 
which otherwise would have been executed, and might have eventuated 
more favorably than his general operations. I answer, therefore, unhes- 
itatingly, that General Scott did not fail, to my knowledge, in adopting 
and prosecuting the plans which were generally deemed most judicious, 
and which, if executed by all parts of the army, might have eventuated 
very differently. But they were not executed. Neither Eustis or Lind- 
say's commands ever came to the point ordered ; and as the right wing, 
with which Scott was, personally, performed its assigned part in crossing 
the Withlacoochee, and in driving between the river and the lake, the 
failure of the other two, in not being in position on the east of the With- 
lacoochee, and in tbe forks, prevented that thorough exploration of the 
swamps and strong holds of that singular liver, which was necessary, to 
find the enemy, surround, and conquer him, which were the objects of 
the campaign. I believed General Scott's plans generally good : I dif- 
fered with him in some of the details; better calculated, in my opinion, 
to secure the objects contemplated. 

4. Question by General Scott. Should his answer to either of those 
points of inquiry be, on its face, unfavorable to the said Scott, will the 



[ 224 J 70 

witness have the goodness to give the grounds of his opinion, in order 
that it may be explained and reconciled with the testimony of other wit- 
nesses in the case ? 

Answer. I was in favor of more dispersion of the troops; viewing 
the war as an Indian, or wild-beast hunt, in which the chances of ferret- 
ing him out, surrounding, overtaking, capturing or destroying him, would 
be multiplied in proportion to the number of parties we could set in mo- 
tion. In these views, however, I must say, in justice to General Scott, 
that I was not sustained by either him or others, and that the opinion 
generally prevailed that it would be as unsafe as it was unmilitary, to 
disperse and expose our army to be beat in detail. As I have been asked 
for my opinion and reasons, I have given them : subsequent operations 
and events have confirmed, in my judgment, the correctness of them; 
but they do not detract from operations which have been so generally 
sustained by others, and particularly by the conduct of those who have 
followed in succession, and who have been equally as unfortunate, from 
moving in masses. We must meet the enemy as they meet us, disperse 
when they do, and concentrate as quick. 

5. Question by General Scott. By whom and under what circumstan- 
ces was the letter written to Major McLemore, permitting or directing 
him to send a detachment of Florida militia, by water, with subsistence 
up the Withlacoochee river ? 

Answer. The letter to Major McLemore was written by me. He 
sought the service, and my letter was in reply to a friendly one from 
him. As I have previously transmitted a copy of the letter to the Court, 
let the document speak for itself. I assume the responsibility. 

6. Question by General Scott. Was any copy of that letter entered 
on the record-books at headquarters ? 

Answer. I answer in the negative. 

7. Question by General Scott. What limitations as to the time of ar- 
rival on the Withlacoochee, and the length of stay there, did that letter 
to Major McLemore impose ? If the witness kept any copy of the letter, 
or has since obtained the original, he will please annex it to the answer 
under this interrogatory. 

Answer. I refer to the letter, a copy of which is in possession of the 
Recorder. 

8. Question by General Scott. Does the witness recollect any con- 
versation between him and the said Scott, or with General Clinch, about 
the time they crossed the Withlacoochee, or at Tampa bay, respecting 
the possible or probable execution of Major McLemore's proposition to 
send supplies up that river, and the probable length of stay of the detach- 
ment which might accompany those supplies ? 

Answer. The witness recollects a conversation held at the bay of 
Tampa between General Scott and General Clinch. It was in relation 
to orders issued to the latter, directing him to send the fourth regiment 
of infantry, and some other troops from his wing, to penetrate the With- 
lacoochee as far as practicable by water; General Clinch meeting them 
with his main force at some designated point on his return march by land. 
General Clinch seemed not to think, by his remarks, the operation either 
necessary or practicable ; and to sustain the latter he introduced a wit- 
ness, a soldier who had ascended the Withlacoochee, and who repre- 



71 [ 224 ] 

sented the ascent with troops by water exceedingly hazardous, if not 
impracticable, unless covered and protected by troops on land. Gen- 
eral Scott expressed some anxiety to have the operation executed, lest 
McLemore should be on the river ; but Clinch spoke very positively 
that that must be impossible ; that he was convinced McLemore had not 
attempted the expedition, and that if he had he must have failed, and 
returned to the Suwannee: that he (Clinch) had every confidence in 
the information of his witness, (the soldier above adverted to,) and was 
satisfied the river Withlacoochee could not be penetrated if an enemy 
opposed. By reference to me in the course of the conversation, I could 
only state what were the orders to McLemore : " that he must not come 
unless he could reach the river by the 29th of March ; must be very 
prudent in attempting to ascend it ; hazard nothing, and by no means to 
remain on the river after the 3d of x\pril ; but to return to the Suwan- 
nee." it appears McLemore did not reach the Withlacoochee until the 
2d or 3d of April ; persisted in ascending, and on his own gallant re- 
sponsibility established the block-house, and resolved to maintain it. 
The result of this conversation was an abandonment of the enterprise 
contemplated by a part of General Clinch's command, and a subsequent 
order to Major Read, which was drawn up with great prudence and cau- 
tion, in consequence of the information given by General Clinch and his 
witness. 

9. Questionby General Scott. What were the impressions expressed 
in those conversations by the witness, as to the execution of that enter- 
prise, and the length of time that the detachment, if it arrived at all, 
would remain on the Withlacoochee ? 

Answer. There was no doubt expressed but that McLemore had not 
penetrated the Withlacoochee, and that if he had within the time limited, 
in obedience to his instructions, he must have returned on the day or- 
dered. Subsequent facts show that he did return with a part of his com- 
mand to the Suwannee, and could have brought back the whole of his 
force, had not a part of them preferred remaining and braving the enemy. 
They voluntarily sought the hazard. 

10. Question by General Scott. By whom were the instructions to 
Major Read, the commander of the expedition by water from Tampa bay 
to the Withlacoochee, drawn up, and did the said Scott fail to provide 
every thing in his power to give success to that expedition ? 

Answer. The order was drawn up by me ; and I am not aware that 
General Scott restricted or withheld any of the means necessary to the 
success of the expedition. Major Read was directed to make the neces- 
sary requisitions on the quartermaster at the bay of Tampa ; and I have 
some indistinct recollection of hearing (for I was not present at the con- 
versation) of his, Major Read's, desiring a howitzer, or a piece of artil- 
lery, which, it was said, General Scott did not think essential : however, 
I do not know that the piece of ordnance required was denied or not. I 
know that the quartermaster was very much engaged for some time in 
building boats adapted to the ascent of the river, so that there should be 
no failure in the requisite transportation. I do not know whether they 
were taken or not. 

11. Questionby General Scott. According to the best intelligence 
possessed at headquarters at the time, and in reference to the means 



[ 224 ] 72 

provided, was there 100m for a reasonable doubt that Major Read's ex- 
pedition ought to succeed ? 

Ansioer. There was not a doubt entertained at headquarters that the 
nature of the service was distinctly understood, and that it was assigned 
to an officer and troops who would execute it. Indeed it was a confi- 
dence reposed by the General in Major Read that induced him to assign 
to him so responsible a duty. The General was aware of the difficulties 
and hazards of the enterprise ; and while it was committed to an officer 
who had been highly recommended by the superiors with whom he had 
served, it was deemed necessary (after the conversation held with Clinch 
previously adverted to in reply to question 9) to draw up the order un- 
der the precautions which characterize it. The order was, however, 
discretionary; Major Read to be the judge, on his arrival at the mouth 
of the Withlacoochee, on the hazard or not of his ascending it. The 
order, however, speaks for itself; and 1 have only deemed it necessary, 
under the facts detailed, to advert to the causes of its general prudent 
and cautious character. 

The testimony having here closed, Major General Scott made the 
Address which accompanies these proceedings; after which, the Court 
adjourned this case to a future day. 

January 30, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Court proceeded to pronounce its Opinion in the foregoing case, 
as follows : 

The Court, after a careful review of the great mass of testimony taken 
in the foregoing investigation, finds that Major General Scott was amply 
clothed with authority to create the means of prosecuting the Seminole 
war to a successful issue ; but is of opinion that, at the time he was in- 
vested with the command, the season was too far advanced for him to 
collect, appoint, and put in motion his forces, till a day too late to com- 
pass the object. It appeals that, after using great diligence and energy, 
he was not in a condition to take the field and enter the enemy's strong 
holds before the 28th of March, and then without sufficient means for 
transporting the necessary supplies to enable him to remain there long 
enough to seek out the scattered forces of the enemy. 

The Court, therefore, ascribe the failure of the campaign to the want 
of time to operate ; the insalubrity of the climate after the middle of 
April ; the impervious swamps and hammocks that abound in the country 
occupied by the enemy, affording him cover and retreat at every step ; 
an absence of all knowledge by the General, or any part of his forces, 
of the topography of the country, together with the difficulty of obtain- 
ing, in time, the means of transporting supplies for the army. 

The Court is further of opinion, from the testimony of many officers 
of rank and intelligence, who served in the campaign, that Major General 
Scott was zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of his duties, and 
that his plan of campaign was well devised, and prosecuted with energy, 
steadiness, and ability. 

As connected with the Seminole campaign under Major General Scott, 
in 1836, the attention of the Court has been calied to the tone and Ian- 



73 [ 224 ] 

guage of his " Order No. 48," dated the 17th of May, and of his letter 
of the 1 1th of May to the Adjutant General, now on the file of this Court, 
(see documents Nos. 138 and 119:) the first reflecting on the people of 
Florida, and the latter on the conduct of Major Read, of the Florida vol- 
unteers. The tenor of these are not considered a military offence, but 
an indiscretion that it were better to have avoided. 

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, 

President of the Court. 
S. Cooper, Captain U. S. Army, 

Judge Advocate and Recorder of the Court. 



The following communications were submitted for the consideration of 



CONTINUATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE FORKGOING CASE. 
Frederick, February 22, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to notice. All present 
The fol 
the Court 

War Department, 

February 18, 1837. 

Sir : I have the honor to enclose a copy of an Order of the President 
of the United States, on the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry of which 
you are President, relative to the campaign against the Seminole Indi- 
ans under Major General Scott, and, in compliance with the direction of 
the close thereof, to transmit the Proceedings, with the documentary ev- 
idence referred to therein, (except such as was selected and taken back 
by the Judge Advocate,) for the future action of the Court. I forward, 
also " Major General Scott's Address, or Summary of Evidence taken in 
his case." 

Very respectfully, 

Your most obedient servant, 

B. F. BUTLER, 
Secretary of War ad interim. 
Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb, 

President of the Court of Inquiry, Frederick, Md. 

(copy.) 

The Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry recently assembled and still 
sitting at Frederick, by virtue of Orders No. 65 and 68, so far as the same 
relate to the causes of the failure of the campaign of Major General Scott 
against the Seminole Indians, in 1836, were heretofore submitted to the 
President, and the examination thereof suspended, in consequence of the 
necessary connexion between the case of Major General Scott and that 
of Major General Gaines, also referred to the same Court and not yet re- 
ported on. Certain other Proceedings of the same Court having been 
since examined by the President, and having been found defective, and 
therefore remitted to the Court for reconsideration, the President has 



[ 224 ] 74 

deemed it proper, in order to expedite the matter, to look into the first- 
mentioned Proceedings, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not 
the like defects existed therein. On this inspection of the record, he 
perceives that the Court has not reported, except in a few instances, the 
facts of the case, as required by the Order constituting the Court, and in 
those instances, the facts found by the Court are stated in a very general 
form, and without sufficient minuteness and precision ; and he therefore 
remits the said Proceedings to the Court, to the end that the Court may re- 
sume the consideration of the evidence, and from the same, and irom 
such further evidence as may be taken (in case the Court shall deem it 
necessary to take further evidence) may ascertain and report, with dis- 
tinctness and precision, all the facts touching the subject to be inquired 
of, established to the satisfaction of the Court by the evidence before it, 
and especially the times when and places where the several occurren- 
ces which are deemed material by the Court, in the formation of its Opin- 
ion, actually took place, with the amount of force on both sides, at the 
different periods of time embraced in the transaction, and the positions 
thereof, and such other circumstances as are deemed material by the 
Court ; together with its Opinion on the whole subject, for the information 
of the President. 

The Secretary of War ad interim will cause the Proceedings of the 
Court in the case of Major General Scott, first above mentioned, with the 
documentary evidence referred to therein, and a copy hereof, tobetians- 
mitted to Major General Alexander Macomb, President of the Court, for 
the proper action thereon. 

ANDREW JACKSON. 

Washington, February 18, 1837. 

The Court proceeded, in conformity with the foregoing instructions of 
the President of the United States, to take up and review the document- 
ary and oral testimony taken on a former decision in the investigation of 
the failure of the campaign under Major General Scott against the Semi- 
nole Indians in Florida, in 1836, and submits the following Synopsis or 
condensed view of the testimony on which the Court formed its Opinion. 

DOCUMENTARY TESTIMONY. 

January 21. General Scott ordered to Florida, with full power to 
raise a volunteer force, &c. (Doc. 4.) 

January 31. General Scott writes from Augusta that he is making 
preparations for the campaign, by raising a force and collecting supplies ; 
finds muskets in the Augusta arsenal, but no accoutrements or cartridges ; 
the powder unfit for service — no knapsacks, &c. — shall go to Milledgeville 
to consult the Governor on the subject of the Creek difficulties. (Doc- 
ument 18.) 

February 2. General Scott reports from Augusta — wants patent ri- 
fles — none in the Southern arsenals — shall aim with muskets — not a suf- 
ficient number of accoutrements — shall borrow from South Carolina — de- 
ficiency in camp-kettles, &c. — shall have them made — wants more tents, 
musket-cartridges, «^c. (Doc. 20.) 

February 6. General Scott writes from Augusta that he has just re- 



75 f 224 ] 

turned from Milledgeville, where he believes he has quickened the meas- 
ures for obtaining the force from Georgia ; progress making in raising 
force and collecting supplies for the campaign, &c. (Doc. 34.) 

February 16. General Scott arrives at Savannah on the 9th ; has 
been fully occupied in regulating the supplies and movements of the 
troops for Florida ; part of the South Carolina force on the way to Flor- 
ida ; others expected soon to assemble, &c. ; expects by the end of the 
month to have in the field a force of about 4,600, 1,400 of which mount- 
ed ; shall arrive in Florida in advance of more than half of the forces 
called for from South Carolina and Georgia, and before the Alabama re- 
giment has reached its destination, (Tampa bay,) and expects towards 
the end of the month to commence operations. (Doc. 38.) 

February 20. General Scott reports from Savannah the arrival of a 
detachment of recruits from the north ; has been waiting for the return 
of a steamer, &c. sets off in a few moments for Florida. (Doc. 44.) 

February 22. General Scott arrives at Picolata ; a battalion of Geor- 
gia foot in position, another of mounted men, on this side of the St. 
Mary's, and presumes another battalion of mounted Georgians ate in 
march from the interior of Georgia. The head company of South Caro- 
lina mounted regiment has reached the Ogechee ; the regiment of South 
Carolina foot at St. Augustine ; shall await the arrival of at least a por- 
tion of the mounted force before commencing operations. Gen. Clinch 
has at Fort Diane 523 men, and reports the enemy about 1,500 warriors, 
and 200 or 300 negroes. (Doc. 46.) 

February 26. General Scott at Picolata; reports the regiment of 
South Carolina foot moving from St. Augustine, via Tomoca, upon Volu- 
sia, where it is expected to arrive by 3d March ; the South Carolina 
mounted regiment may be expected at Volusia about the 7th ; these two 
regiments, with five companies of United States artillery, will constitute 
the left wing. Only one company of mounted Georgians has arrived ; a 
battalion of Georgia foot (340 strong) now in route for Fort Diane, dis- 
tance sixty-five miles, and a bad road; has been occupied in devising 
means to send to Fort Drane large supplies ; is waiting the arrival of 
means of transportation from Augusta and Savannah ; some wagons have 
arrived but no horses ; the remainder of the baggage train not expected 
in less than ten days; is using every means to hasten on supplies ; em- 
barrassed by the arrival of General Gaines at Fort King with 1,100 men, 
and who has called upon General Clinch at Fort Drane for 1,400 rations, 
which will leave only 5,000 rations at Fort Drane, i. e. about eight days' 
subsistence for the force there, say 650 men ; recalls the Georgia battal- 
ion now on the march for Fort Drane ; sends 20,000 rations to Volusia, 
which is about fifty miles from Fort King, and seventy from Fort 
Drane ; shall hasten to Fort Drane, although his presence still neces- 
sary at Picolata ; all his plans thwarted, the principal of which was 
to move in concert from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, on the 8th 
March, upon the enemv, who are supposed to be on the Withlacoochee. 
(Doc. 47.) 

March 2. General Scott at Picolata ; reports difficulty in obtaining 
means of transportation ; some of the Georgia volunteers refuse to be 
mustered into service ; four other companies just arrived ; the United 
States dragoons may not arrive in a month. The left wing will probably 



I" 224 ] 70 

leach Volusia by the 8th or 10th. Colonel Lindsay's forces cannot be 
at Tampa before probably the 15th ; he cannot be in position in time, 
and General Eustis cannot cross the Ochlawaha before the 14th. (Docu- 
ment 52.) 

March 6. General Scott at Picolata ; reports he has no recent intelli- 
gence of the movements of General Gaines later than 29th ultimo ; im- 
portant for his combinations that he should speedily learn what has be- 
come of General Gaines's column, and whether the position and numbers 
of the enemy have been materially changed by its operations. Part of 
the foot of the left wing now occupy Volusia and positions on the coast as 
far as Tomoca ; four other companies are engaged in scouring the coun- 
try between the Atlantic and St. John's ; the left wing cannot be at Volu- 
sia before the 12th. The forces in vicinity of Picolata and known to be 
coming up, are 140 men, under Major Gates, just landed, and eight days 
from Savannah, through a most unusual storm; 320 Georgia foot; 140 
Georgia mounted men at Garey's Ferry ; Captain Wharton's dragoons, 
ninety strong, expected at Garey's about the 11th ; 16,000 rations just 
despatched for Fort Drane ; the wagons will return to be reloaded ; in 
the mean time wagons and horses may be expected from Savannah. The 
wagons reported to have been shipped at Baltimore have been left be- 
hind, &c. ; shall send no more troops to Fort Drane on account of diffi- 
culty of subsisting them there. (Doc. 68.) 

March 9. General Scott between Picolata and Garey's Ferry, re- 
ports on his way to Fort Drane, via Garey's, taking a force of about 240.. 
which may be important to rescue General Gaines. The left wing can- 
not be in force on the Ochlawaha before the 17th, and Lindsay cannot 
operate more than two days' march from Tampa, for want of means of 
transportation ; no transportation yet arrived from Savannah. The amount 
of subsistence that will be at Fort Drane on the 8th, 17,497 rations of 
bread and flour, and 1 1,000 rations of pork, with beef-cattle in the neigh- 
borhood, &c. The troops about to proceed as far as the Withlacoochee 
will not have the means of taking with them rations for more than six 
days; recapitulates the cause of his deficiency in the means of transport- 
ation. (Doc. 71.) 

March 14. General Scott at Fort Drane ; reports the force from the 
Withlacoochee fallen back on Fort Drane ; has directed General Eustis, 
after scouring the country through which he will have to pass, to place 
his column in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha by the 25th instant; Col. 
Lindsay by the same day to be at Chickuchatty. The right wing will 
move from Fort Drane about the 24th for the Withlacoochee ; this time 
is appointed to give Eustis and Lindsay time to put themselves in posi- 
tion, to recruit the forces lately under General Gaines, and to receive 
subsistence from Garey's Ferry. (Doc. 77.) 

March 13. Fort Drane; the plan of campaign to move in three 
columns from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, upon the Withlacoo- 
chee, where they will co-operate, &c. (Docs. 81,93.) 

March 20. General Scott at Fort Drane ; reports he shall probably be 
obliged to move from Fort Drane on 24th or 25th, with less than eigh- 
teen days' subsistence for the right wing, which will consist of about 
1,700 fighting men. Some wagons and horses arrived at Picolata from 
Savannah about the 12th instant ; General Eustis does not expect to be 



77 [ 224 ] 

at Pelaklikaha with his wing before the 27th or 28th ; without more 
wagons and horses has no hope of accumulating at Fort Drane beyond the 
current consumption, more subsistence than they shall have on the 24th. 
(Doc. 94.) 

March 25. General Scott at Fort Drane ; the right wing moves to- 
morrow ; reports a skirmish between General Eustis's advance guard and 
a small party of Indians; Lindsay arrived at Tampa on the 5th and ex- 
pects to march on Fort King with a force of about 1,120 men ; Captain 
Wharton with his dragoons has reached Fort Drane. (Doc. 97.) 

April 12. General Scott at Tampa, reports the greater part of the right 
wing reached that place the 5th ; half of the left wing arrived the same 
day, and the centre the day before. All compelled to go to Tampa for 
subsistence, &c. (Doc. 103.) 

April 8. General Clinch reports the movement of the right wing from 
Fort Drane to Tampa ; left Fort Drane 26th March, with 450 artillery, 270 
4th infantry, 75 United States dragoons, 171 Augusta volunteers, Louis- 
ana regiment of volunteeis, 321 Cooper's volunteers, and 230 Georgia 
mounted men, aggregate 1 ,968 ; with two six-pounders and eighteen days' 
rations in wagons, pack-horses, &c. The route in direction of ("amp Iz- 
ard, on the Withlacoochce ; difficulty in forwarding the wagon-train, the 
road new, country wet and deep, obliged to lay logs to make them prac- 
ticable ; reached Camp Izard on the morning of 28th ; the enemy gave 
notice of his presence on the opposite bank, by firing into camp ; prepara- 
tions immediately made for forcing the passage in boats brought from Fort 
Drane. 

At 4 o'clock A. M. of the 29th, the bank of the river occupied by 
sharp-shooters and the two pieces of artillery; at day-light the advance, 
consisting of two companies of artillery, crossed, followed by the Louisi- 
ana regiment and the fourth infantry : the train then crossed — in the 
mean time two companies of mounted men crossed at a difficult ford one 
and a half mile below — another swam the river near the ferry. The rear 
division while crossing was attacked ; the enemy driven off by discharges 
from the field-pieces and a volley from the rear guard. Except this 
attack the passage was unmolested. The enemy fired a few shots into 
camp during the night from the northern side of the river. On the 
morning of the 30th proceeded up the river in search of the enemy, and 
at 10 o'clock discovered him in small parties on an island in a chain of 
lakes: the baggage train drawn up in compact order and left with a 
guard of 300 men. The troops advanced to the attack ; the enemy re- 
tired ; were pursued about four miles, when it becoming late, the troops 
encamped — marched early next morning (31st) and soon discovered the 
enemy on another island — dispositions immediately made for attack with 
the right column on one end of the island and the left on the other : the 
approach at both points impracticable to any but infantry, and extremely 
difficult for them, the island being surrounded by very broad and wet 
savannahs, and so boggy that it was with difficulty the men could struggle 
through it. As the head of the right column approached firm ground, 
received a sharp discharge of rifles from the enemy ; but dashing forward 
the enemy was soon dislodged and pursued three or four miles, and 
driven across the river ; the column halted and remained on the bank 
of the river until recalled an hour after. In the pursuit which succeeded 



f 224 ] 78 

the first charge a portion of the right column became several times en- 
gaged, whenever thick cypress or hammock growth favored the enemy ; 
but in every instance he was promptly expelled and pursued. The left 
column approached the island simultaneously with the right, and received 
a hot discharge from the enemy as it arrived within rifle-shot of the ham- 
mock, and at the moment when the advance was plunging through a deep 
and difficult morass, a few discharges from a six-pounder silenced the 
enemy ; when the advance &c. charged the hammock and the enemy 
fled, and were actively pursued for two miles, until the left came up with 
the right column, and finding it impossible to penetrate the cypress 
swamp on its left, halted. Finding it impossible to follow the enemy 
across the river, and being 24 hours without provisions, the troops re- 
turned to the baggage train and encamped. On 1st April marched along 
the lakes and reached the next morning what appeared to be their south- 
eastern extremity, where they established a post of observation under 
Major Cooper; leaving him 17 days' provisions, and reserving only 
enough to carry the troops to Tampa, where they arrived on the 5th 
April, after a fatiguing and difficult march, making the road the whole 
distance: the fatigue and exposure increased the sick-list to 150. The 
killed and wounded in the several rencounters were four killed and 
nine wounded. (Uoc. 104.) 

April 10. General Eustis reports the operations of the left wing. 
Arrived at St. Augustine 15th February — commenced the establishment 
of a chain of posts at intervals of from 10 to 20 miles, extending south 
as far as Musqueto inlet, in order to cover the southern plantations, &c, 
and drive off the predatory bands of savages. On the 9th March Colonel 
Goodwyn's regiment of mounted South Carolinians marched to St. Au- 
gustine. On the 10th three men of Brisbane's regiment were killed 
witiiin 200 yards of his intrenchment, at Tomoca ; t he enemy fled be- 
fore he could rally upon them. On 15th the several detachments of the 
column put in motion for Volusia, via Tomoca. On 22d all had reached 
that point but Colonel Butler's battalion and two companies of artillery; 
both which had operated as far south as Smyrna. The route to Volusia 
was exceedingly difficult and injurious to wagons and horses. On 2 l 2d 
commenced crossing St. John's — about 3 P. M. the advanced guard, after 
cro sing briskly, were attacked by a considerable party of Indians; the 
guard maintained itself until reinforced by two companies; when a charge 
being made, the enemy was repulsed at all points, and retreated to his 
fastnesses. In the encounter our loss was three killed and nine 
wounded — one Indian found dead, and evidences of four others being 
thrown into the river. On 24th a subaltern's command of mounted men 
fell in with a party of 12 or 15 Indians and killed two. On 25th the 
left wing, consisting of four companies of United States artillery, Colonel 
Goodwyn's mounted regiment, and Colonel Brisbane's regiment of foot, 
and Elmore's volunteers, concentrated ; and on 26'th commenced the march 
for Pelaklikaha by the upper crossing of the Ochlawaha with 1,400 men 
and 13 days' rations, leaving at Volusia two companies of Brisbane's. 
The route very difficult — made only seven miles by the evening of 27th. 
The route becomes better — obliged to build bridges on the Ochlawaha, 
the Withlacoochee, and one intermediate stream — found no serious im- 
pediments to the march to Tampa. On 29th, after crossing the Ochla- 



79 [ 221 



waha, an Indian oi" note, Ayah Ilajoe, was killed by Colonel Shelton, 
who was wounded. On 30th the advance was attacked at Okihumpky 
swamp, and three men wounded : the hammocks were scoured and the 
Indians found behind some pines, from which they were soon driven into 
the depths of the swamp, inaccessible to the troops ; one of our men 
wounded : the enemy retreated whenever our line approached 200 yards. 
These were the only Indians seen on the march. On reaching Pelakli- 
kaha, found the villages abandoned, and no sign of their having been 
occupied for several weeks : cattle and ponies abundant in the neigh- 
borhood — caused the houses and fences to be burned. On 31st despatched 
an express to Fort King, who returned the night of 1st April with infor- 
mation that General Scott with the right wing had crossed the Withla- 
coochee on 28th March ; that no communication could be held with him 
on that route, and no provisions could be obtained at Fort King. It being 
impracticable, in the exhausted state of the horses, to draw provisions 
from Volusia, and having no guide who was acquainted with the country 
south of Pelaklikaha, determined to move south on the main road from 
Fort King to Tampa — fired signal-guns at 10 A. M. on four successive 
days, without hearing any response. On 3d fell upon Lindsay's trail re- 
turning to Tampa, and sent an express to him. On the 4th received his 
answer. On 5th, leaving the foot 15 miles from Tampa, arrived at Tampa 
with all the horse and wagons. (Doc. 105.) 

April 10. Colonel Lindsay reports the operations of his command, 
(the centre.) On 2d March embarked at Mobile with three companies 
of Alabama volunteers — seven other companies sailing about same time; 
— the first eight companies reached Tampa on Cth March, and the two 
others, with horses, provisions, and ammunition, did not arrive until the 
13th — found a battalion of Florida volunteers on the west side of the 
Hillsborough, and about the 10th was joined by a company of Louisiana 
volunteers. On the 12th discovered large fires in the direction of the 
Alalia river. The Florida battalion directed to scour that section of 
country, which duty was successfully performed by a night march, by 
which the Indians were suprised in their cam]), and driven across the 
river, with a loss of three of their party killed and six of their ponies cap- 
tured — determines to make a forward movement, and construct a stock- 
ade on the Hillsborough, where it is crossed by the main road from Tampa 
to Fort King, with a view of bringing subsistence nearer to the scene of 
operations; and, with this view, marches on the 15th. The bridges 
having been destroyed by the enemy, the march was much embarrassed, 
and did not reach the Hillsborough until the 17th; from which time to 
20th was engaged in constructing the stockade called Fort Alabama. 
The Florida battalion, under Major Read, left this post, and the remain- 
der returned on 21st to Fort Brooke — received there a despatch from 
General Scott, giving the plan of campaign, and requiring him to be at 
Chickuchatty on the 25th, to co-operate. On 22d commenced the march, 
taking up the battalion at Fort Alabama, and leaving there one com- 
pany and 30 sick ; the route lay through a hilly country, abounding in 
hammocks. After passing Elochuteka, the Indians, taking advantage 
of their coverts, began to annoy the rear and flanks. On 26th a flanker 
was killed and another wounded while passing a dense hammock nearly 
a mile in length — the hammock was entered, when a brisk fire was 



I 224 ] 80 

kept up between the rear and the enemy ; directed a company to charge 
into the hammock, with a view to ascertain the force of the enemy ; the 
Indians were driven off to the distance of a quarter of a mile in the open 
woods. During the night, at the encampment, parties of our men were 
fired upon by the Indians from a hammock contiguous to a pond which 
furnished water to the troops. Finding the position of the enemy was 
too distant to be reached by musketry, a round of canister was thrown in, 
which dispersed them. On the 27th the enemy still continued their 
annoying attacks, always lying in ambush : one of our men killed and 
two wounded — at noon halted, and a smart attack was made on the rear, 
but upon a brisk return of the fire, the Indians disappeared. On 28th, 
when encamped at Fort Broadnax, near Chickuchatty, the Indians com- 
menced a fire on our horses and the party guarding them, when a de- 
tachment was ordered to drive them, which was done without loss on 
our side. On the 30th piovisions beginning to be scarce, two parties of 
mounted men were sent in pursuit of cattle, covered by a force of 250 
men ; they brought in a supply sufficient for four days, although without 
bread or salt. During the day the friendly Indians killed a chief called 
Charley Fixico, a leader of about 85 men. At night the sentinels were 
occasionally fired on, and also during the 31st, but without injury. On 31st 
made an attempt to procure more beef. Being 60 miles from our depot, 
with barely enough provisions in store to march to it, without any pros- 
pect of being able to keep the field, for the purpose of co-operating, as 
contemplated in the plan of campaign, and having obtained no response 
to the signals made for eight days in succession, deemed it advisable to 
return to Tampa, where he arrived at night, the 4th April. In the in- 
terval, between the departure from and return to Fort Alabama, that 
post was attacked by a force of between 3 and 400 Indians. The attack 
commenced about eight A. M., and continued, without intermission, for 
two hours and twenty minutes; our loss, one killed and two wounded ; 
that of the enemy supposed to be 15 killed. Notwithstanding their de- 
feat in the main attack, they continued to lie around the work in consid- 
erable force, both day and night, until the return of the main force of 
the centre, w T hen they moved off on the same road by which we march- 
ed and the si<j;n made on that road furnishes the means of estimating 
their numbers. (Doc. 10G.) 

April 30. General Scott, at Picolata ; reports the movement of the 
troops from Tampa on the 14th instant; accompanies the left wing via 
Pelaklikaha, and the upper crossing of the Ochlawaha. On the night of 
the 22d the camp was fired upon by a party of six or eight of the enemy. 
They were pursued at day-light ; no result. A party of the enemy was 
met on the 24th, which might have been cut off, but for a false move- 
ment of a company of horse ; the horses and packs of the enemy cap- 
tured ; after scouring a succession of hammocks, which were, as far as 
practicable, surrounded by the horse, were eluded by every Indian. 
Goes to Volusia and embarks on board a steamer, and ascends the St. 
John's, GO miles above Volusia, to the head of Lake Monroe ; cannot 
cross the bar ; but takes a canoe and ascends yet further ; attacked by a 
party of the enemy. The object of this reconnoissance, 8fC. A body of 
the left wing reached Volusia the 25th. All the volunteers of the left 
wing marched under Colonel Goodwyn, on 28th, for St. Augustine, via 



81 [ 224 ] 

Tomoca ; the regulars left to garrison Volusia and superintend the 
evacuation of the post, which had become extremely sickly ; the evacua- 
tion may be completed in a week. Believes the whole force of the 
enemy, including negroes, does not exceed 1,200 fighting men, and that 
not 500 have, at any time since the commencement of hostilities, been 
brought within the same ten miles square. In all our operations within 
the last 30 days, have not found a party of more than 130: but parties 
of from 10 to 30 have been encountered almost every where. His views 
in regard to future operations, and the force necessary to subdue the 
enemy. Operations cannot be carried on except between the 20th No- 
vember and the end of April, the intermediate period being too hot or 
sickly. At the end of January he asked for troops of the Governors of 
the several States. The last of the South Carolinians arrived at St. Au- 
gustine the 9th March, and at Yolusia the 25th. The Georgians, in 
part, arrived at Fort Drane about that time : but six companies of horse 
not till the 9th April, after the campaign was nearly over. The Alaba- 
ma regiment, that was expected at Tampa about the 25th, did not reach 
that place till the 13th of the month. These extraordinary delays it was 
impossible for him to foresee or guard against. (Doc. 11G.) 

May 5. The Adjutant General writes to General Scott that the Pres- 
ident approves of General Scott's proposed plan of operations from 
Tampa, &c. The Secretary of War thinks it probable that, owing to 
the approaching season of the year, (he campaign in the field cannot be 
much longer vigorously pushed, in which event General Scott is to 
make a judicious selection of posts necessary to be occupied by the 
troops, &c. (Doc. 118.) 

May 11. General Scott, at St. Augustine, writes that he is much 
indisposed. From Clinch's report, the Indians have recommenced dep- 
redations and murders in the vicinity of Fort Drane. There is little 
hope of imbodying a respectable number of inhabitants as mounted men 
to aid in their own defence ; has authorized Clinch to raise SO or 100, in 
addition to the regular force (9 companies) at Fort Drane. Eustis en- 
gaged in mounting two companies of his regiment. Captain Dimmock's 
company hastily mounted and despatched in pursuit of a party of the 
enemy at Montangas ; overtakes them, kills three and wounds several : 
our loss, one killed and four wounded. The Indians fled to a hammock. 
The South Caiolina volunteers will not consent to remain longer, their 
time having expired. Has been using every means to raise a company 
of mounted volunteers this side of the St. John's ; doubts if he shall suc- 
ceed in raising even 40 men." The steamer Essay ons will be useful by 
frequently passing up the St. John's, as far as Lake George, in prevent- 
ing Indians from crossing the river and joining in depredations ; speaks 
of the conduct of Major Read as disgraceful, &c. (Doc. 119.) 

April 27. General Clinch at Fort Drane ; reports the return of the 
right wing from Tampa ; on 14th April, his force, consisting of 278 artil- 
lery, 43 dismounted dragoons, 202 infantry, 139 Augusta volunteers, and 
140 mounted men, left Tampa, on its return to Fort Drane, via Fort 
Cooper, on the Withlacoochee, making short marches, in consequence 
of the heat of the weather and debilitated condition of the horses, &c. 
On the 18th, within three miles of Fort Cooper, despatched two com- 
6 



[ 221 ] 82 

panies, with light wagons, with instructions to Major Cooper to join him ; 
the detachment fired upon from a hammock, and a lieutenant and private 
severely wounded ; the enemy fled. Major Cooper had been invested 
by the enemy from 5th to 17th April, and had lost one killed and five 
wounded ; estimated the force around him at 25U. On 22d one of the 
flankers fired on as he passed near a hammock ; prompt pursuit made, 
but without effect, the Indians retreating through the thick undergrowth ; 
25th, reached Fort Drane, men and horses much exhausted by sickness 
and heat of the weather : another day's march would have occasioned 
the abandoning the train; 15 horses and mules died on the road, and 
eight were turned out that could not begot along by leading, (Doc. 120.) 
Reports the volunteers returning to their homes; recommends disposi- 
tion to be made of the regular troops. On 20th Indians made an attack 
on Fort Drane, but were met and repulsed by the garrison ; carried off 
some negroes and horses. (Doc. 121.) 

April 26. Governor Call reports the situation of the troops in the 
block-house, on the Withlacoochee, and proposes the relief of the garri- 
son, &c. (Doc. 122.) 

April 29. Council of war at Fort Drane ; determine that relief can- 
not be afforded to the garrison on the Withlacoochee from Fort Drane ; 
the reasons given. (Doc. 124.) 

May\. General Scott differs from the council in opinion; thinks 
that 250 men would be sufficient to relieve the garrison on the Withla- 
coochee, and that that number might be safely sent from Fort Drane; 
orders that the largest practicable force be immediately sent from Fort 
Drane, provided Governor Call has not been advised that relief cannot 
be afforded from Fort Drane. (Doc. 12G.) 

May 5. General Clinch i eports that Governor Call has made ar- 
rangements for relieving the garrison on the Withlacoochee from Su- 
wannee, &c. (Doc. 127.) 

May 7. Colonel Lindsay reports that the force under his command 
moved from Tampa for the forks of the Withlacoochee, on the evening 
of the 14th April. In passing over the Hillsborough a wagoner was 
killed by the Indians, and that night the Alabama regiment was fired on 
and a sentinel wounded ; the remainder of the march effected without 
disturbance from the enemy; arrives at the Withlacoochee; his disposi- 
tions there ; no sign of Indians ; encumbered by the sick of his com- 
mand ; returns to Fort Alabama. His wagon train insufficient for the 
removal of the sick alone to Tampa, and the abruption of the post ne- 
cessarily deferred until the army could return with its transportation, re- 
lieved from the encumbrance of the sick. The march to Fort Brooke, 
uninterrupted by the enemy, and after resting a day and a half, returned 
to remove all the public property and stores from Fort Alabama. Col. 
Chisholm ordered, with the Alabama regiment, a battalion of 4th in- 
fantry and twenty artillery, to remove the troops at Fort Alabama, break 
up the post, and bring away all the property- The- command scarcely 
proceeded three miles from Fort Brooke, when they discovered consid- 
erable signs of Indians, the trails leading towards Thlonotosassa creek, 
and after passing that creek it was apparent that a party had crossed 
from the Hillsborough. The troops moved on unmolested to Fort Ala- 
bama, and on the return march were attacked about 3 o'clock P. M. 



83 [ 221 ] 

On ihc 27th, as the advanced guard was preparing to cross Thlonoto- 
sassa creek, the Indians firing from a dense covert on the front and back 
flanks of the column, which killed and wounded a considerable number 
of the troops. The fire was vigorously returned by the troops, and by 
the six-pounder, &c. After 12 or 13 rounds from the piece, Colonel 
Foster, at the head of the infantry, charged into the hammock, attacked 
and drove the Indians, estimated at 300, and they put an end to the con- 
flict, which had been kept up for an hour. The Indians fled through 
the cover of thick hammocks, and the troops marched to Tampa, where 
they arrived the next day; five of our troops were killed, 24 wounded. 
The volunteers are returning to their homes. The rainy season has set 
in, and the weather so hot as to render it impossible to keep the field 
without a gre~at sacrifice of life, &c. (Docs. 129, 131, 132.) 

April 26. Colonel Smith, oi' Louisiana volunteers, reports his expe- 
dition, accompanied by a naval force, to Charlotte harbor and up Pease 
creek; nothing of interest. (Doc. 133.) 

May 17. General Scott's order 48 ; speaks of the panic of the people 
of Florida. (Doc. 138.) 

May 20. General Scott at St. Augustine ; reports he has been sick 
since the 11th; is recovering slowly, &c. (Doc. 146. ) Has received 
instructions from the War Department, which obliges him to leave Flo- 
rida ; turns the command over to General Eustis. (Doc. 14S.) 

May 16. Secretary of War directs General Scott to take the direction 
of the Creek war. (Doc. 155.) 



ORAL TESTIMONY. 



Deposition of Charles Dimmock, late quartermaster, (page 12.) 

To question 1. Stationed at Savannah, &c. 

To question 2 and 4. Submits letters of advice from Major Cross- 
two wagons shipped by brig Oglethorp, ten others to be shipped, 30th 
January; six wagons shipped in schooner Ida in February ; two wagons 
shipped in February from Savannah to Picolata, six more on the 8th 
March, and two others about the 1st of May ; all these received from 
Major Cross. Harness, &c, for the wagons, arrived on 24th February, 
and shipped to Picolata. 

To question 5. First bacon received 3d of April, reshipped to Florida 
4th April ; limited transportation. 

To 6th question. No knowledge of bacon being shipped before 4th 
April. 

To 1th question. All the requisitions of General Scott for transporta- 
tion complied with, except two boats, which could not be obtained. Pur- 
chased seven wagons, and received eight from Major Cross, making 15 
in all. On or about the 10th of February, purchased by order of General 
Scott, 151 horses at Augusta and 65 near Savannah, in all, 216. Turn- 
ed over to Captain Gibson 15 horses; 4th March sent 58 across the 
country to Florida; on 4th March 106 to Captain Wharton; 8th March 
sent 8 horses by steamboat ; on 16th March sent On 18, making in all 
205 horses. Harness in excess were sent for all the wagons. 

Deposition of Colonel Gadsden, (page 15.) So full of incident that it 
must be read to a full understanding of the campaign. 



[ 22 1 ] 84 

Deposition of F. D. Ncwcomb, late of the army, (page 21.; 

To question 1. Was assistant quartermaster at Tam 

To question 2. Received no transportation from New Orleans in 
March, and up to 17th April. Subsequent to the march of General 
Scott from Tamp;;, there was received at Tampa, about 1st May, sixteen 
mules and a few carts or wagons. They would not have been sufficient 
for tiie purpose required. They were sent from New Orleans, in 
?.nswer to a letter calling for 50 wagons and 200 horses. 

To question 3. The reason transportation was not forwarded to Tampa 
from New Orleans, the impression that the war had been ended by 
General Gaines; communicated the same to General Scott. Received 
fhe information from the quartermaster at New Orleans : see letter of 
Major Clark, page 22. 

To question 4. Corn for the horses damaged, except a few bags 
sound. 

To question 5. Furnished ample transportation for Major Read's 
command. Expedition of great importance. General Scott evinced 
great solicitude on the subject. 

To question 6. No better transportation could have been furnished 
Major Read, and that furnished ample. 

Colonel Lindsay's testimony, (page 24.) Necessary that the whole 
should be read, as it embraces important information in reference to the 
whole campaign, and the causes of failure. 

General Eustis's testimony, (pages 33 and 43.) The whole should be 
read ; important in facts. 

Captain Thrus ton's testimony (page 41 ) should be read, being im- 
portant as to facts, &c. 

Colonel Bankhead's testimony, (page 54,) should be read; impor- 
tant to an understanding of the operations of the campaign. 

Captain Thistle's testimony, (page 58.) 
To question S. Impressions as to the Indians being still hostile. 
To question 9. Indians found ready to fire ; fired upon the rearguard ; 
killed a negro. 

Mr. Locke's testimony, (page 60,) relating to supplies of provisions. 

General Clinch's testimony, (page 61.) Necessary to be read, em- 
bracing a view of the campaign. 

Lieutenant Morris's testimony, (page 66,) relative to provisions; 
erection of bake-ovens, &c. ; sutlers' supplies, &c. 

Letter from Major Clark, page 67, (Doc. 152.) 

Captain Van Buren's testimony, (page 67.) 

To question 1. Train of wagons arrived at Picolata from Fort Drane, 
1st or 2d March. 

To question 2. Captain Shannon, quartermaster, charged with load- 
ing the train with unremitted exertions. 

To question 3. Stormy weather ; difficulty of crossing the St. John's 
river. 

To question 4. Train left Picolata 5th March. General Scott marches 
with a small detachment 9th March ; object to rescue Generals Gaines 
and Clinch on the Withlacoochee; the subsistence by train for them. 



85 [ 224 J 

Colonel De Peyster's testimony, (page 68.) In reference to the 
difficulty of crossing the St. John's with supplies, in consequence of 
stormy weather. 

Colonel Gadsden's 2d deposition, (page 68,) should be read, to a 
full understanding of the operations of the campaign. 

The Court, in proceeding to review the Seminole campaign under 
Majsr General Scott in Florida, and the Opinion it has formed as to the 
causes of its failure, already submitted to the President, will rcmaik 
that that Opinion was formed upon a careful examination, and a compre- 
hensive view of the oral and documentary testimony taken in tne case, 
as cited above, applying the same in its general and particular bearing 
upon the subject submitted for its examination and inquiry. 

In conformity with the instructions of the President, the Court, after 
stating the above facts in reference to the manner its Opinion was formed, 
proceeds to review the whole of the testimony, documentary and oral, 
and imbodies such facts deduced therefrom, and applies the same to the 
several causes enumerated in its Opinion as to the failure of the cam- 
paign. 

1st. As to the want of time to operate — see order of the Secretary of 
War of 21st January, (doc. 4;) also, documents 18,20, 24, 38,44,46, 47, 
52,68,71,77, 81, 93, 94, 97; also, testimony of General Clinch, page 
61, in answer to 1st question of General Scott, and in answer to the first 
question by the Court, on page 62. Deposition of Colonel Gadsden, 
page 21, line 3 of last paragraph. General Eustis's testimony, page 40, 
line 3, and Colonel Bankhead's testimony, page 55, lines 8 and 9 from 
bottom. 

2d. As to the insalubrity of the climate — see Colonel Lindsay's tes- 
timony, page 29, lines 7, 8, 9, 10 from bottom; page 32, lines 6,7 ; also, 
Colonel Bankhead's testimony, page 56, lines 5, 6, 7. General Clinch's 
testimony, page 61, in answer to 3d and 4th questions, by General Scott ; 
andGeneral Eustis's testimony, page 39, in answer to 22d question by 
General Scott. 

3d. As to swamps and hammocks — see testimony of Colonel Lindsay, 
pages 25 and 26, in answer to General Scott's 6th question ; page 32, 
in answer to General Scott's 27th question ; also, General Eustis's tes- 
timony, page 39, in answer to General Scott's 25th question. 

4th. As to a want of a knowledge of the topography of the country — 
see Colonel Lindsay's testimony, page 31, lines 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16, 17; also, General Eustis's testimony, page 39, in answer to question 
by the Court. 

5th. As to the difficulty of obtaining in time the means of trans- 
portation for the army — see testimony of Charles Dimmock, page 14, 
in answer to a question by the Judge Advocate ; also, Colonel Gadsden's 
testimony, page 24 and 69, in answer to 2d question by General Scott. 
F. D. Newcomb's testimony, page 22, in answer to questions 2 and 
3 by General Scott. Colonel Lindsay's testimony, pages 27, 28, in 
answer to questions 13, 14, 15, by General Scott; and General Eustis's 
testimony, page 33, in answer to question 1, by General Scott, and page 
40, in answer to question by the Court. 



[ 224 J 86 

The Court, in thus resuming the consideration of the evidence, as di- 
i ected by the President, and in reporting with distinctness all the facts 
touching the subjects of inquiry, as well as the times when and places 
where any material occurrence took place, with the amount of force on 
both sides, at the different periods of time embraced in the transaction, 
and the positions thereof, and all other important circumstances, believes 
it has fulfilled the instructions of the President ; and, further, the Court 
considers that its Opinion, already given, is fully sustained by the facts 
and circumstances herewith submitted. 
The Court adjourn, sine die. 

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, 

President of the Court of Inquiry. 
S. Cooper, Judge Advocate, 

Recorder of the Court: 



CONTINUATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE FOREGOING CASE. 

Washington, March 2, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to notice. All present. 
The following Order from the Secretary of War was laid before the 
Court : 

Department of War, 

March 2, 1837. 

To Major General Macomb, President of the Court of Inquiry 
directed to be convened at Frederick, Maryland, by General Order 
No. 65 : 

Sir : You will reassemble the Court of Inquiry in the city of Wash- 
ington, in order that it may reconsider and review the Proceedings in 
the cases of the campaigns in Florida, and in the Creek nation, conduct- 
ed by Major General Scott, so as to embrace facts in the Opinion of the 
Court, as required by the Order of the President organizing the Court, 
and by his Orders of the 14th and 18th of February last. 

B. F. BUTLER, 
Secretary of War ad interim. 

In obedience to the foregoing order, the Court was occupied until the 
Sth of March, in reconsidering and reviewing its Proceedings, and in re- 
porting the following facts : 

The Court finds, from a review of the testimony, that Major General 
Scott was ordered, on the 21st of January, to take the direction of the 
Florida war, with full authority to organize a regular and volunteer force 
sufficient, in his judgment, with a view to bring the war to a speedy ter- 
mination. That, under this order, he proceeded to Augusta, Georgia, 
where he arrived near the last of January, and commenced organizing 
the service. That he proceeded thence to Milledgeville, for the pur- 
pose of consulting with the Governor of Georgia on the subject of the 
Creek ditliculties, and hastening the preparations for operations in Flora- 



87 [ 224 J 

da. That lie returned to August:! on the Gth of February, and arrived 
at Savannah on the 9th, where he was occupied in regulating the sup- 
plies and movements of the troops for Florida, until the 20th. That he 
arrived at Picolata on the 22d, and was detained there until the 9th of 
March, awaiting the arrival of troops, both regulars and volunteers, also, 
transportation and supplies, and in forwarding the same to Fort Drane and 
Volusia; his plan of campaign being to move in three divisions simulta- 
neously from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, upon the Withlacoochee, 
the strong hold of the enemy. That, on the 9th of March, General Scott 
proceeded to Fort Drane with a small escoit, with supplies for the re- 
lief of General Gaines's forces on the Withlacoochee, and arrived at Fort 
Drane about the 14th, where he was detained until the 25th, to give time 
for the left wing and the centre of his army to put themselves in position, 
and also in awaiting the arrival of supplies to enable him to commence 
operations ; these supplies were delayed for the want of additional means 
of transportation momentarily expected from Savannah, the few teams 
already in use being nearly exhausted by the bad state of the roads and 
the constant and heavy labor imposed on them. On the 26th of March 
General Scott commenced his movement from Fort Diane for the With- 
lacoochee with the right wing of his command, consisting of about 1,968 
regular and volunteer troops, and with IS days' rations. That he reach- 
ed Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, on the morning of the 28th, where 
the Indians, from the opposite bank of the river, fired into the camp. 
Preparations being made, the troops commenced crossing the river the 
next morning at 4 o'clock ; during the crossing the rear division was at- 
tacked, but the enemy was driven. On the morning of the 30th, the army 
having crossed, proceeded up the river in search of the enemy, whom 
they discovered about 10 o'clock, in small parties, on an island in a chain 
of lakes; the troops advanced to the attack, when the Indians retired 
and were pursued about four miles, but not overtaken. The next morn- 
ing the* Indians were again discovered on another island, surrounded by 
broad and wet savannahs, and so boggy that it was with difficulty the 
troops could struggle through them. The Indians were attacked, dis- 
lodged, and pursued three or four miles, when they eluded the pursuit 
by crossing the river. In this pursuit the troops became several times 
engaged, but the enemy was always dislodged and driven from the ham- 
mocks. Finding it impossible to pursue the enemy across the river, and 
being twenty-four hours without provisions, the troops returned to their 
baggage train and encamped. On the 1st of April, the troops proceed- 
ed on the march, and established a post ol observation, called Fort Coop- 
er, at the southeastern extremity of a chain of lakes, leaving there a part 
of the force, with 17 days' provisions, and reserving only enough sub- 
sistence to carry the remainder to Tampa bay, where they arrived on the 
5th of April, after a fatiguing and difficult march, making the road the 
whole distance. The loss of the troops in the several rencounters was 
4 killed and 9 wounded. 

The left wing, under General Eustis, after scouring the country be- 
tween St. Augustine and Volusia, via Tomoca, commenced crossing the St. 
John's at Volusia, on the 22d of March, when it was attacked by the enemy, 
who was repulsed at all points, and retreated to his fastnesses, after a loss on 
the part of the troops of three killed and nine wounded; one Indian was 
found dead, and evidences of four others being thrown into the river. On 



[ 224 ] 88 

the 24th, a subaltern's command of mounted men fell in with a party of 
twelve or fifteen Indians, and killed two. On the 25th, the left wing, 
consisting of four companies of United States artillery, Colonel Good- 
wyn's mounted regiment, Colonel Brisbane's regiment of foot, and El- 
more's volunteers, concentrated, and on the 26th, commenced the march 
for Pelaklikaha, by the upper crossing of the Ochlawaha, with 1,400 men 
and 13 days' rations, leaving at Volusia two of Brisbane's companies. 
The route being difficult the troops made only seven miles by the even- 
ing of the 27th, and were obliged to build bridges over the Ochlawaha, 
the Wiihiacoochee, and one intermediate stream. On the 29th, after 
crossing the Ochlawaha, an Indian of note, Ayah Hajah, was killed by 
Colonel Shelton, who was wounded. On the 30th, the advance was at- 
tacked at Oakahumpkey swamp and three men killed ; the hammocks 
were scoured and the Indians discovered and driven into a swamp, in- 
accessible to the troops, one of whom was wounded. The enemy re- 
treated whenever the troops approached to within two hundred yards. On 
reaching Pelaklikaha, the villages were found to have been abandoned 
perhaps for several weeks ; cattle and ponies were abundant in the 
neighborhood ; the houses and fences were burned by the troops. It 
being impossible to obtain provisions from Fort King, and the horses be- 
ing too much exhausted to draw provisions from Volusia, and General 
Scott having crossed the Withlacoochee south, on the 28th, with the 
right wing, the left wing moved on the main road from Fort King to 
Tampa, where the horse of that wing arrived on the 5th of April, leav- 
ing the foot at a position fifteen miles from that place. 

The centre, under Colonel Lindsay, consisting of from 1,000 to 1,200 
men, organized at Tampa about the 13th of March. Large fires being 
discovered in the direction of the Alalia, the battalion of Florida volun- 
teers was sent in that direction, where they surprised a party of Indians, 
killing three and capturing six ponies. On the 15th, the centre moved 
upon the Hillsborough, on the main road to Fort King, and on the 20th, 
established a post, called Fort Alabama, with a view of bringing supplies 
near to the scene of hostilities, in the direction of the Withlacoochee, 
leaving there the Florida battalion under Major Read, the remainder of 
the troops marching back to Fort Brooke, (Tampa,) where a despatch 
was received from General Scott giving the plan of the campaign, and 
requiring the centre to be at Chickuchatty by the 25th to co-operate. 
On the 22d, the march was commenced, the battalion at Fort Alabama 
was taken up, leaving at that post one company and thirty sick. The 
route lay through a hilly country, abounding in hammocks. Alter passing 
Elochucto, the Indians, taking advantage of their coverts, began to an- 
noy the rear and flanks of the column ; a flanker was killed and another 
wounded whilst passing a dense hammock. The hammock was scoured 
and the Indians driven out. During the night, at the encampment, par- 
ties of the troops were fired on by the Indians from a hammock contigu- 
ous to a pond which furnished water lor the troops; the Indians were dis- 
persed by around of canister. On the 27th, the Indians still continued 
their annoying attacks, always firing from ambush; one of our men was 
killed and two wounded. The column halted at noon, when an attack 
was made upon the rear, but upon a brisk return of the fire the Indians 
disappeared. On the 28th, when encamped at Fort Broadnax, near the 



89 [ 224 ] 

Chiekuchatty, the Indians commenced a fire on the horses and the party 
guarding them. A detachment was sent out which drove the enemy 
without loss to the troops. On the 30th, provisions being scarce, two 
parties of mounted men were sent in pursuit of cattle, covered by a force 
of 250 men ; they brought in a supply sufficient for four days. During 
that day, the friendly Indians attached to the command killed a chief 
called Charley Fixico, a leader of about 85 men. That night the sen- 
tinels were fired upon occasionally, and, also, on the 31st, but without 
injury. On the same day, an attempt was made to procure more beef. 
Being sixty miles from the depot, with barely enough provisions to reach it, 
without any prospect of being able to keep the field for the purpose of 
co-operation, and having obtained no response to the signals made for 
eight days in succession, Colonel Lindsay deemed it advisable to return 
to Tampa, where he arrived on the night ot the 4th of April. In the in- 
terval between the departure from and return to Fort Alabama, that post 
was attacked by a force of between 3 and 400 Indians, which resulted in 
a loss on the part of the troops, after an action of two hours and twenty 
minutes, of one killed and two wounded ; the supposed loss of the 
enemy was 15 killed. The enemy continued to lie around the work 
in considerable force, both day and night, until the return of the centre 
column. 

The several columns which arrived at Tampa about the 5th of April, 
remained at that place until the 14th, for the purpose of recruiting the 
men and horses, which had become much exhausted from the heat of the 
weather and the fatiguing and difficult marches. The army was here 
divided into five detachments : Colonel Smith, with the Louisiana vol- 
unteers, was detached to Charlotte harbor and up Pease creek, accom- 
panied by a naval force, where, after operating some days up the coun- 
try, and discovering no Indians, returned to Tampa, and thence to New 
Orleans, where the volunteers were discharged. 

The Florida volunteers, under Major Read, were sent to the mouth 
of the Withlacoochee, to operate up that river. The object of this ex- 
pedition was not effected, and the troops were conveyed to St. Mark's 
and Tallahassee, where they were discharged. 

The right wing, under General Clinch, consisting of 278 artillery, 43 
dismounted dragoons, 202 infantry, 139 Augusta volunteers, and 140 
mounted men, marched for Fort Drane, via Fort Cooper, on the Withla- 
coochee, making short marches, in consequence of the heat of the weather 
and the debilitated condition of the horses. On the 18th, three miles 
from Fort Cooper, General Clinch despatched two companies, with light 
wagons, with instructions to Major Cooper to join him ; the detachment 
was fired upon from a hammock, and one lieutenant and a private se- 
verely wounded ; the enemy fled. Fort Cooper had been invested from 
the 5th to the 17th of April, with a loss of one killed and five wounded ; 
the force of the enemy estimated at 250. On the 22d, one of the flank- 
ers was fired on from a hammock, when prompt pursuit was made, but 
without effect, the Indians retiring through a thick undergrowth. The 
troops reached Fort Drane on the 25th, the men and horses much ex- 
hausted by sickness and the heat of the. weather; another day's march 
would have occasioned the abandoning the train; 15 horses and mules 
died on the road, and eight were turned out that could not be got along 



[ 224 ] 90 

by leading. The term of service of the volunteers having expired, the}' 
returned to their homes. On the 20th, the enemy made an attack on 
Fort Drane, but were repulsed by the garrison ; they carried off some 
negroes and horses. 

The left wing, accompanied by General Scott, moved via 
Pelaklikaha and the upper crossing of the Ochlawaha, for Volusia. 
On the night of the 22d of April, the camp was fired upon by a party of 
six or eight Indians ; they were pursued at daylight without any result. 
On the 24th, a party of the enemy was met, but with no other result 
than the capture of their horses and packs, the enemy escaping into the 
hammocks. A body of the left wing reached Volusia on the 25th. All 
the volunteers of the left wing marched under Colonel Goodwyn for St. 
Augustine, on the 28th, via Tomoca. The regulars were lelt to garri- 
son Volusia, and superintend the evacuation of the post, which had be- 
come very sickly. 

The centre column, under Colonel Lindsay, moved for the forks of 
the Withlacoochee. Passing over the Hillsborough, a wagoner was 
killed by the Indians, and on that night the Alabama regiment was fired 
on and a sentinel wounded. The remainder of the march was effected 
without annoyance from the enemy. No signs of Indians were discov- 
ered on the Withlacoochee. Being encumbered with the sick, the troops 
returned to Fort Alabama. The wagon-train was insufficient for the re- 
moval of the sick alone to Tampa, and the abruption of the post of Fort 
Alabama was necessarily deferred until the army could return with its 
transportation from Tampa, relieved from the encumbrance of the sick. 
The march to Tampa was uninterrupted by the enemy, and after resting 
a day and a half, Colonel Chisholm, with the Alabama regiment, 4 com- 
panies of infantry, and 20 artillery, returned to remove all the public 
property and stores from Foit Alabama. The troops reached Fort Ala- 
bama, and on their return march, were attacked about 3 o'clock in the 
afternoon of the 27th, as the advance guard was preparing to cross Thlo- 
notosassa creek ; the Indians firing from a dense covert on the^ front 
and both flanks of the column. The fire was vigorously returned by the 
troops, and after twelve or thirteen rounds from a field-piece, Colonel 
Foster, at the head of the infantry, charged into the hammock, attacked 
and drove the Indians, estimated at 300, and thus put an end to the con- 
flict, which had been kept up for an hour, resulting in a loss on the part 
of the troops of 5 killed and 24 wounded. The troops reached Tampa 
the next day, and the volunteers returned to their homes, the rainy sea- 
son having set in, and the weather so hot as to render it impossible to 
keep the field without a great sacrifice of life. 

The strength of the enemy during the campaign is estimated by Gen- 
eral Scott not to exceed 1,200 fighting men, and he is of opinion that not 
more than 500 had, at any time since the commencement of hostilities^ 
been brought within the same ten miles square, and that in all his opera- 
tions for thirty days, no party larger than 130 had been found, but that 
parties of from ten to thirty had been encountered almost every where. 

After the return of the troops from Tampa to their several positions, 
General Scott deemed it necessary, in consequence of the extreme heat 
of the weather and the sickness of the troops, to put them into summer 
quarters, which was approved by the Secretary of War, in a letter of the 
5th of May, from the Adjutant General, and thus closed the campaign. 



91 [ 221 J 

The Court, after a full consideration of the foregoing facts, and the 
testimony from which they are drawn, comes to the same conclusion as 
expressed in its Opinion already given, in the following words, to wit : 

" The Court, after a careful review of the great mass of testimony ta- 
ken in the foregoing investigation, finds that Major General Scott was 
amply clothed with authority to create the means of prosecuting the 
Seminole war to a successful issue, but is of opinion that, at the time he 
was invested with the command, the season was too far advanced for 
him to collect, appoint, and put in motion, his forces, until a day too late 
to compass the object. It appears that, after using great diligence and 
energy, he was not in a condition to take the field and enter the enemy's 
strong holds before the 28th of March, and then without sufficient means 
for transporting the necessary supplies to enable him to remain there 
long enough to seek out the scattered forces of the enemy. 

" The Court, therefore, ascribe the failure of the campaign to the want 
of time to operate — the insalubrity of the climate after the middle of 
April — the impervious swamps and hammocks that abound in the coun- 
try occupied by the enemy, affording him cover and retreat at every 
step — an absence of all knowledge by the General, or any part of his 
forces, of the topography of the country ; together with the difficulty of 
obtaining, in time, the means of transporting supplies for the army. 

"The Court is further of opinion, from the testimony of many offi- 
cers of rank and intelligence who served in the campaign, that Major 
General Scott was zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of his du- 
ties, and that his plan of campaign was well devised, and prosecuted 
with energy, steadiness, and ability." 

A. MACOMB, Major General, 
President of the Court of Inquiry. 

S. Cooper, Judge Advocate, 

Recorder of the Court. 






224 ] 92 

No. 2. 

PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY 

IK THE CASE OF 

MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT. 

[delay in opening and prosecuting the creek campaign.] 
PAKT SECOND. 



Continuation of the Proceedings of a Court oj Inquiry, held at the city 
of Frederick, Maryland, by virtue of Orders No. 65 and 68, dated 
Adjutant GeneraVs Office, Washington, October 3, 1836, and October 
14, 1836. 

Frederick, December 13, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. 

Present: Major General Macomb, President, Brigadier General At- 
kinson and Brigadier General Brady, members, Captain Cooper, Judge 
Advocate and Recorder. 

The Court was occupied from this day to the 16th of December in ex- 
amining the documentary testimony having reference to the campaign 
against the hostile Creek Indians, in 1836. (See papers accompanying 
these Proceedings.) 

December 19, 1836. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
The subject of the Creek campaign being resumed — 

Major Edmund Kirby, paymaster oj the army, and a witness on the 
part of Major General Scott, being duly sivorn, was interrogated as 
follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. Did the witness serve with General 
Scott in the late Creek war ? in what capacity, and for what length of 
time ? 

Answer. I did. I was announced in orders for staff duties generally, 
and accompanied General Scott from St. Augustine, on the 21st of May, 
and remained with him at Columbus to the 17th of June, when I return- 
ed to Florida. 

2. Question by General Scott. By what general officer of the army was 
the witness and General Scott joined at Augusta, Georgia, and by what 
high public functionary at Milledgeville ? 

Answer. General Scott was joined at Augusta, on the 27th of May, 
by Major General Jesup, and was accompanied from Milledgeville to 
Columbus by Governor Schley, together with General Jesup. 



93 [ 224 J 

S. Question by General Scott. Does the witness recollect any con- 
versation at Milledgeville, on the road, or at Columbus, between his Ex- 
cellency the Governor of Georgia, General Jesup, and General Scott, 
respecting the best plan of operations against the hostile Creeks ; and 
what were the outlines of that plan ? 

Answer. Previous to arriving at Augusta, General Scott had explain- 
ed to me that his plan of operations would be, first, by troops placed on 
the left bank of the Chattahoochee, and steamboats to cruise upon that 
river, to prevent the escape of the enemy into Florida ; then, with such 
forces as could be spared, to commence operations below the enemy, 
in Barbour county, Alabama, and drive the enemy before him upwards, 
or capture him. After being joined by General Jesup and Governor 
Schley, he explained to them, in my presence, his plan of operations. 
General Jesup remarked that the same plan had occurred to him, and 
had been discussed by him with the President and the Secretary of War. 
Governor Schley also remarked that the same general plan had occurred 
to him as the most proper. 

4. Question by General Scott. Is the witness aware that General Jes- 
up, in any subsequent conversation with General Scott, that is, before the 
former set out for .Tuskegee, ever expressed a doubt as to that plan of 
operations, or suggest any modification of it ? 

Answer. I am not. 

5. Question by General Scott. Did General Scott, up to the time the 
witness left him, steadily adhere to the same plan of operations in alibis 
conversations, instructions, orders, and arrangements ? 

Answer. He did. 

6. Question by General Scott. Will the witness state, after looking at 
the letter-book of headquarters, whether the originals of the two letters 
to his Excellency the Governor of Alabama, therein copied, were duly 
despatched, and by what several conveyances ? 

Answer. The originals were placed in the hands of Captain Page, to 
be transmitted, by an Indian runner, from Fort Mitchell, across the na- 
tion, to Tuskegee ; a duplicate set was handed to the express-rider, who 
brought a letter from Governor Clay, by the upper route, through Cham- 
bers county, addressed to the commanding officer of the Georgia militia, 
at Columbus, to be conveyed by that route to Governor Clay. Both of 
these letters are dated the 31st of May, the day after the arrival of Gen- 
eral Scott at Columbus. 

7. Questionby General Scott . Had, at the time the witness left Gen- 
eral Scott, as far as he knows, or believes, any answer to, or acknowledg- 
ment of, those letters been received by General Scott ? 

Answer. Many of the letters received by General Scott were opened 
by me, and all official ones, I believe, were placed in my hands. I have 
no knowledge or belief that he received one from Governor Clay up to 
the time I left him. 

8. Question by General Scott. Does the witness recollect any letter 
from Governor Schley to Governor Clay of the same date with those from 
General Scott to the latter, and does the witness know by what convey- 
ance or conveyances Governor Schley's letter was sent to Governor Clay ? 

Answer. I believe that Governor Schley wrote to Governor Clay by 



[ 224 ] 94 

the same conveyance, and perhaps by both conveyances by which Gene- 
ral Scott's letters were sent. 

9. Question by General Scott. What does the witness recollect as to 
General Scott's calling for a return from the arsenal near Augusta, while 
passing through that city, and of his marking upon that return the num- 
ber of arms and ordnance stores which he wished to be sent to Columbus? 

Answer. At Augusta, on the 26th of May, General Scott sent to Ma- 
jor Baden, the commanding officer at the arsenal, who was too unwell to 
leave his quarters, for a list of all the arms and ordnance stores at the 
arsenal. He marked upon the list such articles as he deemed would be 
useful for the campaign, and directed Lieutenant Dimmock, the quarter- 
master, to have them forwarded without delay to Columbus. 

10. Question by General Scott. Had General Scott any staff with him 
at Augusta, other than the witness and Captain Dimmock, and were not 
the witness and General Scott greatly occupied at the time? 

Answer. Lieutenant Dimmock accompanied General Scott from Sa- 
vannah to Augusta, and was left at the latter place on duty, as assistant 
quartermaster. I was the only other staff officer with the general at the 
time, and we were both constantly occupied by official duties. 

11. Question by General Scott. Does the witness recollect whether 
any copy of the return received from the Augusta arsenal w 7 as retained 
by the witness or General Scott, and what became of the return which 
was marked by General Scott, as the witness has already stated? 

Answer. I believe no copy was retained, but the original w T as placed 
in the hands of Lieutenant Dimmock, with orders to have the articles 
which the General marked forwarded. 

12. Question by General Scott. Up to the time that the witness left 
General Scott at Columbus, and when the latter was not quite ill in bed, 
is the witness aware that the said Scott failed, in point of zeal, or judg- 
ment, in preparing for prompt and active operations against the hostile 
Creek Indians ? 

Answer. I am not. The General manifested great and incessant so- 
licitude for the arrival of the necessary arms and other supplies, to enable 
the troops to take the field. 

13. Question by General Scott. What does the witness recollect of 
arms and accoutrements having been ordered by General Scott from St. 
Augustine and Picolata to the Chattahoochie river, before the said Scott 
left Florida ? 

Answer. Very soon after leaving St. Augustine, the general informed 
me that he had, previously to leaving that place, ordered all the surplus 
arms and accoutrements at St. Augustine and Picolata to be forwarded to 
the Chattahoochie. 

14. Question by General Scott. Is the witness aware of any failure 
on the part of General Scott to hasten by all the means in his power, the 
arms and accoutrements necessary for the Georgia quota of troops ? 

Answer. I am not. He manifested constant anxiety for their arrival, 
and used every means in his power to hasten it. 

15. Question by General Scott. The witness saw, or mustered into 
service, the greater part of the Georgia line of troops ; what portion of 
those troops brought with them arms and accoutrements, and what was 
the condition of those arms and accoutrements ? 



95 [ 224 ] 

Answer. 1 mustered into the service of the United States forty-five 
companies of the Georgia troops, at Columbus, early in June. They 
were generally entirely destitute of arms and accoutrements. The few 
arms they had were generally unfit for service in the field. 

1. Question by the Court. How many days were the Georgia militia 
waiting for their arms, or detained for the want of them ? 

Answer. The Georgia troops had nearly all arrived at Columbus by 
the 12th of June. Some arms had arrived previously, and had been 
placed in the hands of the militia, who were ordered immediately to take 
post below Columbus, on the Chattahoochie. 

2. Question by the Court. Do you not think that those who brought 
with them their fowling-pieces and ordinary rifles might have been sent 
forward and been fit, with these arms, to meet the Indians successfully ? 

Answer. The troops who brought arms with them were immediately 
ordered to take post on the Chattahoochie, below Columbus, and occu- 
pied several positions on the left bank of that river ; ammunition for them 
was purchased in Columbus. In my opinion, if these men, thus imper- 
fectly armed, had been sent across the river, into the enemy's country, 
they might have been flogged and driven out of it. Their arms were of 
different calibre, and not in order. They had no accoutrements, no fixed 
ammunition, no camp equipage, and no adequate supply of provisions. 

3. Question by the Court. Were the Creek Indians better armed 
than they ? 

Answer. I had no means of knowing. 

16. Question by General Scott. Was the portion of the Georgia mili- 
tia, already armed at the time the witness left Columbus, (June 17,) 
sufficient in number to guard the left bank of the Chattahoochie, and, at 
the same time, to operate against the enemy in his own country suc- 
cessfully ? 

Answer. It was not. The Georgia troops, posted on the left bank of 
the Chattahoochie, below Columbus, were fully occupied in repelling the 
efforts of the enemy to escape across the river in the direction of Flo- 
rida. 

The Court adjourned, to meet to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. 

December 20, 1S36. 
The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
The examination of Major Kirby continued. 

17. Question by General Scott. When the witness arrived with Gen- 
eral Scott at Columbus, Georgia, what was the state of the stores and 
supplies generally found there for the army ? 

Answer. There was a destitution of all supplies. Subsistence for 
the troops was purchased by me, from day to day, through the agency of 
Major Huson, in the streets of Columbus, and in the neighboring country. 
Camp-kettles, mess-pans, tents, and haversacks were also made, under 
the orders of the General, for the troops arriving. Drag-ropes for the 
wagons, and ferry-ropes were made, and scows were constructed ; and 
all the powder and lead to be found in the place was also purchased. 



[ 221 ] 96 

The powder and lead were made into cartridges and distributed to the 
militia, 

18. Question by General Scott. What docs the witness recollect of a 
conversation between Generals Jesup and Scott, respecting a letter from 
the said Scott, dated at Augusta, May 26, 183G, and addressed jointly to 
the quartermaster and commissary at New Orleans; and which letter is 
Copied into General Scott's letter-book, in the handwriting of the witness ? 

Answer. Upon General Jesup's informing General Scott of the ar- 
rangements made by him previously to leaving Washington, it appeared 
that he also had instructed Major Clark to forward supplies of provisions 
from New Orleans to the Creek nation. On a comparison of dates, it 
was deemed extremely probable that the communications from Generals 
Scott and Jesup to Major Clark must both have reached him, at New 
Orleans, by the same mail. 

19. Question by General Scott. Was the conclusion just stated by the 
witness arrived at both by the said Jesup and the said Scott ? 

Answer. The calculation was made by General Scott, and I under- 
stood it to be assented to by General Jesup. 

The Court was occupied the remainder of this day, and the whole of 
the next, in prosecuting the inquiries into the Seminole campaign. 

December 22, 1S36. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Judge Advocate presented to the Court the following depositions : 

Deposition of A. H. Kenan, a ci tizenof Georgia, taken by the Judge 
Advocate on the 27th of November, 1836. 

1. Questionby General Scott. You served with General Scott against 
the Creeks; in what capacity, and for what time ? 

Answer. I served with General Scott in the late Creek campaign 
as volunteer aid-de-camp, under a commission of colonelcy from the Ex- 
ecutive of Georgia. In this capacity, I was with General Scott from 
about the 4th of June, 1836, until his recall, which was about the 6th of 
July, 1836. 

2. Question by General Scott. Early in June, at Columbus, did you 
frequently hear General Scott develop, for discussion, his plan of cam- 
paign against the hostile Creeks ; and what was that plan ? 

Answer. I joined General Scott two or three days after his arrival at 
Columbus. The General and Governor Schley, and others of the army 
and town were in frequent conversations, upon the subject of the cam- 
paign, and the defence of the Georgia and Alabama lines. I cannot 
more intelligibly or more definitely and concisely give the plan of cam- 
paign than by a reference to General Scott's letter of instruction to Ma- 
jor General Jesup, upon his departure from Columbus to assume the 
command at Tuskegee of the Alabama troops. This letter to General 
Jesup, bearing date the 1st of June, 1836, contains the prominent fea- 
tures of General Scott's contemplated movements. In the frequent con- 
versations between General Scott and Governor Schley and others, in 
my presence, it was deemed all-important, preparatory to any offensive 



97 [ 224 ] 

movement upon the enemy, to cut off his retreat to Florida. To secute 
this object, it was the plan of General Scott to station troops upon the 
eastern bank of the Chattahoochie river, from a point IS or 20 miles be- 
low Columbus, to Roanoke ; a course which would not only intercept 
the enemy's retreat to Florida, but which would protect the frontier of 
Georgia, and keep open the navigation of the Chattahoochie. In addi- 
tion, it was urged by General Scott that this course or plan of opera- 
tions would not only give defence and protection to the frontier of Geor- 
gia, and prevent the escape of the enemy, hut, by commencing his opera- 
tions in the vicinity of Irwinton, Alabama, and moving upwards, the dis- 
embodied parts of" the hostile Creeks would be driven to the interior of 
the nation, and most probable imbody for battle, or surrender. It was 
also urged by General Scott that this plan of operation would not only 
intercept the llight of the enemy, and give immediate defence to the 
frontier counties of Georgia, but that, in its beneficial results, the health 
of the army would be consulted, in passing, in the early part of the season, 
from the swamps to higher and healthier parts of the nation. 

3. Question by General Scott. To whom did General Scott develop 
his plan of campaign for discussion ; and was General Jesup one of those 
present ? 

Answer. General Scott developed his views fully and freely to Gov- 
ernor Schley, and to the officers of tiie army, and many of the officers of 
the volunteers, all of whom gave their concurrence. I arrrived at Co- 
lumbus the day previous to Genera! Jesup's departure for Tuskegee, 
and consequently know but litile of the concurrent views of General 
Jesup. The only interview between the two Generals in my presence, 
was upon the morning of General Jesup's departure for Tuskegee, at 
which time General Scott give the General the letter of instructions pre- 
viously referred to. 

-1. Question by General S " ' : . Did General Jesup, in terms or in manner, 
dissent from that plan and its supposed advantages ; or did he, in terms 
or in manner, assent to the one or the other ? 

Answer. General Jesup made no objection to the plan or its supposed 
advantages: from the conversation which passed, I received the impres- 
sion that the plan was a mutual one. 

5. Question by General Scott. Did General Scott steadily adhere to 
that plan of operations in all his conversations, acts, and arrangements, 
without deviation, up to the time of General Jesup's march upon, and 
personal arrival at, Fort Mitchell ? 

Answer. He did. 

G. Question by General Scott. Were you not almost constantly with 
General Scott by day and by night, and fully in his confidence ? 

Answer. I was constantly with General Scott, and had the pleasure of 
believing I possessed his confidence. 

7. Question by General Scott. Was the conduct of General Scott, in 
preparing for the campaign, and its prosecution, marked by zeal, activi- 
ty, and judgment, or the reverse ? 

Answer. Could the conduct of this distinguished officer, in the late 
campaign, for zeal, activity, and judgment, require the favorable opinion 
of a junior in military science, I would beg leave to superadd to its tes- 
7 



[ 224 ] 98 

timony the results of the violation of his plan of campaign, and the ap- 
probation of the Executive and the officer's of* the volunteers of Georgia. 

Deposition of Major General J. W. A. Sanford, formerly of the Georgia 
Hue, taken by the Judge Advocate the 11th of December, 183G. 

1. Question by General Scott. In what capacity or station did the wit- 
ness serve in the recent war against the hostile Greek Indians, and what 
was about the number of the Georgia line, under the orders of the wit- 
ness (say) on the 20th of June last ? 

Answer. On the 27th of May last I was appointed by his Excellency 
Governor Schley, of Georgia, to the command of the Georgia militia, or- 
dered to rendezvous at or below Columbus; and, in a few weeks there- 
after, to the entire command of all the militia called out to defend its 
western frontier. From the time I was thus invested with the command 
up to the period (the 20th of June) when I was ordered by Major 
General Scott to descend the east bank of the Chattahoochie, there had 
probably arrived thirty-five hundred men. This number had, however, 
been so far reduced by the policy which had been adopted, in guarding 
the passes of the river, that when I received this order, there was not 
exceeding twenty-one or two hundred men in my camp. 

2. Question by General Sco't. Up to about the time that the witness 
marched with a part of his division towards the place called Roanoake, 
with a view of crossing the Chattahoochie into the enemy's country, 
what portion of the division in the vicinity of Columbus, and above, had 
received arms and accoutrements, and what portion was without arm: 
and accoutrements ? 

Answer. Of the troops remaining under my immediate command, less 
than one-third were armed, and these variously and indifferently with 
shot-guns, rifles, and muskets. Our miserable deficiency in this respect 
was most strikingly displayed to my view when, upon the occasion of an 
alarm, and it was expected the enemy would be upon us in full force, i 
had the mollification of beholding within my lines fifteen or sixteen hun- 
dred men with no weapons of defence beyond their side-arms, clubs, 
and club-axes. 

3. ({uestio7iby General Scott. Prior to the witness's march from Colum- 
bus down the country (say) about the 21st of June, had not the greater 
part of his division, having arms and accoutrements, been previously dis- 
tributed along the left bank of the Chattahoochie, in order to defend the 
Georgia settlements, and to prevent the enemy from escaping across that 
stream in the direction of Florida ? 

Answer. The weak and almost defenceless condition of my camp, al- 
luded to in my last answer, in a great measure resulted from our efforts to 
guard the east bank of the Chattahoochie, to restrain the enemy from 
crossing that stream, to prevent him from depredating upon Georgia, and 
escaping to Florida. The men were no sooner armed than they were 
despatched in that direction for this purpose. 

4. Question by General Scott. Was the number of armed men of the 
Georgia line, retained in the vicinity of Columbus (say) up to the 21st of 
June, more than was deemed necessary, at the time, to guard that place 
and the unarmed men in the witness's camp or camps? 



99 [ 224 ] 

Answer. The number of troops (Hoxey's battalion) stationed at Co- 
lumbus for the protection of that place, considering its commercial im- 
portance and the number of lives and amount of property at stake, was 
not more than sufficient for that object. Many, indeed, doubted its ade- 
quacy in this respect, in the event that the enemy had attacked that 
place. 

5. Question by General Scott. Was any time lost, after the arrival of 
arms, about the 21st of June, in putting the whole disposable force of 
Georgia in movement for active operations? 

Answer. Not one solitary moment was lost or delayed, after arms were 
put into the hands of the men, in marching directly to the point whence 
it was intended that active operations should commence against the ene- 
my. Such, indeed, was the anxiety of General Scott to put the troops in 
motion, and so promptly was he seconded by their enthusiasm, that a 
portion of them who had received muskets alone, marched to Roanoke 
without any accoutrements whatever. 

6. Question by General Scott. Does the witness know, did he hear, or 
had he reason to believe at the time, that a single white inhabitant or 
white person was murdered in the Creek country by the Indian enemy, 
between the arrival of General Scott at Columbus and the commence- 
ment of active operations under his orders on the west side of the Chat- 
tahoochie ? 

Answer. The witness does not know, nor does he remember to have 
heard of any white person being killed on the west bank of the Chatta- 
hoochie, by the Indians, after the arrival of General Scott at Columbus; 
on the contrary, he believes that such were the consternation and alarm 
created by the first outbreaking of hostilities, that all who had any reason 
to believe themselves endangered by the proximity of the Indians, im 
mediately lied from their homes to places deemed secure agaiast their 
approach : this was particularly the case with those who had established 
settlements south of the Federal road. The nation below this point was 
decidedly hostile, and this fact was universally known. I cannot, there- 
fore, conceive any one so reckless of life as to be guilty of the suicidal 
folly of remaining when its destruction was inevitable. 

7. Question by General Scott. Had the whole of the white inhabitants 
of the then Creek country, not previously murdered by the hostile In- 
dians, evacuated that country before the arrival of General Scott at Co- 
lumbus, about the end of May ? 

Answer. I consider this question already answered in my reply to the 
last interrogatory. 

8. Question by General Scott. What, in the opinion of the witness, 
were the relative advantages or disadvantages between a plan of opera- 
tions, beginning on a line at or a little above Irwinton, and below the 
hostile Creeks, and acting up the country; and beginning (say) on a 
line from Tuskegee to Fort Mitchell, above the greater number of the 
enemy, and thence operating down the country ? 

Answer. The principal advantage which the former would have over 
the latter of the two plans proposed in this question, would be (the passes of 
the river being properly defended) that if a competent force were intro- 
duced below the enemy, his retreat into either Georgia or Florida would be 
effectually cut off. By constantly advancing upon him upwards, he would 



[ 224 ] 100 

be daily restricted to less and less space ; and as he receded from our 
approach, he would of necessity, from the nature of the country, be com- 
pelled to occupy ground in every respect favorable to our troops, until, 
hemmed in and pressed at every point, he would be forced either to an 
unconditional surrender, or to fight with but little prospect of success; 
and if defeated, with no hope of escape. The navigation of the river 
promised also to be a powerful auxiliary in this system of operation, by 
furnishing supplies in a short time at any given point between Fort Gaines 
and Columbus, whence, if it became necessary, they could be readily 
transported into the interior of the nation. By the contrary move- 
ment, that is, commencing at Tuskegee, and progressing towards 
Fort Mitchell, this advantage would have been lost, and whether you 
would get in gun-shot of the hostile party, would depend entirely upon 
their inclination. If the experiment of waiting your approach was con- 
sidered too hazardous, free from all apprehension as he would move 
downivard, he would consult his safety in his flight, and every step that 
he would thus take would be attended with accumulating difficulties in 
the pursuit ; for experience has demonstrated that, after reaching the 
dense swamps of Georgia and Florida, he would have been scarcely less 
secure than if defended by regular intrenchments and fortifications. In- 
dependently of the embarrassments likely to be thus produced, the move- 
ment of the troops downwards in the summer months, so far as it might 
affect their health and efficiency, was liable to objections not applicable 
to that made in a different direction. 

9. ({uestion by General Scott. If the whole disposable force of Geor- 
gians, Alabamians, and regulars, with the friendly Indians acting as aux- 
iliaries, had been placed in line below the enemy, and had operated up 
the country, whilst the frontier settlements of Georgia and Alabama were 
guarded by competent detachments, is it not probable that fewer of the 
enemy would have escaped across the Chattahoochie in the direction of 
Florida, than actually did so escape, and also that the war would have 
been earlier finished than it actually was ? 

Ansiver. Had the first plan of operations, alluded to in my last reply, 
been fully adopted, the troops now mentioned would have been able to 
have carried it out. The enemy being encompassed in every direction 
by superior numbers, defeated in his hopes of escape, and defeated in 
the field, must have immediately sued for peace, and the war would have 
very probably terminated without those straggling parties which invaded 
Georgia the latter part of July last. 

10. Question by General Scott. Is it not probable or certain that the 
movement of General Jesup, and the forces under his immediate orders, 
from Tuskegee upon Fort Mitchell, and from that line below, before all 
the other forces (upon the Chattahoochie) were ready to take their 
positions on that river and the base-line below the enemy, put the ene- 
my upon the endeavor to escape in the direction of Florida, and led to 
the many severe conflicts which took place on the soil of Georgia? 

Answer. The Indians were doubtless apprized of the great force 
assembled upon the borders of the nation, and must have watched its 
movements with great anxiety. Any demonstration in the direction of 
their camp must have brought them at once to a determination in their course 
of conduct. The very near approach of General Jesup, therefore, 



101 [ 221 ] 

whilst it may have perhaps intimidated a portion of them into a surren- 
der, certainly admonished those who were disinclined to that measure 
of the necessity of a retreat; and they did retreat a few days thereafter, 
through the lower part of Georgia, murdering men, women, and children, 
before they were themselves overtaken and beaten. 

1 1 . Question by General Scott. Which of the two plans of operation — 
that of operating with the whole disposable force, under the general 
command of the said Scott, upwards, from a line below the enemy, and 
beginning (say) about the 25th of June ; and the plan pursued by the 
said Jesup, viz : beginning an isolated movement (say) about the 12th 
of the same month, from Tuskegee towards Fort Mitchell, and thence 
operating down the country — would, in the opinion of the witness, have 
the sooner terminated the war, by the capture of the great body of the 
enemy ? 

Answer. I consider this question answered in my reply to the 8th 
interrogatory. 

12. Question by General Scott. Will the witness be pleased to state 
his recollection of the length and degree of the said Scott's illness, at 
Columbus, in the month of June, 1836? 

Answer. I do not recollect the precise duration of General Scott's 
illness whilst at Columbus. He was attacked a few days after he arri- 
ved there, and was confined to his bed for several days. During this 
time, I had more than once occasion to visit him, and generally found 
him prostrate ; his feelings greatly distressed at his situation, and at. the 
continued delay of the arms which had been ordered to that place. Upon 
the latter subject, he spoke with great emphasis ; and his mind was so 
much worried at the disappointment, that I did not doubt that his own 
anxiety in this respect had a tendency to protract his illness. 

13. Question by General Scott. Is the witness aware that the said 
Scott, in any particular, when not ill in bed, tailed in point of zeal or 
judgment, in the direction of the war against the hostile Creek Indians? 

Answer. The plan of operations devised by General Scott, was, in my 
opinion, founded in great wisdom ; and I know of no instance, in which 
he wanted zeal, energy, or judgment, in any measure essential to its 
entire success. 

14. Question by General Scott. With a reasonable doubt whether 
the volunteers and draughts of Alabama would come under the rules and 
articles of war, and into the service of the United States, was it not more 
important not to commence active operations until all the volunteers and 
draughts of Georgia, on the Chattahoochie frontier, should receive arms 
and accoutrements, and the greater part of the regulars expected should 
arrive ? 

Answer. The great extent of frontier to be protected ; the uncertain 
number of the enemy to be encountered ; the scale of operation laid 
down, rendered it proper that we should not commence active operations 
until our troops were armed and in sufficient force to occupy every point 
where their presence might be found to be necessary. 

15. Question by General Scott. Is the witness aware of any failure 
on the part of the said Scott, to hasten, by all the means in his power, 
the arrival of the arms and accoutrements necessary for the Georgia 
quota of troops ? 



f 224 ] 102 

Answer. In the frequent conversations which ensued between Gener- 
al Scott and myself, upon the subject of arms, his feelings seemed to be 
absolutely tortured by their non-arrival. He spoke of the frequent and 
urgent solicitations he had made to those in whose care they were in- 
trusted, to have them forwarded with all possible expedition ; and I 
recollect when it was reported that the wagons containing them were 
not as near us as they should have been, from the length of time they had 
been upon the road, he despatched a special messenger, with orders to 
have them move by night and day, until they should arrive at Columbus. 

Deposition cf Major Marcus D. Huson, of Georgia, taken by the Judge 
Advocate the llth of December, 183G. 

1. Question by General Scott. In what capacity was the witness with 
the army on the Chattahoochie in May and June last, and where princi- 
pally stationed ? 

Ansiver. Under the appointment of the Governor of Georgia, 1 acted as 
quartermaster and commissary to the volunteers and draughted militia as- 
sembled on the Chattahoochie, principally at Columbus, in May and June 
last, till the arrival, in the early part of June, of the disbursing officers of 
the United States army; and subsequently, I assisted them in the per- 
formance of their duties. 

2. Question by General Scott. Had the witness occasion in that period 
to purchase, for the troops, rations for men and forage for horses? 

Ansiver. I had. 

3. Question by General Scott. What resources remained within 

days' reach of Columbus for men and horses, which it was possible to 
purchase even at high prices, as late as the 17th of June last? 

Ansiver. I could have purchased a limited supply of flour and bacon in 
Columbus, such as had been previously bought up by speculators for the 
express purpose of selling to the Commissary department ; but both were 
so damaged as to be unfit for use. The resources of Columbus and its 
vicinity, in provisions and forage of good quality, up to the 9th of June, 
w r ere so far exhausted that it look the wagons from six to ten days to 
make the trips to and from the places where the articles were to be found 
in the neighboring country. 

Captain C. A. Waite, of the 2d regiment of infantry, a witness on the 
part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as 
follows : 

1. Question by General Scott. Where, and in what capacity, were you 
on duty in June last ? 

Answer. I arrived at Columbus on the 9th of June, and from that time 
until the 10th of July I was on duty at that place as the senior oilicer of 
the Quartermaster's department. 

2. Question by General Scott. What does the witness recollect of his 
being sent for by General Scott, on the receipt of the news that General 
Jesup was approaching Fort Mitchell (say) on the 17th of June, and 
what passed between the witness and General Scott at that interview? 

Answer. I recollect being questioned by General Scott at that time (I 



103 [ 224 1 

think I was sent for by the general) in relation to the supplies of forage, 
&c, of the Quartermaster's department. In answer, I stated that the 
quantity of forage on hand at that time was not more than sufficient for 
two or three days' consumption. From the supplies on hand I was di- 
rected to send to Fort Mitchell a supply, for the Alabama troops, of some 
400 or 500 bushels of corn. I recollect General Scott's stating that the 
movement of General Jesup was contrary to the original plan of the cam- 
paign, and that his arriving there without supplies would be the mean.? 
of retarding the operations of the Georgia troops. General Scott express- 
ed much anxiety to commence the campaign immediately, and appeared 
much embarrassed by the movement made by General Jesup. 

3. Question by General Scott. Does the witness recollect what direc- 
tions were given on the same occasion to Lieutenant McCrabb, the as- 
sistant commissary of subsistence ? 

Answer. I recollect that Lieutenant McCrabb was directed to forward 
supplies of provisions to Fort Mitchell for the Alabama troops, and that 
they were forwarded. 

4. Question by General Scott. Does the witness recollect that Lieu- 
tenant McCrabb had any difficulty in obtaining the subsistence then for- 
warded, or that that officer had had any difficulty just before in obtaining 
articles for the subsistence of the troops at Fort Mitchell, prior to the ar- 
rival of General Jesup ? 

Answer. I don't know what difficulty Lieutenant McCrabb there had 
in procuring the supplies then forwarded to General Jesup. I recollect 
hearing Lieutenant McCrabb say that he found difficulty in procuring 
some parts of the ration ; but whether it was prior or subsequent to the 
time alluded to in this question, I am unable to say. At the time I was 
at Columbus I was the only regular officer of the Quartermaster's depart- 
ment, and my duties were so exceedingly arduous, that my time was en- 
tirely engrossed in attending to the duties of my particular department, 
so much so that I knew very little of what was doing in the other depart- 
ments. 

5. Question by General Scott. At the period referred to, had any sub- 
sistence arrived by way of the Chattahoochie or Ockmulgee rivers, or by 
land, from Augusta ? 

Answer. No supplies had arrived at that time by the way of the Ock- 
mulgee, nor am I aware that any had arrived by the way of the Chatta- 
hoochie. Supplies had arrived from Augusta, but I am not able to state 
the quantity. 

Owing to the absence of witnesses this case was laid over to a future 
day, and the Court adjourned. 

Monday, January 16, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
The Judge Advocate here presented to the Court the following depo- 
sitions : 

Deposition of tlie honorable William C. Dawson, of the House of Repre- 
sentatives. 

1. Question by General Scott. In what capacity did you serve in the 



[ 224 ] 101 

late campaign against the hostile Creek Indians, and on what particular 
duty, from early in June, 183G, to about the 20th of that month? 

Ansiver. I commanded a volunteer company. The particular duty 
which I was ordered to perform, (and the orders were given me in a few 
hours after I reported to headquarters,) was, to take the command of a 
detachment composed of "the Fanche volunteers" (my company) and a 
part of the Columbus artillery company, go immediately aboard the steamer 
Metamora, and cruise up and down the Chattahoochie, and prevent the 
hostile Creeks from crossing, either to plunder or escape, or for any other 
purpose, and to destroy all their canoes, batteaux, flats, rafts, &c. 1 was 
also directed to call at the stations on the river and render them any aid 
or assistance they might require, and communicate to them any discovery 
I might make in passing up and down the river. In this particular ser- 
vice I remained until about the 20th of June — other detachments were on 
the same service. 

2. Question by General Scott. As far as may be known or believed by 
the witness, what portion of the Georgia line, with arms, was placed in 
defensive positions on the left bank of the Chattahoochie, including the 
companies engaged in cruising on that river on board of steamers; what 
portion retained in the vicinity of Columbus for the defence of that city, 
and the unarmed troops of the same line ; and was the portion of armed, 
so retained, greater than was generally deemed necessary for the two 
latter objects ? 

Ansiver. I cannot positively say what portion of the Georgia line, with 
arms, was placed in defensive positions on the left bank of the Chatta- 
hoochie liver, including the companies engaged in cruising on that river 
on board of steamers. All were placed in defensive positions on the left 
bank of the river which were not retained in the vicinity of Columbus, 
for the protection of that place and the troops who had no arms. The 
portion retained was not greater than was generally deemed necessary 
for that purpose. 

3. Question by General Scott. Was any time lost in pushing detach- 
ments (regulars and volunteers) from the neighborhood of Columbus 
down the left bank of the Chattahoochie, to take up defensive positions, 
in proportion to the arrival of armed companies and of arms to be distrib- 
uted ; and was any time lost, after the arrival of arms for the remainder 
of the Georgia line, in putting in march, for active operations on the side 
of the Chattahoochie, the whole disposable force, regulars and volun- 
teers ? 

Ansiver. When I reached Columbus with my company, I found energy 
and despatch in the organization of the army, and in ordering to defensive 
positions all that prudence would permit to be sent, reserving a suffi- 
ciency of arms to protect an unarmed army, and defend the city of Co- 
lumbus. My company being chiefly armed, having carried the arras with 
it, I was ordered immediately into active service. Some of-mymen being 
unarmed, I had to select muskets frem a lew old ones found in Columbus. 
So soon as the arms arrived regulars and volunteers were put in motion. 

4. Question by General Scott. Did the witness once, or oftener, hear 
General Scott develop, for inquiry and information, his plans for de- 
fensive and offensive operations, on the eastern, western, and southern 



105 [ 224 ] 

sides of the enemy, including all the forces, Georgians, Alabamians, and 
regulars; and will the witness please state his opinion of those plans? 

Answer. I heard General Scott, I think more than once, develop his 
plans for the campaign, and the way he intended to conduct it, for in- 
quiry and information. His plans for offensive and defensive operations 
then were considered best calculated to effect the objects intended. At 
the time his plans were presented to me 1 thought them correct, and still 
think so, for I know of nothing to change that opinion. 

5. Question by General Scott. Supposing the eastern and southern 
sides of the enemy to have been sufficiently guarded to prevent his es- 
cape in either of those directions, and the western side sufficiently guard- 
ed for the protection of our settlements — which was the better plan of 
offensive operations ; to begin (say) about the 25th of June, at the south, 
just below the enemy, and with our whole disposable force, Georgians, 
Alabamians, regulars, and friendly Indians, operate upwards; or to begin 
(say) about the 12th of June, on the line from Tuskegee to Fort Mitch- 
ell, nearly above the whole of the enemy, and with the Alabamians and 
friendly Indians operate downwards? 

Answer. In my opinion, " upwards." 

6. Question by General Scott. To what does the witness principally 
attribute the many partial and successful attempts of the enemy to force 
their way across the Chattahoochie in the direction of Florida, between 
the 12th and 25th of June? 

Answer. The movements of that portion of the troops which had been 
stationed at Tuskegee, I then partly attributed the many attempts (which 
seem to have been frequently successful) of the Indians to force 
their way across the Chattahoochie. The march of that portion of the 
army I then thought put in motion the Indians, and hastened their efforts 
to escape towards Florida. This is my opinion. 

7. Question by General Scott. Which of the two plans stated in the 
fifth interrogatory would probably have best prevented parties of the 
enemy from escaping across the Chattahoochie, and have the sooner ter- 
minated the war, or the capture of the greater number of the enemy ? 

Answer. " Upwards." 

S. Question by General Scott. Is the witness aware, from personal 
observation or otherwise, that General Scott failed in any instance in 
point of judgment, zeal, or activity, as the director of the late war against 
the hostile Creek Indians? 

Answer. General Scott's conduct during the late campaign against the 
hostile Creeks, was marked by zeal and activity, and the result of that 
campaign has evinced his judgment and foresight. 

Sworn to before S. Burch, justice of peace, Washington, D. C, 6th 
January, 1837. 

Deposition of his Excellency William Schley, Governor of the State of 

Georgia. 

1. Question by General Scott. About what time, at what place, and 
accompanied by what general officer of the army, did General Scott, on 
his way to the then Creek country, wait on your Excellency ? 

Answer. On the evening of the 28th of May, 1836, Major General 



[ 224 ] 106 

Scott and Major General Jesup, of the United States army, ca led on 
me at the Executive office, in Milledgeville, Georgia. 

2. Question by General Scott. At that interview, does the witness re- 
collect any conversation respecting the plan of campaign, or of operations, 
(first suggested in a letter to the witness, dated May 26th, ) which Gen- 
eral Scott thought it probable he would find it the best to adopt against 
the Creek enemy ; and what were the principal features to that plan ? 

Answer. During that interview, I stated to Generals Scott and. Jesup 
my views and opinions in regard to the proper course to be pursued 
against the Creek Indians, which was this : that the troops should be 
placed on the line of the Chattahoochie on the Georgia side, in numbers 
sufficient to prevent the escape of the enemy to Florida, and that no 
demonstration should be made on him in Alabama, until his retreat to 
Florida should be by these means effectually cut oil*. When I had thus 
stated my opinion, General Scott expressed to General Jesup his surprise 
and satisfaction that he, General Scott, at Savannah, General Jesup at 
Augusta or at Washington, I do not recollect which, and the Governor 
of Georgia at Milledgeville, should all, without concert or consultation, 
have determined on the same plan of operations. If General Jesup made 
any reply, I do not now recollect it. In a letter addressed me by Gen- 
eral Scott, dated at Savannah, on the 26th of May, the following language 
is contained : " I presume it will be best to assemble the great body of 
our forces as lowdow r n as Irwinton, and operate thence up the country." 
This course of operation, when the river should have been sufficiently 
guarded, I approved as the proper plan, and the events of the war have 
satisfied me that, if our views had been carried out, much human life 
would have been saved. 

3. Question by General Scott. Upon the development of the said 
Scott's suggested plan of operations, did one or more individuals present 
remark that it was a singular coincidence that such had been his or their 
own preconceived plan or notion on the subject ; and who was that in- 
dividual, or who were those persons ? 

Answer. The substance of this question is answered in my answer to 
the second interrogatory. I understood, during the conversation, that 
there was no disagreement between the two Generals and myself. If 
General Jesup did not in so many words agree with us, he certainly did 
not express any dissent, and thereby left me under the impression that 
he approved the plan. 

4. Question by General Scott. With what army officers did your 
Excellency proceed from Milledgeville to Columbus, in May last, and did 
any similar conversation and concurrence of views on the same subject 
take place between the same parties on the route to Columbus, or after 
their arrival at that place ? 

Answer. On the morning of the 29th of May, 1836, I left Milledge- 
ville in the public stage for Columbus, in company with Major General 
Scott, Major General Jesup, Major E. Kirby, and, I think, Captain Parrott. 
During the journey, we spoke freely of coming events, and the proper 
course to be pursued in regard to the campaign, and, as far as I could un- 
derstand the views of the officers, we all concurred in opinion. 

5. Question by General Scott. Was not the same plan of campaign 
frequently developed in conversation by the said Scott at Columbus, in 



107 f 224 J 

the presence of Major General Jesup, and many otheis, and did the said 
Jesup, before his departure west from Columbus, at any time, although 
the subject was always proposed for discussion, intimate any modification 
of or objection to that plan ? 

Answer. The plan was spoken of in Columbus, and if General Jesup 
disputed, or made any different proposition, I did not know or hear it. 

6. Question by General Scott. Did the said Scott, in all his orders, in- 
structions, conversations, and arrangements,'as far as they were known to 
the witness, steadily adhere to the same plan of operations, up to the time 
when it became known to the witness and said Scott that the said Jesup 
had with his forces, or a great part of them, approached Fort Mitchell 
from Tuskegee. 

Answer. Major General Scott made no alteration in the original plan 
of operations, but steadily adhered to it, as far as I know or believe, un- 
til after General Jesup's movements in Alabama. 

7. Question by General Scott. What, in the opinion of your Excellency, 
were the relative advantages or disadvantages between a plan of opera- 
tions beginning on a line at or a little above Irvvinton, and below the 
hostile Creeks, and acting up the country ; and beginning, say, on a line 
from Tuskegee to Fort Mitcheli, above the greater number of the 
enemy, and operating down the country? 

Question 8, by the same. If the whole disposable force of Georgians, 
Alabamians, and regulars, with the friendly Indians acting as auxilia- 
ries, had been placed in line below the enemy, and had operated up the 
country, whilst the frontier settlements of Georgia and Alabama were 
guarded by competent detachments, is it not probable that fewer of the 
enemy would have escaped across the Chattahoochie in the direction of 
Florida, than actually did so escape, and also that the war would have 
been earlier finished than it actually was ? 

Question 9, by the same. Is it not probable or certain that the move- 
ment of General Jesup and the forces under his immediate orders, from 
Tuskegee upon Fort Mitchell, and from that line below, before all the 
other forces upon the Chattahoochie were ready to take their positions 
on that river, and the base-line below the enemy, put the enemy upon 
the endeavor to escape in the direction of Florida, and led to the many 
severe conflicts which took place on the soil of Georgia ? 

Question 10, by the same. Which of the two plans of operation — that 
of operating with the whole disposable force under the general command 
of the said Scott, upwards, from a line below the enemy, and beginning, 
say, about the 25th of June, and the plan pursued by the said Jesup, 
viz: beginning an isolated movement, say about the 12th of the same 
month, from Tuskegee towards Fort Mitchell, and thence operating 
down the country — would, in the opinion of the witness, have the sooner 
terminated the war, by the capture of the great body of the enemy? 

Answer to the 1th, 8th, 9th, and 10/// questions. These questions all re- 
late to the same matter, and ask my opinion of the probable effect of a dif- 
ferent course from that pursued by General Jesup. It is an unpleasant task to 
give an opinion on a subject of which I cannot be supposed toknowmuch 
scientifically. But as I felt a deep interest in the events of the war, and 
had much to do with the plans and arrangements of the campaign, I feel 
that I cannot be justly charged with presumption in saying that I believe 



[ 224 ] 108 

the plan of cutting off the retreat of the enemy to Florida, and attacking 
him from below and driving him up the country, would have been decided- 
ly preferable to a movement such as General Jesup made from Tuskegee 
through the nation in the direction of Fort Mitchell ; because, by having 
the river properly guarded, and attacking the enemy below, he would 
have been compelled to a conflict or capitulation ; whereas the other 
course left him free to fight or retreat through a sparsely-populated country 
to Florida, as a considerable portion did, when it was known that the 
army under General Jesup was in motion. But, if there had been concert 
of action between the two divisions of the army, so that both would have 
moved at the same time, the one down the Chattahoochie on the Georgia 
side, and the other from Tuskegee down on the western side of the 
Creek nation, and ajunctionhad been formed below the hostiles, (in the 
mean time having left a sufficient force on the line of the Chattachoochie 
to guard the passes to Florida,) I believe that the war would have been 
sooner effectually closed, and with less bloodshed ; for, in the retreat 
of the Creeks through the lower counties of Georgia, many families and 
persons were murdered. 

11. Question by General Scott. How were the rooms, occupied re- 
spectively by the witness and the said Scott, situated, in respect to each 
other, when the latter happened to be in Columbus, in May, June, and 
July, 1836 ? 

Answer. Major General Scott and I occupied the second story of a 
house in Columbus during the time he remained there. There were two 
rooms, with a door between them. I occupied the eastern or froat room, 
and he the western or back room. The weather was extremely warm ; 
the middle door was generally open, and we had mutual access to each 
other's room, without ceremony. 

12. Question by General Scott. Had your Excellency any reason to 
believe that, when within your reach, the said Scott withheld from your 
knowledge any important paper or information received by him, or that 
he withheld from you any important letter or order written by him cr 
in his name ? 

Ansiver. I had no reason to believe that General Scott withheld from 
me any facts, letters, orders, or information of any kind connected with 
or having relation to the Creek war. On the contrary, I believe he con- 
cealed nothing from me on that subject. 

13. Question by General Scott. Does your Excellency recollect being 
shown a letter from the said Jesup to the said Scott, dated on the waters 
of the Hatchychubby, June 17th, in which it is said: "I would have 
struck the enemy to-night but for your letter; if he is not struck to-mor- 
row morning he will escape for the present ;" which letter was in reply 
to instructions from the said Scott to the said Jesup, " to stop all of- 
fensive movements (if you are in command) on the part of the Alaba- 
mians, until the Georgians are ready to act, (say) on the 21st instant, 
when the greater number of them will be armed and ready for the field? 

Answer. I remember seeing a letter written by General Jesup to Gen- 
eral Scott, containing the substance of the remarks quoted, but cannot 
remember the date or the precise words used, and that it was in reply to 
General Scott's order to stop all offensive movements. 

14. Question by General Scott. Has the witness reason to know 



109 [ 224 J 

(and how) that that instruction, from the said Scott to the said Jesup, was 
disobeyed, and the effect upon the enemy, if any, of such disobedience? 
Answer. This question 1 am unwilling to answer, unless it should be 
necessary to do so for the purposes of justice; because, whatever informa- 
tion I may possess on the subject, was received at a time and place that, 
in the ordinary intercourse among gentlemen, may be considered as for- 
bidding a disclosure, except it be absolutely necessary to the protection 
of innocence. 

15. Question by General Scott. Does the witness recollect that letters 
were written, both by him and the said Scott, about the 31st of May, to 
his Excellency Governor Clay, of Alabama, on the subject of co-opera- 
tion against the hostile Creek Indians, and, if the witness retained a copy 
of his letter to that Governor, will he have the goodness to annex it to 
the answer he may give to this interrogatory? 

16. Question by the same. Before the 8th of July, when the said Scott 
left Columbus for the North, had the witness received any reply to the 
said letter written by him to the Governor of Alabama ? 

Answer to \bth and IQth questions. 1 have a distinct recollection that 
General Scott and I wrote to the Governor of Alabama on the 30th of 
May, on the subject of co-operating against the enemy. No answer was 
received by me, and I learned from General Scott that he had received 
none. After my return to Milledgeville, I inquired of Governor Clay, 
in a letter I addressed him on another subject, whether he had received 
mine of the 31st of May, to which he replied that he had, and that he 
should have answered it, " but for the want of any safe and direct com- 
munication between Montgomery and Columbus, and for the further rea- 
son that the management of the war had then devolved on Generals Scott 
and Jesup, which seemed to render any further correspondence between 
us upon that subject unnecessary." 

17. Question by General Scott. Did not the said Scott frequently ex- 
press, in conversations with the witness, much regret and some surprise 
that neither of the two had received any reply to, or acknowledgment 
of, the letters written by the witness and the said Scott to the Governor 
of Alabama about the end of May ? 

Ansioer. Yes ; we frequently talked of the matter, and were at a loss 
to account for the silence of Governor Clay. This, however, has been 
explained to me, as stated in my answers to the loth and 18th interrog- 
atories. 

IS. Question by General Scott. Does the witness recollect, in any 
letter from the said Jesup to the said Scott, written from Tuskegee, an 
expression of a doubt to this effect : " I have not yet obtained the com- 
mand of the troops; but^ if I obtain it at «//, I shall probably enter on 
duty to-morrow;" and was it not rendered still doubtful, from the oral 
reports made to the witness and the said Scott by several officers and 
others who accompanied the said Jesup from Columbus to Tuskegee, 
whether the Alabama volunteers and draughts would consent to be mus- 
tered into the service of the United States, and come under the orders 
of the said Jesup ? 

Answer. I do remember the remarks quoted from General Jesup's let- 
ter, written at Tuskegee, I think, on the 8th of June ; and General Scott 
and I were in doubt, from that letter and the statements of several gen- 



[ 224 ] 110 



tlemcn who accompanied General Jesup as an escort to Tuskegee, 
whether he had obtained the command of the Alabama troops, until Gen- 
eral Scott received his letter giving an account of his march from Tus- 
kegee towards Fort Mitchell. 

19. Question by General Scott. Has the witness received a letter from 
General Jesup, enclosing another to the witness, said to have been writ- 
ten some time before, but not sent ; and will the witness be pleased to 
annex a copy of the first letter here alluded to, in answer to this inter- 
rogatory ? 

Answer. Yes, I have received such letter, a copy of which is annexed. 
(See docs. Nos. 267, 268.) 

20. Question by General Scott. Will the witness be pleased to state 
his recollection of the length and degree of the said Scott's illness at 
Columbus, in the month of June, 1836 ? 

Answer. General Scott was attacked with fever a few 7 days after his 
arrival at Columbus, and was confined to his room and bed for ten or 
twelve days, the precise time not recollected ; during a part of which he 
was considered by his physicians very ill, so much so that I was request- 
ed by one of them to prevent persons from going into his room, as they 
considered it necessary to his recovery that he should be kept quiet, and 
not permitted to be excited by conversation. 

21. Question by General Scott. Is the witness aware that the said 
Scott, in any particular, when not ill in bed, failed, in point of zeal or 
judgment, in the direction of the war against the hostile Creek Indians 
before mentioned ? 

Answer. I am perfectly satisfied that General Scott was not, at any 
time, wanting in zeal or judgment in conducting the Creek war, except 
when he was so ill in bed that he could not act at all. I believe that his 
L^reat anxiety to labor in the cause had a tendency to protract his con- 
finement, and when he mounted his horse and too!; the field, I thought 
him physically nimble to do so without great hazard. 

22. Question by General Scott. With a reasonable doubt whether the 
volunteers and draughts of Alabama would come under the rules and arti- 
cles of war, and into the service of the United States, was it not more 
important not to commence active operations until all the volunteers and 
draughts of Georgia on the Chattahoochie frontier should receive arms and 
accoutrements, and the greater part of the regulars expected should ar- 
rive ? 

Answer. With the great uncertainty in regard to the course of the Al- 
abama troops, and the situation of General Jesup, I considered it all-im- 
portant that the whole of tiie Georgia troops should be prepared to take 
the field. And, even if we had known that General Jesup had com- 
mand, and was ready to act, I should, with my views of the proper course 
to be pursued, have deemed it proper to wait for aims to supply the troops 
on the eastern side of the Chattahoochie, that they might guard the 
passes to Florida, and co-operate with General Jesup in attacking the 
enemy in Alabama, after a junction was formed between the troops of 
the two States below the enemy. 

23. Question by General Scott. Is the witness aware of any failure, 
on the part of the said Scott, by all the means in his power, to hasten 



Ill [ 224 ] 

the arrival oMhe arms and accoutrements necessary for the Georgia 
quota of troops ? 

Answer. No. On the contrary every thing was done that could be; 
for, when the arms did not arrive as soon as we expected, General Scott 
employed and sent Mr. Oowell, an active and intelligent young man, in 
pursuit of them, with instructions to get other wagons as lighters, and to 
force them on with all possible speed ; which he did. 

Sworn to the 3d January, 1S37, before 

D. B. MITCHELL, 
Justice of the inferior court, Baldwin county. 

Lieutenant William H. Bet is, of the 1st regiment of artillery, a ivitiiess 
on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, teas interro- 
gated asfollotvs : 

1. Question by General Scott. In what capacity did the witness serve 
in the Creek war with General Scott, and between what periods ? 

Answer. At the request of Major General Scott, I joined him at Co- 
lumbus, Georgia, about the 2d of June, 1836, and acted in the capacity 
as aid-de-camp to that general from that time (though not placed in or- 
ders to that effect until about the 20th of June ) in all his operations 
against the Creek Indians, until the 6th of July, when he was recalled. 

2. Question by General Scott. What does the witness know, or what 
was reported at headquarters, on the the subject of accidents happening 
to steamboats with arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and other army sup- 
plies, between Darien and Hawkinsville, which caused dela} r s in June 
last ? 

Answer. It was reported at the headquarters of Major General Scott 
at Columbus, that a steamboat loaded with arms, accoutrements, and other 
army supplies, had burst her boiler in the month of June, on the Ockmul- 
gee river, between Darien and Hawkinsville, some distance below the 
latter place ; that in consequence the agent of the quartermaster's depart- 
ment at Hawkinsville had to hire another boat that had been laid up for 
the summer, to cause it to be refitted and despatched down the river after 
the above-named supplies. Much time was delayed in the arrival of the 
newsof the accident at Hawkinsville, and for the other boat to reach the 
scene of disaster to the transfer of the arms. It was also reported that 
another boat, similarly laden, had met with an accident between Darien 
and Hawkinsville, that delayed, for several days, her arrival at the latter 
place. 

3. Question by General Scott. What does the witness remember of his 
being, by General Scott's instruction, about to proceed on the road to 
Hawkinsville, to hasten on the arms and accoutrements to Columbus, and 
what prevented the witness from proceeding on that service ? 

Answer. Unaccountable delay having been experienced in the arrival 
of the aims expected by the way of Hawkinsville, I was directed by 
Generai Scott, about the 18th of June, to proceed on the road to Haw- 
kinsville, by day and night, until I should meet the train of wagons, by 
which they were being conveyed to Columbus, and to hasten their ar- 
rival by every possible means. I had mounted my horse to execute this 
order, when Major Beard arrived in the public stage from Hawkinsville 



[ 22 i ] 112 

by the way of Macon. J]e assured both General Scott and myself (hat 
he had the most perfect confidence in the zeal and activity of the con- 
ductor ; that their arrival could not he expedited by my trip, and that they 
would certainly be there in two or three days. They did not, however, 
arrive until about a week from this time. 

4. Question by General Scotl. What does the witness remember of any 
delay that subsequently occurred, in transporting the same arms, accou- 
trements, &c, from Ilawkinsville in wagons to Columbus. 

Answer. I have stated in my third answer that they did not arrive 
until three or four days after the expected time ; the reason assigned for 
which, on the arrival of the train, was a letter written by Major General 
Irwin, of the Alabama militia, to Brigadier General Wilcox, of Georgia, 
who had been charged with the protection of the district of country on 
the route of the enemy to Florida. This letter stated that about two 
thousand hostile Creek Indians had crossed the Chattahoochie, and were 
laying waste the lower counties of Georgia, murdering men, women, and 
children indiscriminately. On the appearance of this letter in the public 
journals, the inhabitants of this portion of the State fled for protection to 
the interior. The conductor of the train from Ilawkinsville was seized 
with the same panic, and changed his direction so as to pass entirely above 
the supposed enemy, thereby delaying the arrival of the arms some three 
or four days. 

5. Question by General Scott. On receiving despatches from General 
Jesup, about the 17th of June, what does the witness remember of Mr. 
Waite and Mr. McCrabb (the quartermaster and the commissary) being 
sent for to come to headquarters, and what passed between General Scott 
and those officers on that occasion ? 

Answer. On the receipt of a letter from Major General Jesup, about 
the 17th of June, Major General Scott sent for Lieutenant Waite and 
Lieutenant McCrabb, assistant quartermaster and assistant commissary, at 
Columbus, and questioned them with reference to the supply of forage 
and provisions on hand, and what amount they could probably furnish the 
troops under the command of General Jesup ; to which Lieutenant 
McCrabb replied that he had but a small supply of provisions on hand, 
and that he had nearly exhausted \l\e market in furnishing I he troops at 
Fort Mitchell, and on the river below, with provisions. General Scott 
directed him, in the strongest terms, to use every exertion to supply the 
troops under the command of General Jesup, and if necessary for this 
purpose, to place the Georgia troops on half or quarter rations. 

G. Question by General Scott. What does the witness remember of the 
state of the roads and bridges between Augusta and Columbus, and be- 
tween Ilawkinsville and Columbus, in June last? 

Answer. I recollect distinctly that much rain fell in the month of June, 
and know from personal observation that the road between Columbus and 
Augusta was in very bad condition. 

r General Scott having requested until Friday, the 20th instant, to 
prepare his linal address, the Court adjourned to that day, at 10 o'clock, 
A. M. 



113 [ 224 j 

January 20, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The following deposition of F. P. Blair, Esq., was here presented to 

the Court : 

1. Question by General Scott. Is the deponent one of the editors of 
the newspaper called The Globe, published at Washington city? 

Answer. Yes. 

2. Question by General Scott. In The Globe, dated September 26th, 
1830, there is a letter addressed to the deponent, and signed " Th. S. 
Jesup," followed by four others, signed, respectively, " Winfield Scott," 
" Th. S. Jesup," " Winfield Scott," and " Th. S. Jesup," with notes (o 
the two signed " Winfield Scott." Was the first of the five letters written 
by Major General Jesup; did the five, with the notes mentioned, consti- 
tute one or more communications for publication, and by whom were 
they communicated ? 

^ Answer. All the letters alluded to were received through the mail from 
General Jesup. The first, this deponent believes, was written by him; 
the rest communicated at the request of this deponent. For this request', 
th^ reasons are assigned in the editorial preface t*o the publication. They 
were, doubtless, sent with an expectation that they would be published. 

3. Question by General Scott. It the letters, with the notes mentioned, 
were not expressly communicated for publication, was permission to 
publish them impliedly given, and by whom? 

Answer. The letters, with the notes, this deponent understood, (from 
their communication, in compliance with the request for the copies,) he 
had the permission of Genera! Jesup to make public; but the publication 
was made on the responsibility of this deponent. He published them as 
an act of justice to General Scott as well as to General Jesup, having 
published General Jesup's letter referring to them, with editorial remarks, 
also referring to them. General Scott had written a letter to a frien 3, w hich 
he was authorized to show to this deponent, speaking of this as an unjust 
course to him, and calculated to prejudice his cause before the country 
and the Court. This deponent conceived there was no othf v mode in 
which he could repair the wrong, but that of publishing the correspond- 
ence between the parties. Although he had not the express direction 
of either for doing so, he supposed, from the circumstances alluded to, 
that he had the implied consent of both. 

^ 4. Question by General Scott. It is stated in The Globe, dated August 
8, 1836, under the editorial head, in reference to " General Scott's orders 
and letters," that "some were sent to us for publication, as we under- 
stood, at his instance." Will the deponent be pleased to inquire into 
and state the grounds of this understanding. 

Answer. This deponent occasionally received articles from the War 
Department, introducing letters and despatches from General Scott, of 
which the following, prefacing the letter inculpating Major Read, is an 
example : ' ; As an act of justice to General Scott, we publish the follow- 
ing official letter, recently received at the War Department, from that 
8 



[ :2i ] 114 

er." The impression made by the phraseology, that the j ublication 
\\; s required i act of justice" to General Scott, was, that he had 

req es ed it . s due to him from the Department. This impression, growing 
out of frequent communications from the Department, explanatory of 
G neral Scott's conduct of the war, was confirmed by a brief conversation 
with Major Van Buren, in relation to the publication of the letter which 
speaks so harshly of Major Read. Falling in casually with Major Van 
Bi ten in the street, after a few words between him and deponent in rela- 
tion to the contents of that setter, he inquired if it would appear in the 
Gl be ; he was told that it had not yet been communicated to the editor 
for that purpose. He said he hoped the publication would be counter- 
manded. This deponent understood him to mean countermanded by some 

equent letter from General Scott. Upon inquiry of General Jones, 
• L deponent is now informed that he (General Jones) and Major Van 
B en, both thought the publication likely to produce nnpleasent conse- 
quences, and expressed an opinion against the publication, but that it 
was ordered, notwithstanding, by the Secretary of War; who said he 
thought General Scott expected its publication. This statement will ex- 

n the misunderstanding of tacts under which the article of the Globe 
of the 8th of August, 1836, was written, in which it is said of the publi- 

m made of General Scott's o ders and letters, that " some were sent 
to us for publication, as, we understood, at his instance." 
Sworn to the 17th of January, 1837, before 

ROBERT GETTY, 

Justice of the peace. 

The testimony having here closed, Major General Scott made the 
Address which accompanies these proceedings; after which the Court 
adjourned this case to a future day, 

January 30, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Court proceeded to pronounce its Opinion in the foregoing case- 
as follows : 

Upon a careful examination of the abundant testimony taken in the 
foregoing case, the Court is of opinion that no delay, which it was prac- 
ticable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott in opening the 
campaign against the Creek Indians. On the contrary, it appears that he 
took the earliest measures to provide arms, munitions, and provisions, for 
his forces, who were found almost wholly destitute ; and as soon as arms 
could be put into the hands of the volunteers, they were, in succession, 
detached, and placed in position to prevent the enemy from retiring upon 
Florida, and whence they could move against the main body of the 
enemy, as soon as equipped for offensive operations. 

From the testimony of the Governor of Georgia, of Major General 
Sanford, commander of the Georgia volunteers, and many other witnesses 
of high rank and standing who were acquainted with the topography of 
the country and the position and strength of the enemy, the Court is of 
opinion that the plan of campaign adopted by Major General Scott was 
well calculated to lead to successful results, and that it was prosecuted 



115 [ 224 ] 

by him, as far as practicable, with zeal and ability, until recalled from 
the command, upon representations made by Major General Jesup, his 
second in command, from Fort Mitchell, in a letter bearing date the 20th 
of June, 1836, addressed to F. P. Blair, Esq., at Washington, marked 
" private " containing a request that it be shown to the President — which 
letter was exposed and brought to light by the dignified and magnanimous 
act of the President in causing it to be placed on hie in the Department 
of War, as an official document, and which forms pait of these Proceedings. 
(See document No. 214.) Conduct so extraordinary and inexplicable on 
the part of Major General Jesup, in reference to the character of said 
letter, should, in the opinion of the Court, be investigated. 

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, 

President of the Court. 
S. Cooper, Judge Advocate, 

Recorder of the Court. 



Continuation of the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry in the case 
of Major General Scott, in reference to the delay in opening and 
prosecuting the Creek campaign. 

Frederick, February 18, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to notice. All present. 

The President of the Court submitted the following communications ; 

War Department, 

February 15, 1837. 

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of the Opinion of the Presi- 
dent of the United States on the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry of 
which you are President, relative to the campaign against the Creek In- 
dians, and, in compliance with the direction at the close thereof, to trans- 
mit, herewith, those Proceedings, with the documentary evidence re- 
ferred to therein, for the further action of the Court. 
Very respectfully, 

Your most obedient servant, 

B. F. BUTLER, 
Secretary of War ad interim. 
Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb, 

President of the Court of Inquiry, fyc. 

P. S. The Proceedings and a portion of the documents accompany 
this. The balance of the documents (except Nos. 204 and 209, which 
will be sent to-morrow) are in a separate package, and sent by the same 
mail. 

(copy.) 

The President has carefully examined the Proceedings of the Court of 
Inquiry recently held at the city of Frederick, by virtue of Orders Nos. 



[ 221 ] 116 

Go and 68, so far as tlm same relate to the causes of the delay in open- 
ing and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama, against the 
hostile Creek Indians, in the year 1836; and has maturely considered 
the Opinion of the Court on this part of the subject referred to it. 

I he Order constituting the Court directs it, among other things, " to 
inquire and examine into the causes of the delay in opening and prose- 
cuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama, against the hostile Creek 
Indians, in the year 1836, and into every subject connected with the 
military operations in the campaign aforesaid ; and after fully investiga- 
ting the same, to report the facts, together with its Opinion on the whole 
subject, for the information of the President." 

It appears from the Proceedings, that, after the testimony of nine wit- 
nesses had been received by the Court, and after more than one hundred 
documents bearing on the subject, had also been produced in evidence, 
and after Major General Scott had addressed the Court on the subject, 
the Court proceeded to pronounce its Opinion, as follows: 

" Upon a careful examination of the abundant testimony taken in the 
foregoing case, the Court is of opinion that no delay, which it was prac- 
ticable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott in opening 
the campaign against the Creek Indians. On the contrary, it appears 
that he took the earliest measures to provide arms, munitions, and pro- 
visions for his forces, who were found almost v. holly destitute; and as 
soon as arms could be put into the hands of the volunteers, they were, 
in succession, detached and placed in position to prevent the enemy 
from retiring upon Florida, and whence they could move against the main 
body of the enemy, as soon as equipped for offensive operations. 

"From the testimony of the Governor of Georgia, of Major General 
Sanford, commander of the Georgia volunteers, and many other witnes- 
ses of high rank and standing, who were acquainted with the topography 
of the country and the position and strength of the enemy, the Court 
is of opinion that the plan of campaign adopted by Major General Scott 
was well calculated to lead to successful results, and that it was prose- 
cuted by him, as far as practicable, with zeal and ability, until recalled 
from the command upon representations made by Major GeneralJesup, 
his second in command, from Fort Mitchell, in a letter bearing date the 20th 
of June, 1836, addressed to F. P. Blair, Fsq., at Washington, marked 
"private" containing a request that it be shown to the President ; which 
letter was exposed and brought to light by the dignified and magnani- 
mous act of the President, in causing it to be placed on file in the De- 
partment of War as an official document, and which forms part of these 
proceedings. (See document No. 214.) Conduct so extraordinary and 
inexplicable on the part of Major General Jesup, in reference to the 
character of said letter, should, in the opinion of the Court, be inves- 
tigated.'" 

The foregoing opinion is not accompanied by any report of the Jacts 
in the case, as required by the Order constituting the Court ; on the 
contrary, the facts are left to be gathered from the mass of oral and doc- 
umentary evidence contained in the Proceedings ; and thus a most im- 
portant part of the duty assigned to the Court remains unexecuted. 
Had the Court stated the facts of the case, as established to its satisfac- 
tion by the evidence before it, the President, on comparing such state of 



117 [ 22 1 ] 

facts found by the Court with its Opinion, would have distinctly under- 
stood the views entertained by the Court in respect to the degree of 
promptitude and energy which ought to be displayed in a campaign 
against Indians— a point manifestly indispensable to a correct appreciation 
of tbe Opinion, and one which the President's examination of the evi- 
dence has not supplied, inasmuch as he has no means of knowing wheth- 
er the conclusions drawn by him from the evidence agree with those oi 
the Court. 

The Opinion of the Court is also argumentative, and wanting in re- 
quisite precision, inasmuch as it states that "no delay, which it was prac- 
ticable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott, in opening 
the campaign against the Creek Indians," &c. ; thus leaving it to 
be inferred, but not distinctly finding, that there was some delay, and 
that it was made by some person other than Major General Scott ; with- 
out specifying in what such delay consisted, when it occurred, how long 
it continued, nor by whom it was occasioned. Had the Court found a 
state of facts, as required by the Order constituting it, the uncertainty 
now existing in this part of the Opinion would have been obviated, and 
the justice of the Opinion itself readily determined. 

That part of the Opinion of the Court which animadverts on the letter 
addressed by Major General Jesup to F. P. Blair, Esq., bearing date the 
20th of June, 183G, and which presents the same as a subject demand- 
ing investigation, appears to the President to be wholly unauthorized by 
the Order constituting the Court, and by which its jurisdiction was con- 
fined to an inquiry into the causes of the delay in opening and prose- 
cuting the campaign against the hostile Creeks, and into such subjects as 
were connected with the military operations in that campaign. The 
causes of the recall of Major General Scott from the command, and the 
propriety or impropriety of the conduct of General Jesup in writing the 
letter referred to, were not submitted to the Court as subjects of inquiry. 
The Court itself appears to have been of this opinion, inasmuch as no 
notice was given to General Jesup of the pendency of the Proceedings, 
nor had he any opportunity to cross-examine and interrogate the wit- 
nesses, nor to be heard in respect to his conduct in the matter remarked 
on by the Court. 

For the several reasons above assigned, the President disapproves the 
Opinion of the Court, and remits to it the Proceedings in question, to 
the end that the Court may resume the consideration of the evidence, 
and from the same, and from such further evidence as shall be taken, 
(incase the Court shall deem it necessary to take further evidence,) 
may ascertain and report, with distinctness and precision, especially as 
to time, place, distances, and other circumstances, all the facts touching 
the opening and prosecuting of the campaign in Georgia and Alabama, 
against the hostile Creek Indians, in the year 1836, and the military 
operations in the said campaign ; and touching the delay, if any there 
was, in the opening or prosecuting of said campaign, and the causes of 
such delay ; and to the end, also, that the Court, whilst confining its 
Opinion to the subject-matters submitted to it, may fully and distinctly 
express its opinion on those matters, for the information of the Presi- 
dent. 

The Secretary of War ad interim will cause the Proceedings of the 



[ 224 ] 118 

Court, on the subject oi' the campaign against the Creek Indians, with 
the documentary evidence referred to therein, and a copy of the fore- 
going Opinion, to be transmitted to Major General Alexander Macomb, 
President of the Court, for the proper action thereon. 

ANDREW JACKSON. 
Washington, February 14, 183ft. 

The Court, in proceeding to give the facts upon which its Opinion is 
founded, would respectfully state, that the Proceedings and Opinion of 
the Court were made up in the usual form, and according to the rule of 
service, and were transmitted to the Secretary of War, accompanied by 
all the testimony offered in the case, which testimony contains all the 
,. cts brought to the notice of the Court, and upon which the Opinion of 
the Court was founded. But, h\ obedience to the directions of the 
President, the Court has proceeded to state the facts embraced in the 
testimony, both documentary and oral, referring to " time and place, 
distances, and other circumstances," and which will be found in the fol- 
lowing Synopsis : 

DOCUMENTARY TESTIMONY. 

On the 23d of May the Secretary of War instructs General Jesup to 
station a sufficient force at the south point of the Creek nation, to pre- 
vent the retreat of the Indians to Florida, &c. (Doc. 161.) 

On the 25th of May General Scott arrives at Augusta, on his way 
to take the direction of the war. (Doc. 164.) 

On the 2Glh he informs the Governor of Georgia that he has ordered 
essential stores from Picolata, St. Augustine, Charleston, and Savannah, 
&c, which will be immediately shipped to Hawkinsville, on the Oekmul- 
gee, within 75 miles of Fort Mitchell ; has also ordered 250,000 com- 
plete rations from New Orleans to the highest navigable point on the 
Chattahoochie, and shall take measures for the supply of 200 bushels of 
corn-meal daily on the same river. Ten wagons, loaded with subsistence, 
will leave Augusta for the same destination to-morrow ; a small de- 
tachment of recruits has arrived at Augusta from the North. (Doc. 
165.) 

On the 21th May, appoints Major Beard agent of quartermaster's stores, 
and sends him to [lawkinsville to hasten on supplies, &c, and to pur- 
chase subsistence. (Doc. 167.) 

On the 3\st May, Major Baden, in charge of the arsenal at Augusta, 
notifies General Scott that he has turned over to the quartermaster at 
Augusta, on the requisition of Governor Schley, 1,000 muskets, to be 
sent to Columbus. (Doc. 168.) No ammunition or flints appear to have 
been sent with these arms, although the Governor's requisition ( Doc. 
163) calls for them. 

On the 29th May Quartermaster Dimmock notifies General Scott that 
10 wagons, with supplies, left Augusta the day previous ; anticipates dif- 
ficulty in procuring wagons in forwarding supplies, &c. Captain Mon- 
roe's company arrived at Augusta from the North ; the companies of 



1 19 [ 2 . i j 

Major Pierce's command, with Monroe's, have 75 days' subsistence 
with them; this will require 5 wagons per company. The riflesordei i 
from Charleston, via Savannah, left Charleston on 27th. Major Garland 
directs that camp equipaj lished from Savannah; there is none 

there. 300 wagons will be required to forward all the supplies on. 
{Doc. 171.) 

On the 2d June General Scott informs the Adjutant General that he 
arrived at Columbus on 30th May ; the troops are being mustered into 
service ; the frontier of Georgia above and below Columbus is guarded 
to prevent escape of the Indians towards Florida, Sac. ; shad take addi- 
tional measures, by employing a steamer, hourly expected, with a com- 
pany on board, and by pushing some mounted companies 50 or 60 miles 
below; supposes i,500 Georgia troops to have arrived on the frontier, 
distributed over a line of 40 miles on the river; as many more expected ; 
companies arrive daily ; all are not expected before the 12th, perhaps 
I5th. The Governor of Alabama, with about an equal number, will be 
ready to march upon the enemy by the 5th ; doubts if he has subsistence 
for more than 5 days. No magazines on the Georgia side ; the supplies 
precarious, which state of things must continue at least 8 days longer, 
when 100,000 rations from Picolata, St. Augustine, Savannah, and 
Charleston, may begin to arrive from Macon and Hawkinsville by 
ons ; the supplies from New Orleans can't arrive before the 20th ; late, 
long, and heavy rains in this quarter have injured the roads. Geneial 
Jesup leaves to-morrow (3d June) for Montgomery. If we fight the 
Indians with inferior numbers we shall probably beat them, but with a 
great loss of valuable lives on our part: if we wait for the arrival of all 
our forces, and till we have ample means of subsistence secured for 20 
days in advance, the war may be successfully terminated on our part 
with but small loss of lives. This consideration has great weight with 
General Scott, and has been developed to Governor Clay. A delay. of 
10 days has therefore been urged. (Doc. 172.) 

On the 28th May Governor Clay invites the co-operation of the forces 
on the Georgia side by the 5th June. (Doc. 173.) 

On the Hist May General Scott notifies Governor Clay that 1,000 reg- 
ulars are expected to begin to arrive at Columbus in 8 days; learns that 
on the 29th some individuals were murdered, and several houses burned 
on the Georgia side ; is opposed to all premature operations ; forces must 
iirst be assembled and organized, magazines established, &c. In 10 
or 15 days every thing will be in readiness on this side ; gives his plan 
of campaign, and proposes 'now the Alabama troops shall co-operate. 
(Docs. 174, 175.) 

On the 1st June General Scott instructs General Jesup to proceed to 
Montgomery, &c, and take command of the Alabama troops, and ope- 
rate up the country from a point below Irwinton. (Doc. 176.) 

On the 3d June General Scott directs Captain Harding, in charge of 
the Mount Vernon arsenal, Alabama, to send to Columbus 4 pieces of 
ordnance complete, 150 rounds of canister for each, 3,000 stands of 
muskets complete, 100,000 rounds of musket cartridges, and 50,000 
flints. (Doc. 178.) 

Onthe lith Captain Harding replies that he has not the articles ; that 
the Governors of Alabama and Florida have completely exhausted his 



f 224 ] t :o 

Slock, &c, the former having received 6,800 muskets, 4 six-pounders, 
[ . ; lias sent General Seott's requisition to Baton Rouge arsenal, 
to be supplied from thence. (Doc. 179.) 

June 3. Further instructions to Major Beard at Hawkinsville to hasten 
on supplies, &e. (Doc. 180.) 

June 2. Quartermaster Dimmock reports 24 wagons with provision? 
on the road from Augusta to Columbus, also 5 companies of regulars ; 
tinds it difficult to get wagons, &e. (Docs. 182, 183.) 

June 3. Quartermaster Dimmock directed to forward no more subsist- 
ence from Augusta to Columbus, the state of the roads and difficulty oi 
procuring transposition, &c. The country about Columbus not xri 
exhausted, and the 100,000 rations ordered by the Ockmulgee will begin 
to arrive in 7 days. ( Doc. 184.) 

C 5. Major Beard, at Hawkinsville, reports the difficulty of sending 
on the supplies; nons have yet arrived at that place, (Doc. 186,) and 
none arrived as late as 8th June. (Doc. 188.) 

June 10. General Jesup reports to the Secretary of War that he shall 
move against the enemy to-morrow or next day ; has 900 Alabama vol- 
unteers, and expects to be joined on his route by 500 mounted men and 
200 Indians, and hopes to strike the enemy in less than 5 days, (Doc. 
190 ;) shall occupy a position on Fort Mitchell road, 20 miles in advance, 
and there await the arrival oi' (he Indian warriors, or, if he can find the 
enemy, attack him immediately. The country almost without supplies ; 
none of those ordered yet arrived, &c. (Doc. 191.) 

June 10. Further instructions from General Scott to Major Beard to 
hasten on the supplies, ike. ; riflesj musket accoutrements, and tents, 
much needed to complete the equipment of the troops, a portion of whom 
are without arms and shelter; General Scott extremely anxious on the 
subject. (Doc. 192.) 

June 10. General Scott writes to General Jesup that, for want of 
arms, accoutrements, &c, it will be impossible for the Georgians to com- 
mence operations from the neighborhood of Irwinton in 8 or 10 days, 
nor even then, unless the arms, &e., should arrive, The regulars are 
advancing from Augusta; all but a small detachment of marines had 
reached that place at the last dates; has more than doubled the force 
placed in the lower counties of Georgia to prevent the Creeks from 
crossing to the Seminoles. (Doc. 193.) 

June 12. General Scott writes to the Adjutant General that he has 
b( en quite sick since the 2d, but expects to be on horse-back to-morrow. 
Has 3,300 Georgia volunteers, but not more than one-third armed ; no 
accoutrements in any of the Southern arsenals; expects in 6 or 8 days 
to arm and equip the whole of the Georgia forces, and as a respectable 
number of regular troops may be expected by that time, shall lose no 
time in commencing active operations. The Alabamians represented to 
be well armed in muskets, but without accoutrements, cartridges, and 
flints. As he has been able to obtain armed men, has sent off detach- 
ments to guard the left bank of the river; some pushed below the coun- 
try occupied by the Creeks on the opposite bank ; some of the middle 
detachments have, within 8 or 10 days, been surprised by small parties, 
and the advantage has been against us ; has two steamers constantly 
cruising on the river, &c. (Doc. 194. "i 



ill [ 22 1 ] 

June 11. Major Baden reports certain ordnance and ordnance stores 
arrived at Augusta from Charleston, (Doc. 195,) which he is directed to 
send immediately to Columbus. (Doc. 196.) 

June 11. Lieutenant Deas directed to proceed with all possible haste 
to Hawkinsville, and send forward immediately all the rifles, muskets, 
accoutrements, &c, that may be there, or on their way, to Columbus; 
also, tents and equipage, &c. (Doc. 197.) 

June 12. Lieutenant Heintzehnan, at Hawkinsville, reports the arrival 
of supplies at that place for the army; has just loaded 10 wagons ; will 
supply General Wilcox's force of 260 with arms and provisions ; impos- 
sible to get sufficient number of wagons, &c. (Doc. 198.) 

June 14. General Scott reports to the Adjutant General that he is still 
held inactive from the non-arrival of arms, ammunition, &c. ; has reason 
to hope they will arrive in a few days from Hawkinsville, with subsist- 
ence in abundance, and from Augusta. Nearly all the Georgians ordered 
(a little more than 3,000) already on the frontier; but the greater num- 
ber of companies have come without arms and accoutrements. As fast 
as the mounted corps can be aimed, shall send them down on the Geor- 
gia side as low as Irwinton, where he shall commence operations. The 
first company of regulars arrived yesterday, and four or six may be ex- 
pected to-morrow, and the whole, including marines, may be expected 
in a week; has not, however, been waiting for them, but for arms and 
accoutrements for the militia; is without advices from Governor Clay or 
General Jesup, and is doubtful whether the Alabama forces will come 
into the service of the United States ; they aie not prepared to take the 
field, being in want of ammunition and flints ; learns that General Moore, 
with 750 mounted Alabamians, has arrived at Irwinton, and thinks of 
commencing operations forthwith; shall write to him to wait his arrival 
in that quarter. (Doc. 199.) 

June 16. J. Crowell reports the wagons, with arms and ammunition, 
on the way, and may be expected in Columbus by the night of the 19th, 
&c. ; difficulty of procuring wagons, &c. (Doc. 201.) 

June 16. Major Beard reports fiom Macon that 21 wagons and one 
howitzer, on their way from Hawkinsville, with a great portion of the 
musket accoutrements, and all the rifles ; no ammunition found on board 
of either boat. The marines are in the neighborhood, and will pass 
through in the morning. (Doc. 202.) 

June 17. General Scotts reports to the Adjutant General from Colum- 
bus that the troops are impatient to move, and so is he, but cannot with- 
out arms, ammunition, and subsistence, which they shall have by the 
21st ; no time has been lost since the arrival of arms, &c, at Hawkins- 
ville ; the delay occurred with the transportation line between Darien 
and that point ; caused agents to be stationed at both places, and has 
reason to believe they have been active and pushing ; as to arms coming 
from x\ugusta, the distance (220 miles) and the badness of the roads, 
rendered worse by the storms of rain the last of May and the beginning 
of June, have cause the delay; has no experienced staff officer. (Doc. 
203.) 

June 18. General Scott reports to the Adjutant General that he is em- 
barrassed by the unlooked-for ai rival at Fort Mitchell of General Jesup's 
forces. If the subsistence from Savannah via Darien, should not begin 



[ 224 ] (22 

to arrive to-morrow, all the troops must, in consequence of this move- 
ment, be put on short allowance ; GeneralJesup entirely out of position ; 
wants him at Irwinton, in order that he may operate up instead of down 
the country, but knows not how to get him there without crossing and 
recrossing the river. This will create great delay, &c. ( Docs. 205, 206. ) 
General Jesup wants subsistence for his forces, and will be obliged to go 
to Fort Mitchell, and asks General Scott to supply him there. (Doc. 
207.) General Scott distressed at his arrival there; the difficulties in 
supplying him, &c. ; sends all he can command. (Doc. 208.) 

June 21. One thousand muskets arrived last night and have been 
issued to the troops, who will immediately march for the mouth of the 
Cow-ag-gee Creek, on the Chattahoochie, below the enemy. The ac- 
coutrements (expected to-morrow) will be sent after them. 500 rifles 
expected with the accoutrements, and a battalion of mounted men will 
remain to receive them. The delay in the arrival of these supplies has 
been owing to steamboat accidents, and the difficulty of procuring wag- 
ons. The horse will probably overtake the foot ; shall march with the 
former. The enemy are above the Cow-ag-gee creek ; if so shall cross 
the troops to Alabama side at that point. A battalion of artillery march- 
ed down on this side of the river yesterday, another follows closely. 
The first detachment of marines will be here to-morrow and will imme- 
diately take the same route, and so with the remaining detachments of 
regulars. After leaving the necessary guards on the left bank of (his 
river, above, and particularly below Columbus, may have left about 2,000 
Georgians besides the regulars, that may be up in time for commence- 
ment of active operations, together with 100 friendly Indians. Shall 
now be obliged to give General Jesup instructions to act downwards 
from his position, simultaneous with the forces to be landed below the 
enemy. (Doc. 209.) 

June 23. Sets out in a few minutes to overtake General Sanford. 
Accoutrements and rifles will not be here (Columbus) in two or three 
days, the conductors of the wagon-train having took a panic and turned 
from the direct road, &c. General Sanford has wit!; him about 150 
unarmed men ; has reason to believe the enemy is imbodied between 
the Hatchychubby and the Cow-ag-gee creeks ; shall cross the river 
below the latter; is confident no Indians have yet escaped across the 
Chattahoochie towards Florida, &c. The first detachment of marines 
just arrived. (Doc. 215.) 

June 22. Lieutenant Heintzelman at Ilawkinsville, reports the 
arrival of stores at that place, and shall forward them immediately in 
wagons. (Doc. 224.) 

June 24. General Scott at Fort Mitchell reports to the Adjutant Gen- 
eral that he left Columbus yesterday, and is here to consult with Gen- 
eral Jesup. General Jesup, and many of the officers with him, consider 
the war as nearly over. They estimate that there only remains out 
some 150 hostile warriors under Jim Henry, besides Neomico's party, 
who have for some time stood last in their camp, in a state of neutrality. 
They will probably soon surrender themselves. They are nearer Tus- 
kegee than the Chattahoochie. There must be about 1,000 who are yet 
to come in or be subdued. The hostiles are among the most desperate 
of the nation ; they are between the Hatchychubby and Cow-ag-gee 



123 I 224 | 

creeks, and hope to escape to Florida, &c, but which is impossible, 
from the means adopted to guard the river. The Georgia line, and two 
battalions of regulars below, will cross below the enemy, and scour the 
country upwards, whilst General Jesup moves with his forces down, &c. v 
The fiats for crossing the river will pass down to-day. The movements 
of General Jesup ; the strong guards placed on the river below, render- 
ing escape towards Florida hopeless ; and the large assemblage of troops 
all around the Creek country, showing that their early subjugation was 
inevitable, has caused the early surrender of the hostile parties who 
have come in. Besides those who gave themselves up to the Alabami- 
ans and friendly Indians, between 50 and 70 came in to this place pre- 
viously without any escort. The number of warriors now in confine- 
ment here is more than 300, &c. (Docs. 237, 238, 239.) 

June 26. General Scott, opposite Roanoke, directs General Jesup to 
discharge the Alabamians, except a detachment of mounted men, to 
escort the Indian prisoners as far as the dense settlements of Alabama, 
whence the Indians may be escorted to the Mississippi by the regulars, 
&c. (Doc. 241.) 

July 2. General Scott, at Fort Mitchell, reports to the Adjutant Gen- 
eral that he has just returned from Irwinton ; represents the movements 
of the troops below, &c. It is thought that there cannot be in the late 
Creek country more than 40 or 60 hostile warriors ; some of these have 
sent word that they will soon be here, &c. Nineteen hundred prisoners 
will be emigrated as soon as the streams shall have subsided, &c. De- 
tachments have been sent in pursuit of some of the hostiles who have 
crossed the river in the direction of Florida, &c. (Doc. 243.) 

July 4. Just returned from Roanoake, where he made arrangements 
for closing the campaign, &c. (Doc. 248.) 

July 6. (At Columbus) reports the Indians who had retreated to- 
wards Florida overtaken and surrounded in a swamp, &c. (Doc. 249.) 

June 25. The Secretary of War directs General Scott to dispose his 
force so as to prevent the Creeks from retiring towards Florida, &c. 
(Doc. 255.) 

June 28. General Scott recalled. (Doc. 256.) 

July 8. General Scott turns over the command to General Jesup. 
(Doc. 258.) 

ORAL TESTIMONY. 

Testimony of Major Kirby. 

Accompanies General Scott from St. Augustine, 21st of May. (Ques- 
tion 1.) General Scott's plan of campaign concurred in by Governor 
Schley and General Jesup. (Question 3.) On 26th of May General 
Scott directs Major Baden to furnish certain arms and ordnance stores, 
and instructs Quartermaster Dimmock to forward them without delay to 
Columbus. (Question 9.) Up to the time witness left General Scott 
at Columbus (17th June) he manifested great and incessant solicitude 
for the arrival of the necessary arms and other supplies to enable the 
troops to take the field. (Question 12.) Soon after leaving St. Augus- 
tine, General Scott informed witness that he had, previously to leaving 



[ 221 ] 124 

that place, ordered all the surplus arms and accoutrements at St. Augus- 
tine and Picolata to be sent to the Chaltahoochie. (Question 13.) Gen- 
eral Scott manifested constant anxiety for the arrival of the arms and 
accoutrements, and used every means in his power to hasten it. (Ques- 
tion 14.) Witness mustered into service 45 companies of the Georgia 
troops early in June ; they were generally entirely destitute of arms and 
accoutrements; the few arms they had were generally unfit for service 
in the field. (Question ]o.) The Georgia troops had nearly all arrived 
at Columbus by the 12th of June. Some arms had arrived previously, 
and had been placed in the hands of the militia, who were ordered im- 
mediately to take post below Columbus, on the Chattahoochie. (Ques- 
tion 1, by the Court.) The troops who brought arms were immediately 
sent to take post on the Chattahoochie, below Columbus, and occupied 
several positions on the left bank of the river. Ammunition for them 
was purchased in Columbus. Their arms were of different calibre, and 
not in order. They had no accoutrements, no fixed ammunition, no 
equipage, no adequate supply of provisions. (Question 2, by the Court.) 
The Georgia militia, already armed by the 17th of June, were not suffi- 
cient in numbers to guard the left bank of the Chattahoochie, and at the 
same time to operate against the enemy in his own country, successfully- 
•The Georgia troops were fully occupied on the left bank of the Chatta- 
hoochie, below Columbus, in repelling the efforts of the enemy to es- 
cape across the river in the direction of Florida. (Question 16.) When 
witness arrived withGeneral Scott at Columbus, (30th May,) there was 
a destitution of all supplies. Subsistence was purchased from day to day 
in the streets of Columbus and the neighboring country. Camp-kettles, 
mess-pans, tents, and haversacks were made, and scows for crossing the 
river constructed ; all the powder and lead to be found in the place was 
purchased, made into cartridges, and distributed to the militia. (Ques- 
tion 17.) 

Colonel Kenarts testimony. 

The importance of cutting off the retreat of the enemy to Florida, 
preparatory to any offensive movement upon him, to secure which, it was 
General Scott's plan to station troops upon the eastern bank of the Chat- 
tahoochie, from a point 18 or 20 miles below Columbus, to Roanoke; 
the reasons for this plan given. (Question 2.) General Scott strictly 
adhered to his plan of operations, till General Jesup arrived at Fort 
Mitchell, with his forces. (Questions.) General Scott discharged his 
duty with great zeal and judgment. (Question 7.) 

General SanfonVs testimony. 

States the amount of his force (3,500: ami its disposition. (Question 1.) 
Less than one-third of the troops were armed, and those variously 
and indifferently, with shot-guns, rifles, and muskets. On an occasion 
of an alarm, when the troops were paraded, there were 1,500 or 1,600 
men, with no other weapons of defence beyond their side-arms, clubs, 
and club-axes. (Question 2.) To restrain the enemy from crossing the 
stream, to prevent him from depredating upon Georgia, and escaping to 



125 [ 224 J 

Florida, the men were no sooner armed than they weie despatched in 
that direction, for that purpose. (Question 3.) The number of troops 
stationed at Columbus, up to the 21st of June, was not more than suffi- 
cient to protect lives and property. (Question 4.) Not a solitary mo- 
ment was lost or delayed after arms were put in the hands of the men, 
in marching directly to the point where it was intended active opera- 
tions should commence against the enemy. (Question 5.) If the plan of 
operations alluded to in the last reply had been fully adopted, the 
troops would have carried it out. The enemy, encompassed in every 
direction, &c, must have immediately sued for peace. (Question 9.) 
General Scott quite ill at Columbus, a few days after his arrival there ; 
Confined to his bed ; feelings greatly distressed at the continued delay 
of the arms ordered to that place ; doubted not but that his over-anxiety 
in this respect tended to protract his illness. (Question 12.) The plan 
of operations devised by General Scott was, in witness's opinion, founded 
in great wisdom, and knows of no instance of his want of zeal, energy, 
or judgment, in any manner essential to its entire success. ( Question 13.) 
The great extent of frontier to be protected ; the certain number of 
the enemy to be encountered ; the scale of operations laid down, ren- 
dered it proper that we should not commence active operations until 
our troops were armed, and in sufficient force to occupy every point 
where their presence might be found to be necessary. (Question 14.) 
In free conversations with General Scott on the subject of arms., his feel- 
ings seemed to be absolutely tortured by their non-anival. He spoke 
of the frequent and urgent solicitations he had made to those to whose 
care they were intrusted, to have them forwarded with all possible ex- 
pedition. He despatched a special messenger with orders to have them 
move night and day, until they should arrive at Columbus. (Question 15.) 

Major Husoii's testimony. 

Purchased rations and forage. Could have purchased a limited supply 
of bacon and flour, in Columbus, such as had been previously bought 
up by the speculators for the purpose of selling -to the commissioners 
but both were so damaged as to be unfit for use. The resources of Co- 
lumbus and its vicinity, in provisions and forage of good quality, up 
to the 9th of June, were so far exhausted, that it took the wagons from 
G to 10 days to make the trips to and from the places where the articles 
were to be found in the neighboring country. (Questions 2 and 3.) 

Captain Waiters testimony. 

States the difficulty of supplying General Jesup's forces at Fort Mitchell 
with provisions, forage, &c. from Columbus. (Questions 2, 3, 4, 5.) 

The honorable Mr. Dawson's testimony. 

Was employed on board of a steamboat with a company of artillery, 
cruising up and down the Chattahoochie, to prevent hostile Indians from 
crossing, and to destroy their canoes and rafts ; remained on this service 
to 20th June ; other detachments were employed on the same service. 



[ 224 ] 1 2G 

( Question 1 . ) The volunteers were all placed in defensive positions, on 
the left bank of the Chattahoochie, and in cruising on the river on board 
of steamboats, which were not retained in the vicinity of Columbus 
for the protection of that place. (Question 2.) When he reached Co- 
lumbus with his company , found energy and despatch in the organization 
of the army. As soon as arms arrived, regulars and volunteers were put 
in motion. (Question 3.) Thought General Scott's plans for offensive 
and defensive operations to be correct, &c. (Question 4.) The plan of 
operating npioards preferable, &c. (Question 5.) To the march of the 
troops from Tuskegee he attributes the attempts of the Indians to force 
their way across the Chattahoochie, &c. (Question 6.) Thinks the plan 
of operating upwards would have best prevented the enemy from cross- 
ing the Chattahoochie, and sooner terminated the war. (Question 7.) 
General Scott's conduct during the campaign was marked by zeal and 
activity, and the result of the campaign has evinced his judgment and 
foresight. (Question 8.) 

Governor Schley's testimony. 

States his views and opinions given to General Scott and General Jes- 
up, in regard to the proper course to be pursued against the Creek In- 
dians, and the concurrent views of General Scott. (Question 2.) Was 
under the impression General Jessup approved the plan of campaign of 
General Scott. (Question 3.) Travelled in company from Milledgeville 
to Columbus in May, with General Scott, General Jesup, and Major 
Kirby ; spoke freely of the coming campaign, and, as far as he understood 
the views of the officers, all concurred in opinion, &c. (Question 4.) 
General Scott made no alteration in his original plan, &c. (Question 6.) 
Gives his reasons why a movement up the country was preferable to that 
down, &c. (Questions 8,9, 10.) General Scott was confined to his room 
and bed, soon after his arrival at Columbus, for ten or twelve days, and 
his physicians considered him very ill, &c. (Question 20.) General 
Scott was not wanting in zeal or judgment in conducting the Creek war, 
except when he was so. ill in bed that he could not act at all, &c. (Ques- 
tion 21.) The importance of waiting until the Georgia troops were 
armed before acting, £cc. (Question 22.) Every thing was done by 
General Scott to hasten the arrival of the arms ; he sent Mr. Crowell to 
hasten them on, &c. (Question 23.) 

Lieutenant BetVs testimony. 

States that a steamboat loaded with arms and accoutrements and other 
army supplies, had burst her boiler on the Ockmulgee, between Darien 
and Hawkinsville, and the delay occasioned thereby in refitting and de- 
spatching another boat down the river after said supplies; also, an acci- 
dent to another boat similarly laden, consequent delay, &c. (Question 
2.) Was ordered about 18th June on the road to Hawkinsville, to hasten 
the train of wagons with supplies, &c. ( Question 3. ) The delay of ar- 
rival of arms for three or four days, caused by a report of the Creek In- 
dians having crossed the Chattahoochie, causing a panic to the drivers, 



127 [ 224 ] 

&c. (Question 4.) States the condition ofthe roads and bridges to have 
been bad, &c. (Question 6.) 

After a careful review of the testimony which contains the facts on 
which the Court has formed its Opinion, above recited, the Court is com- 
pelled, by a conscientious sense of duty, to adhere to the Opinion already 
given as to the causes ofthe delay in opening and prosecuting the cam- 
paign in Georgia and Alabama, against the hostile Creek Indians in 1836. 

The Court, in expressing its opinion that " no delay which it was prac- 
ticable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott," had refer- 
ence to the impracticability of collecting arms and munitions for the vol- 
unteers, as early as they were assembled and mustered into service, in 
consequence of the accidents which happened to steamboats, by which 
part were being conveyed ; the difficulty of procuring wagons by which 
others were transported, and the badness ofthe roads, rendered particu- 
larly so at the time by heavy rains. In support of which, the Court re- 
fers particularly to documents No. 171, 172, 182, 183, 184, 186, 192, 
197, 198, 201, 203, 209, and 215; and to General Sanford's answer 
to the 15th interrogatory, Governor Schley's answer to the 23d interrog- 
atory, and to the whole of Lieutenant Bett's testimony. 

ALEX. MACOMB', Major General, 
President of the Court oj Inquiry. 

S. Cooper, Judge A dvocate, 

Recorder of the Court. 



FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT IN THE FOREGOING CASE. 

Washington, March 2, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to notice. All present. 

The following Order from the War Department was laid before the 
Court : 

Department of War, 

March 2, 1837. 

To Major General Macomb, President of the Court of Inquiry directed 
to be convened at Frederick, Md., by General Order No. 65 : 

Sir: You will reassemble the Court of Inquiry, in the city of Wash- 
ington, in order that it may reconsider and review the Proceedings in the 
cases of the campaigns in Florida, and in the Creek nation, conducted by 
Major General Scott, so as to embrace the facts in the Opinion of the 
Court, as required by the Order of the President organizing the Court, 
and by his Orders of the 14th and 18th of February last. 

B. F. BUTLER, 
Secretary of War ad interim. 

In obedience to the foregoing Order, the Court was occupied until the 
8th of March, in reconsidering and reviewing its Proceedings, and in 
reporting the following facts : 



[ 221 ] {"28 

The Court finds, from a careful review of the testimony, the following 
facts: That, under instructions from the War Department of the 16th 
May, General Scott arrived at Augusta from Florida on the 25th May, 
on his way to take the direction of the Creek campaign, having, previ- 
ously to leaving Florida, ordered essential stores from Picolata, St. Au- 
gustine, Charleston, and Savannah, to Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, 
within seventy-five miles of Fort Mitchell; and had also ordered 250,000 
complete rations from New Orleans to the highest navigable point on the 
Chattahoochie ; that he despatched ten wagons with subsistence from 
Augusta on the 28th May, for Columbus, and appointed an agentand sent 
him to Hawkinsville to hasten on supplies and purchase subsistence; 
that he proceeded himself to Columbus, where he anived on the 30th 
May, and directed the Georgia volunteers already assembled thereabout 
1,500, to be mustered into service and distributed over a line of forty 
miles on the river above and below Columbus, to prevent the escape of 
the Indians towards Florida, and also the employment of two armed 
steamers cruising up and down the river for the same purpose ; that, on 
the 1st June, he ordered General Jesup to Montgomery to take com- 
mand of the Alabama troops and to operate up the country from a point 
below Irwinton ; that he was engaged in organizing the Georgia militia 
and collecting supplies and arms up to the 23d of June ; that on the 12th 
June, there had arrived at Columbus 3,300 Georgia volunteers, but not 
more than one-third were armed ; that General Moore arrived at Irwin- 
ton about the 14th June, with 750 mounted Alabamians, with a view of 
commencing operations forthwith, but that he was instructed by General 
Scott to await his arrival in that quarter ; that General Jesup, unex- 
pectedly to General Scott, arrived about the 17th June in the neighbor- 
hood of Fort Mitchell, with the Alabama forces from Tuskegee, calling 
on General Scott for supplies, which had not then anived from New Or- 
leans ; that,on the night of the 20th June, 1,000 muskets arrived, and were 
distributed to the Georgia volunteers on the 21st June, who were immedi- 
ately ordered to the mouth of Cow-ag-gec creek, on the Chattahoochie, be- 
low the enemy ; that companies of the regular troops commenced arriving 
out he 14th, and to the 20th, when two battalions were matched down the 
liver; the first detachment of marines arrived on the 23d, and marched 
immediately below ; the last detachment of marines arrived some days 
after; that General Scott left Columbus on the 23d to comiwcnce opera- 
tions below, and was actively engaged from that time until the Gth July, 
when he was recalled from his command by the instructions of the Pres- 
ident of the 28th June, and that he turned over his command to General 
Jesup on the 8th July. 

The Court, after a full consideration of the foregoing facts, and of the 
testimony from which they are drawn, conies to the conclusion already 
expressed in its Opinion, given in the following words, to wit: 

"Upon a careful examination of the abundant testimony taken in the 
foregoing case, the Court is of opinion that no delay, which it was prac- 
ticable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott, in opening 
the campaign against the Creek Indians. On the contrary, it appears 
that he took the earliest measures to provide arms, munitions, and provis- 
ions for his forces, who were found almost wholly destitute ; and as soon 



129 



[ 224 ] 



as arms could be put inlo the hands of the volunteers, they were in suc- 
cession detached, and placed in position to prevent the enemy from re- 
tiring upon Florida, and whence they could move against the main body 
of the enemy as soon as equipped for offensive operations. 

" From the testimony of the Governor of Georgia, of Major General 
Sanford, commander of the Georgia volunteers, and many other witnesses 
of high rank and standing, who were acquainted with the topography of 
the country, and the position and strength of the enemy, the Court is of 
opinion that the plan of campaign adopted by Major General Scott was 
well calculated to lead to successful results, and that it was prosecuted 
by him, as far as practicable, with zeal and ability, until recalled from 
the command." 

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, 
President of the Court of Inquiry. 

S. Cooper, Judge Advocate, 

Recorder of the Court. 



[ 224 J J 30 



MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT'S ADDRESS, 

OR 

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE TAKEN* IN HIS CASE. 



Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Court : 

When a Doge of Genoa, for some imaginary offence, imputed by Louis 
XIV, was torn from his government, and compelled to visit France to de- 
base himself before that inflated monarch, he was asked, in the palace, 
what struck him with the greatest wonder amid the blaze of magnificence 
in his view? "To find myself here !" was the reply of the indignant 
Lescaro. And so, Mr. President, unable, as I am, to remember one 
blunder in my recent operations, or a single duty neglected, /may say, 
that, to find myself in the presence of this honorable Court, whilst the 
army I but recently commanded is still in pursuit of the enemy, fills me 
with equal grief and astonishment. 

And whence this great and humiliating transition ? It is, sir, by the 
fiat of one who, from his exalted station, and yet more from his une- 
qualled popularity, has never, with his high displeasure, struck a func- 
tionary of this Government — no matter what the office of the individual, 
humble or elevated, who was not from the moment, withered in the gen- 
eral confidence of the American people. Yes, sir, it is my misfortune to 
lie under the displeasure of that most distinguished personage. The 
President of the United States has said, Let General Scott be recalled 
from the command of the army in the field, and submit his conduct in 
the Seminole and Creek campaigns to a Court for investigation ; and lo ! 
I stand here to vindicate that conduct, which must again be judged, in the 
last resort, by him who first condemned it without trial or inquiry. Be it 
so. I shall not supplicate this Court, nor the authority that has to re- 
view the " opinion" here to be given. On the contrary, I shall proceed 
at once to challenge your justice to render me that honorable discharge 
from all blame or censure which the recorded evidence imperiously de- 
mands. With such discharge before him, and enlightened by the same 
mass of testimony, every word of which speaks loudly in my favor, the 
justice of the Commander-in-chief of the army and navy cannot hesitate. 
It must acquiesce ; and then, although nothing may ever compensate me 
for the deep mortification I have been recently made to experience, I 
may hope to regain that portion of the public esteem which it was my 
happiness to enjoy on past occasions of deep moment to the power and 
the glory of these United States of America. 

I. — The Failure of [my] Florida Campaign. 

Permit me here, Mr. President, to offer a preliminary remark : If by 
failure, the common idea of disaster, defeat, or repulse, be understood, 
then that term does great injustice to me and the brave regulars and vol- 



131 \ 224 ] 

unteers whom I had the honor to command. Sir, we suffered no defeat, 
check, or repulse. The enemy, encountered by the several columns and 
detachments, were, in every instance, beaten, driven, and scattered be- 
yond the reach of possible pursuit ; ( 1 ) and if we had chosen to imitate, in 
our reports, the example of many others engaged in similar operations, 
we might no doubt have figured much more largely in the public journals. 
But, in every instance, as far as I know or believe, though our affairs 
were numerous, and not deficient in danger and brilliancy, we always de- 
clined substituting imagination and conjecture for ascertained facts. Per- 
haps, by the discoveries of history, the high reputations gained before 
and since, by the arts alluded to, may, in time, be brought down to the 
humble level of myself and companions. 

It is true, sir, that we did not succeed in sending off the great body of 
the Seminoles to the west of the Mississippi. In this object, ardently 
desired by all, there was certainly a failure, and the same thing may be 
said of the summer and autumn campaign which followed; although the 
commander or commanders — for it seems there were two, Governor Call 
and General Jesup — had the benefit of the knowledge of the country, and 
the enemy, acquiied by previous operations; the benefit of the roads re- 
cently opened ; the plans which had been essayed and suggested ; longer 
time for preparation and operation ; an auxiliary Indian force, which was 
denied me, (2) and above ail, the power of inviting the enemy to surrender, 
and of holding negotiations. With this great power, Mr. President, I was 
notarmed. My instructions were,/o reduce the enemy to unconditional sub- 
mission; to hold no parley, no negotiation — not even to say, as the price 
of surrender, that kind treatment might be expected, much less that the 
beneficial stipulations in the last treaty, in favor of those Indians, should 
be carried into execution by the United States — because, sir, any such 
assurance, on my part, would have been a condition. 

Have my successors in Florida the " diplomatic" faculty that w T as 
withheld from me ? If the letter-writers in the newspapers are to be be- 
lieved, that faculty has been either expressly conferred or usurped with 
impunity. It would seem that wheedling messages have been sent to 
the enemy by every body — from the two commanders down to a captain. 
Still no great result has been obtained, and now another, or winter cam- 
paign has been for some time on foot ; the sole director of which, besides 
all the advantages over me which have just been enumerated, has had 
from the beginning, the farther prospect of ending the war by the failure 
of the enemy's ammunition, [S) and the knov\ n want oflong perseverance 
on the part of all Indians. 

But, notwithstanding all those advantages, it would seem that, up to the 
last dates from Florida, not a Seminole had been sent out of the Territory 
since I caused four hundred to be shipped from Tampa bay. These, it 
is true, were called friendly Indians. Yet, if it had not been for the 
awe inspired by the presence of the army, and some iittle decision on 

(1) See testimony of Generals Clinch and Eustis ; of Colonel Lindsay and Captain Thrus- 
ton. 

(2) Doc. No--. 82 ami 92 inclusive. 

3) May 17. I wrote to Governor Call : " I will beg your Excellency to urge upon Com- 
modore Dallas, the importance of keeping the revenue cutters and the smaller United States 
vessels constantly cruising around Florida, to prevent the escape of captured slaves, and (.') 
prevent the Indians from receiving arms and ammunition from traders." 



[ 22 4 ] 132 

my part, this detachment would long ere this have been merged in the 
great body of the nation. 

, to take up my personal movements, my arrangements, and opera- 
tions, in the chronologic:,! order. 

Being in Washington, in January, 1S3G, on other duties, I was, on the 
20th, sent for by the Secretary of War. I found him in his office at four 
o'clock, P. M. I was asked when I could set out for Florida, and an- 
swered, that night. I was told that my instructions could not be got 
ready for me so early. All the lettters (four in number) from Governor 
Eaton and General Call, dated the 8th and 9th of the same month, and 
now in evidence, ( 1 ) had, 1 think, been just received. I foresaw, at 
once, all the difficulties and hazards of the service which was thus as- 
signed to me, and an immense pecuniary loss that I should inevitably 
sustain if not in New York in a week from that time, i had, moreover, 
the highest confidence in the judgment and abilities of General Clinch, 
independent of his better knowledge of Florida, and of the enemy to be 
combated. I mention these circumstances, Mr. President, to show that 
I did not solicit to be sent to supersede that excellent officer. I was 
not, however, as a soldier, at liberty to decline any appropriate duty that 
might be required of me, and, of course, did not decline this. Accord- 
ingly, I left Washington in t lie night of ('no 21st, and, notwithstanding an 
accident on a railroad, by which 1 lost twenty-four hours, the Court will 
find me addressing a requisition to the Governor of South Carolina on 
the 29th fiom Columbia, and al Augusta the 30th. 

At this place my occupations were numerous and important, as my 
letter-book, the contents of which are mostly in evidence, will show ; 
requisitions for troops, addressed to the Governors of South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Alabama ; letters to the Governor of Florida, to Generals 
Eustis and Bull, Colonel Lindsay, &c, besides horses and wagons pur- 
chased for the United States cavalry and the general baggage train. 

On the 2d of February, it lias been seen that I set out for Milledge- 
viile, in order to confer - with the Governor of Georgia, according to my 
instructions, on the subject of the Creek Indians. Having adopted pre- 
cautionary measures in relation to the latter, I returned to Augusta, and 
leached Savannah on the 9th. 

Here, again, I was incessantly occupied in regulating, by correspond- 
ence, the movement of the troops, and making other- arrangements for 
the campaign, till the 20th, and might have been usefully so engaged fof 
a week longer; but wishing to be nearer to Generals Clinch and Eustis. 
with a view to more rapid communications, I reached Picolata On the 
22d of February. 

At this time General Clinch was at Fort Drane, with about five hun- 
dred regulars and volunteers, unmolested by the enemy, but not in 
strength to take the field with any prospect of advantage. I had written 
to him from Savannah, and he knew of the heavy reinforcements which 
were approaching. Two companies of Augusta volunteers, under Cap- 
tains Robinson and Bones, had already reached Fort Drane, and are in- 
cluded in the above estimate. These two companies did not strictly make 
part of the Georgia quota. 

(1) Documents Nos. 6, 8, 9, and 10. 



i r 3 [ 224 ] 

General Eustis, Colonel Brisbane's regiment of South Carolina foot, 
and a company of Columbia volunteers, under Captain Elmore, all ar- 
rived, by water, at St. Augustine, about the 15th. This independent 
company (Elmore's) was over and above the quota called for from South 
Carolina; but, like Robinson 1 id Bones's, it went through the cam- 
paign with zeal and distinction. 

With the volunteers under his command, and a few companies of regu- 
lars, General Eustis soon gave tranquillity and confidence to all the 
inhabitants between the Atlantic and the St. John's, whose dwellings, 
and other fixtures, had not been previously destroyed. No devastation 
was committed after his arrival. 

The first battalion of Georgia foot, under Major Cooper, had also pre- 
ceded me a few days. I found it at Picolata, with a company o\' regulars, 
and Colonel Bankhead in the command of both. 

It was my intention, Mr. President, to have remained but a few days 
at Picolata — merely long enough to organize the service, to give a fixed 
plan of campain, and, on the arrival of some additional troops, wagons, 
horses, and arms, to have commenced operations. The Court has seen, 
in part, what embarrassments kept me there no less than fifteen days. 

The 22d of February I received, through General Clinch, the letter 
(1) to him, from General Gaines, dated at New Orleans, the 2d of the 
same month, proposing a plan of co-operation between, the two generals; 
which letter confirmed the previous rumor, that a large force was to be 
expected at Tampa bay from New Orleans ; and to this letter there is a 
postscript, by Governor Eaton, saying that a battalion of two hundred and 
fifty Floridians would sail in two days, from St. Marie's, I'm- the same des- 
tination. To prevent too great a concentration of troops at Tampa, I 
instantly, by express, desired Governor Schley to keep at home the 
second battalion of Georgia foot that was about to proceed, by the 
Chattahoochie, Appalachicola, and the Gulf, to that point. For- 
tunately, my letter reached his Excellency just in time to prevent 
the movement. That battalion was discharged ; and but that it was too 
late, I should have taken a similar step in respect to the Alabama regi- 
ment which Colonel Lindsay had received my instructions to raise and 
to conduct to Tampa. 

To show the apprehensions which General Gaines's letter excited in 
me at the time, and the temper in which I spoke of his movement, I beg 
leave, Mr. President, to imbody an extract of my letter(2) to General 
Clinch, dated the 25th of February : 

"The movement from New Orleans, although highly worthy of praise, 
under the circumstances, [the massacre of Dade's detachment, and Gen- 
eral Gaines's necessary ignorance of the measures of Government,] may, 
if it should lead to a premature advance from Tampa, be productive of 
a result the most unfavorable. If the advance, for example, should 
fail to crush the enemy, and terminate the war — and without mounted 
men, I suppose such result can scarcely be hoped for — the enemy may 
be scattered, and put upon his retreat to the southeast. To follow him 
in such retreat, might he almost impracticable, and to prevent the escape 
in that direction, Colonel Lindsay has my instructions in detail." 

0, Document No. 48. (2) Document No. 58. 



[ 224 ] 134 

The Court has seen, Mr. President, how soon those prophetic appre- 
hensions were accomplished ! ()!' course, I had not the time to commu- 
nicate with General Gaines; and Colonel Lindsay, to whom my instruc- 
tions had been addressed, arrived at Tampa ajier the advance of that 
general. 

The very next day after the above was written, and whilst I was in the 
act of reporting( 1 ) to the Adjutant General for the information of Govern- 
ment, among other difficulties, the means I was devising lor sending far- 
ther supplies to Fort Drane, 1 received from General Clinch a letter(2) 
enclosing one(3) from General Gaines, showing that the latter was ac- 
tually at Fort King on the 22d, where he arrived without subsistence, 
and instantly, as General Clinch reported in his letter, called for " nearly 
all" the provisions at Fort Drane, intending, with that supply, to return 
to Tampa across the Withlacoochee near the battle-ground of the 31st of 
December ! I shall, in the sequel, notice the evidence which shows that 
General (iaines knew, at Pensacola, that 1 had been ordered to Florida, 
and that helearned(4) of General Clinch, before leaving Fort King, that 
I was soon expected, and with large reinforcements. 

Before the receipt of those despatches, I knew that there were at Fort 
Drane about twenty thousand rations for men ; and, expecting to send 
thither, and to Fort King, in a few days, by wagons and boats, (through 
the Ochlawaha,) two or three times as many rations, 1 had, on the 24th, 
put Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia loot in march to join General 
Clinch; intending to follow with the first company of mounted men that 
might arrive, and one was then daily expected. Those means of land 
and water transportation not being as yet at hand, all hope of early 
operations was now frustrated, and I was obliged to recall (5) Major 
Cooper's battalion, then distant two days' march over a wretched load; 
as it was easy to subsist the battalion on the St. John's, and infinitely 
difhult to do so at Fort Drane. 

The same embarrassment (the arrival of the troops at Fort King from 
Tampa) caused me to issue the Order No. 4, (G) and to write the letters 
(7) of February 20th and March 1st to General Clinch. He, however, 
had no means of sending either of those papers to General Gaines, who, 
I think, had marched from Fort King .twenty miles from Fort Drane) 
on the 25th of February. 

March 2d (8) 1 learned, with great distress, that the Ochlawaha 
could not be used lor transporting supplies. From a few months' disuse, 
tin's narrow, crooked, and shoaly river had become obstructed by fallen 
timber, and the Indians had, at Payne's landing, near Fort King, destroy- 
ed the peculiar boats expressly constructed for that navigation. We 
were now reduced to the necessity of using only land transportation 
for about seventy tons of supplies, and over bad roads, and 1 had not 
ordered all the wagons and horses which 1 should have required but 
for a reliance, to some extent, on that river. 

A summary of my embarrassments in respect to the means of trans- 

(1) Letter of Feb. 26, Doc. No. AT. (5) Order No. 5, Doc. No. 56. 

(2) Hated Feb. 21, Doc. No. 50. (6) Doc. No. 55. 

(3) Dated Feb. 22, Doc. No. -19. (7) Doc. Nos. 59 and 60. 

(4) Clinch's answers to interrogatories. (8) Doc. 52. 



1&5 [ 224 ] 

portation, the Court will find in the fifth paragraph of my letter (1) to 
the Adjutant General, dated March 9th. Of the ten or fifteen wagons 
therein mentioned, and which I learned, officially, at Savannah, were 
ordered to be shipped from Baltimore by the Quartermaster General, in 
January, it seems, by the deposition of Captain Dimmock, that two of 
them had reached Florida in February, six about the 11th of March, and 
two reached Savannah about the 4th of May. (2) 

As early as the 2Gth of February I had, however, requested (3) 
General Clinch to send down all the means of land transportation 
he could command. The train sent arrived at the point opposite 
to Picolata on the 2d of March; (4) was loaded with about sixteen 
thousand rations, and other essential supplies, and despatched for Fort 
Drane the Oth. The delay, in this operation, was caused by the width 
of the river, and the violence of a long storm; which rendered it haz- 
ardous, and, a part of the time, impracticable to pass over the supplies to 
the wagons. The train was slightly augmented (4) by wagons and 
horses which had arrived principally from Charleston via St. Augustine. 

As a proof of the extreme tempestuousness of the weather, Major 
Gates, with a battalion of three companies of regulars, was at this time 
more than eight days v 5) in coming from Savannah to Picolata in a good 
steamer, which ordinarily made the trip in less than three days. 

A company (Kenan's) of Georgia mounted men arrived opposite to 
Picolata on the 26th of February. With this company I had intended 
(4) to march immediately to Fort Drane ; but, with the exception of its 
gallant captain, second Lieutenant Muson, and, I .think, nineteen men, it 
refused to be mustered into the service of the United States, and teturncd 
home. Four other companies of this first battalion of Georgia horse ar- 
rived about a week later. One of them, (Allen's," with the exception of 
two or three privates, followed the example of Kenan's company. 
Douglass's, Malone's, and Sweeney's, from the first, showed better dis- 
positions. These only I was enabled to see, having, at the hazard of 
life, crossed the river in the storm for the purpose ; when, after a short 
harangue, every man came under the rules and articles of war with loud 
cheers. The well-disposed men, both of Kenan's and Allen's, generally 
joined those companies which entered the service ; and it is due to the 
disaffected of Kenan's to say that, having seen their error, every man, I 
believe, nobly served in the subsequent campaign (against the Creeks) 
under Captain Gaither. It is probable that many of Allen's men did the 
same. 

The 2d of March I received, through General Clinch, General Gaines's 
letter (6) to him, dated the 29th of February ; and not another word did 
I hear of the troops with the latter general till the 9th of March. Du- 
ring this interval, nay, from his arrival at Fort King, the state of my 
mind, or generally my embarrassments, may be inferred from the efforts 
to hasten (7) the train loaded with subsistence, and from my orders and 
correspondence, which are in evidence, on the subject of General Gaines's 
movement. 



(1) Doc. No. 71. (2) Deposition of Captain Dimmock. (3) Doc. No. 59. 

(4) Letter to Adjutant General, March 2, Doc. No. 52. (6) Doc. No. 63. 

(.5) Lettcrto Adj. Gen., March 6, Doc. No. 68. (7) Testimony of Capt. Van Uuren. 



f 224 ] 136 

The 26th of February(l) I wrote to General Clinch: "I have heard, 
with equal astonishment and regret, that Major General Gaines, without 
reference to my movements — perhaps in ignorance, possibly in defiance 
of them — should have made a premature movement from Tampa bay, and 
having arrived within twenty miles of Fort Diane, should have called for 
nearly three-fourths of the subsistence in deposite at that place, and on 
which I had relied for the movement of the right wing in concert with 
the other parts of the army." *#*■*« To remedy this unex- 
pected embarrassment, I send you two copies of Orders No. 4, one of 
which you will despatch to the commander of the detachment from Fort 
Brooke, [Tampa bay,] whoever he may be, with all speed, and limit 
the subsistence called lor from Fort Drane according to the intention of 
those orders." * * * * " Major General Gaines, I presume, will 
have heard of the order which ought to take him to the Mexican fron- 
tier. If he should prefer to remain, he must obey .my orders." 

Orders No. 4/2) of the same date, direct that General Gaines's de- 
tachment should remain at Fort King until further orders ; that current 
subsistence only should be issued to the detachment ; direct that the 
peculiar boats believed to be at Payne's Landing should be sent to 
Picolata (or to meet a steamer at the mouth of the Ochlawaha) to receive 
subsistence ; if the boats could not be sent, the troops were to march, 
without delay, to Volusia, on the St. John's, whither twenty thousand 
rations were about to go up in a steamer, and the detachment was en- 
joined not to attempt any offensive movement, except so far as might be 
necessary to carry into execution those, my orders. 

March lst(3) 1 again wrote to General Clinch: "I regret, in every 
point of view, the premature and unauthorized movement from Tampa 
bay by that general, [Gaines,] and the very awkward and responsible posi- 
tion he has placed himself in by his subsequent march from Fort King." 
"In any event, the iesponsibility of his movement and 
actual position is his own ; for he must have known as early as the 10tli 
ultimo, if not before, that I had been charged with the general direction 
of the war in Florida, and that, by interfering, he constituted himself 
an interloper. Even if you had sufficient stores and means of transport- 
ation, 1 should command you to send no subsistence to him — unless to 
prevent starvation ; but you have neither. Let him, therefore, in time, 
extricate himself from the embarrassment he has placed himself in, by 
marching upon Volusia, where, I have no reason to doubt, that twenty 
thousand rations, sent hence on the 27th ultimo, have safely arrived. As 
he appears to have his retreat open to him, or, is in no peril to prevent 
his taking that step, you, of course, will make no detachment to join 
him." 

This letter is an answer to one received by express, and which en- 
closed General Gaines's communication to General Clinch, dated the 
28th of February. (4) 

In a third lettcr(o) that I caused to be addressed to General Clinch, 
March 2d, he was told, c: If Major General Gaines should fall back upon 
Fort King or Drane, it is presumed that he will proceed to execute the 
orders of the Government, which will carry him to another quarter. In 

(1) Doc. No. 59. (3) Doc. No. 60. (5) Doc. No. 64. 

(2) Doc. No. 54. (4) Doc. No. 62. 



137 [ 224 ] 

that event you will be the senior officer, and I am instructed by Major 
General Scott to say, that you are at liberty to detain the troops from 
Fort Brooke [Tampa] at either of the forts mentioned, Drane and King. 
Subsistence will reach you in five or six days." 

A fourth letter (1) on this subject (in part) was addressed by me to 
General Clinch, dated March 4th, in which it is said : 

" I still presume that Major General Gaines will be obliged to fall back 
upon Fort Drane, which increases my anxiety to send the wagons with 
some additions, loaded. I would prefer, much, that the force brought 
with him were back at Tampa bay, or rather that it had not marched 
from that place ; provided that the movement fails to crush the enemy 
or to terminate the war. The worst result, next to the loss of that fine 
body of men, or a third of it, would be the mere success of driving the 
enemy into the lower country, where, I suppose, it would be almost im- 
possible for us to follow; I mean below the waters of Charlotte harbor. 
Hence my indignation, that an isolated attack should have been made 
from your vicinity, well calculated to produce that result, and at a time 
when you knew and Major General Gaines must have known through 
you, (2) (and before) that my plan, with ample means, was to move 
simultaneously upon the Withlacooeb.ee in three columns — from Tampa 
bay, the upper crossing on the Ochlawaha, and Fort Drane — so as to 
make it impossible for the enemy to escape to the lower country." 

" I have not yet supposed that Major General Gaines has not his re- 
treat upon Fort Diane or King perfectly in his power. On account of 
subsistence, if he can cut his way through the enemy to Tampa bay, I 
much prefer that his force were there, and when I wished him to march 
or send that force to Volusia, it was because it could be infinitely more 
easily subsisted there than at Fort Drane. Should he, however, be in 
any difficulty in operating a retreat from the Withlacoochee, I certainly 
wish you to afford him any succor that the slender means within your 
reach may allow ; and this, doubtless, you would render without any 
special permission to that effect. If the force return to Fort Drane or 
King, it must be subsisted, for at least five or six days, upon means de- 
rived from this place, [Picolata,] and hence I now prefer that it should 
become a part of the right wing [General Clinch's command] rather than 
take that quantity of subsistence [from you] and march back to Tampa 
bay." 

And, finally, I caused a fifth letter (3) to be written to General Clinch, 
March 6th, in which will be found this paragraph : 

" Major General Scott is exceedingly anxious to hear the result of the 
operations on the Withlacoochee. The last intelligence from that quarter 
(through you) was only to the 29th ultimo." 

My reports on the same subject, addressed to the Adjutant General, 
for the information of Government, dated at Picolata the 26th of Feb- 
ruary, the 28th, (notes on my Order No. 4,) March 2d and 6th, are to 
the same effect; all showing the embarrassments and delay which the 
isolated movement from Tampa upon Fort King and the Withlacoochee 
caused in my plan of combined operations. 

In the notes (4) of the 28th of February, after recapitulating many of 

(1) Doc. No. 69. (2) Clinch's answers to interrogatories. (3) Doc. No. 70. 

(4) Doc. No. 55. 



[ 224 ] 138 

the facts already brought into review, among them, the arrival of General 
Gaines at Fort King with 1,140 (1 ) men, without bringing more rations 
than sufficed for his march, although he came from Tampa, where the 
amount of subsistence was great: after noticing his having drawn from 
Fort Drane nearly all the food for men collected there, together with the. 
baggage train necessary to transport that subsistence to him at Fort King, 
and which train in the whole had been required at Picolata to take fur- 
ther supplies to Fort Drane, the point the most difficult to supply in or 
about the whole theatre of operations, I add : 

" It will be seen from the foregoing, that to re-establish my plan of 
campaign, viz : to move simultaneously from Fort Drane (or Fort King) 
from Volusia and Tampa, say about the Sth of March — the great difficulty 
will be to send supplies for the right wing, [Clinch's command ;] and the 
bad road from Picolata to Fort Drane, 65 miles, has, by a heavy rain 
which has now been falling for 46 hours, been rendered infinitely worse." 

In the report of the 2d of March to the Adjutant General, I said : 

" By reference to the map it will be seen that, even if Major General 
Gaines could succeed in driving the enemy from the VVithlacoochee, 
there is no force to prevent the retreat below Charlotte harbor, or to any 
point in the lower [part of the] peninsula. A small guard only was left 
[by him] at Tampa; Colonel Lindsay will not be in position in time; 
and Brigadier General Eustis cannot cross the Ochlawaha earlier than 
the 13th or 15th instant. The retreat, it will be seen, is therefore open 
to the Indians. In this point of view, then, it would be better for the 
public interests that the Indians should drive Major General Gaines, than 
that ho should drive them. The war, in fact, would be forwarded by his 
being forced back upon Forts Drane and King. In truth, according to 
his own showing, he ought to have fallen back on the evening of the 
28th or the morning of the 29th (2) [of February.] The lives which he 
has lost have promoted no end. He must, I think, still fall back, and I 
wish to heaven that it may be without further loss. Brigadier General 
Clinch, from his present want of wagons, can send him no efficient aid, 
and the wagons cannot be back [from Picolata] in four or five days. If 
the force with Major General Gaines were now back at Tampa bay, it 
would be in its true position ; but he cannot retreat thither ; for it will 
be seen by his letters [enclosed] that he has not the means of passing 
the river [VVithlacoochee.] He found the enemy where all my arrange- 
ments presumed the enemy would be found, and in the position the most 
favorable to us." 

And, on the 6th of March, I again write to the Adjutant General on 
the same subject, thus : 

"No intelligence has been received of the movements of Major 
General Gaines of a later date than his letter of the 29th ultimo, a copy 
of which has been forwarded. He cannot, therefore, have fallen back 
upon either Fort Drane or King, or have marched upon Volusia. In 
either case I should, doubtless, have received a further report of him 
from Brigadier General Clinch. It may then be hoped that he has 
beaten the enemy, or at least have succeeded in effecting his return to 

(1) Captain McCall's requisition for subsistence, Doc. No. 51. 

(2) See his letters of tliose dates, Documents Nos. 62 and 63. 



139 [ 224 ] 

Tampa hay. In this state of doubt and anxiety I know not how long I 
may have to remain ; yet it is important that I should speedily learn what 
has become of his column, and particularly whether the position and 
numbers of the enemy have been materially changed by its operations. 

" 1 send no more troops, for the present, to Fort Drane, on account of 
the difficulty of subsisting them there. If Major General Gaines shall 
not fall back on that point, it will be indispensable to wait for Captain 
Wharton [with his company of United States dragoons.] In the mean 
time it is easy to subsist the forces here and at Garey's ferry." 

On the 9th of March I reported ( 1 ) to Washington as follows : 

" 1 have just set out for Fort Drane, via Garey's ferry, on Black creek, 
[just established as an army depot,] with two companies of regulars, 
[foot,] and intending to take with me, from the latter place, the small 
battalion of mounted Georgians (heretofore mentioned) under the com- 
mand of Major Douglass. Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead is at the head 
of the first detachment, and the two, together, may make a total of about 
240; but even this small force maybe important to rescue (2) Major 
General Gaines." 

"I had not received the slightest information of the operations on the 
Withlacoochee (official or otherwise) of a later date than the 29th ulti- 
mo, up to this morning, and had concluded that he had effected his march, 
with more or less success against the enemy, upon Tampa bay, when, at 
daylight, the steamer that I am now in arrived and brought the rumor, 
which is confirmed by the two accompanying notes (3) from Paymaster 
Lytle, received about six hours afterwards. On the reception of the ru- 
mor I immediately commenced preparations for this movement ; but being 
delayed by the necessity of unlading and relading the boat, I am now at 
anchor at the mouth of Black creek. I hope to put the troops in march, 
from Garey's ferry, early in the day of to-morrow, and to reach Fort 
Drane with a small escort the day following. It is possible that even 
these little detachments of horse and foot may reach the Withlacoochee 
in time to render a valuable service." 

The parts of Major Lytle's notes relative to this subject are — on the 
5th of March he writes to me — " I have been directed by General Clinch 
to inform you that your communication of yesterday's date reached him 
at this place, [Fort Drane,] after he had mounted his horse and was on 
the move, with the forces under his command, to escort supplies to Gen- 
eral Gaines." * * * * " Colonel Gadsden arrived here from Tal- 
lahassee on the 4th, yesterday, and accompanied General Clinch this 
morning to the Withlacoochee." And Major Lytle says, on the 8th, "by 
direction of General Clinch, I opened your communication of the Gth in- 
stant, which arrived late last night in advance of the wagons, [from Pi- 
colata, loaded with subsistence, &c] You will perceive, by my letter of 
the 5th, that General Clinch, with all the forces at this post, and 100 
mounted men from the vicinity, had left for the Withlacoochee to escort 
a small supply of cattle, ammunition, &c, to General Gaines, having re- 
ceived, the night before, a third express from that officer. No word has 
been received from either of those generals since the 5th." * * * * 
"N. B. The amount of General Gaines's last express to General Clinch, 

(1) Doc. No. 71. (2) See testimony of Captain Van Bnren. (3) Doc. No. 72. 



[ 224 ] i 10 

dated the 3d instant, was merely copies of his previous letters, with a 
note, stating that the Indians were still around him ; but. little or no fight- 
ing [had] taken place since his last communication" — that, it is presumed, 
of the 29th of February. 

I beg the Court to observe, th;;t those two notes of Major Lytle, as 
has been shown in evidence, reached me cc at the same moment," ( 1 ) 
at Picolata, about meridian, on the 9th of March. 

I shall proceed to give further extracts from my report to the Adjutant 
General, of the same date — March the 9th : 

" I am aware that the movement I am making may be condemned, if 
regarded in any other light than a rescue, (2) as premature. Colonel 
Goodwyn's mounted regiment [of South Carolinians] only arrived at St. 
Augustine last night or this morning, and consequently the left wing 
[General Eustis's command] cannot be in force on the Ochlawaha, in the 
direction of Pelaklikaha, earlier than the 17th, or up with the enemy be- 
fore the 20th instant. Colonel Lindsay, who may have already arrived 
at Tampa bay, cannot operate more than two days' march from that place, 
from the want of means of transportation — Major General Gaines having 
taken away the horses which were there ; and the basis of the right wing 
[Clinch's command] is merged in the force brought by that general 
[Gaines] into the field, and must participate in his success or failure. If 
it falls back with him on Fort Diane, it must suffer great loss, and if it 
follow him to Tampa bay, it [the basis of the right wing] will be wholly 
out of position. 

" In this, and even a greater state of uncertainty I have been held 
since the 2Gth ultimo. The day after I ordered back Major Cooper's 
battalion of Georgia foot, to prevent starvation at Fort Drane ; and though 
daily, from that time, in the expectation of receiving from Savannah 
horses and serviceable wagons, not one has arrived. The quantity of 
subsistence that will be at Fort Drane, say to-morrow, will only be that 
sent from Picolata on the Gth instant, viz : 17,497 rations of bread and 
flour; 11,000 rations of pork, (with beef-cattle in the neighborhood;) 
8,000 rations of beans ; some coffee, vinegar, &c. And the troops 
now about to proceed, [with me,] perhaps as far as the Withlacoochee, 
(3) will not have the means of taking with them rations for more than 
six days [extra.] 

"I beg leave to recapitulate the causes of my great deficiency in means 
of transportation: 1. The wagons and horses which I knew Brigadier 
General Clinch to possess, early in February, have been more broken 
down by hard service and bad roads than I had expected to find them ; 
2. I had, upon what was considered in Georgia, and even at Picolata, the 
best information, confidently relied upon the use of the Ochlawaha, as 
late as the 2d instant; 3. No bacon has arrived, and the difference be- 
tween it and pork, including wood and brine, is fifty per centum against 
the latter ; 4. The [two-] horse wagons purchased at Charleston and Au- 
'gusta, by assistant quartermasters L'Engle and Peyton, (4) arc gcneral- 

(1) Endorsement of Lieutenant Van Buren, aid-de-ramp, &c. 

(2) Colonel Gadsden's deposition and Captain Van Buren's testimony. 

(3) Colonel Gadsden's depositions and the testimony of Captain Van Buren. 

(4) Though bad, it has since been ascertained that better two-horse wagons could not be 
purchased at those places. 



I 



221 



\y poor, and many of them unserviceable; 5. The 10 wagons actually 
reported to have been shipped at Baltimore, in, I think, the Arctic, with 
Major Gates, were all left behind ; G. Of the 19,000 rations known to be 
at Fort Urane, about the 25th ultimo, nearly the whole have been drawn 
by a force not expected by the Government or myself to appear in that 
quarter; and 7. Not a horse for the baggage train, left by me at Savan- 
nah, or which I have since ordered to be purchased by assistant quarter- 
master Dimmock, has arrived in Florida." (1.) * * * * * * * 

" Instructions have been left behind me to send forward rations, should 
the means of transportation arrive in time, and the troops already in the 
neighborhood of Picolata — Major Cooper's and the remaining company 
of Major Gates's battalions. I have also desired Brigadier General Eustis 
to order to Fort Drane two companies of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment, 
and a further order will go back, in this boat, to Lieutenant Dimmock, on 
the subject of horses and wagons. 

" Some rifles and the tents arrived this morning at Picolata; but Col- 
onel Goodwyn's regiment had marched through six or eight storms with- 
out cover, and now, all companies in march are to be reduced to three 
tents each." 

The following is the postscript to the foregoing report : 

" Please remark that, in his letter to Brigadier General Clinch, dated 
at New Orleans, the 2d ultimo, (2) Major General Gaines speaks of 'an 
efficient co-operation;' promises to be 'in readiness,' at Tampa bay 'by 
the 8th of the present month [February] to form a junction at or near 
that place with your command, whenever, and as soon as, in your 
judgment, your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement ;' and 
concluded by saying — ' a sufficient quantity of ammunition and provisions 
have been transported to Fort Brooke [Tampa] to divide with you, until 
further supplies are received.' Yet, he did not wait till the brigadier 
gave notice that he was 'in force' — came to Fort King, and swept nearly 
the whole of the subsistence collected at Fort Drane. A copy of that 
letter is in your office, and I now enclose one from Governor Eaton, (3) 
from which it will appear that Major General Gaines knew, at Tampa 
bay, about the 14th ultimo, that I had been charged with the direction of 
this war. He first heard this at Pensacola, and received Governor Ea- 
ton's despatch at Tampa, as I can establish. Hence his haste, and neg- 
lect of the assurances given to Brigadier General Clinch, his isolated 
attack," Sec. 

Mr. President: I am not, nor desire to be, the prosecutor or accuser 
of Major General Gaines, either before this or any other Court, nor before 
the public. In respect to the latter tribunal — I have not published, nor 
caused to be published, a word against any human being whatever, or 
even a word in self-defence, since, at the latest, I was ordered to Florida 
— unless, indeed, two simple notes of explanation may be regarded as 
exceptions : the first, in May last, on the subject of a term hastily, and I 
may say, accidentally, applied by me in an official report, to the volun- 
teers I then had the honor to command ; and the second, written for pub- 
lication within a few days past, repudiating certain language which I saw 

(1) Some soon after arrived. The storm and the want of sufficient steamers delayed 
Captain Dimmock. 

(2) Doc. No. 48. (3) Dated February 24, Doc. No. 73. 



[ 224 J Ml 

myself reported as having applied, before this Court, to a high political 
functionary. If many of my official reports, written in the field, and 
transmitted for the information of Government, have, at Washington, been 
printed in whole or in part, the act was done, in every instance, without 
my knowledge, or the expression of the slightest wish to that effect, on 
my part. The officers of my staff, sir, so far as I know or have seen, have 
been equally silent. 

And what outrages have I not suffered from the publications of others 
during this period of silence ? I shall speak in this place only of Major 
General Gaines. I complain not that he and his staff should occasionally 
fdl up a column or two of the newspapers in praise of the hero of Camp 
Izard; but what right or justice was there in the outbreaks against me 
on the part of that chief — on the Withlacoocb.ee, at. Tallahassee, Mobile, 
and I know not at how many other places ? All these effusions of spleen, 
whether in the form of orders, speeches, or letters, have been carefully 
obtruded upon the public. I have heard of many of those melancholy 
exhibitions, but have only read one — the order of the 9th of March, turn- 
ing over the command of the troops, on the Withlacoochee, to Brigadier 
General Clinch. It is, without any immediate agency of mine, in evi- 
dence ( 1 ) before this Court. In that paper, I am very facetiously de- 
nominated "the officer charged with the diplomatic arrangements of the 
War Department," approaching, as it is obliquely intimated, only to re- 
ceive the formal surrender of that enemy whom he had, without a sortie, 
most strangely, but happily, conquered or subdued ! 

It has been seen, Mr. President, in every form, that this was a slight 
misapprehension, to which the enemy was by no means a party ; and that 
no military or diplomatic blunder of mine was necessary to resuscitate a 
war that had not then, nor has yet been terminated. It would be super- 
fluous to quote the evidence — it abounds on the records of this Court, 
and what is worse, it yet abounds in unhappy Florida. 

The Judge Advocate has read in evidence, furnished for the purpose 
by the War- Department, (he official reports written by me at the time 
for the information of Government; in several of which Major General 
Gaines's movements are mentioned. Those particular reports, in com- 
mon with the others, it was my right and duty to make, being charged, 
at the time, by seniority in commission and special assignment, with the 
chief direction of the war against the Seminole Indians. Several pas- 
sages of that part of the testimony have already been imbodied in this 
summary, to show how far I was, in my plans and operations, hindered, 
crippled, or defeated by the movements of that general. Without de- 
patting from the strict line of <■ fenc i that I have prescribed to myself, 
and which, no doubt, this Court would otherwise have imposed, it remains 
for me to show that Major General Gaines, in his operations in Florida, 
so far as they embarrassed mine, constituted himself an intruder — that is, 
that he came into the lie!;! i/i his own wrong. 

It has been seen, Mr. President, in what terms of praise (in my let- 
ter (2) to General Clinch of the 25th of February,) 1 bore ray humble 
testimony to General Gaines's movement from New Orleans; provided 
that, in violation of his express assurance, previously given to Clinch, 

(l) Doc. No. 78. (2) Document No. 58. 



143 [ 224 j 

that he would wait for a junction with him at or near Tampa, it did not 
lead to a premature advance into the interior. But I then did not know 
the fact, so clearly disclosed in Captain McCall's letter,( 1 ) republished in 
The Army and Navy Chronicle, (whole No. 84,) which has been veri- 
fied, and is now in evidence. 

Captain McCall was at the time with General Gaines, and his acting 
assistant adjutant general. He says in his letter that "on the route, and 
within two days' march (by steam) of the Indian borders, be [General 
Gaines] received a notification that General Scott had been ordered to 
repair from the ci(y of Washington to Florida, ' and to take command of 
the troops operating against the Indians in that quarter.' At the same 
time he [General Gaines] was informed that 'the state of affairs west of 
the Mississippi might soon require his attention, \i not his presence, in 
that quarter;' and he was directed to await further orders in the city of 
New Orleans." 

The point at " two days' march by steam" from Tampa bay, was evi- 
dently Fensacola, where we know, by Governor Eaton's letter above- 
noticed, (incidentally,) that General Gaines touched on his way from 
New Orleans to Tampa bay. 

But the captain argues, in the same letter, and no doubt after General 
Gaines, that, had the latter "obeyed the order, [received at Fensacola,] 
and, by so doing, left General Clinch in expectation of a promised co- 
operation, to extricate himself as ho could from any difficulty into which 
the failure, on the part of General Gaines, in preconcerted movements, 
might peradventure have thrown him," (Clinch,) " it is difficult to say 
whether the historian would have approved or condemned" General 
Gaines. But we have seen, (and I have probably already assigned the 
true motive) that the "promised co-operation" and "preconcerted 
movements," commencing with " a junction at or near" Tampa, was not 
observed by General Gaines. 

The captain's letter continues: "And, without General Gaines, the 
volunteers, [the Louisiana regiment,] his principal force, were unwilling 
to proceed ; for, before they left New Orleans, he had pledged himself 
to accompany them whithersoever they went, and to stand by them," 
&c. These again are evidently General Gaines's own pretexts for 
his intrusion. 

First, the unwillingness of the Louisiana regiment to proceed without 
General Gaines to command it. 

Finding at this place Captain Thistle, who commanded a company in 
that corps, in Florida, from some day in February to the end of its term 
of service, I caused him to be summoned as a witness, and to be inter- 
rogated on (his point. To my (third) question he answered : " For my 
part, when I was raising the men for my company, I did not know there 
was such a man as General Gaines in the country. Colonel Smith and 
[Lieutenant] Colonel Lawson, I understood, were to command. I speak 
only in reference to my own company — my own officers and men. When 
at Fensacola, I never heard any thing of the kind mentioned, nor did I 
ever hear there that General Gaines was about to leave us. When we 
got acquainted with General Gaines, the officers and men were well 
pleased with him." 

(1) Document No. 150. 



[ 224 



144 



" Question 4. Did your regiment, as far as you know, obey, with equal 
cheerfulness, every officer of superior rank, whether of the regulars or 
volunteers ? 

" Answer. They did so. I never heard the least murmur, neither among 
the officers or men, nor the first word of dispute'; they were always 
ready to obey orders, both with the regulars and volunteers, from all of* 
fleers placed over them." 

The same disposition, on the part of the regiment, may be inferred 
from the letter of its commander, Colonel Smith, to Captain Shannon, 
dated at Fort King, February 25th. In this the writer says: 

" I find it is General Gaines's intention to go down to Tampa bay by 
the scene of General Clinch's fight, and then to quit Florida. I would 
wish you to say to General Scott that if he thinks my regiment can be of 
use to his operations, I would rather remain with it in Florida than go 
back without having seen a fight ; though, to tell the truth, I would ra- 
ther have the fight before the grand army comes up. I would like, there- 
fore, before we can be shipped back from Tampa bay, to be ordered on 
some active duty by General Scott." (Colonel Smith has been summon- 
ed as a witness, at my instance, but has not arrived.) 

Who, Mr. President, would infer, from the spirit of this excellent let- 
ter, that the patriotic Louisiana regiment was a body of vassals who only 
owed allegiance, or service, to a particular chief? or, rather, who would 
not affirm that it continued in the field to the last moment, and, in the 
language of Captain Thistle, " always ready to obey orders, with regu- 
lars and volunteers, from all officers placed over them?" (The depo- 
sition of Mr. Dyer, then quartermaster and commissary of the Louisiana 
regiment, strongly supports what is said under this and the next head.) 

The other pretext, as we learn from Captain McCall's letter, is : 
General Gaines had pledged himself to accompany the Louisiana regi- 
ment^ SfC. 

It seems, from Captain Thistle's testimony, that this corps was raised 
in part, and that arrangements were in progress to complete it (no doubt 
by his Excellency Governor White) as soon as the news of the massa- 
cre of Major Dade had reached New Orleans, and before it was known 
that General Gaines was in that part of the country. Colonel Smith's 
letter equally excludes the idea of a pledge. He speaks of General 
Gaines's intention of returning to Tampa, and thence embarking for 
New Orleans, and the wish of himself and regiment to remain. The 
pledge, therefore, seems to have been a mere gratuitous flourish, made 
without any moving consideration, without acceptance, and without being 
known or remembered in the regiment. The troops, both regulars and 
volunteers, might very well have proceeded from Pensacola to Tampa 
bay under Colonel Smith, who was fully qualified to direct and command 
them. In this way, sir, I show that General Gaines came upon the the- 
atre of operations as an intruder, and in his own wrong, 

In my report ( 1 ) of March 14th, I said, for the information of Gov- 
ernment, that " I have every reason to hope that the enemy remains 
nearly in the same position as before the isolated, and, therefore, false 
movement of Major General Gaines." An adroit and faithful negro spy, 
the same who had " been sent over the river" (2) by General Gaines, 

(1) Doc. No. 77. (2) Doc. No. 149. 



145 [221 J 

for a like purpose, was again despatched to ascertain the correctness of 
the impression so reported, but this spy never returned. We afterwards 
learned that he fell under suspicion- and was confined. The impression, 
however, was universal in the right wing, (with which I marched,) up 
to its passage of the YVithlaeoochee, as is stated by Captain Thruston, 
the very intelligent chief of General Clinch's staff. This witness says: 
" I did not entertain a doubt myself that the enemy was still concentra- 
ted about the YVithlaeoochee, where /believed, and think it was the im- 
pression of others who had the best opportunities of information, that the 
women and children were then placed by the enemy for security ; that 
they would defend the passage of the river with all their force, as they 
had done when threatened by General Gaines," [and it might have been 
added, when previously approached by General Clinch, December the 
31st.] "I heard no other supposition than that there we should be re- 
sisted, and that (here the principal battle would be fought. That im- 
pression continued with me and others, and, I believe, generally through- 
out the wing, until our advance had landed on the opposite bank. I will 
mention, in support of this opinion, the fact that one of our men [a black 
wagoner] was cut off by a small party of Indians, said to be five, with- 
in eight miles of Fort Diane, on our first day's march."' 

According to my report ( 1 ) dated the 12th of April, and the testi- 
mony of Captain Thruston, General Clinch's column, with which I 
marched to Tampa, passed the YVithlaeoochee (that stopped General 
Gaines) with but little molestation; that we entered and scoured The 
Cove, the enemy's strongest hold, to its head, as we believed at the mo- 
ment, and without encountering a force of more than 130. Indeed, in 
the whole period of my operations, as may be seen by the written re- 
ports made to me by Clinch, (2) Eustis, (3) and Lindsay, (4) and of 
mine to Washington, (5) neither of those principal commanders, under 
me, at any time met with a larger body of the enemy at any one place — 
that which attacked Colonel Lindsay's column, on its last return to Tampa 
bay excepted, and which was estimated at about three hundred. By the 
term principal commanders, just used, I of course do not mean to include 
the officers who respectively commanded the two small posts established 
in the interior, denominated Forts Alabama and Cooper. These, from 
the enemy's perfect knowledge of his own most difficult country, and his 
consequent facilities of concentration, were reported to have been re- 
peatedly attacked, and by several hundreds each time. 

It has been further shown, in evidence, that the many columns and de- 
tachments under my orders, traversed an immense space in a short pe- 
riod, and visited many of the enemy's favorite haunts and strongest 
holds, and I now read this passage from my report to Washington of 
the 30th of April: 

" I am more than ever persuaded that the whole force of the enemy, 
including the negroes, does not exceed 1,200 fighting men. It is prob- 
ably something less. Of that force 1 am equally confident that not 500 
have, at any time since the commencement of hostilities, been brought 
within the same ten miles square. In all our operations within the last 

(1) Doc. No. 103. (3) Doc. No. 105. (5) Docs. Nos. 103 and 116. 

(2) Doc. No. 104. (4) Doc. No. 106. 

10 



[" 22i J 146 

thirty days, [known to me,] we have not found a party of probably more 
than 130; but parties of from ten to thirty have been encountered almost 
every where. No Indian woman, child, or negro, nor the trace of one, 
has been seen in that time. Those non-combatants, it has been evident 
to us all, have been removed beyond the theatre of our operations. They 
were, no doubt, even while the parley was going on with General Gaines, 
on the 7th of March, moving oil' to the southeast, beyond Pease creek 
and Lake Tohopkelika, and in that almost inaccessible region they are now 
concealed. That officer, it is said, caused Powell and his chiefs to be 
informed, by way of inducing them to accept the Withlacoochee as a 
temporary boundary, that large armies were approaching, which would 
fill up the Indian country, and crush every thing in the way. The wily 
chiefs profited by the information; sent off their families, and dispersed 
their warriors into small parties. In this way, Powell expects to make 
good his threat, viz : that he would protract the ivar to three years." 

Except on the suppositions of this extract, how was I, Mr. President, 
to account for our not finding, three weeks after General Gaines, any 
considerable body of the enemy ? He supposed himself to have been 
surrounded in his breastwork with his 1,000 or 1,100 men, by 1,200 or 
1,500 warriors. What had become of them ? He certainly killed but 
few, and captured not one. Whence then the subsequent dispersion? 
My supposition is rendered more than probable by Captain Hitchcock's 
letter to the honorable Mr. Lyon. M. C, dated Fort Drane, March 11, 
1836. since published, and now in evidence. (1) In this letter, the cap- 
tain says " a staff officer" (himself) was, at Fort Izard, sent out by Gene- 
ral Gaines to hold a parley or negotiation with the hostile chiefs, " and in 
the plainest language to tell them the exact truth as to the force ordered 
into the country to subdue them ; that additional force was expected every 
day ; that the time was near when every Indian found with a rifle in his 
hand would be shot down. This was communicated with such explana- 
tions as were deemed necessary to give it force," &c. 

And what, sir, were the objects of that parley, or "diplomatic" trans- 
action ? It seems, according to the published letters of Captains Hitch- 
cock and McCall, " that the Indians did not wish to fight any more, but 
they wanted him [General Gaines] to retire from the Withlacoochee ;" 
and in the general narrative of Captain Thistle, commenced under a 
question put by the Court, this witness said : " Captain Hichcock and 
other officers (Adjutant Barrow) went out and held a conversation with 
them [the Indians;] they inquired particularly as to our situation — 
whether we had provisions, and whether we had brandy and tobacco. 
They said they could supply us with provisions in abundance ; that we 
could fish on the river bank, if we chose ; and that they would fight no 
more if they were permitted to keep the opposite side of the Withlacoo- 
chee, making that river the boundary." 

Was this the language of a subdued people, humbly suing for peace 1 ? 
They had commenced the war without owning an acre of ground in 
Florida. They had ceded every foot. The time had arrived for their 
emigration to the West. Sooner than quit their natal soil they had ap- 
pealed to arms ; they had massacred a detachment of a hundred men ; 

(l)Doc. No. 149. 



117 [ 224 ] 

they had held their country notwithstanding the gallantry of Clinch and 
his handful of troops on the 31st of December ; they had even held Gen- 
eral Gaines himself, with his strong and excellent column, penned up un- 
der their tire from the 27th of February ; they had, in short, glutted 
their revenge, conquered the country up to the left bank of the Withlacoo- 
chee, gained all they wanted, and felt themselves in strength to dictate 
the terms of peace. Hence the overture to make the Withlacoochee the 
future boundary — to treat on the basis of the uti posidetis — each party to 
hold what it possessed ; and accordingly we find Captain Hitchcock in- 
structed (o reply, on the part of 'General Gaines, "that if they would 
engage to cease from all acts of hostility, retire south of the Withlacoochee, 
and promise to attend a council when called upon by the United States 
commissioners, they should not, for the present, be molested." Just at 
this critical moment General Clinch arrived with the needed succor, and 
we hear of no farther negotiations ! 

Well, sir, General Gaines now left the theatre of operations. Near 
Micanopy he met Colonel Bankhead's column, coming up, and, as the 
latter has testified, said : " You may go on, colonel; there is nothing to 
be done now, it is all finished." His order of the 9th of March, boast- 
ing, among " the important objects" he had " accomplished," that " the 
principal force of the enemy had been beaten, and forced to sue for 
peace," preceded or accompanied him. His progress towards Tallahas- 
see and Mobile was one continued triumph. But it may be asked, What 
had all this self-felicitation, and those public gratulations, to do with my 
operations ? This, Mr. President, is precisely what I am about to show. 

It will be remembered that two of the columns, those of Generals 
Clinch and Eustis, of the army under my command, respectively, from 
Fort Drane and Volusia, arrived at or near Tampa bay on the 6th and 
5th of April, and the third, or Colonel Lindsay's column, returned bom 
the interior about the same time. All, much harassed and worn by long 
and fatiguing operations, looked to this great Southern depot for the sup- 
plies and refreshments, so greatly needed to enable men and horses to 
return to the field. To give some idea of what we were; here doomed 
to experience, 1 will recall parts of my official report,(l) written at 
Tampa the 12th of April, for the information of Government, and which 
letter has been given in evidence by the Judge Advocate. 

" My disappointments on the Gulf have been as great as those expe- 
rienced on the St. John's. The latter were pretty fully reported at the 
time," &c. 

" Please now refer to my joint letter(2) to the quartermaster and the 
commissary at New Orleans, dated at Savannah, February 14th, and ac- 
knowledged^) on the 26th of the same month. A copy was transmit- 
ted to you for the information of the proper departments at Washington. 
The letter, it will be seen, is both specific and urgent. Yet, instead of 
my finding here about 50,000 rations of hard bread, and about 90,000 
rations of bacon, I found but 12,740 pounds of the former, and 21,600 
pounds of the latter ! Not an additional ration of either has arrived 
since I came." (Both the quartermaster and commissary, here alluded 

(1) Dnc. No. 103. (2) Doc. No. 39. (3) Doc. No. 42. 



[ 244 ] MS 

to, I have caused to be summoned as witnesses, and neither has ap- 
peared. ) 

" Colonel Lindsay (the report continues) had required, for the use of 
his column, of the quartermaster at New Orleans, a number of wagons 
and horses, and not one has been sent. Again: the sutler (the person 
next in importance to the quartermaster and the commissary with every 
army) left this place, more than a month ago, for New Orleans, to bring 
back with him a large supply of goods for the troops which were expected 
[here.] Those supplies are exceedingly wanted by every officer and 
man. But the quartermaster writes, that he hesitates about sending the 
wagons and horses; and the sutler, that he declines sending his stores — 
because each has heard of Major General Gaines's triumphal entry into 
Tallahassee, in consequence of his having finished the war! It is pre- 
sumed that the commissary at New Orleans stopped the shipment of hard 
bread and bacon for the same reason." ( This presumption is now fact, 
as shown by the testimony of Captain Thistle. Lieutenant Morris, 
who, at Tampa, had the letter from his brother, the sutler, testified, be- 
fore this Court, to all that I had alleged in respect to the non-arrival of 
sutlers' stores. See, on this point, the testimony of Colonels Lindsay 
and Bankhead, and for the sufferings of both officers and men, from the 
want of shoes, shirts, light garments, and groceries, see the testimony of 
Colonel Lindsay, Mr. De Peyster, and Captain Thistle. In respect to the 
want and non-arrival of wagons and horses at Tampa, see testimony of 
Colonel Lindsay; the letter ( 1 ) of Captain Shannon, (chief quarter- 
master;) the deposition of Mr. Newcomb, late of the army, and quar- 
termaster at Tampa, with the letter of the quartermaster at New Orleans, 
to him, annexed.) My report of the 12th of April continues: 

" Captain Green, of the cutter Dallas, was at Tallahassee when Major 
General Gaines arrived at that place. Me had been ten days soliciting 
permission to go and make a survey of the mouth of the Withlacoochee ; 
on renewing his application to someone of the Territorial Government, he 
was told the war was over. We have :?o?u to make the survey for the 
expedition that has been mentioned, [which sailed under Major Read, 
the 17th or 18th ot April.] These arc the new disappointments and 
vexations I have been doomed to experience." 

This statement, given in the report from memory, has been fully sus- 
tained by the testimony of Captain Green, before this Court, with this 
important addition : the captain would have ascended the river, having 
provided the necessary means. 

But, Mr. President, to a question put by the Court, General Clinch 
replied : " I am of the opinion that the movement of Major General 
Gaines's command, through Florida, did not materially affect the opera- 
tions of Major General Scott." 

Sir, no one entertains a more sincere respect and regard for this most 
excellent commander and citizen than I do, and I am sure that the whole 
army regrets his retirement to civil life. His opinion is always entitled 
to great weight, and hence, mainly, the overwhelming facts which I have 
just imbodied, and which, otherwise, I might have left scattered over 
your voluminous documents and minutes, to be remembered or hunted 
up by the Court. 

(1) To the Quartermaster General, April 11th, doc. No. 154. 



149 [ 22 1 ] 

It is, moreover, evident to me, Mr. President, from the reply to ano- 
ther question also propounded by the Court, that, on the point of inter- 
ference with my operations, the sound mind of General Clinch was too 
much influenced, at the moment, by the narrative he had so recently 
given of the neglects shown him by the War Department, prior to the 
time when I had the misfortune to be ordered (o Florida. If his repeat- 
ed calls for troops and supplies, and his wise admonitions on the temper 
early manifested by the Seminoles had received but half the attention 
due to his position — this still-raging war might never have bursted upon 
the country. Under this ruling idea, the witness could see nothing but 
the imputed errors of the War Department. Whilst that was on the 
throne of his mind, all the subsequent causes ot failure in sending the 
Indians out of Florida sunk into comparative insignificance. Be this as 
it may, I put, in concurrence with the isolated opinion of General Clinch, 
on the subject of General Gaines's interference with my operations, the 
great body of facts already detailed, and the opinions of witnesses of no 
less intelligence and respectability. See the deposition of Colonel Gads- 
den, the chief of my staff, who marched with General Clinch to the suc- 
cor of General Gaines, and who knew more of Florida and the Semi- 
noles than, perhaps, any three individuals with the army ; and see the 
testimony of Colonel Bankhead, who marched with me from Picolata to 
Fort Diane, where he came under the command, and continued with, 
General Clinch. The strong opinions expressed on this point by the two 
colonels, like the opposing one given by General Clinch, were all elici- 
ted without a question put by me. 

The point which has thus been rather more fully discussed than I had, 
until lately, intended, was, however, but the second cause of the failure 
of my operations to send out of Florida the great body of the Seminole 
Indians, and there were many other causes, besides the first in impor- 
tance, some of which have already been partially, though but incidental- 
ly, developed. It is now my purpose to bring rapidly the whole, in the 
same connexion, under the review of the Court. 

Of these causes, many, as will be seen, are closely united, and, in the 
descending scale, consequent upon each other. For these reasons, the 
analysis and the enumeration will, in some instances, be rather difficult. 

1. The lateness of my orders — 12 o'clock in the night of January 21s?, 
icith notice, the day before, to hold myself in readiness ; and the short 
term of service of the great body of troops. 

I do not mean to say, Mr. President, that any time was lost by the War 
Department, in putting me in motion after the news of Clinch's affair of 
December the 31st, which preceded, at Washington, the account of 
Dade's melancholy fate on the 28th. Nor shall I stop to discuss the 
question, Why had not stronger measures been taken on the receipt of 
Clinch's warnings and calls for reinforcements — beginning in January, 
1835, and reiterated October Sth, October 17th, December 9th, and De- 
cember 16th, of the same year?(l ) 

Well, sir, the Court has seen that I was promptly at Augusta, where 

(1) Doc. No. 151. 



I 224 J 150 

I 'completed my callsfor volunteers or draughted men : two regiments from 
South Carolina, one of horse and one of foot ; the same from Georgia, 
and one of foot from Alabama, at 740 men- per regiment, making a total 
of 3,700. A fine spirit was abroad in those States, and great exertions 
made in each to supply its quota. Yet, from many unavoidable causes — 
the immense spaces to be traversed, and others which I will not stop to 
enumerate, but not one of which can be charged to me — instead of find- 
ing myself in force at Picolata and at Tampa bay as early as the 20th of 
February, as I had originally flattered myself that I might, I arrived in 
Florida on the 22d, much in advance of three-fifths of those troops. 
Only the foot of South Carolina and seven companies of Georgia had 
preceded me. The Georgia horse began to arrive about the end of the 
month, the three companies before mentioned, and another, on the 10th 
of March, under Captain Nelson, who had made an unparalleled march 
from the northwest corner of Georgia. I ought, in my previous narra- 
tive, to have stated that this fine company joined at Garey's ferry, and 
added about 70 men to Colonel Bankhead's little column which set out 
with me for Fort Diane. The same day, Colonel Goodwyn's fine regiment 
of South Carolina mounted men reached St. Augustine, over a long road 
through rain and mud, and, like Nelson's company, without tents, and 
without a murmur. The Alabama regiment, under Colonel Chisholm, 
and Major Head's battalion of Floridians, arrived at Tampa bay, with 
Colonel Lindsay, between the 1st and 10th of March. (It has been seen 
that this battalion had not been called for by me, and that it went to Tam- 
pa bay without my knowledge, at the time, and against my wishes ; and 
that the second battalion of Georgia foot was, in accordance with my re- 
quest, never furnished.) Finally, six companies, instead of four, to make 
up for the defection of the first two — of Georgia horse, arrived at Garey's 
ferry, via Middle Florida and Fort Drane, about the 10th of April, whilst 
I was at Tampa. These six companies were, nevertheless, mustered 
into service, in accordance with instructions I had left behind, and 
immediately afterwards discharged, by the advice of Major General Ma- 
comb, who then happened to be at Picolata. 

All the volunteers called for by me were mustered into service for 
only three months, according to the instructions I had received from the 
War Department; and I suppose that the President of the United States 
has no authority to require the services of militia, by draughting, for a 
longer period. 

It has thus been seen that I was not in force to commence combined 
and efficient operations earlier than the 10th of March, and, by this date, 
the mass of the volunteers, owing to the different periods of arrival at the 
several places of rendezvous, and consequent acceptances, by muster, 
had only about 60 days to serve. This was the same thing nearly, in a 
system of combined operations, requiring the services of the whole, as if 
none had had a longer time to serve ; and all had been from home, with 
slight differences, equally long. 

But let not these movements of the volunteers excite a smile to their 
prejudice. The delay in their arrival on the St. John's, as I have said, 
was unavoidable, and there was even a greater delay in the approach of 
throe companies of regulars, which were ordered to embark, at Balti- 
more, in the dead of winter, and with the mercury in the thermometer 



151 f 224 J 

several degress below zero. This battalion was delayed by ice in the 
Chesapeake, 3 know not how many weeks, and finally reached Picolata 
on the 6th of March. With all the lights of the Quartermaster General, 
ten wagons were ordered ( 1 ) to be purchased, and shipped from Balti- 
more, about the same time — six came to Florida as late as the 11th or 
March, two earlier, and two in May ! (2) Now, if 1 were expected to 
make long marches, through a savage country, without road or bridges, 
why could not those three companies have been marched to Norfolk, or 
even to Wilmington, and thence embarked ? Time would have been 
saved in either case. And why were not the wagons shipped from some 
port not obstructed by ice ? Again : a detachment of United States dra- 
goons, under Captain Wharton, that received orders for Florida, at New 
York, about the 24th of January, was delayed several weeks in that har- 
bor, waiting for its arms and horse-furniture, and joined me at Fort 
Drane, (after a short passage to Savannah,) sixty days from the recep- 
tion of those orders ! There was no delay from the want of horses ; 
they had been purchased, by my orders, and placed at Savannah as early 
as the 12th of February. 

Let it be remembered, Mr. President, that those shipments and move- 
ments were not made under my directions ; yet I was advised of them, 
and suffered much embarrassment from not earlier receiving the troops 
and wagons. 

I have said that I was, by the 10th of March, in sufficient force to com- 
mence operations, and that the mass of the volunteers had then about CO 
days to serve — a part more and a part less. This period was rather more 
than was necessary for the marches and operations actually made under 
my orders, but wholly insufficient to enable us to scour the country south 
andeastof Pease creek, which is commonly termed the Ever-glades, even 
if the lateness of the season, the sickliness of the climate in those regions, 
as early as the end of April, and other causes which will be noticed, 
had not interposed insurmountable obstacles. I ought, therefore, to have 
given we any prospect of success, to have been ordered to Florida seve- 
ral months earlier, and with a force of a much longer term of service. 
He who now directs the war in that quarter, besides other advantages, 
has had more time for preparation ; has a better season for operations ; 
more regular troops, and volunteers of a longer period of service. 

In respect to volunteers for ninety days, the testimony of General 
Eustis and Colonel Lindsay is strongly in support of what I urge on this 
point. 

2. The unexpected intrusion of General Gaines. 

This was the second cause of my failure, both in point of time and 
importance. 

Now, although I considered myself in strength on the St. John's, and 
at St. Augustine, to commence forward movements as early as the 10th 
of March, the Court will please remember that my general plan of ope- 
rations was to move at the same time, as nearly as practicable, from Fort 
Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, upon the great body of the enemy supposed 

(1) Gen. Jvsup to Major Cross, January 26. (2) Deposition of Lieutenant Dimmock. 



[ 224 ] 152 

to be about the cove of tbe Withlacoochec ; to march in person with 
Clinch, and to give instructions to Eustis and Lindsay so far to deviate 
from that approximation of the three columns, as to pursue any consid- 
erable body of the enemy, or any considerable fresh trail that might be 
discovered. Hearing of General Gaines's intrusion, and seeing that a 
consequent delay was inevitable, I called back a detachment already in 
march to join Clinch, and, through the latter, caused Lindsay to be ad- 
vised ( I ) of that delay, lest he should make an isolated movement. And 
General Clinch has testified (2) that a forward movement could not have 
been made from Fort Diane earlier than the 2Gth of March, (the day on 
which he actually moved,) for two reasons: I. To give time for the 
troops which had been shut up in Camp Izard with General Gaines to 
recruit themselves ; 2. To enable the last train of wagons sent, to return 
from Garey's ferry with subsistence. The answer to the second question 
put to Captain Thruston shows more in detail the reduced condition of 
those troops. Here then was the cause of a considerable delay — from 
the 10th to the 26th of March — less the time necessary to march from 
the St. John's to Fort Diane ; and Eustis, in the mean time, instead of 
being forced to Volusia, which was to become his base of operations, was 
employed in scouring the country between the St. John's and the Atlan- 
tic, as far as Tomoca and Volusia. Lindsay was advised (3) of this fur- 
ther delay. The Court too has seen that it was my intention, on the 9th 
of March, (4) to strengthen the right wing by troops drawn from the 
left, if General Gaines's detachment had not fallen back on Fort Drane. 

3. Insufficient means of transportation. 

This cause of failure in my operations has, like the one just noticed, 
been pretty fully developed in the former parts of this summary. I shall, 
therefore, only remark in this place that the means of land transportation 
would have been nearly sufficient, notwithstanding the intrusion of Gen- 
eral Gaines, if we could have used the Ochlawaha for about seventy tons 
of supplies (as I had expected to do) up to the 2d of March ; and that 
those means, even without the use of the Ochlawaha, would have been 
sufficient by the 12th, but for that intrusion. The necessity of replacing 
the subsistence drawn from Fort Drane by General Gaines ; of providing 
for a larger force than was expected there ; of transporting articles of 
subsistence fifty per centum heavier than those I had early and specific- 
ally called for, both from the St. John's and Tampa, caused our wagons 
to be overloaded, the horses to be overworked, and many of both to be 
broken down. The Court will further remember who took from Tampa 
the means of transportation which were there early in February, and 
what prevented the arrival of new means from New Orleans. 

4. Insufficient supply of hard bread and bacon for marches. 

On the 21st of January, in his office, the Commissary General of Sub- 
sistence and myself fully concurred as to the advantages of hard bread 

(1) Document No. 61. (.») March 13, Doc. No. 81. 

(2) Answer to the first question. (4) Document No. 74. 



153 [ 224 ) 

and bacon, over flour and pork, on marches. Ten days after, in a letter ( 1 ) 
to the Adjutant General, I recurred to this subject, and required on the 
St. John's (at Picolata) large quantities of both hard bread and bacon ; 
which passage of ray letter, according to request, the Adjutant General 
duly communicated to the Commissary General before the 10th of Feb- 
ruary, as the former reported (2) to me on that day. 

Now, it is shown by the testimony of Mr. Locke, who was the assistant 
commissary at Picolata, that the quantity of hard bread which had arrived 
prior to the march of Clinch's column from Fort Drane, and of Eustis's 
from Volusia, was much less than was wanted for those columns, although 
I had prohibited the issue of hard bread to the troops when at rest on 
the St. John's. The deficiency was made up, of course, in flour, of which, 
and of pork, our supply was abundant ; and the same testimony is express 
that not a pound of bacon reached the St. John's, from the commissariat, 
earlier than the 15th of April, when all the columns were near the Gull 
of Mexico. 

Though much embarrassed on the St. John's and the march to the 
south, by the want of those particular items of food, as the Court has 
seen, I have always been unwilling to suppose that the chief of the com- 
missariat was in fault ; and am now, since hearing read before this Court 
his instructions to the agents of his department on the subject, yet more 
unwilling to impute blame to him. His merits are acknowledged by the 
whole army, and I am free to declare that I have never known a better 
man, or a more faithful public servant. The failure in the particulars 
stated was, however, not the less embarrassing. 

Well, sir, the army, early in April, was compelled to give up, for the 
moment, the search for the enemy, and to march upon Tampa bay to seek 
for supplies. The Court has seen what orders I had given to the assist- 
ant commissary at New Orleans in respect to this depot ; the large 
quantity expected, and the small quantity of hard bread and bacon found 
there, and that that little would not have been equal to three or four 
marches of the army, if Colonel Lindsay had not brought with him a 
small quantity from Mobile. On this point the testimony of Lieutenant 
Morris, the then commissary at Tampa, is more explicit than even that 
of General Eustis or Colonel Lindsay. And the reason why more of 
those items of subsistence had not been sent from New Orleans, is also 
pretty fully in evidence. (The then commissary at the latter place was 
duly summoned to appear here, and has not arrived.) 

Mr. Locke stated, in his testimony, that the difference in weight, owing 
to the brine and wood necessary to the preservation in warm weather of 
pork, is fifty-one per centum against the latter in favor of bacon. This 
difference is known to most marching officers ; and that between the ra- 
tion of eighteen ounces of flour and twelve of hard bread, is evident to 
all the world. To have been obliged, then, as we were, to take with all 
the columns in their several marches nearly two-thirds of our whole sub- 
sistence in the heavier articles, was the same thing as if a larger portion 
of our otherwise deficient means of transportation had been captured or 
destroyed ; and even this was not the only evil consequent upon that 
necessity, as will be presently seen. 

(1) Document No. 18. (2) Document No. 36. 



[ 224 ] 154 

5. Heat of the climate — badness of ivater — sickness. 

From the lateness of the season into which we were thrown, from the 
causes already stated, we found the heat, even before the 20th of April, 
so oppressive, that the troops could not execute even ordinary marches 
from this cause alone. ( Testimony of Clinch, Eustis, Lindsay, and Thrus- 
ton, also Colonel Smith's report ( 1 ) of his expedition up Pease creek.) 
The troops had still to wear their winter clothing, from the non-arrival of 
sutler's goods at Tampa from New Orleans; the sink-holes, or ponds, on 
which both men and horses had generally to rely for water, were now, 
many of them, dried up, and in the others the water was tepid, besides 
being filled with vegetable matter and animalcula. ( Testimony of Clinch, 
Eustis, Thruston, &c.) Add to these causes of distress and disease the 
swamps and hammocks which were traversed, the deficiency in bacon te 
which the volunteers had very generally been accustomed at home, and 
the necessity all were under, (he greater part of the time, when in march, 
to eat unleavened dough partially fried with pork, or half baked before 
camp fires, and it will astonish no one to learn from the testimony that 
we had very many individuals, officers and men, who could neither ride 
nor march. The only resource was to crowd them into the wagons; for, 
in a savage country, we could leave no one behind. 

6. Forage and grazing. 

At St. Augustine, and on the St. John's as high up as the depot at Vo- 
lusia, there was, on the requisitions of General Eustis and my own, upon 
Lieutenant L'Engle at Charleston, and Lieutenant Dimmock at Savan- 
nah, an abundant supply of both coin and hay, and there was no positive 
deficiency in forage around Fort Drane. At Tampa we again found an 
abundance of corn and hay, with a small quantity of oats, all supplied in 
compliance with my requisition, as I suppose, upon the quartermaster at 
New Orleans. This corn, however, was generally bad, having probably 
been sweated on board of vessels. The good was mostly consumed at 
Tampa, during a rest to recruit the horses, of eight or ten days, at that 
place. The portion issued for renewed operations was generally the ref- 
use, which killed some horses and injured more. (Deposition of Mr. 
Newcomb, and testimony of Captain Thruston.) 

The grazing in the interior, as all the witnesses questioned on the 
subject have testified, furnished but an occasional and a slight resource. 
Hence the Court will not be surprised that General Eustis caused every 
cavalry horse with him to be led by his owner, on foot, the last sixteen 
miles of the march from Volusia upon Tampa. The grazing was but 
little less bad on the return marches. 

But it may be asked, Why not have taken more corn with the columns 
from the depots which furnished that which was good ? If our trains had 
been doubled a sufficient supply could not have been transported, even 
if there had been good roads. Let any gentleman make the calculation 
for himself, to see how many wagons would be required, for example, to 
take corn enough for a thousand horses for twenty days, including the 

(1) Document No. 133. 



155 f 224 J 

consumption of the draught horses so employed, and he will be astonish- 
ed at the result. Again ; why not make every rider put three bushels of 
corn in his saddle, and lead his horse for seven or eight days ? Regular 
cavalry may be compelled to do this ; but I know of no power of per- 
suasion that can induce any body of volunteers whatever, unless it be 
under the highest calls of patriotic interest, thus in their own estimation 
to degrade themselves. I made the proposal ; and, although I commanded 
at the time a corps of horse composed mostly of gentlemen of the highest 
spirit and devotion to country, I was advised not to issue an order to that 
effect, as it could not be enforced, although I pledged myself that I would 
do what I wished to require of others. I then reduced the quantity of 
corn to be so taken, in my Order No. 28, ( 1 ) and it is in evidence that 
considerably less — about an average o( three pecks only — was actually 
put on each horse. And the Court will readily conceive that the trans- 
portation of hay into the interior, for the consumption of even two days, 
was wholly out of the question with marching troops, as well on account 
of its bulk as its weight. 

From the foregoing circumstances it resulted that all surviving horses 
arrived at Tampa in a bad condition, (2) and returned to the north of 
Florida in a worse, as is shown by the evidence. 

7. Roads — bridges. 

The only road within the theatre of our operations was that made by 
Government, connecting Fort King with Tampa bay. This road was 
very partially followed by all the columns under my command. Its three 
bridges were destroyed by the enemy at the commencement of hostili- 
ties. All the other routes were opened by the columns as they marched, 
and the streams roughly bridged at the same time. These labors were 
difficult and incessant, as might be supposed, and has been shown in the 
testimony of Eustis, Lindsay, and Thruston. 

8. Want of an auxiliary Indian force. 

The Court has seen, by my Order No. 13, (March 14,) (3) that I call- 
ed for 500 friendly Creek Indians, to be commanded by General 
Woodward, Major Watson, and Major Flournoy. The first two have 
been summoned here on this and another important point, but have not 
arrived. The third early fell in the Creek war. Colonel Gadsden's 
deposition shows the importance of such force, and my successors in 
Florida have had the benefit of the suggestion. It was denied me by 
the agent of Government, and that denial not even rebuked by the 
Secretary of War. See Major Hogan's letter(4) to that functionary, 
and his reply,(5) dated, respectively, March 28 and April 12. For 
the standing and qualifications of the two majors named by me to bring 
on the Indians, see Goveror Eaton's letter(G) to me, dated March 7, 
and General Clinch's notes(7) of introduction. General Woodward is 

(1) Document No. 109. 

(2) Letter of Captain Shannon to the Quartermaster General, April 11, Doc. No. 154. 

(3) Doc. No. 82. (4) Doc. No. 86. (5) Doc. No. 87. (6) Doc. No. 88. 
(7) Doc. Nos. 89 and 90. 



[ 224 156 

too highly distinguished both as a commander of and against Indians, to 
require a word of support in this place ; and it will be seen in the agent's 
(Major Hogan's) letter(l ) to me, dated the 1st of February, that he 
thought he could, "in ten days, raise [me] 1,000 warriors, and be on 
the march to join" me. 

9. Want of guides. 

Eustis and Lindsay, as shown by their testimony, had no competent 
guides, and could obtain none. Clinch's column was rather less badly provi- 
ded in thisrespect,yethehad not a guide who knew any thing of the intrica- 
cies of The Cove, a Cretan labyrinth, held from the knowledge of the 
white man, as the sacred groves of the Druids were never entered ex- 
cept by the initiated. In short, all the difficult parts of Florida were, to 
the whole army, one terra incognita. Government gave me no topo- 
graphical information, nor had any to give ; and the booksellers' maps 
only afforded outlines filled up with unlucky guesses. 

10. The limited time J or active operations. 

From preceding causes, and deducting the time unavoidably lost at 
Tampa, (2) the columns of Clinch and Eustis were actually in the field, 
beyond Fort Diane and Volusia, only about twenty-two days. Tbe tes- 
timony of both Clinch and Thruston shows that I could not have put the 
right wing in operation from Fort Drane earlier than I did, the 26th of 
March ; and Eustis, with the left wing, crossed the St. John's at Volu- 
sia, about the same time, to approach The Cove by the way of Pelakli- 
kaha. Clinch, with his wing, was compelled to return to Fort Drane, 
on the 25th of April, the term of service of a part of his volunteers hav- 
ing already expired, and, as he reported(3) to me, the 27th, " men and 
horses much exhausted by sickness and the heat of the weather. An- 
other day's march would have occasioued the abandoning of a part of the 
train. Fifteen horses and mules died on the road, and eight more turned 
out that could not be got along by leading." 

Eustis, with the left wing, (which I accompanied from Tampa,) was, 
in like manner, and very much in the same condition, compelled to re- 
turn to Volusia on the same day, April 25. 

Colonel Smith, who had, with his regiment, the Louisiana volunteers, 
been detached by the way of Charlotte harbor, up Pease creek, about 
the 12th of April, returned to Tampa the 26th, and embarked for New 
Orleans, according to orders, where the regiment arrived, I think, a little 
after its term of service had expired. 

The battalion of Floridians sailed from Tampa about the 17th of April, 
for the Withlacoochee, on its way to St. Mark's, where it was discharged. 
I do not know when this battalion was mustered into service. 

The centre column, under Colonel Lindsay, which at first included 
Major Read's battalion, having arrived by steam from Mobile, at Tam- 
pa, was tho first of the three columns, under my orders, in the field. On 

(1) Doc. No. 84. (2) Testimony of Clinch, Eustis, and Thruston. (5) Doc. No. 120. 



157 [ 221 ] 

the 15th of March, he put himself in movement, established a post on the 
Hillsborough, 23 miles from Tampa, called Fort Alabama, as a place of 
deposite, and advanced towards The Cove as far as Chickuchatty, which 
he reached about the 24th, the letter (1) advising him of the delay 
in the movements of the two other columns, having reached him subse- 
quently. 

This column, consisting principally of the Alabama regiment of vol- 
unteers, under Colonel Chisholm, and several times changed in its other 
parts, was also the latest in the field, by a few days. By my Orders No. 
38,(2) of the 16th of April, Colonel Lindsay was instructed, on his re- 
turn to Tampa, after my departure, to make any further movement with- 
in the compass of his forces, in the prosecution of the campaign, that 
might be deemed useful, and then to cause the volunteers with him (the 
'Alabama regiment and an independent company of Louisianians, under 
Captain Marks) to be embarked for their respective homes. That em- 
barkation was commenced by him, according to his report,(3) May the 
7th, " the rainy season having set in," and it being deemed " impossible 
to keep the field with bodies of troops without great, and for any objects 
that could be accomplished, a wanton waste of life." 

Thus terminated, Mr. President, active operations under my com- 
mand ; and if, from the causes assigned, without decisive results, at least 
without defeat or check, and without dishonor. 

In my report of the 12th of April, from Tampa, J spoke in terms 
of high commendation of the three principal commanders under me — 
Clinch, Eustis, and Lindsay. Each continued to the last to deserve greater 
praise than it is in the power of one, under my present circumstances, to 
bestow. I also had the benefit of Colonel Gadsden's assistance, the 
chief of my staff, a volunteer in the war, a soldier, and a patriot, who, in- 
dependent of his particular knowledge of the enemy and the peninsula, 
of his services with me, and on prior occasions, is endowed with talents 
and virtues which give him high claims upon the Government and coun- 
try. The handfuls of regulars who were with me in the field, never 
faltered in difficulty or danger; and if now and then they yielded the 
post of honor, it was purely in compliment to their countrymen fresh from 
civil life, who were cherished and assisted on every occasion. Those 
patriotic volunteers of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Florida, were, no doubt, many of them, sometimes inefficient, from the 
mere awkwardness of inexperience ; but they very generally brought 
with them to the war high chivalry, which always inspires the wish of 
personal distinction, and this was frequently and nobly attained by indi- 
viduals and detachments. 

On the principal commanders and the troops which were under me, I 
have then only to invoke the approbation of their country. Let its cen- 
sure, through this Court, fall on me, and me alone, of that army, if all 
were not done which it was possible to accomplish under the circum- 
stances. 

Some questions, Mr. President, were put to as many witnesses of the 
higher ranks, who have appeared before this Court, to ascertain whether 

(1) March 13, Doc. No. 81. (2) Doc. No. 114. (3) Doc. No. 129. 



[ 2^4 J 158 

I had failed in any particular, as a commander in Florida, in point of 
judgment, zeal, or personal conduct. The answers were direct in every 
instance, but too complimentary to be here reproduced. Let them sleep 
for the present on your records. They may hereafter be read by those 
who will not be made to blush for their parent. 

A word, sir, as to my plan of campaign. 1 believe that this has been 
sufficiently developed in the evidence and imbodied in this summary. It 
has been censured by a writer, himself an old officer, and who delights 
to see himself in print, as being somewhat European, as if it were criminal 
to import professional knowledge, and who seemed to think that generals 
ought to make war without plans of any sort. This vulgar error has 
been incidentally, but too signally rebuked by an eminent military critic 
and political functionary, to be farther noticed in this place. I shall, 
therefore, here simply quote the opinions of two younger but better 
soldiers, on the particlar plan of operations by me laid down and pur- 
sued. 

After exploring the country to a great extent, and learning much that 
was new of it and the enemy, Geneial Clinch says to me, in his report 
1 ) (April 27th) of his operations returning from Tampa bay : " that the 
true plan of operations against them [the Indians] will be that first de- 
signed by you ; that is, by a force from Pelaklikaha, a force ascending by 
my [late] route, and a corresponding one on the north side," his first 
route. This, the Court will perceive, was the precise plan laid down by 
me for pur first operations. 

Captain Thruston, who, I knew, in March, at Fort Diane, did not 
altogether approve of the plan of campaign I was about to follow, and 
with whom I never again conversed on the subject, was, when before 
this Court, at a venture, asked by me this question: 

" 17. The witness became acquainted with the general plan of opera- 
tions projected by General Scott. With the benefit of the witness's sub- 
sequent knowledge of the enemy, and the country occupied by him, 
what is the witness's opinion of that general plan of operations ? 

" Answer. When I first heard Geneial Scott detail his plan of opera- 
lions, I thought he had taken more than necessary precautions, by advan- 
cing into the country with three columns, from different points of the 
peninsula ; not doubting that our wing [Clinch's] of the army would be 
met by the enemy in force on the Withlacoochee. Nor did I believe 
that a nation of 5,000 people could conceal itself so effectually in the 
peninsula, south and cast of the Withlacoochee, that they could not be 
traced and found by one army [column or wing]. My subsequent ex- 
perience taught me my error, and to consider General Scott's plan of 
operations as the true one." 

But, Mr. President, it has been objected to me that, in my first opera- 
tions (towards Tampa bay) I held the troops in masses unnecessarily 
large — of 1,900, 1,700 and 1,200 men, respectively. Of this, I became 
myself, early persuaded. But, in connexion with this point, the Court 
will please look at that part of Colonel Lindsay's testimony, detailing 
his remarks, and the advice he gave me at Augusta, at the end of Janu- 
ary, \boii. I regret that I am obliged here to abridge his evidence. 

(11 Document No. 120. 



159 [ 224 [ 

Colonel Lindsay had served with Major General Jackson, against a part 
of the same Indians, in the campaign of 1818; the "principal object of 
which was," according to the witness, u to drive the Seminoles from the 
Georgia frontier across the Suwannee ; that General Jackson carried into 
the field a force amounting to, perhaps, 6,000 men." This was in reply 
to my 8th question. To the 6th, the Colonel had previously said " the 
country east of the Suwannee is infinitely more impracticable than the 
country west." He adds many striking differences, all against our troops; 
and it is known that General Jackson's operations terminated on 
the west bank of that river. In respect to the advice given on the sub- 
ject of detaching, the witness said: "I believe I mentioned to General 
Scott, that I derived that advice from General Jackson, who, on some 
occasion, when I wanted to goon detached service, made use of this 
emphatic expiession, ' Sir, I never detach against Indians." And again, 
in the same campaign, General Jackson observed to the witness, " that 
he never detached, or suffered small parties to march through the Indian 
country." The Court will please to bear in mind the official relation 
that subsisted, in January, 1836, between General Jackson, Colonel 
Lindsay, and myself; that I had never been in the interior of Florida ; 
that Governor Eaton in his letter (1 ) to me, of February the 3d, 1836, 
speaking of the hostile Seminoles, said "their numerical force cannot 
be less than 3,000, probably more ;" that Colonel Lindsay has testified, 
in answer to my 27th question, what must be evident from the surface 
of the country, that, from dispersion, the enemy had great facilities of 
concentration ; that I had seen, before the columns advanced from Fort 
Drane and Volusia, by General Gaines's letter (2) to General Clinch, 
dated the 29th of February, that the writer supposed himself to have 
been surrounded, in Camp Izard, by "not less than 1,500" warriors ; and 
that although he had from 1 ,000 to 1 ,100 good troops with him, I saw that 
he neither could pass the Withlacoochee, nor had ventured to make a 
sortie. All these considerations induced me, Mr. President, to hold the 
troops under my command, in three columns, until I could feel my way 
a little, and judge for myself. When I had satisfied my mind that there 
were not, in all Florida, more than 1,200 Indian warriors, probably less ; 
and that, of that force, perhaps not 500 had been concentrated at any- 
time in the war, the Court will find that I then became a little 
bolder, and detached freely and far, in all directions ; and it is gratifying 
to recall, that notwithstanding all the bugbears by which I had been, 
for a moment, frighted from my bent, not a disaster — not one defeat 
ensued. I speak, sir, of detachments beyond supporting distance; for 
all the columns were habitually subdivided, within that limit, in search- 
ing for, and in attacking the enemy. 

The first of those distant detachments was that of 340 men left under 
Major Cooper, only 12 miles south of the Withlacoochee, and which 
gallantly maintained itself from the 2d of April till the 18th, when it was 
absorbed on the return of Clinch's column. Major Cooper commenced 
a work for defence, but the enemy gave him no leisure to complete it. 
General Eustis, approaching Tampa, brought his mounted men to that 
depot; but left his foot, from the 5th of April till the 18th, at Camp 

(1) Document, No. 30. (2) Document. No. 63. 



[ 224 ] 160 

Sfielton, under Brigadier General Bull, sixteen miles in the rear, without 
even a breast-work for its defence. With the same body of foot I my- 
self marched to Fort Alabama, whilst the South Carolina horse, under 
Colonel Goodwyn, was on the distant service of searching for the ene- 
my about the head of Pease creek. At the same time Colonel Smith, 
and his Louisiana volunteers, fit for duty, (about 400,) with small par- 
ties from the United States ship Vandalia, under Lieutenant Powell, 
and from the revenue cutter Dallas, under Captain Green, scoured the 
lower part of that creek, to the extent of about GO miles from Charlotte 
harbor. Colonels Smith and Goodwyn thus visited what we had sup- 
posed to be among the favorite haunts and strong holds of the enemy. 
I, myself, on the 20th of April, with a single company of South Carolina 
horse, marched from the Big across the Little Withlacoochec. Again, 
on the ~ lth, with but two companies, I went to Volusia, a day ahead of 
Eustis's column ; sent a small detachment on the 25th to scour the coun- 
try east of Spring Garden lake, and personally proceeded, with Colonel 
Gadsden, Captain Canfield, Lieutenant J. E. .Johnston, and 17 men, in a 
miserable little steamer, to explore the St. John's river to the head of 
Lake Monroe. General Clinch and Colonel Lindsay also made de- 
tachments about the same period ; and I had detached Major Read, with 
the battalion of Floridians, by water, to search the lower Withlacoochee, 
as early as the 17th. 

As this last expedition was the only one made under my command 
that failed to reach the destination given, and to accomplish its objects, 
and for that reason alone has brought upon me infinite obloquy, 1 beg 
the Court will pardon me for dwelling upon it a moment. 

It has been seen by the deposition of Mr. Newcomb, the quartermas- 
ter at Tampa in April last, that, by extraordinary exertions on his part, 
and not a little energy on mine, ample and even extra means were pro- 
vided for Major Read's small battalion of, perhaps, about 200 men. First, 
there were two large and one smaller schooner; two (instead of one) 
cutters, ( illlder Midshipmen Reid and Drake,) manned and furnished, at 
my request, from the United States ship the Vandalia, Captain Webb; a 
large scow, in pieces, but with mechanics, nails, oakum, and pitch, so 
that it might be put together and launched in two hours ; many ship- 
boats or yawls, and pilots. The deponent, an experienced and excellent 
officer, declares, in respect to the sufficiency ol those means, both for 
transporting the troops to the mouth of the river and for ascending it : 
" I did not doubt, nor do I know that any body else did ; I do not think 
Major Read himself doubted, although he attempted to find fault with the 
means." 

But let us now see what use was made by the major of the outfit thus 
furnished. I shall quote his report ( 1 ) to me, which is dated April the 
27th. Being, himself, near the mouth of the Withlacoochee, he says: 

" I despatched all the small-craft to the transports, with orders to the 
officers in command aboard of them to commence debarking the men as 
fast as possible." ***** " On the return of the boats, transporting, 
as I had ordered, as many men as they could receive, the morning re- 
ports of the officers in command were handed me, by which the frightful 

(1) Doc. No. 134. 



161 [ 2:4 ] 

picture of an increase of forty (-10) to the sick-list, in less than two days, 
was presented. Special communications from the surgeons were also 
handed me, in which the most horrible consequences were predicted, 
unless the men could be taken forthwith to some place where medicines 
and good water could be procured. The water on board the schooner 
Caroline, it was said, had already become putrid. Without going aboard, 
I despatched an order for [the transports to] hoist all sail, and to pro- 
ceed with the utmost possible despatch to St. Mark's, the nearest port. 
1 remanded aboard the transports the detachment first ordered to debark, 
and directed a select number often [?] to join me on board the small -craft 
for the purpose of making the reconnaissance and suiveys, which, I find 
upon perusing my order more carefully than at first I did, were the prin- 
cipal objects of the expedition." * * * * " When informed by the pilot 
that we were almost at the mouth, I wont myself into the second cutter 
of the Vandalia — it draws less water than the other — taking with me 
only two of my detachment." * * * * " When I had gotten over the 
bar, I proceeded some two miles and upwards, to within a short distance 
of a large smoke, the fire that afforded which was, perhaps, three miles 
distant. I deemed [it] not prudent to go further, and caused the boat 
to return" — when the major proceeded to St. Mark's after his battalion. 

Here I will not say, Mr. President, Why all this fire and haste ? But 
I may ask, sir, Whence all this smoke and precipitation ? Some parts of 
the report are, doubtless, as obscure as others are strange. For example : 
When the major heard of the new case: i sickness, how many ivcll 
men were left? He does not tell us. The water, too, on board of the 
Caroline, had suddenly become putrid, and the medicines deficient. 
How so? Why not have gone to the transports in order to inquire into 
those extraordinary matters in person ? And was there no good water 
on board of tiie other vessels, or in the Withlacoochee — at the farthest, 
within nine or twelve miles, at the falls ? We have seen that there 
were many well men remaining, ten of whom he retained with him, and 
sent back others in the boats which had brought them from the trans- 
ports. Why not have retained all these, and have sent for more to en- 
able him to ascend the river in his smaller vessels, scow, &c. ? In that 
case he might have passed through the '■ large smoke," and have reached 
the falls. But the major appeals to his " order," and I shall exhibit both 
his instructions and orders. 

By my directions, Colonel Gadsden, on the 14th of April, gives Ma- 
jor Read, in a letter( 1 ) of instructions, among other matters to be at- 
tended to, these : You will embark with " your whole battalion, inclu- 
ding invalids and sick, lor the mouth of the Withlacoochee ; that you come 
to anchor in the nearest and safest accessible harbor to the mouth of the 
stream, and that you proceed with your effective force (leaving your 
sick and invalids on board) with the boats at command, to examine its 
entrance, and to penetrate as far as practicable, and consistent with the 
security of your command," &c. "You will preserve notes of your 
observations, and report," &c, " detailing minutely the character of the 
anchorage at the mouth of the Withlacoochee ; the navigability of that 
river for boats ; the probable distance to which it may be penetrated ; 

(1) Doc. Nos. 112—113. 
11 



[ 221 ] 162 

the character of its banks, and the facilities generally afforded for the 
forming of depots, with a view to supplying an array operating hereafter 
on or near its waters. This duty performed, you will proceed to St, 
Mark's, Florida, in the transports, where your command will be honor- 
ably discharged," &c. 

Mr.De Peyster, a gentleman of Florida, and then a volunteer in Gene- 
ral Eustis's stall*, has said, before this Court, that he was at my quarters the 
day before (the Kith of April) Major Read embarked, when that officer 
called on the subject of his expedition. The purport of this witness's 
answers, as the Court will perceive, is, that two days after the written 
instructions to Major Read, i endeavored, in the most impressive terms 
and manner, to point out to him the importance of the expedition to ul- 
terior operations; called his attention specifically to the necessity of ex- 
amining the liver and making a sketch or draught of its soundings and 
course up to the foot of the obstruction or falls, believed to be twelve 
miles; and that I desired Major Read to select a point, for a future post, 
with reference to wood, as near those falls as practicable. 

In respect to every object, except the mere entrance into the Withla- 
coochee, we have seen that the expedition was a signal failure. 

The first knowledge that I had of this most unexpected result, was 
received May the 1st, at St. Augustine, through a letter( 1 ) from Gov- 
ernor Call, dated April 26, and which gave me the more astounding in- 
telligence, viz : " A few days since 1 received a communication from 
Major McLemore, stationed on the Suwannee frontier, informing me that, 
under orders from General Scott, he had ascended the Withlacoochee 
river, and erected a block-house on the south bank, some ten or twelve 
miles above its mouth, and that he had left a garrison of 40 men in the 
block-house, and a large quantity of corn and pickled beef. This morn- 
ing, at day-light, Major Read, of the Florida battalion, arrived at [Tal- 
lahassee] bringing the intelligence that he discovered, at the mouth of 
the river, one-half of a large Hat-boat, which had been cut in two apparently 
with a dull axe, and by an unexperienced hand. Ilis description corre- 
sponds with that given of the boat left at the block-house," &c. 

As this letter was addressed to me, or the commanding officer at Fort 
Drane, like the report (2) dated April 11, of the establishment of the 
block-house, and signed by Major McLemore's adjutant (McCants,) 
both papers were read bj r General Clinch, and together transmitted to 
me. 1 have said that I received them on the 1st of May. 

The Court has seen, Mr. President, the correspondencc(2) between 
General Clinch, then at Fort Drane, and myself, on this most painful 
subject. The time of his volunteers having expired, or being about to 
expire, he had already sent most of them home, and in his attempt to 
raise a party of mounted men in the Alachua settlements to go to the 
relief of the block-house, he utterly failed. I early became satisfied 
that General Clinch, under the circumstances, did all in his power in 
adopting the second suggestion of Governor Call, viz : " but should it 
be impracticable for you to send a sufficient force by land to ascertain 
[the fate of the party in the block-house,] I have ordered a fortified 

(1) Doc. No. 122. (2) Doc. No. 123. 



163 [ 224 ] 

boat to be in readiness at Suwannee Old Town, to proceed with a part 
of the men at that place to the relief of the garrison, and transport it 
back to Old Town, unless the commanding general should otherwise 
direct. You will, therefore, be pleased to send an express to Major 
McCants, commanding at Old Town, and inform him whether troops 
have been sent by land to the relief of the block-house, or whether the 
boat which will be in readiness, shall be sent on that service." General 
Clinch sent the order for the boat to proceed, and the detachment in the 
block-house was ultimately taken off' by Major Read, and without firing 
a gun. 

It is in evidence that Major Read's report to me, (of his first expedi- 
tion,) though dated the 27lh of April, came to hand at Columbus as late 
as the 8th of June, when I had not the leisure to give attention to it even 
if it had been less illegible ; and thus it happened that I never knew its 
contents, until, with some accidental assistance, the Judge Advocate 
made out to decipher it before this Court. The last paragraph of this 
report appears to be as follows : 

"I discovered, at the mouth of the [Withlacoochce,] the half of a 
flat-bottom boat — a common ferry flat-boat, it appeared to have been. 
Jt had been cut asunder," &c. " When I arrived at St. Mark's, I learn- 
ed, to my astonishment, mortification, and regret, that your Excellency 
[General Scott] had ordered Major McLemore to establish a depot at 
that place," &c. " All which was studiously concealed from me. I did 
not learn, either from your order or from the numerous interviews I had 
the honor to hold with your Excellency, that Major McLemore was even 
in the field — much less that 1 was going to relieve a detachment of his 
command ordered out by your Excellency." 

The Court has seen my report ( 1 ) upon this subject to the Adjutant 
General, dated at St. Augustine, May 11th, which was founded on Gov- 
ernor Call's letter noticed above, and an article in a newspaper, handed 
to me as the production of Major Read. 1 said that he, Major R., " has, 
at Tallahassee, caused a statement to be made, declaring that I had re- 
fused him permission to ascend the Withlacoochee ! And, again, pre- 
suming the statement to have been furnished by him, he denies having 
ever heard that, j.'ossibly, be might find a block-house and garrison es- 
tablished near the falls of the river. Now, I affirm that it was generally 
known, throughout the right wing of the army, that it was just possible 
that Major McLemore, a highly meritorious Floridian, had made such 
establishment. The possibility was mentioned to Major Read, and al- 
though Colonel Gadsden, by accident, omitted the subject in the letter 
of instruction, yet, when the major saw half of a flat, rudely cut in two, 
[so Governor Call had written,] that which was extremely doubtful be- 
fore, became a matter of the most perfect certainty ; and, if the Major had 
been bound home, without other orders, it immediately became his impe- 
rious duty to go instantly to the relief of his countrymen. The flat could 
never have belonged to Indians, and it would not have been destroyed 
if the garrison had returned by water to the Suwannee, and Major Read 
knew it could only have returned by water." 

Now, sir, I did not say in this, or any other letter, that / had told Ma- 

(1) Document No. 119. 



[ 221 ] 161 

jor Read any thing of a detachment having been permitted to visit the 
WithlacoGchee about the end of March. The Court will presently learn 
how it happened to be omitted in Colonel Gadsden's letter to Major 
Read, and by me, in conversation with the latter. Nevertheless, the 
subject was not forgotten ( 1 ) at headquarters, nor had ceased to be oc- 
casionally mentioned among the officers who had come down to Tampa 
from Fort Diane. One of these, Captain i)rano, has testified before this 
Court, that he, at Tampa, stated his impression to Major Read that " there 
was a detachment of Floridians on the Withlacoochee with provisions" — 
the witness having heard " at Fort Diane, [and thinks] General Clinch 
had stated it to [him] that Major McLemore had volunteered his servi- 
ces to go to the mouth of the Withlacoochee." 

I do not here, Mr. President, imbed v this testimony to contradict Ma- 
jor Read, but simply to account for the strong language applied to him in 
the letter last quoted. Two of the harsher expressions therein contain- 
ed are here intentionally suppressed. 1 had not, in May, as has been 
seen, received his report. I, at that time, verily believed, on the opin- 
ion of others, as well as from internal evidence, that the false assertions 
of the article in the Tallahassee paper were from his pen or his lips ; 
Governor Call's letter had said not one word as to the causes which led 
to the failure of the expedition — the spread of sickness among the men; 
the want of medicines, and the want of good water. Now, sir, although 
I think that at least two of those causes might have been guarded against 
by due foresight and activity on the part of the commander, and when 
reported to him, ought to have been closely scrutinized, in person, be- 
fore abandoning the great objects confided to his intelligence and con- 
duct. 1 am not only unwilling to reproduce those harsher imputations, but 
regret that they were ever made. Sir, up to this day, 1 have received no 
note or message of any kind from Major Read. My recantation is found- 
ed on the recent assurance of a friend, ( General Clinch,) that Major 
Read had no agency in the published article alluded to, and his previous 
and subsequent gallantry and i^ood conduct in the same war against the 
Seminole Indians. 

In the deposition of Colonel Gadsden, (which is in evidence,) he 
gives the history of the block-house on the Withlacoochee thus : 

" Major McLemore sought the service by a pin ate letter to the under- 
signed, stating that lie had, on the Suwannee, a boat suitable for the ex- 
pedition, and supplies which he could bring with him to that point — if 
with the consent and approbation ol' General Scott. The following is 
the replj penned by me and by the direction of the general, to whom it 
was read before transmitted." 

1 beg, Mr. President, that the Court will again read every word of 
this letter. 1 regret that I am too much fatigued to imbody it entire in 
this summary. The perusal of it will show how unnecessary it was 
deemed at Tampa to call the attention of Major Read specifically to the 
very remote chance of his finding any detachment on the Withlacoochee. 
Nevertheless, though it was more than a hundred to one that the detach- 
ment was not there, as late as the 14th of April, or even the 4th, if the 
major could have ascended only seven miles higher up that stream — and 

(1) See Col. Gadsden's second deposition. 



165 f 224 ] 

nobody doubted that he could and would — he would have found the gal- 
lant band still firm in its position. 

The letter to Major McLemore is dated at Fort Diane, March the 25th. 
Colonel Gadsden begins by giving to the major the outline of my plan of 
operations ; says " the whole army will probably form a junction at or 
near [the Cove J by the 29th or 30th instant. It is impossible, at this 
time, to anticipate the ulterior operations of the army after it has encoun- 
tered and defeated the enemy in their probably strong hold, in the Cove,'' 1 
&c. " It is more than probable, however, that we may be detained in 
that vicinity many days, reconnoitring the hammocks, and searching for 
Indians in the jungles and thickets of that section of country. If so, 
your co-operation, and the supplies which you report you can bring, may 
prove of essential service. I am directed, therefore, by the general 
commanding, to say that, after securing the post on the Suwannee with an 
adequate garrison, you may proceed with the remainder of your com- 
mand, in the boat you have prepared for the service, provided, in ad- 
dition to your own supplies, you can transport from 750 to 1,000 bushels 
of corn at least, for the use of the army. Should your boat be properly 
secured, as you report, with bulwarks, you may enter the river and ascend 
to the rapids," &c. " You must be at that point by the 30th instant, or you 
will, possibly, be too late to afford any aid to this wing of the army — the 
sole motive which sanctions the service to which you have been called." 
* * * * " As your movement is intended to assist, and not to em- 
barrass this wing of the army, you must not move without an adequate 
supply of ammunition, and from 30 to 40 days' rations for your whole 
command, at the least, in addition to the corn you may transport for our 
relief." (He is then requested to bring, if possible, extra " pork or ba- 
con.") "On reaching the point on the Withlacoochee designated, 
you will use all due precautions to secure your boat and command, by 
building a block-house, or by the construction of some other defence, un- 
til you hear from or of the army. If, after, however, the 2d or 3d of 
April, you receive no tidings of or from this wing, under the command 
of General Clinch, you may be sure that it has proceeded south, to unite 
with Eustis and Lindsay; and, having left the Withlacoochee, your de- 
tention on its waters will be no longer necessary. You will, therefore, 
return, without delay, to your post on the Suwannee, and there wait the 
future orders of the commanding general, or those which may be trans- 
mitted to you by the Executive of Florida." 

Colonel Gadsden's deposition adds, in continuation of this history : " It 
appears, however, from information received from one of the men who was 
in the block-house, that the detachment did not reach the mouth of the With- 
lacoochee until the 1th or 5th of April, two days after it had been ordered 
to quit it ; and when General Scott" had reached the vicinity of Tampa 
bay. " Notwithstanding, however, its fearless commander, and on his 
own responsibility, penetrated the river, established a block-house, and 
left it garrisoned — with a promise to return and relieve it in 8 or 10 days. 
Unfortunately, however, as he entered the Suwannee, he was assailed 
with a fever, and fell a victim to its effects." 

Thus perished, Mr. President, a valuable citizen, whose patriotic zeal, 
pushed a little too far, has brought upon me, unintentionally, I know not 
what amount of general odium. This I have long borne in silence ; but, sir, 



224 



166 



the star of truth approaches the zenith, and as it sheds its light over this 
Court and the public, the deep shades of calumny are made to disappear. 
In relation to the Florida campaign, Mr. President, I have one point 
more to notice, and I shall have done. 

Among the prodigious mass of documents, turned over by the different 
offices of the War Department, to be read by the Judge Advocate, in evi- 
dence against me, as if to crush, by their physical weight, if they could not 
otherwise effect their purpose, there is from the lion. J. M. White, the Flo- 
rida delegate in Congress, a letter ( 1 ) dated at Washington, May 28th, 
to the President of the United States, with an endorsement in the hand 
of the latter, which directs — " A copy of this letter to be sent to Gene- 
ral Scott, ivith an order to withdraw from the command in Florida. A.J.'' 
Of this endorsement, I had no knowledge, until the original was read 
in this Court. What were the feelings which it excited, I will not say ; 
but the association of circumstances recalled to my mind may be inferred 
from the following : 

To my elaborate report of what I had done, and of the operations pro- 
jected, the Adjutant General, May the 5th, (2) replied : 

" Your communication (3) of the 12th of April, reporting the opera- 
tions of the array in Florida, under your command, since your departure 
from Fort Drane, and your arrival at Tampa bay, has been submitted to 
the President, and this day to the Secretary of War. I am happy to in- 
form you that the President approves of your intended plan of opera- 
tions," &c. " I am desired by the Secretary of War to say that, from the 
tenor of your report, as well as by the communication he has just received 
from the Governor of Florida, it is probable that, owing to the approach- 
ing season of the year, the campaign in the field cannot be much longer 
vigorously pushed. In this event, you will make a judicious selection of the 
posts necessary to be occupied by the troops during the interval of active 
operations, which may be best calculated to protect the frontier inhabit- 
ants, and prevent Indian depredations of any kind. For this purpose, all 
the regular troops, including the 4th infantry, must be kept on duty in 
Florida." 

As I had intimated in my letter of April 12th would be done, all this 
had been attended to before the receipt of the Adjutant General's com- 
munication, and which is here cited principally to show that, certainly 
as late as the 5th of May, no displeasure had been officially expressed 
against me at Washington. 

But, in my report (4) of the 11th of May, animadverting upon Major- 
Read, and which, according to a note on the original (now in evidence) 
was received at Washington the 21st — seven days before the date of Mr. 
White's letter to the President of the United States — there is this para- 
graph : 

" I feel and know the risk I incur by the use of this language. Major 
Read is the favorite of Governor Call, and his Excellency's support may 
well turn the tables against me at Washington." 

Sir, I had seen, among the papers which accompanied the instruc- 
tions given me for the Seminole war, a letter (5) (in evidence with that 

(1) Doc. No. 142. (3) Doc. No. 10."!. (5) Doc. No. 6. 

(2) Doc. No. 118. (4) Doc. No. 119. 



167 [ 224 J 



document) from General Call to the President of the United States, dated 
January 9, 1836, in which the writer says : 

" I should be highly gratified to command the army, and believe that 
I could soon bring the war to a close. I fear, however, this I cannot do 
without injustice to General Clinch. He is a bravo and good man ; but 
I fear he is too slow in his movements to conduct a war against the In- 
dians." 

With an official copy of this letter in my possession, it maybe supposed 
that I knew my danger. But, sir, 1 do not complain that, soon after my 
animadversions on Major Read, he was appointed by the President a 
brigadier general in the militia of Florida ; that a lieutenant colonel of 
the army, whom I reported in my letter of March 20th (1 ; as having left 
Fort Drane for duty elsewhere, but went off to Washington, was in a little 
time rewarded with a colonelcy not by seniority ; nor that the Presi- 
dent's endorsement on Mr. White's letter was soon followed by Governor 
Call's being "gratified" with the direction of the war in Florida. But, 
sir, I have, in defence, a right to advert to those extraordinary facts to 
show that, if, in my operations to the South, I had the enemy to conquer 
in my front, I was, at the same time, not a little insecure in my rear. The 
effect of such position every soldier will readily comprehend; and I re- 
spectfully submit the point to the consideration of this Court. A yet more 
extraordinary fact, of the same general character, will be developed in the 
sequel. But, at present, I will return to Mr. White's letter to the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

I think, sir, that I have shown that this letter did not do me all the in- 
jury that was intended at the time. But why, sir, is it brought here, 
with its endorsement, in accusation against me? Mr. White, in a letter 
(2) to the President of this Court, dated December 13, 1S3G, says: 

" This places me in an attitude that I do not choose to occupy." * * * 
" Since the publication of that letter, [to the President of the United 
States,] I have, in the National Intelligencer, over my own name, as an 
act of justice to General Scott, corrected, upon better information, the 
complaints which I deemed it my duty, as the representative of the peo- 
ple of Florida, to make against him. I am unwilling that the first letter 
shall be laid before the Court without the second ; and, as I have no 
copy of it with me at present, I take this occasion to say that I am satis- 
fied, upon a full and impartial review of the facts and circumstances 
connected with the Florida campaign, and upon evidence not then before 
me, that the failure is not to be attributed to Major General Scott, nor 
to causes which it was in his power to control or to remove." 

This voluntary and unsolicited retraction is manly and noble. In my 
judgment and feelings it shows the correspondent of the Court to be 
worthy of being called the honorable Mr. White, by a higher chain than 
that of mere courtesy. It is true, sir, that, in his recantation, he excepts 
what he had originally said of my Order No. 48, on the subject of panics. 
I know not that this reservation ought to break squares between that 
gentleman and myself. The order, although there were many apologies 
for the inhabitants, was founded on information at once full and precise ; 
and, as I said of it in my letter to the Secretary of War, dated June 2 1st, 
" Besides, I was advised by respectable citizens of Florida to come out 

(1) Doc. No. 94. (2) Doc. No. 144. 



[ 2:4 ] 168 

with an order in that spirit, as likely to rally the inhabitants, and I have 
reason to know that the order did good." It" good resulted, i am content 
with the enmities I brought upon myself by the act; for, sir, since the 
war began to rage in that quarter, theie has not been a moment, up to 
this time, when I would not have made any sacrifice of person to have 
stopped its ravages. I deeply mourn over the many afflictions the good 
people of that desolated Territory have experienced ; and I freely for- 
give, as I pray that God may forgive, the injustice of laying those evils, 
in part, to my account. 

II. — Delay in Opening and Prosecuting the Creek Campaign. 

Mr. President : Through much labor, and several weeks of indisposi- 
tion, I have at length reached, in this Summary, the second general head 
of inquiry directed against me ; and here, again, the evidence in my fa- 
vor is ample and overwhelming. The whole of this I anxiously desire 
to compress and imbody ; but fear that my diminished strength will prove 
unequal 10 the task. The records, however, are before the Court; and, 
on its researches, as well as its intelligence and justice, I confidently 
rely. 

On the loth of April, Mr. Secretary Cass wrote (1) to me, to say that, 
as soon as the state of affairs in Florida would permit, he wished me to 
direct my attention to the Creek Indians, and to adopt such measures as 
I might "find necessary to preserve or restore tranquillity in that part of 
the country." By accident this letter was not received before the 20th 
of May, as is shown by Major Kirby's endorsement. 

In the Secretary's next letter, (2) dated May 16th, my attention was 
again strongly called to the Creek country, with power to require troops 
from Alabama. 

From the same source I received a third letter, (3) dated the 19th of 
May, transmitting " for [my] information, a copy of a letter [that] day 
addressed to Brevet Major General Jesup ;" in which copy it is said: 
" Should Major General Scott, under the instructions he has heretofore 
received, proceed to the theatre of operations, he will, of course, be en- 
titled to the command, and you will serve under him." 

On the 19th of May it was known, at Washington, that I was, about the 
beginning of the month, sick at St. Augustine ; and hence the doubt 
whether I had proceeded to the Creek country. The 19th was two days 
prior to the receipt of my letter (4) of the 11th, animadverting on Major 
Read, and nine before the date of Mr. White's letter to the President of 
the United States. 

On the 12th ol June, a fortnight after I had reached the Chatta- 
hoochie, 1 received another letter(5) from the acting Secretary, (Mr. 
Harris,) dated the 1st, and directed to me at Fort Mitchell, in which 
was enclosed a copy of Mr. White's, without the President's endorse- 
ment, and without the slightest allusion to it. After adverting to a pre- 
vious letter (of May 25th) enclosing me a copy of the full instructions 
to Governor Call to assume, in a certain event, the command against 

(1) Doc. No. 115. (3) Docs. Nos. 158 and 159. (5) Doc. No. 141. 

(2) Doc. No. 155. (4) Doc. No. 119. 



169 \ 224 J 

the Seminoles, Mr. Harris concludes : " I am instructed to inform you 
that, under these ciicumstances, the President deems it unnecessary for 
you to return to the command in Florida." 

Now, on the 20th of May, immediately on the receipt of the letter of the 
15th of April, I had charged Brigadier General Eustis with the full com- 
mand in Florida, and had personally set out for the Creek country. 

Behold me then, Mr. President, from the 31st of May to the Gth of 
July, (the day on which the letter of recall reached me, ) in the larger, and, 
at the moment, the more important command, against the Creeks, with- 
out having heard that my conduct in Florida, even my letter respecting 
Major Read, or Mr. White's to the President, had led to the expression 
of one syllable of official displeasure at Washington. On the contrary, 
sir, the letter from the Adjutant General, (of May the 5th,) written by 
command of the President, on the receipt of my report from Tampa 
bay, contained expressions of decided approbation ; and the Secretary's 
letters of the 16th and 19th, written after the receipt of mine of April 
the 30th, reporting that active operations, in Florida, had terminated for 
the season, contain nothing but the language of consideration and respect. 
The elements of discontent, it seems, began to lower and mutter be- 
tween the 21st( 1 ) and 28th,(2) although 1 heard them not ; but, when a 
celebrated letter reached Mr. Blair, the storm thickened, the clouds 
were rent, and I was struck by the winged bolt on the distant banks of 
the Chattahoochie. I must not, however, sir, anticipate. 

Before leaving St. Augustine, as I reported(3) from Savannah, May 
22d, I "ordered the new musket accoutrements, [about eighteen hun- 
dred,] the new arms, [seven hundred and fifty of Hall's patent rifles,] 
and the new tents, from Picolata and St. Augustine to Augusta, and also 
some spare fixed ammunition from the former place." The route of these 
articles was immediately changed, after writing this letter, from Savannah 
via Augusta, &c. — from Savannah, by the way of Darien, the Altamaha, 
and Ockmulgee, to Hawkinsville or Macon ; distant from Columbus, 
Hawkinsville about one hundred and ten miles, and Macon about eighty- 
eight. This change of route was made upon the information of the Hon. 
Mr, Justice Wayne, and the assurance of the agent of the Navigation 
Company, then in Savannah, that the Altamaha and Ockmulgee would 
remain navigable for common, if not for steamboats, many weeks longer ; 
and which assurance, aided by a long succession of heavy showers, was 
more than verified. The Court has seen that the rifles, accoutrements, 
&c, took this latter route, instead of ascending the Savannah river, to 
Augusta, and thence by land two hundred and twenty miles, to Colum- 
bus. 

Having transacted other business in Savannah, the Court has seen 
that I was at Augusta on the 25th of May. Here I learned that, by or- 
ders from Washington, a large quantity of subsistence had been purchased 
in Charleston, to be transported thence by land-carriage via Augusta to 
Columbus, and immediately directed Lieutenant Dimmock, the quarter- 
master at Augusta, to write to Charleston to cause that subsistence to go 
by the way of Darien, for the reasons already mentioned. This letter, 

(1) Date of reception of Gen. S.'s letter of May 11th. (2) Date of Mr. White's, with 

the President's endorsement. (3) Letter to Adjutant General, Doc. No. 160. 



[ 224 ] 170 

however, did not arrive at Charleston in time, which produced, at Au- 
gusta, a part of the embarrassment experienced at this place in obtaining 
wagons. (See Lieutenant Dimmock( 1 ) to me, May 29th.) Subse- 
quent instructions were given by me in respect to all the other heavy ar- 
ticles which, by orders from Washington, were to take the route from 
Charleston via Augusta. 

According to the testimony of Major Kirby, I called, when at Augus- 
ta, for a return of property at the United States arsenal near that city; 
marked upon the return the arms (including the only six-pounder fitted 
for the field) and ordnance stores which I thought might be wanted, and 
ordered that the articles so marked should be forwarded to Columbus. 
The arsenal contained no accoutrements, and few or no cartridges for 
muskets. (See Colonel Lindsay's testimony.) It contained, however, 
several thousands of muskets. 

But this, sir, was my position in respect to arms: 1. I had aleady or- 
dered, from Florida, seven hundred and fifty rifles, complete, and eigh- 
teen hundred musket accoutrements ; because I had learned, by recent 
experience, as is in evidence, that the United States Southern arsenals 
contained neither of those articles, and I wanted them to make up defi- 
ciencies. 2. I did not know, nor could I tell, until I could see Governor 
Schley, at Milledgeville, what muskets he might want to arm the troops 
he had ordered to the Creek country. 3. I confidently relied, as a far- 
ther resource, should it be necessary, on the United States arsenal at 
Mount Vernon, from which, by steam, arms, &c., might have been ob- 
tained more promptly than by wagons from Augusta ; and I had then in 
my possession, transmitted by the Adjutant General, a letter(2 ) from Cap- 
tain Harding to Governor Clay, dated February 8, 1S3G, which showed 
that there were, at that date, in the Mount Vernon arsenal, " ten thousand 
superior new muskets, with buck-shot and ball-cartridges, and ten pieces 
of field-artillery completely equipped." 4. I arrived at Milledgeville 
the 28th of May, when I learned that the State arsenal being deficient in 
arms, the Governor had, the day before, required from the arsenal at 
Augusta one thousand muskets, &c, which his Excellency had thought 
would be enough to make up deficiencies, even before he knew that I had 
ordered to Columbus the seven hundred and fifty rifles (mentioned 
above) for a like purpose. See Major Baden's letter(3) to me, dated 
May 31st, enclosing the requisition(4) of his Excellency, dated the 27th. 
Major Baden said to me, in that letter : " I have this day turned over to 
the assistant quartermaster here, for transportation to Columbus, * * * • 
one thousand muskets," but not the accoutrements, (also required,) be- 
cause there were none in the arsenal. 

Well, sir, I reached Columbus on the 30th of May. Many companies 
of the Georgia line, ordered out by the Governor, had preceded me, 
and others were coming up daily. It was soon ascertained, by Major 
Kirby, the mustering officer, that the troops had brought with them a 
smaller number of arms, and those of a more inferior quality, than Gov- 
ernor Schley and myself had expected. (See testimony of the major 
under my 15th question, and the deposition of the Hon. Colonel Dawson, 

(1) Doc. No. 171. (3) Doc. No. 168. 

(2) Doc. No. 177. (4) Doc. No. 169. 



171 f 224 ] 

M. C, in answer to my third interrogatory.) The heavy rains which 
had been falling for a week, and which, by carrying off bridges and ren- 
dering bad roads worse, also soon alarmed me on the subject of the thou- 
sand muskets coming from Augusta, and the rifles and accoutrements from 
Hawkinsville. Accordingly, on the 3d of June, I addressed the urgent 
Ietter,(l) of this date, to Captain Harding, commanding the United 
States arsenal at Mount Vernon, in which I said : 

" On the receipt of this you will lose no time in hiring a steamer of 
light draught of water, and put on board of her, for this place, four pieces of 
ordnance — two howitzers and two six-pounders, with harness and imple- 
ments complete, and at least one hundred and fifty rounds of ammuni- 
tion (fixed) for each piece. If you have no howitzers, you will send 
four six-pounders. Let the greater number of rounds of fixed ammuni- 
tion be grape and canister, with some shells for the howitzer, and some 
round shot for the six-pounders. Put on board the same boat three thou- 
sand stands of muskets complete ; but 1 fear you have no accoutrements. 
Nevertheless, send the arms, with prickers, primers, &c. Send, further, 
one hundred thousand rounds of fixed musket buck and ball, and some 
buck cartridges, and fifty thousand flints. I rely upon your using the ut- 
most despatch," &c. 

In his reply,(2) dated June 14th, Captain Harding said to me, that 
" the Governors of Alabama and Florida have completely exhausted my 
stock of arms and ammunition," and hence he had sent my requisition to 
the Baton Rouge arsenal ; that " Governor Clay has drawn from this depot 
the following ordnance and ordnance stores, to wit : four six-pounders 
complete ; six thousand eight hundred muskets complete ; one hundred 
and seventy-five thousand buck-shot and ball cartridges ; three hundred 
and seven six-pounder canisters ; one hundred and five six-pounder strap- 
shot ; nine thousand seven hundred flints ; one thousand four hundred and 
ninety-two sets of infantry accoutrements ; fifty yards of slow match ; one 
thousand priming-tubes, and one hundred and thirty-three port-fires. Of 
the above, six thousand muskets, the four pieces of ordnance, and a 
due proportion of other stores, were shipped to Montgomery, and the 
balance were ordered to Claiborne, for the troops called out by the 
Governor, and to be rendezvoused at Irwinton, Barbour county, in this 
State. I am at this moment engaged in preparing ammunition, and ship- 
ping it to Montgomery, which I shall continue to do until the close of 
the campaign." 

Now, when it is recollected that Montgomery is less than fifty miles 
from Tuskegee, the headquarters of the Alabama line, the Court will 
begin to see by what superior energy and despatch Major General Jesup 
was enabled, without giving me the least intimation, and against my or- 
ders, to commence operations on the 12th of June, and to invert my 
plan of campaign ! At Tuskegee, he found the troops, in great num- 
bers, already assembled, and armed from the United States arsenal con- 
veniently situated in the rear. But to return to my situation on the Geor- 
gia side of the enemy. 

I have said that I arrived at Columbus on the 30th of May, accom- 
panied by his Excellency Governor Schley, Major General Jesup, Ma- 

(1) Doc.No. 178. (2) Doc. No 179. 



[ 221 J 172 

jor Kirby, and Captain Parrott ; the three latter of the army. I had 
not with me one staff officer — not even an aid-de-camp — except Paymas- 
ter Kirby; but he was, as I have elsewhere said, almost a host within 
himself, performing, in rapid succession, the duties of adjutant general, 
inspector general, quartermaster general, &c; but even his zeal and 
abilities had their limits, and 1 found, at Columbus, no staff officer, and 
no depots or stores of any kind. On the latter point, sec the testimony 
of Major Kirby. Every thing was still to be collected or created, and 
organized. No assistance, and no stores of any kind had yet arrived, or 
was near at hand, by any order issued at Washington. 

The instructions for General Jesup I hastily drew up, when already 
much indisposed. I had left St. Augustine in a convalescent state ; but, 
travelling night and day from Augusta, in storms of rain, I had now re- 
lapsed. (1) General Jesup set out for the headquarters of the Alabama 
line, at Tuskegee, on the 4th, and took with him Captain Parrott. 

The Georgia troops continued to arrive at Columbus as late as the 23d 
of June. Of the regulars, one company (Captain Monroe's) reached 
that place on the 14th; Major Lomax's small battalion, that of Major 
Pierce, and Colonel Henderson's first detachment of United States ma- 
rines, followed, at intervals of two, three, and five days. The remain- 
der of the United States troops came even a little later. And here it is 
proper to say, that not a man was in the field by my order. The regulars 
were all sent from the North by directions from the War and Navy De- 
partments, and the volunteers, mediately, at least, by the Governors of 
their respective States. 

Hearing from passengers arriving at Columbus, in the public coaches, 
from the East, that the wagons loaded with the muskets, &c, sent by 
Major Baden from the Augusta arsenal, were much delayed by the heavy 
rains and consequent injury to the road and bridges, 1 despatched, on the 
13th of June, an intelligent volunteer, John Crowell, jr., Esq., re- 
markable for his zeal and energy, to proceed rapidly until he should meet 
the train, and then to hire extra wagons, distribute the loads, and force 
the whole to move day and night towards Columbus. See his report (2) 
to me, dated the 16th, and the deposition of Governor Schley, (answer 
to my 23d interrogatory.) 

This train, which Mr. Crowell thought would reach Columbus on the 
19th, did not arrive until the night of the 20th. On the 18th, not having 
heard, in several days, any thing of the approach of the rifles, musket 
accoutrements, &c, which had been expected at Columbus about the 12th, 
from Hawkinsville, 1 instructed an aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Betts, to 
proceed day and night to meet and to hasten on, by similar means, those 
articles. After he was in the saddle for this purpose. Major Beard, who 
had been for some time employed in the quartermaster's department on 
on the Ockmulgee, arrived, and assuring Mr. Betts and myself that he 
(the major) had placed the Hawkinsville train under a most energetic 
conductor, I permitted Mr. Betts to dismount. Two steamboat accidents 
had delayed these arms, &c, coming up from Darien to Hawkinsville ; 
and on the road thence a most extraordinary panic seized the conductor 
and his wagoners, by which several days more were lost. ( See Mr. 

(1) See Gov. Schley's deposition. (2) Doc. No. 201. 



173 [ 224 ] 

Betls's testimony.) Tlio lilies, accoutrements, &c, did not reach Co- 
lumbus till the 24th or 25th, alter I had moved with the whole disposable 
armed force of Georgia, and the regulars, who had come up. Major Al- 
iord's mounted battalion was left to arm itself with a part of the rifles, 
and to follow ; and directions were given for sending down the river the 
remainder of the rifles, the musket accoutrements, &c, for the use of the 
troops in advance. Major Allotd, in a few days, overtook the foot, and 
participated in the operations which ensued. 

That every exertion and much foresight had been exhibited by me to 
obtain the arms, &c, needed to equip the Georgia volunteers, as early 
as possible — say by the 12th, or, at the latest, the 14th of June, is further 
and conclusively shown by the depositions of Governor Schley, Major 
General Sanford, and Colonel Dawson, in answer to my 23d, 15th, 
and 3d interrogatories, propounded to those distinguished individuals 
respectively — to whose depositions I particularly invite the attention of 
this Court. 

If the question be asked, Why I did not take the field, say as early as 
the 15th of June, with the armed portion of the Georgia line and the only 
company of regulars ( Monroe's ) that had then arrived ? — the answers are 
numerous, but I will only here give two : 1. The want of subsistence for 
four or more days — none having yet arrived, principally from (he same 
causes which had delayed the arms ; and this reason will be more fullv 
developed in the sequel. 2. There were not armed men in sufficient 
numbers (before the 21st of June, the day when the muskets were dis- 
tributed, and a movement in force actually commenced, on the eastern 
side of the enemy) even to guard the important points on the Chattahoo- 
chie ; that is, to prevent parties of Indians from escaping across towards 
Florida. (See on this point the decisive replies — of Governor Schley, 
to the 22d question ; of Major General Sanford, to the 5th and 2d ; and 
of Colonel Dawson, to the 3d, addressed to them respectively.) And so 
important was this object considered by Government, that the unusual 
course was adopted of causing Major General Macomb to write to me, 
with his own hand, ( 1 ) June the 25th, as follows : 

"The Secretary deems it very important (hat a strong force should be 
stationed so as to prevent the escape of the Creeks in that direction, 
[towards Florida;] it is, therefore, the order of the Secretaiy of War, 
that you station a sufficient force so as to prevent them making their es- 
cape and taking that direction." (2) 

I apprehend, Mr. President, that it would be difficult to employ lan- 
guage at once more urgent and specific. When I received that letter I 
flattered myself that I had, in hand, the emphatic approbation of Govern- 
ment ; for the measure therein enjoined — originally adopted by his Ex- 
cellency Governor Schley, before the Georgia troops had been mustered 
into the service of the United States — was followed out, after 1 had as- 
sumed the command, in proportion to the arrival of men with arms. O ! 
most simple and short-sighted mortal ! Only three days thereafter another 
letter (3) from Major General Macomb, dated June the 28th, followed : 

" Sir : I have received, through the Secretary of War, the order of the 
President to call you to the seat of Government. You will, therefore, on 

(1) Doc. No. 255. (2) See Doc. No. 161. (3) Doc. No. 256. 



[ 224 ] 174 

the receipt of this letter, turn over to Brevet Major General Jcsup the 
command of the troops serving against the hostile Creeks, and repair to 
the city of Washington." 

This command, sir, was brief and emphatic, and I felt it, as it was in- 
tended — a heavy punishment. No cause was assigned — not the slightest 
explanation of the grounds of offence intimated. I quietly and courte- 
ously obeyed ; set out for Washington, wearied myself but little with 
conjectures, and expressed not one. At Norfolk, as I afterwards found 
to be the fact, the true cause was very fully mentioned to me. I repel- 
led the rumor, which, however, gained at Baltimore ; but, on arriving at 
Washington, I saw the treacherous instrument which had stabbed me 
in the dark — the original letter from Major General Jcsup to Mr. Blair, 
marked " private," and only to be shown to the President of the United 
States! 

Since this deep degradation, and lying prostrate under the ban of Exec- 
utive displeasure, I have been assailed from several quarters, without 
mercy, and with perfect impunity. I shall cite here but two examples 
of these petty annoyances, both of which are in evidence, as belonging 
to this branch of inquiry. 

1. General Jesup, at bis headquarters in the Creek country, found 
leisure to write a second letter to Mr. Blair, dated Septemper 3, 1836, 
and published in the Globe of the 2Gth. This letter (1) was accom- 
panied by two selected letters from me to General Jesup, and his reply, 
with ingenious notes. To the trick of the publication, and the false im- 
pressions given by it as a whole, I may, perhaps, recur before closing 
this address. 

2. A neat little pamphlet, (2) (pink paper,) written in the " Creek 
country, August 8, 1830." This was evidently gotten up with the as- 
sistance of General Jesup, and the use of his official papers, and which 
ingeniously mixes together misstatements of facts with false principles. 
Among the latter, the Secretary's order, and my measures to prevent 
the enemy from escaping across the Chattahoochie towards Florida, arc 
ridiculed and decried. (3) The joint production of the general and his 
captain-aid-de-camp is, however, only signed by the latter. The road 
to favor had been already discovered, and the captain was soon reward- 
ed with the rank of colonel. 

A word more, sir, in respect to arms prior to the arrival of the mus- 
kets on the 20th, and the rifles and accoutrements about the 25th of 
June. 

Major Kirby said, to this Court, that he " mustered into the service of 
the United States 45 companies of the Georgia troops, at Columbus, early 
in June. They were generally entirely destitute of arms and accoutre- 
ments. The few arms they had were generally unfit for service in the 
field." 

(1) Document No. 265. (2) Document No. 263. 

(3) Yet, before it was known that I would be able to go to the Creek country, the Secre- 
tary of War, May 23(1, (Doc. No. 161,) had strongly directed General Jesup to take meas- 
ures at *• the commencement of operations" to "station a sufficient force to prevent the retreat 
of the Creek Indians into Florida, and also to cut off all communication between them and 
the Seminole Indians." Connect this with the letter of June 25 (Doc. No. 255) to me, 
just noticed on the same subject! 



175 [ 224 ] 



Soon after this period, it ought to he stated in justice to Governor 
Schley, that some wagon-loads of Slate arms, which he had mentioned 
to me at Milledgeville as being already on the road to Columbus, ar- 
rived, which enabled us to arm and despatch several reinforcements, 
to guard the passes of the river below, in the direction of Irwinton. 
I have no memorandum of the number of these arms, and I can only 
conjecture that it might have been from 600 to 800 — that is, mus- 
kets, and with few or no accoutrements. But, after those arms were 
distributed, and as many troops sent below, or put on board armed 
steamers, to cruise up and down the river, for the important purposes 
mentioned in Colonel Dawson's answer to the first interrogatory, and 
on which duties he was himself placed, as a captain — Major General 
Sanford, in reply to the second interrogatory submitted to him, says: 

" Of the troops remaining under my immediate command, less than 
one-third were armed, and those variously and indifferently. Our mis- 
erable deficiency, in this respect, was strikingly displayed to my view, 
when, upon the occasion of an alarm, it was expected that the enemy 
would be upon us in full force, I had the mortification of beholding, 
within my lines, 1,500 or 1,600 men, with no weapons of defence, be- 
yond their side-arms, clubs, and club-axes." 

General Sanford's camp was, at this time, four miles in advance of 
Columbus, on the west side of the river, towards the enemy. 

But, Mr. President, there was another and a conclusive reason why it 
was necessary to wait, at least, as late as the 17th of June, for muskets 
and rifles, with which to arm the whole of the Georgia line, before com- 
mencing active operations on the east side of the enemy ; for, as late as 
the 17th I had cause to entertain serious doubts whether the Alabama 
troops would consent to enter the service of the United States ; that is, 
to come under the rules and articles ot war. • 

General Jesup arrived at Tuskegee, the headquarters of the Alabama 
line, on the 4th of June. On the 8th he wrote to me, in advance of the 
return to Columbus of his escort, a strange letter, ( 1 ) containing this 
sentence : " I have not yet obtained the command of the troops, but if 
I obtain it at all, I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow ;" and not a 
word of explanation preceded or followed. 

Surprised, in the extreme, at this intimation of a want of zeal and 
constitutional devotion on the part of the Alabama troops, I eagerly in- 
quired, and caused others to inquire, among the intelligent officers of the 
escort, and several gentlemen who accompanied it as individuals, and 
the apprehensions excited by the letter were much increased. ( See, on 
this point, Governor Schley's answer to my 18th interrogatory.) Nay, 
it appeared to me and many others who knew the circumstances, as 
certain, that the Alabamians had, from the 4th to the 8th of June, re- 
fused to come into the service of the United States, or at least under 
the command of General Jesup, and that they would continue so to re- 
fuse, was even more than probable. 

In this state of apprehension, I reported (2) the circumstances to the 
Adjutant General June the 12th ; adverted to the subject in my report (3) 
to him of the 14th, and again in my report (by means of the paper (4) 
enclosed) of the 17th. 

(1) Doc. 189. (2) Doc. 194. (3) Doc. 199. (4) Doc. 204. 



[ 221 J 176 

In reference to the doubts so reported, the Secretary of War, in his 
letter ( 1 ) of the 20th of June, instructed me, in the name of the Presi- 
dent, that if, contrary to the confidence reposed " in the well-known 
patriotism of the Governor and citizens of Alabama," the militia of that 
State should " not have been mustered into the service of the United 
States, agreeably to the requisition of the Department," 1 was imme- 
diately to "stop all expenditures and supplies of every kind whatever, on 
the part of the United States, for such militia." 

The next letters (2) from General Jesup were received by me on 
the 17th of June, and dated the 15th and 17th. These 1 acknowledged 
in a letter (3) to him of the 17th, in which I said, "you had not inform- 
ed me — you do not even now tell me, that you are in command of the 
Alabamians." It is true, that that fact might, on the 17th, have been 
inferred; but it was not explicitly stated before his report (4) to me, 
dated the 20th. 

Hence, Mr. President, the justness and force of Governor Schley's 
answer to my 22d interrogatory, in which he says, " with the great un- 
certainty in regard to the course of the Alabama troops, and the situa- 
tion of General Jesup, I considered it all-important that the whole of the 
Georgia troops should be prepared to take the held." And, sir, it has 
been shown that the muskets arrived on the night of the 20th, were dis- 
tributed on the 21st of June, and a general movement immediately com- 
menced. 

I have thus, incidentally, shown that 1 was without any letter from 
General Jesup, after that of the 8th, until the 17th of June, when his 
two letters, of the loth and 17th, were received. Whence this long 
silence, Mr. President? In his report (5) of the 20th — the first paper 
sent by him to me, deserving of that name — he said : 

"4 was not aware, until yesterday, that a letter which I wrote to you 
on the 9th instant had not been sent to you. !t was accidentally put 
up with a bundle of papers, and I found it only yesterday morning, and 
from no notice having been taken of my letter of the 12th, I fear it 
has not been received. It was sent by a runner. I enclose a copy (G) 
of it." 

Sir, I am sorry to say that this account of the letter of the Oth is 
strange, if not altogether improbable ; and, I think, lor reasons which will 
appear in the sequel, that it is even doubtful whether the letter of the 
12th was ever confided to an Indian runner. Perhaps, on further search, 
it has been found, like its predecessor, retained among his own papers. 
And, as the point is far otherwise than trivial, 1 will here quote, to 
strengthen my conjectures, what the same writer found himself compel- 
led to say, in similar cases, to higher a functionary. 

From Tuskegee, Alabama, August 2, 183G, General Jesup writes (7) 
to Governor Schley: "Knowing that I had written to you in reply to 
your communications, I was surprised when I received a copy of a letter 
you wrote to the President, in which you declare that I treated with 
'■silent contempt the reasonable request of the Governor of Georgia.' I 

(1) Doc. No. 225. (3) Doc. No. 208. (5) Doc. No. 216. 

(2) Doc. Nos. 206 and 207. (4) Doc. No. 216. (6) Doc. No. 217. 
(7) Letter annexed to the deposition of his Excellency, Doc. No. 267. 



177 [ 224 ] 

examined my letter-book, and found my letters to you recorded in their 
proper places," &c. " I felt indignant that a charge, so entirely un- 
founded, as i then thought, should have been made ; but am now induced 
to believe that, by some oversight or omission, my letters, or at least one 
of them, had not been sent to you." He adds, that an officer, late of 
his staff, "left Fort Mitchell for Washington city on the 1st of July. In 
looking over a file of papers put up by him, the morning he left, and not 
opened since, until last night, I found the enclosed letter. The endorse- 
ment is in hand, and I think it probable that it was put upon file, 
in place of being sent to you." 

August 28. The same ( 1 ) to the same. " I received your letter of 
the loth instant, at the moment of setting out ^or^ &c. " I was detain- 
ed longer than I expected, and only returned this morning. Your letter 
of the 30th of June was not answered; but the omision was inadvertent, 
not intentional. I had forgotten that letter until I received yours of the 
15th." 

Now, sir, I will ask, what credit is to be attached to the declarations 
of one, upon a subject like the present, who has shown himself so for- 
getful, and of habits so irregular. 

But, bad as was his memory, and disrespectful as were his practices, 
in matters of imperious duty, towards the chief magistrate of Georgia 
and myself, it is in evidence, sir, that, when the object was either to 
give effect to malignity, or to emblazon his own judgment and prowess^ 
General Jesup never forgot, and always had the leisure, to address the 
President of the United States through Mr. Blair, or the less effective 
channel — the Secretary of War. See his two letters to " Francis 
P. Blair, Esq.," dated, respectively, June the 20th and September 
3, 1836, and his three official communications, (2) addressed to the 
Secretary of War, dated, respectively, the 10th, 1 1th, and 25th of June, 
1836. 

These five extraordinary productions, for they ,may be respectively 
denominated — the first two mentioned, private- official, and the last three 
official -private, call for a ie\v specific remarks : 

1. The whole are highly laudatory of the writer, Major General Jesup 
himself, to a degree which might have palled upon the palate of his cor- 
respondents, but for the equal and happy admixture of censure of me. 

2. The two private-official letters have both been printed in The 
Globe (3) newspaper — the first with the President's endorsement, but 
without the initial and most sinister word (Private) on the face of the 
letter. Public rumor, without the least agency of mine, and which, in- 
deed, was rife in Washington, Baltimore, and Norfolk, whilst I was yet 
far to the South, without suspicion or without knowledge of the matter^ 
ultimately forced out this production, but not in all its deformity ; for it 
was mutilated in The Globe of that word which gave character to all the 
others. 

(1) Annexed to Governor Schley's deposition, Doc. No. 268. 

(2) Documents Nos. 190, 191, and 240. 

(3) Of July 29th and September 26ih, 1836. 

12 



[ 224 J 178 

3. The letter (1) of the 3d of September was expressly written in 
upport of that (2) of the 20th of June, and accompanied by official 

documents, with notes ; all professedly furnished by General Jesup for 
publication. As the best evidence, Mr. Blair was summoned as a wit- 
ness to establish that fact. At first he informed the Judge Advocate that 
he would attend on a given day ; but, afterwards, wrote to that officer 
that he would prefer that his testimony should be taken by deposition in 
Washington. I immediately drew up the interrogatories, which were 
duly transmitted by the Judge Advocate. Ample time had elapsed when 
I was last in Court, and no answers having been received, the printed 
communication and Mr. Blair's letter (3) to the Judge Advocate, were 
offered by me, and received in evidence. One important object I had in 
view remains, however, unaccomplished. The Globe, under the edito- 
rial head, speaking of my official reports made in the field, said, August 
8, 1836: " Some were sent to us for publication, as we understood, at 
his [General Scott's] instance." Now, as I knew this was not so, I had 
uniformly denied the charge, which, moreover, if true, would have 
rendered me justly obnoxious to the censure of this Court, under the 
instructions given to it by the President of the United States. One of 
my intei rogatories requested Mr. Blair to inquire into the grounds of 
that understanding, and to favor me with his answer. ( The deposition 
of Mr. Blair has but just arrived, and I have but a moment to say so here. 
If time permitted, it would receive a more particular notice. It shows 
that he was mistaken in my having requested the publication of my 
official reports at Washington.) 

4. The three letters to Mr. Secretary Cass were given in evidence by 
the Judge Advocate. They had never been published, nor had I heard 
of them until they were read in Court. Whether the writer was ever 
rebuked by that functionary, may be more than doubted. They were 
certainly not sent back as, at least, they ought to have been, or they 
would not now have been here. I have denominated them official-pri- 
vate ; for, sir, it is evident to me that, when severally written, they were, 
like the celebrated letter to Mr. Blair of the 20th of June, intended by 
General Jesup only for particular eyes. Thanks to the Chief Magistrate, 
he made one official by his endorsement, and thanks to the justice and 
manliness of Mr. Secretary Butler, the other three were not retained in 
the secret pigeon-holes of the War office. And what is the character 
of these so long held official-private documents ? This it is now my 
purpose to expose. 

It has been seen that General Jesup says he wrote to me on the 9th of 
June ; put the letter in a bundle, and forgot it. No wonder. His vanity 
was too much flattered with the honor of writing to Mr. Secretary Cass 
for the eye of the President, to think of me, who was charged, at the 
moment, with the general direction of the war. On the 10th he made 
a report to the Secretary, overlooking, as he did me, the Adjutant 
General and the General-in-chief. The next day he made another re- 
port to the same functionary. In the first, he says that he has " about 
900 volunteers and militia," and " about 200 friendly Indian warriors ;" 
" I shall move to-morrow or the next day, at the farthest, against the 

(1) Doc. No. 265. (2) Doc. No. 214. (3) Documents Nos. 264 and 265. 



179 [ 224 ] 

hostile Indians ;" that he expected " to be joined by 500 mounted men," 
CJ and by 200 Indian warriors, and I hope to strike the enemy in five 
days." Not an allusion is made to me or to the instructions I had given 
him in this report. 

On the 11th, from the same place, Tuskegee, he makes the second 
report to Mr. Secretary Cass. He says that he has been delayed. " I 
shall move forward to-morrow, however, and occupy a position on the 
Fort Mitchell road, about twenty-eight miles in advance, and there wait 
the arrival of the Indian warriors under," &c, " or, if I can find the 
enemy without Indian guides, attack him immediately." 

Now, not a word is said in either of these reports of his having com- 
menced operations " for the purpose of staying the tomahawk and scalp- 
ing-knife, and of preventing the devastation of entire settlements or 
neighborhoods on the frontier ;" nothing of his having " none of that 
courage that would enable [him] to remain inactive when women and 
children are daily falling beneath the blows of the savage." These 
were flourishes which occurred subsequently — not until I rebuked him 
for violating my orders ; moving, prematurely, and without notice to me, 
and for operating on a line which inverted the plan of operations agreed 
upon between us. From his two reports to the Secretary, it is plain that 
none of those devastations and horrors were then going on. The fron- 
tier settlements of Alabama had been tranquillized and rendered secure 
before his arrival at Tuskegee, and every white inhabitant within the 
enemy's country, who was at all exposed, had been murdered, or had 
escaped at the commencement of hostilities. ( See General Sanford's 
answer to my sixth interrogatory. It is conclusive on this point, for no- 
body better knew the Creek country.) No, sir; General Jesup com- 
menced operations on the 12th, without the crying necessity afterwards 
invented ; without " the altered circumstances of the country" from the 
date of my instructions, (1st of June,) which he alleges in his letter to 
me of the 17th. He says not a word of the kind in his two formal re- 
ports to the Secretary of the 10th and 11th; but, on the contrary, sup- 
pressing all allusion to my instructions, shows himself in haste to take 
the war into his own hands; and the Court will recollect how it hap- 
pened, no (hanks to his foresight and activity, that he found the Alabam- 
ians amply provided with arms and ammunition. 

The Court has also seen, by the deposition of Governor Schley, under 
my 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and Gth interrogatories, and the answers of Major 
Kirby to my 3d, 4th, and 5th questions before this Court, that General 
Jesup not only fully concurred ( 1 ) in my plan of campaign against the 
Creeks, without suggesting a modification, but claimed to have had the 
same plan in view before he knew what had been my thoughts on the 
subject; and that I steadily adhered to that plan, in all its outlines and 
details, until it was inverted or broken in upon by the isolated and un- 
expected movement of that General. The plan and its details, so shame- 
lessly denounced, with my Florida operations, in his first letter to Mr. 
Blair, will appear in the sequel. 

In my instructions (2) to General Jesup, dated June 1st, founded on 

(]) Deposition of Colonel Kenan also. (2) Document No. 176. 



[ 824 J 180 

the views so fully and frequently developed in conversations with him, 
I directed that he should repair to the headquarters of the Governor of 
Alabama, understood to be either at Montgomery or Tuskegee, in 
order that the former, by an interview with the latter, might charge 
himself with the command of the Alabamians, and the direction of the* 
war on that side of the enemy. His (irst step after the interview, was, 
to cause the volunteers already called out in sufficient numbers, as we 
knew, to be mustered into the service of the United States, if the enemy 
allowed time for that essential measure. 

" His Excellency the Governor of Alabama [I said in continuation] 
has proposed, in a letter that you have seen, [to the commanding officer 
of (he Georgia militia who might be at Columbus,] to commence vigor- 
ous operations against the enemy as early as the 5th instant. You have 
seen my reply to that letter, and are well acquainted with all the con- 
siderations which have induced me to propose a postponement to the 
15th. In the mean time, however, and before the regulars and all the 
forces of Georgia shall arrive, I think something very advantageous may 
be safely attempted from a point at or below Irwinton, and operating 
tip the country." (The Court has seen that I then had expectations of 
receiving at Columbus, the arms, &c, ordered by the 12th or 14th. My 
letter to General Jesup continues:) "1 shall wish you, therefore, as 
soon as you arc in command, to send as many of the Alabamians, as can 
be safely spired from other great objects [evidently the defence of the 
Alabama frontier setth I snts] to co-operate with any surplus troop 
Georgia that we may have for the field after guarding the important 
points on this river [the Chattahoochie.] What that surplus may be, 
at the end of (say) eight or ten days, 1 cannot speak with confidence; 
but, from the expectations of his Excellency Governor Schley, I think 
we shall by that time be able to send to that point from 1,000 to 1,300 
men, including horse and foot. With this force, and a little addition to 
that which Governor Clay, as you have seen, proposes to send to Irwin- 
ton, and some four or five companies of regulars which may be here in 
time, 1 think we may clear the lower part of this river, that is to say, 
the whole of Barbour county, of the enemy, by the 17th instant, and 
before the arrival of the last of the regulars expected from the North. 
By that time, all our forces on this side w ill be up and ready to be 
thrown across this river for vigorous co-operation ; and as we advance 
up the country, a portion of the volunteers guarding the river may be 
crossed over and united with the pursuing army." The regulars were, 
however, many of them, unavoidably behind this calculation, from four 
to seven days. The letter concludes : " You will take care to commu- 
nicate to me, fully, from time to time, your means, your movements, and 
your plans, and you will hear from me frequently." 

Yet the Court has seen that, after the receipt of the enigmatical and 
alarming letter of the 8th of .June, J did not again hear from General 
Jesup till the 17th, when he reported himself to be within fourteen miles 
of Fort Mitchell ! 

Sir, he not only did not report to me himself, until long aftewards, 
any of the important facts which he so fully disclosed to the Secretary 
of War, as we have seen, but his presence, in all probability, prevented 
Lis Excellency Governor Clay, then at Tuskegee, from acknowledging 



181 [ 224 3 



tny two letters of the 31st of May, as I now certainly know it prevented 
any reply to a letter of the same date and tenor from Governor Schley. 
This fact is established by the answer of the latter to my 15th and Kith 
interrogatories, in which it is said that Governor Clay replied to another 
letter written by the deponent, many weeks subsequent^, " that the 
management of the war had then devolved on Generals Scott and Jcsup, 
which seemed to render any further correspondence between us [the 
two governors] upon that subject, unnecessary." Yet, a reply to either 
the letter of Governor Schley, or to the two from me, would, under the 
mysterious silence of General Jesup, have much diminished my embar- 
rassment at the time. 

In General Jesup's second report, dated the 11th of June, to the Sec- 
retary of War, he says : " I have no means i of communicating directly 
with General Scott. This circumstance inclines me to strike a blow at 
once, though there is some hazard in it. General Scott, when 1 left him, 
expected to be ready to move by the 15th." 

Why, sir, had he no direct means of communicating with me? I lis 
letter of the 8th came to Fort Mitchell by an Indian runner. He might 
have sent his communication of the 9th (if not mistaken, as to having 
written it) by the return of his escort, or another Indian runner. My 
letters to him of the 10th, IGth, Sec.', were sent by single Indians, and 
lie had a large body of friendly Indian warriors with him. I early caused 
Captain Page, who was, at the time, charged with the Indian department, 
and the transmission, by Indian runners, of my letters to General Jesup, 
to be summoned here; but the Judge Advocate informs me that the 
captain is detained at the South by illness. General Jesup has, how- 
ever, nowhere remarked the non-reception of one of my letters of this 
period. 

My second letter to him was dated the 10th, alluded to in the thin], 
(Kith of June,) by mistake, as if dated the 12th. In this letter (of the 
10th) I said : 

" We shall be much delayed in taking the field, on this side, by the 
non-arrival of our most essential supplies — rifles, muskets, musket-accou- 
trements, ammunition, &c. I had expected these, with subsistence stoics, 
to begin to arrive here from the Ockmulgee, by the 7th instant ; but here is 
a letter( 1 ) from the agent, Mr. Beard, dated at Hawkinsville, the 5th, 
in which he reports that nothing had reached that place. He immedi- 
ately despatched a boat to Darien to make inquiries, to hasten, ice. We 
have now, on the Chattahoochie, about 3,000 Georgians, most of them 
kably fine men. Of the whole number, however, not a third have 
sufficient arms, and a still smaller number, good accoutrements. It will, 
therefore, be impossible to arm and equip the remaining two-thirds with- 
out the muskets, the Hall's rifles, and musket-accoutrements, expected 
by the Ockmulgee. From the foregoing, it will be seen that it is im- 
possible for the Georgians to commence operations from the neighbor- 
hood of Irwinton, say in eight or ten days, nor oven then, unless the 
arms and accoutrements should have arrived. I have not had a line from 
Governor Clay," Sec. " We have more than doubled the force placed 
in the lower counties of Georgia, to prevent the Creeks from escaping 
to the Seminoles." 

(1) Doc. No. 186. 



[ 224 J 182 

In my third letter ( 1 ) to General Jesup, dated June 16, after telling: 
him (as in my second letter, in order that his own movements might not 
be precipitated) of the arms, &c. having been heard from, and that they 
might be expected in a few days, I say : " At present, of the 2,200 men 
Major General Sanford has in his camp, (on the other 9ide of the river,) 
only about 400 are armed, [and these but indifferently.] (2) All the 
other armed men have been detached below, to guard the river, and 
which, as yet, from the want of men, [armed,] is but very imperfectly 
guarded." I then advert to the mysteries and omissions of his letter of 
the 8th. After animadverting on several, my letter proceeds : 

" You further tell me that ' if a movement be determined on, I will 
send you information of it by a runner.' A movement to be determin- 
ed on by whom ? — the Alabama commanders, or those in conjunction 
with yourself? Either you were placed in command or you have not 
been. In the first case, you would certainly determine on no scheme of 
offensive operations without my previous concurrence and readiness to 
co-operate ; yet, without receiving any runner from you, or communica- 
tion of any kind, since the 8th instant, a passenger in the stage by the 
upper route, (3) just arrived here, reports that you, at the head of about 
3,000 Alabamians and 1,000 friendly Indians, was about to march upon 
Neomico's band, and to commence offensive operations on a grand 
scale ! I have no doubt there is a gross mistake in this report. You 
may, perhaps, have been about to make some defensive movement or 
operation, to clear a frontier settlement of a portion of the enemy, but I 
will not believe that you have declared your independence of my au- 
thority." 

The Court will here be pleased to remark that I was, until very re- 
cently, ignorant of the fact that General Jesup, though silent towards me, 
had been quite communicative, against all regulations and decent usages 
of the army, to the Secretary of War. 

My letter to him of the 16th continues: " It is certain that Brigadier 
General Moore, of Alabama, has commenced a course of offensive ope- 
rations from Irwinton up the country. From this fact, [alone,] I have 
rather inferred that you have not even yet been invested with the cora- 
mand of the Alabamians, or you certainly would have stopped his pre- 
mature and isolated movement. (4) These doubts and conjectures, in. 
the absence of all direct intelligence from you, are sufficiently harass- 
ing." 

" I mean to be explicit and precise on my part. I desire you, instant- 
ly, to stop all offensive movements, (if you are in command,) on the part 
of the Alabamians, until the Georgians are ready to act, say on the 21st 
instant, when the greater number of them will be armed and ready for the 
field. By that time, too, there will be, on the frontier, the greater part of the 
regulars and marines ordered from the North. On that day, if the move- 
ments of General Moore shall not render a modification of my plan ne- 
cessary, I shall begin to assemble the troops on this side of the nation, 

(1) Doc. No. 204. 

(2) See General Sanforrl's deposition. (3) Why not a letter to me by that? 

(4) from General Jesup's letter to me, (Doc. No. 217,) dated June 12th, and suppressed 
t ; ll the 20th, it would appear that General Moore's movement was part of General Jesup's 
combined operations. 



183 [ 224 j 

somewhere in the neighborhood of Irwinton, and operate up the country. 
It is ray desire that you meet me about that time and place, and that you 
bring with you any disposable force you conveniently can ; or, that you 
hold the whole of the Alabamians in defensive positions on the frontier 
settlements till I shall bring the war into their neighborhood, when you 
can come into the general line of operations with me." 

June 17. I addressed a fourth letter ( 1 ) to General Jesup, of which 
the following are extracts : 

" Sir: I have this moment received your two letters of the 15th and 
17th instant." 

" I am infinitely astonished and distressed to hear of your near approach, 
and in a starving condition, to Fort Mitchell. You knew that your forces 
were not wanted there ; you knew that no supplies could reach Irwin- 
ton from New Orleans, earlier than the 21st instant, if so soon ; and 
you knew, by my letter of the 10th, that nothing had arrived as high as 
Hawkinsville upon the Ockmulgee, and, consequently, nothing could have 
reached this place, by the present date, from that river. I ought, 
to add that you knew, when you left here, that the troops, daily increas- 
ing, were living from hand to mouth on the precarious supplies of the 
neighborhood. Under these circumstances, imagine my astonishment to 
learn that, instead of marching the disposable force of Alabama upon Ir- 
winton, with subsistence for at least ten or five days in advance, to hear 
that you have come through the heart of the Indian country, seeking pri- 
vate adventures, which, if successful, could hardly have advanced the 
v . and against my known plan of operations, to Fort Mitchell, 45 
miles out of position ! It is precisely General Gaines's movement upon 
Fort King, where there was no subsistence, and there is none, as you 
ought to have known, at Fort Mitchell ! My grief and distress are at 
their utmost height. This strange movement you have made without gi in - 
me the slightest notice. You had not informed me, you do not even now 
tell me that you are in command of the Alabamians ; and your last letter 
stated that it was doubtful whether you ever would be invested with that 
command. All this is infinitely strange, and was the last thing in the 
world that was to be expected from you." 

The letter concluded with these words : " Though in grief, I still re- 
main yours, with great regard." 

General Jesup has given this letter, with notes of his own upon it, as 
part of his communication^ 2) to Mr. Blair, printed in The Globe, Septem- 
ber 26, 1836. In one of those notes he says, to discredit my describing 
him to be approaching Fort Mitchell " in a starving condition," that at 
the time " he had subsistence for the troops under his command to the 
22d of June." 

Now, in his letter(3) of the 15th, written from the interior of the en- 
emy's country, he had said to me : "I find it impossible to obtain either 
corn or subsistence here. The hostile Indians have destroyed all that 
they have not taken away." Same letter: "June 16. I am now at the 
Big Spring, within fourteen miles of Fort Mitchell." " I have to request 
that provisions and corn be sent to Fort Mitchell. I have only five days' 
rations, and not a grain of corn." " I shall, probably, be compelled to fall 

(l) Doc. 208. (2) Doc. No. 206. (3) Doc. No. 265. 



[ 224 J 181 

back oo Fort Mitchell, or (o a position near to it. I hop seive or- 

dera from you at that place, to which, if I do not go myself, I shall send 
Mils for subsistence." And in his note(l) to me of the 17th, re- 
zed with the letter of the 15 — 16th, he says: I Qnd that we have 
less than two days' rations in addition to two days' rations in the bands 
of the men. Whethei successful or not, against Ne-o-ee-martla, I shall 
be compelled to go to Fort Mitchell. Can you give us provisions and 
there .' By all means do .vy." 
Here, then, Mr. President, is a greal ! , who takes the field 

against the orders and without the knowledge of his commander; puts 
himself on a wrong line of operations, without plan or object, without the 
assured means of subsistence ; and when out hut from three to five days, 
breaks silence only to call for help, and in piteous accents declares that, 
whether successful or not, he will be obliged to fall hack ! We may now 
why these letters were not given to The Globe; they would have 
supported every assertion of mine, so indecently contradicted in the 
printed notes. Take this, as a second example : General Jesup says 
that, when he arrived at Fort Mitchell, "he found, in the neighborhood, 
feral thousand bushels of corn, which he had directed Captain Page to 
ire early in June." If so, why the urgent entreaty that I would send 
provisions and corn there ? 1 again regret the absence, by sickness, of 
Captain Page. My accuser adds, in the same place : " [f General Scott 
was. not acquainted with the resources at his command, it was not the 
fault of General Jesup. This sneer is happy enough ; but, unluckily for 
iis author, I, myself, gave him, in my letter(2) of the 19th of June, the 
first information he had probably every received of that com ! 

in the same printed notes, General Jesup says, when he "arrived at 
Fort Mitchell, on the night of the I8(h .June, he found a steamboat with 
70,000 rations, which he bad ordered from New Orleans before he had 
left Washington city." How exclusive in his foresight! Again, "he 
expected the arrival of steamboats, with supplies, at Columbus, by the 

loth of June." 

The Court will here please to refer to mj letter,(3) written at Au- 
gu ta, May 26, and repeated, (4) from Milledgeville, the 28th, addressed 
jointly to the quartermaster and commissary at New Orleans, and then 
turn to the testimony of .Major Kirby. From the letter, it will be seen 
that, upon a calculation made bj General Jesup and myself, we both 
thought that his letter from Washington, and mine from Augusta, on the 
inn- subject, would, ver) probably, reach .\Y i Orleans together. And, 
according to Major Kirby's letter(5) to General Irwin, dated June 2d, 
it was thought the firsl supplies could not arrive from that city before the 
18th or 19th. General Jesup, therefore, could not have expected those 
up] lit it Columbus by the 15th of June;" and he knows, in fact, as 

I se\er.d times told him in my letters, that we both thought it would he 

fortunate if they arrived by the l\ Id. By great good luck, how- 

ever, the first steamboat did actually arrive at Fori Mitchell on the 18th 
or 19th of June, whereby the whole army was saved from the misfortune 
which General Jesup's false movement would, otherwise, have occasion- 
ed Doo. No. 207. (3) Doc. No. 166. (5) Doc. No. 181. 
(2) Doc. No. 212. (4) Due No. 170. 



185 [ 224 J 

ed, viz : of being reduced to half or third rations for many days. (See, 
on this point, the testimony of Major Kit by, Lieutenant Waite, and Lieu- 
tenant Betts; also, the deposition of Major Huson.) 

In all this time, Mr. President, from the 9th of June, when be entered 
on duty at Tuskegee, to the 17th, it bad never once occurred to 
General Jcsup that bis march from the frontier settlements of Ala- 
bama, upon Fort. Mitchell, at the opposite side of the Creek country, bad 
been intended to protect the women and children, whom be bad left far 
behind, against the uplifted tomahawk and scalping-knife ; or that he 
bad none of that courage that would enable him to look on such scenes. 
No, sir ; " devastations of entire settlements," as well as women and 
children, the tomahawk and scalping-knife, are entirely omitted in all bis 
letters; the two to the Secretary "of War, dated the 10th and 11th of 
June ; the one to me of the Sth ; the copy of that dated the 12th,(l)but 
handed to me by his aid-de-camp on the :21st ; and his two other letters 
to me, dated the 15 — 16th and the morning of the 17th. But, after he had, 
to anticipate me, taken the war out of my hands, and found himself " com- 
pelled to fall back on Fort Mitchell" for corn and subsistence ; when, in 
short, be bad, late on the 17th, received my letter of the day before, quo- 
ted, in great part, above ; then, and not till then, did those moving topics 
occur to him, in the use of which he has been as happy as in the in- 
vention. See bis second letter(2) to mo, dated the 17th of June, in 
which those weapons are powerfully wielded both for defence and of- 
fence, and which letter closes bis communication in The Globe of the 26th of 
September. But, powerful as that letter may seem, be did not dare to in- 
clude my reply (;J) to it, dated the 1 9th, and which, in all fairness, ought 
to have been published at the same time. This the Court will perceive 
from the following extract: 

" On my return to Columbus, late last evening, I received your second 
(2) of the 17th instant. This is fully as strange as any of your previous 
communications. In it you repeat nothing of your previous intention of 
inarching upon Fort Mitchell ; but you take care to insert two or three 
topies which would furnish a good basis for a popular appeal against the 
hardship imposed upon you of undertaking no system of offensive opera- 
tions without my previous concurrence and readiness to act in concert 
with you. It would seem to be for this purpose, I can imagine no other, 
that you tell me that your operations have been " commenced and have 
been continued for the purpose of staying the tomahawk and the scalping- 
ing-knife, and preventing the devastation of entire settlements or neigh- 
borhoods on the frontier." Nothing, certainly, could have been more 
meritorious. The direct protection of the Alabama settlements was with- 
in your competency, and, indeed among your paramount duties. But 
why commence a grand system of offensive operations which has brought 
you out on this side of the Creek nation at a point where I did not want 
you, without giving me (he slightest intimation that you were about to 
commence, and of course, without waiting for my approbation and co- 
operation ! To have waited for such co-operation, and to have given me 
notice of your intended movements, were, allow me to say, also among 
your paramount duties. 

(1) Doc. No. 217. (2) Doc. No. 210. (3) Doc. No. 212. 



[ 224 ] 186 

" Your next popular flourish is in these words : ' I have none of 
that courage that would enable me to remain inactive when women 
and children are daily falling beneath the blows of the savage.' I 
certainly believe that you have not, and there was not the slightest ob- 
jection, in any quarter, to your protecting the women and children of the 
frontier, with the defence of which you were directly charged. Again, 
nothing could have been more praiseworthy ; but how does this excuse 
your leaving those women and children, and, instead of marching upon 
Irwinton, where you were required — marching in hostile array, seeking 
battles, upon Fort Mitchell, where you were neither expected nor want- 
ed ? 

" On the subject o[ the Alabama frontier settlements, I am happy to 
learn by your letter, that you made such arrangements for their safety as 
to leave you assured on that point. 

" The last dead point you make, as if it were for future use against 
me, is this : ' I would have struck the enemy to-night, but for your 
letter ;(1) if he is not struck to-morrow morning, he will escape for 
the present ; but the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue 
and to reduce him.' Here I am made to deprive you and the country 
of a great imaginary victory. I say imaginary, for I am inclined to 
think that you are, on this occasion, a little too sanguine in your cal- 
culations. But the true answer is this : Who gave you authority to roam 
at pleasure through the Creek nation, at the head of the Aiabamians and 
a body of friendly Indians, without giving notice to and without concert 
with the Georgians and regulars, brought to this frontier for the same 
war, and at an enormous expense to the Government ? Besides, from 
from the position [now] occupied by you, you are forced to operate down 
the country, instead of getting below the enemy and operating up. This 
precisely inverts what you knew to be my plan of campaign — a plan fully 
developed in conversation with you, and to which you did not in the least 
object, although you were invited to discuss it freely !" 

Here, sir, it will be seen that I distinctly predicted that Gen. Jesup's 
second letter of the 17th, assuming new and unfounded reasons for his 
false and unauthorized movements, was intended much more for the pub- 
lic than his immediate commander. Hence those topics of appeal, and 
hence its appearance in his communication to The Globe, without my 
reply ! 

The Court has also seen in that reply, that I discredited the idle vaunt 
that he would have struck the enemy a fatal blow on the 17th or 18th, 
but for my letter of the 16th. Now, sir, it is distinctly in evidence, not- 
withstanding that gasconade, that he not only disobeyed my orders, but 
in the attempt to strike the blow, egregiously failed ! See his third official- 
private letter,(2) addressed to Mr. Secretary Cass, dated June 25th, and 
which so unexpectedly has been brought within my knowledge. It was 
on this, and the circumstances connected with the point, that 1 principally 
wanted the testimony of General Woodward. (3) My 14th interrogatory 
to Governor Schley relates to the same matters. 

(1) June 16, quoted above, doc. No. 204. (2) Doc. No. 240. 

(3) See bis letter to the Judge Advocate, Doc. No. 266. 



187 [ 224 ] 

I have given above extracts of my letter to General Jesup of the 19th 
of June. The following is a continuation of the same communication : 

"Whilst writing the above, I received your letter ( 1 ) of this date, 
written at Fort Mitchell. You charge me with harshness. I have, cer- 
tainly, in previous letters, complained heavily of you, as in the beginning 
of this, and have, in every instance, I think, given the grounds of those 
complaints. The facts stated by me, I think, bear the construction that 
I have placed upon them, and 1 have infinitely regretted the existence of 
those facts. 

" You are mistaken in supposing that I upbraid you for asking for small 
supplies of rations and forage for your troops. I regretted the scarcity of 
our resources in such supplies, and apprehended a scarcity bordering on 
starvation for a few days. Fortunately, 80,000 rations have arrived at 
Fort Mitchell, (and about 20,000 here,) which yesterday were not ex- 
pected earlier than the 22d, perhaps the 23d instant, and I am confident 
that, when here, that we both, by calculation, did not expect any thing 
from New Orleans before the 21st or 22d. I am rejoiced as much on 
your account as my own, that we both have an abundant supply of rations 
for the present, and we know that 150,000 more will soon follow. * * 

" General, (in haste,) I have not intended to say any thing to injure 
you. I have shown in strong terms the construction I had a right to 
place upon your acts and letters. This, I know, may appear harsh. But, 
on the other hand, allow me to say that I have the greatest and an undi- 
minished confidence in your honor, your intelligence, gallantry, and capa- 
city for war. You use the word friendship — I have cherished for you 
for more than twenty-two years, a warm and a sincere affection, which I 
would not part with on any consideration. It has been a little shaken 
since I saw you, but one expression of your letter goes far to recall it. I 
think you have not been attentive to my plans and instructions. In this, 
I certainly think that you have erred, and, also, in your failure to re- 
port fully to me. Throwing, for a moment, seniority aside, I ask it 
of your ancient connexion with me, to be more careful in those par- 
ticulars in future. It will give me sincere delight to put down this 
war with you, and to give you all the fame which I know you are 
so capable of winning.'' 

The letters between General Jesup and myself, were duly, from time 
to time, enclosed by me to the Adjutant General, for the information 
of Government. In writing (2) to the latter, on the 21st of June, I 
enclosed General Jesup's letter to me of the 19th, and the above re- 
ply of the same date, and said to the Adjutant General : 

"With respect to this distinguished officer (General Jesup) I have 
every motive in the world, public and private, to act in perfect har- 
mony. All my ancient affection for him is fast returning. I hope it 
will be entirely restored in a day or two — that is, as soon as I shall 
learn that he conforms himself to my plans and instructions." 

Having subsequently received General Jesup's report, (3) dated the 
20th, giving his operations and motives from the 12th to that date, with 
several other official letters (in evidence ;) having, as I passed down the 
eountry, on the evening of the 23d, met and conversed with him on the 

(1) Doc. No. 211. (2) Doc. No. 209. (3) Doc. No. 216. 



22, J 



1S8 



subject ; confiding in the facts and motives alleged by him on the several 
occasions, and being absolutely ignorant then and long afterwards, of his 
letters to Mr. Secretary Cass, and, above all, the dastardly attack through 
Mr. Editor Blair, ( 1 ) in the since notorious letter of the 20th ; the Court 
may imagine how, with my reviving feelings of kindness, I was led to 
write the voluntary apology (2) for General Jesup's conduct, dated the 
23d of June, and addressed to the Adjutant General. In this letter I re- 
quested that such of my reports as had animadverted on General Jesup, 
might be returned to me, on the ground that, as we ivere again friends, 
no trace might remain on record to show that ice had ever been otherwise. 
He had met, and rode some miles with me that evening. As he entered 
my room, I finished the letter, handed it to him to read before I had read 
it myself, and it was instantly recorded by an aid-de-camp, in my letter- 
book. I did not tell him " on the morning of the 24th," as he writes to 
Mr. Blair, September 3d, that I " would ask to withdraw" the letters, 
&c. The request, and my reasons for it, he had seen the night before. 
With the letter in his hands, he intimated an objection to the word expla- 
nations offered by him ; but on an admonition, on my part, full of firmness 
and kindness, he read the letter through, and expressed himself gratified 
with it. Why, sir, did he not tell me of, or instantly take measures to 
counteract his assassin-like letter, then so recently written to Mr. Blair, 
and which, beyond all doubt, he despatched after the receipt of mine of 
the 19th? 

A miserable apology is attempted by General Jesup, for addressing 
the President of the United States on official matters, through the secret 
channel of Mr. Blair, in the printed sheet, (3) or pamphlet, (before 
noticed,) signed by General Jesup's aid-de-camp. In this joint produc- 
tion, it is said: "The official channel of communication was through 
General Scott. To make the application through him would have been 
indelicate," &c. But where was the convenient channel through Mr. 
Secretary Cass, which General Jesup had twice adopted, (on the 10th 
and 11th of June,) before the letter of the 20th to Mr. Blair, and 
once afterwards, the 25th of June, on other military subjects ?( 4) Have 
those acts of direct insubordination towards me been ever rebuked ? It is 
to be presumed not, sir, or those letters would not have been found, in 
the same Department, in the time of Mr. Secretary Butler. 

The truth is, Mr. President, General Jesup left Washington on the 
22d of May, (5) the day after the receipt of my letter respecting Ma- 
jor Read, and aware of the displeasure which that letter had brought 
upon me, he believed himself at liberty to defy my authority, with 
but little observance, as often as his vanity might dictate. Hence his 
repeated boasts (in his letters) that he had been sent into the field 
by the President himself, although, in the instructions to him, he was 
expressly told (6) that, if he found rne there, he was to serve under 
me, and to obey my orders, as the Rules and Articles of War would have 
told him, independent of those instructions ; and hence, from the same 

(1) Doc. No. 214. (2) Doc. No. 221. (3) Doc. No. 263. 

(4)S-,->- another official letter from him to the Adjutant General, June 28, Doc. No. 242. 
whilst I was in command. (5) General Jesup to Mr.' Cis«, June 25, Doc. No. 240. 

(6) Letter to him trom Mr. Cass, May 19, Doc. No. 159. 



180 [ 224 ] 



cause or causes, all those letters, official-private and private-official, 
with the pamphlet and communication in The Globe, which 1 have 
brought under the review of this Court. The blood of all the Semi- 
noles may be made to crimson the waters of Florida; but neither one 
or both can wash away that stain which his conduct to an ancient friend 
has brought upon him. Sir, a moment more, and I shall have done with 
his name forever. 

Much having been objected to my plan of operations against the Creeks 
as against that in Florida, and there being really some danger that any 
plan of campaign may, from the sneers of some of my contemporaries, be, 
in future, considered as unworthy of the native genius of American com- 
manders — 1 beg leave, Mr. President, to fortify my last humble concep- 
tion of this sort, by the opinions of three highly distinguished gentlemen 
who have favored me with their depositions. The following interroga- 
tories, but slightly and accidentally varied, were propounded by me to 
each of those deponents : 

1. " What, in the opinion of the witness, were the relative advantages 
or disadvantages, between a plan of operations beginning on a line at, 
or a little above Irwinton, and below the hostile Creeks, and acting 
up the country, and beginning (say) on a line from Tuskegee to Fort 
Mitchell, above the greater number of the enemy, and thence oper- 
ating down the country ?" 

2. " If the whole disposable force of Georgians, Alabamians, and regu- 
lars, with the friendly Indians acting as auxiliaries, had been placed in 
a line below the enemy, and had operated up the country, whilst the 
frontier settlements of Georgia and Alabama were guarded by compe- 
tent detachments, is it not probable that fewer of the enemy would have 
escaped across the Chattahoochie, in the direction of Flotida, than actu- 
ally did so escape ; and, also, that the war would have been earlier fin- 
ished than it actually was ?" 

3. ' ; Is it not probable or certain, that the movement of General Jesup, 
and the forces under his immediate orders, from Tuskegee upon Fort 
Mitchell, and from that line below, before all the other forces upon the 
Chattahoochie were ready to take their positions on that river, and the 
base-line below the enemy, put the enemy upon the endeavor to escape 
in the direction of Florida, and led to the many severe conflicts which 
took place on the soil of Georgia ?" 

4. " Which of the two plans of operations, that of operating with the 
whole disposable force, under the general command of the said Scott, 
upwards, from a line below the enemy, and beginning (say) about the 
25th of June ; and the plan pursued by the said Jesup, viz: beginning 
an isolated movement (say) about the 12th of the same month, from 
Tuskegee towards Fort Mitchell, and thence operating down the coun- 
try, would, in the opinion of the witness, have the sooner terminated the 
war, by the capture of the great body of the enemy ?" 

These questions are here differently numbered from the numbers they 
bore in the several papers drawn up by me, to be submitted to the wit- 
nesses. 

I regret, Mr. President, that I have not the time, or strength, to im- 
body the answers to the several interrogatories given by his Excellency 
Governor Schley, a near, an anxious and close observer of all that passed ; 



[ 224 ] 190 

of Major General Sanford, who commanded the Georgia line from an 
early period to the end of the war, and of the honorable Mr. Dawson, a 
colonel at home, but a captain in the campaign. Each is clear and em- 
phatic in favor of the plan of operating upwards, in preference to the re- 
verse plan ; in favor of a delay to about the 25th of June, with a view to 
a united movement upwards, with all the disposable forces, and of the 
opinion that the war would sooner have been terminated by that delay, in 
the beginning, and with better results. I know not an intelligent officer 
who was with me in the campaign, who would not have given like opin- 
ions if called upon for the purpose. 

To this, or a similar question propounded, viz : 
■ " Is the witness aware that the said Scott, in any particular, when not 
ill in bed, failed in point of zeal, activity, or judgsnent, in the direction of 
the war against the hostile Creek Indians, before mentioned ?" 

The answers of Governor Schley, Major General Sanford, Colonels 
Dawson and Kenan, and Major Kirby, to this question, are all again too 
complimentary to be reproduced in this place, and no other officer with 
me in the Creek campaign was interrogated on the subject. 

Mr. President, and gentlemen of the Court : I am exhausted ; but 
should do equal wrong to justice and to my own feelings, not to return to 
each and every one of you, my hearty thanks for the patience and impar- 
tiality you have all shown, including the Judge Advocate, in this long in- 
vestigation. 

Every material fact which has been given in evidence, that could by 
mere possibility, atfect your judgments to my prejudice, and I recollect 
but few of that character, will be found carefully imbodied, or specifically 
referred to, in this Summary. Much, 1 know, to be wholly omitted on 
the other side. These declarations, I am confident, no examination will 
be able to controvert. And here, I may add, that there is not an impor- 
tant circumstance in all my recent conduct in the field, which was not 
duly reported at the earliest moment, and with ray own hand, for the in- 
formation of Government. With, then, this overwhelming mass of evi- 
dence in my favor — permit me again to ask, T$y what strange fatality do I 
find myself here ? It is for this Court, with the approbation of the Presi- 
dent of the United States, to bid me depart with honor ; and that that de- 
cision may be without the farther alloy of suspense, in which I have now 
but too long been held, under circumstances which, perhaps, could not 
have been controlled, I will ask that it be speedily rendered. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Fredeeicktown, Md., January 19, 1S3G. 



191 [ 224 J 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE OF GENERAL SCOTT. 



A. 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

Mobile, Alabama, October 30, 1836. 

Sir: In acknowledging the honor of your letter of the 13th of the 
present month, which I received on the 28th, I have to desire the favor 
of you to lay before the Court of Inquiry of which Major General Ma- 
comb is appointed President, my objections and views of yesterday's 
date, herewith enclosed. 

I am unprepared at this moment to send to you a complete list of wit- 
nesses, nor do I think it necessary, even if it were practicable, until I 
learn the result of my application to change the organization and location 
of the Court. 

I am, however, desirous that my staff officers on the campaign in Flo- 
rida should attend the Court of Inquiry forthwith. Captain E. A. Hitch- 
cock, acting inspector general, now at New York, with Captain G. A. 
McCall, A. D. C., acting as adjutant general, now at Philadelphia. Be 
pleased to summon them to attend. I shall desire General P. F. Smith 
to aid the above-named officers of my staff in acting for me, until I have 
it in my power to attend the Court of Inquiry, which I trust will be au- 
thorized to adjourn to this place ; from whence the Court, the witnesses, 
and all, may occasionally pay a hasty visit to the Floridas, or to the 
Western frontier, as occasion may offer. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 

Captain Samuel Cooper, 

Judge Advocate and Recorder, SfC, 
Frederick, Maryland. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Mobile, October 23, 1836. 
To the Court of Inquiry of lohich Major General Macomb is Pres- 



xaeni 



I received yesterday your Judge Advocate's letter of the 13th of this 
month, notifying me that the first Monday in November, 1836, is fixed 
for the meeting of the Court of Inquiry appointed in General Order No. 
65, of the 3d instant, and requesting of me a list of such witnesses as I 
may wish examined by the Court. 

In reply, I think it my duty to state to the Court, for the information 
of all concerned, the objections and views which follow : 



[ 224 ] 192 

1. I protest against Major General Macomb being the President, or a 
member of the Court of Inquiry, or of any tribunal for the investigation 
of any matter of accusation or rumor against me, or in which I am anywise 
concerned, either directly or indirectly ; or in reference to any duty or 
employment in which 1 have been or may be engaged during the present 
year, or at any rime since the year 1830; because I have had good rea- 
son to believe that the said Major General Macomb has been, at all times, 
since that period, including the present year, up to the 13th of the pres- 
ent month, inclusively, ready and willing to wrong me ; and I am there- 
fore convinced that he would not, as President of the Court of Inquiry, 
be impartial, or do me justice. I expect soon to be able to obtain satis- 
factory evidence in addition to that which here follows, in support of my 
objections ; and, moreover, to show that Major General A. Macomb is, 
in fact, a party, and ought to be considered a party interested in, and to 
some considerable extent accountable for, any failures which may have 
occurred in the campaigns of the present year against the Seminole In- 
dians. 

2. By the Order No. Go, I have learned that the Court of Inquiry 
would assemble " at the city of Frederick, in Maryland, as soon as the 
state of military operations against the Indians will permit the witnesses 
to attend, (of which the President of the Court is to judge and deter- 
mine.") It seems, then, by your Judge Advocate's letter above noticed, 
that ten days after the date of the General Order containing the direc- 
tions of the President of the United States, and two days after that 
order was enclosed to me in the letter of the acting Secretary of War, 
dated the 11th of October, 1836, (which I shall presently notice more 
particularly,) and without any known change in our Indian relations by 
which witnesses could be obtained from the frontiers, the Major General 
has seen fit to fix a day for the assembling of the Court on which he 
must have known it would be impossible for me ( without steam power ap- 
plied to vehicles of transportation on railroads yet to be constructed) to 
attend the Court. I advert to this strange arrangement not by any means 
to manifest on my part any unwillingness to attend the Court, (which 
nothing short of adcep domestic afiliclion that during twq weeks of the pres- 
ent month I have had great reason to apprehend shall prevent, after 
making arrangements to obtain the requisite testimony,) but to show the 
Court the apparent design of the Major General to disregard the orders 
of the President of the United States constituting the Court, and to 
violate the President's more recent instructions, bearing date the 11th of 
this month, and of which the following is an extract: 

" War Department, 

" October 11, 1S36. 

" I herewith enclose you a copy of Order No. 65, providing for a Court 
of Inquiry, to be convened at a proper time, for the purpose of making 
certain investigations, in one of which you will be a party interested. 
And I have the honor to inform you that the President, desirous to afford 
you an opportunity to prepare yourself for the occasion, by collecting such 
evidence and getting ready such documents as you may deem necessary. 



198 [ 221 ] 

has instructed me to inform you that General Arbuckle has been ordered 
to relieve you from your command on the Southwestern frontier. 

"C. A. HARRIS, 
" Acting Secretary of War. 
"Major General E. P. Gaines, 

" Camp Sabine." 

(The 4th, 5th, and 6th lines underscored by me.) 

These orders and instructions appear to have been violated by the Presi- 
dent of the Court of Inquiry, inasmuch as he has taken means to pre- 
clude the possibility of my attending the Court in its first meetings, and 
thus depriving me of the right of a personal scrutiny of the incipient 
Proceedings of the Court, and subjecting me to the imputation of having 
neglected to attend. 

These objections will appear more obvious and conclusive to the 
Court, and to the Department of War, when it is recollected, and seen 
by the present state of the Post Office Department upon this route, that 
the distance on the nearest mail route from this place to the city of Fred- 
erick, Maryland, is nearly one thousand and fifty miles ; that the Gene- 
ral Order No. 65, of the 3d instant, did not reach me until the 22d 
instant, and that the above-mentioned letter from the acting Secretary 
of War, was accompanied by the letter from your Judge Advocate, dated 
the 13th of October, (but two days after the acting Secretary'--,) did not 
reach me until yesterday, the 2Sth : hence, it will be seen that the Major 
General must have known that it was not possible for me to attend the 
Court at its first meeting, when I should have been gratified to have 
made these objections in person, and to have taken other measures, and 
made other objections, at which I have only time now to glance. 

3. I deem it to be my duty to protest, and I do hereby protest, against 
the Court of Inquiry suffering any documentary or other evidence rela- 
ting to me, or to any act of mine, or any matter of accusation or rumor 
against me, to be acted on or received by the Court of Inquiry, before I 
shall have it in my power to attend the Court, and scrutinize such doc- 
umentary or other evidence, and to cross-examine the witness or wit- 
nesses that may be employed or called against me, to bolster up the repu- 
tation of others, at the expense of mine. 

4. In my letter to the Adjutant General of the army dated the 4th of 
July last, I requested that officer to favor me with all the official state- 
ments in his office referring to my conduct in relation to the war in 
Florida. I have not yet received the papers applied for. I shall insist 
on receiving copies of all reports, letters, and other statements referring 
to or calling in question the propriety of my conduct in Florida. I can- 
not complete my list of witnesses until I learn the names of my calum- 
niators; with the matters of accusation or rumor with which the public 
offices at Washington may have been made the repository ; and upon 
which the determination to call me before a Court of Inquiry was based. 

5. In objecting to Major General A. Macomb, and pointing out the 
irregularity of his measures in preventing me from attending the Court 
in its first sessions — an irregularity which, of itself, renders his contin- 
uance on the Court repugnant to every principle of natural equity, law, 

13 



[ 2-24 ] 194 

and justice — I take much pleasure in stating that, with the exception of 
officers who have recently served in Florida, and are therefore supposed 
to feel some solicitude in the matters of inquiry one way or another ; or 
those who have expressed or formed opinions inimical to me, tending to 
condemn me without a hearing, I know but very few others of the gene- 
ral, field, or company officers of the, line of the army* to whom I would 
make any objection as members of the Court of Inquiry. I deem the 
present two junior members of the Court to be unexceptionable, viz : 
Generals Atkinson and Brady. 

6. In deciding upon the foregoing objections to the President of the 
Court, the War Department is desired to weigh each objection with a 
particular view to the latter sentence of the 92d article of war, in the 
words which follow: " But, as Courts of Inquiry may be perverted to 
dishonorable purposes, and may be considered as engines of destruction 
to military merit in the hands of weak and envious commandants, they 
are hereby prohibited, unless directed by the President of the United 
States, or demanded by the accused." I have not been accused except 
anonymously, indirectly, or by irresponsible persons, manifestly laboring 
to conceal their own misconduct by endeavoring to criminate me, and that 
without a shadow of proof. I have, therefore, seen no proper occasion 
for demanding the inquiry. 

7. Since writing the foregoing six objections, a report has reached me 
that the forces (principally friendly Creek Indians) under Captain Lane, 
near Tampa bay, have been defeated, and that the captain, or colonel as 
he has been called, has fallen. Should this report prove to be true, I am 
sure the Department of War, and the Court, will concur with me in the 
ftpinion, that the safety of the long-neglected frontier of Florida, the 
best interest of the service, and the honor of the army, demand that the 
officers composing the Court, the accused, and the witnesses, should re- 
pair to that frontier, or to this place, from whence all may, when needful, 
fly to the theatre of war in three or four days ; and, in place of partaking 
of the comforts of the city of Frederick, unite in bringing the war once 
more to a close. I have never, nor can I willingly or voluntarily turn my 
back upon scenes of war, such as those in Florida, to pass my time in 
comparative indolence in the interior. 

All which is submitted with due respect. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General U. S. Army, 



B. 

Frederick, Maryland, 

January 7, 1837. 

To the Court of Inquiry of which Major General Macomb is Pres- 
ident : 

Pursuant to the orders of the War Department, the undersigned had the 
honor to present himself, yesterday, before the Court of Inquiry now in 

• I have objections to some few of the officers of the General Staff, which I need not 
now mention. E. P. G. 



195 [ 224 ] 

session in the city of Frederick, as a party interested in its proceedings, 
and claimed of right, under the provisions of the 91st article of war, the 
privilege of cross-examining the witnesses called before the Court to 
give testimony in relation to the causes of the failure of the campaigns in 
Florida, in 1836, under Major Generals Gaines and Scott. The Court de- 
cided to exclude him from all participation in its proceedings for some in- 
definite time, advising him that, at some future period, when matters touch- 
ing himself should be presented to the Court, to call him to its presence, 
and accord to him the privilege claimed. 

The undersigned objects to the foregoing decision, in so far as it dis- 
covers a design to prosecute the Proceedings in relation to the causes of 
the failure of the campaigns in Florida to a close in the case of Major 
General Scott, as a separate and distinct case ; inasmuch as such a pro- 
ceeding would be a violation of the Order constituting the Court, and 
N would manifestly deprive the undersigned of the privilege guarantied to 
him by the 91st article of war; matters touching himself having already 
been spread upon the record of the Court, which, unless subjected to his 
scrutiny, must necessarily expose him to ex parte decisions and comments 
unfavorable to him ; he, therefore, solemnly protests against any person 
whomsoever being allowed to sum up the partial and incomplete body of 
evidence now on the record, or yet to be received, or to present any paper 
in the character of a defence, commenting upon such evidence, before 
the undersigned shall have accorded to him the rights and privileges se- 
cured to him by the aforementioned 91st article of war, and which are 
essential to the maintenance of his reputation and honor. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General U. S. Army. 



No. 1. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 
Washington, July 20, 1836. 

Sir : 1 have just seen the private letter of Major General Jesup, dated 
Fort Mitchell, Alabama, June 20, 1836, addressed to " F. P. Blair, Wash- 
ington city," in which he complains of my official conduct, and on which 
the President has endorsed — " Referred to the Secretary of War, that he 
forthwith order General Scott to this place, in order that an inquiry be 
had into the unaccountable delay in prosecuting the Creek war, and the 
failure of the campaigns in Florida. Let General Jesup assume the com- 
mand." 

In compliance with the foregoing direction of the President, I was or- 
dered hither by a letter to me from Major General Macomb, and have 
now the honor to report myself accordingly. 

I am ready to meet any investigation into my official conduct that may 
be ordered ; and if charges and specifications, with a view to a general 



[ 224 ] t96 

Court Martial, be not preferred against me, I have to request that a Court 
of Inquiry maybe granted me at the earliest practicable day. 
I remain, sir, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



No. 2. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 
New York, August 2, 1836. 

Sir : In making my report, in person, at Washington, (on the 20th ul- 
timo,) in obedience to the instruction that recalled me from the com- 
mand of the army of the South, I requested to be favored with any and 
all matters of charge or complaint against me, either as the commander 
of the forces against the Creek or Seminole Indians, in the preceding six 
or seven months. 

With the ready permission of the acting Secretary of War, I was fur- 
nished with a copy of the only paper (as was understood) on file against 
me — a letter from Major General Jesup, my second in the Creek war, 
dated at Fort Mitchell, June 20, 1 836, and addressed to F. P. Blair, Esq., 
of Washington city. 

The original was conspicuously marked u private ;" but contained the 
insidious direction — " Let the President see this letter." On seeing it, 
however, the President, it seems, chose to render that which was evi- 
dently intended to work my ruin in secrecy, official and public, by en- 
dorsing the paper — " Referred to the Secretary of War, that he forthwith 
order General Scott to this place, in order that an inquiry be had into the 
unaccountable delay in prosecuting the Creek war, and the failure of the 
campaign in Florida. Let General Jesup assume the command." 

Thus, on an intended confidential communication, I have already been 
once harshly punished, by a recall from a high command, before it was 
known at Washington that the war which I had the conduct of was virtu- 
ally over, (which, fortunately for me, happened to be the case,) and my 
accuser promoted to my place. But, further, as that accuser equally stig- 
matized my conduct in the Seminole campaign as in that against the 
Creeks, the President directs that both shall be investigated. 

That direction I did not sufficiently attend to on the 20th ultimo, or the 
written demand then made for a Court of Inquiry would have been deem- 
ed superfluous. In this opinion 1 am now confirmed ; for, beside the 
President's full power to order an investigation, without demand, either 
by a Court of Inquiry or a general Court Martial, I observe, in the offi- 
cial newspaper (the Globe) of the 29th ultimo, published by General 
Jesup's correspondent, an editorial article, in which it is said, speaking 
on this very subject — " He [the President] deemed it proper to hold 
General Scott to accountability, and make General Jesup the accuser." 



197 [ 224 ] 

Learning thus, from the official paper, that 1 may expect charges and 
specifications to be preferred against roe in form, and for the other reason, 
suggested above, I now ask leave to withdraw my demand for a Court of 
Inquiry, and to await the further pleasure of the Executive in the case ; 
trusting, nevertheless, than an investigation will be speedily ordered, and 
in the most vigorous form. I doubt not that the result will be wholly 
honorable to me, as well in the opinion of the public as in that of the 
President himself. 

I remain, sir, 

With high respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 

P. S. I shall take the liberty to send a copy of this letter direct to the 
Secretary of War, at Detroit, to save time. 

W. S. 



No. 3. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 
New York, October 18, 1836. 

Sir : I have to acknowledge the Order appointing the Court of Inquiry 
of which Major General Macomb is named as President ; and a supple- 
mental Order, extending the field of its investigations. 

I shall seize with gladness any opportunity to repel the unjust impu- 
tations under which I have so long labored in respect to my operations 
against the Seminole and Creek Indians; but, from an article in the offi- 
cial newspaper (the Globe) of the 29th of July last, I had been led to 
hope that a general Court Martial would have been ordered for my trial 
on those imputations ; for the Globe, in a tone of authority, said — the 
President had decided to make General Jesup my accuser. This annun- 
ciation necessarily pointed to such tribunal, as, before Courts of Inquiry, 
a formal accuser or prosecutor is unknown. 

I should certainly greatly prefer to confront General Jesup, in face of 
a Court Martial, to being obliged to encounter in the dark, and at second 
hand, before a Court of Inquiry, his false accusations and misstatements, 
taken from newspapers, pamphlets, and I know not how many " private" 
letters, written to a third person, advantageously situated to render them 
most effective against me, both with the President and the public. One 
of these artful missiles, after harshly tearing me from a high and honora- 
ble command, which I had every prospect of speedily terminating to the 
satisfaction of the Government and the country, conferred that very com- 
mand upon my insubordinate junior and accuser. Thanks to the Exec- 
utive, this letter (of which I had not the slightest suspicion until my ar- 
rival at Norfolk) has been forced into light. How many more, of the 



[ 224 ] 198 

same character, may insidiously lurk behind to envenom the inquiry 
against me, I may never learn. 

Not knowing what farther time might be suffered to elapse in bringing 
on a judicial investigation of the whole matter in question, and suffering 
greatly in public opinion under General Jesup's ex parte and garbled 
publications, I was just about to defend myself in the form of an official 
' letter, the publication of which I should have requested, when I received 
formal notice that the Court of Inquiry would meet on the 7th of the next 
month. I shall now forbear going into a detailed exposure and refutation 
of the injuries complained of, but will still ask, as an intimation of what 
had been my purpose, and the abundance of my means, that this letter 
be published. 

Of General Gaines's similar acts of outrage against me, I have heard 
much, but have seen scarcely any thing. I shall therefore confine my- 
self, in this place, to the enumeration of General Jesup's three principal 
publications which have come to my knowledge : 

1. His letter to Mr. Blair of the 20th of June last, and which was 
printed at length in the Globe of the 29th of the next month. This pub- 
lication, although the letter was originally intended solely for the eye of 
the President and Mr. Blair, General Jesup evidently sanctions, as may 
be seen in his letter of the 3d ultimo to the same editor, and also publish- 
ed in the Globe of the 26th ultimo. 

2. The pamphlet or printed sheet, signed and circulated by Captain 
Lane, of General Jesup's staff, and which is evidently the joint production 
of the aid-de-camp and his chief. 

3. The publication, by General Jesup, in the Globe of the 26th ultimo, 
of a part only of my official correspondence with him, on the matters 
which are to be investigated by the Court of Inquiry, with false glosses, 
in the form of notes, furnished the editor by General Jesup himself. 

Again solemnly protesting that I have not, up to this moment, written 
or suggested, or caused to be written, a line or word on the subject of the 
Seminole and Creek campaigns, for any newspaper whatever, I think 
myself entitled to ask respectfully that this letter may be published ; and 
this is the first time that I have requested the publication of even an offi- 
cial letter — the assertion of the Globe (July 29) to the contrary notwith- 
standing. 

So far have I been from writing military or political articles on recent 
events, I have scarcely permitted myself to converse with my most inti- 
mate friends on the points in controversy. I have held myself in strict 
retirement, and have, at this moment, more than forty letters of inquiry 
from distant friends — some of them written eleven weeks ago — which I 
have not yet answered, fearing that I might violate the reserve I had 
prescribed to myself. 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



199 [ 224 ] 

No. 4. 

War Department, 

January 21, 1836. 

Sir : You will please to repair, without unnecessary delay, to Florida, 
and assume the direction of the operations against the Seminole In- 
dians. 

I enclose, for your information, copies of the various instructions which 
have issued from this Department for the suppression of the hostilities of 
these Indians, and of such other papers as may be necessary to put you 
in full possession of the state of affairs in that quarter. I enclose, also, 
duplicate letters to the Governors of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, 
and Florida, requesting them to call into the service of the United States 
such militia force as you may deem necessary, and advising them that 
the authority thus conferred upon you, will enable you to increase, mod- 
ify, or revoke any requisition which may have been made in pursuance 
of the powers granted to Generals Clinch and Eustis, to call upon the 
Executives of those States, and of the Territory, for any militia force. 
Their powers, also, to call for such force, will cease on your assumption 
of the command. 

It is impracticable here to prescribe the amount of force which ought to 
be carried into the field. That must depend upon the actual circum- 
stances which you may find existing when you reach the scene of opera- 
tions. It is of course highly desirable that no unnecessary force should 
be employed, as the expense may be thereby greatly increased. Still, I 
would not have you hesitate for a moment in calling out such a number 
of the militia as will enable you, with promptitude and certainty, to put 
an immediate termination to these difficulties. The horrors of such a 
warfare are too great to run any risk in its immediate suppression. This 
subject is, therefore, committed entirely to your own discretion. 

The difficulties with these Indians have arisen from their indisposition 
to comply with the terms of a treaty concluded some time since with 
Colonel Gadsden. That treaty provided for their removal west of the Mis- 
sissippi ; but, when the period of its execution arrived, it was found that 
a considerale portion of the Indians were unwilling to remove. As they 
had ceded their whole country in Florida, it was impossible to permit 
them to remain there, as they would have become a lawless banditti, liable 
at all times to commit depredations upon the settlements. After much 
discussion with the agents of the Government, the Indians finally agreed 
that if their removal were postponed till this winter, they would voluntari- 
ly emigrate. When the arrangements began to be made for carrying this 
agreement into effect, a spirit of disaffection appeared, which led first to 
the murder of one or more of our own citizens, and then of some of their 
own chiefs, who were disposed to carry into effect the agreement that had 
been made. This state of things was soon followed by open hostilities. 

Copies of the earlier commnnications to and from General Clinch, 
which are herewith enclosed, will put you in possession of all the neces- 
sary facts. 

I shall state very generally the measures which have been directed by 
this Department. 

General Clinch is in command of the troops in Florida. He has had 



[ 224 ] 200 

placed at his disposal, fourteen companies of ihc army. But how many 
of these have actually reached that part of the country, and are now act- 
ing with General Clinch, is not known to this Department. He was some 
time since authorized to call upon the Governor of Florida for such 
militia force as he might deem necessary. And more recently, similiar 
authority was extended to him, to call upon the Governors of South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. A sloop of war and two revenue cut- 
ters have been ordered to report to General Clinch, and to co-operate 
with him on the southwest coast of Florida, and another revenue cutter 
on the eastern coast. 

You will perceive, by the accompanying copy of a letter to General 
Eustis, that, in consequence of the unofficial, but no doubt authentic 
statements which reached here a few days since, respecting the recent 
action with the Indians, and the destruction of the settlements, authority 
was given to him to call upon the Governor of South Carolina for what 
militia force he might require, and to accept such volunteer corps as 
might offer, and to proceed with this force, and with the garrisons of 
Charleston and Savannah, to St. Augustine, and there to assume the 
command, and open a communication with General Clinch. You will 
also see that General Eustis has detached one company from Charleston 
to St. Augustine. In addition to the duplicates herewith enclosed to the 
several Executives above mentioned, another will be transmitted to each 
of them by mail. On your arrival at Charleston, you will probably be 
able to ascertain the precise state of affairs in Florida, and to take your 
measures accordingly. These you will please to adopt without delay. 

Should you deem it important to hare a personal communication with 
the Governor of South Carolina, or Georgia, you are at liberty so to do. 
Your own route, however, to the scene of operations in Florida, must 
depend upon another circumstance. Letters from Governor Eaton, 
General Call, and Colonel Gadsden, copies of which are enclosed, leave 
but little doubt that some of the Creek warriors have joined the Semi- 
noles. To what extent this disaffection may have proceeded, we have 
not here the means of ascertaining. But, from the number and position 
of the Creek Indians, it is highly important, if they evince any disposition 
to join the hostile Indians in considerable numbers, that the most vigor- 
ous measures should be adopted to check this spirit. It is probable that 
you will be able to obtain such intelligence in South Carolina as may 
on able you to form a correct estimate of the danger to be apprehended 
from this source ; and if there is reason to believe that the Creeks are 
in a hostile state, or that they meditate it, you will then call into the 
field such militia force as may be necessary to occupy the Creek country 
in Alabama, and immediately to reduce these Indians to submission. 
Should, however, there be no cause for alarm on this subject, your un- 
divided efforts will be directed to the Seminoles. 

Whatever expenditures may be rendered necessary, you will please to 
direct ; and the proper staff' officers under your command will be fur- 
nished wit'n such funds as may be required to meet them. One hundred 
and twenty thousand rations were some time since ordered, as a precau- 
tionary measure, to the St. John's. Whatever additional supplies may 
be required from the Subsistence department, will be procured upon your 
orders. The arsenals at Augusta, in Georgia, and at Mount Vernon, in 



201 [ '224 J 

Alabama, and the ordnance depot in Charleston, will issue such arms 
and ammunition as you may find necessary. 

I have to request that you will ascertain from the various Staff depart- 
ments at this place, the arrangements which have been made, and which 
are necessary for the transportation, pay, subsistence, and operations of 
the regular force and militia which will be under your command. The 
great expense and inefficiency of the militia, when called ©ut for too 
short a time, renders it indispensable that no force of that description 
should be received into service for a shorter period than three months 
from the time of their arrival at the place of rendezvous, to be disbanded 
previously, if their services should not be so long required. 

You will take care to have the militia regularly mustered into service, 
and that the number of officers is in proper proportion to the number of 
men. 

I have also to request that you will give the necessary instructions for 
the preservation and accountability of the public property. There is, 
upon these occasions, too often, so great a waste, particularly where a 
militia force is brought into the field, that great circumspection should 
be used. 

You will see, by some of the accompany documents, that many of the 
negroes have been captured by the Indians, and that there is reason to 
apprehend that they will be transported to Cuba. I have to ask your 
particular attention to the measures indicated to prevent the removal of 
those negroes, and to ensure their restoration. You will allow no terms 
to the Indians, until every living slave in their possession, belonging to 
a white man, is given up. 

Governor Eaton has also suggested, as his letter will show, that some 
of the fishing vessels on the coast of Florida are engaged in co-operating 
with the Indians. This subject should be immediately investigated, and 
I refer you, for the proper measures, to the suggestions contained in the 
letter of yesterday to General Clinch. 

I have also to request that you will communicate freely with Governor 
Eaton, and advise him of your movements; so far as any expense may 
have been encountered, by his direction, in the defence of the Territory, 
which can be met by this Department, agreeably to the usages of the 
service, you will order to be paid on the proper vouchers. But, if doubts 
exist as to whether they are legally payable without a specific appro- 
priation therefor, you will refer them here for consideration. 

The line dividing your own department from that of General Gaines 
is at present an imaginary one, and probably would, if run, actually pass 
through the scene of hostilities. You will pursue your operations, there- 
fore, without regard to any such divisionary line. 

General Clinch has been instructed to allow the Indians no pacifica- 
tion, till they are unconditionally subdued, and till they consent to an 
immediate embarkation for the country west of the Mississippi. This 
point you will particularly advert to, as also to that branch of the in- 
structions to General Clinch which directs him to deliver over to the 
civil authority such of the Indians as were guilty of individual outrages 
before the commencement of hostilities. It' the Creeks have engaged 
or should engage in these hostilities, you will, in like manner, promptly 
subdue them, and make it an indispensable condition of peace being 



f 224 ] <i02 

granted to them, that they depart, as soon as the Government can make 
the proper arrangements, for their country west of Arkansas. In both 
of these cases, it will be proper that a vigilant supervision be exercised 
over these Indians, till their removal ; and that they be accompanied by 
such a force as will keep them quiet. Their arms and ammunition will 
be taken from them, and not restored until they shall have reached their 
new country. And even then a discretion must be exercised by the 
military commanding officer in that quarter, to withhold them for as long 
a period as he may think proper, if the Indians evince any spirit of dis- 
affection. Colonel Hogan is the principal agent for the removal of the 
Creek Indians. He will be directed to report to you, and to receive 
your instructions ; and he will be able to communicate to you all the 
necessary information respecting the views of the Government on the 
subject of the removal of these Indians, and their mode of proceeding. 

General Clinch will give you similar information concerning the 
Seminoles, as he has been for some time in communication with them, 
and understands fully the views of the Department. Genera! Thompson, 
the principal removing agent, has been killed, and General Clinch has 
been requested to assign an officer to do his duty. 

Reposing entire confidence in the arrangements you may make, and 
in the promptness and vigor of your movements, 

I remain, sir, &c, 



LEWIS CASS. 



Major General Winfield Scott, 

Washington city. 



No. 5. 



Headquarters, Florida Volunteers, 
Camp near Fort Defiance, December 22, 1835. 

Sir : Having heard of the distress and alarm on this frontier, occasion- 
ed by Indian depredation, I raised a detachment of 250 volunteer mount- 
ed riflemen from my brigade, and, under the orders of the acting Govern- 
or, proceeded to this border, where I found about the same number of 
men, under the command of Colonel Warren, of the East Florida militia. 
I have assumed command of the whole, making my force about five 
hundred men. They were raised, however, for only four weeks ; and 
many of them are badly armed and equipped. The services of these 
troops have been tendered to General Clinch, and accepted, for the pros- 
pect of protecting the frontier. I can, sir, scarcely give you an adequate 
description of the frontier inhabitants. The whole country between the 
Suwannee and the St. John's rivers, for the distance of fifty miles above 
the Indian boundary, is abandoned ; the frontier inhabitants shut up in 
a few miserable stockade forts, and the Indians traversing the country 
at will, burning and destroying wherever they appear. Before my arri- 
val, a number of skirmishes had taken place, in which the Indians were 
invariably successful. A few days since, a detachment of Colonel War- 
ren's command, while on their march in the margin of the Alachua savan- 



203 [ 224 J 

nah, was attacked by a party of Indians. His baggage guard was defeat- 
ed, and his baggage captured. Two days after, I marched on the same 
ground, recovered one wagon, a carryall, and the greater part of the 
baggage. I had intended to camp that night at a house within one 
mile of Fort Defiance, formerly called Micanopy, where there was a sup- 
ply of corn and fodder. When my spies and advanced guard approached 
they observed a house on fire ; they pressed forward, and found the trail 
of a small party of Indians leading into a thick hammock ; they gave pur- 
suit, and drove them into a pond, in which there was a thick undergrowth 
and a number of trees, in which the Indians were concealed. The vol- 
unteers led, by Colonel Read, the brigade inspector, gallantly entered the 
water, and fought most bravely, at half pistol-shot, as long as an Indian 
or the flash of his gun could be seen. When the fight was over, we 
found but four of the enemy killed. My loss was four wounded ; among 
these was Captain Lancaster, of the first regiment, and George Johnson, 
of the 2d regiment of volunteers, while fighting bravely in the front of 
the action. They are all doing well, except one of the privates, whose 
wound I fear is mortal. I have this moment received an express, inform- 
ing me that the Indains have crossed the Suwannee river, and are now 
burning and destroying at the old town. Many of my men are drawn 
from that quarter and a short distance beyond it ; they feel much alarm- 
ed for the safety of their families, and I much fear many of them will 
leave me to-night. I assure you, sir, the country requires immediate 
protection, and it cannot be given too promptly. 

Very respectfully, I am, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. K. CALL, 



To the President 

of the United Slates. 



General commanding in Florida. 



No. 6. 



Tallahassee, January 9, 1836. 

My Dear General : In my last I informed you of the situation of the 
frontier of East Florida. I succeeded with the volunteers under my com- 
mand in driving the enemy within his boundary along the whole line be- 
tween the Suwannee and the St. John's. Having accomplished this im- 
portant object, we united with General Clinch, who commanded the 
expedition into the enemy's country, the result of which, I presume, has 
been communiteated to you through the Secretary of War. 

The time for which the volunteers engaged having expired, I have 
returned to this place to obtain from the Governor the necessary force to 
prosecute the war. As yet, nothing has been done. When I left Gen- 
eral Clinch on the 3d instant, he could not have brought into the field 
more than one hundred and fifty efficient men. Four additional companies 
were said to be at Tampa bay, on their march from that place to Fort King, 
but no certain intelligence had been received from them. One hundred 
and fifty mounted volunteers marched from this place a few days since. 



f 2U ] 204 

I ordered the commanding officer to report himself to General Clinch, by 
whom they will be employed as a protection to the frontier until we are 
prepared for a campaign. To put a prompt and successful termination to 
this war, we require an army of 2,500 or 3,000 men. About one-third 
of this force can be raised in the Territory, the balance must consist of 
regulars and militia from the neighboring States. 1 shall return to the 
frontier in some capacity or other, so soon as I can raise a force of any 
description. I should be highly gratified to command the army, and be- 
lieve I could soon bring the war to a close. I fear, however, this I cannot 
do without injustice to General Clinch. He is a brave and good man, 
but I fear he is too slow in his movements to conduct a war against the 
Indians. 

I had many difficulties to contend with in my late expedition, and 
among others mutiny and desertion among my troops, but the examples 
I have made of the offenders will have a salutary effect hereafter. 

The power of the enemy is variously estimated ; by those best informed 
at from 1,200 to 2,000 warriors ; and it is confidently believed that a large 
number of the Creek Indians have united with them. They are well 
armed ; they are waging a war of extermination, and will fight desperately. 

The enclosed letter from Colonel Fitzpatrick, the President of the 
Legislative Council, will inform you of the manner in which arms have 
been furnished to the Indians. It contains other valuable information, 
which I beg leave to lay before you. 

Very, &c, 

R. K. CALL. 

General Jackson. 



No. 7. 



Tallahassee, January 8, 1836. 

Sir : Previous to my leaving Key West information was received from 
Tampa bay, that a Spanish vessel had landed arms and ammunition in 
the neighborhood of a Spanish fishery at Charlotte harbor, to supply the 
Indians on the coast The surgeon of the post at Key West, Dr. Nourse, 
accompanied Major Dade's company to Tampa and returned in the trans- 
port Motto, and communicated the information to several persons, and 
said he got it from Captain William G. Ganders and others at Tampa, and 
that there was proof of the fact, as he understood from them. I well re- 
collect that, previous to my leaving Key West, I one morning observed 
a Spanish vessel coming in at the northwest passage, from the direction 
of Tampa and Charlotte harbor, which vessel brought no cargo, nor do 
I know whether or not she carried any away to Cuba. The collector at 
Key West, near two months previous to this time, had suspended from 
duty the inspector of the customs at Charlotte harbor for refusing to per- 
mit spirituous liquors to be landed on the island where he lived, and upon 
which also a Spanish subject named Caldez lives, and who is carrying on 
a fishery, and has a vessel trading there under Spanish colors, manned in 
part by Seminole Indians. There is but one citizen of the United States 
attached to the concern, who is the person that brought the charges against 



S205 [" 221 ] 

the inspector, and who has been going backwards and forwards in the 
Spanish schooner since that time ; with this exception the fishery is 
carried on by Spaniards and Indians, and is owned by a man named Badia, 
who lives in Havanna. I know that the Spaniards interested in the fish- 
eries have been much dissatisfied on account of the proposed removal of 
the Indians, and that they have heretofore derived much benefit from the 
services of the Indians at the fisheries and on board these vessels; and 
that this man Caldez is more dreaded by, and has more influence over 
the Indians, than he ought to have. There being no inspector at this point, 
and the collector having sent the revenue cutter to New Orleans, arms 
and ammunition, or any thing else, in any quantity, could have been landed 
there at any time with impunity. As the southern section of Florida is 
very little known except to the Indians, I take the liberty to offer you 
such information as a residence of more than twelve years in that section 
of country has enabled me to obtain. From Cape Roman, on the west coast, 
to Cape Sable, and from thence to Cape Florida, are innumerable islands 
formed by rivers and creeks running from the Ever-glade, (so called,) and 
having for their source the great Lake Macaco, where the Indians go in 
their light canoes, and where they have some towns and cornfields. 
This part of the country is little known to the white man, but the Indians 
are perfectly acquainted with it, and if they are driven from their present 
position, they will certainly go there. I have good authority, upon which 
I can rely, that many canoes with women and children, and some men, 
have been sent there some time ago ; and if the warriors are driven there, 
they can sustain themselves against four times their number. They can 
live on the coonty root, which abounds in the vicinity of Cape Florida 
and New river, and the great abundance of fish and turtle which are 
found in the rivers and on the seacoast, and which they take in any quantity 
at pleasure. From Cape Sable to Cape Florida, inside of Key Largo, and 
the other keys, there is but one white man living that has ever penetrated 
it, and passed through ; it is there the Indians have their hunting-grounds, 
and from where they can retire into the islands in the Ever-glade, and 
can go to the east as far and even beyond New river, and to Charlotte 
harbor on the west. Steamboats of light draught of water, having plenty 
of small boats of the least possible draught, is the only means by which 
you can follow the Indians in their canoes. One should go to Cape 
Florida and proceed east to Indian river, where she can enter and go up 
the lagoon, and the St. Sabastian and St. Lucia rivers ; another should 
go down through Key Biscayno bay (where the light-house is) and into 
Barne's sound, and pass through in boats to Cape Sable ; and another 
should go through from Indian Key to the Cape Sable, and proceed along 
the coast to Cape Roman and Charlotte harbor. Those vessels and boats 
should, by all means, get pilots at Indian key and the neighborhood, who 
have a knowledge of the navigation, as any person unacquainted will 
find the greatest difficulty to get along. 

I am thus particular because I know much inconvenience and difficulty 
will necessarily occur in the fitting out an expedition to go on a coast so 
little known ; and I am certain that if the Indians once get down there 
they can sustain themselves for years against a superior force, and that it 
will be impossible to starve them out. I very much hope that the Gov- 
ernment will see the necessity of destroying those Spanish fisheries, and 



[ 224 ] 206 



of prohibiting their vessels from carrying on any trade on the coast. I 
tender you my services in any way I can be useful in any expedition 
which may be sent to any part of the Territory. 

Respectfully, &c, 

C. FITZPATRICK. 
General R. K. Call. 



No. 8. 



Tallahassee, January 9, 1836. 

Dear Sir : By the enclosed despatch from General Call, you will per- 
ceive that the volunteers have returned home, and the security of the 
frontier of this Territory and Georgia is now at the mercy of the Indians. 
A few regulars, equal to garrison duty, and one hundred and fifty militia, 
are all the force, by General Call's report, which is now in the field. 
Militia are few and widely scattered here ; and as for arms, there are 
none. I send to-morrow an express to Augusta, as in my letter I ad- 
vised you I should do, to procure arms. If successful, an expedition may 
be gotten up again by the last of this month. 

Again let me repeat, that a large and imposing force will be necessary, 
as being the most economical, to put down these Indians. A force barely 
adequate — men with but little confidence in themselves, and are all the 
time going to and coming back from the war — such you will see was the 
case with General Call's volunteers. Their term had expired, and they 
would come home, with an enemy just in view of them. The country 
is full of morasses and swamps, and such a force should be ordered that 
occasional detachments may be sent out in different directions, to inter- 
cept and cut up the enemy, and parties be left to guard depots that ne- 
cessarily may be required to be formed in the rear of the advance. 

Two or three steamboats to cover the coast, to transport troops, and 
to furnish supplies, will also be necessary, and will prove economical. 
Although their cost will be $1,500 or $2,000 a month to the Govern- 
ment, in the end they will prove cheapest. 

I have written to the Governor of Georgia, to know if he cannot take 
the responsibility of sending a force into the field. Prompt action, and 
a good force, will quiet every thing here in forty or sixty days : tardiness, 
and want of decision, may make it last a year. Why not order all the 
Spanish vessels who fish on our coast, and no doubt aid and encourage 
the Indians, under their fishing pretexts, to depart out of our waters? 
The acts of 1794, June 5th, and of 1800, April 24th, give the President 
the power to do so. It is very important, I assure you. If you will au- 
thorize me, I have a steamboat, with naval officers on board, to whom I 
will assign the duty. I think I have already the authority myself, but 
do not desire to act without the approval of the President. 

Yours, 

Lewis Cass, J. H. EATON. 

Secretary of War. 



201 [ 224 ] 

No. 9. 

Tallahassee, January 8, 1836. 

Sir: I enclose you herewith my report of the result of the expedition 
to the Indian country, from which I have just returned. The exposed 
situation of the frontier, the hostile attitude and warlike character of the 
Indians, require that the most prompt and efficient measures should be 
adopted without delay, for prosecuting the war in the enemy's 
The precise strength of the enemy has not been ascertained. It is vari- 
ously estimated by men of intelligence to be from 1,200 to 2,000. It is 
known they have applied to the Creek Indians for assistance, and no 
doubt is entertained that a considerable number of warriors from that 
nation is already in the country. Though I have, with the forces lately 
under my command, driven back the enemy within his own boundary 
along the whole line of the frontier, from the Suwannee to the St. John's, 
yet, on the east of the latter river, at the last intelligence, the work of 
desolation was still progressing, and all the plantations south of Tampa 
were destroyed. The Indians are resolved not to abandon the country 
which contains the bones of their fathers. They have raised the toma- 
hawk in despair : they are waging a war of extermination, and the safety 
of our fellow-citizens requires that not a moment should be lost in car- 
rying the war into their own country. As yet no preparation has been 
made. General Clinch, when I left him on the 3d instant, could not have 
carried into the field a regular force of more than one hundred and fifty 
men, from additional companies were said to be at Tampa bay, or on 
their march from that place to Fort King. But no certain intelligence 
had been received, and some fears are entertained that they may have 
been cut off by the enemy. 

The country in which we must meet the enemy is peculiarly favorable 
to the Indian mode of warfare. It is interspersed with swamps and ham- 
mocks, where alone they are to be found, and in which they have a de- 
cided advantage. To bring this war to a speedy and successful issue, an 
army of 2,500 or 3,000 men should be immediately ordered into the field. 
I have written to the President of the United States, asking for 1,000 
regular troops. I would now recommend that 1,500 foot-men, well armed 
and equipped, be requested from the State of Georgia, for the term of 
six months, and that all the disposable force of the Territory be called 
into service for the same length of time. With such a force, well em- 
ployed, the war may be brought to a conclusion in a short time ; but it is 
in vain to think of subduing a fierce and desperate enemy, selecting his 
own ground for battle, with a force less efficient. 

The detachment of one hundred and fifty volunteers which I met on 

its way to the frontier, I placed under the command of Colonel Parish, 

whom I directed to report himself to General Clinch. They will serve 

as a guard to the settlement, until an army can be carried into the field. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

Governor Eaton. R, K. CALL. 



[ 224 ] 208 

No. 10. 

Tallahassee, January 8, 1836. 

Sin: The term of service for which the volunteers from Middle Flor- 
ida engaged having expired, they are now on their return march to this 
place, where they will be discharged. They have made a most active 
and fatiguing expedition. They have rendered faithful and important 
services. We found the enemy in possession of the country for thirty 
miles above the Indian boundary. The inhabitants have abandoned their 
homes, and were collected in a few small forts constructed in the differ- 
ent neighborhoods. The Indians, divided into small bands, were spread- 
ing desolation over the whole land. The prompt and rapid march of the 
troops under my command, soon routed and drove them within their own 
limits. 

Having accomplished this important object, the disposable regular force 
under the command of General Clinch, consisting of about two hundred 
men, was united with the volunteers at Fort Drane,.from where we re- 
solved to make a rapid movement into the enemy's country, and attack 
them in their towns. The volunteers from Middle Florida had at that 
time but four days to serve, and we were able to carry with us only a 
sufficient supply of provisions and forage for that period. Our guide had 
informed us that in two days' march we should arrive at the Withlacoo- 
chee river, at a point where it might be easily forded, and that within a 
mile from the river we should find a large town of the enemy. On the 
morning of the 31st of December we from our camp before day, 

and soon after it was light we arrived on the bank of the river, where we 
were greatly surprised to find, instead of a ford over which to pass, we 
had to encounter a deep and rapid stream, with no other means of cross- 
ing than that of an Indian canoe found at the opposite side. The regulars 
crossed ; and when a very small portion only of the volunteers had gain- 
ed the opposite bank, the Indians in a large body commenced a spirited 
and unexpected attack, which continued for some time. During the fight 
the volunteers continued to cross the river and support the troops engaged, 
until the enemy was driven back. It was owing to their appearance in 
the field, and the gallant intrepidity with which they fought, that the reg- 
ular troops were not entirely cut off. It was to them as well as myself 
a of deep mortification and regret, that so few of us should have 

been enabled to participate in the danger and glory of the day : but, 
from the time of attack, and the circumstances under which it was made, 
it was unavoidable. 1 crossed the river myself during the fight, and did 
not arrive on the field till it was nearly ended. 

Colonel Parkhill and Colonel Head were in the staff of General Clinch. 
They, with my aid-de-camp, Major Wellford, were among the foremost 
in the field, and were greatly distinguished for their bravery and useful- 
ness during the fight. The loss of the enemy is variously estimated at 
from forty to sixty killed. Our loss was four killed and fifty-nine wound- 
ed. Among the latter was Captain Graham, Lieutenants Campbell, Gra- 
ham, and Ridgely, of the regular troops, Colonel John Warren, Major 
Cooper, and Lieutenant , of the volunteers. None of the 

wounds of the officers are considered dangerous, except Major Cooper's. 



209 [ 221 ] 

He was shot through the lung?, but hopes are entertained of his recover- 
ing. 

The number of our wounded, and our want of supplies to enable us 
to proceed further into the country, compelled us to recross the river. 
This was successfully done about sundown, in the presence of the enemy, 
who appeared to have been reinforcing during the whole day. The vol- 
unteers formed the right and left flanks, resting on the river above and 
below the landing. The regulars formed the centre part of the line, 
uniting with the volunteers. The enemy formed a line some distance 
from us, covering our whole front. The war-whoop was repeatedly 
given along the line, and we were in momentary expectation of an attack, 
while recrossing the river on a log, which in the course of the evening 
had been prepared for that purpose. We encamped at dark on this side 
of the river, under the sound of the war-whoop, but the enemy had suf- 
fered too severely to renew the attack ; and the next day we returned 
with our wounded to Fort Drane. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. K. CALL. 

His Excellency John H. Eaton, 

Governor of Florida. 



No. 11. 



War Department, January 11, 1836. 

Sir : I am instructed by the President to say to you, that you will con- 
tinue your operations against the Indians until they are reduced to sub- 
mission. You will grant them no pacification but upon their uncon- 
ditional surrender, and with a distinct understanding that they embark 
immediately on board the vessels that have been provided, and proceed, 
without delay, to the country that has been set apart for them west of the 
Mississippi river. All the necessary arrangements for that purpose will 
be made, in conformity with the previous instructions, by General Thomp- 
son, in conjunction with yourself. From the state of feeling manifested 
by the Indians, it will be proper that the necessary guards should accom- 
pany them. And for this you will provide as in your opinion circum- 
stances will require. When a pacification is granted to the Indians, they 
must place themselves immediately under your control, and must be 
properly secured until they can be embarked. Such of them as you can 
ascertain have been guilty of private murders, previous to the commence- 
ment of hostilities, or any other infraction of the laws, you will appre- 
hend and deliver over to the civil authorities for examination. 
\ Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

LEWIS CASS. 

General D. L. Clinch, 

Fort King, Florida. 
14 



f 224 ] 210 

No. 12. 

Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, January 21, 1836. 
Order No. 7. 

The commanding officers of the companies at Forts Johnston and Ma- 
con, in North Carolina, and at Savannah and Augusta arsenal, in Geor- 
gia, will proceed forthwith to Picolata, Florida, with the effective force 
of their respective companies, leaving only the ordnance sergeants and 
invalids. The medical officers of the army, at the abo.ve posts, will ac- 
company their respective garrisons. 

The detachment of dragoon recruits at New York, and the detachment 
of recruits for the artillery and infantry at the same place, will proceed 
to Picolata, Florida; the former under the Command of Captain Whar- 
ton, of dragoons; the latter under the command of Lieutenant Herring, 
of 3d artillery. Lieutenants Simonton and Wheelock, of dragoons, and 
Lieutenant Beall, of 1st infantry, are assigned to the command of Capt. 
Wharton; and Lieutenant Poole, of the 3d, and Lieutenant Humphreys, 
of the 2d artillery, are assigned to the command of Lieutenant Herring. 
The following officers are relieved from the duty to which they are 
now assigned, and will forthwith repair to Picolata, Florida, on their way 
to join their respective companies : 

2d Lt. Morris, of the 1st artillery, .... company C. 
1st Lt. Chambers, 2d " .... « G. 

IstLt. Dancy, 2d " .... « D. 

" . _ " F. 

" .... "A. 

" .... « G. 

" .... « G. 

« .... « H. 

" .... « H. 

Assistant Surgeons Myers, Suter, and Cuyler, will repair without de- 
lay to Florida, and report to the officer in command. 

Assistant Surgeon Worrell will repair to New York without delay, and 
there await the orders of the Surgeon General. 

Major General Scott will repair to Florida, and take command of the 
troops operating against the Indians in that quarter. Besides his per- 
sonal staff, he will be joined by Captain Canfield, of the topographical 
engineers, Lieutenant Van Buren, aid-de-camp, and Lieutenant John- 
son, of the 4th artillery. 

The commanding officer of Fort Monroe will send two officers from 
his command, the one to Fort Macon, the other to Fort Johnston, in 
North Carolina, to take charge of those posts during the absence of their 
respective garrisons. 

The chiefs of the Staff departments will make the necessary arrange- 
ments for the transportation and supplies for the troops destined for 
Florida. 

By order of Major General Macomb. 

S. COOPER, 
Acting Adjutant General. 



2d Lt. 


Burnett, 


2d 


2d Lt. 


Stockton, 


2d 


2d Lt. 


Fuller, 


2d 


2d Lt. 


Ward, 


2d 


2d Lt. 


Linnard, 


2d 


2d Lt. 


Burk, 


2d 



211 [ 224 ] 

No. 13. 

War Department, January 21, 1830. 

Sin: The recent intelligence which has been received here respect* 
uig the state of affairs in Florida, has rendered it expedient to order 
Major General Scott to proceed to that Territory, and to assume the di- 
rection of the operations against the Seminole Indians, and also against 
the Creek Indians, should these latter have engaged in hostilities, as, 
from recent information, there is some reason to apprehend. 

I am instructed by the President to request you to call into the ser- 
vice of the United States, and to place under the command of Major 
General Scott, such portion of the militia of Georgia, Alabama, and 
Florida, as he may require to be employed in suppressing the hostility of 
the above-mentioned Indians. It is expected that the militia thus called 
out will serve for at least three months after they arrive at the place of 
rendezvous, unless sooner discharged. 

I beg leave to suggest that the authority thus conferred upon General 
Scott will enable him to increase, modify, or revoke any requisition 
which may have been made by General Clinch, in conformity with the 
letter which I had the honor to address to you on the 8th instant. This 
authority will also supersede the powers intrusted to those officers on this 
subject, as soon as General Scott shall have taken the personal direction 
of operations. 

Very respectfully, &c. 

LEWIS CASS. 

His Excellency Wm. Schley, 

Governor of Georgia, Milled geville. 

His Excellency C. C. Clay, 

Governor of Alabama. 

His Excellency John II. Eaton, 

Governor of Florida, Tallahassee. 



War Department, January 21, 1836. 

Sir : The recent intelligence which has been received here respect- 
ing the state of affairs in Florida, has rendered it expedient to order 
Major General Scott to proceed to that Territory, and to assume the direc- 
tion of the operations against the Seminole Indians, and also against the 
Creek Indians, should these latter have engaged in hostilities, as, from 
recent information, there is some reason to apprehend. 

I am instructed by the President to request you to call into the ser- 
vice of the United States, and to place under the command of Major 
General Scott, such portion of the militia of the State of South Carolina 
as he may require to be employed in suppressing the hostility of the 
above-mentioned Indians. It is expected that the militia thus called out 



[ 224 J 212 

will serve for at least three months after their arrival at the place of ren- 
dezvous, unless sooner discharged. 

I beg leave to suggest that the authority thus conferred upon General 
Scott will enable him to increase, modify, or revoke, any requisition 
which may have been made by Generals Clinch or Eustis, in conform- 
ity with the letters which I had the honor to address to you on the Slh 
and 17th instant. 

This authority will also supersede the powers intrusted to those offi- 
cers on this subject, as soon as General Scott shall have taken the per- 
sonal direction of operations. 

Very iespectfully, &c, 

LEWIS CASS. . 
His Excellency Geo. McDuffie, 

Governor of South Carolina, Charleston, S. C. 



No 14. 



Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, January 25, 1S36. 
General Order, No 9. 

1. The 6th regiment of infantry will be prepared to move from Jef- 
k rson barracks to Fort Jesup, Louisiana, as soon as the season and nav- 
igation will permit. Brevet Brigadier General H. Atkinson will sec to 
the execution of this order, as to the time of departure of the regiment, 
but will remain at Jefferson barracks, and continue in his present com- 
mand. Surgeon Findlay, and Assistant Surgeon Hughey, will proceed 
with the regiment to Fort Jesup. 

2. Major A. II. Thompson, now of the 6th infantry, and Captain J. 
Rogers, of the same regiment, will be relieved from the recruiting ser- 
vice and join their regiment, with all the disposable unattached recruits. 

3. Captain H. Smith, Lieutenants Cady, Freeman, and Williams, on 
engineer service, and Lieutenant Drayton, on topographical duty, all of 
the 6th infantry, will forthwith be relieved and join their regiment. 

4. Fort Armstrong will be evacuated as early as practicable, and the 
garrison, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Davenport, of the 1st in- 
fantry, will be transferred to Fort Snelling, St. Peter's, except one officer, 
one non-commissioned officer, and ten men, to take charge of the public 
property at that post till it be disposed of. Assistant Surgeon Emerson 
will proceed with the command to Fort Snelling. 

5. The companies of the 1st regiment of artillery, respectively sta- 
tioned at Forts Severn and Washington, and the Washington arsenal, will 
immediately proceed to Fort Monroe, and thence, without delay, to join 
the army in Florida, via Savannah, and the St. John's river. The bat- 
talion will be commanded by Major Gates. The following officers of the 
regiment on detached service will forthwith be relieved, and join their 



213 f 224 J 

respective companies, for active service, without delay : 1st Lieutenants 
A. J). Mackay and E. S. Sibley, from engineer, and 2d Lieutenant D. 
E. Hale, from ordnance duty. Assistant Surgeon Hawkins will accom- 
pany the battalion of artillery under Major Gates to Fort King, and then 
proceed to comply with his previous orders. 

G. Major N. S. Clark, now of the 2d infantry, will assume command 
at Hancock barracks; and Brevet Major Dearborn, with companies F 
and K, will proceed to Boston harbor and garrison Fort Independence. 
The quarters will forthwith be cleared and be prepared for the accom- 
modation of the troops, by the proper departments, and, when ready, the 
commanding engineer at Boston will notify Major Dearborn accordingly. 

7. The officers of the proper departments will furnish the necessary 
transportation, supplies, and all facilities for the execution of this order. 

8. Captain G. W. Allen, 4th infantry, now on recruiting service, will 
repair to New Port, Kentucky, there relieve Major Thompson, and as- 
sume the duties of superintendent in the Western Department. Lieut. 
Barry, of the 1st regiment artillery, is assigned to duty at New Port, 
Kentucky. 

By order of Alexander Macomb, major general commanding in chief. 

R. JONES, 

Adjutant General. 



No. 15. 



War Department, January 29, 1S36. 

Sir : By a report from the collector of Key West, it appears that much 
alarm prevails there in consequence of the defenceless state of the 
island. 

I have to request, as soon as you can properly do so, that you detach 
one of the companies under your command to reoccupy that place. 

Very respectfully, &c, 

LEWIS CASS, 

Secretary of War. 
Major General Scott, 

Augusta, Georgia. 



War Department, January 29, 1S36. 

Sir : I have been informed by General Hamilton that, under certain 
resolutions of the citizens of Charleston, volunteers have been called 
into the service, and provisions, ammunition, &c. purchased, with a view 
to aid in relieving the inhabitants of Florida from the devastations of the 
Seminole Indians. 

I have to request that, so far as this force may be useful to you, it may 
be received into the public service ; and that you will also authorize the 



[ 224 ] 214 

reception and payment of the above-mentioned articles, if you shall need 
them in the prosecution of the duties intrusted to you. I am desirous 
that, so far as expenses have been incurred under the above resolutions, 
and with the generous motive which no doubt prompted them, that can 
be met agreeably to law and the usages ot the service, this should be 
done ; and I presume this object will be most readily effected by taking 
the volunteers and the material provided into the public service. Still 
this measure must depend upon your own view of your wants, and of your 
means of supplying them. 

I have requested the Navy Department to issue the necessary instruc- 
tions to the revenue cutters employed on the Florida coast, to receive 
your orders, and also to desire Commodore Dallas, with the squadron un- 
der his command, to co-operate with you. Be pleased to communicate 
freely with Commodore Dallas. 

Very respectfully, 

LEWIS CASS. 

Major General Scott, 

Augusta, Georgia. 



No. 16. 



Steamboat Roanoke, 

River Roanoke, January 25, 183G. 

Sir : General Scott directs me to present his compliments, and begs 
that you will send to Augusta, Georgia, several sets of Infantry Tactics — 
1st and 2d volumes — for the use of the militia, and several other sets of 
the same to Fort King, Florida. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

A. CANFIELD, 
Captain Topographical Engineers. 
General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General United States Army. 

P. S. — We have lost, by an accident on the railroad, fifteen hours \ 
my letter from Petersburg, Virginia, should have been dated January, 
21th. 



No. 17. 



Fayetteville, N. C, 

January 27, 183G. 

Sir : General Scott directs me to say that he wishes a quantity of 
tents to be sent to the St. John's, East Florida, that will make, with 



215 [ 224 ] 

those now there, a sufficient number for 1 ,500 men ; and camp-kettles and 
mess-pans for 3,000 men. 

By the accident on the railroad, we have lost twenty-four hours. 
We shall probably stop one day at Columbia, two days at Augusta, and 
then proceed by way of Savannah. 

I am, sir, most respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

A. CANFIELD, 
Captain Topographical Engineers. 
General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



No. IS. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta, Georgia, January Si, 1836. 

Sir : I arrived here yesterday, after losing a day by an accident on 
the Petersburg railroad, and after stopping another at Columbia. 

No important intelligence has readied me from the theatre of war, in 
Florida, except that the Seminoles are in greater force than was suppo- 
sed, by the incorporation of captured and fugitive blacks, and the arrival of 
small parties from the Creeks in Alabama. 1 am happy to add that it 
is also reported that Brigadier General Clinch has communicated with 
the St. John's river, and received from thence several wagon-loads of 
supplies, and a detachment of recruits. 

At Columbia, I learned from Brigadier General Eustis that he had 
called upon the Governor of South Carolina for a detachment of GOO men. 
The Governor being absent, 1 addressed a letter to him, requesting that 
the force might be extended to a regiment of ten companies, making 740 
men, including sergeants, corporals, and musicians. On my way hither, 
I found that regimental meetings had been ordered by the Governor, for 
the purpose of furnishing the force required by Brigadier General Eustis, 
and heard that one regiment had given, by volunteering, the company 
required of it. In regard to the object of the call— the war in Florida — I 
witnessed every where, on my route, an excellent spirit on the part 
of the South Carolinians. 

On receiving, at this place, from Colonel Lindsay, and other well-in- 
formed persons, better intelligence respecting the force of the enemy, and 
the character of the country in which I have to conduct the war, my views 
and measures have been materially modified. It is now my opinion that 
the Seminoles cannot be promptly reduced to submission by a force much 
short of 5,000 men, and that the greater part of this force ought to be 
mounted. 

I have accordingly made a second requisition upon the Governor of 
South Carolina, and for a regiment of mounted men, to rendezvous at 
Purysburg, on the lower Savannah river ; whence I propose to cause 
them to march into Florida via Picolata. And I have required of the 
Governor of Georgia two regiments of mounted men, to which I propose 



[ 224 ] 216 

to give nearly the same direction — that is to say, Picolata, FortDrane,or 
Fort King. For Tampa bay, and to co-operate thence with the forces to be 
assembled on the St. John's river and its vicinity, I have further made a 
requisition upon the Governor of Alabama for a fifth regiment, to serve 
on foot, and which I have requested him to cause to rendezvous at Mo- 
bile. Colonel Lindsay I shall despatch from this place, for the purposes 
of mustering this regiment into service, and of furnishing it with arms, ac- 
coutrements, subsistence, and the necessary means of transportation 
to Tampa bay, where, having arrived, he will be instructed to assume the 
command of the regiment and the companies of artillery now at that post. 

I am afraid it will be supposed that 1 have called for too large a militia 
force for the suppression of the Seminoles, but I have not conversed with 
an intelligent person in the South who does not believe an army oi 5,000 
men indispensable to the speedy accomplishment of that object ; and I 
have required that the greater part of the force shall be mounted, as being 
infinitely more effective against Indians than the same numbers on foot. 
The theatre of operations, also, I learn from persons much better acquaint- 
ed with it than myself, is much less unfavorable to the movements and 
subsistence of horses than I had supposed, and I shall take care to have 
ample supplies of corn placed at Tampa bay, and on the St. John's. 

[I find here a large number of muskets, but no accoutrements, and no 
cartridges for them, and the public powder being utterly unfit for service, 
Colonel Lindsay has, in order to supply the immediate demands of the 
service, been obliged to purchase powder, and to detain Captain Baden's 
company to make cartridges. Why we have taken the trouble to build 
arsenals, and to deposite muskets, without acoutrements, and without car- 
tridges, it is not for me to say. Doubtless the three should always be found 
together.] 

This arsenal is also without knapsacks, and Brigadier General Eustis 
writes to Colonel Lindsay that there are less than 2,000 in the har- 
bor of Charleston. The latter informs me that he has required of Ma- 
jor Garland 3,500. I hope that they have already been shipped to Sa- 
vannah for Picolata, together with tents for 1,500 men, in addition to 
the number now in the use of the troops in Florida, in store at this place 
and in Charleston. The 1,500 additional tents I asked Major Garland, 
whilst at Washington, to have sent without delay. Tents, in sufficient 
numbers to cover at least one-half of the men 1 shall have in the field ; 
musket accoutrements for every musket, and knapsacks for every man, 
are indispensable. Haversacks are equally wanted ; but as it would be 
in vain, I fear, to inquire for these at any of our depots, I have already given 
orders to have a sufficient number made. 

Lieutenant Colonel Talcott told me, at Washington, that 500 of Hall's 
patent rifles had been sent to Charleston, and, on inquiring of Colonel 
Bomford, lie stated the number sent thither to be 2,500. He added that 
every rifle was accompanied with every thing necessary to its use in the 
field. As it is my intention to arm a large portion of the militia called 
for with this rifle, I shall be infinitely distressed to learn that any part of 
Colonel Bom ford's statement, made to me, shall prove inaccurate. 

I shall want, on the St. John's river, say at Picolata, in the next three 
months, about 320,000 rations, and, in the same time, at Tampa bay, 
160,000 — including the number which may now be supposed to be at the 



217 [ 224 ] 

two places. Of the meat part of the rations, I wish a third part to consist 
of bacon, (side pieces,) a third part of salt pork, and the remainder of 
fresh beef, which I shall cause to be purchased, and to move on the hoof 
with the army. Jn respect to bread, I wish at least three-fourths to be 
in the form called hard ; for we shall have no time to bake for ourselves, 
and hard bread is more portable than soft, or the flour necessary for 
the one or the other. Please give a memorandum to the above effect to 
the Commissary General of Subsistence ; that will suffice for him. 

I think of setting out to-morrow evening for Miiledgeville, in order to 
confer with the Governor on the hostile dispositions recently evinced by 
the Creek Indians on the borders of this State. From the facts which 
have reached me, I think it probable that I shall deem it necessary to 
place a body of Georgia militia, and another like force from Alabama, in 
observation upon those Indians, as well to hold them in awe as to pre- 
vent their sending further reinforcements to the Seminoles. 

This letter ought properly to be addressed to the Secretary of War ; 
but, as the General-in-chief complained, on a lormer occasion, that I did 
not communicate with him, I address myself to you for the information of 
both the Secretary and the General-in-chief. 
I have the honor to remain, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

VVINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 

P. S. — I expect to be back here at the end of three days, and at Sa- 
vannah in a week. 

W. S. 



No. 19. 



Charleston, January 31, 1836. 

General : I have seen General Eustis, and placed him in possession 
of your letter. I have also said to him what you desired. Colonel 
Bankhead will leave here probably on Tuesday for Savannah. There 
is a letter here, directed to you, from Major Garland, stating that tents 
for 1,000 men are ordered to Savannah. This letter is enclosed here- 
with. I am sorry to say that your fears as to the rifles were well found- 
ed. Not one of Hall's has been sent here ; there are, however, 200 on 
hand, of the old pattern. There are but 38 common tents on hand, and 
none of any other kind at this place. 

General Eustis is of opinion that both horses and mules should be 
purchased. 

Nothing has been received from Fort King since the 6th instant ; not 
much apprehension, however, is entertained of its safety. Captain 
Drane, with about 80 men, well armed, left Picolata about the 11th, with 
provisions for that post : of these, also, nothing has been heard. If they 



[ 224 J 218 

had not succeeded in reaching their destination, the had news would 
probably have reached this city. With an apology for this scrawl, 
I am, General, 

Your most obedient servant, 

A. VAN BUR EN. 
Major General Scott, 

Augusta, Georgia. 



No. 20. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta , Georgia, February 2, 1836. 

Having ascertained that the Governor of this State would be absent 
from Milledgeville to-day and to-morrow, I have delayed setting out to 
see him till this evening. I shall be back here in two or three days, and 
then proceed to Savannah, where I shall necessarily be detained longer 
than I could wish. 

As apprehended, of the five hundred patent rifles said by Lieutenant 
Colonel Talcott to be at Charleston, and the 2,500, as reported by Colo- 
nel Bomford, not one has arrived ! I wish this fact to be distinctly 
placed under the eyes of the Secretary of War. From the want of 
rifles we shall be obliged to arm the volunteers and draughts with mus- 
kets, and here again, although we have muskets in abundance, at this 
arsenal and at Charleston, we have (as reported to me by Brigadier 
General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay) but about two thousand five hun- 
dred musket accoutrements! It is useless, under such disappointments, 
to waste time in sending to the arsenal at Mount Vernon. 1 shall take 
it for granted that that depot, like all the other ordnance establishments 
in this quarter, is deficient in its supplies. 

In this state of disappointment and vexation, I shall endeavor to bor- 
row of South Carolina, say 1,500 musket accoutrements, and twice as 
many knapsacks ; but it is doubtful whether South Carolina has them to 
lend. Our store-houses are equally deficient in camp-kettles. These 
1 have no hope of borrowing, and shall therefore immediately give 
orders to have as many made here, at Savannah, and Charleston, as I 
shall probably want. 

I have just received from Major Garland an invoice of tents for one 
thousand men ordered to Savannah. I asked him for one-half more, and 
he has sent no other article of camp equipage. 

Musket cartridges, say 160,000 rounds, I wish to be immediately sent 
from the north to Picolata. The companies of Captains Baden and Van 
Ness, here and at Charleston, arc now engaged in making a supply for 
immediate use. On the subject of the strange deficiency under this 
head I have already (in my last letter) spoken with indignation. 

I have to ask that the attempt be yet made to send to the St. John's 
river twenty-five hundred of Hall's patent rifles, ivith every thing ne- 
cessary for their use in the field. They may possibly arrive in time. 



219 [ 224 J 

Copies of my letters to the Governors of South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, and Florida ; also, to Colonel Lindsay, who will leave here in 
a day or two, will be sent to you by one of my staff, to-morrow, in my 
absence. 

The Seminole force, I have every reason to believe, is much greater 
than was apprehended at the time I left Washington. Governor McDuffie, 
among many others, strongly recommends that an overwhelming force 
should be marched into Florida at once. 

I fear that I shall have a difficulty in obtaining the two regiments 
mounted, asked for from this State. 

Cannot the 4th infantry be ordered from Louisiana to the theatre of 
operations ? Volunteers to occupy the United States barracks at New 
Orleans, and to keep guard in that city, might readily be obtained, by 
arrangement with the Governor of Louisiana, for a few months. I am 
strongly tempted to carry this idea into execution. 

I have reason to believe that the greater part of the Creeks, on the 
borders of this State, now remaining in the nation, are disposed to main- 
tain peace with us. The band called Euchees may be excepted. Be- 
tween it and the whites, near Columbus, there has been some fighting, 
six or ten days since ; and no doubt many of the young Creeks have 
gone off to join the Seminoles. All these matters I shall understand 
better when I shall have conversed with Governor Schley. 

On looking again at Major Garland's letter, I do not perceive that the 
tents are to be sent to New York for shipment, in case the Delaware 
should be closed with ice. I may not, therefore, hear of them till the 
next general thaw. I beg that twice that number of wall and common tents 
be immediately sent to Florida, from New York, together with camp- 
kettles for 1,500 men, as I may not be able to have made here, at Savan- 
nah, and Charleston, half the number wanted of the latter article. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. Gen. Jones, 

Adft Gen. U. S. Army. 



No. 21 



Augusta, Georgia, 

February 3, 1836. 

General : I have the honor to transmit, by General Scott's order, 
copies of his letters to the Governors of South Carolina, Georgia, Ala- 
bama, and Florida, and to Colonel Lindsay. 

With the highest respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

J. E. JOHNSTON, 
Lieutentant Artillery. 
Brig. General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army. 



[ 224 220 

No. 22. 

Headquarters, Eastern Department, 
Columbia, S. C, January 29, 1836. 

Sir: With this I have the honor to transmit to you a duplicate com- 
munication from the Secretary of War. 

By a letter from Brigadier General Eustis, just received, I learn that 
he has made a call upon your Excellency for six hundred men. I will 
ask that that force be extended to a regiment, and that it consist exclu- 
sively of infantry, or infantry and riflemen — that is to say, of ten com- 
panies, with the field and staff provided for by the acts of Congress on 
the subject. 

Volunteers will be gladly accepted in lieu of militia draughts, and I 
presume that they may be more readily obtained. For greater explicit- 
ness I will add that mounted infantry or riflemen are not required. 

I beg leave to suggest that it would much hasten the arrival of the 
force on the theatre of operations, say the St. John's river, East Florida, 
if your Excellency would have the goodness to designate for the compa- 
nies several different points of rendezvous, in the navigable waters of 
the State, convenient for embarkation on board of the steamboats. 

Arms and accoutrements shall be supplied by the United States. 
Any volunteers from the State already accepted to serve for the period 
of three months, unless sooner discharged, may be considered as a part 
of the force herein called for. 

I shall set out to-night for Augusta, Georgia, where I may be detained 
several days, and then expect to proceed to Savannah. At the one or 
other place, I shall be happy to learn from your Excellency what points 
have been given for the rendezvous of the South Carolina regiment. 
I have the honor to remain, 
With high respect, 

Your Excellency's 

Most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To his Ex'cy George McDuffie, 

Governor of South Carolina. 



No. 23. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836. 

Sir : Since I had the honor to address you on the 29th instant, I find 
it necessary to provide for a larger force than was then deemed neces- 
sary, to put down the Seminolcs in Florida, and to hold in check the 
Creeks in Alabama. I have accordingly now to call upon your Ex- 
cellency for a regiment of mounted men (to be armed .as infantry or 
riflemen) for service in Florida, in addition to the regiment of foot 
already called for from South Carolina. 



221 [ 224 ] 

I will ask your Excellency to be pleased to order the companies of 
mounted men, as soon as draughted, or raised by volunteering, to rendez- 
vous at Purysburg, on the Savannah river, at that place. An officer of 
the United States army shall be in waiting to muster into the service of 
the United States the companies, as they shall successively arrive, and 
to furnish the arms and accoutrements which may be required. The 
period of service for both regiments will be three months, unless sooner 
discharged, and if your Excellency should prefer that the two regiments 
furnished by your State should be considered as forming a brigade, be 
pleased to designate the usual general staff for the same, and they shall 
be accepted and mustered into the service of the United States. 

Hoping to hear from you on the subject of this and my former letter, 
I will add that I expect to remain in this place four or five days longer, 
and, if obliged to visit Milledgeville to procure better intelligence re- 
specting the temper and movements of the Creeks, that I shall return 
here within the time specified. 

I have the honor to remain, 

Your Excellencv's most ob't serv't, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To his Ex'cy George McDuffie, 

Governor of South Carolina. 

P. S. But for the impression that the greater part of the expected 
theatre of War in Florida would be unfavorable to the subsistence and 
movements of cavalry, I should have asked for none but mounted men. 
On conversing with Colonel Lindsay and others at this place, that im- 
pression has been materially changed ; and, as it will probably be more 
agreeable to the South Carolinians to volunteer to serve on horse-back, 
I will now say that, if any of the companies of the regiment first called 
for should present themselves at Purysburg mounted, they will be glad- 
ly accepted as part of that regiment. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 24. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta, Georgia, February 1, 1S36. 

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's 
letter of the 30th ultimo, just brought to me by an express. 

It will be quite as well for the whole force asked for in the first in- 
stance, by Brigadier General Eustis, to report to him in Charleston, as 
your Excellency suggests, as for it to proceed by company and by dif- 
ferent routes towards the theatre of operations, as was suggested by 
myself. 

By the third section of the " act more effectually to provide for the 
national defence by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United 
States," the organization of the militia was fixed, and has since under- 



[ 224 J £222 

gone but slight modifications. Such of these as may be material I will 
briefly notice. The original act was approved May 8, 1792. 

By the said third section "each regiment (shall consist) of two bat- 
talions; each battalion of five companies; each company of sixty-four 
privates." * * * " To each company one captain, one lieutenant, one 
ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, one drummer, and one fifer or 
bugler. That there shall be a regimental staff, to consist of one adjutant, 
one quartermaster, to rank as lieutenants, one paymaster, one surgeon, 
one surgeon's mate, one sergeant major, one drum major, and one fife 
major." 

The material modification of this act is found in one entitled " An act 
concerning field officers of the militia," passed April 20, 1S1G, and in 
these words:" that from, (&c.) instead of one lieutenant colonel com- 
mandant to each regiment, and one major to each battalion of the militia, 
as is provided by the act (May 8, 1792, above quoted,) there shall be 
one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, and one major to each regiment of 
the militia consisting of two battalions." 

I will, therefore, beg your Excellency to cause the second regiment I 
have had the honor to call for from South Carolina, to be organized ac- 
cording to the provisions of law ; and, also, the first, as far as may now be 
practicable, without too great a loss of time. 

I understood at Washington that mounted men or mounted infantry 
and riflemen were, in respect to pay, considered as cavalry ; but that the 
officers' monthly pay was regulated by that of infantry. In respect to 
the former, I refer your Excellency to the act approved January 2, 1795, 
sections 1, 2, and 3. 

The general staff of a brigade is fixed by the act April 18, 1814, in 
these words: "To each brigade an aid-de-camp, with the rank of cap- 
tain, and quartermasters of brigade, heretofore provided lor by law," 
shall have the rank of captain. "The fundamental act of 1792 having 
said that there shall be " to each brigade one brigadier general, with one 
brigade inspector, to serve also as brigade major, with the rank of major." 

Expecting to be back at this place from Milledgeville in a day or two, 
and to remain till perhaps the 6th or 7th instant, 
I have the honor to remain, 
With the highest respect, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

His Excellency Governor McDufeie, fyc. 



No. 25. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta^ Georgia^ February 2, 1836. 

Sir: By returns from Charleston, just received, I have to apprehend 
a delay in receiving from the North the full supply of knapsacks, musket 
accoutrements, tents, and camp-kettles, which will be required for the 
Florida campaign. To save time, I will beg your Excellency to instruct 
the store-keepers of South Carolina, at Charleston or elsewhere, to let 



223 [ 224 ] 

the United States have such of those articles as may be upon hand and 
which may be required. 

Receipts shall be given for the articles, and I pledge myself to your 
Excellency to cause the ai tides furnished to be replaced in kind, from 
the depots of the United States, without delay, and without expense to 
South Carolina. 

Your Excellency will greatly oblige me by causing a note to be written 
to Brigadier General Eustis, at Charleston, in reply to this request, as I 
may be absent from Augusta in the direction of Milledgeville for several 
days. A copy of this letter I shall cause to be sent to Brigadier General 
Eustis for his information. 

I have the honor to remain, 
With high respect, 

Your Excellency's most ob't serv't, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
His Excellency George McDuffie, 

Governor of South Carolina. 



No. 26. 
Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to transmit, with this, a duplicate communica- 
tion from the Secretary of War. 

In pursuance to the authority conferred upon me, I have now to call 
upon your Excellency to place under my command two regiments of 
mounted men, (infantry, or infantry and riflemen,) for the period of three 
months, unless sooner discharged, and which force 1 will immediately 
cause to be mustered into the service of the United States. 

If it be preferred, the two regiments may be considered as constitu- 
ting a brigade, and the usual general staff for such a corps will at the 
same time be mustered into the service of the United States. 

The force herein called for is destined by me to act against the Semi- 
nole Indians, in Florida ; and I will beg your Excellency to give the 
regiments one or more places of rendezvous, in the direction of (say) 
Picolata, where ample magazines shall be provided. The arms (rifles 
or muskets) and accoutrements which maybe required to render the 
force effective, shall be supplied at the same place, or earlier, according 
to circumstances. 

It is my purpose to be in person, at Picolata, as early, at least, as the 
10th of the next month ; and I need not add how important it is that 
the Georgia force should be there as near that time as practicable. 

In respect to the Creek Indians on the borders of Georgia, and who 
are understood to be unquiet, if not in a state of hostility towards the 
United States, I propose to confer with your Excellency in person, with- 
in the next two or three days. 

In the mean time, I have the honor to be, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To his Excellency Wm. Schley, 

Governor of Georgia. 



[ 224 ] 224 

No. 27. 

Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta, Georgia, January 01, 1806. 

Sir.: I have the honor to transmit, with this, a duplicate communica- 
tion from the Secretary of War. 

In pursuance to the authority conferred upon me, I have now to call 
upon your Excellency to place under my command one regiment of in- 
fantry, or infantry and riflemen, to serve on foot, for three months, (un- 
less sooner discharged,) against the Seminole Indians in Florida. 

I will beg your Excellency to appoint Mobile as the rendezvous for 
the regiment, whither I shall send Colonel Lindsay, of the army, to 
muster it into the service of the United States, and to accompany it to 
its point of destination — Tampa bay. 

Colonel Lindsay will also cause the regiment to be supplied with the 
arms, the accoutrements, the ammunition, subsistence, and whatever else 
may be necessary to its efficiency in the field. 

In respect to the Creek Indians on the borders of Georgia, I will beg 
your Excellency to confer with Colonel Lindsay, to whom I shall give 
such instructions as may be deemed necessary. If, after conferring with 
him, a force should be deemed necessary to observe and hold in check 
the Creeks, I have to request that you will furnish that force, and place 
it in the position that may be determined upon by that conference. The 
force shall be mustered and taken into the service of the United States. 

In the mean time, I need not add how important it is, with a view to 
the operations against the Seminoles, that the regiment from Alabama 
destined to act from Tampa bay, should be speedily raised by draught or 
volunteering, and embark for that place. 
I have the honor to remain, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To his Excellency C. C. Clay, 

Governor of Alabama. 



No. 28. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta, Georgia, February 1, 1S06. 

Sir : With this communication your Excellency will receive a dupli- 
cate one from the Secretary of War. 

I am here engaged in procuring forces to suppress the Seminole In- 
dians. With a view to this, I have asked for one regiment of foot, and 
one of mounted men, from South Carolina; two regiments of mounted 
men from Georgia ; and one regiment of foot from Alabama. The latter 
I have requested the Governor to cause to rendezvous at Mobile, whence 



2^5 [ 224 | 

it will proceed to Tampa bay, when Colonel Lindsay, of the army, who 
will accompany it, will assume the command of the regiment and the 
regular companies he may find in garrison there. All the other troops, 
regular and militia, recently ordered to Florida, or now to be raised, will 
proceed by the St. John's river, open a communication with Brigadier 
General Clinch, form a junction with him and Colonel Lindsay, and, 
having opened a free communication with Tampa bay, take that line as 
a new basis of operations, and prosecute the war with the utmost vigor. 

The South Carolina regiment of foot will be on the St. John's by the 
10th instant: the other regiments will arrive in that quarter later. One 
independent company has already sailed hence for that destination, and 
another will follow from this little patriotic town to-morrow. Brigadier 
General Eustis will accompany the South Carolina regiment of foot, and 
I shall follow closely. 

1 ought to add, that four additional companies of regulars, and one 
hundred and seven dragoons, recruits from New York, are probably al- 
ready in movement for the same destination. In respect to the Creeks 
in Alabama, on the borders of Georgia, whose dispositions are doubtful, 
I shall take measures, in concert with the Governors of Georgia and Ala- 
bama, to hold them in check and in awe, and particularly to prevent them 
from sending reinforcements to the Seminoles. I go for this purpose 
to-morrow to Milledgeviile, and shall write fully to the Governor of 
Alabama. 

When I have added that I suppose it will be of great importance to 
cut the enemy oil" from his fastnesses to the left of the line from the St. 
John's river to Tampa bay, and to throw him to the right, I shall have 
given you an outline of my means and my views. 

In respect to the militia from your Territory, already much harassed by 
the war, I shall be happy to take into the service of the United States 
any four or six hundred mounted men who can be spared from the im- 
mediate defence of their homes, and whom your Excellency may find it 
convenient to put in the field : but I make no positive requisition to that 
effect, at this time. Any force actually imbodied, or which you may 
cause to be imbodied, with not more than the proportion of officers 
fixed by the act of 1792, for "establishing a uniform militia throughout 
the United States," shall be considered as being in the service of the 
United States for the period of three months from the time they em- 
barked, at the request of voUr Excellency. 

I shall be thankful, and pay the necessary expenses, if your Excel- 
lency can find an opportunity to communicate the substance of this letter 
to General Clinch, to whom, though I shall write, I may not be able to 
reach from this quarter. 

1 have the honor to remain, 
With great respect, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 
WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Hon. J. II. Eaton, Governor of Florida. 



15 



r 221 j 



2Q6 



No. 29. 



RTMENT, 

'■eorgia, February 2, 1S3G. 

Sir : You will please repair to Alabama without unnecessary delay, 
and cause to be in readiness at Mobile, the arms, accoutrements, ammu- 
nition, flints, and knapsacks, necessary to equip and render efficient in the 
field a regiment of infantry, which it is expected his Excellency the Gov- 
ernor of Alabama will, under a requisition that I have made to that effect. 
cause to be raised and rendezvous at that city. In the mean time, you 
will correspond with the Governor on the subject of the regiment, and 
endeavor to hasten its arrival at Mobile by any means in your power. 
As soon as aware of its near approach, you will engage the means of 
transporting it to Tampa bay, accompanying it thither, and on your arri- 
v< i assume the command of all the forces, regular and militia, assembled 
at that point. But, prior to the c on at Mobile, you Will muster 

the regiment into the service of the United State:; for the period of three 
months, unless sooner discharged, and immediately after cause the redes 
and articles of war to be read at the head of the several companies. 

In mustering the corps into service, you will be careful to see that 
there be not an excess ol officers compared with the number of men, 
either in grade or number. In this respect you will take as your guides 
the act for " establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States," 
passed the 8th May, 1792, modified, in regard to the field officers, by the 
act of April 20, 1818. 

To procure the arms and equipments mentioned, it may be necessary 
to visit the arsenal at Mount Vernon, or to send to New Orleans. In 
either case, you will require what may be needed in my name, and by 
my authority. 

Should you, in your route to Mobile, learn that the Creek Indians are 
as hostilely disposed against the whites as has been a little time since 
reported, and which reports 1 do not now credit, you will immediately 
confer with the Governor of Alabama on the subject, by letter, and, if 
practicable, in reference to the other duties assigned you, in person, on 
the subject; and in the case of evident necessity, request his Excellency 
to place a regiment or battalion of infantry in observation upon those 
Indians, and I will, in such case, cause the regiment or battalion to be 
mustered into the service of the United States. 

By the 20th of this month, at the latest, I hope to be in sufficient force 
on the St. John's river, or at Fort King, or Fort Diane, to commence a 
system of vigorous operations against the Seminole Indians; and by that 
period you, I think, may be expected to have arrived at Tampa bay. 
Your co-operation from that side may have a powerful influence on the 
result of the campaign ; but I do not wish you to put any thing seriously 
to hazard until you shall have heard from me, or until you shall be posi- 
tively certain that I have pushed the war to within one or two marches 
of your position. In such case, with or without special instructions, you 
will press forward with energy until you open a communication with the 
main army. It is not probable, however, that you will find yourself many 
da/s at a time without instructions from headquarters, and I desire that 



2-27 [ 224 ] 

you will avail yourself of all means to report frequently every thing that 
may he interesting at or about your post. 

It is unofficially reported that Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, with a de- 
tachment of the fourth infantry, has been ordered from New Orleans to 
Tampa bay. If this should be true, your force may be sufficient to enable 
you to leave the necessary garrison, and to operate a junction with the 
main army at the distance of three or four marches. 

Relying fully on your zeal, gallantry, and judgment, for the execution 
of the duties assigned to you, , 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Colonel William Lindsay, 

United States 2d Artillery, tyc. 

P. S. — I have omitted to mention cam}) equipage, which you will also 
endeavor to procure for the Alabama regiment, and I will remind you of 
the great utility of furnishing every man with a haversack. 



No. 30. 



Tallahassee, February 3, 1836. 

Dear Sir : To-night intelligence has reached me, and I greatly rejoice 
at it, that you are to take command of the Florida war. The authorities 
at the city of Washington greatly undervalue the power of this foe, 
taking into consideration the country that is to be operated in. Their 
numerical force cannot be less than 3,000, probably more. To con- 
quer them, a greatly superior force should be sent, to overawe them 
in the first place, and by garrisons and strong depots to hold the country, 
as an advance upon it is made. It will be folly to move against them, 
except such results can be effected ; and, short of three or four thousand 
men, they cannot be attained. In an open field, Greek may meet Greek, 
and contend for the palm of victory ; but amidst the gloomy covert for- 
ests, where the savages can lie concealed, that sort of glory is too inse- 
cure and doubtful. 

Will you permit me to suggest — and I do it with great respect towards 
you, for, suffer me to say, as I hope you well know, that no one reposes 
in you more and greater confidence than I do — that the mode of action 
and operation should be an attack at different points, at one and the same 
time. 

General Clinch is locked in by the enemy at Camp King ; for the last 
thirty days he has had no communication with Tampa bay, distant from 
him about one hundred miles : the enemy occupies the ground between. 
Until the 20th January, which is twenty three days after the fell disaster 
of poor Dade, being in thirty-five miles of the conflict, he was without 
information of the butchery of his detachment. Of course you will per- 
ceive that every thing of communication is cut off between those points. 



[ 224 ] 228 

It is matter of hazard for an express to approach General Clinch, either 
from east or west. 

My suggestion to you is this: that the force you can command from 
Georgia, say 1,000 or 1,200 men, be hastened on to Camp Kins;. General 
Clinch has only about two hundred regulars under command, at this time. 
A few days' provisions will answer. It need not be a matter of concern 
with you about supplies. The Secretary of War writes that 120,000 
rations are ordered from New York, and here and at Tampa will be found 
a supply for 3,000 men for forty or fifty days. 

The Georgia troops should be advanced to Camp King. You should 
proceed here, and go by water from St. Mark's to Tampa. The force 
called out here, 500 men, are coming in ; about 200 are already here. 
I propose sending them by water to Tampa, where there is already about 
250 effectives. The Governor of Georgia speaks of having rendezvoused 
at Thomasville (near here) 400 men : these also should be embarked at 
St. Mark's for Tampa, and thus you will have a force there of 1,200 or 
1,400 men. A like force under Clinch, to advance from the north, would 
enable you to make a junction in three days, and cut of all the With- 
lacoochee Indians. On the other hand, if the advance be made entirely 
from the direction of Camp King, the Indians will retreat before you, 
not meet you ; and on their way may destroy the post and friendly In- 
dians at Tampa, and our transports there. Three of our ships of war 
are there, but cannot approach the fort near enough to give aid. 

I write in haste, and for any further particulars refer you to Colonel 
Hawkins. 

With great respect, 

JOHN H. EATON, 

To Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott. Governor of Florida. 



No. 31. 



War Department, 

February 2, 1S3G. 

Sir: I have the honor to transmit for your information a copy of a 
letter this day addressed to the Governor of Georgia. If the force called 
out by the Governor of Georgia is in your opinion required, you will 
please receive it into service ; and, if not, it will be discharged without 
delay. 

So far as the expenditures which have been incurred for the Florida 
militia, received into service by General Clinch, can, from the state of the 
accounts, be met with reference to this Department, you are requested to 
direct their payment. Your acquaintance with the laws and usages of 
the service will enable you to judge what cases may be safely paid without 
this reference. The Paymaster General will give the paymasters the 
necessary instructions to make such payments to the militia serving under 
you as you may direct. He will furnish the paymasters with such forms 
and detailed instructions as, I trust, will enable them to perform their du- 



229 [ 224 ] 

ties in such a manner as will ensure the prompt settlement of the ac- 
counts. 

Very respectfully, &c, 

LEWIS CASS. 
Major General Scott, 

Augusta , Georgia. 



No. 32. 

War Department, 

February 2, 1836. 

Sir : I have had the honor to receive your lettter of the 23d ultimo, 
and in answer, beg leave to inform you that the arrangements you have 
made for calling a militia force into the service of the United States tor the 
defence of Florida are approved by the President, and the expense will 
be met by the United States, so far as the same may be in conformity with 
the law and the usages of the service. 

Agreeably to your suggestion, I have directed a warrant to be issued in 
your favor for the sum of $15,000, which will be remitted to you in a 
draft on the Bank of Augusta, for the purpose of being applied to meet 
the above expenditures. I have (o request that regular vouchers may be 
taken, in all cases, specifying the amount and object, in order to iacilitate 
the settlement of the accounts. Be pleased, also, to cause the men to be 
regularly mustered into service. It is expected they will serve the term 
of three months after their arrival at the place of rendezvous, unless 
sooner discharged. It will be necessary that the provisions should be 
issued upon regular provision returns, signed by the commanding officer. 
I have to request that your Excellency would communicate freely with 
Major General Scott, to whom the general operations have been commit- 
ted, and who will make such a disposition of the forces raised as he may 
think proper. 

Very respectfully, &c , 



LEWIS CASS. 



His Excellency William Schley, 

Governor of Georgia, Milled gevllle. 



No. 33. 



War Department, 

February 6, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to request that the course stated in my letter to 
you of the 29th ultimo, respecting the supplies furnished by the citizens 
of Charleston, may be pursued with relation to other places which have, 
in like manner, voluntarily interposed their means for the suppression of 
the Seminole hostilities. 

Very respectfully, &c, 

LEWIS CASS. 
Major General Scott, 

Augusta, Georgia. 



[ 224 ] 230 

No. 34. 

Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Augusta, Georgia, February 6, 1836. 

Sir : For the information of the Secretary of War and the General-in- 
chief, I have to report that I returned from Milledgeville last night. 

From the Governor of the State I was happy to learn that all apprehen- 
sion of disturbances on the part of the Creeks on the Chattahoochie had 
entirely subsided. Their chiefs have solemnly pledged themselves to 
keep- their people quiet within the nation ; to deliver any property 
which may be taken or stolen from the whites, &c. The Governor 
concurred with me in the opinion that it would hardly be necessary to 
station a regiment or battalion in observation upon those people ; but it 
was agreed upon between us that he should adopt that precautionary 
measure in case of any change in their attitude or dispositions. 

By my visit to Milledgeville, I believe I may flatter myself that I have 
quickened the measures necessary to obtain, by volunteering or draughting, 
the force required of this State. A most excellent spirit prevails both on 
this and the other side of the Savannah river. Governors McDuffie and 
Schley are exerting themselves to the utmost to furnish their quotas of 
men. The former is now with me ior the convenience of arranging 
certain details. The South Carolina regiment of foot has gone to 
Charleston, and probably will embark hence to-morrow or the next day. 
The second call for a regiment of mounted men will also be mainly supplied 
from the same State by volunteering. Perhaps one or two of its compa- 
nies will present themselves on foot. They shall be accepted, and the 
whole number may be expected at the general rendezvous (Purysburg) 
by the 16th instant. 

The call made upon Georgia will be complied with as speedily as possi- 
ble. Of the twenty companies, (two regiments,) probably only a little more 
than one-half will be mounted. These are directed to march upon Pico- 
lata via Colerain on the St. Mary's river, where I shall, as at Purysburg, 
have subsistence for men and horses provided. The companies on foot 
will proceed from Macon, by steamboats, to Picolata. Five have already 
taken that route. 

By the term regiment, in my several requisitions, I had reference to 
the organization prescribed by the " act more effectually to provide for 
the national defence by establishing a uniform militia throughout the 
United States," approved May 8, 1792, modified, in respect to the higher 
officers, by the act of April 20, 1S16, "concerning field officers of the 
militia." A regiment, therefore, consists o( seven hundred and forty-four 
enlisted men, including non-commissioned staff. 

If there be any act of Congress respecting the organization or pay of 
militia, whether cavalry, infantry, or mounted men, not in Cross's Militia 
Laws, I beg you will point it out to me, or rather send me a copy. Gov- 
ernor. McDuffie thinks there is one giving two lieutenants to each com- 
pany of infantry, and that the South Carolina law, which specifies two 
lieutenants, is founded on an act of Congress to that effect. The Georgia 
law is, in this respect, the same, which increases the presumption ; but 
Governor Schley, like Governor McDuffie, could not find the act in the 



23* \ 224 ] 

code of the United States. Out of respect to those States, I suppose it to 
be my duty to accept of the two lieutenants per company of infantry > and 
the act of 1793 expressly gives two to each company of cavalry. In fact, 
four officers per company of sixty-four privates are necessary to its effi- 
ciency in the field. 

I have caused upwards of one ' horses to be purchased in this 

. kjcrhood, and in i more the number will be completed to one 

hundred and fifty. They are designed as mounts for the dragoon recruits 
and for the baggage-train. The larger portion will be sent off to Savan- 
nah the day after to-morrow, and the remainder are to follow closely. The 
average cost of these horses will be something less, I think, than one 
hundred and twenty dollars, including a commission to the agent employed 
of live per centum . They are equal to the service for which they are in- 
tended, and are thought to be cheaply purchased at that rate. 

I have also ordered the purchase of twenty two-horse wagons, in addi- 
tion to an equal number purchased by the direction qf Brigadier General 
Eustis below, which will be sent hence to Savannah. Even these and 
fifty pack-horses will scarcely suffice for the baggage and subsistence train 
of the army to be assembled in Florida. 

My duties on the route of Columbia and Milledgeville have thrown 
me out of the line of intelligence from the seat of war. To-morrow I 
shall set out for Savannah, whore I may be detained for some days in 
calculating and arranging the supplies which will be wanted in Florida, 
and for the troops on their route thither. 

[From a letter addressed by Colonel Bomford to the store-keeper in 
Charleston, I learn that five hundred rifles have been at length ordered 
to that place ; but no advice of the shipment had been received. Five 
hundred ordered instead of the two thousand five hundred sent ! It will 
be impossible for me to make war without arms, and I think the troops who 
are to serve in Florida entitled to the most effective. I trust that a 
former letter, in respect to these rifles, will have been promptly at- 
tended to.] 

Brigadier General Eustis will precede me by a few days in arriving in 
Florida. He will be instructed to occupy himself in organizing the troops 
as they shall reach the St. John's, the means of transportation, &c. 
Lieutenant Colonel- Bankhead 1 shall detain to muster into service the 
mounted regiment of South Carolinians who are to rendezvous at Purvs- 
burg, near Savannah. 

I have had the honor to receive, this evening, two letters from the 
Secretary of War, both dated the 29th ultimo. His instructions shall be 
attended to. 

The force that first sailed from Charleston for St. Augustine, volun- 
teered for the immediate defence of the latter place, and only for one 
month. I shall soon cause it to be honorably discharged ; for, the mo- 
ment we are in force on the St. John's, and take up the expected line 
of operations, St. Augustine will become an interior position. That line 
of operations will probably be first from Picolata to Tampa bay, in order 
toopen communicationswith Forts King and Diane, and with Colonel Lind- 
say. My object will be to cut the enemy off from the country to the left 
of that line, and to force him to the right. If I succeed, the theatre 
of operations, though favorable to him, will be much less bad for us 



I 224 ] 232 

than the southern part of the peninsula. No definitive plan of operations, 
however, will be laid down till I shall have arrived upon the St. John's, 
and have obtained the best information which can be had. 

I am more and more persuaded that I have not called for too large a 
force. By the 25th instant I may, perhaps, have in Florida, in all, four 
thousand men, and by March, five hundred more. It is not probable 
that I shall delay offensive movements quite so long. Whatever may 
wisely be attempted with smaller numbers, shall not be neglected. 
I remain, sir, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



No. 35. 



IlEADQUARTEUy, EASTERN DEPARTMENT, 

Savannah, February 9, 1836. 

Sir: I arrived here this evening, and wrote in haste by the steamer 
John Stony, just from St. Augustine, bound to Charleston, to take the 
chance of this letter finding you at the latter place. 

It is presumed that the South Carolina regiment of foot has, by this 
time, embarked for Florida, and 1 am anxious that you should be there 
(at St. Augustine or Picolata) as soon as practicable. If I were to send 
Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, he would find himself commanded by one 
or two full colonels, and perhaps by a brigadier general, (from Georgia,) 
in less than five days after his arrival. 

The objects to be accomplished by your early presence in Florida are 
many : First, your rank, experience, and talents, will enable you to or- 
ganize the service in that quarter generally ; Secondly, to cause to be 
mustered into service the militia companies which are there, and those 
which may be daily expected to arrive ; to open communications with 
Brigadier General Clinch and Fort King; and, in general, to do whatever 
the good of the service or particular emergencies may require. For 
these purposes you will assume the general command of the left wing of 
the army of Florida, and establish your headquarters, for the time, either 
at Picolata or St. Augustine, visiting the other place. I shall follow you 
in a few days ; that is, as soon as the greater part of the militia called for 
from South Carolina and Georgia shall have reached Florida, and I shall 
have made the necessary arrangements (from this place) for the entire 
force destined for the war in that quarter. 

Five companies of foot embarked on the 4th instant, on board a steamer 
at Macon for Picolata, and three companies of mounted men were to have 
marched from the neighborhood of Milledgeville, on the 7th or 8th, for 
the same destination, via: Colerain, on the St. Mary's river. Other com- 
panies of Georgia militia will proceed from day to day by the same routes. 
Those on foot, by the Ockmulgee, and the mounted men by Colerain from 
the interior of the State, and in a few days the mounted regiment of 



233 [ 224 j 

South Carolinians, will begin to arrive at Purysburg on the Savannah, to 
inarch thence, by Colerain, to the same general destination, Picolata. 

I shall probably cause the companies of this regiment, as they succes- 
sively present themselves, to be mustered into the service at Purysburg; 
but all that shall reach Florida, without having been so mustered, will 
there, by your orders, be formally taken into service. 

In compliment to the State laws of South Carolina and Georgia, I wish 
that every company of militia, whether mounted or on foot, of sixty-four 
privates and upwards, may be accepted with one captain, two lieutenants, 
(one first and one second,) and one ensign or cornet. If the excess of 
privates, per company, be very great, 1 have no objections that even an 
other lieutenant per company should be accepted. For the field officers 
and the staff of a regiment, see the acts heretofore referred to. The 
companies being below the standard of sixty-four privates each, I wish 
to be accepted with some liberality in respect to subalterns. 

I am as anxious to see you in person as I am desirous that you should 
be early in Florida. If you can call here without much delay, do so; if 
not, proceed at once to your destination. My wish is to converse with 
you as to the impending compaign in general, and also to learn the pre- 
cise quantity of forage ordered to Florida, and the number of rations. 
But I have time to say no more, except that I shall send forage and ra- 
tions to Colerain for the mounted Georgians, who are to take that route, 
and the same to Purysburg, for the second regiment of South Carolinians. 
Unfortunately the quartermaster here is sick in bed. 

Twenty two-horse wagons, with harness, I have ordered to be pur- 
chased at Augusta. They will pass here in a few days for Florida. I 
have also caused to be purchased 120 dragoon horses, and about thirty 
for the baggage train. How many of each have you sent to Florida? 

If the cavalry recruits, from New York should not touch here, their 
horses must be sent to Picolata. 

With great respect, 

I remain yours, truly, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. Gen. Eustis, fyc. 



No. 36. 

Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, February 10, 1836. 

Sir: Your letter of the 31st of January, from Augusta, communicating 
the preliminary measures you have taken in reference to the amount of 
militia force which you have called for, and the proposed military opera- 
tions in Florida, has been duly received, and submitted to the Secretary 
of War and the General-in-chief. 

Those subjects of your letter which refer to the several departments 
of the Staff, have been communicated to those departments respectively, 
with reiterated instructions to furnish all supplies necessary for your 
operations in Florida. It may be proper to remark, however, that, as the 



[ 224 ] 23 -A 

law makes no provision for the issue of knapsacks for the militia, these 
articles cannot be supplied: this subject has this day been referred by the 
Secretary of War to the military committee, with a request that a law be 
passed authorizing the issue of knapsacks to the militia. 

Since writing the above, I have received your communication of the 
2d of February, which has also been submitted to the Secretary of War 
and the General-in-chief. Orders have been given to the several depart- 
ments of the Staff, to furnish as promptly as possible the supplies required 
by your several communications. 

Your suggestion that the 4th infantry should be ordered to the theatre 
of operations has been anticipated in part by Major General Gaines, who 
has ordered the companies from Baton Rouge to Florida. 

The copies of your letters to the Governors of South Carolina, Geor- 
gia, Alabama, and Florida, also to Colonel Lindsay, mentioned in your 
communication of the 2d instant, forwarded by Lieutenant Johnson, have 
also been received. 

A letter from Captain Belton, the commanding officer at Fort Brooke, 
received the 8th instant, reports that he has taken into service about 
ninety of the friendly warriors, located in his immediate vicinity, with a 
view to co-operate against the hostile Indians. The Government is by 
no means disposed to emply the Indians in this affair ; but, as matters may 
have proceeded too far, as to be beyond its control, it is now left entirely 
to your discretion. 

I am, sir, 

With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. JONES, Adjutant General. 

Major General Scott, 

Commanding in Florida, Savannah, Georgia. 



No. 37. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Savannah, February 11, 1836. 

Sir : I have had the honor to receive your Excellency's communication 
of the 3d instant, by the hands of your aid-de-camp. Colonel Hawkins ; 
whom I have placed in possession of my means and plans for the prosecu- 
tion of the war against the Seminole Indians. The details he will commu- 
nicate to you. 

I am very thankful for the complimentary expressions contained in your 
letter, and still more for the valuable information and suggestions it con- 
contains. The former I shall endeavor, to the utmost, to deserve, by a 
prompt termination of the war that has so greatly afflicted a large portion 
of your Territory. 

I have but little to add to my letter to your Excellency of the 1st inst. 



235 [ 224 ] 

The militia forces called for from South Carolina and Georgia are already 
in movement by land or by water, and I hope the regiment of Alabaniians 
will soon be at Mobile, so as to arrive at Tampa bay by the 25th instant 
at the latest. 

With the exception of about 450 Georgians, all the forces destined to 
act from the St. John's river may be expected to arrive by the same date, 
and I shall be there about the 18th. Brigadier General Eustis will pre- 
cede me, and I shall commence operations promptly. 

I have preferred to cause the greater part of the reinforcements to as- 
semble at Picolata and St. Augustine, as these places are more accessible 
from Fort King, and because the magazines will be on the St. John's. Be- 
sides, I still entertain the hope of finding the great body of the enemy 
above the line from St. Augusta to Tampa bay, and of driving them to- 
wards Middle Florida and Georgia. If I succeed in doing so, the theatre 
of operations will be much narrowed, and, although the surface of the 
country will be favorable to the enemy, it will be much less bad for us 
there than that below. 

In respect to the Florida militia which your Excellency may have, or 
shall find it necessary to put into the field, defensive positions are suggest- 
ed ; and if I should be able to push the war to their vicinity, the Florida 
militia would then have an opportunity of assuming the offensive, and of 
striking to great advantage. All this, however, I will beg leave to refer 
to your own discretion, and better knowledge of the necessity of the case. 
Whatever may be required on my part in respect to the acceptance and 
payment of the force detached by you, under the limitations heretofore 
stated, shall be readily done. 

I hope that my letter of the 1st instant was received in time to render it 
unnecessary, in your Excellency's judgment, to send any part of the mi- 
litia of Florida to Tampa bay. Even without a reinforcement from New 
Orleans, (of which 1 know nothing, except by rumor,) Colonel Lindsay, 
will by the 25th instant be in sufficient force at that point. 

Hoping to interchange frequent communications with your Excellency, 
I have the honor to remain, 
With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To his Excellency J- K. Eatox. 

Governor of Florida. 



No. 38. 

Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Savannah, February 1G, 1836. 

Sir : I arrived here this day week, and have been most fully occupied 
in regulating the supplies and the movements of the troops destined for 
Florida. Hence I have not had a moment to look into the subjects re- 
ferred to me in the letters of the Secretary of War, dated the 29th ulti- 
mo and the 6th instant, and apprehend that if I were to undertake to go 






[ 224 ] 236 

thoroughly into those matters, I should be nothing but an auditor of ac- 
counts for the rest of the campaign. 

My information from Florida represents a virtual truce between the small 
force under Brigadier General Clinch and the enemy. The former is too 
weak to act offensively, and the latter, like all other Indians, never attack 
field works though of the slightest construction. Indeed, of the positions 
and movements of the enemy, there is nothing recent or specific. The 
route from Picolata to Forts Drane and King seems to be open for even 
the smallest detachments. 

Brigadier General Eustis passed here two days ago, with Captain Van 
Ness's company United States artillery, on hoard a steamer bound to St. 
Augustine. 1 approve of his detention at Charleston, where he made him- 
self highly useful in preparing the means for the campaign, and in muster- 
ing into service the regiment of South Carolina foot. This regiment, or 
nine of its companies, embarked a day or two before him, and the tenth 
company has followed. Of the other regiment from that State, which will 
be mounted, (except one company, and that passed here yesterday in a 
steamer,) I only know that it was expected to begin to arrive yesterday 
on the Savannah river. Learning that Purysburg was not so favorable a 
point for crossing as Hudson's ferry, twenty-two miles above, I despatch- 
ed an order, by an express, some days ago, to change the direction of the 
regiment accordingly. Captain Page is gone up in a small steamer be- 
longing to the Engineer department, with arms and subsistence for this 
regiment, and to assist in passing it across the river. He has my instruc- 
tions to muster it into service. See accompanying paper A. 

Of the two mounted regiments asked for from Georgia, probably not 
more than twelve companies will present themselves on horseback. Five 
of the latter are now- presumed to be at Colerain, on the St. Mary's river, 
or beyond, and five, on foot, arrived a few days since from Macon, at Da- 
rien. Steamers, with subsistence, have been despatched to take the foot to 
Picolata, and Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead is gone to muster the battalion 
into service. A steamer had been previously despatched with subsistence 
for men and horses to Colerain or Traders' Hill, (within five miles of 
each other,) and to Jacksonville. All the mounted men from South Caro- 
lina and Georgia will pass by those places. The market of this vicinity 
could not supply the required quantity of grain for that steamer, and I 
have been obliged to substitute rice-meal for Hudson's ferry, on this river. 
If the Arctic, supposed to be yet fast in the ice of the Chesapeake, had ar- 
rived, we should have had corn for Colerain, Jacksonville, (on the St. 
John's,) and Hudson's ferry. I deem it quite unfortunate that some ref- 
erence to the thermometer had not been made before the shipment of 
troops and supplies, in the dead of winter, from Baltimore. Every body 
and thing on board the Arctic I consider as thrown out of the campaign, 
and I fear the same conclusion would be just if applied to the tents, knap- 
sacks, and rifles expected from the clothing and ordnance bureaus. 

In respect to subsistence for men and horses, to be placed on the St. 
John's and at Tampa hay, I beg leave to refer to instructions given by me, 
copies of which (B and C) are herewith enclosed, [The papers A, B, and 
C, by mistake, have preceded this letter.] 

Colonel Hawkins, the aid-de-camp of Governor Eaton, arrived here a 
few days since, bringing despatches, and he has set out on his return with 



237 [ 224 ] 



my answer. I had anticipated his inquiries, generally, by my letter to 
his Excellency, dated the first instant, (a copy of which has been forward- 
ed.) and I have said to him, more in detail, that it will be preferable to place 
any force lie may have in the field or find it necessary to call out (not ex- 
ceeding 400 or 600 men) in defensive positions for the protection of the 
settlements of Middle Florida, as it was still my hope to cutoff' the hos- 
tile Indians from the southeast, and drive them towards those settlements. 
I added that, if I could succeed in that wish, the Florida militia might, as 
approached, pass from the defensive to the offensive ; but 1 have not required 
the levy of a single company in Florida. 

1 learn by newspapers that from 600 to 1,000 men, mostly volunteers, 
have sailed from New Oilcans for Florida, I think Tampa bay. I have 
not called for a single man, of the regulars or militia, from Louisiana. 
Perhaps the reported force volunteered for the temporary protection 
of Tampa bay, as certain companies sailed hence and from Charleston lor 
the specific defence of Picolata and St. Augustine, some weeks ago. Hence 
I could not rely on the troops from Louisiana for the general purposes of 
the campaign, and, therefore, did nothing to arrest the detaching and the 
march of troops from this quarter. Out if Tampa bay has been reinforced 
from Louisiana, and to the extent reported, Colonel Lindsay will be in a 
condition, on arriving with the Alabama regiment, to act offensively in 
any direction, and independent of support. 

His Excellency Governor Eaton estimates the enemy's armed force, in- 
cluding blacks I presume, at 3,000, against which I may have, by the end 
of this month, something less than 5,000 men in the field, say 1,400 mount- 
ed and about 3.200 on foot, and not a word has been heard of or from the 
United States dragoon recruits since I left Washington. The mounts 
for them, however, have arrived from Augusta, together with about thir- 
ty horses, applicable to the baggage train. Instructions have been re- 
peated to send those recruits to this place for their horses, should they 
touch at Charleston. 

Nothing has yet beeti heard from the Governor of Alabama or from 
Colonel Lindsay, in respect to the regiment asked for from that State, but I 
do not doubt that the utmost activity and zeal will be displayed by both in 
complying with the wishes I have expressed to them, respectively. I can- 
not too highly applaud the spirit that lias been manifested in South Caro- 
lina and Georgia. Governors McDuffie and Schley have lent themselves 
powerfully to the occasion. The former has made extensive circuits to in- 
spire, to detach, and to organize, and both have thrown open the arsenals 
and magazines of their States to supply, as far as they could, our wants ; 
but, unfortunately, we shall still be greatly deficient in tents, knapsacks, 
and rifles, unless supplied from the North. I shall direct returns to be 
sent to Washington of such articles as we have been obliged to borrow, and 
hope, for the honor of the United States, as well as to redeem my personal 
pledge, that each and every one will be promptly replaced in kind. The lower 
parts of Georgia and South Carolina should not long be leftdisfurnished of 
the means of putting effective detachments of militia in the field. A like 
consideration has induced me to leave the feeble company of United States 
artillery, at the Augusta arsenal, behind. That city has sent into Florida 
two fine companies of volunteers, and I do not think the United States have 
the moral right to place the implements and munitions of war in the midst 
of such a population, without placing at the depot a competent guard. 



[ 224 



238 



That company is, moreover, still engaged in fixing ammunition for the 
Florida army. 

With my approbation, Brigadier General Eustis accepted the services 
of a company of Charleston volunteers, to occupy Fort Moultrie, in the 
absence of its regular garrison. This arrangement rendered Captain 
Van Ness's company disposable for the field. 

Brigadier General Eustis has been instructed to send the revenue cutter 
Jefferson, to coast Florida as far as Key West, for information, &c. On 
the return of the cutter, I shall act on the suggestion of the Secretary of 
War, and send, if necessary, a company to reoccupy the evacuated post. 

Hoping by to-morrow, or at the latest, the day after, to have done every 
thing here in my power, for the good of the campaign, I shall set out for 
Florida, and occupy myself, equally, at St. Augustine and Picolata — 
places only about seventeen miles apart. The post office, I understand, is 
at the former. 

Captain Page has been ordered to proceed, after a few days, to the 
Creek nation, stopping on the way to muster into service a battalion that 
the Governor of Georgia, by arrangement with me, has thought it prudent 
to place in observation upon that people. Should the Governor of Ala- 
bama have deemed it necessary to adopt a similar measure, Captain Page 
is also instructed to muster the force put in observation from that State. 

1 shall arrive in Florida, in advance of rather more than half the forces 
called for from South Carolina and Georgia, and probably before the Ala- 
bama regiment has reached its destination. All that may profitably be at- 
tempted before the arrival of the rearmost companies from the two former 
States, shall be put in practice ; but it is not my expectation to risk any 
detachment of less than say 700 or 1,000 men, beyond supporting distance 
of a like body. At Picolata, I hope to find a full report from Brigadier 
General Clinch in answer to all my inquiries, and, finally, I may flatter 
myself that, towards the end of this month, I shall be in condition to com- 
mence decisive operations. 

With great respect, 
I remain, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

WIN FIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. Gen. R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 

P. S. Brigadier General Eustis is fully instructed to do in Florida, he- 
fore my arrival, all that I could myself execute if there in person. 

Lieutenant Chambers arrived here the night before the last. Have all 
the other lieutenants who were, on the 21st ultimo, ordered to join the 
companies in Florida, or expected to be there, got excused from the dan- 
gers and hardships of the campaign ? I hear nothing of any of them. 

February 17. The steamer in which I am to go to Florida, and which 
was expected last night, has not arrived. The head of the mounted South 
Carolina regiment has reached this river above. The rear is expected to 
follow in six or seven days. I have heard of the movement of but ten com- 
panies of Georgians, besides the two from Augusta already in Florida. 

W. S. 



239 [ 224 ] 

No. S9. 

HEADqUARTEU9, EASTERN DEPARTMENT, 

Savannah, February 14, 1836. 

Sir : I expect to want at Tampa bay, between the first of March and 
the middle of May, for the army to be employed under my command 
against the hostile Seminole Indians, independent of the wants on account 
of such of those Indians as may be forced to emigrate, subsistence as fol- 
lows : 

For men, two hundred and fifty thousand complete rations, and for 
horses, one hundred and twenty thousand rations of corn and oats and 
forty thousand rations of hay or fodder. 

From each of these supplies you will please deduct what you may esti- 
mate to be at Tampa bay on the first of the next month, or on its way 
thither. The remainder you will immediately begin to purchase and ship 
to that place, say a third (except the long forage) early in March, another 
third by the first of April, and the other third by the first of May. The 
Jong forage, in the whole, must be at Tampa bay by the first of April, and 
begin to arrive by the 10th of March. 

To enable you to judge with accuracy the quantity of each kind of sub- 
sistence to be sent, you will call for a return from the proper officers at Tam- 
pa bay, by the first conveyance that may go !o that place and return to 
New Orleans. This you may do in my name. 

As it is feared that the army will be deficient in tents and knapsacks, 
you will please send any that may be on hand at New Orleans to Tampa 
bay, say a number of each sufficient for one thousand men. 

I am also ignorant of the number of rounds of fixed musket and rifle 
cartridges which I may find at the same general depot. 

If there should be at New Orleans a supply of either on hand, send to 
the number of eighty thousand musket cartridges and twenty-five thousand 
for rifles, with the first subsistence you may ship, and in lieu of cartridges 
an equivalent in powder, lead, paper, and twine. Send, at the same time, 
say two hundred rounds of fixed canister for twenty four-pound howit- 
zers, and twice that number of rounds for six-pounders. You may make 
a partial deduction from each kind of ammunition, according to your knowl- 
edge of the quantity supposed to be already at Tampa bay. 

In respect to the rations for men, the bread part must, to the extent of 
seven-eighths of the whole number, be in the form called hard. The ut- 
most exertions must be made to have the necessary quantity baked, if the 
market should not be able to supply it at once. The meat part of the rations, 
to the extent of three-fifths of the whole, must consist of well-cured sides 
of bacon, and the remainder of pork, as it is not expected that many cattle 
can be purchased in the southern part of Florida. 

If there be not tents on hand near you, you will cause the number asked 
for to be immediately made and shipped. 

Show to the commissary of subsistence at New Orleans this letter, on 
whom it will be as obligatory, in all that concerns his department, as if it 
were directly addressed to him. 

Relying on the zeal and promptitude of you both, I remain, with great 
respect, your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
The U. S. Assistant Quartermaster, New Orleans. 



224 240 



P. S. Since writing the above, I have heard it said, on some uncertain 
rumor, that 600 or 700 volunteers had sailed from New Orleans for 
Tampa bay. This force was not included in the foregoing estimates and 
requisitions, which were forwarded on the supposition that I should have 
in the field, say 900 regulars, 1,480 men (half mounted) from South Car- 
olina, 1,480 (part mounted) from Georgia, and 740 (foot) from Alabama. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 40. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Savannah, February 12, 1836. 

Sin : I shall want at Picolata sufficient grain to feed (say about) 1,700 
horses for seventy days, and hay for the same number of horses about one. 
third of that time. 

About 4,800 bushels of corn and no pounds of hay have been [ordered 
to Picolata from Baltimore, and you are no doubt acquainted with the 
quantity sent from Charleston. 

To complete the supply of each kind of forage specified above, as likely 
to be wanted on the St. John's river, you will immediately take measures 
to purchase and to ship thither what may be required. It is not important 
that all the forage yet to be purchased should arrive at once, as a portion 
of it will not be wanted in six or eight weeks. You may accordingly 
regulate yourself in the purchase and shipment, bearing in mind that there 
are. but small means of storage at Picolata. 

As Brigadier General Eustis is expected to leave Charleston to-day, 
I address myself directly to you. 

With respect, 

Yours truly, 

WIN FIELD SCOTT. 
To Lieutenant J. L'Engle, 

Assistant Quartermaster U. S. .?., 

Charleston, South Carolina. 



No. 41, 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Savannah, February 12, 1856. 

Sir: By a letter from the Secretary of War, you will have been advised 
of in v approach, for the purpose of taking upon myself the general direc- 
tion of the war in Florida. No mortification ought to be felt by you, be- 
cause the command has been given to me. I am your senior, and it was 
known that I was your friend. With very limited, and, as experience has 
shown, inadequate means, you have maintained your positions in the ene- 
my's country, and you have fought a battle with honor to yourself, and 
the handful of brave men who were under you. I shall have an overwhelm- 
ing force, with ample magazines, and means of transportation, together 



241 [ 2-24 J 



with all the benefits of your better local knowledge and personal services. 
! have come to this place by the upper route via Columbia and Miliedgeville, 
t'ortlie purpose of making arrangements, in person, to facilitate and hasten the 
movements of detachments of militia, called for from South Carolina and 
Georgia; two regiments, or 1,480 men from each, and one regiment, or 
740 men, in addition, from Alabama. I have despatched Colonel Lind- 
say to hasten the embarkation of the latter front Mobile, and to accompany 
this regiment to Tampa bay, where he will assume the command, on his 
arrival (say from the 20th to the 25ih instant) of all the forces he may find 
there, and operate thence towards the main army, which will move from 
Picolata ami St. Augustine. 

The remainder of the reinforcements ordered to Florida will be assem- 
bled at Picolata and St. Augustine. Brigadier General Eustis precedes 
me by a few days, to organize and place in position the troops which first 
arrive, and to open a communication with you and Camp King (at least by 
letter) and I am happy to learn, unofficially, that you are in security, and 
have kept open the communication with Picolata via Fort King. 

I am unable as yet, from the want of recent information from the thea- 
tre of war, and better topographical knowledge of that theatre, to lay 
down any definite plan of operations. I shall rely much on communica- 
tions to be received from you on all points necessary to the formation of 
such plan ; but my present idea is. that it may be best to move upon the 
road to St. Augustine to Tampa bay, until joined by Colonel Lindsay, 
from the latter place, and, if possible, to cut off the greater number of the 
Indians from the fastnesses below that line. I3y confining the enemy 
above, the theatre will be much narrowed ; and although the country will 
be favorable to him. it will be much less bad for us than the southern part 
of the peninsula. What hope is there, say with 3,000 men, of accomplish- 
ing this leading object ? In the mean time, I can make any movement that 
may facilitate your junction with me at some favorable point; or, the posi- 
tions of Forts Drane and King, being succored, or considered as secure, 
you may remain at the former, till the main army shall reach, in driving 
the enemy, your immediate vicinity. L<*t me have, as promptly as pos- 
sible, and freely and fully, your views on these, and on all other points 
that may be interesting to the service. 

Brigadier General Eustis, with a regiment of foot from South Carolina, 
will probably be on the St. John's, or at St. Augustine, about the 15th in- 
stant. Three, companies of United States artillery, and about 100 dra- 
goon recruits, all from the north of the Potomac, will be there soon after ; 
and two companies of United States artillery, from North Carolina, have 
already reached the same destination. Some wagons and horses are also 
gone, and others are to follow. From Georgia, a part of the forces on 
foot, say five companies, left Macon by steam on the 7th instant, and the 
remainder of the militia of the same State, mostly mounted, are no doubt 
now in route. Finally, the regiment of mounted South Carolinians may 
be expected to pass this place in the next seven or eight days. I therefore 
hope to be in force at Picolata and St. Augustine by the 25th instant, and 
personally present before the 20th. 

I have this instant learned that I may not expect to have in Florida 
more than 960 of the Georgia militia before the end of this month. I how'- 
ever shall not wait for the remainder, butl commence operations, proba- 
bly about the 25th instant, if I shall hear from you by that time. 
16 



L 224 J 242 

I have provided about, forty two-horse wagons, and shall have (say) 
about one hundred pack-saddles. Shall I be able to operate with the for- 
mer, or are the two means of transportation in due proportion to each 
other ? My knowledge of the interior of Florida is yet but wvy imperfect. 
Please scud nic one or more good guides, if you have them, and any good 
interpreter who may be with you. if those persons join me alter 1 shall 
have advanced into the interior, it may he sufficient. 

Please give me the best intelligence you ran as to the distribution of the 
eneim over the lace of the country; his numbers, including blacks, and 
the proportions of foot and mounted. Where are the women and children 
probably concealed ? 

1 shall wish to organize a corps of scouts or spies. Will Colonel War- 
ren (who has been with you) make a good commander of such corps, or 
can you recommend one ? What other individuals can you point out as ser- 
viceable members of such corps ? 

What, is your strength in regulars, volunteers, and friendly Indians? 
What your means of subsistence for men and burses ? and what means of 
transportation have you in wagons, horses, mules, and pack-saddles ? 

If you, ["roni your better knowledge of the interior of Florida, ami the 
probable distribution of Ihc enemy, think it best that \ should, with the 
whole or part of the new forces, operate on the direction of Forts King atid 
Diane, please give me your reasons. 

With entire confidence in your abilities, and the highest personal re- 
gard, 

I remain, General, 

Yours, truly, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To Brigadier General Clinch, 

Fort Drane, East Florida. 



No. 42. 



Assistant Quartermaster's Office, 

New Orleans 26th February, 1836. 

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the 1 4th instant, from Savannah. Immediately on the 
receipt I called upon the assistant commissary of subsistence, and put him 
in motion. I find there is not a barrel of hard bread to be obtained in the 
city without having it baked for the occasion. Lieut. Morrison is exerting 
himself to get it ready as soon as possible. I fear he will not be able to 
procure the quantity required in time. Whatever can be done will be 
done- He will be ready to make a shipment of subsistence on the first of 
March. I am this day shipping hay and corn, which I trust will reach 
Tampa before the 10th of March. 1 shall continue to ship, as directed 
by you, and you may depend the forage shall be there in t\uv time, barring 
shipwrecks. In regard to the ordnance stores, there is none in this city. 
On the receipt of your letter I immediately addressed the ordnance officer 
at Mount Vernon arsenal, Alabama, and the ordnance officer at the arsenal 
at Baton Rouge, requiring them to let me know immediately whether 



243 [ 224 J 

the articles requited can be furnished ; if so, they shall be shipped im- 
mediately. Rest assured, sir, that no exertions shall be wanting on my 
parr, or the assistant commissary of subsistence, to have you well sup- 
plied. 1 find, sir, that I have but one hundred and thirty-eight tents on 
hand ; these I have shipped this day. I have been advised that a quantity 
has been ordered from Philadelphia, and 1 think 1 ran rely upon their 
reaching here in time for them to reach Tampa bay by the middle of 
March. 1 have issued every knapsack en hand, and have now making in 
this city 696, to complete the requisition of Colonel Lindsay, for the regi- 
ment of Alabama militia. I have also furnished him with tents and camp- 
kettles, mess-pans, &c, to complete that regiment for the field. 

I will assure you, sir, it would give me pleasure to take the field with 
you. I am intimately acquainted with every part of Florida, the locali- 
ties of all Uie Indian towns and villages. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 
With high respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

J. CLARK, 



Major Gen. W. Scott, 

Commanding in Florida. 



Jlssist. Quartermaster, 



No. 43. 



Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Savannah, February 19, 1836. 

Sir : I am instructed by Major General Scott to acknowledge the rc- 
rcipt, on the 13th instant, of the letter of the Secretary of War of the 5th, 
transmitting three copies of the regulations prescribed for carrying into 
effect the resolutions of Congress of the 1st February, respecting issues to 
certain inhabitants of Florida. In connexion with the subject of that reso- 
lution, General Scott desires a reference to his letter to the Commissary 
General of the 12th instant. Two letters from the Secretary of War of 
the 11th, and one of the 12th — one of the former requiring information as 
to the numerical force of the Seminoles, and the others referring to pay- 
ments of the militia, have also been received. These were received on the 
18th and 19th instant. 

I am also instructed to acknowledge your letters of the 2d and 10th 
instant. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 

Yours, respectfully, 

A. VAN BUREN. 
Brig. Gen. R. Jones, 

Adjutant Gen., Washington. 



[ 224 J 244 

No. 44. 

Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Savannah, February 20, 1836. 

Sir : The detachment of United States recruits under Lieutenant Her- 
ring, and the medicines, &c, in the charge of Assistant Surgeon Worrel, 
having arrived in the river helow, the recruits will immediately proceed 
with me to Picolata. The medicines, &c, cannot he got out of the vessel 
to-day, but will follow. 

I have been delayed here waiting for the return of one of three steamers, 
which sailed hence eight and seven days since for St. Augustine and Pico- 
lata. Neither has yet returned, and I can wait no longer. For the reason 
mentioned I am without late information from either Brigadier Generals 
Clinch or Eustis. 

I have this moment received your letter of the 13th instant, enclosing 
the copy of one from Major Garland. I requested tents of the Major, 
having no power to order, and concluded that he would obtain the proper 
authority for causing the tents to be sent by the conveyances and routes 
the most expeditions. It was lucky, however, that 1 wrote on the subject 
from Augusta. 

On the subject of knapsacks, my grief is inexpressible, that the discovery 
should have been made at a critical moment, that there was no authority 
to supply them to the militia called into the service of the United States. 
I suppose it to be the wish that all troops put into the field and in the pay 
of the Union should be highly efficient. Now, it is known to all, who 
have marched, that troops are wholly inefficient without knapsacks, and I 
presume it to be generally known that the militia of the United States, at 
home, are very partially supplied with this essential appointment. Those 
now in march for, or who have arrived in, Florida, have not, from the ne- 
cessity of the case, with few exceptions, had time to supply themselves. 
They have very generally left home on the shortest notice, and in passing 
through South Carolina and Georgia, I promised to the volunteers every 
where, tents and knapsacks. This promise I shall not be able to comply 
with, and my grief is almost overwhelming. In respect to the rifles, it is 
but little less ; for they too were promised to some extent. 

Colonel Lindsay had asked for 3,500 knapsacks. In my first or second 
letter from Augusta, (my papers are on board, and I follow in a moment,) 
I begged that the whole number might be speedily sent, if not actually ship- 
ped. If they had arrived (or arrive) the militia should (or shall) have 

them. 

I have time only to add that no invoice has been received of tents or 
rifles actually shipped, and that the Artie has not arrived. 
In great haste, 

I remain, respectfully, yours, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brig. Gen. Jones, 

Mft Gen. U. S. Army. 



245 f 224 ] 

No. 45. 

Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, March 2, 1836. 

Sir : Your communication from Savannah of the 20th ultimo, has hecn 
submitted to the Secretary of War and General-in-chief. With regard 
to knapsacks, the Secretary desires me to say that a hill is now 
on its passage through Congress authorizing their supply : and the more 
promptly to meet the exigency of the service, instructions have been given 
to the proper department, in anticipation of the passage of the law, to 
send to Florida the knapsacks in store, for the use of the militia force un- 
der your command. If the law does not pass (of which, however, no doubt 
is entertained) the Secretary directs that in such event the knapsacks must 
be withheld. 

With regard to the supply of rifles. I can only refer you to Colonel 
Bomford's communication of the lltb of February, detailing the measures 
taken by the Ordnance department for supplying arms (including rifles) 
and ammunition for the Florida campaign. 

I am, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. JONES, Adjt. Gen. 
Major Gen. Scott, 

Comm'g in Florida, Fort King. 



No. 46. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Ficolata, February 22, 1836. 

Sir: I am instructed by Major General Scott to report his arrival at 
this place last evening, and that he has assumed command of the army 
operating in Florida. He has found here the first battalion of Georgia 
foot, in position. The 1st battalion of Georgia mounted men is on this 
side of the St. Mary's, and it is presumed the 2d mounted battalion is now 
in march from the interior of Georgia. The head company of the South 
Carolina mounted regiment has readied the Ogechee, and the regiment 
of foot from that State, under Colonel Brisbane, is at St. Augustine. It is 
probable that General Scott will await the arrival of at least a portion of 
the mounted force, before he commences a system of operations. 

A despatch from General Clinch has been found here, dated the 20th 
instant, and a return of the troops under his command at Fort Drane, and 
its vicinity, dated the 17th instant. His force consisted of 523 men, in- 
cluding volunteers. He states that of the enemy to be about 1,500 war- 
riors and 2 or 300 negroes ; and believes the principal part of it to be con- 
centrated on the Withlacoochee, thirty-five or forty miles southwest of Fort 
Drane. Brigadier General Clinch also states that, on the arrival of 
Colonel Lindsay at Fort Brooke, with the Alabama regiment, Major 



[ 224 ; 246 



General Gaines will have near 2,200 men, and about 100 friendly In- 
diaus. 

1 have the honor to be, 

Vevy respectfully, .sir. 

Your most obedient. 

A. VAN BUREN, 

Aid. de-camp. 
Brig. Gen. 11. Jones, 

Mft Gen. U. S. Army. 



No. 47. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, February 26, 1836. 

Sir: The regiment of South Carolina foot (Colonel Brisbane's) is un- 
der the direction of Brigadier General Eustis, moving from St. Augustine 
via Tomoca, upon Volusia, (6 miles above Lake George) where it will ar- 
rive say the 3d of March. In route it will establish one or more small 
posts, which will be abandoned in succession, to secure the communication 
with the rear, and to give confidence to the inhabitants heretofore driven 
from that part of the country. They are already returning to their plant- 
ations. 

A detachment of South Carolina infantry is at this moment about to em- 
bark in a steamer for Volusia, for the purpose of establishing a secure de- 
pot for supplies that may be required there, to the south and west. 

The South Carolina mounted regiment will probably cross the St. John's 
river at Jacksonsville about the 1st of March, and proceed via St. Au- 
gustine, &c. to Volusia, where it may be expected to -arrive about the 7th. 
The two South Carolina regiments, and say five companies United States 
artillery, will constitute the left wing. 

Only one company (Capt. Kenan's,) of tiie Georgia mounted men has ar- 
rived here. It reports that it parted with the other four companies of the 
same battalion at Dublin, in the interior of Georgia; waited for them 
three days at Colerain, on the St. Mary's, where the whole were to reunite, 
and then proceeded hither without hearing anything of them. There was 
no field officer with this battalion, and the companies took different routes 
from Dublin, in order to multiply the chances of obtaining subsistence for 
men and horses. To Colerain, from Savannah, 1 sent two days' subsist- 
ence for all the men and horses — that is, all the mounted men from Geor- 
gia and Carolina, and the United States detachment of dragoons — as the 
whole were ordered to cross the St. Mary's at that point. 

Captain Kenan is somewhat afraid that the remainder of his battalion, 
or some of its companies, may even turn back before reaching Colerain, 
or from that point ; and he is still more apprehensive that 1 may never see 
any company of the second battalion of mounted men called for from the 
same State. Yet Governor Schley wrote to me on the 14th instant that he 
had " a strong hope that (he) shall be able to send you five more companies 
ol mounted men, who will march to Colerain in a few days." 

One battalion of Georgia foot (340 strong) arrived here ten days since. It 



247 224 J 



is now in route for Fort Drane. distance 65 miles, and a bad road. I 
have instructed the commander (Major Cooper) to repair some of the worst 
places as he proceeds : because, by this route, all the supplies for Fort 
Drane must be sent. 

The remaining battalion of Georgia foot, which I originally designed 
should pass this place, and which I afterwards, on the request of Governor 
Schley, permitted him to send by tiie Appalachicola, I desired him, by an 
express that i despatched hence on tiie 23d, via Jacksonville, to stop and 
discharge. This request was made as soon as I knew with certainty that 
a large force had sailed from New Orleans for Tampa bay. 

Observing, by returns from Brigadier General Clinch, that his supplies 
were but limited, and desirous of placing at Fort Drane subsistence for the 
right wing for ai least twenty days, in order to give confidence and effect 
to any movement to be made from that point, I have been occupied in de- 
vising means to send thither additional supplies, to the amount of seventy 
tons. To enable me to do this, I have been waiting for the wagons, horses, 
and packsaddles, provided at Augusta and Savannah. Some of these 
wagons have arrived, but, as yet, no horses. The remainder of that bag- 
gage train cannot be expected here, from Savannah, in less than ten days. 
In the mean time Brigadier General Eustis has been able, after providing 
for the South Carolina foot, to send a few wagons and teams for the Geor- 
gia battalion of foot, and for about two and a half tons more. I had also 
written to Brigadier General Clinch to send down all his spare teams to 
aid in taking the remainder of the seventy tons; and here are despatches 
from him which change the whole aspect of affairs, and infinitely aug- 
ments our difficulties in the way of transportation. 

It seems that Miijor General Gaines arrived at Fort King, from Tampa 
bay, on the 22d, and instantly called upon Brigadier General Clinch for 
14,000 rations, he having brought with him about 1,100 men, and no sub- 
sistence except for the troops on the march. This demand will leave only 
about 5,000 rations at Fort Drane, and will moreover occupy the whole of 
the baggage train at that place for many days. In other words, there will 
be left at Fort Drane but about eight days' subsistence for the regulars 
and volunteers who are there, say 650 men. To prevent starvation, I 
must, therefore, instantly recall the battalion of Georgia foot, now about 20 
miles from this, and detain it until subsistence in abundance can be sent in 
advance. I have also ordered twenty thousand rations to be put on board 
the steamer about to set out for Volusia ; but Volusia is about 50 miles 
from Fort King and 70 from Fort Drane, and the greater part of the 
route difficult, if not impracticable, for wagons. Pack-horses must be used, 
or the force from Tampa bay must approach Voiusia. 

Although my presence here for some days longer is highly necessary, I 
must hasten to Fort Drane with the company of Georgia mounted men 
above mentioned, in order to regulate the movements in that quarter. 
Major General Gaines, if he has not withdrawn, I shall first send to the 
Mexican frontier. 

In a letter from him to Brigadier General Clinch, dated at New Orleans, 
the 2d instant, and communicated to me by the latter, he says that tiie New 
Orleans force is " intended to be in readiness at Fort Brooke, Tampa, by 
the 8th of the present month, to form a junction at or near that place with 
the force under your command, whenever, and as soon as in your judgment 
your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement." 



[ 224 1 248 

It seems, however, that lie wailed for no communication from Brigadier 
General Clinch. He either knew, or did not know, at Tampa, if not 
sooner, that 1 had heen charged with Ihe direction of the war. In the 
former case perhaps he hoped to finish the war before the forces I had call- 
ed for could come up; in both cases he has neglected the assurance given to 
Brigadier General Clinch, I hat he would wait till the latter could co-operate. 
Major General Gaines, however, is at Fort King, having arrived hy the 
usual route from Tampa. He saw no enemy, as I learn by his letter to 
Brigadier General Clinch ; and the only meritorious service performed by 
him on the route, was the burying of the remains of Major Dade and his 
gallant detachment. 

At Fort King, at the latest, he must have learned that I was expected 
in Florida with :t large force ; yet it will be seen, by the copy of his let- 
ter herewith enclosed, he intended, as soon as he had deprived Brigadier 
General Clinch of his subsistence, to march in pursuit of the enemy. 

I have time to add no more. All my plans are thwarted ; the principal 
of which was to move in concert from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, 
on the 8th of March, upon the enemy, who are supposed to be (at this 
time) principally upon theAVithlacoochce. 
I remain, in haste, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WIN FIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. General Jones, 

Adjutant Generul U. S. 



No. 48. 



Headquarters, "Western Department, 

New Orleans, February 2, 1836. 

Sir : With a view to an efficient co-operation of the forces now assem- 
bling in the northeast quarter of Fast Florida, under your command, with 
those ordered from this city, by water, to Tampa bay, against the Semi- 
nole Indians and their colored vassals and allies, 1 take much pleasure in 
advising you that a tine battalion of the chivalric volunteers of Louisiana, 
consisting of eight companies, headed by Adjutant General Smith, are en- 
gaged to embark to-morrow with the regular troops at this post, under the 
command of Colonel Twiggs, on board the steamboats the Merchant, 
Captain Smyler, and the Watchman, Captain Vincent. These forces, 
amounting to near 700 men, added to 250 artillerists and marines, 
now at Tampa, to be sustained by an efficient naval force, promptly 
furnished by Commodores Dallas and Bolton, for cutting off the enemy's 
boats and other means of escape to the islands on the coast, are intended 
to be in readiness at Fort Brooke. Tampa, by the 8th of the present month, 
to form a junction, at or near that place, with the force under your com- 
mand, whenever and as soon as in your judgment your force shall be suf- 
ficient to justify the movement. 

In the interim I shall be governed by such information as 1 may receive 



249 [ 224 ] 



at Tampa, or my voyage thither to effect the desired junction, and as soon 
as possible to operate against, and take or destroy the enemy. 

I advise you to move with great caution, fortifying your camp at night, 
and inarching in open order during the day, so as to be always ready for 



action at a moment's warning. 



The supplies of subsistence and ammunition, at Tampa, are sufficient to 
divide with you until additional supplies can be obtained from this place. 
I am, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 
To Brig. General Clinch, 

Or the officer commanding the army now at or near 

Fort King, East Florida. 

To this force may be added 250 men under General Call, as lieutenant 
colonel, who will proceed to Tampa in two days, from St. Mark's. 

J. H. EATON. 



No. 49. 






Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fort King, East Florida, February 22, 18S6. 

General: I do myself the honor to announce to you my arrival at this 
place this afternoon, my force consisting of an aggregate of near eleven 
hundred and forty regulars and volunteers, pursuant to my plan of ope- 
rations communicated to you under date of the 2d of the present month, 
all in good health, save and except some few cases of chills and colds, which 
1 doubt not that two days' rest will remove. 

My march to this place was by the way of Warren's landing, on the 
Alafia river, and thence to the " military road," near the burnt bridge, on 
the Hillsborough river; thence along the road to this post ; having found, 
nearly forty miles south of this post, the deeply afflictive exhibition of the 
slain and mutilated bodies of the gallant band who fell in battle under 
Major Dade on the 28th of December, without being able to discover the 
savage foe by whom this and numerous other acts of barbarism had been 
perpetrated upon this ill-fated frontier. 

Hoping soon to see you, or to hear from you the result of your late move- 
ments upon the northern and eastern border of the theatre of the war, 
with the information obtained by you as to the enemy's late movements, 
and present probable position, that we may concert movements for his 
speedy overthrow, in which I shall take much pleasure in a cordial co-op- 
eration with you, I offer you my best wishes that our joint efforts may 
turn to a speedy and honorable termination of the war. 

My present object is to march from this place, by the way of the lower 
battle-ground, on the Withlacoochee, and thence whithersoever any trail 
or trace of the enemy may he found, and, finally, to return to Fort Brooke, 
obtain additional supplies, and then move in a direction to Charlotte bar- 



[ 224 " 250 



bor, not doubting that, after scouring the frontier north and east of this 
place, you will obtain such information of the movements of tlte enemy as 
to lead you from this place, by the way of Tolocchopka, on Pease creek, 
and thence towards Charlotte harbor, where you will find a supply of 
subsistence and ammunition, under the protection of a United States naval 
force. At Fort Brooke you will also find similar supplies, sufficient for 
your return to this place; or, if necessary, to enable you to remain in that 
quarter, with 1,000 or 1,200 men, until you can obtain supplies from New 
Orleans. 

These suggestions are necessarily imperfect, but this must always be the 
case, more or less, in a war with a people who take no prisoners ; who 
have no fortifications ; no intercourse with any other part of the human 
family; no newspapers, or any post office or intelligence department. I 
therefore leave you to act according to the best of your judgment, and the 
information you may from time to time obtain ; proceeding, as I shall pro- 
ceed, upon the principle that, to find the enemy, we must search for him ; 
and, when we find him, we must take or destroy him, or he will assuredly 
destroy us. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

ED. P. GAINES, 
Major General commanding. 
To Brig. Gen. D. L. Clinch, 

or officer on the northeastern border of East Florida. 



No. 50. 



Fort Drane, Florda, 

Februanj 24, 1836. 

Sir : I hasten to advise you of the arrival at Fort King, (20 miles south 
of this,) of Major General Gaines, from Fort Brooke, with a force of 
about 1,000 men. General Gaines brought provisions only for the march 
through, and has now required of me nearly all that we have on hand here. 
I shall send down to-day as much as we can find means to transport to 
him. I shall also go down myself to Fort King, and return to-morrow. 
I am, with high respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 
D. L. CLINCH, 

Brevet Brigadier General. 
Major General Scott, 

Commanding in Florida. 



251 [ 224 ] 

No. 51. 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fort King, Florida, February 22, 1836. 

Sir : I am directed by Major General Gaines to request that you will 
cause to be delivered to Lieutenant Colonel Foster, 4th infantry, fourteen 
thousand rations of salted pork and fourteen thousand rations of hard bread 
or flour, or equal quantities of each, with a small quantity of salt, for the 
troops at this post. 

With great respect, 
I am, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Jl. D. C. acting assist' t Adjutant Gen'l. 
C. M. Thruston. 

Captain Sd artillery. 



No. 52. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, March 2, 1836. 

Sir : I wrote to you by the last steamer that left this place, on the 26th 
ultimo, and two days after made notes upon an order, (No. 4,) which you 
will receive at the same time with this. 

All hope of sending supplies hence, by the. Ochlawaha, is abandoned. 
We have to rely solely on the road to Fort Drane, which is bad enough : 
and the horses and mules which were to have followed me closely from Sa- 
vannah have not arrived. The quartermaster (Lieutenant Dimmock) of 
that post had been in bed the greater part of the time that I was there : but 
was again on his feet when I left him. It is possible that he may have re- 
lapsed. 

The correspondence, copies of which will accompany this letter, between 
Major General Gaines and Brigadier General Clinch, and the latter and 
myself, will explain the state of affairs in respect to the right wing, or the 
theatre of war in the direction of those generals. 

No calculation can be made on the movements or dispositions of the force 
under Major General Gaines. He probably got beyond the reach of my order 
No. 4, before it arrived at Fort Drane, and therefore he may not receive 
it before to-morrow. Whether he will obey it, or allow the force he brought 
from Tampa bay to march to Volusia, is uncertain. There is no doubt 
that he will be obliged to fall back upon Fort King or Fort Drane. The 
whole of Brigadier General Clinch's baggage train will arrive here to-day 
(on the opposite side of the river) for subsistence, and I shall add a few 
wagons, for which there are horses here which came from Charleston via 
St. Augustine. 

The company of mounted Georgia volunteers that arrived here about six 
days ago, and with which I had expected to march to Fort Drane, refused 
to be mustered into service, and refused to come under the rules and arti- 



[ 224 ] 252 

cles of war, with the exception of a small part that remains. The rest went 
off, without leave, from their gallant and patriotic captain (Kenan) yester- 
day and the day before. The other four companies, of the same battalion, 
are this moment reported to have arrived on the opposite shore. I have 
sent an officer over to muster them into service; if I can get two of the 
companies I shall be most happy. I may obtain the four, but will march 
with one to Fort Drane. Some mounted men are indispensable ; and I 
know not that the United States dragoons will arrive in a month. I wish 
that I had never relied upon the arrival of that detachment. Expecting it 
hourly at Savannah (I had expected it at Charleston as early as the 4th 
ultimo) I left all the horses, in order that the mounts might first be chosen, 
and the remainder of the lot then sent here for the baggage train. That 
error I corrected, as far as practicable, by an order given to Lieutenant 
Dim mock on the 21st ultimo. No horses, however, have arrived from Sa- 
vannah. 

Brigadier General Eustis has just come over from St. Augustine. [We 
have heard nothing recently from Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted 
South Carolinians, but presume it has reached Jacksonville below.] The 
left wing will probably reach Volusia by the 8th or 10th instant. 

The steamer, sent up to Volusia, returned last night, having landed the 
detachment and provisions with success. Indeed, too much praise cannot 
be bestowed upon the officers and men composing that detachment. Cap- 
tain Canfield, of the topographical engineers, went up and returned in the 
steamer, which had to be unloaded to pass the bar at the head of Lake 
George. Indians were seen going up and returning, and several random 
shots exchanged. I ordered from Savannah the little steamer belonging to 
the engineer department, called the Essayons, to be sent here for the ex- 
press purpose of communicating with that post, and of supplying it with 
stores from Picolata; but that boat, like every thing else (almost) left be- 
hind, has not arrived. 

The river here is nearly two miles broad, and has, on account of wind, 
been extremely difficult to pass in flats and open boats yesterday and to- 
day. I am endeavoring to send over provisions for Fort Drane. and the 
extra wagons. If Major General Gaines falls back upon Fort King or 
Fort Drane, those provisions will soon be necessary for the current sub- 
sistence of the forces which will be assembled in that vicinity, and I should 
not be surprised if he seize upon the greater number of the wagons, with 
their loads, and endeavor to make his escape out of the Territory by way 
of Tampa bay. He brought with him about 60 pack-horses, I understand, 
from that place, and no wagons. Whether he will carry off the Louisiana 
volunteers and the regulars with him, is uncertain. The former, I learn, 
(from Captain Shannon, United Slates 1st infantry, who arrived last night 
via Tampa and Fort Drane,) were mustered into service for 90 days; and 
by a lctler from Colonel Smith, who commands the regiment, the men are 
desirous of performing their duty. 

I have at length received a letter from Colonel Lindsay, dated at Mobile, 
the 13th ultimo. lie was about to set out for Tuscaloosa to hasten the 
Alabama regiment. It is now evident that he cannot be at Tampa before 
the 10th. probably the 15th instant. 

By a reference to the map it will be seen that even if Major General 
Gaines could succeed in driving the enemy from the Withlacoochee, there 
is no force to prevent the retreat below Charlotte harbor, or to any point 



253 [ 224 J 



in the lower peninsula. A small guard only was left at Tampa. Colonel 
Lindsay will not be in position in time, and Brigadier General Eustis can- 
not cross the Ochlawaha earlier than the 14th instant. The retreat, it will 
be seen, is therefore open to the Indians. In this point of view, then, it 
would be infinitely better far the public interests that the enemy should 
drive Major General Gaines than that he should drive them. The war, in 
fact, would be forwarded by his being forced back upon Fort Drane or 
Fort King. He ought, in truth, to have fallen back on the evening of the 
28th or the morning of the 29th ultimo. The lives which he has lost have 
promoted no end. He must, I think, still fall back, and I wish to heaven 
that it may be without further loss. Brigadier General Clinch, from his 
present want of wagons, can send him no efficient aid ; and the wagons 
cannot be back in four or five days. If the force with Major General 
Gaines were at Tampa bay, it would now be in its true position ; but he 
cannot retreat thither ; for it will be seen by his letters that he has not the 
means of passing the river. He found the enemy exactly in the vicinity 
where all my arrangements presumed the enemy would be found, and in 
the positions which would have been the most favorable to us. 

I cannot close this letter without adding that I have heard nothing of the 
tents and knapsacks. The rifles, it seems, were to leave Harper's ferry 
about the 13th ultimo; and Major Gates, who reached Savannah a week 
ago, has not since been heard from. Those arrangements and movements 
are about upon a par with certain militia movements in my rear. The 
functionaries concerned must feel themselves in the enjoyment of a niost 
profound peace. 

I remain, sir, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 

P. S. I have this moment heard that, of the four mounted Georgia com- 
panies just arrived, one, with the exception of 19, refuses to be mustered, 
and that another, that has but 40 privates, is ready to enter the service. 
The two other companies, encamped some miles off, I shall hear from in 
the morning. I shall endeavor to see all the companies to-morrow, if we 
can cross the river, and to blend the fragments of companies ; but I learn 
that, in that case, those fragments will not agree to be consolidated without 
all their officers and non-commissioned officers ! ! The Essayons is in 
sight. 

W. S. 



No. 53. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 
Orders No. 1. Picolata, February 22, 18S6. 

Major General Scott, having arrived in Florida, assumes the general 
direction of the war against the hostile Seminole Indians. 



[ 224 ] 254 

The staff officers attached to genera! headquarters at present, are Cap- 
tain Canfield, (topographical engineer.) Lieutenant Chambers, (chief of 
the commissariat,) am! Lieutenants Van Birreu, Temple, and Johnston, 
aides-de-camp. All orders and instructions, conveyed by either of them 
in the name of the Major General, and whether orally or in writing, will 
be duly obeyed. 

The right and left wings of the army, or the troops on the west and east 
side of the St. John's river-, will be continued under the respective orders 
of Brigadier Generals Clinch and Eustis ; and the forces which are to 
operate from Tampa bay, under Colonel Lindsay, will, when they come 
into line, constitute the centre. The wings will soon be greatly reinforced 
by the arrival of both regulars and volunteers. 

The three immediate commanders of the right, left, and centre of the 
army, respectively, will generally receive orders direct from general 
headquarters; but, of course, every junior will obey any senior, according 
to the rules and articles of war, and the usages of the service, whether the 
parties belong to 1 he militia, or to the militia and regular army. 

As, for the first time, patriotic volunteers from South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida, are to come into the same line with a 
portion of the regular- army, it is confidently hoped that a beneficial 
emulation, without uukindness or prejudice, may animate the different 
forces. All are equally Americans, actuated by the like determination — 
to subdue a treacherous and a common foe. 

But valor and patriotism alone are not sufficient for that eird. Some 
tactical instruction and an exact obedience to commands, are also neces- 
sary. Instruction can only be acquired by opportunity and labor. A firm 
resolution to obey, accomplishes the other great requisite at once. Let the 
resolution, then, be promptly taken by all who have nobly turned out to 
avenge their butchered countrymen. 

But again : to parade, to march, to mount guard, and to fight, are not 
the only duties of war. To handle and preserve the supplies of the army, 
and to construct camp and other field defences, are equally required of eve- 
ry good soldier. A corps of servants, for these purposes, would be too 
large and cumbrous. It would double the army, and render one-half too 
mean, and the other- too delicate for the glory of a well-contested field. 
Fatigue parlies must, therefore, when wanted, be furnished by all the corps 
in their turn, and proportionally. 

WIN FIELD SCOTT. 

By command of Major General Scott. 

A. VAN BUREN, 
Aid-de-camp, acting AssH Adft General. 



No. 54. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, February 26, 1836. 
Orders No. 4. 

The detachment of regulars and volunteers which has recently arrived 
at Fort King from Fort Brooke, will remain in its present position till 



255 [ 224 J 

further orders. It will, from time to time, receive from Fort Drane the 
subsistence which cannot he supplied at Fort King. 

Brigadier General Clinch, or the commanding officer at Fort King, will 
immediately hire or employ any suitable boats which may be found at or 
near Payne's landing, to be sent down with a sufficient detachment to re- 
ceive at Picolata, or if met, from a steamer which will be despatched lo 
the mouth of the Ochlawaha, the subsistence which will be wanted at Fort 
King. The steamer may be expected at the mouth of the Ochlawaha, with 
supplies, by tSie 3d or 4th of the next month, and will wait there, if neces- 
sary, for the boats till the 8th. 

Should it be impracticable to send suitable boats to Picolata, or the 
mouth of the Ochlawaha, for the subsistence, the detachment recently from 
Fort Brooke will march to Volusia, without delay, and there wait for 
further orders. To that point, subsistence, in abundance, will be sent 
hence to-morrow, to be placed under the cover of a field-work and a strong 
detachment. 

No offensive movement, except so far as may he necessary to carry 
these orders into execution, will be attempted by the troops at, or in the 
neighborhood (if, Forts King and Drane, until further instructions from 
general headquarters. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

A true copy: 

A. \\n Buiien, 

Aid-de- Camp, acVg AssH Adft Gen. 



No. 55. 
Notes for the Secretary of War and the General-in-chieJ . 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, February 28, 1836. 

Fort Drane is the depot nearest to the supposed position of the mass of the 
enemy, and the point the most difficult to supply from Picolata. The right 
wing was intended to be concentrated at Fort Drane — say by the 8th of 
March, when it was expected that General Clinch would have had all the 
Georgia troops, companies of United States artillery, and the detachment 
of United States dragoons ; in all, about fourteen hundred men. 

On the 25th instant it was know that General Clinch would have had, 
but for General Gaines, nineteen thousand rations for men, and about three 
thousand bushels of corn for horses. That amount of subsistence at Fort 
Drane, [ should more than have maintained by the 8th of March, by 
means of the baggage train expected from Savannah and Charleston, and 
by the aid of bunting on the Ochlawaha to Payne's landing. But if only 
twenty thousand rations, for men, could have been placed at Fort Drane 
(including the number there on the 25th instant) by the 8th of March, the 
light wing might have advanced with confidence on the latter day, inde- 
pendent of farther partial supplies from this place. 

Boating on the Ochlawaha, to Payne's landing, is still relied upon with 
great confidence. General Clinch has there from four to six sugar lighters, 
(his private property, I believe,) built expressly for that river, and capa- 
ble of transporting from forty to sixty tons. Their construction is pecu- 



[ 224 ] 256 

liar ; and the boats at Picolata, or on tlic St. John's, cannot be used on the 
Ochlawalia. On tbe 25th I heard of those boats, and immediately directed 
General Clinch to send them down. (It is supposed (hat there is no enemy 
on tbe Ochlawalia.) His means of land transportation were to be sent at 
the same time. But General Gaines not only arrives with eleven hundred 
and forty men, in the mean time, from a grand depot, bringing with him 
no supplies ; not oidy calls for ail the baggage train, and nearly the 
whole of the subsistence at Fort Diane, but takes General Clinch, person- 
ally, from his position ; and I may be. thereby delayed three days longer 
than I should have been in learning whether the boats can come down or 
not ! My order No. 4 may, in part, correct those evils ; and, by order 
No. 5. I have recalled the Georgia battalion of foot. A chapter of em- 
barrassments and vexations ! 

Not a doubt is entertained that the post at Volusia will be established. 
The steamer Santee went hence on the 27th instant for the purpose, having 
on board Elmore's company of South Carolina volunteers and a United 
States company under Lieutenant Irwin ; in all, one hundred and sixty 
men. She also took twenty thousand rations, two scows or flats, two row- 
boats, tools, nails, &c. If the steamer cannot pass the bar at the head of 
Lake George, six or eight miles below Volusia, (and it is believed she 
can, at least by the aid of the lighters,) the lighters and boats will be able 
to reach the point, &c. Farther supplies, of every sort which may be 
required by the left wing, or the troops from Tampa, will, from time to 
time, follow from Picolata. But Volusia, though easy of access from this 
place, is much more distant from the enemy on the Withlacoochee, than 
either Fort King or Dranc. The left wing, however, when concentrated 
at Volusia, will he in position either to march upon the Withlacoochee, 
the upper crossing on the Ochlawalia, to Tampa. Charlotte harbor, or, in 
general, to prevent the enemy from escaping to the southeast, particularly 
by a simultaneous movement, with Colonel Lindsay and the Alabama 
regiment, from Tampa bay; and this, too, whether General Gaines 
marches his column to Volusia, remains at Fort King, or, in a pet, takes 
it back to Tampa — perhaps. New Orleans, against my orders. 

It will be seen, from the foregoing, that, to re-establish my plan of cam- 
paign, viz: to move simultaneously from Fort Urane, (or Fort King,) 
from Volusia, and Tampa — say about the 8th of March — the great diffi- 
culty will be to send supplies for the right wing; and the bad road from 
Picolata to Fort Dranc (sixty-five miles) has, by a heavy rain which has 
now been falling for forty-six hours, been rendered infinitely worse. 

I beg that this mode of communicating, which accident has tin own me 
upon, may be excused. 

WIN FIELD SCOTT. 



No. 56. 



HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF FlORIDA, 

Picolata, February 27, 1836. 
Orders No. 5. 

An unexpected and unauthorized arrival at Fort Drane of a heavy de- 
tachment of troops from Tampa bay, without subsistence, being likely to 



257 [ 224 ] 

exhaust the supplies provided at Fort Dranc for other troops, the Georgia, 
volunteers, under the command of Major Cooper, will return to the St. 
John's, and encamp till the embarrassment that causes this retrograde 
movement can be remedied. 

By command of Major General Scott : 

A. VAN BUREN, 
Aid-de-camp, acting AssH AdjH General. 



No. 57. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, February 27, 1836. 
Orders No. 6. 

Until the arrival of the other parts of the same battalion, Captain 
Kenan's company of mounted volunteers will be held as a separate corps. 

Every company of mounted volunteers will be supplied with picketing- 
rope, and, to the extent of the supply, with nose-bags. 
By command of Major General Scott: 

A. VAN BUREN, 
Aid-de-camp, acting AssH Adft General, 



No. 58. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, February 25, 1836. 

Sir: I arrived here the evening of the 22d, and had the satisfaction of 
receiving your letters of the 17th and 20th. 

I enclose you a ropy of an order that I issued on my arrival. 

A battalion of Georgia foot (three hundred and forty strong) crossed the 
river last evening to join you. Its baggage train being exceedingly indif- 
ferent, (nothing better having arrived,) I doubt whether the battalion 
reaches you in four or five days. Major Cooper is its commander. 

The first company of a battalion of mounted men, from the same State, 
is expected to arrive opposite to Picolata to-day. The remainder of the 
battalion (four companies) are supposed to be one, two, and three days be- 
hind. This battalion (say three hundred and fifty strong) is also destined 
to reinforce the right wing under your command, and it shall be despatched 
as fast as the companies arrive, after leaving time for each company to re- 
fresh its horses. A second battalion of mounted Georgians may be expected 
by the same route, and for the same destination, in ten or twelve days. I 
shall not wait for it, nor for the detachment of United States dragoons, 
which has occupied at least twenty-two days in getting horse-equipments in 
New York and Philadelphia, and may occupy three weeks more. I shall 
join you with one of the companies of mounted men nearest at hand. 
Another Georgia battalion of foot that was to rendezvous at Columbus to 
17 



I 224 ] 258 

go tlienee via Appalachicola, I hope an express, sent by me, may arrive in 
time to keep at home. 

Brigadier General Eustis has commenced pushing forward the South 
Carolina regiment of toot via Tomoca, &c, towards Volusia, where it 
may arrive by the 3d of March. A steamer will take hence, in two days. 
a detachment of South Carolinians (Elmore's company, one hundred and 
ten strong) to the bar, ten miles below Volusia, and thence, with flats and 
row-boats, proceed to make an establishment at that place. A company of 
regulars may go with this detachment, and large stoics for either wing of 
the army will be deposited there. 

The regiment of mounted South Carolinians began to arrive at Savan- 
nah on the evening of the 20th. This regiment (say seven hundred and 
forty strong) may reach St. Augustine by the 3d of March, and Volusia 
the 7th. It will cross the St. John's at Jacksonville. With the left wing 
there will be, in addition, five companies of regulars — leaving one here, 
and, perhaps, another at St. Augustine ; and I propose to send to the right 
wing at least two of the companies that embarked at Baltimore for this 
place via Savannah. These companies may now be hourly expected here, 
having heard that they had got to sea. 

According to computation, Colonel Lindsay could not have embarked 
the Alabama regiment (seven hundred and forty men) at Mobile for 
Tampa earlier than the 24th instant, probably not so early. I have not 
had a line from him or Governor Clay. My call on the latter was 
dated at Augusta, the 31st ultimo, and Colonel Lindsay set out for the 
same place the 4th instant. 

I am greatly surprised that Governor Eaton should think of sending a 
single company from Middle Florida to Tampa ; for he knew all that I had 
done in respect to that end of our line of communications, and he knew 
of the forces sent to the same place from New Orleans, and which did not 
enter into my estimates for the war. Indeed, I expressly told the Governor 
that it would be best to keep his militia (already much harassed) at home, 
and in defensive positions, as I hoped to drive the enemy in upon the 
settlements of Middle Florida. The movement from New Orleans, al- 
though highly worthy of praise, under the circumstances, may, if it 
should lead to a premature advance from Tampa, be productive of a result 
the most unfavorable. 

If the advance, for example, should fail to crush the enemy and termi- 
nate the war — and, without mounted men, I suppose such result can scarce- 
ly be hoped for — the enemy may be scattered and put upon his retreat to 
the southeast. To follow him in such retreat, might be almost imprac- 
ticable ; and, to prevent the escape in that direction, Colonel Lindsay has 
my instructions in detail. 

To resume : I hope to be personally at Fort Drane before the 3d of 
next month, and to make the right wing about fourteen hundred strong. 
Brigadier General Eustis will have at Volusia, four days later, even a 
larger force, and Colonel Lindsay, (or Major General Gaines, ) by the 
Sd, the largest army of the three. If, therefore, I can send to Fort Drane 
from this, as I do not doubt I shall, the necessary supplies, say hard bread, 
bacon, and some corn, (besides what you report,) the 8th of March had 
best be fixed as the day for the vigorous movement of the right, the left, 
and the centre of the army, upon the enemy. The necessary instructions 
to Colonel Lindsay, I wish you to give by any route in your power — say 



259 [ 224 ] 

direct, if practicable, or by Tallahassee and St. Mark's, or both. If the 8th 
of March be too early a day, you may designate the loth, 12ih, or 15th. Is 
it not possible to take a portion of the supplies, wanted to give the right 
wing confidence in its forward movement, by water, from this place? 

If I had, here, the sugar-lighters from Payne's landing, they might be 
loaded, towed to the mouth of the Qchlawaha, and thence polled up to 
that landing. I estimate that it will be necessary to transport to you, 
before the 8th of March, in order that you may, on that day, have a 
balance for fifteen days, about seventy tons of supplies ; and I fear that 
I shall not have, of /and-transportation, for the purpose, in that time, 
exceeding, say. thirty-five two-horse wagons. Setid down, then, as much 
of your baggage train as you can spare, and at once ; also the sugar- 
lighters, if you can safely do so. 

By the Florida, hourly expected from Savannah, I hope we shall re- 
ceive about fifteen two-horse wagons, and some horses. More of the latter 
will soon arrive here and at St. Augustine; and five large wagons will 
come with the troops from Baltimore; but, remember, that seventy tons 
will load one hundred and forty two-horse wagons. 

I hope to hear from you by the return of the express, and remain, 
With great consideration, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To Brigadier General Clinch. 



No. 59. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Ficolata, February 26, 1836. 

Sir : I have heard with equal astonishment and regret, that Major 
General Gaines, without reference to my arrangements, perhaps in igno- 
rance, possibly in defiance of them, should have made a premature move- 
ment from Tampa bay, and having arrived within twenty miles of Fort 
Drane, should have called for nearly three-fourths of the subsistence in 
deposite at that place, on which I had relied for the movement of the right 
wing, in concert with the other parts of the army. If his demand shall 
have been complied with in full, before my orders on the subject shall 
arrive, all hopes of putting the right wing in motion in search of the enemy 
must be delayed till the rations so withdrawn can be replaced from this 
point ; and the means of land transportation to a sufficient extent, are not 
expected to arrive here before the eighth of the next month. 

To remedy this unexpected embarrassment, I send you two copies of Or- 
ders No. 4; one of which you will despatch to the commanding officer of the 
detachment from Fort Brooke, whoever he may be, with all speed, and 
limit the subsistence called for from Fort Drane, according to the inten- 
tion of those orders. 

I hope it may be found practicable to send from the Ochlawaha suitable 
boats to receive (say) from twenty to eighty tons of subsistence, and other 
supplies, at once, which will be wanted to justify an effective movement 
upon the enemy from your vicinity. If not, send down all the means of 



[ 224 ] 260 

land transportation at or near your headquarters, which you can sp 
We have no suitable boats here, and the horses expected from Savani 
cannot be here in the whole, before perhaps the 3th of March. The 
steamer Florida arrived last night with some wagons, hut without horses, 
and but one company of Georgia mounted men has been heart! of. With 
that I shall set out for Fort Diane as soon as I can ; perhaps not in four 
or five days. In the mean time, let me continue to hear from you. 

The steamer Santee, with about 160 regulars and volunteers, sets out 
early to-morrow morning to make an establishment at Volusia. She taken 
20.000 rations, lighters, boats, &c. From Fort King to Volusia, I sup- 
pose to be about fifty miles, and the route practicable for troops. 

Major General Gaines, I presume, will have heard of the order which 
ought to take him to the Mexican frontier. If he should prefer to remain, 
lie must obey my orders. 

In haste, with great respect, 

1 remain truly yours, 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 
To Brigadier General Clinch, 
Commanding^ §c, Fort Drane. 



No. 60. 



Headq.uak.teks, Aumy of Florida, 

Picolata, .March I, 18 36. 

Sir : By the arrival, at daylight this morning, of the express frnm Fort 
Diane, I have your note of yesterday, accompanied by a letter to you 
from Major Genera! Gaines, dated the day before. 

I regret, in every point of view, the premature and unathorized move- 
ment from Tampa bay, made by that Gciiernl, and the very awkward and 
responsible position he has placed himself in, by his subsequent march 
from Fort King. I presume that, as instructed, you sent him my Order 
No. 4, dated the 26th ultimo. By that be saw that if the troops he 
brought with him from Tampa bay could not he subsisted at Fort King, 
by means of supplies derived irom this place, through the Ochlawaha, it 
was expressly commanded that the column should march to Volusia with- 
ou delay, where subsistence in abundance would be. immediately provided. 
But he had before that order readied him, taken from Fort Drane a large part 
of the subsistence relied upon for a more systematic course of operations, and 
decamped ; the order, however, I take it for granted, was sent after him, 
and in time to reach him within twenty miles of Fort King. In any event, 
the responsibility of his movements, and actual position, is his own ; for 
he must have known, as early as the 10th ultimo, if not before, that I had 
been charged with the general direction of the war in Florida, and that by 
interfering:, lie constituted himself an interloper. 

Even if you had sufficient stores on hand, and means of transportation, 
under the circumstances, [should command you to send no subsistence to 
him, unless to prevent starvation : but you have neither. Let him, there- 
to) r, in time, extricate himself from the embarrassment he has 
placed himself in by marching upon Volusia, where, I have no reason to 
doubt, that 20,000 rations, sent hence on the 27th ultimo, have safely arri- 
ved. As he appears to have a retreat open to him, or is in no peril to pre- 



26 t [ 224 ] 

vent his faking that step, you, of course, will make no detachment or 
movement to join him. 

The train you have ordered hither is expected to night : as yet, we have 
here few wagons to add toy our number. The whole train shall he immediate- 
ly loaded with subsistence, and sent hack to Fort Drane. I have only 
time to say that, should the troops under Major General Gaines he com- 
pelled to march back to Fort King, or to Fort Drane, instead of proceed- 
ing to Volusia, as heretofore commanded, and as I still wish that they 
should do, on account of the extreme difficulty of sending subsistence to 
your neighborhood, you will only issue rations to them for their current 
subsistence, and not for further false expeditions. 

As the first consequence of the arrival of the troops from Tampa bay to 
Fort King, and the demand made upon Fort Drane, for subsistence, I was 
obliged to order back a battalion of Georgia volunteers, that had then been 
nearly two days in route to join you. 

The company of mounted men from the same State, now on the, oppo- 
site side of the river, refuse to be mustered into service, and refuse to come 
under the rules and articles of war. The other companies of the same 
battalion may follow their example; if they do, I shall lose no time in 
ordering the whole hack to their homes. 

Major Gates, with his three companies, has not arrived, and I have no 
intelligence respecting the United States dragoons, of a recent date. 
Finally, the horses for some days expected from Savannah have not arri- 
ved. These embarrassments may detain me here I know not how long. 

The left wing is moving upon Volusia with system and success. The 
South Carolina foot constitutes the advance, and I suppose the mounted 
regiment from the same State is now crossing the St. John's at Jackson- 
ville. 

Send another copy of my Order No. 4 to Major General Gaines, and a 
copy of Order No. 1, which is enclosed for the purpose. The former is 
reiterated so far as respects the march to Volusia, if this be practicable ; 
and enclose him a certified copy of this letter for his government and your 
justification. 

I remain, in haste, 

Your obedient servant, 

WIN FIELD SCOTT. 

P. S. I am instructed by Major General Scott to say that the quar- 
termaster's return did not accompany your letter of the 27th ultimo. No 
return has been received of your ordnance, or ordnance stores, particular- 
ly the fixed ammunition for muskets. Please to send one. 

Respectfully, 

* A. VAN BUREN, 

Jlid-de-camp. 



No. 61. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, March 1, 1 836. 

Sir : I have just closed No, 1 to you, of this date. It has since occur- 
red to me that Colonel Lindsay may arrive at Tampa hay, and premature- 



[ 224 ] 262 

Jy march to meet the column he will suppose to be in operation from Fori 
Drane. Such a movement would infinitely embarrass the subsistence de- 
partment here, and with you, on account of the false movement of Major 
General Gaines, and our want of sufficient means of transportation from 
this point. Therefore, if possible, and you can best judge, communicate 
with Colonel Lhidsay, and say that a movement from Fort Drane must be 
unavoidably delayed, for the reasons mentioned, to the 15th instant, when 
he will, with as many days' subsistence as possible, for his command, but 
with hot less than eight or six, march to meet you at such probable point 
as you may name. 

Again, with the highest respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
To Brigadier General Clinch, 

Fort Drane. 



No. 62. 



Headquarters, Camp Izard, 

On the right bank of the JVithlacoochee, 2 miles west of 

General Clinch's battle ground, February 28, 1856. 

General: I take much pleasure in stating to you that I have reason to 
believe I have now near me the principal force of the Seminole Indians, 
with their black vassals and allies. I, yesterday afternoon, after halting 
my reserve and rear guard, with my baggage train, in the upper pine 
woods, near the encampment north of the battle-ground, proceeded with 
the remainder part of my force to the Withlacoochee, with a view to re- 
connoitre and inspect in person the adjacent section of the river, prepara- 
tory to my intended crossing, which I had designed to attempt this morn- 
ing. I had been at the river only long enough to examine it 250 or 300 
yards, about and above the usual crossing-place, when the enemy com- 
menced a spirited firing on my party, and kept it up, with the war-whoop, 
for half an hour. The fire was of course returned. 

Having determined this morning, in consequence of the thick woods on 
the opposite side of the river, to extend my examinations to this point, at 
which I learned there were open pine woods on both sides of the river, I 
accordingly marched with my whole force to this place, where I was 
promptly met by the enemy, whose force appears to have increased very 
considerably in the course of an hour or two. The river at this place is 
deemed to be about as wide, but much deeper and less rapid, than at the 
first-mentioned place, with open pine woods on both sides. Neither of the 
places are fordable. My reconnaissances, in consequence, of the narrow- 
ness of the river, and the impossibility of finding materials for promptly 
bridging or rafting the stream, have resulted in the loss of two of the 
Louisiana volunteers killed, and ten volunteers and regulars wounded ; 
among the latter I deeply lament to find the gallant Lieutenant Izard, of 
the dragoons, dangerously. 

Being convinced that the principal force of the enemy is now assembled 
before me, and not doubting that their women and children are placed in 



263 [ 224 J 

a large cypress swamp, witliin a few miles of this place, and that an imme- 
diate movement of a force equal or nearly equal to that now with me, con- 
sisting in part of mounted men, would enable us to put an end to the war 
in the next 10 days, by a combined and simultaneous movement against 
them, I have deemed it my duty to propose to you such a movement, 
should the forces expected at Fort Drane have arrived — otherwise the 
force there on the 22d would, I think, be sufficient — but this is doubtful, 
and the case is one of too much importance to leave the question of force at 
all in doubt. In the expectation of this co-operation, I shall endeavor to 
amuse the enemy in completing my boats and preparing to cross — but I 
shall not cross until I hear from you. 

In any event I request of you six thousand rations of pork and flour 
and sugar, with the quartermaster's stores which follow : 2 whip-saws, 
2 cross-cut saws, 2 hand-saws, 6 adzes, 6 trows, augers, assorted, 4 broad- 
axes, 2 iron wedges, 200 iron spikes; and, if possible, 2 field-pieces, with 
150 rounds canister and 50 round shot; 10,000 rounds musket-cartridges. 
I have the honor to be, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 

Killed — Zeno Boullie, Valentine Beck. 

To Brig. Gen. D. L. Clinch, 

or officer commanding the United Slates troops assembling at 
Fort Drane, East Florida. 

V. S. The forces from Fort Drane should cross the "Withlacooch.ee at 
the ford eight or ten miles above the battle-ground or at the point, and 
more down on the left bank of the river, to this place. 



No. 63. 



Headquarters, Camp Izard, 

2 miles west of General Clinch's battle ground, 

February 29, 1836. 

General : I last night stated to you, by express, the occurrence of my 
meeting the Indians on my arrival at this place, suggesting the expe- 
diency of an immediate co-operation on the part of the disposable force 
under your command, under the strong conviction that, by such co-opera- 
tion, we should be able, in a few days, to bring the war to a close, having 
been convinced that the principal force of the enemy is assembled near me, 
on this river. The occurrences of the day confirm me in the opinion I 
then expressed to you. 

Having occupied myself in preparing a small work to command the cross- 
ing-place of the river, and making canoes for tl'e purpose of constructing a 
bridge, I had not deemed it necessary to strengthen my breastworks, not 
having apprehended that the enemy would have the temerity to attack me 
in my position. In this conclusion, however, I have been disappointed. At 
10 o'clock this morning a spirited and vigorous attack was made by the 
enemy on three sides of my encampment, which continued two hours, with 



224 ] 264 



little or no intermission — in the course of which they frequently ap- 
proached so near to my left flank, commanded by Adjutant General Smith, 
of the Louisiana volunteers, as to wound several men on the opposite flank, 
a distance of 200 yards. They were, however, repulsed : 1 have reason 
to helievc with considerable loss. 

The loss sustained hy the force of my command was 1 sergeant kill- 
ed, and 1 officer (Lt. Duncan) and 10 men wounded of the regulars, and 
1 officer and 20 men wounded of the volunteers. The troops having been 
particularly instructed not to throw away their fire or to fire without cor- 
rect aim at a short distance, 1 was happy to find the order was strictly 
attended to, and consequently but little ammunition was expended. It is 
imposible to say, with any precision, what was the enemy's force ; but 
the officers best acquainted with the service concur with mc in opinion it 
was not less than 1,500. From the foregoing facts, I have no doubt the 
principal force of the enemy is now in this vicinity; that they are sensible 
of the desperate situation in which they have placed themselves, and that 
their temerity will prompt them to make a resistance commensurate with 
the circumstances in which they find themselves. 

I have abstained and shall abstain from a sortie until I hear from you, 
in the expectation that this course will contribute to keep them together, 
whilst a sortie might tend to disperse them. I am now satisfied a move- 
ment directly to this place will be more advisable than to attempt to cross 
the Withlacoochce higher up, as suggested in my letter of yesterday. I am 
moreover of the opinion that, if mounted men can be procured in the course 
of a few days, your force should not move from Fort Dranc without this 
description of troops. I repeat my request that I may be furnished 6,000 
rations of flour, pork, and sugar, 5 bushels of salt, some corn, with tools 
to build blockhouses, 2 field-pieces, 150 rounds of canister and 50 round 
shot, 10,000 musket ball-cartridges, with as many light wagons as can 
be spared, as my wounded are increasing daily and my horses decreasing. 

I have the honor to be, &c, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 

To Gen. D. L. Clinch, 

or officer commanding troops assembled at Fort Drane, 
Jiuld Lang Sync. 



No. 64. 



Extract of a letter addressed to Brigadier General Clinch, by order of 
Major General Scott, dated 

Picolata, March 2, 1836. 
If Major General Gaines should fall back upon Fort King or Fort 
Dranc, it is presumed that he will proceed to execute the orders of the 
Government, which will carry him to another quarter. In that event you 
would be the senior officer ; and I am instructed by Major General Scott to 
say that you are at liberty to detain the troops from Fort Brooke, at either 
of the forts mentioned — Dranc and King. Subsistence will reach you in 
five or six davs. 

A. VAN BUREN, 

Md-de-camp. 



265 [ 224 ] 

No, 65. 

Fort King, February 25, 1SS6. 

Dear Shannon : I received your letter and check, for which I am 
much obliged. I find it is General Gaines's intention to go down to 
Tampa hay, by the way of the scene of General Clinch's fight, and then 
to quit Florida. I wish you would take occasion to say to General Scott 
that if he thinks the services of my regiment can he of use to his operations 
I would rather remain with it in Florida than go hack without having 
seen a fight. Though, to tell the truth, I would rather have the fight 
before the grand army comes up. I would like, therefore, before we can 
he shipped hack from Tampa hay, to be ordered on some active duty by. 
General Scott. Try and send any news you may hear. 

Yours, sincerely, 

P. F. SMITH. 

Captain S. Shannon. 



No. 66. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, March 4, 1836. 



Orders No. 1 1. 



Captain Shannon, chief of the United States quartermaster's department, 
will exert himself to start the wagon train (loaded) as early as possible 
for Fort Drane. He will engage a responsible wagon-master, and obtain 
the drivers that may he wanted. 

Major Cooper will detach a company from his battalion to escort the 
wagons, which will remain at Fort Drane until the remainder of the 
battalion shall come up with it. 

The commander of the escort will receive instructions for the march 
from the quartermaster, as will the wagon-master. The latter will be 
immediately charged with the command of the drivers, and the care of the 
wagons and horses j the whole under the general direction of the com- 
mander of the escort. 

By command of Major General Scott : 

A. VAN BUREN, Jl. 1). C. 



No. 67. 



Headquarters of the Army of Florida, 

Picolata, March 5, 1836. 

Orders No. 12. 

All the troops now in the vicinity of Picolata and Garey's ferry, on 
Black creek, as well as those expected to arrive in a few days at the one 



[ 224 ] 266 

or the other place, are destined to make part of the right wing of the army, 
and will constantly hold themselves in readiness to march for Fort Drane» 

To make room for subsistence, ammunition, and hospital stores, the 
wagon train will be relieved of every thing that can be dispensed with. 
Commanding officers of battalions and companies will look closely to this 
great object, and each is held responsible that every thing is left behind 
not absolutely necessary to the efficiency of officers and men. 

A great saving in the weight to be drawn may be made in diminishing 
the number of tents. One for the officers of a company, and one for every 
twelve sergeants, corporals, privates, and musicians, will give as many as 
the means of transportation will permit. This proportion must, on no 
account, be exceeded. Every intelligent individual will see that it is suf- 
ficient when he reflects that there will then be tents enough to cover the 
sick, the delicate, and all the arms, particularly as near the enemy, one- 
third of every company ought to be on guard from sun-down to sun-rise. 

In order that the wagons ard pack-horses may not be broken down by 
the lazy, no individual, except a sick or a lame man, will be allowed to 
ride. In cases of doubt, a surgeon, or if there be none, the commanding 
officer will decide. This rule must be rigorously enforced. 

As a general rule, the troops will always commence long marches with 
four days' subsistence in each haversack. Hard bread, which is the light- 
est and the most wholesome, has been provided for the purpose, and for 
the same reasons bacon shall soon be issued ; until it shall arrive, boiled 
pork for two days will be put in each haversack, with bread for four, at 
the commencement of the march for Fort Drain 1 . 

The arms and ammunition of every man must, at all times, he kept in 
the best possible condition for firing. Both must be carefully inspected by 
company officers every morning and every evening. Commanders of com- 
panies will always see that this is done in every company, and field officers 
will also look to the execution of this command. 

Arms must not be permitted to remain too long loaded. The loads must 
from time to time be drawn, or, by special permission, fired : all the bad 
loads of the same battalion or company at the same time. The special per- 
mission is indispensable to prevent false alarms ; for, near the enemy, a 
single discharge ought to be a signal for the whole to turn out under arms. 
For this reason, and also on account of the difficulty of transporting am- 
munition in wagons, all idle firing in or about camps or columns in march 
is strictly prohibited. 

When access can be had to the ammunition wagon, every man ought con- 
stantly to have in his cartouch-box or pocket at least twenty-four rounds 
of ammunition to fit him for battle. This object ought to be looked to every 
morning when arms and ammunition are inspected. 

Volunteers will seize every occasion that may offer to drill by battalion 
and by company. 

By command of Major General Scott : 

A. VAN BUREN, Aid-de-camp, 

Acting Assistant Adjutant General* 



267 [ 224 | 

No. 68. 

Beadq.uahters, Akmy of Florida, 

Picolata, March 6, 1836. 

Sir : No intelligence lias been received of the movements of Major 
General Gaines of a later date than his letter dated the 29th ultimo, a 
copy of which lias been forwarded. He cannot, therefore, have fallen hack 
upon either Fort Drane or King, or have marched upon Volusia. In 
either case, I should, doubtless, have received a further report of him from 
Brigadier General Clinch. It may then be hoped that he has beaten the 
enemy, or, at least, have succeeded in effecting his return to Tampa bay. 
In this state of doubt and anxiety, I know not how long I may have to re- 
main. Yet it is important to my combinations that I should speedily learn 
what has become of his column, and particularly, whether the position and 
numbers of the enemy have been materially changed by its operations. 

I at length know that the South Carolina mounted regiment reached 
Jacksonville yesterday. It is destined to make part of the left wing. 
The foot (in part) of the same wing now occupies Volusia, and posi- 
tions on the coast as far as the Tomoca. Four other companies are 
engaged in scouring the country between the Atlantic and the St. 
John's, as far south as the Alachua ferry, or Pilatka. Several small 
parties of the enemy have been discovered almost in a line between 
this and St. Augustine. A few shots have been exchanged, but without 
results. On the supposition that Major General Gaines has left the state 
of the enemy on the Withlacoochee unchanged, the left wing (under 
Brigadier General Eustis) need not be concentrated at Volusia until a day 
or two before Brigadier General Clinch shall be in force to act vigor- 
ously from Fort Drane. Besides, Brigadier General Eustis has neces- 
sarily been compelled to wait for the South Carolina mounted regiment, 
which cannot reach St. Augustine before the day after to-morrow, and Vo- 
lusia before the 12th. 

If the column under Major General Gaines had fallen back upon Fort 
Drane or King, the right wing would have wanted nothing but subsistence, 
and the forces now in this vicinity, and known to be coming up, to act with 
vigor and effect. These forces are : 1. Three companies United States 
artillery, under Major Gates, which landed this morning, about 140 men, 
and which detachment has been more than eight days in coming from Sa- 
vannah, by steam, through a most unusual storm. 2. Major Cooper's 
battalion of Georgia foot, about 320 men, encamped about 4^ miles west 
of this, on the Fort Drane road. 3. A small battalion of Georgia mounted 
men, only about 140 strong, now waiting for orders at Garey's ferry, or 
Black creek, distant, by a direct route, (say) 60 miles from Fort Drane. 
4. Capton Wharton's detachment of United States dragoons, about 90 
strong, now in march from Savannah, and which may arrive at Garey's 
ferry about the 11th. These two small detachments of horse are, on the 
above supposition, deemed of greater importance to the right wing than 
the two of foot, and I do not know that any part of the second battalion 
of mounted men called for from Georgia, can now be expected, and, indeed, 
if this second battalion were to arrive with no better dispositions than were 
evinced by the mass of the first, I should regret its appearance. 

The first battalion consisted of Captains Kenan's, Allen's, Douglass's, 
Malone's, and Sweeny's companies. Less than 20 privates of Kenan's, and 



[ 224 ] 268 

not one of Allen's, were willing to be mustered into service ; that is, to 
come under the rules and articles of war. Their zeal and patriotism had 
evaporated before their arrival, in the opinion of many of their officers, 
and in that of all the gallant men of the same State who remain. Allen's 
men, in despite of his patriotic exertions, deserted him, in mass, the morn- 
ing after their arrival on the opposite side, and before I could get across 
the river. The mass of Kenan's company, the one first on the ground, 
also deserted. This officer's cliagrin is as great as his intelligence and 
general merits. About seven of his men only, who were willing to be 
mustered, have joined the three remaining companies of the battalion. 
These (Douglass's, Malone's and Sweeny's) showed better dispositions from 
the first. 1 visited their camp, on the other side of the river, four days 
ago, in a severe storm of wind and rain, and. alter a short harangue, every 
man of them answered to his name at the muster, and cheered the rules and 
articles of war that were duly read to them. This is the small battalion 
reported above as being now at Garey's ferry. 

I pray I may be pardoned for accepting this battalion, the companies of 
which are greatly below the standard of 64 privates, whilst each has its 
full complement of officers, sergeants, and corporals. No two of the com- 
panies were willing to unite into one. 1 was obliged to have some mounted 
men for the right wing, and I knew not that another company would pre- 
sent itself from the same State. The 140 or 150 men thus obtained, 
added to the detachment of United States dragoons, may suffice till the 
right and left wings shall approximate in the direction of the Withlacoo- 
chee or the Ochlawaha. 

About 16,000 rations, with a good supply of hospital stores, were de- 
spatched this morning for Fort Drane. The same wagons will return here 
or to Garey's ferry to be reloaded, and, in the mean time, both wagons and 
horses may be expected from Savannah to complete the baggage train. 
None were brought by the two steamers which arrived last night. They 
brought Major Gates's detachment, corn, rations, &c. but no bacon. The 
latter is exceedingly wanted, on account of its lightness compared with 
pork, and also because it is greatly preferred by all the volunteers. Not 
a pound has arrived here, or at St. Augustine. This failure will demand 
an increase of not less than eight four-horse wagons. To add to my nu- 
merous vexations, the wagons reported to have been shipped at Baltimore, 
in the Arctic, have been left behind. As connected with the business of 
transportation, take this in connexion with the unexpected impossibility of 
navigating with common boats the Ochlawaha, and the extraordinary de- 
tention of both wagons and horses at Savannah, and it will be seen that 
human agents are as little to be relied upon as the winds and waves. AH 
have fought powerfully against me. I am not, however, cast down. My 
exertions shall be the greater, and there is yet both means and time to pros- 
ecute the campaign to a successful termination. 

The boat is about to depart. 

In haste, I remain, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WIN FIELD SCOTT. 

I send no more troops, for the present, to Fort Drane, on account of the 
difficulty of subsisting them there. If Major General Gaines shall not fall 



26 a [ 224 ] 

back on that point, it will be indispensable to wait far Captain Wharton. 
In the mean time it is easy to subsist the forces here and at Garey's ferry, 



W. S. 



Brig. Gen. R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army. 



No. 69. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata,March4, 1836, 

Sir : I caused a letter, dated the 2d instant, to he despatched to you by 
a return express that left us yesterday morning. 

Before the arrival of the wagon-train from Fort Drane, endeavors had 
been made to put across the river a supply of provisions. The roughness 
of the river was then an impediment. The storm has since increased, and 
still continues. Even the little steamer (Essayons) that has been here these 
two days can render but partial assistance. Her burden is very small, and 
yet she draws so much water (more than four feet) that she cannot approach 
nearer than some hundred yards the opposite shore. 

Being informed that Garey's ferry, on Black creek, furnishes a much 
better landing, witli tolerable storage, and that the road thence to Fort 
Drane is rather shorter, and less bad, than the route from the point opposite 
to this, I have ordered several schooners, now here, to proceed thither and 
to discharge their cargoes of forage and subsistence for men. Three small 

O O O . 1*11 

companies of mounted Georgians, mustered into service yesterday, will 
return to that ferry, where they had left their wagons. It is my expectation 
to order the wagons (now to be sent to you) on their return from Fort Drane, 
to that place, to receive their second loads — say of hard bread, bacon, and 
small rations, with, perhaps, some corn; but, I am glad to perceive that 
the quartermaster, with yon, estimates that about 3,000 bushels of the latter 
article may be obtained in the vicinity of Fort Drane. Please cause the 
whole amount of corn, estimated to be in the neighborhood, to be purchased. 
Including the United States dragoons, you will have, by the 17th instant, 
at least 250 mounted men, besides the horses of the baggage-train, to subsist ; 
and corn is so heavy an article of transportation that I should be glad not 
to be obliged to send a bushel from this quarter, except for use upon the 
road. Hay I have never expected to transport by (and, beyond two or 
three, marches. 

I still presume that Major General Gaines will be obliged to fall back 
on Fort Drane, which increases my anxiety to send the wagons (with some 
additions) loaded. I would prefer, much, that the force brought with him 
was back at Tampa bay, or rather, that it had not marched from that place ; 
provided that the movement fails to crush the enemy, or to terminate the 
war. The worst result, next to the loss of tbat line body of men, or a third 
of it, would be mere succ.es* in driving the enemy into the lower country, 
where I suppose it would be almost impossible for us to follow — I mean 
below the waters of Charlotte harbor. Hence my indignation that an iso- 
lated attack should have been made from your vicinity, well calculated to 
produce that result ; and at a time too, when you knew, and Major Gen- 



f 224 ] 270 

eral Gaines must liave known, through you, (and before,) that my plan, 
with ample means, was to move simultaneously upon the Withlacoochcc, iu 
three columns, from Tampa hay, the upper' crossing on the Ochlawaha and 
Fort Drane — so as to make it impossible for the enemy to escape to the 
lower country. 

1 have not yet supposed that Major General Gaines has not his retreat 
upon Fort Drane or King perfectly in his power. On account of subsist- 
ence, if he can cut his way through the enemy to Tampa bay, I should 
much prefer that his force should be there; and when I wished him to march 
or send that force to Volusia, it was because it could be infinitely more 
easily subsisted there tiian at Fort Drane. Should he, however, be in any 
difficulty in operating a retreat from the Withlacoochcc, I certainly wish 
you to afford any succor that the slender means within your reach may 
allow; and this, doubtless, you would render, without any special permission 
to that effect. If the force return to Fort Drane or King, it must be subsisted 
for at least fire or six days from the means derived from this place; and 
hence, I 7107/7 prefer that it should become a part of the right wing, rather 
than take that quantity of subsistence from you, and march back to Tampa 
bay. 

Give me any intelligence you may possess as to the route from you to 
Garey's ferry — [near Whitesville, on Black creek.] 

All the information obtained here and at St. Augustine, represents the 
route from Volusia to the road between Fort King and Tampa bay, as 
practicable for troops moving with wagons — certainly, with pack-horses. 

No troops have arrived here within two days. The United States dra- 
goons are in march from Savannah. Two or three steamers with troops, 
wagons, horses, &c, have been expected these five days. 
With great consideration, 

I remain, yours trulv, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To Brigadier General Clinch, 

Commanding, fyc. Fort Drane. 



No. 70. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, .March 6, 1836. 

• Sir : Major General Scott is exceedingly anxious to hear the result of 
the operations on the Withlacoochee. The last intelligence from that quarter, 
through you, was only to the 29th ultimo. 

Major Gates landed here this morning with three companies of United 
States artillery, about 140 strong. No horses and no wagons have arrived. 
Captain Wharton's detachment may arrive at Garey's ferry by the 11th. 
It is probable that this detachment and the 140 Georgia mounted men will 
be the only horse with the right wing ; and hence Major Gates's and Major 
Cooper's battalions are detained near this depot until Captain Wharton 
shall approach nearer to the above-mentioned ferry. 

A baggage train, consisting of seventeen, four and five, and twelve two- 
horse wagons, and six carts, set out for Fort Drane this morning, escorted 



271 [ 224 ] 

by one company of Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot. They have 
with them 8,960 rations of hard bread, 8,557 rations of flour, 1 1,000 rations 
of pork, 8,000 rations of beans, two barrels of coffee, one barrel of vinegar, 
eigiit boxes of soap, three boxes of candles, 5,000 flints, and a large supply 
of medical stores. In consequence of the extremely bad state of the road, 
particulary at this end of the route, it is presumed that from four to five 
days will be required for this train to reach you. General Scott hopes that 
it may arrive in good time, and the subsistence and stores in good order. 

Under the impression stated to you in his last letter, General Scott wishes 
you, after giving the horses a reasonable rest at Fort Drane, to send back 
the best wagons and teams to Garey's ferry, to receive a further supply of 
subsistence and general stores for the right wing of the army. Should 
your better knowledge of the route between those places convince you that 
it will be more advantageous to send the train back to Bayard, (opposite 
this place,) you will please do so — giving timely notice thereof to general 
headquarters 

Genera! Scott bids me ask, will it be necessary, in your judgment, to send 
an escort with the train from Fort Drane to Garey's ferry ? He supposes 
not. But, you will please, in this case, decide that point for yourself; and, 
should it be in favor of an escort, he suggests a detachment other than that 
which is now in march with the train. It will be easy when the wagons 
shall be reloaded at Garey's ferry, to furnish an escort from that point back 
to Fort Drane. The South Carolina regiment of mounted men will, in all 
probability, have passed the river at Jacksonville, by to-morrow night. 
I have the honor to be, sir, 

With high consideration, 

Your most obedient servant, 

R. E. TEMPLE, 
Lieutenant and Md-de-camp. 

To Brigadier General Clinch, 

Commanding left wing, Qc. Fort Drane. 



No. 71. 



HEADQUAUTEKS, AltMY OF FLOKIDA, 

Between Picolata and Garey's Ferry, March 9, 1836. 

Sir: I havejustsetout for Fort Drane, via Garey's ferry, on Black creek, 
with two companies of regulars, and intending to take with me, from the 
latter place, the small battalion of mounted Georgians, (heretofore men- 
tioned,) under the command of Major Douglass. Lieutenant Colonel 
Bankhead is at the head of the first detachment, and the two, together, may 
make a total of about 240 : but even this small force may be important to 
rescue Major General Gaines. 

I had not received the slightest information of the operatious on the 
Withlacoochee (official or otherwise) of a later date than the 29th ultimo, 
up to this morning, and had concluded that he had effected his march, with 
more or less success against the enemy, upon Tampa bay, when, at day- 
light, the steamer that I am now in arrived and brought the rumor, which 
is confirmed by the two accompanying notes from Paymaster Lytle, re- 



[ 224 ] 2 7 2 

ceived about six hours afterwards. On the reception of the rumor, I 
immediately commenced preparations for this movement ; but being delayed 
by the necessity of unlading and relading the boats, I am now at anchor 
at the mouth of Black creek. I hope to put the troops in march, from 
Garey's ferry, early in the day to-morrow, and to reach Fort Drane with 
a small escort the day following. It is possible that even these little de- 
tachments of horse and foot may reach the Withlacoochee in time to render 
a valuable service. 

I am aware that the movement I am making may be condemned, if 
regarded in any other light than a rescue, as premature. Colonel Good- 
wyn's mounted regiment only arrived at St. Augustine last night or this 
morning, and consequently the lelt wing cannot be in force on the Ochla- 
waha, in the direction of Pelaklikaha, earlier than the 17th, or up with 
the enemy before the 20th instant. Colonel Lindsay, who may have al- 
ready arrived at Tampa bay, cannot operate more than two days' march 
from that place from the want of the means of transportation — Major 
General Gaines having taken away the horses which were there, and the 
basis of the right wing is merged in the force brought by that general into 
the field, and must participate in his success or failure. If it falls back 
with him upon Fort Drane, it must suffer great loss, and if it follow him 
to Tampa bay, it will be wholly out of position. 

In this, and even a greater state of uncertainty. I have been held since 
the 26th ultimo. The day after, I ordered back Major Cooper's battalion 
of Georgia foot, to prevent starvation at Fort Drane ; and though daily, 
from that time, in the expectation of receiving from Savannah horses and 
serviceable wagons, not one has arrived. The quantity of subsistence that 
will be at Fort Drane (say) to-morrow, wjll only be that sent from Pico- 
lata on the 6th instant, viz: 17,497 rations of bread and flour, 11,000 
rations of pork, (with beef-cattle in the neighborhood,) 8,000 rations of 
beans, some coffee, vinegar, &c. And the troops now about to proceed, 
perhaps as far as the Withlacoochee, will not have the means of taking 
with them rations for more than six days. 

I beg leave to recapitulate the causes of my great deficiency in the means 
of transportation : 1. The wagons and horses which I knew Brigadier 
General Clinch to possess early in February have been more broken 
down by hard service and bad roads than I had expected to find them ; 
2. I had. upon what was considered in Georgia and even at Picolata the 
best information, confidently relied upon the use of the Ochlawaha, as late 
as the 2d instant; 3. No bacon has arrived, and the difference between it 
and pork, including wood and brine, is fifty per centum against the latter; 
4. The wagons purchased at Charleston and Augusta, by Assistant Quar- 
termasters L'FiUgle and Peyton, are generally poor, and many of them 
unserviceable; 5. The six or ten wagons actually reported to have been 
shipped at Baltimore in, I think, the Arctic, with Major Gates, were all left 
behind; 6. Of the 19,000 rations known to be at Fort Drane about the 
25th ultimo, nearly the whole have been drawn by a force not expected by 
the Government or myself to appear in that quarter; and, 7. Not a horse 
for the baggage train, left by me at Savannah, or which I have since 
ordered to be purchased by Assistant Quartermaster Dimmock, has ar- 
rived in Florida. 

On the 21st ultimo, when I was but 20 hours from Savannah, I sent 
back by a steamer that was met, an order to Lieutenant Dimmock to ship 



273 J" 224 | 

about 40 horses for the baggage train to Picoiata. This order was strongly 
reiterated, by a return steamer, live days afterwards; and again on the 2d 
instant, by another boat, he was instructed to send immediately and by the 
speediest conveyance, 70 horses for the train and six four-horse wagons. 
I had, this morning, a report from him saying, after lie had received my 
first and second orders; that he had sent 11 the horses wanted for draught 
and packs by land, except a few which were to come as packs with Captain 
Wharton. Now, as the latter was about 24 days in New York, after re- 
ceiving orders for Florida, and expected to remain so in Savannah, he can- 
not be looked for in this neighborhood before the 18th or 20th instant. The 
other parts of the lot were, it seems, given as packs to the tenth company 
of South Carolina mounted men, and sent forward in a drove. They 
must, it is feared, arrive in a state unfit for the baggage train (say) about 
the 16th instant. Such has been the failure of human agents. The weather 
lias been equally adverse. 

If the force on the Withlacoochce should fall back on FortDrane, it will 
be seen from the foregoing, that a part, at least, must probably march upon 
Volusia or Garey's ferry, to be within reach of subsistence. Instructions 
have been left behind me to send forward rations, should the means of 
transportation arrive in time, and the troops already in the neighborhood 
of Picoiata— Major Cooper's and the remaining company of Major Gates's 
battalions. I have, also, desired Brigadier General Eustis, in the same 
event, to order to Fort Drane two companies of mounted men of Colonel 
Goodwyn's regiment, and a fourth order will go back in this boat to Lieu- 
tenant Dimmock on the subject of horses and wagons. 

Some rifles and the tents arrived this morning at Picoiata; but Colonel 
Goodwyn had marched through six or eight storms without cover, and now 
all companies in march are to be reduced to three tents each. 
I have the honor to remain, with respect. 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army. 

P. S. Please remark that, in his letter to Brigadier General Clinch, 
dated at New Orleans the 2d ultimo, Major General Gaines speaks of "an 
efficient co-operation;" promises to be "in readiness" at Tampa bay, "by 
the 8th of the present month, to form a. junction at or near that place with 
the force under your command, whenever, and as soon as, in your judgment, 
your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement ;" and concludes by 
saying, " a sufficient quantity of ammunition and provisions have been 
transported to Fort Brooke, to divide with yon, uniil further supplies are 
received ;" yet he did not wait till the brigadier gave notice that he was 
"in force;" came to Fort King, and swept nearly the whole of the sub- 
sistence collected at Fort Drane. A copy of that letter is in your office, 
and I now enclose one from Governor Eaton, from which it will appear 
that Major General Gaines knew, at Tampa bay, about the 14th ultimo, 
that I had been charged with the direction of the war. He first heard this 
atPensacola, and received Governor Eaton's despatch at Tampa, as lean 
establish. Hence his haste and neglect of the assurances given to Briga- 
dier General Clinch ; his isolated attack, &c. 
18 



[ 224 ] 274 

No. 72. 

Fort Drane, March 5, 1836. 

Sir : I have been directed by General Clinch to inform yon (hat jour 
communications of yesterday's date reached him at tiiis post after he had 
mounted his horse and was on the move, with the forces under his com- 
mand, to escort supplies to General Gaines. He directed me likewise to 
say to you, that the distance from this point to Garey's (on Black creek) is 
about the same as the distance from here to Picolata. 

As you may wish, however, to obtain all the information possible on the 
subject, I will take the liberty of adding, from my own knowledge, that 
the road from Garey's to this place is sandy, consequently, almost invari- 
ably dry ; while the road from Picolata here is muddy after heavy rains, 
particularly such as we have just experienced. 

Colonel Gadsden arrived here from Tallahassee on the 4th, (yesterday,) 
and accompanied General Clinch this morning to the Withlacoochee. 
Very respectfully, 

J. S. LYTLE, U. S. Jirmy. 



Fort Drane, March 8, 1836. 

Sir : By direction of General Clinch I opened your communication of 
the 6th instant, which arrived late last night, in advance of the wagons. 
You will perceive by my letter of the 5th that General Clinch, with all 
the forces at this post, and one hundred mounted men from the vicinity, 
had left for Withlacoochee, to escort a small supply of cattle, ammunition, 
&c, to General Gaines, having received the night before a third express 
from that officer. No word has been received from either of these Gene- 
rals since the 5th. When General Clinch left here he expected to be back 
on the 9*h. 

The probability is that the wagons will return without an escort, there 
being at present no troops here ; and should General Clinch get back be- 
fore the wagons depart, his men may be too much fatigued to march again 
immediately : but this of course is merely conjecture. I am satisfied, 
however, that General Clinch would advise that an escort accompany the 
wagons back to this place, when reloaded. 

Captain Graham being directed by General Clinch to send back the 
wagons for supplies after their arrival here, will send them to Garey's, it. 
being the best road. 

Very respectfully, 

J. S. LYTLE. 

To Major General Scott, U. S. Jinny, 

commanding in Florida. 

K. B. The amount of General Gaines's last express to General Clinch, 

dated 3d instant, was merely copies of his previous letters, with a note, 
stating that the Indians were still around him, but little or no fighting 
taken place since his last communication. 



275 [ 224 ] 

No. 73. 

Tallahassee, February 24, 1836. 

Bear Sir : I have received your letter and enclosure for Colonel Lind- 
say. To-morrow a despatch vessel will proceed to Tampa, by wliicli I 
shall send your letter, and hope it will find him these. Ten days ago 
General Gaines proceeded there, and immediately I forwarded General 
Scott's letter to me, and the Secretary of War's instructions, that he might 
be fully apprized. Since that time I have heard nothing from him. 

At Tampa, far as 1 am advised, there is a force now of about 1,200 or 
1,400 men. An express from General Clinch, received last night, states 
his force at 458, rank and file; in all 558. His provisions will serve about 
fifteen or twenty days, say to the 1 0th March. His transportation is twenty- 
seven horses, thirty mules, nine wagons, six carts. 

It is important, I think, that General Scott should agree upon a day of 
moving, and by some despatch steamboat advise those at Tampa of the 
time of the day lie will march, that both detachments may advance at one 
and the same time. The day should be fixed so prospectively that no time 
may be lost, or mistake be made, as to the day of departure. 

Say to General Scott I fear much his Volusia move : it is too low down 
in the swamps, and cannot, I apprehend, be passed securely. If he had 
moved from Picolata to Camp King, the country being higher would have 
afforded a safer and better march, and one, I think, equally advantageous 
to our military operations. 

Colonel Fitzpatrick, speaker of the Legislative Council of the Terri- 
tory, will proceed to join General Scott from this place. He well knows 
the Cape country, is an intelligent man, and will render great service. 

I write in great haste. Health and safety to you all, and kind regards 
to General Scott. 

Yours, 

J. H. EATON. 

Major A. Van Buren. 



No. 74. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, March 9, 1836. 

Sir : A rumor has reached me this morning, brought by the Florida 
from Jacksonville, and to that place by a horseman, (citizen I presume,) 
that Major General Gaines was still on the Withlacoochee, and had been 
joined by Brigadier General Clinch, with the forces which were under the 
command of the latter ; that the two had been engaged, more or less, daily 
with the Indians, and that the latter had a fort near the scene of those 
combats, which Major General Gaines intended to attack on the 6th or 7th 
instant. I have determined to move with such forces from this neighbor- 
hood (say) Major Gates's battalion and that of Georgia mounted men, as 
I may be able to find wagons for, in the direction of Fort Drane and the 
scene of operations, governing myself according to circumstances. 

The great difficulties consist in supplying subsistence at Fort Drane 



f 224 J 276 

and beyond. On the arrival (say on the lOtli) of the wagon train des- 
patched hence on the 6th instant, there cannot be lull rations left for all 
the forces in that vicinity for more than a day or two, and the train took 
bread stuffs for only about fourteen days for those forces. The pork (there 
was no bacon here) was but for a little more than half that time. To 
transport additional supplies, I cannot reckon upon more than two wagons 
(extra) at Garey's ferry, and one here, besides the ammunition-wagon and 
the one for general headquarters. I mean wagons to which we can attach 
teams ; and for the ammunition, I shall be obliged to retain the wagon you 
sent over yesterday, which is now loaded with rifles for St. Augustine. 
Lieutenant Dimmock has not sent a horse by water, and not a wagon. 
Contrary to my reiterated orders, he h;is started the mules and horses 
by land ; giving some as packs to one of Colonel Goodwyn's companies, 
(which, therefore, will bring no wagon,) some to Wharton, also as packs, 
and the remainder in (I suppose) a drove. Wharton expected to make 
good ten days in Savannah ; consequently, I know not when the pack- 
horses will arrive. Some pack-saddles have come in the Florida. Lieu- 
tenant Dimmock had not received my letter of the 2d, by the San tee. That 
boat, like all the others, for ten days, has been delayed beyond all time. 
The Florida reports that she must have reached Savannah on the 7th. We 
shall see what effect the letter she carried will produce. 

Perhaps I shall be able to find wagons only sufficient to take subsistence, 
say for ten days, for but two companies of Major Gates's battalion. I 
write in haste, and cannot make (yet) the necessary calculations. 

I wish you immediately to despatch two or three companies of Colonel 
Goodvvyn's regiment, under a field officer, to follow to Fort Drane, provi- 
ded that you can furnish the means of transporting subsistence for the men, 
equal to eight days, and forage (corn only) for three or four days. If you 
cannot furnish the transportation without halting the movement of the left 
wing in its march to Volusia, then the two or three companies will be put 
in march as soon as you shall be able by the new arrivals of horses and 
mules to supply the above amount of transportation. 

From the enclosed letter (a copy) from Governor Eaton, I begin to doubt 
whether the route from Volusia, either by the upper or lower crossing on 
the Ochlawaha, upon any point in the road from Fort King to Tampa bay, 
be as practicable for troops as we have heretofore supposed. I have relied 
upon you to obtain, at St. Augustine, the necessary information in relation 
to that route. I hope that you have satisfied yourself that it is practicable 
for wagons, or at any rate for pack-horses. Some pack-saddles will be 
left here for you. 

Your arrangements for covering the plantations to the south of St. Au- 
gustine, and for scouring the country between you and Volusia, I have 
Highly approved. Colonel Goodvvyn's regiment having now arrived, 1 wish 
you to begin to concentrate on Volusia ; and as soon as your means of 
transportation will allow, to push forward as large a portion of your force 
as practicable to the Ochlawaha, at the upper or lower crossing, according 
to the choice of routes, and there establish a sufficient post ; but before you 
shall have passed Volusia, I hope to be able to give you better data for the 
regulation of your march and operations beyond the Ochlawaha. If a 
practicable route can be found, I shall probably wish you to march with 
your whole disposable force, after leaving the necessary garrisons for your 
small posts in the rear, upon either Okihamky, Pclaklikaha, or Chickuchatty, 



277 [ 224 ] 

and extend that force a little to the right and left, (as far as prudence may 
permit,) as well to prevent the enemy from escaping to the southeast, from 
the Withlacoochee, as to increase the chances of communicating with the 
right wing and Tampa hay. 

These are the probable instructions which I may, upon better informa- 
tion, confirm from Fort Drane ; and they are intimated in advance, to meet 
the possible case of my not being able to communicate with you again in 
any short time. In that event you will proceed, if the route will permit, 
to carry them into execution, and as soon as your means of transportation 
will allow. I am aware that the latter are not fully equal to xhe occasion, 
and may, by the continuation of the series of accidents, not be sufficient 
in some time. I know, however, that all that may reasonably be attempted 
will be essayed by you, and I have every confidence in your zeal, as well 
as abilities. If you had the adequate means of transportation, and I were 
sure of the practicability of the route indicated, I should be absolutely 
certain of your executing the part assigned you, and in the shortest time. 
If in your march to the southwest you should open a communication with 
Colonel Lindsay, or any other officer junior to you, you will give him any 
instructions that you may deem necessary to harmonize his movements 
with the general views which you know me to entertain, and which may 
not be incompatible with recent instructions from general headquarters. 
Those views are, first, to pursue and beat the larger bodies of the enemy, 
and, secondly, to prevent, by all practicable means, the escape of that 
enemy into the lower parts of the peninsula. 

Four companies of Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot will be left 
in position till sufficient means of transportation can be supplied. It will 
then be my wish that you put those companies in march for Fort Drane. 

Captain Wharton's detachment of dragoons, which cannot arrive at 
Jacksonville or Garey's ferry before the 16th or 18th instant, is destined 
to take the same route. I shall leave instructions for its government at 
the one or other of those places. 

I have just opened a letter from the Governor of Georgia, advising me 
of the march from Milledgeville, upon Colerain, Jacksonville, and Pico- 
lata, of another company of mounted Georgians. The inarch commenced 
on the 28th ultimo. I shall leave instructions here, subject to your control, 
for its government. My meaning is, that it shall not follow me to Fort 
Drane till it is known that at least 10,000 additional rations have been 
sent thither from Garey's ferry or this place, unless the company should 
bring with it the means of transporting with it subsistence for itself for at 
least ten days. 

Please call for returns from the assistant quartermaster and assistant 
commissary, left at this place. They both have my orders to make Ga- 
rey's ferry the depot for further supplies which may be wanted, at and 
beyond Fort Drane, by the right wing. Please see instructions from me 
to the assistant quartermaster here, and permit him, as far as practicable, 
to carry the same into execution. 

In great haste. 1 remain, with the highest respect. 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier Gen. Eustis, U. S. Jinny, 

commanding, tf-c. 

P. S. — I set out this evening via Garey's ferry. Colonel Bankhead ac- 



224 



278 



companies me, at the head of two companies of artillery. Major Gates 
is left here as the commander of the post, for the present ; subject, of course, 
to your orders. The boat to communicate with Volusia has not arrived. 

W. S. 



No. 75. 



Headquarters, Army or Florida, 

March 9, 1836. 

Sir : Of the wagons and horses that may be expected to arrive here, or 
at Garey's ferry, from Savannah and Charleston, I wish as many as possi- 
ble, with reference to the wants of the left wing, of which Brigadier General 
Eustis will be the judge, despatched for Fort Drane, with subsistence for 
men. Hard bread will be sent in preference to flour, and bacon, should 
any arrive, in preference to pork. 

Add, for each train, small rations, (say) one-third as many as you send 
bread. Should no bacon be on hand, let the number of rations of pork sent 
be in the proportion of two to three of bread, and one barrel of flour may be 
sent for every three of bread. 

1 wish you also to send to the same place by the first train that you may 
despatch, a good proportion of the tools expected from Savannah — say 
saws, augers, alul broad -axes. 

It is probable that another company of mounted Georgians may arrive 
in a week at Jacksonville. Show this letter (or send a copy) to both Bri- 
gadier General Eustis and Major Gates, that one or other may send orders, 
in advance, for that company to proceed to Garey's ferry, and there 
await further orders. 

The same thing of another company of mounted men, that may be ex- 
pected from the same State. A company of mounted South Carolinians 
may also be soon expected at Jacksonville, destined for the left wing. I 
mention these companies to you in order that you may take measures to 
place forage at those places for them, as well as for Captain Wharton's 
detachment of United States dragoons, which is to march to Fort Drane. 
Being fully persuaded that Garey's ferry is the better depot for stores in- 
tended for the right wing, you will take care to keep it supplied with what- 
ever you may think will probably be wanted. 

The quarter part of the baggage-wagon train, lately sent hence to Fort 
Drane. was ordered to return to Garey's ferry to be reloaded for the right 
wing. Events may prevent the execution of that order. Hence the in- 
struction in the beginning of this letter. 
In great haste, 

I remain truly yours, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Lieutenant DusENBURT, 

Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. Ji. 

The Essayons (steamer) is left under your immediate charge, principally 
for supplying the depot at Garey's Ferry. Lieutenant Searight, assistant 
commissary of subsistence, is ordered thither ; he will, to any necessary 



279 f 221 J 

extent, be subject to your instructions. All haversacks and nose-bags here 
anust be put on board the Florida to-day. 

Any haversacks that may arrive from St. Augustine must be forwarded 
by the earliest possible conveyance, and, if in time, by the wagon-horses 
about to proceed to Garey's ferry. 



No. 76. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Garey's Ferry, March 10, 1836, 

Sir : As an assistant commissary you are placed on duty at this depot, 
and you are also charged with the duties of acting assistant quartermaster. 

In the two capacities, with the assistance of Mr. Williams, or some other 
capable person, you are charged with the issue of subsistence and forage to 
all troops, volunteers or regulars, that may arrive here ; also, with the de- 
livery of arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and other appointments, to 
such of the troops as may require them, within the regulations of the service. 

Upon all those points you will correspond with assistant quartermaster 
Dusenbury, at Picolata, so as to keep this depot supplied with whatever 
may probably be required by troops passing on to the theatre of war. 

Among the troops that may be expected soon to arrive, are four other 
companies of Georgia mounted volunteers. Such companies, as they suc- 
cessively arrive, you will regularly muster into the service of the United 
States, for ninety days, unless sooner discharged, and cause the rules and 
articles of war to be read to each and every one. All this you will do by 
my authority ; and such are the instructions given to me by the War De- 
partment. 

Those companies may probably arrive here without arms. Hall's patent 
rifles and some of the common rifles are at Picolata, and also some swords, 
and muskets in abundance. 

Write to Lieutenant Dusenbury to send hither some of both kinds of 
rifles, and also some muskets; say about seventy-five of the latter. With 
the common rifle, sabres must be issued in equal numbers; but Hull's 
having a bayonet, no sabre will go with them. Indeed, Lieutenant Dusen- 
bury has, witli the number here, not more than sixty or eighty left. Give 
the companies that may present themselves the choice of arms within your 
means of supply, and also issue the corresponding ammunition, or powder 
and lead, in the case of the selection of rifles. Some three hundred or more 
haversacks and nose-bags will be sent to you very soon. Issue to each 
man either a nose-bag or a haversack, to carry the four days' -provisions 
for himself, required by my orders for marching troops. Tents, at the 
rate of three per company, will also be allowed, and more for troops whilst 
here in camp. There are many tents at Picolata. 

It is my wish and order that no company or companies that may arrive 
(till further orders) shall proceed hence to Fort Draue and the theatre of 
war, with the means of transporting, with it or them, less than eight days* 
subsistence for men. The reason of this instruction is founded on the fear 
of scarcity of rations in that quarter ; but, should the train, soon expected 
hereto be reloaded, be sufficient to take 15,000 rations back to Fort Diane, 



[ 224 ] 280 

tlien the companies may be allowed to proceed to that place, with the means 
of transporting with them six days' rations. The train may be expected 
here in five or seven days, and by correspondence with Picolata you will 
hold yourself in readiness to despatch it back without delay. 

I wish you to send not more than one part of flour to three of hard bread ; 
and in pork, two-thirds as many rations as you send in bread and flour. 

For the present, and until our means of transportation are better, you 
will send small rations, in the proportion of one to four compared with flour 
and bread. 

Other supplies for Fort Drane may be directed, such as carpenters' tools, 
&c. Lieutenant Dusenbury has my general instructions on the subject. 

Some rope for picketing horses, and for helping wagons over bad parts 
of the route, will be supplied to the wagons of the general train, and any 
wagon belonging to a detachment, according to your means. 

Under the general instructions to me from the War Department, (a copy 
of which you have,) this place is constituted a place of issue to the dis- 
tressed inhabitants of Florida. I can leave no officer here but yourself. 
You will therefore make issues under the printed instructions on the sub- 
ject, and according to the spirit of those instructions. 

If bacon should arrive here or at Picolata, I wish it to be sent to Fort 
Drane, instead of pork, and as many rations of bacon as of bread and flour. 

In proportion to the difficulty of the duties assigned you, will, no doubt, 
be your zeal and energy in execution. 
With respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

WIN FIELD SCOTT. 

To Lieutenant Searight, 

U. S. A., $c. 



No. 77. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Fort Drane, March 14, 1836. 

Sin: On my arrival here, I found that the force which had been upon 
the Withlacoochce had fallen back on this vicinity. 

Brigadier General Clinch, with some means of subsistence, and about 
600 men (of whom 150 were mounted Floridians) joined Major General 
Gaines on the 6th instant. The force under the latter had already been 
reduced to the necessity of commencing on horses and dogs for their sub- 
sistence. After receiving that timely and important succor, the army re- 
mained in position till the 10th. 

It may be remarked that, from the time of entrance into the intrenched 
camp, up to the retreat in this direction, not a sortie was attempted, and 
that, to save the pride of the higher officer, the command was relinquished 
to the next in rank, in order that he might give the order to retreat. 

A copy of Major General Gaines's order yielding the immediate com- 
mand of their joint forces to Brigadier General Clinch, is enclosed. This 



281 [ 224 ] 

extraordinary paper I have but little time to comment upon. The poor 
sneer against me, as the diplomatic agent of the War Department, is in 
character with all his recent acts ; for, at the moment of the arrival of the 
succor, on the 6th, he had already opened a negotiation with the enemy, in 
which it is said, on good authority, he was willing to leave them in the 
qniet possession of the country below the Withlacoochee, until the arrival 
of ** the diplomatic agent ;" but in which Powell insisted that that river 
should he the perpetual boundary between us and the Seminoles. But for 
Brigadier General Clinch, I have no doubt some treaty, on the one or other 
basis, would have been formed between the parties. He alleged the posi- 
tive instructions of the War Department against all negotiating, and he en- 
abled Major General Gaines to save the original force with him. Not a 
sortie was made from the intrenched camp, from the time of its formation 
up to the retreat, and on the approach of the succor, a large detachment 
of the enemy had taken a position to intercept the retreat in this direction. 
How, under such circumstances, it can be alleged that the enemy has been 
beaten, it would be difficult to reconcile with facts. 

I have every reason to hope that the enemy remains nearly in the same 
position as before the isolated, and, therefore, false movement of Major 
General Gaines. This is fortunate. 

I have instructed Brigadier General Eustis, after scouring the country 
through which he will have to pass, to some extent, to place his column in 
position some where in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha, about the 25th 
instant. Colonel Lindsay, by the same day, is to be with his force at Chick- 
uchatty (about two marches from Tampa) and means are suggested to 
each in order to multiply the chances of communicating with each other. 
The right wing will move hence (say) on the 24th instant, to attack in 
front. This column will pass the Withlacoochee about half a mile below 
the late intrenched camp, where there is a good ford, and of which Major 
General Gaines might have availed himself if he had had the strength or 
inclination. 

The 25th instant is appointed, in order that I may be certain of giving 
Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay time to put themselves in 
position respectively, and further to give time for the harassed troops 
lately under Major General Gaines to recruit themselves for effective op- 
erations. The same interval is equally important to enable Brigadier 
General Clinch to receive from Picolata or Garey's Ferry, the quantity 
of subsistence indispensable to give confidence to the movements of the 
right wing. I have time to add no more. 

Enclosed ar« copies of the order of Major General Gaines, mentioned 
above, and of Brigadier General Clinch's letter to me. 
With great respect, 

I remain your most obedient, 

WiNFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 

■ 



[ 224 ] 282 

No. 78. 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fort Izard, on the TVithlacoochee, Florida, March 9, 1836. 

Order No. 7. 

1. Called to East Florida by the savage massacres and conflagrations of 
the 28th December and the following month, the commanding General 
hastily collected in Louisiana the forces which accompanied him from that 
patriotic State. These troops, in the short space of thirty-six days, have 
marched by land and water nearly eight hundred miles, one hundred and 
forty of which was through the country occupied by the enemy, whose prin- 
cipal force they have met, beaten, and forced to sue for peace. 

2. These important objects of the campaign having been accomplished 
with the hearty and cordial co-operation of Brigadier General Clinch, (to 
whose sound judgment the defence of this frontier had been wisely con- 
fided, and by whose gallantry the enemy had been chastised on the 3 1st of 
December, and since held in check as far as his limited means would al- 
low,) the troops from Louisiana are placed under his command, in order to 
guard against the known faithlessness of the enemy until the arrival of the 
forces under the officer charged with the diplomatic arrangements of the 
War Department. Whenever and as soon as that officer shall mature his 
plan of operations, and accomplish the duties assigned him, the forces 
from Louisiana will return to New Orleans. 

3. The commanding General cannot, consistently with his views of pro- 
priety, take leave of the troops by whom he has been so manfully sustained, 
without tendering them his grateful acknowledgments for the constancy 
and courage with which they have performed every duty, and borne priva- 
tions, the recital of which would not fail to command the admiration of 
the virtuous and wise of every section of the republic. The officers and 
soldiers of the whole of these forces (including the artillery from Tampa 
bay) acting as a light brigade, under command of Lieutenant Colonel 
Twiggs, of the 4th infantry, have performed their duty so much to the sat- 
isfaction of the General, that he cannot discriminate between the relative 
claims of corps, of officers, or other individuals, without the risk of invidi- 
ous distinctions : all did their duty cheerfully and gallantly ; and when it 
became necessary to meet the question whether to cat the meat of their 
own horses or to abandon an important position, all cheerfully preferred 
this unpleasant subsistence to any movement that would endanger the fron- 
tier — the horse-meat was accordingly eaten by officers and men, until the 
enemy was beaten and sued for peace. A timely supply of provisions ar- 
rived, escorted by the brave Georgians, Floridians, and regulars, under 
General Clinch, at the moment the pacific propositions of the enemy were 
in the act of being answered. The Indians were tired on by the General's 
light troops before he could be notified of the object of their being near the 
camp. They have since disappeared. 

4. TheGeneral deeply regrets the fall of 1st Lieutenant J.F.Izard, of the 
dragoons, acting brigade major, and in command of the advance guard. 
He fell at the head of his corps, and though mortally wounded, had the 
heroic presence of mind to order "keep your positions men, and lie close." 
2d Lieutenant Duncan, of 2d artillery, was slightly wounded ; Captain 



283 [ 224 J 

Sanders, commanding the friendly Indians, was severely wounded ; Captain 
Armstrong, of the United States transport schooner Motto, was slightly 
wounded. The two last-named officers were in the advance, where their 
services had been highly useful during the march. Lieutenant Ephraim 
P. Smith, of Captain Williams's company of Louisiana volunteers, received 
three wounds. This officer and twenty nine non-commissioned officers and 
soldiers of other companies of the regiment, evinced their gallantry by 
their good conduct, as well as by their honorable wounds. The General is 
convinced that he never commanded a finer corps : its chief would do honor 
to any service. 

The officers of the medical department merit the approbation of the 
General for the attentive and skilful manner in which their duties were 
discharged. 

List of killed and wounded. 

Killed — 1st Lieutenat J. F. Izard, dragoons - 1 

" Sergeant F. Dunn of the 2d artillery - 1 

'• Private Z. Bolie, of Louisiana volunteers - 1 

" " Val. Beck, 1 

" " Henry Butler 1 

- Total 5 

Wounded — of officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. 
" 2d artillery .... 8 

" 4th infantry .... 8 

" Louisiana volunteers - - - 30 



By order of Major General Gaines. 



— Total 46 



GEO. A. McCALL, 

Aid-de-camp, acting assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 79. 



Headquarters, Right Wi]vg, Florida Troops, 

Fort Brane, March 12, 1836. 

Sir : I returned last night from the Withlacoochee with the troops 
composing the right wing, Florida army. The troops turned over to me 
by Major General Gaines are stationed four miles in advance of this post, 
and with a little rest and recruiting, will be a very efficient force, and will 
add much to the strength of the right wing of the army of Florida. 

The principal force of the Indians are still on the Withlacoochee, and it 
is my opinion they will remain there until driven from their strong hold 
by force. 

The enclosed papers, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, will inform you of the principal 
occurrences that have taken place since my last communication to you. 
I beg leave to refer you to Colonel Gadsden for further particulars. 
I am, &c. 

D. L. CLINCH, 
Brigadier General U. S. Ji. 
Major General W. Scott, 

Commander of the Florida army. 



[ 224 ] 284 

No. 80. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Fort Dram, March 14, 1836. 

Sir : On the 6th instant Brigadier General Clinch, with a considerable 
quantity of subsistence and about 600 men, (of whom 150 were mounted 
Floridians, ) reached the intrenched camp on the Withlacoochee. The 
troops there, without having made a single sortie, had already commenced 
eating their horses and dogs ; and the enemy had a large detachment in 
position to intercept the retreat in this direction. 

Major General Gaines had actually commenced a sort of negotiation 
with the Indians, in which he was willing to let them remain quiet below 
the Withlacoochee, until " the diplomatic agent of the War Department" 
(myself) should arrive ; but in which Powell insisted on that river as the 
permanent boundary between the Seminoles and the whites. The ar- 
rival of Clinch put a stop to the negotiation ; and the higher officer yielded 
the immediate command to the next in rank, in order that the latter might 
take upon himself the unpleasant, but necessary step, as was believed by 
both, of commanding a retreat. 

The enemy, as is confidently believed, remains nearly in the posi- 
tion occupied on the 27th ultimo. This is fortunate : the recent ope- 
rations require ten or twelve days to recruit for active operations. The 
same time is wanted to bring subsistence to this point, and perhaps to 
enable you and Colonel Lindsay to place your respective forces in po- 
sition. The latter, by the way of St. Mark's, and direct from this place, 
is instructed to be at Chickuchatty by the 25th instant. On the same day 
I wish you to be at or near Pelaklikaha, to act as heretofore instructed. 

Brigadier General Clinch, Colonel Gadsden, (who is with me and in 
my staff,) and others, think there is no doubt but that you will find the 
route to that place, from Volusia, perfectly practicable with pack-horses, 
if not with wagons. Take with you, accordingly, all the pack-horses ex- 
pected at Picolata from Savannah, and you need not send to the right 
wing any part of the South Carolina regiments. 

Colonel Lindsay is instructed, after gaining his position, to fire a gun 
(if he should have one) every morning at 10 o'clock, to multiply the 
chances of communicating with you. You will do the same, and at the 
same hour, for the double purpose of being heard by Brigadier General 
Clinch and the colonel. Clinch will be instructed (if he can take a gun) 
to do the same thing. 

The instructions to the three commanders of corps is, in one or two 
particulars, the same — to pursue and beat any considerable body of the 
enemy ; and next to that, if possible, to prevent any such body from es- 
caping to the southeast. 

When you and Colonel Lindsay shall have gained the positions men- 
tioned above, I wish each to close upon the enemy in the rear, whilst he 
shall be vigorously attacked by Clinch in front. The latter will cross the 
Withlacoochee near the late intrenched camp, about thirty-five miles, and 
southsouthwest from this place. The enemy is supposed to remain in 
the swamps or hammocks a little above, and on the left bank of the With- 
lacoochee, near the junction of the branches of that river ; that supposed 



285 | 224 J 

position is also called (he cove. I left orders with Major Cooper, and at 
Garey's terry, that no troops should march upon this place without ar- 
riving here with at least six days' subsistence unexpended. It is now 
my wish that no detachment shall leave the neighborhood of Picolata or 
Garey's ferry, before the 19th instant, for this place, and not then without 
the extra subsistence mentioned. 

I wish you to retain the wagons and horses that may arrive in your vi- 
cinity, which may be indispensable to the left wing, and give the re- 
mainder to the right. Many (in addition) will be wanted by Clinch. All 
the horses brought from Tampa are reported as utterly unserviceable, 
and by the time the wagon train that left here yesterday for Garey's ferry 
shall return, with their loads of subsistence, &c, many of them will be 
broken down. Five or six additional four-horse wagons (with their 
horses or mules) were required of Lieutenant Dimmock, in my letter to 
him of the 9th instant, besides the wagons expected from Baltimore, and 
the wagons, horses, and mules, previously required of that officer ; that 
is, when 1 left Garey's ferry, about twenty four-horse wagons, five two- 
horse wagons, and, in all, 110 horses and mules, for the baggage train, 
were expected to arrive from Savannah, at Picolata, St. Augustine, and 
Garey's ferry. You better know than myself what means of land trans- 
portation were then expected from Charleston. I wish not less than two- 
fifths of those expected means of transportation to accompany the troops 
which are to join Brigadier General Clinch, and the wagons to be prin- 
cipally loaded with provisions for men. No company is to be allowed to 
bring with it hither more than three tents ; and beyond this point it is not 
expected to take half so many. You will make a similar calculation for 
your march from Volusia, and reduce the ration of hard bread to the old 
allowance, (twelve ounces.) 

About the 19th instant I wish Wharton's United States dragoons, and 
one company (only) of Georgia mounted men, to be put in route for Fort 
Drane. Means of transportation being furnished for those companies, 
Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot will be next supplied, and put 
in march. Each detachment must bring with it extra subsistence for at 
least six days — taking enough for the march to this place on each horse 
or each man. 

All the remaining wagons that can be spared, (say) from four to ten, 
I wish to be loaded, according to instructions left with Lieutenants Du- 
senbury and Searight. One of the wagons must be loaded with musket 
cartridges and some rifle powder. 

If you should leave St. Augustine or Picolata before those several ob- 
jects have been attended to, give the necessary instructions (to carry out 
my views) to the proper officers at St. Augustine, Picolata, and Garey's 
ferry. The route from the latter place to Fort Drane, is rather less bad 
than that from Picolata. No escort is deemed necessary, except to aid 
the wagons in getting over the bad places in the route. 

I left you an ammunition wagon in the place of the one brought with 
me hither. 

If any thing material should occur, (and nothing is expected,) I shall 
write to you hence to Volusia via Picolata. 



\ 224 J 286 



Wishing you success in jour movements, and confident that, if it be 
possible, you will command success, 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General Eustis, 

Commanding left wing. 

P. S. Cause the troops to march here to be supplied with haversacks 
for subsistence for men, and cornsacks to be used in bringing forage on 
horseback. Order any remaining haversacks in wagons to this place. 

W. S. 



No. 81 



[Duplicate.] Fort Drane, March 13, 1836. 

Sir: The plan of campaign against the Florida Indians is now suffi- 
ciently matured to enable General Scott to set in motion the right and 
left wings of the army under his command. The former, under the 
command of General Clinch, is now concentrating at Fort Drane, and 
will take up its line of march so as to be in position in advance of the 
Withlacoochee, or Amaxura river, at or near the late battle-ground, by 
the 25th of March. The left wing, led by General Eustis, and now on 
its advance to Volusia, on the St. John's river, will move from that point 
so as to be in position at or near Pelaklikaha, by the above date. With 
the force you will bring from Alabama, united with Lieut. Col. Call's 
battalion of Floridians, now at the bay of Tampa, it is expected you will 
be able to move one thousand strong, so that the centre may be prepared 
to co-operate at the above date with the right and left wings of the army, 
in its position at or near Chickuchatty. As there is no want of subsist- 
ence, or the means of transportation, at the bay of Tampa, it is confi- 
dently calculated that you will be able to march within the time desig- 
nated. The route of your march you will select with discretion, having 
constantly in view the main object of the movement confided to your 
judgment — that of preventing the escape of the enemy, or of its retreat 
towards the Ever-glades, or supposed hiding-places of the savages in the 
thickets or jungles of the south. The Tampa road, to Fort King, may 
probably be the best route you can select until you have crossed the 
Hillsborough river, and have advanced to a point east of Chickuchatty, 
when you will move west upon that village. You will, on your march, 
keep a vigilant eye for Indian signs, and pursue any trail which may in- 
dicate the imbodying of a sufficient savage force worthy of your atten- 
tion. As soon as in position at or near the Chickuchatty village, which, 
it is hoped, you will accomplish by the 25th of the month, you will fire, 
at 10 o'clock of each morning, a single gun, from a field-piece, until re- 
sponded to from either the right or left wing of the army, when you may 
advance upon the lower Withlacoochee, keeping south of that stream, 
and so extending to the right as to be able to communicate with General 
Eustis, on the advance from Pelaklikaha, should he find it advisable and 



287 [ 224 ] 

practicable to extend to the left ; and thus, by a combined and judicious 
co-operation of the three portions of the army, enclose the Seminoles in 
their strong hold in the Cove, or big swamp of the Withlacoochee. It 
may be necessary, while in position at Chiekuchatty, to examine carefully 
the hammocks near that village, and, on your march, to reconnoitre, and 
even explore, the big hammock, near which you will necessarily pass, 
and which has been represented as one of the strong holds of the In- 
dians, to which they may possibly first retreat, should their present position 
on the Withlacoochee be found untenable with Clinch in their front and 
Eustis on their flanks. It is not improbable that, should the Seminoles 
take the alarm on the advance of the right and left wings of the army, 
and retreat south, they may pass between the column commanded by 
you and that of the left under Eustis, before either of you have ap- 
proached sufficiently near to admit of such flank extensions as to prevent 
it. In this event, they may pass to Pease creek, and, by the boats said 
to be on that river, and the facilities of its navigation, pass to Charlotte 
harbor; and from thence, by Charlotte and the Coolosohatchey rivers, 
to the Ever-glades. To prevent this, it would be advisable, on your 
march from Tampa, to despatch the revenue cutters on that station, with 
such boats as the navy can afford, to Charlotte harbor, with orders to 
take such position on those waters, and so blockade the rivers of that 
section of country, as to cut off most effectually all retreat to or commu- 
nication with the glades of the south. 

In the General Order of the 22d of February, you are assigned to the 
command of the centre- of the Florida army, and this designation of your 
command is preserved in this communication, though you will readily per- 
ceive, in the movements now directed, you occupy the left, and, conse- 
quently, will operate on the left until, by a union of the whole force, 
you assume your originally assigned position in the centre. 

Respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

JAMES GADSDEN. 

Colonel Gadsden is in mv staff. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

The Indian who delivers you this will receive from you a recompense 
of fifty dollars, as per agreement. 



Col. Wm. Lindsay, 

Commanding left wing, fyc. 



JAMES GADSDEN. 



No. 82. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 
Order No. 13. Fort Drane, March 14, 1836. 

General Thomas Woodward, of Macon county, Alabama, is author- 
ized, aided by Majors J. H. Watson and VV. B. Flournoy, to accept the 
services of any five hundred Creek warriors, to be employed as auxili- 



[ 224 ] 288 

aries in the present war against the Seminole Indians. Should General 
Woodward decline taking the command of these friendly Indians, Major 
Watson, assisted by Major Flournoy, will take the command of them. 

The United States agents in the creek nation will give every facility 
in raising and despatching the auxiliary force mentioned above. The 
force will proceed, by water, from the Creek country to Tampa bay, 
where, on its arrival, it will be reported to any general or colonel who 
may be in command in that quarter. 

Commissions of course cannot be granted to the gentlemen who may 
be employed with this force ; but the commander will be considered as 
having the rank of lieutenant colonel, the next officer the rank of major, 
and the third that of captain. Should more officers be requisite, one or 
two lieutenants will be recognised ; but this will be a subject for future 
determination. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 83. 



War Department, 

Washington, January 21, 1836. 

Sir : Major General Scott has been directed to assume the general 
direction of operations in Florida. Recent intelligence has led to 
the belief that the Creeks have actively joined, or intend to join, the 
Seminole Indians in their hostilities. Should such prove to be the case, 
General Scott has orders to reduce the Creek Indians, as well as the 
Seminoles, to unconditional submission. In this event, you will please 
to report yourself to him, and communicate to him all the instructions 
and information in your possession respecting the views of the Govern- 
ment on the subject of the removal of the Creek Indians. You will also 
carry into effect such instructions on this matter as he may give you. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

LEWIS CASS. 
Col. Jno. B. Hogan, 

Columbus, Georgia. 



No. 84. 



Fort Mitchell, 
Creek Agency, February 1, 1836. 

My Dear General: 1 have this day received a letter from the hon- 
orable the Secretary of War, of which the enclosed is a copy, from 
which I have learned that you are again in the field, and that the impor- 



289 f 224 ] 

tint duly of subduing the Seminoles has been assigned to you, and that 
{ am ordered to report myself to you, and receive and carry into effect 
such instructions as you may give me. Now, this is all news to me, and 
is perfect Hebrew, unless the Department meant, in a modest way, to 
say to me, take a thousand of your Creek Indians and repair to Florida 
and aid General Scott to subdue these rascally Seminoles. If this was 
their view, why not say so at once, and you should, in a very short time, 
have me again along side of you tugging at the old oar. I have no doubt 
but that I could, in ten days, raise you 1,000 warriors, and be on the 
march to join your army ; and, in as many more days, be with you : all 
that is necessary is an order to that effect. But the Secretary seems to 
think the Creek Indians are hostile ; this is not the fact : although some 
little skirmishing has taken place, on the Georgia side of the river, and 
some few lives have been lost on both sides; but a peace has be< n ef- 
fected here to-day between two militia general officers, from Georgia, 
and the chiefs; and an agreement has been signed by all the chiefs pres- 
ent. I was fifty miles below here night before last, and, hearing of these 
murders, I came up yesterday, and to-day effected this peace, which I 
hope and trust will last at least until we can get them out of the country. 
I am using every exertion to effect this object, and have no doubt but 
I shall be successful, in a measure, in the course of this spring. A re- 
port is going the rounds of the public papers, that a large body of the 
Creeks have joined the Seminoles; this, you may rely on, is incorrect. 
I have recently visited all the lower towns, and there is none oi their 
people absent; and you may rely on it, that, including all the stragglers 
that may have joined the Seminoles during the last summer, they cannot 
exceed one hundred, in ill ; but I am told that they are reinforced by a 
number of runaway negroes, who are decidedly the most active, keen, 
and intelligent fellows among them. Whatever their strength was be- 
fore this war, their reinforcements cannot exceed 3 or 400, of every de- 
scription. 

In relation to the Creeks, there would I e no difficulty in procuring their 
services, or in depending on them after they were procured. Whether 
under existing circumstances, the Government would be willing to em- 
ploy them against the Seminoles is more than I can say ; but, ii they 
should, there would be no difficulty in procuring as many as you might 
choose to muster into service. 

I have the honor to remain 

Your friend and numble servant, 

JNO. B. HOf.AN, 
Superintendent Creek removal. 
Maj. Gen. W. Scott, 

Commanding in Florida. 



No. 85. 



War Department, April 12, 1836. 

Sir : I enclose, herewith, an extract of a letter received from Colonel 
Hogan, together with a copy of one this day addressed to him. 
19 



[ 224 ] 290 

As my views are fully expressed in the letter to Colonel Hogan, f 
need not trouble you with a repetition of them. 

Very respectfully, 

Your most obedient servant, 

LEWIS CASS. 
Major General Scott, 

Fort King, Florida. 



No. 86. 



Extract of a letter from John B. Hogan to the Secretary of War, dated 

Tuskegee, March 28, 1836. 

Sir : At this council, Mr. John H. Watson, the same young man 
who commenced all the late disturbances at Columbus, by attacking a 
party of Creeks below Fort Mitchell, in which affair two white men were 
killed — this Mr. Watson came on the ground with a piece of paper pur- 
porting to be a copy of an order recently issued by Major General Scott, 
authorizing General Woodward, of this place, who is one of the new 
batch of emigrating contractors, to accept the services of any 500 Creek 
In liana, as volunteers. General W. declined making any efforts to raise 
volunteers, by stating that it was a well-known fact that he had no influ- 
ence with the Indians, but if they were raised, and no better man could 
be found, he would go with them ; but, as far as I could understand his 
open declarations, he appeared to disapprove altogether of the project, 
as it was his opinion that it would retard the emigration. Mr. Watson, 
who appears to be a wild, rash, inconsiderate young man, insisted that 1 
was bound to raise the warriors. I referred him to Captain Page, as a mili- 
tary officer, and who was acting as superintendent, but he seemed to think 
that a word or two liotn me would induce the chiefs to jump at the offer. 
In the mean time I consulted Captain Page, who was decidedly opposed 
to sending Indians under the orders of such a man, and, indeed, seemed 
to disapprove of it. I also consulted with Opothleholo, who said he did not 
want his people to engage in any such war at present, that he was anx- 
ious to get off for the West, but if the Secretary of War wanted his peo- 
ple to go he did not wish them to go with men he did not know, and of 
course had no confidence in. Other chiefs told me the same thing. Mr. 
Watson continued to follow me about, and insisting that I must get him 
Indians to go ; and at last he became rude and offensive. I then cut him 
short by telling him that if he had any communications to make me, to do 
it in writing, and I would in the same manner reply. I also consulted 
the emigrating contractors, who I had reason to think were pushing on 
Watson, and asked them, if the Indian warriors were raised, if they would 
give me, from under their hands, a relinquishment of any claim they 
might hereafter choose to prefer for damages on account of those Indians 
being carried to Florida. They said they would not give any relinquish- 
i . it, nut the Indians might go if the War Department required their 
services. 

Whatever inclination 1 might have to obey General Scott's orders — 



[ ^ J 

and certainly there is no officer I have ever served under that I more 
highly love and respect, and whose orders at all times afforded me more 
pleasure to obey — yet, in the present instance, I have deemed it most 
prudent to refer the whole matter to you. I can easily perceive Gener- 
al Scott's situation when he gave that order to those young men, Watson 
and Flournoy, who visited him at Picolata, and no doubt made a display 
of their patriotism and popularity among the Creeks, and urged the Gen- 
era! to give them an order to bring into the field 500 Indians. The Gen- 
eral seeing but one side, and being pleased with their spirit, gave the 
order ; you will see, too, that the order, (a copy of which I herewith en- 
close,) does not embrace an order on the commissariat or quartermaster 
general's department for subsistence and transportation, or on the ordnance 
department for arms, or their being mustered into the service of the 
United States, nor was it personally addressed to Captain Page or my- 
self, or would Mr. Watson vouch that it was a correct copy of General 
Scott's order, as he wrote it, he said, from memory. If it is desirable to 
have the 500 Creek warriors engage in this war, I have but little doubt 
they can be obtained if proper persons are sent to command them, but I 
do not think that either Mr. Watson or Mr. Flournoy are the right sort 
of persons to be charged with such a command. I have no doubt of the 
bravery of either, but I should think that they lack the other requisites 
of a commander, viz : prudence, temper, caution, and experience. If, 
however, you wish the order complied with, it shall be attempted and 
enforced as far as my influence will go. In my first communication to 
General Scott, I made a tender of my services, should he require In- 
dians in this campaign ; not having heard from him, I presume the Depart- 
ment would not sanction the employment of them, and thought no more 
on the subject. If, however, I am mistaken, I a<j;ain tender my services 
to go as commander of such a body as the Department may order. A 
matter of that sort is much more to my taste than the duties now assign- 
ed me. 

I have the honor to remain 

Your obedient servant, 

JNO. B. HOGAN. 
Hon. Lewis Cass. 



No. 87. 



War Department, April 12, 1836. 

Sir : I have just received your letter of the 28th ultimo. 

With respect to the employment of the Creek Indians under the orders 
of General Scott, I am unwilling to give you any definite instructions. I 
would rather that the campaign should be brought to a successful ter- 
mination without the aid of the Creek Indians. Still, if from the nature 
of the operations, this cannot be done without sacrificing our own troops 
to the unhealthfulness of the climate in the sickly season of the year, the 
Department will consent to have a corps of these Indians raised, if they 
are willing to be so employed. But the time which has intervened since 
the authority given by General Scott on this subject, and the great 



[ 224 ] 292 

changes which may have occurred in the state of things in Florida, ren- 
der it inexpedient to give directions here to have any measures taken. I 
think it is best that you should explain to the Creeks the views of Gen- 
eral Scott in relation to the employment of these young men, and request 
them to have in readiness the force which he required to be called out, 
should General Scott again renew the requisition. In the mean time, 
I shall communicate these views to General Scott, and refer to his own 
discretion the course which shall be taken. 

I have to request your zealous co-operation in whatever measures 
General Scott may think necessary. 
Very respectfully, 

Your most obedient servant, 

LEW. CASS. 
Col. J. B. Hog an, 

Columbus, Georgia. 



No. 88. 

Tallahassee, Florida, March 7, 1836. 

Dear Sir : Major Flournoy and Mr. Watson, of Columbus, Georgia, 
who will hand you this letter, has applied to me to receive into the ser- 
vice 200 Indians that he has conditionally engaged. It is a matter over 
which I have no authority, and accordingly have referred him to you. 
If, as I presume will be the case, the Indians shall betake themselves to 
hammocks and swamps, and seek for safety there, those Indians may 
prove highly serviceable in discovering their retreat; besides, as in war 
times neighboring tribes are not disposed to be inactive, they may join 
the enemy if you refuse to take them into your service. I should think, 
therefore, it would be most advisable to authorize those gentlemen to 
bring them to Tampa. The Chattahoochie river being now in fine or- 
der, they could very soon be transported in a steamboat to Tampa bay. 

I have no news either from the army or elsewhere. Our difference 
with France is adjusted, without war and without apology. 

In this Territory, horses, nor supples for them, could be procured ; 
accordingly, one-half, say 300, were sent to Tampa bay, under Major 
Read. About 200 are, or soon will be, on the frontier about the Suwan- 
nee, to guard against those marauding straying parties that may attempt 
any mischief there. 

With great respect, 

J. H. EATON. 

Gen. Winfeld Scott. 



No. 89. 



Headquarters, Right Wing, F. A., 

Fort Drane, March 13, 1836. 

Sir: I have the honor to enclose you a letter from General Call, and 
to introduce to your polite attention Major Watson and Major Flournoy, 



2.43 f 224 ] 

of Georgia. These gentlemen come to me highly recommended. lam 
decidedly in favor of the plan proposed by Major Watson. 
I am, with high respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

D. L. CLINCH, 



Maj. Gen. Scott. 



Brig. Gen. U. S. A. 



No. 90. 

Headquarters, Right Wing, F. A., 

Fort Drane, March 13, 183G. 

Sir: I have the honor to enclose to you a letter from General Call, 
and to introduce to your polite attention Major Watson and Major Flour- 
noy, of Georgia. 

These gentlemen come to me highly recommended, and I am deci- 
dedly in favor of the plan proposed by Major Watson. 
I am, with high respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

D. L. CLINCH, 



Maj. Gen. Scott. 



Brig. Gen. U. S. A. 



No. 91 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 
Orders No. 14. Fort Drane, March 14, 1836. 

In this vicinity, in the march from Volusia, and the march from Tam- 
pa bay, the ration of hard bread will be reduced to the old allowance of 
twelve ounces, and the ration of flour to fourteen ounces. 

This allowance of bread or flour, if used with economy, will be found 
sufficient, and without care and economy, double the quantity might not 
suffice. 

The commanding General will be most happy to extend the allowance 
the moment that our means of transportation shall permit. In the mean 
time the reduction is indispensable, to enable the three columns from 
Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa bay, to execute the marches which are 
soon to be attempted. All good soldiers will, no doubt, cheerfully sub- 
mit to a regulation founded on the necessities of the service. 

Colonel Gadsden, quartermaster general of Florida, is attached to 
general headquarters. All orders communicated by him, in the name of 
the general-in-chief of this army, will be duly obeyed. 

By command of Major General Scott : 

A. VAN BUREN, 
Aid-de-camp, acting AssH Adft General. 



[ 224 ] 294 

No. 92. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Fort Drane, March 16, 1836. 
Orders No. 15. 

All the troops destined to reinforce the right wing, left on the St. 
John's river on the 10th instant, or which after that date may have arri- 
ved in the vicinity of Picolata or Garey's Ferry, will march for Fort Drane 
as soon as they can be respectively supplied with the necessary means of 
transportation; but not earlier than the 19th instant. It will be suffi- 
cient if the several detachments arrive here on the 23d of this month. 

As cavalry or mounted men are most needed by the right wing, the 
detachment of United States dragoons will be first supplied with the 
means of transportation ; next, any company of Georgia mounted volun- 
teers that may have arrived at Garey's ferry ; and, thirdly, the remainder 
of Major Cooper's Georgia battalion. 

Should there be more than one company of Georgia mounted volun- 
teers at Garey's ferry, two may be put in march for this place, if it can 
be done by the 22d instant. All other companies or detachments will 
remain at that depot until further orders. 

No company or detachment, whatever, will be put in march for Fort 
Drane, without the means of bringing with it to this place, six days' sub- 
sistence for men, over and above the consumption on the march. 

This order will be communicated by Lieutenants Dusenbury and Sea- 
right to the troops near them respectively, and rigorously carried into 
execution. 

On every man and horse subsistence will be taken for each, sufficient 
at least for the march to Fort Drane ; and not more than three tents will 
be allowed to a company. 

By command of Major General Scott. 

A. VAN BUR EN, 
Aid-dc-camp, acting Assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 93. 



Fort Drane, March 16, 1836. 

Sir : As the period approaches for the advance of the various wings 
of the Florida army to their previously assigned positions in the cam- 
paign, and more minute and accurate topographical information of the 
probable seat of war is acquired, it has been deemed necessary by the gen- 
eral-in-chief to communicate the contemplated operations more in detail, 
to the commandants of the different portions of the army, so as to ensure that 
co-operation essential to a speedy and successful result. Measures have 
been sufficiently matured on the right, to enable General Clinch to 
move on his assigned position, in advance of the late battle-ground on the 
Withlacoochee, by the 24th instant ; he will reach it on the 26th, and 
be prepared to cross the river and drive the enemy from his concealment 



295 [ 2M ] 

in the cove or swamp of the Withlacoochee on the 27th or 28th of the 
month. It is confidently expected that the left wing, under your com- 
mand, though now acting in the centre, and the centre, under the com- 
mand of Colonel Lindsay, thrown upon the left, will be able to move in 
time, so as to be in the respective positions assigned them at Pelaklika- 
ha and Chickuchatty by the 25th of the month. The position of Pelak- 
likaha was deemed important, not merely from its topographical relations 
to the probable seat of war, on the waters oi the Withlacoochee, but as 
the residence of Micanopy, the head chief of the Seminoles, and his ne- 
gro population. Micanopy formerly resided at Ocahumpky, but this 
place has long since been abandoned, and Pelakiikaha is now the joint 
place of residence of the chief and his slaves. From the last advice he 
was at home, not anticipating, probably, a movement from the quarter- in 
■which your command is now concentrating. You will perceive, tin 
fore, the importance as you approach the Ochlawaha, of your making a 
rapid movement in advance, if only with your mounted men and light 
troops, so as to surprise, annihilate, or capture Micanopy and his n 
allies. If successful, it would be striking an important and most effectual 
blow on the enemy. Pelakiikaha is about 15 miles from the upper cross- 
ing on the Ochlawaha; it may probably be 18 or 20, but cannot possibly 
exceed the latter distance. On your reaching Pelakiikaha, the com- 
manding General, on reconsideration, deems it advisable that you advance 
your position west to the main road, from the bay of Tampa to Fort King, 
at or near the fatal battle-ground of Dade and his party. The distance 
from Pelakiikaha is about rive or six miles, and at this point you will fire 
the signal at the hour each day, directed in a precarious communication, 
until responded to from the other wings of the army, when you will be 
prepared to advance to that junction, which will close, it is hopejd, the 
war. 

On your reaching the road, you will not be more than 25 miles from 
where Lindsay will probably leave it in his march upon Chickuchatty ; 
it will be advisable, therefore, that you push your reconnoitring parties, 
or mounted men, in that direction, to ascertain whether the enemy in 
any force have retreated by or across that route, and to interceptor pur- 
sue them if practicable. You will hold steadily in view that, as the 
object of the combined morement of the army in three divisions from 
three different points, all converging to a common centre, the supposed 
strong hold of the enemy, is to enclose, beat, and destroy him in that 
strong hold, so it is all-important to prevent his retreat, and force him 
to action. It is not probable that a retreat will be attempted by any 
other route from the cove or Withlacoochee swamp (should the enemy 
be found there) but eastwardly on Pelakiikaha, by the trail between the 
big and little Withlaeoochees, which would throw him in your face ; or 
by the Chickuchatty trail and big hammock, which will bring him in con- 
tact with Lindsay; or, by a route intermediate between your two respec- 
tive columns. You will, therefore, perceive the necessity of vigilance, 
and such extension to the right and left as will enclose or shut up these 
avenues, and accomplish in the shortest time the objects of this campaign. 
As the relative positions of the columns under the command of Colonel 
Lindsay and yourself will not exceed in distance 40 miles, a distance which 
as you advance upon the cove, will be gradually shortened, it is thought such 



[ 241 ] 295 

extension may be made, and such communication preserved between jour 
respective commands, as to prevent all retreat, or at all events, to so watch 
the movements of the enemy as to gain the earliest intelligence of his retreat, 
and to ensure the speediest and most effectual pursuit upon his trail. Should 
the enemy effect escape between your columns, and a pursuit be deemed 
advisable, it is expected that the earliest intelligence of the fact will 
be communicated to headquarters, and that no opportunity be lost of 
communicating as often as practicable with the General-in-chief, now 
with the right wing, as well as with Colonel Lindsay, operating on 
your left. 

Arrangements have been made to procure, if practicable, a steamboat 
better adapted to the navigation of the St. John's than the Santee ; but 
should the quartermaster fail in this respect, the Santee will be kept 
in the public service, so as to ensure a supply of provisions, &c, at 
your main depot, on the St. John's, even at the additional labor of 
lighting her over the bar of the lake. It is the wish of the commanding 
general that you will detain the boat at Volusia, on her last trip previous to 
your departure ; so that you may communicate to him by expresses, the 
movements of the rear of your column on the march to its position in 
advance of the Ochlawaha. It is not improbable that after you are in 
motion, the commanding General will be able to communicate with 
you by express direct ; and it is thought probable that you may have it 
equally in your power, by some Indian runner, to keep the General 
advised direct of your march. If so, it is expected that you will em- 
brace every opportunity of doing so. For your better information, I add 
some distances, which may be important in shedding some additional 
light on the topographical features of the country, the seat of war, and 
of exhibiting the relative distances of the respective columns of the army 
when in their assigned positions: 

Distance from Fort Drane to position in advance of the Withlacoochee, 
from 30 to 35 miles, in S. VV. or W. S. W. direction. From Fort 
Drane to Fort King, 25 miles, southeasterly direction. From Fort 
King to Pclaklikahai, 40 miles, southwardly. From Fort King to Dade's 
battle-ground on main Tampa road, 35 to 10 miles. From battle-ground 
to little Withlacooehec, from 7 to iO miles. From little Withlacoochec 
to big Withlacoochec, 7 miles ; to Elochuctu, where probably Lindsay 
will leave the main road on his march to Chickuchatty, 13 miles. To the 
Hillsborough, 10 miles; to Tampa, 23 miles. Both of the Withlacoo- 
chees as well as the Hillsborough were bridged formerly. Those over 
the former stream have been destroyed, but the fords were passable by 
the last information received. The bridge across the Hillsborough had 
been injured, but will probably be repaired by Lindsay. Those over the 
YYithlacoochees, should you be detained in that quarter, and it be 
found practicable, without too much labor, it may be important to 
restore to their former condition. 

Bv order of Major General Scott. 

JAMES GADSDEN. 

To Brigadier General Eustis, 

Commanding left wing of the army of Florida. 



297 f-221 ] 

No. 94. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Fort Dram, March 20, 183G. 

Sir : For the information of the Secretary of War and the General-in- 
chief, I addressed you a hasty note on the 1 4th. Nothing material has 
since occurred. This wing is waiting to give time for Brigadier General 
Eustis and Colonel Lindsay to gain their respective positions, Pelakli- 
kaha and Chickuchatty ; for the arrival of the wagons sent hence to Ga- 
rey's Ferry for subsistence, the last of which may be expected by the 
24th, with (it is hoped) some additional teams from Savannah, and for 
the troops from New Orleans to recruit their stiength. All these objects 
I have good reason to hope will be accomplished by the 26th or 27th in- 
stant, although I have not had a line from Colonel Lindsay later than his 
letter dated at Mobile, the 13th ultimo. In the mean time it is confident- 
ly believed that the the great body of the enemy remains in the swamp 
or cove of the Withlacoochee, about the junction of its three branches, 
say thirty-five miles from this place. 1 send a topographical sketch of 
that vicinity, made by my aid, Lieutenant Johnston, from information 
received here and principally from Colonel Gadsden, the quartermaster 
general of Florida, whom I have taken into the service of the United 
States, and my staff, with that rank. His minute knowledge of the coun- 
try and the hostile Indians, together with his general military intelligence, 
render him a valuable acquisition. I also expect to derive much valua- 
ble assistance from Colonel Fitzpatrick, the President of the Territorial 
Legislative Council, particularly if the war should be carried into the 
lower part of the peninsula, with which he is, perhaps, better acquainted 
than any other individual in the Territory. He is with me, and is well 
disposed to render himself generally useful. 

You will receive with this, copies of several orders. No. 13 was sup- 
posed to be necessary in order to be provided with the bestkind of means 
to ferrit out of the swamps and other hiding-places, small parties of the 
enemy which may be expected to remain out after the great body ot the 
nation shall be subdued. General Woodward and Majors Watson and 
Flournoy, mentioned in that order, are strongly recommended to me as 
suitable persons to direct the detachment of 500 Creek warriors. I trust 
that this step on my part may meet the approbation of the War Depart- 
ment. It seemed to me to be dictated by a wise discretion, and it will, 
probably, by abridging time, save many valuable lives from the eflects of 
the summer climate of the lower country. 

The order limiting the \ ration of bread or flour is the direct result of 
the want of sufficient means of transportation, and we shall probably be 
obliged to move hence on the 24th or 25th instant, with less than eighteen 
days' subsistence for this wing, which will consist of about 1,700 fighting 
men. No murmur has been uttered in consequence of that reduction in 
the ration. All are disposed to make any sacrifice which the good of the 
service shall demand. 

I have discharged many individuals of the volunteer corps for special 
reasons, generally on account of disability. Brevet Major Mountford, 
who had injured a foot, has been permitted to retire. The case of Lieu- 



[ 224 ] 298 

tenant Colonel Twiggs requires a more particular notice. He was 
neither sick nor wounded. In the presence of Brigadier General Clinch, 
he demanded whether, if in the course of the campaign, one or more 
companies of any other corps should be adjoined to, or momentarily at- 
tached with the 4th infantry, under his command, brevet rank would 
take effect on such junction or detachment ? I replied in the affirmative. 
He then said that there was some order or regulation which explained 
or differently construed the 61th article of war. My ready answer was, 
that I knew of no order or regulation that was incompatible with that ar- 
ticle, and that, if one were produced, conflicting with its plain meaning 
and import, I should deny its power to repeal an act of Congress. Lieut. 
Col. Twiggs added that he knew such would be my course, and that he 
would ask leave to retire to his post, (New Orleans,) as he was unwilling 
to be commanded by any brevet lieutenant colonel whatever, no matter 
what the circumstances. I expressed my unwillingness to lose his servi- 
ces, and said, as far as practicable, I would endeavor to respect his feel- 
ings ; yet, i( he chose to do so, to make his application in form, to the 
commander of the wing, (then present,) and that he should be indulged. 
Contrary to my expectation, I must confess that application was made, 
and the Lieutenant Colonel was off in an hour, via Georgia, and I should 
should not be surprised to learn that he takes Washington also in his 
route to New Orleans. As this individual is generally believed to rely 
fully as much on his political as his military standing, to carry his par- 
ticular objects, and as he had not got many miles on his route before he 
began to utter complaints against the general headquarters of this army, 
I have gone into a detail of the circumstances of his departure, and have 
to add another particular: Before Major General Gaines turned over the 
immediate command of the troops, then on the W ithlacoochee, to Briga- 
dier General Clinch, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs took care to obtain from 
the former an order for New Orleans, to go via, I know not what States 
and cities. Of this order I had heard not a syllable till after the depart- 
ure of the Lieutenant Colonel ; it was kept a profound secret from me, 
and I am now morally certain that the point presented to me about rank 
was but a pretext. I am, however, content that he is gone ; the com- 
mand of the 4th infantry has devolved on an officer at least his equal. 

The two officers present, who, by the seniority of their brevets, might, 
in particular cases, have commanded Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs mo- 
mentarily, are Lieutenant Colonels Bankhead and Foster. The latter 
is now the commander of the 4th infantry, aided by brevet Major Wilson, 
on duty as major. 

As I am about to plunge deeper into this peninsula, and farther from 
the Government, there is another clamor which, as I learn, is now swell- 
ing its peals against me in the rear. 

It may be remembered that I reported two companies of Georgia 
mounted volunteers, with the exception of a fragment of one of them, as 
having refused to be: mustered into the service of the United States, that 
is, as having refused to place themselves under the rules and articles 
of war. The first was commanded by the patriotic and intelligent Cap- 
tain Kenan, and the second by Captain Allen. I saw neither of those 
companies ; but both were amply provided for by the Governor of Geor- 
gia to the St. Mary's river, and there and at Jacksonville, each found sub- 



299 224 ] 

sistence for men and horses, which I had caused to be deposited in ad- 
vance, for all the Georgia and South Carolina mounted men. Captain 
Allen I saw for less than a minute after, as he informed me, his company- 
had refused to serve. As he assured me that he had used his best exer- 
tions to change the determination of his men, I expressed the sympathy I 
felt in his patriotic chagrin ; and said that a company might, perhaps, be 
formed out of the well-disposed men of the two companies, and had my 
attention called off by the many instructions to be given to persons on 
board of a steamer then in the act of leaving the wharf, where the mo- 
mentary interview took place. He added something about volunteering 
as a private, to which I replied, that that was not at all necessary to the 
vindication of his honor- A few minutes afterwards, I turned round to 
say more to the same effect to the Captain, but he had disappeared, and I 
saw and heard not another word of him, till I heard of his clamors 
against me at Jacksonville. This is the man whose patriotic exertions 
to induce his men to do their duty, I reported both to the War Depart- 
ment and the Governor of Georgia ! That report was founded solely on 
his word, and I had soon an opportunity of learning, from the gallant 
Georgians who remained, that he was as ready to desert as either of his 
men. His example, however, had no effect on the patriotic companies of 
Douglass, Malone, and Sweeny, of the same battalion ; and, what is in-^ 
finitely to its credit, none on the fine company of Captain Nelson, of the 
second battalion of mounted men, from the same State. This company 
marched with me from Garey's Ferry, having treated with contempt the 
falsehoods of Captain Allen and the other deserters, whom it passed on 
the other side of Jacksonville. But it maybe doubted whether the four 
other companies of Captain Nelson's battalion, a few days behind him, 
have been found equally determined. They had not arrived at Jackson- 
ville on the 15th instant, and, according to a letter just received from 
Governor Schley, they ought to have been there by the 13th. 

Whether the falsehoods of deserters will be credited against me by the 
Government or the patriotic State of Georgia, I know not. The gallant 
men of the same State who are in Florida, cannot be heard till the war 
is over. With these I am more than satisfied, and in their keeping, I am 
confident that the honor of Georgia and the Union will be upheld. 

Major Cooper, and four companies of his battalion, will, I am afraid, 
be compelled to remain on the St. John's longer than I could wish, for 
the want of the means of transportation. One company is here, ( Meri- 
weather's,) having escorted the wagon-train that left the St. John's on 
the 6th instant. The remainder of the battalion is, I learn, exceedingly 
discontented at not being among the foremost troops in battle. The un- 
expected arrival of the troops from New Orleans, and other causes, so 
frequently reported, as to the failure of the means of transportation, must 
be my apology. 

Captain Wharton, I have just learned, had not reached Jacksonville on 
the 15th. I have but little hope of his taking any part in the campaign ; 
although it is yet possible that he may be up in time. His detachment 
is much needed by this wing, which has only four small companies of 
mounted men, making a total of about 215. 

Some wagons (six) and twelve horses, arrived at Picolata from Savan- 
nah about the 12th instant, and a few horses as packs, with the last com- 



[ 224 ] 300 

pany of South Carolina mounted men, a little before. All those means 
of transportation were indispensable to the left wing. 

Brigadier General Eustis, in a letter just received, doubts whether he 
can reach Pelaklikaha earlier than the 27th or 28th. The movement of 
the right wing may, or may not be, delayed a few days accordingly. 
This will depend on a calculation of Lindsay's movements and the amount 
of subsistence that may arrive by the 24th from below. The latter may 
be so small as not to allow of any delay here, as we must take enough to 
give the right wing time to beat the enemy and to march to Tampa bay. 
Without more wagons and horses from Savannah, we have no hope of 
accumulating at this place, beyond the current consumption, more sub- 
sistence than we shall have on the 24th. Those calculations 1 shall rig- 
orously make the moment I have despatched the express now in waiting. 

The right wing will take with it, on ox- wagons, two good boats, just 
constructed, for passing the Withlacoochee. No body here doubts that 
the enemy will be driven by this wing. 

I have the honor to be, with respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



No. 95. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Fort Drane, March 20, 1836. 

Sir : We have good hopes that our wagons will be back here by the 
23d or 24th instant, with subsistence enough to warrant a movement on 
the part of Brigadier General Clinch, the moment they do arrive. This 
prompt movement will be indispensable for two reasons : 1st. Colonel 
Lindsay will, in all probability, be in advance of Chickuchatty by the 26th, 
and if Clinch be not on the Withlacoochee by the 25th, the whole of the 
Indians might fall upon Lindsay. 2d. With his means of transportation, 
Clinch cannot expect to increase his amount of subsistence after the 24th 
instant, and it is indispensable that he should take enough to last him to 
Tampa bay or Volusia, allowing time to beat the enemy on the way. 

If you cannot reach Pelaklikaha by the 25th, it may suffice if you are 
there by the 27th. The distance to that place from Volusia is not greater 
than was represented by Colonel Gadsden in his letter of the loth in- 
stant. 

Brigadier General Clinch is confident that Captain Drane can know 
nothing of the country southwest of Volusia, except from hearsay. He 
is accordingly ordered to his company. 

Why did you not take Captain Dimmock's company with you? With 
it you would have five, independent of Merchant's, left at Picolata. 

I reckon upon your being in force at Pelaklikaha by the 27th at 
the latest. The dry weather for the last ten days must have allowed 



301 [ 224 J 

the streams to subside, and, I hope, has favored the recovery of the 
troops from the measles. The sick and wounded in this wing are 
numerous. Not doubting that we shall soon meet, after a decisive success, 

I remain, &c, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brig. Gen. Eustis, U. S. A., 

Commanding left wing, fyc. 

P. S. There is good reason to hope that you will find cattle west of 
Volusia, and towards the Withlacoochee, perhaps some corn and rice. 

W. S. 



No. 96. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Fort Drane, March 23, 1836. 

Sir : Your inability, duly certified, to perform the active duties of the 
field, has induced me to order you to Fort Marion or St. Augustine. But 
it is not my intention to limit your duties to the latter place. You can 
render important services also at Picolata and Garey's Ferry. Accord- 
ingly you will frequently visit the two places last mentioned, and regu- 
late every thing at both as the good of the service may require. 

Picolata is the principal depot for the army in Florida, and Garey's 
Ferry the particular depot for the supply of this place and the right wing. 
The right wing, however, may soon, if successful, be expected to derive 
its supplies from Tampa bay, and so may the left wing, which has moved 
by Volusia. Nevertheless, supplies will soon be needed here for the 
troops which will be left in the vicinity, and possibly to meet the case 
of the right wing being forced back upon Fort Diane or King. 

If the campaign be successful, in a few weeks the troops of the right 
and left wings may be expected to pass Volusia on their return to the 
north or their private homes ; besides the greater part of the regulars, 
all the South Carolinians and Georgians will take that route. Supplies 
of subsistence and means of transportation will be wanted at that place 
according to their numbers, excepting means of transportation for the 
mounted men. The latter I shall probably order to march via Volusia, 
St. Augustine, and Jacksonville. A hospital tent and medicines and hos- 
pital stores will be greatly needed at Volusia. All those objects you will 
cause to be in readiness as soon as you shall learn that the campaign has 
been terminated. 

Without further instructions you need not put in march any company 
or detachment of troops which may now be in the neighborhood of Pico- 
lata or Garey's Ferry, or which may arrive at either place after the date 
of this letter. Should any company (and three may be expected) of 
Georgia mounted men be now at those places, or subsequently arrive, 
you will muster them into the service of the United States for ninety 
days, unless sooner discharged, and detain the company or companies 
until further instructions. 



[ 224 ] 302 

In respect to the issues to be made to the distressed inhabitants of Florida, 
you will be governed by the printed instructions, signed by the Secre- 
tary of War, untii further orders. 

In the hands of Lieutenants Uusenbury and Searight, you will find my 
instructions on the subject of discharged or disabled volunteers. Please 
cause those instructions to be executed. 

Of course, any orders that may reach you from Brigadiers General 
Clinch or Eustis will be complied with. 

Wishing you a restoration to health, 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
To Lieut. Col. Crane, 

2d regiment artillery. Fort Drane. 



No. 97. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Fort Drane, March 25, 1836. 

Sir : I am instructed by Major General Scott to inform you that the 
right wing of the army will move hence to-morrow. The enemy is sup- 
posed to be still in his late position on the Withlacoochee, about two 
marches from this. 

The copy of a letter from Brigadier General Eustis, reporting a skir- 
mish between the advance guard of his column and a small body of In- 
dians, I have the honor to enclose ; also, a return of the troops under the 
command of Brigadier General Clinch, to which are to be added four 
companies of Georgia foot, amounting to near 220 men. About that num- 
ber of invalids will be left as a garrison for this post. 

A despatch, dated the 10th of this month, has been received from 
Colonel Lindsay, reporting his arrival at Tampa bay on the 5th instant, 
and another, (both via Tallahassee,) dated the 12th, stating his design to 
march for Fort King, with a force of 750 Alabama volunteers, 300 Florida 
troops, under Lieutenant Colonel Call, and 50 warriors, (say) 1,120 
men. No information, however, of any actual movement from Tampa, 
by Colonel Lindsay, has been received. 

Captain Wharton, with his detachment of dragoon-recruits reached this 
the day before yesterday. I enclose, by direction of the General, the 
report of that officer, containing his reasons for the delay in his arrival 
here. Major General Scott's remarks upon the report, you will find en- 
dorsed thereon. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, 

A. VAN BUREN, 
Aid-de-camp, acting assistant Adjutant General. 

Brig. Gen. R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



303 [ 224 ] 

No. 98. 

Headquarters, Left Wing, Army of Florida, 

Volusia, March 22, 1836. 

General : Owing to a misunderstanding of my orders on the part of 
Brigadier General Bull, a part of my force, viz : Colonel Butler, with 
four companies of mounted men, and Major Kirby, with two companies of 
artillery, have not yet reached this place. I, however, hope to see them 
to-morrow morning. I have been engaged to day in crossing my advance 
guard and baggage-train over the river. About an hour ago the guard 
(two companies) were attacked by a small party of Indians, (about 50,) 
and a brisk skirmish ensued. The enemy was soon repulsed. I sent 
more men over the river, one company mounted, and all are now in pur- 
suit. We have had six wounded brought in ; none are yet reported 
killed ; none but the wounded have yet returned from the chase ; they 
report two or three Indians killed. I am obliged to send the Santee off 
for Picolata for more horses immediately, that she may return to-morrow 
evening. I will report further by her next trip. 

The only guide on whom I can in any degree depend, (Ben Wiggins) 
is absent with Colonel Butler ; still I think I can reach Pelaklikaha by the 
27th instant. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your humble servant, 

ABM. EUSTIS, 
Brigadier General U. S. A. 
Major General Scott, 

Commanding, fyc. 

P. S. Our parties have returned from the pursuit unsuccessful ; they 
have brought in three (sentinels) who were shot dead on their posts, 
(all Brisbane's.) With all the firing, I have no evidence that an Indian 
was killed. 



No. 99. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa Bay, April 6, 1836. 
Orders No. 16. 

All the sick and disabled of the army will be sent as soon as practi- 
cable to the general hospital at this place. 

Such of the invalids belonging to volunteer corps as are not likely to 
be fit for duty within their term of service, will, on the certificate of the 
proper medical officers, be honorably discharged by the commanding 
officer of Fort Brooke, as opportunities may offer to send them by water 
to a port the nearest to their homes. 



224 



304 



The quartermaster's department will charge itself with furnishing the 
means of transportation, and consult the wishes of each individual as to 
the port of destination, so far as public economy may permit. 

Individuals left in hospital will be duly treated and subsisted after 
their term of service shall be out, and, when fit to be put on board of a 
vessel, supplied with rations to the place nearest to their homes, as in 
the case of other discharged men. 

Subsistence furnished to all discharged men will be duly noted on the 
respective discharges. 

By command of Major General Scott. 

JAMES GADSDEN, 
Quartermaster General. 



No. 100. 

Statement of hard bread received Jrom Lieutenant P. Morrison, A. C. S. 

at New Orleans. 

Colonel Twiggs's requisition 
for Louisiana militia. 

1836. 

February 10th, Invoice No. 1, 166 barrels, containing 11,890 lbs. 
March 1st, « No. 2, 118 " " 8,615 

March 4th, " No. 3, 26 « " 1,725 

March 10th, " No. 4, 164 " « 11,450 

March 24th, " No. 5, 126 " " 9,518 



Total, 43,198 lbs. 

Amount on hand, April 8th, 1836 — 

182 barrels hard bread, at 70 pounds each, is 12,740 pounds. 

Bacon — 

Quantity received, .... 23,101 

Issued, ..... 1,500 



Balance on hand, - - 21,601 lbs. 

Fort Brooke, Florida, April 8, 1836. 

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, 
First Lieutenant, A. C. S. 



No. 101. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 
Order No. 23. Tampa Bay, April 9, 1836. 

It is indispensable that another regular surgeon should be placed on 
duty in the general hospital at this place. One will be immediately de- 
tailed for the purpose from the right wing. 



305 [ 224 ] 



Every regiment, battalion, or independent company, having sick in 
the general hospital, will, if it has not already been done, send attend- 
ants "in proportion to the number of its sick. If there be more than 
twelve sick, two attendants will be supplied ; if more than twenty-four, 
tbree attendants, and so on, allowing one attendant for every twelve 
sick men. 

The attendants on the sick, to be left when the troops march, need not 
be effectives in the ranks. Individuals laboring under slight accidents 
or disabilities, though unable to march, are the proper attendants on 
the sick. 

Every person in hospital below the rank of officer, whether sick or 
an attendant, is, for the time being, under the exclusive command and 
control of the medical officers. The latter are held responsible for the 
good order of the hospitals, as well as for the treatment and cure of 
the sick. 

When the different corps next march, all invalids of every rank must 
be left at this place. 

By command of Major General Scott. 



Orders No. 26. 



No. 102. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa Bay, April 10, 1836. 



The arras, accoutrements, ammunition, knapsacks, and haversacks, of 
discharged volunteers, and of the sick volunteers, (who are likely to be 
lelt in hospital at this place,) must be immediately collected and turned 
over to Lieutenant McKenzie, the ordnance officer at the fort, who will 
take measures to have the arms put in condition for reissue toother forces 
which may soon be expected. 

Commanding officers of regiments, battalions, and companies, will give 
prompt attention to the execution of this order, and so will the surgeons 
at the general and other hospitals. 

By command of Major General Scott. 



No. 103. 

Head Quarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa Bay, April 12, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to report, for the information of the Secretary 
of War and the General-in-chief, that I reached this place with the 
greater part of th*e right wing under Brigadier General Clinch, on the 
5th instant. Bigadier General Eustiscame in with half of the left wing the 
same day, and Colonel Lindsay, who commands the centre, the day be- 
fore. This approximation of the greater part of the three columns was 
the result of no particular instructions. Each found itself compelled to 
come in for subsistence. 
20 



[ 224 ] 306 

The reports of those principal commanders under me, are herewith 
enclosed, and marked, respectively, A, B, and C. 

It will be seen that although no general battle has been fought, many 
combats and sharp affairs have taken place ; that the boast of Major 
General Gaines that he had beaten the enemy, and compelled him to sue 
for peace, was but a vain imagination, and that although he told the chiefs, 
who held him enclosed in a log pen until relieved by Brigadier General 
Clinch, that the diplomatic agent of the War Department would soon 
arrive to settle (amicably) all differences, not a white flag has been 
seen by this army, and not an overture of submission or peace heard of. 
On the contrary, the small parties which have been met with almost 
every where, hare fiercely resisted, until put in danger of the bayonet. 
The war, on our part, is, in fact, scarcely begun. 

It is not the fault of Clinch, Eustis, or Lindsay, that no important bat- 
tle has been fought by either. Clinch marched from Fort Drane to the 
point on the Withlacoochee where Major General Gaines was checked, 
and thought himself compelled to fortify ; the right wing, by an admirable 
movement, crossed the river at that very point without much molestation, 
notwithstanding the bravado of the enemy of the day before. The wing 
then passed the recent battle-ground of its brave commander, where 
again there was, for a moment, a slight hope of resistance, and then 
scoured the cove, (probably the strongest hold in Florida,) to the extent 
of seven or eight miles. From this point to Tampa bay, although the 
column passed through many of the enemy's favorite settlements, not 
a gun was fired. Several towns heretofore occupied by friendly In- 
dians were left standing. All the others (and there were many) were 
burned. In approaching this place Clinch kept as far to the west of the 
Fort King road as practicable, in order to scour a district of country not 
before visited by our troops. He, throughout the march, commanded 
his column with judgment and ability, and at the principal combat on the 
31st ultimo, he bravely dismounted and followed his troops above the 
knees in mud. No considerable recent trail of men, women, children, or 
cattle, was discovered in the march of more than 100 miles ; and it is not 
believed that the enemy encountered exceeded one hundred and fifty. 
Colonel Gadsden, of my staff, by his superior topographical knowledge 
and general intelligence and activity, rendered important services to the 
column. The commendation bestowed by Brigadier General Clinch on 
other officers and other corps, I know to have been deserved. 

The reports of Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay will 
speak for themselves. I have every reason to repose the highest confi- 
dence in those able Commanders. It will be seen that the former has, 
like Clinch, executed a long march through the heart of the enemy's 
country, and with only a few sharp affairs with small parties. The latter 
is also true of Lindsay, who marched from this place to a point beyond 
Chickuchatty (one of the enemy's principal settlements) about sixty 
miles, where he took a position and remained as long as his subsistence 
would permit, waiting for instructions from me, or a communication with 
Eustis. The three columns were for several days within thirty miles of 
each other. Owing to the direction of the wind, Clinch's column heard 
the signal-guns fired by the other two, but neither of the latter could 
hear any response. 



307 f 2>4 J 

From a careful comparison of all the information collected by the 
three columns, I am now strongly persuaded that not sixty of the enemy 
have been killed during this war, and that there have not been as many 
•as six hundred imbodied at any one place. The signs about the Withla- 
coocbee do not contradict these estimates ; and it is the opinion of all 
the commanders that the Indians are now dispersed in war parties, or 
parties of observation, consisting of from sixty to two hundred each, 
with, however, great facilities of concentration. The women and chil- 
dren are supposed to be concealed in certain places (which will be men- 
tioned) and engaged, with a portion of the warriors, in planting, fishing, 
and hunting. The cattle found grazing in some districts, and particu- 
larly about Pelaklikaha, were numerous. Some were killed by Brig- 
adier General Eustis for consumption — the remainder left for the future 
wants of the army. The two other columns found but few cattle, and 
all not three bushels of corn. 

All the horses, draught, pack, and saddle horses, arrived here much 
reduced. Many broke down on the routes; some died, and a greater 
number, belonging to the mounted men, have been mustered as utterly 
incapable of service. Some corn, about a bushel and a half for each 
horse, was brought from the depots, Forts Drane and Volusia ; but 
the roads have been bad, the weather hot, the loads great, and the graz- 
ing indifferent — the Indians having, this season, but partially burned the 
woods and savannahs. The ponds, too, on which all mainly relied for 
water, had, many of them, dried up; and on the return march, this in- 
convenience, without heavy showers of rain, (which will spoil many 
parts of the routes,) will be still more seriously felt. The long halt here 
has been for the purpose of recruiting the horses a little — corn and 
hay, though of an indifferent quality, being found in abundance. This 
forage has been sent from New Orleans by Major Clark, assistant quarter- 
master, under my orders of the 14th of February. 

Many officers and men, besides the wounded, were broken down on 
the march. The measles early broke out among the South Carolinians, 
and laterly in the Alabama regiment and Florida battalion. The mumps 
too, have contributed to thin the ranks of the effectives. It will be seen 
by the returns, that the number of sick to be left here is unusually great, 
and many slight cases must be added to the sick reported ; for, in a 
country and a war like this, nobody can be left on the route. All must 
either march or be placed in the wagons, and every sick man is equal 
in weight, including his knapsack and firelock, to one hundred rations. 
Seven or five men, where there are no roads, load up a four or two 
horse wagon, even if the horses be in full strength. 

Colonel Smith with his Louisiana regiment is now in two schooners, 
accompanied by the cutter Dallas, captain Green, and with thirty-one 
days' subsistence, bound to Charlotte harbor, and the Meacca or Pease 
creek. On his arrival in that harbor he will be joined by Lieutenant 
Powell of the navy, who is there, in two boats, with a small party from 
the United States ship Vandalia. The schooners will ascend the creek 
some miles and anchor, the cutter a little higher up. The troops will 
then land on the left bank of the creek, and with the aid of the small 
boats and haversacks, take subsistence enough to last six or more 
marches. The day after to-morrow Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of 



• 



[ 224 J 308 

mounted South Carolinians (about 500 strong) will march hence for the 
upper part of the same creek, and will be followed by the foot of Eus- 
tis's wing, at the distance of from fifteen to twenty miles. 1 shall, for 
particular reasons which will be developed, probably march with this 
column. The distance hence to the lake (Simmons) at the head of the 
creek, is computed to be 43 miles. The object of this combined move- 
ment is to strike at the negroes, women, children, and warriors, who 
have settlements on the upper and lower part of the creek, and who 
are now, in security, supposed to be engaged in planting, fishing, and 
hunting. The movement promises better results than we have yet 
obtained. 

The term of service of the Louisiana regiment will expire early next 
month. When the expedition shall have terminated the regiment will 
touch here, on its return to New Orleans, and take up its sick. 

From Pease creek, Eustis's column united, will cross the St. John's, 
probably at Berrysford, if practicable, and proceed by Spring Garden to 
the depot at Volusia, having previously visited, if its subsistence will 
permit, the supposed settlements on Lake Tohopkelika, southwest of Lake 
Monroe. On the arrival of this column at Volusia, the term of service 
of the South Carolinians will have so nearly expired as to render it im- 
probable that they can be employed on any new expedition. 

The right wing, under Clinch, will be put again into the field the day 
after to-morrow. It will march by the route it came over; absorb Major 
Cooper's battalion of Georgians, left fortified in the interior; re-enter 
the cove it scoured on the 30th and 31st ultimo, whilst Lindsay approaches 
it from above, and then march to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, (not 
yet visited,) and there receive from vessels and boats to be sent from 
this place, a fresh supply of subsistence for men and horses. On his 
way he will take up his boats sunk in a lake or pond near Camp Cooper. 
Having accomplished the objects of the march to the mouth of that river, 
he will either cross there or return to Blodget's ferry, at Camp Izard, 
with the boats, and return to Fort Diane, observing the right bank of 
the Withlacoochee, in ascending, as far as his renewed means of subsist- 
ence may allow. His force, however, will be much diminished at the 
mouth of the river, for he will have instructions to embark the 4th United 
States infantry for this place ; and if he crosses to the right bank, to em- 
bark the Florida battalion in one of the schooners for St. Mark's. He 
will then be left with three companies of Georgia mounted men, Major 
Cooper's battalion, two companies of Augusta volunteers, a weak battal- 
ion of United States artillery, and Captain Wharton's detachment of 
United States dragoons. 

The term of service of the Georgians just mentioned, will begin to 
expire on the 22d instant. Robertson's company having been mustered 
into service on the 23d of January ; Bones's about the 1st of February ; 
Cooper's battalion the 15th, (I think,) and the mounted men ten days 
later. The whole of these volunteers will be put in march for their 
homes as soon as they shall reach Fort Diane ; the foot, by water from 
Garey's ferry or Picolata. The Florida battalion has a longer time to 
serve, but it is feeble; seven companies, and less than 200 effective 
men. It was mustered into service under the orders of Governor Eaton, 
with the companies far below (in privates) the legal standard. 



309 [ 224 | 

Lindsay, with a feeble battalion of United States artillery, a company 
of Georgia mounted men, (Nelson's,) the Alabama regiment, and an 
independent company of Louisiana volunteers, (Marks's) will march at 
the same time with Clinch and Eustis. He will be instructed to march 
into the forks of the Withlacoochees, and thence to penetrate, if prac- 
ticable, the head of the cove, whilst Clinch enters below. Having 
scoured the country in that direction, he will return to the Fort King 
road, put Nelson's company of mounted men in march for Fort Drane via 
Fort King, and return with the remainder of his troops to this place. 

The time of the Alabamians, and the independent company of Louisi- 
anians, will not expire as early as that of the other volunteers. Any 
thing that Lindsay may reasonably attempt, after being again compelled 
to return to this place for subsistence, he will be instructed to attempt. 
Besides the volunteers mentioned, he will have with him the battalion 
of United States artillery, and find the 4th infantry here from the mouth 
of the Withlacoochee. He will, when he sends his volunteers to their 
respectives States, be instructed to leave the artillery here as a garrison, 
under Major Zantzinger ; send a company of the 4th infantry, with 60 
or 90 days' subsistence, to Key West, and keep the remaining companies 
here, or send them to Baton Rouge, as may seem best. 

What may be accomplished by these new expeditions, I am unable to 
say. I have the highest confidence in the respective commanders, and 
do not doubt that they will be well supported by their officers and men. 
I am not, however, judging from the past, sanguine as to results. Some 
new settlements will be visited ; the places of concealment for the ene- 
my's women, children, and negroes, may be found en Pease creek, near 
the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and at the head of the cove, to which 
Clinch's column (we now have reason to believe) did not quite ascend. 
It is quite a labyrinth of ponds, hammocks, and savannahs, with small 
fields of pines. If the enemy's plantations of corn can be destroyed, 
together with his cattle, much will be effected, even if his negroes, 
women, and children should not be captured. The latter, however, it 
is most important for us to possess. 

When the volunteers shall be sent home, if the war be not over, it is 
evident that the regular force (about 789 effectives) will be inadequate 
to prosecute the war to any advantage, even if the season of the year 
would permit. I shall, therefore, feel myself compelled to place the bat- 
talion of artillery that marches with Clinch in defensive positions in the 
vicinity of Fort Drane, where we left, on the 26th ultimo, only the sick 
and invalids, with Gates's company of artillery at Fort King. The bat- 
talion of artillery that will march with Eustis, will be distributed on the 
St. John's and the Atlantic for a like purpose. Two companies (Dim- 
mock's and Merchant's) were left at Garey's ferry, Picolata, and St. Au- 
gustine ; Fort King being 23 miles farther from any depot (with a prac- 
ticable route) than the vicinity of Fort Drane, and covering nothing, I 
expect to abandon. Those views, however, will be modified according 
to the results of the expeditions which are sketched above. 

The five hundred Creek warriors expected here early in this month, 
have not arrived, nor have I heard a word in relation to my order on the 
subject since its date. They are no longer expected; should they, how- 
ever, come by the time that Lindsay will be compelled, for the want of 



[ 224 ] 310 

subsistence, to return to this place, be may, in conjunction with the other 
forces with him, employ those Indians to advantage. He will be in- 
structed accordingly. 

I ought to have reported from Fort Drane, that, learning from Captain 
Wharton and his officers that his detachment, generally, were bad horse- 
men, and, indeed, knew little or nothing about the care of horses, I 
caused a little more than fifty of the men to be dismounted, and the 
horses were turned over to the quartermaster, by whom they were great- 
ly wanted. The remainder of the detachment (about 28) retained their 
horses, and marched with the right wing, with which they will return, 
together with the foot, under Captain Wharton. 

I shall probably march with the left wing, (Eustis's command,) in order 
to be at Volusia and Picolata in time to regulate the discharge of the 
Georgia and South Carolina volunteers, and the distribution of the gar- 
risons of regulars to the north of this, somewhat \u the manner indicated 
above. It will give me (he opportunity, also, of a freer communication 
with the Government, from which I have now been cut off since the 
26th ultimo ; for a letter cannot be transmitted from this place or any 
point in the interior, to Fort Drane or Volusia, without the protection 
of a strong detachment ; and since ray arrival, we have had no vessel 
that could be Spared from the expeditions to the mouth of the Withla- 
coochee and Charlotte harbor, to transmit orders or communications to 
St. Mark's or New Orleans. This letter will be put in the post office 
at Pensacola by the United Slates transport schooner Motto, which will 
be despatched to-morrow to New Orleans. 

We found here but one United States ship or vessel, the Vandal ia,. 
Captain Webb. He has shown the best dispositions towards the land 
service, and is about to aid us with two boats for the expedition to the 
mouth of the Withlacoochee. Two other of his boats, as has been stated, 
are now at Charlotte harbor. No cutter was found here. The Dallas 
came up from Lieutenant Powell a few days since, and is now gone 
back to co-operate with Colonel Smith. Captain Green, the commander 
of this cutter, is an intelligent and zealous officer. The cutter Dexter,, 
Captain Randolph, arrived yesterday, and is to aid the expedition to the 
mouth of the Withlacoochee. He came in under the orders of Governor 
Eaton, whom she had taken from Pensacola to St. Mark's. The cutter 
Washington, 1 understand, is now down in the direction of Pensacola, I 
know not under whose orders. 

The Motto would have been despatched earlier, but for the necessity 
of making for her a new rudder. Besides letters and orders, she will 
take a number of discharged volunteer officers and men, (sick and dis- 
abled, to be landed at Pensacola and New Orleans. 

My disappointments, on the Gulf, have been as great as those expe- 
licnced on the St. John's. The latter were pretty fully reported at the 
time ; and, at the last dates, not a pound of bacon had arrived on that 
river or at St. Augustine. Those disappointments may appear to be 
mere trifles at Washington. 1 shall demonstrate the most serious in- 
fluence that they have bad on the operations of this army. 

First, let it be remembered that one hundred horses will take hard 
bread and bacon (say) for 1,000 men, sufficient to subsist that force as 
long as the quantity of pork and flour taken by 150 horses would subsist 



"^' 



311 [ 224 | 

a like force : that is, the difference between pork and flour on the one 
hand, is just fifty per centum, compared with bacon and hard bread, in 
favor of the latter. Secondly, let it be remembered that the deficiency 
in our means of transportation was sufficiently great, independent of the 
addition to the weight to be drawn, created by the necessity of loading 
the wagons with Hour and pork. Besides, all Southern volunteers pre- 
fer bacon to pork, and no troops can, in the woods, convert flour into 
wholesome bread. Both time and means are wanting. 

Some hard bread arrived in time on the St. John's, but not enough. 
Thus the last rations of flour and pork, consumed by Clinch's wing, the 
day it arrived here, had been drawn from Garey's ferry, a distance of 165 
miles. Eustis's wing had also to bring with it pork and a portion of flour, 
owing to the deficiency of hard bread on the St. John's. 

Please now refer to my joint letter to the quartermaster and commis- 
sary at New Orleans, dated at Savannah, February the 14th, and acknowl- 
edged on the 26th of the same month. A copy was transmitted to 
you for the information of the proper departments at Washington. 
The letter, it will be seen, is specific and urgent. Yet, instead of 
my finding here about 150,000 rations of hard bread, and about 
90,000 of bacon, I found but 12,740 pounds of the first, and 21,600 
pounds of the latter! Not an additional ration of either has arrived 
since I came. Colonel Lindsay had required, for the use of his column, 
of the quartermaster at New Orleans, a number of wagons and horses, 
and not one has been sent. Again, the sutler (the person next in im- 
portance to the quartermaster and commissary with every army) left this 
place more than a month ago for New Orleans, to bring back with him a 
large supply of goods for the troops which were expected. Those sup- 
plies are exceedingly wanted by every officer and soldier. But the 
quartermaster writes that he hesitates about sending the wagons and 
horses, and the sutler, that he declines sending his stores, because each 
has heard of Major General Gaines's triumphal entry into Tallahassee, 
in consequence of his having finished the war ! ! It is presumed that 
the commissary at New Orleans stopped the shipment of bacon and hard 
bread for the same reason. 

Captain Green, of the cutter Dallas, was at Tallahassee when Major 
General Gaines arrived at that place. He had been ten days soliciting 
permission to go and make a survey of the mouth of the Withlacoocb.ee. 
On renewing his application to some one in the Territorial Government, 
he was told that the war was over ! We have now to make the survey 
for the expedition that has been mentioned. These are the new disap- 
pointments and vexations that I have been doomed to experience. 

In connexion with the strange imagination that the war was finished at 
Camp Izard, it may be remarked that Major General Gaines put himself 
under an escort of some mounted Floridians, to take him from Fort 
Drane towards the Suwannee, and that Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, a few 
days afterwards, although he asserted, with Major General Gaines, that 
the war was over, did not deem it safe for him to take the Tallahassee 
route. Colonel Gadsden, and two other gentlemen, came to Fort Drane 
ten days before in perfect security, over that very route, and before it 
was imagined that the war had been brought to a happy conclusion. 

In respect to hard bread, it is proper to state that, besides the 12,740 
pounds mentioned above, we have about 7,000 pounds brought from Mo- 



[ 224 ] 3 12 

bile by Colonel Lindsay. The commissary at New Orleans is entitled to 
no credit for this small supply. 

Among other Orders, a copy of No. 24 will be found enclosed. The 
friendly Indians made many difficulties ; but I finally told them that they 
must embark, and Lieutenant Harris has just reported that the whole 
(399 souls) are actually on board. About a third of the number are 
warriors. A few (two or three) are retained as guides, and a small 
number were left at Fort King. 

April 13. Since writing the above, I have been forced, from our ig- 
norance of the mouth of the Withlacoochee, to modify the instructions 
given to Clinch. From Camp Cooper he is instructed to take a trail that 
we observed (coming down) which leads into and towards the head of the 
cove. This will bring him near to Lindsay, who will operate between 
the Withlacoochees, and north of the smaller. The two columns will 
probably meet or be near enough to each other for the 4th United States 
infantry to pass to Lindsay, in order to return to this place with him. It 
is, consequently, now probable that I shall march with Lindsay instead 
of Eustis, and pass on with Clinch from Pelaklikaha, via Forts King and 
Diane. 

Altera fuller examination of Indians, (friendly and prisoners,) toge- 
ther with persons called guides, and comparing the information so derived 
with Colonel Gadsden's knowledge of the country, Eustis will be in- 
structed, after he shall have scoured the upper parts of Pease creek, to 
visit Lake Tohopkelika, (southwest of Lake Monroe,) then turn to the 
north, pass to the east of Lake Eustis, strike his late trail, and return to 
Volusia. It is hoped that his means of subsistence will enable him to ac- 
complish the march, and the important objects connected with it. 

The vessels and boats prepared for the mouth of the Withlacoochee 
will take Major Read and his Florida battalion to that place, whence he 
will survey the mouth, and examine the river to a point as high as prac- 
ticable. The battalion will then embark on board a schooner and return 
direct to St. Mark's. 

The rudder of the schooner Motto not being finished, I shall despatch 
the cutter Dexter with this and other letters to St. Mark's. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. General Jo.ves, 

Adjutant General C S. A. 



No. 104. 



A. 

Headquarters, Right Wing, Florida Army, 

Camp Georgia, April 8, 1S36. 

Sir : I have the honor to submit a report of the operations of this 
wing of the army since marching from Fort Drane on the 26th ultimo. 

On that day it consisted of the following forces, viz : artillery, 450; 
4th regiment infantry, 270 ; Wharton's dismounted dragoons, 57 ; two 



313 [ 22 1 ] 

companies Augusta volunteers, 171 ; Smith's regiment Louisiana volun- 
teers, 469 ; Cooper's battalion Georgia volunteers, 321 ; and four com- 
panies Georgia mounted men, 230 — aggregate, 1,968. Two six-pounder 
cannon, with a wagon-train and pack-horses transporting provisions for 
15 days, (besides three days in the haversacks,) with the least possible 
quantity of equipage, not more than three tents being allowed to com- 
panies of any size. 

The route was in the direction of Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, 
the point at which the enemy would most probably be found, as on all 
previous attempts to cross that river he had defended the passage with 
such pertinacity as to lead to the belief that his strong hold would be 
found in that vicinity. 

It was only by the great exertion of the whole force that the wagon- 
train could be passed over the route, the road being new, and the coun- 
try wet and deep, so that much of it was obliged to be laid down with 
logs. The wing reached Camp Izard on the morning of the 28th, and 
soon after the enemy gave notice of his presence on the opposite bank 
of the river, by firing into our camp. Preparation was immediately made 
for forcing the passage in boats, which had been constructed at Fort 
Diane for the purpose, and brought along with us. 

Colonel Gadsden, quartermaster general of Florida, acting inspector 
general, who, throughout the march, displayed great zeal and intelligence, 
reconnoitred the ground, and selected the point of crossing very judi- 
ciously. 

The details having been prepared, the river bank was occupied at 4 
o'clock on the morning of the 29th by sharp-shooters, and the two pieces 
of artillery, and at daylight the advance (companies A and G, 2d artil- 
lery) crossed in small detachments under the command of Brevet Major 
Zantzinger. I must here take occasion to mention an act of personal 
gallantry on the part of Foster Blodget, a private of the Augusta blues, who 
volunteered to swim the river, and attach a *ope to a tree on the opposite 
side, which greatly expedited the first crossing. After the two companies 
of the advance had possessed themselves of the southern bank, they 
were followed by the regiment of Louisiana volunteers, and the 4th 
regiment United States infantry. 

A sufficient force having thus been thrown across to maintain the posi- 
tion, the whole train was passed in the course of the day. Two com- 
panies of mounted men had, in the mean time, crossed at a very difficult 
ford li mile below ; another swam the river near the ferry. All the 
train being over, the rear division was crossing, under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Bankead, when it was attacked in rear, but the ene- 
my was driven off by two discharges of the six-pounder under Lieuten- 
ant Brooks, and a volley from the rear guard under Captain Belton. 
Except this attack, the passage was unmolested. The enemy fired a few 
shots into the camp during the night from the northern side of the 
river. 

On the morning of the 30th, the wing proceeded up the river in search 
of the enemy, and at 10 o'clock he was discovered in small numbers on 
an island in a chain of lakes running nearly parallel with the river. The 
baggage -train was drawn up in compact order, and left with a guard of 
300 men, and the troops advanced to attack. The enemy, however, re- 



[ 224 ] 311 

tired, and pursuit was continued about four miles, when, as it was grow- 
ing late, the wing encamped. Marched early on the morning of the 31st, 
and soon discovered the enemy on another island. It will be proper 
here to remark that the chain of lakes before mentioned is spotted with 
islands of dense cypress swamps and hammock growth (whence the Indian 
name Oloklikaha, Spotted Lake,) as was afterwards discovered on our 
march, nothing of the topography being known to us at first. 

Dispositions were immediately made for attack by the right column, 
under Colonel Smith, on one end of the island, and by the left column, 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, under my own observa- 
tion, on the other. The approach at both points was impracticable to 
any but infantry troops, and extremely difficult to them ; the island being 
surrounded by a very broad and wet savannah, and so boggy that it was 
not without great efforts that men could struggle through it. 

As the head of the right column approached the firm ground, it was 
met by a sharp discharge from the enemy's rifles, but, dashing forward, 
he was soon dislodged and pursued for the distance of three or four 
miles, when he was driven across the river, and the column halted and 
remained on the bank of the river until recalled, an hour afterwards. 
Coloned Smith and his command conducted with great spirit and courage 
throughout. 

In the pursuit which succeeded the first charge, that portion of the 
right column composed of the 4th infantry, Wharton's dragoons, and two 
companies of Louisiana volunteers, under the immediate command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Foster, became several times engaged, whenever 
thick cypress or hammock growth favored the enemy ; but in every in- 
stance he was promptly expelled and pursued. Lieutenant Colonel 
Foster speaks in very high terms of his officers and men, and mentions 
particularly the conduct of Lieutenant Barron, adjutant of the Louisiana 
volunteers. 

The left column approached the island simultaneously with the right, 
and was received with a hot discharge from the enemy as soon as it 
arrived within lifle-shot of the hammock, and at the moment when the 
advance under Major Cooper, of the Georgia volunteers, was plunging 
through a deep and difficult morass. A few discharges from a six-pound- 
er, under Captain Miller, which had been forced to the edge of the 
morass, silenced the enemy — when the advance, with the 1st battalion 
of artillery and Captain Robinson's two companies, which had, in the 
mean time, formed to the front, charged the hammock, and the enemy 
fled. Active pursuit was made for two miles, until the left came up with 
the right column, when, finding it impossible to penetrate the cypress 
swamp on its left, towards the river, it halted. Lieutenant Colonel Fos- 
ter had taken the only trail leading in that direction. Colonel Bank- 
head reports that his battalion conducted with great zeal and prompt- 
ness. 

Finding it impossible to follow the enemy across the river, and being 
for 24 hours without provisions, the troops returned to the baggage-train 
and encamped. 

April 1. Marched along the lakes lying between us and the river, and 
reached the next morning what appeared to be their southeastern termi- 
tion, and established a post of observation under Major Cooper, with his 



315 [ 224 ] 

battalion, leaving him 17 days' piovisions, and reserving only enough to 
subsist the wing for five days, proceeded to Tampa bay for further sup- 
plies, where it arrived on 5th April, after a difficult and fatiguing march, 
being obliged to make the road the whole distance. 

The fatigue and exposure of the march increased the sick-list to 150. 
Subjoined is a return of killed and wounded in the battle of Oloklikaka : 

Killed. Wounded. 

Artillery, - - 2 privates. 

4th infantry, - - 1 do. 

Dragoons, 1 private, - 

La. volunteers, 3 do. - 4 do. 

Cooper's battalion, - - 2 do. 

4 killed. 9 wounded. 

C. M. THRUSTON, 

Captain A. A. A. General. 

The officers of my staff were fully efficient, and carried out with great 
promptness the dispositions which the circumstances required. 

U. L. CLINCH, 
Brigadier General U. S. Army. 
To Maj. Gen. Scott, 

Commanding . 



No. 105. 
B. 
Headquarters, Left Wing, Army of Florida, 

Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, April 10, 1836. 

General : In compliance with your directions, I proceed to detail the 
operations of the left wing of the army, from the arrival of the forces at 
St. Augustine. 

On my arrival at St Augustine, on the 15th of February, I was inform- 
ed that the whole country between the St. John's and the seacoast was 
in possession of the Indians, and that small bands of them were ranging 
in all directions, burning houses, and driving off the cattle. I therefore 
proceeded without delay to establish a chain of posts at intervals of from 
ten to twenty miles, extending south as far as the Mosqueto inlet, in or- 
der to cover the southern plantations, and to scour the intervening coun- 
try, and to drive off the predatory bands of savages. Owing to the ex- 
treme difficulty in procuring guides, this latter duty was not as effectually 
performed as I could have desired, and we doubtless left some small 
parties of Indians in our rear, when the troops were withdrawn from the 
Atlantic coast. 

On the 9th of March, Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted vol- 
unteers from South Carolina reached St. Augustine. 

On the 10th, three men of Colonel Brisbane's regiment were killed, 
within two hundred yards of his intrenchment at Tomoca, and the ene- 
my had scalped them and fled before he could sally out upon them. 

On the 15th, the several detachments of my column were put in mo- 



[ 221 ] 316 

tion via Tomoca to Volusia on the St. John's, and on the 22d, all had 
reached that point except Lieutenant Colonel Butler's battalion, and 
two companies of artillery under Major Kirby ; both of which parties 
had operated as far south as Smyrna. The route from Tomoca to Vo- 
lusia was found nearly impracticable, and was only accomplished by the 
most persevering exertions, and to the great injury of wagons and 
horses. 

On the 22d of March, 1 commenced crossing the St John's; about 3 
o'clock P. M. my advanced guard on the west side of the river (con- 
sisting of Ashby's and Fripp's companies of Brisbane's regiment) was 
briskly attacked by a considerable party of Indians. These companies 
maintained their ground with great gallantry and steadiness, until re- 
inforced by two others (Henry's and Hibbla's) under Colonel Brisbane, 
when a charge being made, the enemy was repulsed at all points, and 
fled to his fastnesses. In this encounter our loss was three killed and nine 
wounded. Although we found only one Indian dead on the ground, I 
had satisfactory evidence of four others being thrown into the river. 

On the 24th, a subaltern's command of mounted men fell in with a par- 
ty of twelve or fifteen Indians in the open pine land, killed two, and 
might have destroyed the entire party, but for the misconduct of the 
lieutenants in command. 

On the 25th, my whole, (consisting of four companies 1st regiment 
artillery, under Major Kirby, Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment, 
Colonel Brisbane's regiment (foot,) and Captain Elmore's Columbia 
volunteers,) was concentrated; and on the 2Gth, leaving two companies 
of Brisbane's regiment at Volusia, under the command of Major Gates, 
United States army, with the wounded and sick, I commenced my march 
for Pelaklikaha, by the upper crossing of the Ochlawaha, at the head of 
fourteen hundred men, and with thirteen days' rations. The first part 
of my route was so difficult for my wagons that, with every exertion of 
men, as well as horses, I had, on the evening of the 27th, progressed only 
seven miles. As we advanced, however, the country became more favora- 
ble, and with the exception of being obliged to build bridges over the 
Ochlawaha, the Withlacoochee, and one intermediate stream, I found no 
serious obstacle to impede my march to this place. On the 29th, after 
crossing the Ochlawaha, an Indian of some note, Ayah Ilajo, was killed 
by the gallant General Shelton, serving as a private volunteer, who was 
himself severely wounded. 

On the 30th, my advance, consisting of a portion of the mounted regi- 
ment under Colonel Goodwyn, was attacked at the Okihumky swamp, 
and three men were wounded. On my arrival at the spot with Kirby's 
battallion and the two advance companies of Brisbane's regiment, I 
caused the hammock to be scoured, and the Indians were found posted 
behind some pines, from which they were soon driven into the depths of 
(to us) an inaccessible swamp. Kirby's loss was one wounded, and the 
enemy retired whenever our line approached within two hundred yards. 
These are the only Indians I have seen on our march. On my reaching 
Pelaklikaha, I found the villages abandoned, and no sign of their having 
been occupied for several weeks; cattle and ponies however were abun- 
dant in the neighborhood. The houses and fences were burnt by my 
order. On the 31st I despatched an express to Fort King, who returned 



817 f 224 ] 

to me the night of the 1st April, with information that you had crossed the 
Withlacoochee with the right wing on the 28th March; that no communi- 
cation could he held with you on that route ; and that I could obtain no 
provisions at that post. Deeming it impracticable, in the exhausted state 
of my horses, to draw provisions over the route I had come from Volusia, 
and my only guide having reached the extent of the country with which 
he was acquainted, I saw no alternative but to extend my operations south- 
ward on the main road from Fort King to Tampa bay. Doing which, 
I fired signal-guns at ten o'clock A. M. on four successive days, without 
hearing any response. On the third instant I fell upon the trail of Colonel 
Lindsay returning hither, and immediately sent an express to him. On the 
4th, I received his communication in reply, and also yours dated the 2d 
instant. On the 5th, leaving my foot soldiers and wagons fifteen miles from 
here, I came to this place with all my horses, and had the honor to report 
to you in person. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your humble servant, 

ABRM. EUSTIS, 



Major General Scott. 



Brig. Gen. y U. S. Army. 



No. 106. 
C. 



Headquarters, Centre, Florida Army, 

Tampa bay, April 10, 1836. 

Sir: I embarked at Mobile with three companies of the Alabama 
regiment of volunteers, commanded by Colonel Wm. Chisholm, colonel 
of the regiment, on the 2d of March, five other companies of the same 
regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Crabb, and two 
under Major Taliaferro, sailing at or about the same time. The first 
eight companies arrived here on the 6th of March, and the two last in 
transports, bringing our horses, provisions, and ammunition, did not reach 
this place until the 13th. On my arrival here I found Major Read, with 
a battalion of Florida volunteers, encamped on the west side of Hills- 
borough river, and, about the 10th, L was joined by Captain Mark's 
company of Louisiana volunteers ; on the 12th, discovering large fires in 
the direction of the Alalia river, Major Read was directed, with the 
Florida battalion, to scour that section of the country, which duty was 
successfully performed by a night march, by which the Indians were 
surprised in their camp and driven across the river, with the loss of 
three of their party killed and six of their ponies captured. 

My entire force being collected, in the absence of all instructions 
from headquarters, I determined to make a forward movement, and 
construct a stockade on the Hillsborough river, where it is crossed by the 
main road from Fort Brooke to Fort King, with a view of bringing our 
subsistence nearer to the scene of military operations, and on the 15th 
the line of march was accordingly taken up. The destruction of bridges 
by the Indians delayed and embarrassed our march so much that we did 



f 224 ] 318 



not arrive at the Hillsborough until the 17th, from which time until the 
20th we were engaged in the construction of a stockade named by me 
Fort Alabama, Major Read, of the Florida battalion, was left in com- 
mand of this post, whilst the remainder of the force leturned to Fort 
Brooke on the 21st. 

During my absence a despatch from Major General Scott, announcing 
the general plan oi the campaign, and requiring me to be in position at 
or near Chickuchatty on the 25th, for the purpose of co-operation, had 
been received here through the hand of some friendly Indian. In obe- 
dience to this order the line of march was taken up on the 22d. On 
leaving Fort Alabama I was joined by Major Read and the battalion of 
Florida volunteers, Captain Marks being left in command of Fort Ala- 
bama, with a company of Louisiana volunteers, and about 30 of the .sick 
of the command. Our route lay through a hilly country, abounding with 
hammocks, and after passing Elochuteka, the Indians, taking advantage 
of their coverts, began to annoy us with their fire on the rear and flanks. 
On the 26th, a flanker of Cooper's company, Alabama regiment of volun- 
teers, was killed, and another badly wounded. This attack was made on 
the rear of the flankeis whilst the army was passing a dense hammock 
of nearly a mile in length, the front and centre of the columns having 
plunged into the hammock, a small portion of the rear only being left in 
open ground, skirted by woods, and a brisk fire going on between the 
enemy and the rear. I directed Captain Bonham, of the Alabama regi- 
ment, to charge with his company into the skirt of the hammock from 
which the fire proceeded, with a view of ascertaining the number and 
force of the attacking party. This duty was promptly performed, and 
Major Taliaferro having ordered up Blount's company of the same regi- 
ment, to sustain Bonham, the Indians were driven off, showing them- 
selves at the distance of a quarter of a mile in the open woods, yelling 
and dancing. At our encampment this night parties of our men were 
fired upon by the Indians, from a hammock contiguous to a pond which 
supplied us with water. 

Finding that the position of the enemy was too distant to be reached 
by musketry, I threw in one round of canister, which dispersed them. 
On the 27th, by the same annoying attack, the enemy always lying in 
ambuscade, one private of Campbell's company of Alabama volunteers 
was killed and two wounded. At noon, whilst halted, a smart attack was 
made upon our rear, but upon a brisk return of the fire, the Indians 
disappeared. On the 28th, wherien camped at Camp Broadnax, (so call- 
ed in honor of the inspector general of the army of the centre,) near 
Chickuchatty, the Indians commenced a fire on our horses and the party 
guarding them, when a detachment of the Florida battalion, under Cap- 
tains Roulett and Allison, toge'.her with Blount's and Nott's companies 
of the Alabama regiment, were ordered to drive them. This service 
was performed without any loss on our side. On the 30th, provisions 
beginning to be scarce, two parties of mounted men, one under the com- 
mand of Captain Taylor, of the Alabama regiment, and the other under 
Captain Roulett, of the Florida battalion, were sent out in pursuit of 
cattle, covered by a force of 250 men, commanded by Lt. Col. Crabb, 
of Alabama regiment of volunteers. These parties were successful in 
bringing in such a supply of cattle as enabled us to subsist four days lon- 
ger, although destitute of bread and salt. 



319 f 224 J 

During the day our friendly Indians killed a chief called Charley 
Fixico, a leader of about 85 men. At night the sentinels guarding the 
flank occupied by the Florida battalion were fired upon, and during the 
31st, all of our sentinels orcasionally received shots, but without any in- 
jury. On the 31st, I made an unsuccessful attempt to procure more 
beef, finding myself removed 60 miles from my depot, with bare enough 
provisions in store to march to it, without any prospect of being able to 
keep the field for the purpose of co-operation, contemplated in the plan 
of the campaign ; and having obtained no response to the signals made 
by me to the other forces in the field, eight days in succession, I deem- 
ed it advisable to commence my return to Tampa bay, which I effected 
by the 4th of April, at night, having been out 14 days on ten days' pro- 
visions. In the interval between any departure from Fort Alabama and 
my return to it, that post was attacked by a force supposed to be between 
3 and 400 Indians. The attack commenced about 8 A. M., and continued 
without intermission two hours and twenty minutes. The loss on the side 
of the defenders was one man killed and two wounded, whilst that of 
the enemy was supposed to be 15 killed. Notwithstanding their defeat 
in the main attack, they continued to lie around the work in consider- 
able force, both day and night, until my return, when they moved off on 
the same road by which I marched ; and the sign made on that road 
furnishes me with the means of estimating their numbers. During the 
whole time of the siege, Captain Marks, his officers and men, conducted 
themselves with coolness and courage. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

WM. LINDSAY, Col. 2d Arfy 
and commanding army of the centre. 

Maj. Gen. W. Scott. 



No. 107. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa bay, April S, 183G. 
Orders No. 22. 

The army will prepare and hold itself in readiness to march in a very 
few days. 

The utmost attention will be given to have the whole baggage train, 
including carriages, pack-saddles, and horses, fitted and refreshed for 
the field as soon as possible. 

The commanders of the three principal corps of the army will imme- 
diately take measures to ascertain whether the haversacks with which 
the men have been provided, have been preserved. If any have been 
lost, they must immediately be replaced. The same means will be 
adopted to cause every mounted officer and man to be provided with a 
sufficient corn-sack or wallet to carry the necessary corn for his horse. 

The hard bread and bacon which have arrived at this place are in- 



[ 224 ] 320 

tended for distant expeditions. Neither will be issued to the troops 
within two marches of this place, and all the corps will be supplied with 
those two items of subsistence according to their relative numbers. 
By command of Major General Scott. 

JAMES GADSDEN, 
Quartermaster General. 



No. 108. 



Headquarters, Arm* of Florida, 

Tampa bay, April 9, 1836. 

Orders No. 24. 

The embarkation of the friendly Indians for their new country, west 
of the Mississippi, will commence on the morning of the 11th instant, at 
the latest. It is expected that all who are now here will be on board 
the transports by the 13th. 

The acting superintendent, Mr. Sheffield, will repair to Fort King, as 
soon as practicable, to obtain the papers of the agency, and to put in 
movement the friendly Indians who are at that place, for the same gene- 
ral destination west of the Mississippi, by any route that may be found 
the most practicable. 

At the joint request of Lieutenant Harris, disbursing agent, and of the 
acting superintendent, Lieutenants Jones and Meade (both of whom are 
invalids, and unfitted for the arduous duties of the field) are assigned for 
duty with the emigrating Indians at this place. 

Acting Assistant Surgeon Hulse is relieved from army duty, and will 
report himself to Lieutenant Jones as the surgeon and physician to the 
emigrating Indians now about to embark. 

By command of Major General Scott. 

JAMES GADSDEN, 
Quartermaster General. 



No. 109. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa bay, April 11, 1836. 

Orders No 28. 

All the corps of this army will be put in motion, by land or water, on 
the mornings of the 13th and 14th instant. 

Mounted officers and men must provide themselves with the means 
of takin^ on horse-back the grain necessary for their horses, as the 
wagons and pack-horses will only take grain for themselves. Two 
bushels of corn for each horse may easily be carried on his back ; but in 



321 f 224 | 

this case it will be indispensable that the horse should be led, and not 
ridden, for at least two days. 

The mounted volunteers may deem this order a hardship. Let them 
reflect on the importance to the service that the horses should have grain 
for subsistence, and that no grain can be obtained on this side of Volusia 
and Fort Drane. This fact must be sufficient to satisfy the good sense 
of every mounted volunteer. It will also be remembered that the 
mounted men will march towards their respective homes, (with but 
slight deviations,) to which they will be soon honorably dismissed. 

Brigadier General Clinch will send one of his battalions of United 
States artillery to join the centre under Colonel Lindsay, and the latter 
will direct the Florida battalion, under Major Read, to report to Briga- 
dier General Clinch. 

By command of Major General Scott. 

JAMES GADSDEN, 
Colonel in the Staff. 



No. 110. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa bay, April 10, 1836. 

Sir : The war has not been as yet carried into the enemy's settle- 
ments on the Meacca and Pease creek. That country is believed to be 
one of his strong holds, and the place of concealment for many families 
and negroes. How far those settlements extend down the creek or 
river towards Charlotte harbor is not accurately known, and I am in 
the same state of ignorance as to the number of righting men that may 
probably be found in that quarter. His force, however, in that quarter, 
is not estimated at more than two hundred and fifty men. It is probably 
much less. 

It is my wish that you proceed to Charlotte harbor with your regi- 
ment, on board the two schooners which have been designated for the 
purpose, accompanied by the cutter Dallas, Captain Green, which is 
also put at your disposition for the expedition, and to ascend the Meacca 
or Pease creek with those vessels, as far as you may find practicable or 
safe, when you will land your forces on either bank, and march in search 
of the enemy and his settlements. Lieutenant Powell, of the navy, is 
now in Charlotte harbor, with two new boats and a party from the 
the United States ship Vandalia. An order will go with you from the 
commander of that ship, instructing Lieutenant Powell to unite and co- 
operate with you. On your way thither you will instruct the cutter to 
keep a lookout for that party, which may be on its return, and if not you 
will deliver the instructions to Lieutenant Powell, mentioned above. 
Besides the boats which that officer has with him, and those belonging 
to the cutter and the transport schooners, you will engage such other 
boats and canoes in Charlotte harbor as you may require. 

After the two schooners shall be obliged to come to anchor in the 
Meacca, perhaps the cutter may be able to ascend the creek some miles 
21 



[ 221 ] 322 

higher. With those vessels, it is suggested that you leave a competent 
guard on debarking, when the small boats and canoes may be service- 
able in taking subsistence for the troops to a much higher point. 

With the aid of the small-craft and the haversacks, it is supposed that 
you may operate effectively, to the distance of lour, perhaps six marches, 
(going and returning,) after leaving the vessels. If so, it is thought 
highly probably that you will be able to reach the settlements of the hos- 
tile Indians, and to beat and capture the enemy in that quarter. For 
this purpose you will pursue any considerable trail you may find to a rea- 
sonable distance — having reference to your force and means of subsist- 
ence. The capture of the families of the enemy, and the slaves in their 
possession, as well as the destruction of their settlements, are among the 
principal objects of the expedition, some, if not all of which, I think you 
cannot fail to accomplish. 

Guides and interpreters you will find with Lieutenant Powell; and 
you may engage any others that you may find in Charlotte harbor. 

A simultaneous movement of 500 mounted men will be made upon 
the settlements near the head of the same river or creek. It is possible 
that you may be able to communicate with that force, but it is not ex- 
pected that you will make any hazardous halt or movement to accom- 
plish that object. 

After accomplishing or attempting the objects suggested, you will, at 
the end of a reasonable time, return to this place, where you will find 
the quartermaster's department instructed to furnish the best transporta- 
tion that can be had for the honorable return of your regiment to New 
Orleans. 

Please report to me, in duplicates, by different routes, the results and 
observations of your expedition, which I do not doubt will terminate as 
honorably to you, your officers and men, as any service that has pre- 
ceded it. 

I remain, with the highest consideration and respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To Col. P. F. Smith, 

Commanding Louisiana Volunteers. 



No. Ill 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa Bay, April 16, 1836. 
Order No. 37. 

The Louisiana regiment of volunteers, under the gallant Colonel Smith, 
will, on its return to this place, immediately proceed to New Orleans in 
the best transports the quartermaster's department can supply. It will 
first turn into store the arms and other property of the United States in 
its possession, and which may not be necessary to the comfort of the reg- 
iment in its passage home. 

At New Orleans, Major Clark, or other United States officer, will 



3.3 [ 22 i ] 

muster the regiment out of the service of the United States; and it will, 
at the same time, be paid by the paymaster of the army stationed in that 
city. 

What may be the results of the expedition to Charlotte harbor and Pease 
creek, in which the regiment is at present engaged, cannot be known to 
the commanding general in some weeks. Judging from the past, those 
results cannot fail to be highly honorable to the colonel, the officers, and 
the men, of that efficient corps, which is already entitled to the thanks of 
the country. 

Dr. Lawson,the senior surgeon of the United States army, who, under 
a commission from the State of Louisiana, has served as lieutenant col- 
onel of this regiment, and who has superadded the distinction of arms to 
his high medical reputation, will temporarily take charge of the general 
hospital at this place. As soon as the great body of the sick shall have 
been restored and sent oft* to their respective States, Surgeon Lawson 
will return to his prooer station. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 112. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa Bay, April 12, 183G. 

Sir : I am directed by Major General Scott to inform you that the 
duties of paying off the Louisiana and Alabama volunteers, now in the 
service of the United States, as discharged, will devolve on you. Colonel 
Lindsay, commanding the cutter, expects to embark them from this port 
for Mobile on or about the 1st of May, so that you may safely calculate 
on their arrival at that place between the oth and 10th of the month at 
latest. It is all-important that you be at that point on the arrival of the 
Alabama volunteers; so that there be no unnecessary detention in dis- 
charging and paying them off. Colonel Lindsay, to whom you will re- 
port on your arrival in Mobile, will furnish you the necessary funds, if 
not already placed at your disposal by the proper authorities at Washing- 
ton, and will afford you every facility to the speedy and faithful discharge 
of the responsibilities by this communication imposed on you. 

By command of Major General Scott: 

JAMES GADSDEN, 

Colonel in the staff. 

Major Charles Mapes, 

Paymaster, New Orleans. 



No. 112— 113. 



Headquarters, Tampa Bav, 

April 14, 1836. 

Sir : The imperfect knowledge had of the Withlacoocb.ee river and its 
entrance from the Gulf, and the impossibility of acquiring, from any source 



[ 224 ] 824 

which may be relied on, such information of its accessibility with the 
interior as to ensure the co-operation and junction of forces operating by 
land and by water, has induced the commanding general so to modify the 
contemplated movements of the right wing of the Florida army, to which 
your battalion had been attached, as to devolve on you and your com- 
mand a very responsible and honorable duty— a service, the performance 
of which may possibly have an important influence on the results of the 
closing campaign, and cannot but prove very valuable in any ulterior ope- 
rations deemed necessary against the Seminolcs. The commanding gen- 
eral therefore directs you to embark, as early as practicable, (the quar- 
termaster of this post furnishing on your requisition suitable transports. 
with a full supply of provisions,) your whole battalion, including invalids 
and sick, for the mouth of the Withlacoochee ; that you come Co anchor 
in the nearest and safest accessible harbor or anchorage-ground to the 
mouth of that stream, and that you proceed with your effective force, 
leaving your sick and invalids on board, with the boats at command, to 
survey and examine its entrance, and to penetrate as far into the interior 
as maybe found practicable and consistent with the security of your com- 
mand — holding steadily in view that the object of your expedition is one 
of reconnaissance, more with a view of obtaining information of a part of 
the probable seat of war unknown to us, than to operate directly against 
the enemy. There is no evidence, either from discovered trails, or any 
other source, of the hostile party in any force having gone in the direction 
of the mouth of the Withlacoochee ; yet, in the midst of the uncertainties 
prevailing as to the directions taken by the different dispersed parties of 
the enemy, it is not improbable one division may have taken that course. 

The general is unwilling, therefore, to expose unnecessarily your small 
command to either being cut off, as you will be separated from all succor, 
or from being exposed to an unequal combat on a river, the enemy having 
possession of the banks, and your command unprotected in your boats. 
He relics, therefore, on your prudence and discretion, that while in the 
performance of a service of reconnaissance — one for the obtaining of in- 
formation — you do not hazard the safety of your battalion in an unequal 
contest; that all your movements be made with caution, examining well 
the river before you enter, and not land and penetrate the country to any 
extent that would jeopardize the same communication with your trans- 
ports. You will preserve notes of your observations, and report the re- 
sult of your examinations, directed Garey's ferry, Black creek, to the 
commanding general, detailing minutely the character of the anchorage 
at the mouth of the Withlacoochee ; the navigability of that river for 
boats; the probable distance to which it may be penetrated ; the charac- 
ter of its banks; and the tacilities generally afforded for the forming of 
depots, with a view of supplying an army operating hereafter on or near 
its waters. This duty perlormed, you will proceed to St. Mark's, Florida, 
in the transports, where your command will be honorably discharged by 
the territorial authorities which mustered you into service, as it will be 
impossible for the commanding general to detail a regular officer for said 
service. 

Captain Bunce, an experienced pilot of this coast, and who has been in 
the mouth of the Withlacoochee, will accompany your expedition, and 



325 [ 224 ] 

ender you every service in the accomplishment of the important duties 
imposed on you by this communication. 

Respectfully, 

JAMES GADSDEN, 

Colonel in the staff. 
Major L. Read, 

Florida battalion. 



No. 113. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Tampa Bay, April 14, 1836. 

Sir : With the centre under your command, you will march without 
delay, by the Fort King road, till you shall have passed the Big Withla- 
coochee ; you will then penetrate the forks of the two rivets of that name 
by any leading trail or practicable route, and open a communication with 
Brigadier General Clinch, who, in all probability, will have entered the 
cove of the Withlacoochee on the 19th instant. A junction or close ap- 
proximation of your force with his is indispensable, as you will have to turn 
over to his command the company of mounted Georgians, and the de- 
tachment of United States dragoons, and receive from him the United 
States 4th infantry, which will return with you to this place. 

In marching to communicate with Clinch, you will not neglect 
io pursue any considerable recent trail of the enemy, as far as you 
may safely do so without losing the chance of such communication, say 
between the 20th and 23d instant, somewhere within the forks of the 
Withlacoochee. 

You will take with your command the greater practicable amount of 
subsistence, so that after, as before communicating with Clinch, you may 
be in a condition to keep the field as long as possible, and ready to at- 
tempt any enterprise that may contribute to the success of the war. 

It is not doubted that the force of either Clinch or the centre will be 
found perfectly adequate to beat any body of the enemy that either is 
likely to encounter. No junction, therefore, for that specific object, is 
deemed indispensable. The approximation of the two forces is directed 
with a view to the other objects first mentioned, and also fortius purpose, 
that if Clinch should drive the enemy, you may be in a position to strike 
a decisive blow, and vice versa. 

For your government on your final return here, you will receive fur- 
ther instructions or orders. 

Relying on a continuance of that vigor and intelligence which you 
have already displayed in this campaign, and not doubting that you will 
be well supported by the regulais and volunteers under your command, 
I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Colonel Wm. Lindsay, 

Commander of the Centre. 



[ 22 1 ] 326 

No. 114. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 
OrdkrsNo. 38. Tampa Bay, April 16, 1836. 

On the return of the centre of this army, under Colonel Lindsay, he 
will have, at his disposition, four companies of United States artillery, 
seven companies of the United States 4th infantry, the Alabama regi- 
ment of volunteers, and Captain Marks's company of Louisiana volun- 
teers, besides the small garrison in Redoubt Fraser. 

What more may reasonably be attempted by those patriotic volunteers 
and regulars, in the prosecution of the war, is left to the zeal and judg- 
ment of Colonel Lindsay, or the senior officer of the centre. The com- 
manding general will soon be in the northern part of the Territory, and., 
therefore, may not have it in his power to give prompt instructions for the 
movement of those forces. 

Besides the train of wagons and pack-horses, water transportation for 
new expeditions may be supplied by the quartermaster's department. 

When the term of service of the volunteers shall have expired, or 
sooner, if no new expeditions can be attempted with a prospect of ad- 
vantage, the volunteers mentioned will be embarked for their homes. No 
doubt is entertained that the two corps will each be entitled to an honor- 
discharge, and tiie thanks of the country. The discharges may be 
given here, or at Mobile and New Orleans, as may be deemed best. In 
either case, the quartermaster's department will furnish the necessary 
transportation. 

When operations shall be over for the season, the four companies of 
artillery will be left in garrison here ; a company of the 4th infantry, with 
sixty days' subsistence, will be sent to Key West, to reoccupy the post 
on that island ; two companies of the same regiment will be sent, under 
a field officer, to establish a post at or in the vicinity of Watson's or 
Dabney's plantation, on the Suwannee. A good supply of subsistence 
will be taken by the two companies, up that river. On the establishment 
of the post, any detachment ol Florida militia, in its vicinity, will be dis- 
charged and sent home. 

Those arrangements being completed, the commanding officers at Fort 
Brooke, Key West, and on the Suwannee, will report to the headquar- 
ters of the western department. 

As soon as it may be prudently done, the detachment of United States 
marines, under Lieutenant Waldron, will be instructed to rejoin the prop- 
er naval commander. This officer and his detachment are entitled to 
the thanks of his army for the zeal and good conduct they have displayed 
ashore. 

it care will be bestowed by the proper officer to render the horses 
1< ft here by the army capable of service. As soon as they shall have 
partially recovered strength, a small detachment of mounted men will 
be formed for the purpose of occasionally scouring the vicinity, and of 
keeping prowling parties of the enemy at a distance. 

The loin- remaining companies of the 4th infantry will be detained as 
a part of the garrison at this place, or sent to Baton Rouge, as Colonel 
Lindsay, or other commanding officer, may deem necessary. 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 



327 [ 22 1 J 

No. 115. 

Department of War, 

April 15, 183G. 

Sir : I enclose, for your information, the copy of a letter this day ad- 
dressed to Governor Clay, of Alabama, and to request that, as soon as 
the state of your operations in Florida will permit, you will direct your 
attention to the Creek Indians, and adopt such measures as you may find 
necessary to preserve or restore tranquillity in that part of the country. 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

LEWIS CASS. 
Major General Scott, 

Fort King, Florida. 



No. 116. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

Picolata, April 30, 1836. 

For the information of the War Department, I have the honor to re- 
port my arrival here yesterday. My last report was dated at Tampa bay, 
the 12th and 13th instant. 

The right wing and the centre of this army moved from that place on 
the 14th, as did also the South Carolina mounted regiment. The foot of 
the same wing (the left) had remained encamped for twelve days, about 
fifteen miles from Tampa, on the Fort King road, and the Florida battal- 
ion commenced its embarkation for the mouth of the Withlacoochee on 
the 17th. I left Tampa the same day, and joined the foot of the left wing, 
with which I marched to Fort Alabama, on the Hillsborough. Here, on 
the next day, we were rejoined by the South Carolina mounted regiment 
from its expedition to the head of Pease creek, where no Indians and 
no recent trails were found. Colonel Goodwyn, the commander, how 
ever, discovered and burnt an extensive town on the left bank of that 
stream. 

On the 20th, the left wing passed the Big Withlacoochee, where we 
found the centre engaged in constructing a defence for its baggage-train, 
preparatory to entering and scouring the forks of the Withlacoochees, 
whilst the right wing was advancing by the cove and the left bank of 
the main river. 

I continued to march with the left wing via the scene of Dade's mas- 
sacre, Pelaklikaha, and the upper crossing of the Ochlawaha. On the 
night of the 22d our camp was fired upon by a party of six or eight of 
the enemy. One man and two horses were slightly wounded. At day- 
light a detachment of horse was put in pursuit of the enemy ; but at the 
end of a few miles the trail was lost, between some of those hammocks, 
swamps, and ponds, which everywhere abound. Another small party of 
the enemy was met on the morning of the 24th, and which might have 



[" 22 1 J 328 

been cut off from the nearest hammock, but for a false movement made . 
by the company of horse constituting the advance guard. The horses 
and packs of the parly were captured; but, after halting and scouring a 
succession of hammocks, which were, as far as practicable, surrounded 
by the horse, we found ourselves eluded by every Indian. 1 mention 
these mortifying incidents to show the character of the enemy, and the 
nature of the country. The foot broke into hammocks where a goat could 
not penetrate, and the horse rapidly took up the positions assigned ; but 
the enemy, in all such cases, contrive to escape by secret passages, which 
afterwards can but rarely be found. 

When at the distance of twenty-three miles, I took an escort of two 
mounted companies, and proceeded to Volusia on the 24th. Finding 
there the United States steamer the Essayons, I embarked in her, and 
with a guard of only seventeen men, determined to penetrate, by the 
St. John's, the southern part of the peninsula as far as practicable. Colo- 
nel Gadsden, Captain Canfield, and Lieutenant Johnston, accompanied 
me, to note the course and depth of the river, together with the general 
topography of the country. We found no difficulty in passing up to the 
head of Lake Monroe, and might have carried to that point a draught of 
eight or nine feet of water. The distance ascended is 200 miles from the 
mouth of the river, and 60 from Volusia. We found the river beyond 
the lake nearly as bold as below, and, if we could have crossed the bar 
at the entrance, we do not doubt that we might have gone fifty or seventy 
miles farther towards Cape Florida; but, unfortunately, our boat drew 
more than four feet, and we only found four on the bar. 

This reconnaissance was made with a view to several objects. I was 
anxious to discover whether the Indians had any settlements on the upper 
part of the river; to find out the place of concealment for their women, 
children, and negroes ; to give to the well-disposed, among the latter, 
an opportunity of communicating with us ; to observe trails and cross- 
ings, and particularly to find a good point, as far in the interior as practi- 
cable, for the establishing of a new post before the recommencement of 
active operations on our part. Such point we found about eight, miles 
below Lake Monroe, on the cast bank. A leading trail passes through 
it. Here we took the ferry-canoe in ascending, and here, on returning, 
a sharp fire was thrown in upon us by a party of ten or fifteen Indians, 
who lay concealed in high grass on the west side. But for their timidity, 
they might have killed the four officers, who were standing exposed on the 
bow of the boat. They fired from a distance of 300 yards. 

Brigadier General Eustis arrived, with the body of the left wing, at 
Volusia, on the 25th. The garrison he had left there, under Major 
Gates, had been sharply attacked, on the 14th, by, perhaps, 80 Indians. 
Two of our men, who happened to be outside, were killed, and possibly 
the enemy lost as many, but no sortie was. 

Before the arrival of Eustis, I had planned an expedition to Spring 
Garden, consisting of the two companies of horse that had escorted me 
and GO volunteers of the garrison. The detachment returned without 
discovering any recent signs of the enemy. 

All the volunteers of the left wing marched, under Colonel Goodwyn, 
on the morning of the 2Sth, for St. Augustine, via Tomoca, &c. Briga- 
dier Generals Eustis and Bull, both being much indisposed, came down 



329 [ 22 i ] 

the river with me. The regulars were left to garrison Volusia, and to 
superintend the evacuation of the post, which had alteady become ex- 
tremely sickly. Many cases of malignant bilious fever had occurred, 
which, in the opinion of some of the physicians, threatened the approach 
of the yellow fever. By the aid of two boats — the Santee and the Es- 
sayons, the evacuation may be completed in a week. Colonel Goodwyn 
and the two regiments of volunteers may be expected to reach St. Au- 
gustine, with the baggage-train, in four days from this time. He will 
pursue any fresh Indian trail he may cross. 

I have had, as yet, no report from Brigadier General Clinch. I learn, 
however, unofficially, that he reached Fort Diane on the 26th, without 
finding, in his march, any party of the enemy exceeding fifteen or twenty. 

From Colonel Smith, who, with the Louisiana volunteers, went on an 
expedition up the Pease creek, via Charlotte harbor, nothing had been 
heard when I left Tampa bay. I may receive his report via St. Mark's 
and Tallahassee in ten or twelve days. One, from Major Read, who 
commanded the expedition up the Withlacooch^3 (from its mouth) may 
be expected in the same time, and also a third from Colonel Lindsay. 
On the receipt of all those reports, I shall be able to form a pretty accu- 
rate opinion of the measures to be pursued to put an end to this war, 
which must be recommenced at a better season, and with very different 
menus. On our side, so far, nothing of importance has been achieved. 

I am more than ever persuaded that the whole force of the enemy, in- 
cluding the negroes, does not exceed 1,200 fighting men ; it is probably 
something less. Of that force, I am equally confident that not 500 have, 
at any time since the commencement of hostilities, been brought within 
the same ten miles square. In all our operations, within the last thirty 
days, we have not found a party of more than perhaps 130; but parties 
of from ten to thirty have been encountered almost every where. No 
Indian woman, child, or negro, nor the trace of one, has been seen in that 
time. Those non-combatants (it has been evident to us all) have been 
removed beyond the theatre of our operations. [They were, no doubt, 
even while the parley was going on with General Gaines on the 7th of 
March, moving off to the southeast, beyond Pease creek, and lake To- 
hopkelika, and in that almost inaccessible region they are now concealed. 
That officer, it is said, caused Powell and his chiefs to be informed, by 
way of inducing them to agree to accept the Withlacoochee as a tempo- 
rary boundary, that large armies were approaching, which would fill up 
the Indian country or crush every thing in the way. The wily chiefs 
profited by the information ; sent off their families, and dispersed their 
warriors into small parties. In this way Powell expects to make good his 
threat, viz : That he ivould protract the war three years.] 

To end it in [less time] [I am now persuaded that not less than 3,000 
regular troops are indispensable ; 2,400 foot and about 600 horse. The 
country to be scoured and occupied requires that number.] I have no par- 
ticular desire to conduct the operations of the new forces ; that is a duty 
which I shall neither solicit nor decline. 

[Of the above force, 3,000 good troops, (not volunteers,) five hundred 
will be necessary to garrison five posts for the deposite of supplies. Say 
one on the St. John's, 7 miles below Lake George ; one up the Pease 
creek, say 15 miles above Charlotte harbor; one at Tampa bay ; one 12 



wmm 



I 224 J .330 

miles from the Gulf of Mexico, up the Withlacoochee, and one on the 
same river, near the Fort King road, with 160,000 rations deposited at 
Tampa bay, and thirty or forty thousand at each of the other posts. Five 
columns with haversacks, and a few one-horse carts, may operate 
securely, and with every prospect of success — at least to the north and 
west of Charlotte harbor. For the country below, additional means 
will be wanted, viz: two or three steamers of a light draught of water, 
and fifty or sixty barges of different sizes, capable of carying from ten 
to fifty men each. 

I give these items, in order, if approved, that the necessary appropria- 
tions may be asked at once. I beg leave to add, in haste, that new regi- 
ments, or regiments of recruits, would be worth little or nothing in this 
war. I will, therefore, earnestly recommend that the companies of the 
old regiments be extended to eighty or ninety privates each. Recruits, 
mixed up with old soldiers in June or July, would become effective by 
the first of December ; and I repeat that operations cannot be carried 
on by any troops whatever, in this peninsula, except between the 20th 
of November and the end of April. The intermediate period is too hot 
or too sickly to be endured.] 

The boat is about to depart, and I must, for the present, conclude. 

At the end of January I asked for troops of the Governors of several 
States. The last of the South Carolinians arrived at St. Augustine the 
9th of March, and at Volusia the 25th ; the Georgians, in part, arrived 
at Fort Drane about the same time, but six companies of horse not till 
the 9th of this month, after the campaign was nearly over. As it was 
impossible for them to join either of the columns, Lieutenant Colonel 
Crane sent them back to their homes. 

The Alabama regiment, that was expected to reach Tampa bay about 
the 25th of February, did not reach that place till (I think) the 13th of 
March. These extraordinary delays, it was impossible for me to foresee 
or to guard against. 

A portion of the Georgians have just arrived here to embark for their 
homes, and the remainder of the same quota will follow. The South 
Carolinians will be discharged at St. Augustine and Jacksonville. 

I shall write again by the first opportunity. In the mean time, I shall, 
here or at St. Augustine, await the orders of the Department. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. Gen. R. Jones, 

Adj. Gen. U. S. Army. 



No. 117. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Geo., June 14, 1836. 

Sir : I perceive that Governor Call has obtained permission to make 
a summer campaign against the Seminole Indians. With all my heart I 



331 I 224 ] 

wish him success; but more than fear, whatever the amount and descrip- 
tion of his forces, heat and sickness will defeat him. 

I hardly think that he will be able to raise, under the late volunteer 
act, more than 200, possibly 300 men, and they will not be highly effec- 
tive. Of the regulars left by me in positions on Alachua and Suwanee 
frontiers, many I learn have already fallen sick, and I have reported 
that no volunteers can be counted on from this quarter. The only re- 
inforcement the Governor can, with certainty, expect, in any short time, 
is the detachment from Baton Rouge, which, at his suggestion, I have 
orderded back to Florida. 

Not doubting then that an attempt to operate in the summer, as low as 
the Withlacoochee, will be attended with great loss from sickness, and 
must inevitably fail from that cause alone, however ample the means, 
I beg leave earnestly to call the attention of the Government to the 
only plan, and to the particular means, which, in my humble opinion, can 
give success. 

The Seminole Indians are not formidable frDm their numbers. Of 
fighting men, including blacks, I do not believe they have more than 
1,200 in all Florida, and I am morally certain that, of that number, not 
more than 500 have been imbodied at any time since the commence- 
ment of hostilities. The strength of this enemy consists in the extent 
of the country he occupies, and still more in the frightful nature of its 
surface. The country west of the Suwannee, in which the campaign of 
1818 was prosecuted with success, is a bowling-green compared to that 
below the Withlacoochee, not to mention that beyond Pease creek and 
Lake Tohopkelika. Those who have only seen the first, can form no idea 
of the second and third districts mentioned. Fancy a surface checkered 
at convenient distances for the Indians, with hammocks, cypress swamps, 
savannahs, and scrubs. Every hammock and scrub is more difficult, be- 
ing pre-occupied with Indians, to storm and to carry, than any field- 
work it was my fortune to take in Canada. With the advantage of those 
innumerable fastnesses, if the enemy continues his late policy of sending 
off to the Ever-glades his families, and of breaking up his warriors into 
small parties, who shall say that he can beat such an enemy in a given 
time ? Not a Wayne, nor any other great commander against Indians, 
living or dead, could venture to say that he could do it in a single 
season. 

The season for operations in Florida is from the 25th of November to 
the end of April. I assert that an army cannot be safely put into the 
field earlier nor continued later. With the best possible troops, 3,000 is 
the minimum force required. To obtain the recruits wanted, every 
man serving in this particular war ought to have pledged to him, at the 
end of it, a bounty of 160 acres of land, ( not Florida land — that would be 
a fraud ;) and every officer should receive a gratuity at the commence- 
ment of the campaign, of not less than three months' pay ; for I repeat 
that the war against the Seminole Indians is one of unmitigated priva- 
tion and suffering, without the least possible expectation of fame or 
glory to individuals. Without the bounty of 160 acres of land to each 
enlisted soldier, I am confident, from the present high price of labor 
thoughout the country, the number of recruits required cannot be ob- 
tained. 



WltiX 



[ 224 ] 332 

I have heretofore stated that five posts ought to be established in the 
country, at or just before the commencement of operations : Tampa bay ; 
the falls of the Withlacoochee ; the great crossing of the same river ; on 
Pease creek ; and seven miles below Lake Monroe — not Lake George, 
as I wrote in my letter of the 30th of April. Between those posts, the 
troops should operate with such subsistence as they may take in their 
haversacks and a few one-horse carts, and each horseman taking, at the 
commencement of each expedition, three bushels of corn in his saddle, 
and leading his horse for the first eight days. 

The one-horse carts (about one hundred) should be light, and yet 
strong, with a water-proof covering. The tire should be four and a 
half inches in width, and made of rolled boiler iron. These carts ought 
to be ordered in time, and, when ready, sent to Tampa bay, Fo;t Drane, 
and Picolata — 50 to the first place, 25 to the second, and 25 to the third. 
Three steamboats of good burden, but of light draught of water, for the 
Gulf of Mexico, and a fourth, of the same description, for the St. John's 
river, ought also to be Ordered in the course of the summer. 

With the forces and means here hastily enumerated, I repeat that, by 
able combinations, it will be possible, in a single season, to drive the 
enemy's parties out of the country between the Withlacoochee and 
Charlotte harbor, and accomplish something advantageous in the Ever- 
glades at the same time, with the further aid of fifty or sixty barges, 
which ought to be ordered to be provided with the steamboats. 

These views I hold it to be my duty again to present. I wish, for the 
good of the country, that I had the influence with the Executive and 
Congress to cause them to be adopted. Perhaps, after the trial and fail- 
ure of other plans and means, they may, by the autumn of 1837, find 
favor in those quarters. 

I have the honor to remain, 

With high respect, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To the Hon. Lewis, 

Secretary of War. 



No. 118. 



Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, May 5, 1836. 

Sir: Your communication of the 12th of April, reporting the opera- 
tions of the army in Florida under your command, since your departure 
from Fort Drane, and of your arrival at Fort Brooke, Tampa bay, has 
been submitted to the President, and this day to the Secretary of War. 
I am happy to inform you that the President approves your intended plan 
of operations, and deems it very important that the movement against 
the negroes, women, and children of the hostile Indians, should be vig- 
orously prosecuted, fully pursuaded as he is, that the capture of these, 



t^utm 



333 [ 2 24 ] 

nd the destruction of their settlements, would best ensure the speedy 
ermination of the war. 

I am desired by the Secretary of War to say that, from the tenor of 
our report, as well as by the communication he has just received from 
he Governor of Florida, it is probable that, owing to the approaching 
eason of the year, the campaign in the field cannot be much longer 
igorously pushed. In this event, you will make a judicious selection of 
lie posts necessary to be occupied by the troops during the interval of 
ctive operations which may be best calculated to protect the frontier 
^habitants, and prevent Indian depredations of any kind. For this pur- 
ose, all the regular troops, including the 4th infantry, must be kept on 
uty in Florida. 

A bill making provision for the raising of volunteer troops is now 
ending in Congress, and soon, it is presumed, will become a law ; in 
i T hich case you may expect such reinforcements as may be necessary 
3r the public service, relative to which the views of the Department 
/ill hereafter be communicated. 

The Secretary of War also desires me to communicate to you his wish 
lat you may confer with the Governor of Florida, in order that such 
ther measures for the effectual defence of Florida may be adopted, if 
ecessary, and which could not otherwise so well be carried into effect, 
s by a co-operation between the Territorial Government and Command- 
ng General in the field. The Secretary of War, resposing great confid- 
ence in the judgment and prudence of Governor Call, wishes a mutual 
iiterchange of views and opinions, as he has so expressed himself to the 
Governor, with regard to the Commanding General in Florida. 
I am, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. JONES, 

Adjutant General. 

Major General Scott, 

Commanding in Florida, Fort Drane, Florida, 



No. 119. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 11, 1836. 

Sir : Much indisposed, I have been waiting for the arrival of a steamer 
n order to write to you ; for I have much to report and to explain. Af- 
er a long delay the boat is come, and yet I am scarcely able to hold up 
ny head for twenty minutes at a time. 

With this you will receive a copy of Brigadier General Clinch's report 
f his march from Tampa bay, and copies of several other letters from 
ame source. 

It will be seen, from the latter of those communications, that the In- 
lians have already recommenced their depredations and murders in the 
"ort Drane vicinity, and that there is but little hope of imbodying any 
espectable number of the inhabitants, as mounted men, to aid in their 



- _ 



[ 224 ] 334 

own defence. I had, under the circumstances, authorized Clinch to 
raise, in the usual form, and to muster into service, eighty or one hun- 
dred. Such addition to the nine companies of United States troops there 
would, I suppose, be sufficient to scour and free that frontier of the ene- 
my, an order having been given by me to remount Wharton's detach- 
ment of United States dragoons from the spare horses of the wagon-train. I 
learn that about sixty mounts can be furnished him in all. 

J have consented to retain Fort King, and many days ago approved of 
the reinforcement of an additional company being sent there. 

The resignation of Brigadier General Clinch was forwarded a week 
ago. The army will lose in this officer one of its best commanders. In 
the same package, a like tender, on the part of Captain Thruston, was 
forwarded. On the earnest solicitation of each, founded on private in- 
terests of the utmost importance, they were allowed to retire (about this 
time) from the army, and to await the decision of the War Department. 
I soon afterwards learned that Captain Thruston would have much prefer- 
red a leave of absence. If his resignation has not been accepted, I trust that 
such indulgence may be accorded. He is highly gifted for any kind of 
war; but, from his knowledge of this country and the enemy, he would 
be of the greatest value on the recommencement of hostilities. Perhaps, 
with handsome promotion, he may be permanently retained in the army. 
He is worthy of a lieutenant colonelcy. 

When Clinch shall retire, the command, in that quarter, will devolve 
on Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, every way capable, if his health were 
better. He is very infirm, from extreme fatigue, and, I learn, can scarcely 
walk or mount his horse. Brigadier General Clinch recommends him 
for leave of absence for the recovery of his health ; and as soon as I can 
spare Major Gates or Major Heileman, I shall send a leave to the lieu- 
tenant colonel, whose recent services, independent of all former claims, 
entitle him to high consideration. 

I enclose a copy of my Order No. 46. General Eustis is engaged in 
mounting two companies of his regiment, using the horses of his baggage 
train with wagon-saddles. Some few common saddles will be purchased 
to complete the number wanted. About eighty-five mounted men may 
thus be obtained with very little cost to the United States; for the horses 
will be wanted on the return of cold weather, and in the mean time they 
could not be sold this side of Tallahassee, for ten per centum of their 
value. The two mounted regular companies will be worth more than 
twice the number of foot. The men are now a little awkward in the 
saddle. In a week they will be quite respectable, and after two months, 
twice as effective as mounted volunteers. Forty men of Dimmock's 
company, the only one here at the time, was hastily mounted on the 7th, 
and sent to pursue a trail seen about five miles from this place. The 
citizens who went out as guides, after travelling some eight miles, de- 
clared that the signs were simply those of the country cattle, and 
the captain returned. On the morning of the 8th, we received a report 
that a party of Indians were at the Metansas ; had captured the slaves of 
Hermandez and Dupont, and would, no doubt, destroy the fixtures at 
both plantations. Captain Dimmock was again hastily mounted and 
despatched. At a little distance from Dupont's place, a small party of 
the enemy were overtaken, at least three killed, and several wounded. 



■ 



335 224 J 

Dimmock lost a private killed, and had a sergeant and three privates 
wounded. Two of his horses were also killed. The Indians, as usual, 
availed themselves of a near hammock, and fought better than they 
have commonly done. They lost their horses and packs, of which they 
had robbed the plantations. All Dupont's negroes escaped ; but the 
enemy had secured three belonging to Hermandez. It is hoped they 
will also escape, on being next approached by the horse. Lieutenant 
Irwin, with Saunder's company, which it is proposed to keep mounted, 
will march out to-morrow to Dupont's place, where a company of foot 
will be placed in garrison. The families and negroes I hope will be 
soon reassured. Every thing south has been long destroyed. 

The handsome check given to the enemy on the 8th, will render him 
more cautious. Without horses, succor would not have arrived till the 
neighborhood had been desolated. 

Both on the 7th and 8th application was made for volunteers from 
the South Carolina foot. One man marched with Dimmock the first 
day ; the same man and six others the second. The time of these 
troops being out, between the Sth and the 20th, no more would vol- 
unteer, either to go by water, on foot, or horseback. On inquiry, it was 
found useless to issue an order, as the colonel (Brisbane) could not 
pledge himself that it would be obeyed. He was, on the contrary, 
certain that it would be disregarded. Goodwyn's regiment of horse 
was already across the St. John's, at Jacksonville, and the remaining 
companies of regulars (four) were at Picolata, engaged in handling and 
securing the public property at that depot. Merchant's company had, a 
few days before, gone to Garey's Ferry, where it will establish itself for 
the summer, &c. 

I have been using every measure in my power to cause a company of 
mounted volunteers to be raised, on this side of the St. John's, to aid the 
inhabitants to defend the country. I would prefer that the company 
should consist of at least sixty- four privates ; but have offered to accept 
one with forty, and give it three officers. It is very doubtful whether 
even that minimum can be engaged. With such company, under tolera- 
ble officers, the two companies of mounted regulars, and the three of 
foot, I do not doubt that entire security may be given to the whole of the 
remaining settlements. 

The little United States steamer, the Essayons, will be useful in 
effecting the same object. By frequently passing up the river as far as 
Lake George, it will be rendered very hazardous for parties of In- 
dians to cross the river to join in depredations on the Alachua frontier, 
or on this side of the St. John's. The parties which infest those dis- 
tricts cannot, I should think, exceed one hundred and fifty in the whole. 
Sixty Indians, however, but for the presence of regulars, would depopu- 
late this part of the Territory in a season. 

I have received no report from Colonel Smith, who, from Tampa, 
went up the Pease creek. None has been received from Colonel Lind- 
say, who was left, on the 20th ultimo, on the Big Withlacoochee, pre- 
paring a fortified camp for his wagons, before scouring the forks. From 
the bad dispositions of the Alabama regiment, his principal force, I ex- 
pect to hear that the duty of that column has been slurred over. 

But the most extraordinary and disgraceful delinquency committed by 



' 



[ 224 ] 336 

any corps, has occurred in the expedition intrusted to Major Read. 
He has not condescended to report to me ; but, from Governor Call's 
letter that was forwarded to Washington, I infer that the major scarcely 
looked into the Withlacoochee. 

His written orders, drawn up by Colonel Gadsden, directed him "to 
penetrate as far into the interior as may he found practicable, and 
consistent with the security of your command." And I said to him 
on each of the two following days, in the strongest and the most pre- 
cise terms, that he would ascend the river to the~first impediment in its 
navigation, which was understood to be twelve miles up. I desired 
him to sketch the windings and the banks of the river, and particu- 
larly to note a site, with wood at hand, and as near the falls as prac- 
ticable,/*^ a military post, the importance of which I fully explained. 
This man has, at Tallahassee, caused a statement to be made, declaring 
that 1 had refused him permission to ascend the Withlacoochee ! and 
again, presuming the statement to have been furnished by him, he de- 
nies having ever heard that, possibly, he might find a block-house and 
garrison established near the falls of the river. Now, I affirm, that it 
was generally known, throughout the right wing of the army' that it 
was just possible that Major McLemore (a highly meritorious Floridian) 
had made such establishment. The possibility was mentioned to Ma- 
jor Read ; and although Colonel Gadsden, by accident, omitted the 
subject in the letter of instructions, yet, when the major saw half of a 
flat, rudely cut in two, that which was extremely doubtful before, 
became a matter of the most perfect certainty; and if the Major had been 
bound home, without other orders, it immediately became his imperious 
duty to go instantly to the relief of his countrymen. The flat could 
never have belonged to Indians, and it would not have been destroyed if 
the garrison had returned by water to the Suwannee, and Major Read 
knew it could only have returned by water. 

Associated with such officers and men, no man's honor is safe. An 
act of sheer cowardice is supported by at least two distinct falsehoods. 

I feel and know the risk I incur by the use of this language. Major 
Read is the favorite of Governor Call, and his Excellency^ support may 
well turn the tables against me at Washington. 

I must again repeat that, although I believe that eight hundred or 
fewer regulars might easily beat die whole of the Seminole warriors if 
they would stand, yet, at least three thousand of the best troops are 're- 
quired to finish this war. 

I have written the foregoing sick and in haste. In a few days I hope 
to be well again, when I shall attempt to give, succinctly, the causes 
which have defeated the operations ; the first of which is, the late day on 
which I was ordered to Florida. 

I remain, with respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

_ . ,. WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General United States Army. 



337 [ 224 ] 

No. 120. 

Headquarters, Right Wing, Florida Army, 

Fort Dr'qne, April 27, 1836. 

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations 
of this wing of the army since marching from Tampa hay, in obedience 
to your order of April 11, No. 28. 

On the 14th instant, the wing, composed of the following force, viz: 
artillery, 278 ; dismounted dragoons, 43 ; fourth infantry, 202 ; Augusta 
volunteers, 139; mounted men, 140; total, 802, marched on its return 
to Fort Cooper, making shorter distances than before, in consequence of 
the increased heat of the weather, and the debilitated condition of the 
horses. All the sick, to the number of 80, had been left in hospital at 
Fort Brooke. On the 17th, the fourth (].\y of the march, arrived within 
three miles of Fort Cooper, and halted. On the morning of the 18th, 
despatched some light wagons, escorted by Malone's and Campbell's 
companies of mounted men, with instructions to Major Cooper to join 
me. These escort companies had proceeded to within half a mile of 
his position, when, as they were passing a hammock, they were fired 
upon by the enemy, and Lieutenant Dawson and private Howard severely 
wounded. This information being brought back to me, and apprehend- 
ing that they might have encountered a large body of Indians, I sent out 
the commandant of the right column, Colonel Bankhead, with a battalion 
of artillery, to reinforce the detachment ; before his arrival, the enemy 
had retired. Major Cooper joined me in the course of the day. My 
reasons for halting were to give the horses a day's rest, and because, 
near that point, the trail, which, according to my instructions, I was to 
pursue, diverged to the right and rear. 

Major Cooper had been invested by the enemy from the 5th until the 
17th of April. In the course of daily skirmishing with them, he lost one 
killed and five wounded. With this you will find a copy of his report. 
His conduct and that of his officers and men deserves, and I have no 
doubt will receive, the highest gratitude of their country, as they dis- 
played great coolness and firmness under the most trying circumstances. 
Major Cooper estimates the force around him at 250 ; there were proba- 
bly more, though not in view. 

On the 19th marched, and, at the distance of four miles, came to the 
river, followed the course of the river bend seven miles and encamped ; 
20th, continued the march up the river seven miles to the Tampa road, 
at Colonel Lindsay's position, and encamped. The distance from the 
old Indian town, (my position on the 18th,) three miles from Fort Cooper 
on the trail to Camp Chisolm, to the crossing of the Withlacoochee on 
the Tampa road, is eighteen miles. The course for the first fourteen 
miles southeast-by-south, and for the last four, northeast. At the dis- 
tance of three miles above the old Indian town, the lake (Olocklekaha) 
or range of ponds, which we first struck on 30th March, terminates. The 
approaches toward the river between the ponds (if they be ponds and 
not a lake) were narrowly searched, with a view to ascertain whether 
any access to a position for operation between the ponds and the river 
22 



[ 224 J 338 

could be observed ; I am satisfied that there is none. The only trail, 
above the Indian town, leads across the river at a point which we dis- 
covered to be the upper termination of the ponds by pursuing this trail. 

The course of my route corresponds very nearly with the course (sup- 
posed) given to the river by Colonel Gadsden in his draught. The bend 
of the river is more regularly curved than he has made it. 

No lord practicable for wagons could be discovered, though there are 
several new-worn trails leading across. I have every reason to believe, 
from the sign which we observed in the route, that a considerable pro- 
portion of the enemy inhabits this region of country, but in detached 
parties, and that their last place of retreat will be either between the 
forks of the river, or between the ponds and the river, and that the true 
plan of operations against them will be that first designed by you ; that is, 
by a force from Pelaklikaha, a force ascending by my route, and a corres- 
ponding one on the north side. The Indians can cross the river at various 
places with such facility, that no single force can proceed against them 
with any certainty of success. 21st. Crossed both branches of the river 
by the Tampa road, having left with Colonel Lindsay the fourth infantry, 
and taken up the mounted escort and Nelson's company. 22d. On this 
day one of the flankers (Bostick) was fired on as he passed very near a 
hammock. His horse was wounded under him. Prompt pursuit was 
made, but without success ; the Indians retreated through the thick 
undergrowth too rapidly to be overtaken. 

23d and 24th. Continued the march to Fort King, capturing and driving 
along about two hundred head of cattle. 25th. After leaving a supply of 
ammunition at Fort King, marched to Fort Drane. Men and horses 
much exhausted by sickness and the heat of the weather ; another day's 
march would have occasioned the abandoning a part of the train ; fifteen 
horses and mules died on the road, and eight were turned out that could 
not be got along by leading. 

I must he permitted to express my high approbation of the gallant 
feeling manifested on all occasions by both officers and men, under the 
most trying circumstances attendant on a long and fatiguing march through 
a country almost unknown to the white man, and in charging through 
swamps and hammocks, wherever the track of the enemy was visible — 
all of which they bore without a murmur, and with the greatest firmness. 
I cannot close this communication without expressing my high gratifica- 
tion at being able to say that not the smallest difficulty occurred in the 
right wing, from the time we left Fort Drane until our return to it, and 
that the best and kindest feelings existed between the different corps 
composing the wing ; and the only rivalry, who should occupy the post of 

danger. 

I am, sir, with the highest respect and regard, 

Your most obedient servant, 

D. L. CLINCH, 
Brigadier General U. S. Army, commanding. 
Major General Scott, 

Commanding. 



339 [ 224 ] 

No. 1.81. 

Headquarters, Right Wing, Florida Army, 

Fort Drane, April 27, 1836. 

Sir : My report of this date will inform you of the operations of the 
right wing since we left Tampa bay. The four companies mounted 
volunteers from Georgia have been ordered to return to their homes. 
The two companies from Augusta, commanded by Captains Robinson and 
Bones, took up the line of march this morning for Augusta, via Picolata, 
and the Louisiana volunteers left sick at this post when that gallant regi- 
ment left this, will march in the morning under the command of Lieute- 
nant Wight, with the wagon train for Garey's ferry, there to await your 
orders and transportation. There will be upwards of one hundred men, 
who will leave in the morning, that will require transportation on their 
arrival at Garey's ferry. The disposition of the regular troops so as to 
give the greatest protection and security to the inhabitants and their prop- 
erty, is one of much difficulty ; and, owing to my peculiar situation, is 
one of great delicacy, but it must be met. As it is generally considered 
that the occupancy and defence of this post is one of much importance 
to the military operations against the Indians, I have deemed it necessary 
to garrison it with five companies of artillery, and Captain Wharton's 
company of dragoons, from which a strong detachment will be sent to 
protect the property and provisions at Oakland, about six miles northeast 
from this post. I would strongly recommend the remounting of the whole 
of Captain Wharton's company with the least possible delay, as I con- 
sider it impossible to give quiet and protection to the country without 
this species of force, to aid and assist the troops acting as infantry. I 
shall order one company to take post at or near Micanopy, and the re- 
maining company to Fort King, and I do not think this force sufficient to 
keep the Indians within their former limits, without the aid of one hundred 
and fifty or two hundred mounted men from the adjacent counties. It is 
believed that, if proper encouragement is given, that two or three com- 
panies of mounted volunteers can be raised for the period of six months, 
as many of the inhabitants will be prevented from making crops this 
year, and will of course be out of employment, and, if not employed by 
the Government, will be compelled to leave the country with their fami- 
lies. These men are well acquainted with the country, and could, with 
the assistance of the regular troops, scour that part of it tying between 
the settlements and the enemy, so as to deter them, except in very small 
parties from harassing the settlements. These men should be permitted 
to subsist themselves and horses, as far as practicable, should they prefer 
doing so, as it is believed this plan would be most convenient to them- 
selves, and less expensive to the Government, as their horses could do 
with very little corn when well grazed. I would, therefore, respectfully 
but strongly recommend the raising of this force as soon as practicable, 
and of stationing it at some point that will give the greatest protection to 
the country. About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 20th instant, the 
Indians made an attack on this place, but were met and repulsed by the 
garrison commanded by Captain Lendrum. They succeeded, however, 
in carrying off three of my negroes, and seventeen public horses. On 



[ 224 ] 340 

the night of the 25th instant, the cotton and gin house belonging to Colo- 
nel Mcintosh was burnt, and the loss estimated at about five thousand 
dollars. The accompanying letter contains all the information received 
from the command established on the Withlacoocb.ee, and, unless relieved 
by Major Read, I am fearful their situation will be a critical one. The 
major must, however, have reached that point long ere this. 
I am, with high respect, 

Your most obedient, 

D. L. CLINCH, 
Brigadier General U. S. A., conuVg. 
Major General W. Scott, 

Commanding Florida army, Pcnsacola. 



No. 122. 



Tallahassee, April 26, 1836. 

Sir: A tew days since I received a communication from Major McLe- 
more, stationed on the Suwannee frontier, informing me that, under orders 
from General Scott, he had ascended the Withlacoochee river, and 
erected a block-house on the south bank some ten or twelve miles above 
its mouth, and that he had left a garrison of 40 men in the block-house, 
and a large quantity of coin and pickled beef. This morning, at day- 
light, Major Read, of the Florida battalion, arrived at this place from the 
Withlacoochee, bringing the intelligence that he discovered at the mouth 
of the river one half of a large flat boat, which had been cut in two ap- 
parently with a dull axe, and by an unexperienced hand. His descrip- 
tion corresponds with that given of the boat left at the biock-house by 
Major McLemore, and I have every reason to fear that the block-house 
has been taken and the garrison massacred by the Indians. Colonel Read 
reports that he saw a number of lues extending along the coast as far west 
as the head of Wacassa bay, and has no doubt of there being a large number 
of Indians in that quarter. I have thought it proper to communicate this 
intelligence to you, and would respectfully suggest the propriety of send- 
ing a force to the block-house to ascertain the fate of the garrison, and if 
they are still safe, to bring them off, unless it should be deemed more 
expedient by the commanding general to continue the force at that place. 
The detachment sent on this service should be strong enough to meet a 
considerable force, as I have no doubt of there being a large body of the 
enemy in that neighborhood. The block-house cannot be more than 
thirty-five or forty miles from Fort Diane ; but, should it be impracticable 
for you to send a sufiicient force by land to ascertain its fate, I have or- 
dered a fortified boat to be in readiness at Suwannee Old Town to proceed 
with a part of the men at that place to the relief of the garrison, and 
transport it back to the Old Town, unless the commanding general should 
otherwise direct. You will, therefore, be pleased to send an express to 
Major McCants, commanding at the Old Town, and inform him whether 
troops have been sent by land to the relief of the block-house, or whether 
the boat, which will be in readiness, shall be sent on that service. Major 
Read was not apprized that there was a block-house and garrison on the 



341 [ 224 J 

Withlacoochee until his arrival at St. Mark's, and the disbanding of his 
command. 

The ieport of his examination at the mouth of the Withlacoochee will 
be made out in a few days. 

It is reported on good authority that the Creek Indians have recently 
manifested a restless disposition, and some apprehension is expressed of 
approaching hostility with them. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. K. CALL, 

Governor of Florida. 
To General Scott, 

or officer commanding Fort Drane, Florida. 



No. 123. 



Fort Dabney, Suwannee Oid Town, 

April 11, 1836. 

Sir : In accordance with an order, received through Colonel James 
Gadsden from Major General Scott, Major McLemore advanced up the 
Withlacoochee with provisions, and established a block-house about four 
miles below the rapids or lalls. There are between 5 and 700 bushels of 
corn at this post, defended by about 40 men. The position is eligible 
and commanding, and there is no difficulty in transporting any quantity 
of provisions as far as the rapids, in flats or boats defended by bulwarks. 
There is at the station a fine large flat of this kind. Soon after our ar- 
rival at this post, we were visited by an Indian dog, once in the morning, 
and a second time in the afternoon, when he was shot by one of the sen- 
tinels. With this exception, we saw no sign of Indians recently made. 

By order of Major McLemore, commandant. 



To the Officer Commandant at Fort Drane. 



J. McCANTS, 

Adjutant. 



No. 121. 



Headquarters, Right Wing, Florida Army, 

Fort Drane, April 29, 1836. 

At a council convened this evening to consider a proposition submitted 
by the brigadier general commanding, were present — 

Brigadier General Clinch ; Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, Captain 
Thruston, Captain Lee, 3d artillery; Captain Tompkins, 1st artillery ; 
Captain Foster, Georgia volunteers ; Major Cooper, Georgia volunteers ; 
Captain Lendrum, 3d artillery; Captain Wharton, dragoons; Captain 
Seymour and Captain Brown, Georgia volunteers. 



[ 224 ] 342 

The question proposed was on information furnished by a letter from 
Governor Call, that a detachment of Florida militia had ascended the 
Withlacoochee river nine miles above its mouth, on the 2d of April, 
under Major McLemore, and that, after constructing a block-house, had 
left there forty men, with several hundred bushels of corn, and a large 
supply of salted beef; that Major Read, on his arrival at Tallahassee on 
the 26th of April from Tampa bay, had reported that, in passing the 
mouth of the Withlacoochee, he had discovered a boat cut in two, which 
he had reason to believe, from the description of the boat left with the 
detachment, to be the same. Governor Call suggests, in his letter to the 
commanding general, the propriety of sending a force from this place to 
the block-house to learn the fate of the garrison ; stating also, if that 
could not be done, that he had directed a force to go from Suwannee Old 
Town in a fortified boat, (the force to be supplied by a part of Major 
McCant's command there,) to the relief of the detachment. 

The question submitted was on this information, and it was decided 
unanimously that a force adequate to the purpose could not be marched 
from this post. Not more than three hundred men could be raised at all 
capable of marching ; that the physical ability of these is questionable, 
the whole being just returned from a most fatiguing and harassing cam- 
paign, in a state too enfeebled by exposure, hard marching, and sickness, 
to undertake a new expedition of 100 miles. That, admitting them to 
be capable in those respects, they are not in sufficient number to enter 
the heart of the enemy's country, there being no other troops now ope- 
rating in the Territory, they must,expect to encounter the whole strength 
of the enemy, which experience has shown to be competent to resist 
successfully the attempt of a much larger force to cross the Withlacoochee. 
The block-house is on the opposite side. The effort to be made from 
the force here would leave this frontier entirely exposed. 

C. M. THRUSTON, 
Captain, acting Adjutant General. 



No. 125. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, J\!ay 1, 1836. 

Sir: Your several letters, dated the 27th and 28th ultimo, were re- 
ceived this morning. 

I approve of the disposition you propose to make of the regular com- 
panies under your command. 

1 wish you to cause to be mounted, as soon as practicable, the whole 
or the greater part of the detachment of United States dragoons. For 
this purpose, you will use the public horses in the neighborhood of Fort 
Drane which may be fit lor service, and not indispensable to transport to 
that place subsistence from Picolata or Garey's ferry. If you have not 
serviceable horses and mules sufficient for both objects, some can be sent 
from the left wing. The remaining horses and mules with you you will 
take measures to have sent to the best district for grazing, and where 



343 [ 224 J 

they may be considered in safety for the summer and autumn, as all will 
be wanted at the recommencement of active operations. Your report on 
this subject, together with an estimate of the resources of the country for 
grazing and foraging cavalry and draught horses, will determine the num- 
ber of horses I may deem it necessary to send to you. 

Your suggestion that 150 or 200 mounted men, in addition to the de- 
tachment of United States dragoons, should be immediately called for to 
aid in the defence of the Alachua settlements during the summer and 
autumn, 1 shall refer to the War Department, believing that the force 
with you, horse and foot, judiciously posted and employed, is sufficient 
for the present. 

I also wish to learn from you what amount of subsistence, for men, you 
now have at Forts Drane and King, and what baggage-train is deemed 
indispensable to supply the required subsistence for the men to be posted 
in that vicinity (say) for the next six months. 

You do not give me the number of the Louisiana detachment ordered 
to Garey's ferry to seek transportation to New Orleans. 1 wish you had 
sent them (if practicable) to St. Mark's, via Tallahassee. Perhaps a 
packet may be found in Charleston to take them home. 

Send me a return of the regulars under you. 

1 still think it desirable, on account of the distance, to abandon Fort 
King — it covers nothing — but will take no step on the subject till 1 shall 
have heard again from you, and shall have received the instructions of 
the War Department. In the mean time, reinforce the post with the 
additional company, as you have proposed. 

You say nothing as to the discharge of Major Cooper's battalion of 
Georgia foot. It may be discharged and paid at Garey's ferry or Pico- 
lata. Besides Paymaster Lytle with you, we have here Paymasters 
Kirby and Muhlenberg, both provided with funds. 

By accident, I presume, you omitted to enclose Major Cooper's report 
of his defence of Fort Cooper. 

When you shall have made- all the arrangements suggested above, you 
will charge the officer next in rank with the defence of the Alachua fron- 
tier, and be yourself at liberty to retire. I shall be glad to see you here 
or at Picolata on public business. Your resignation 1 have, with sincere 
regret, forwarded for the acceptance of the War Department. The army 
will lose in you one of its best commanders. I shall probably remain in 
the vicinity for several weeks. 

With high respect and regard, 

I remain truly yours, 

WTNFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Clinch, 

Commanding right wing. 



No. 126. 
Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 1, 1836. 

Sir : I have this moment received another express from you, bringing me 
Major Cooper's report, a letter from Governor Call, and the opinion of a 
council of war, held at Fort Drane on the 29th ultimo. 



[ 224 J 344 

From the two latter papers, it appears that a small garrison, placed in 
a block-house on the Withlacoochee, on the 2d ultimo, may be consider- 
ed in extreme peril, ii" not actually lost, and that the council has deter- 
mined that no succor can be afforded from Fort Diane. It also appears, 
from Governor Call's letter, that the expedition under Major Read, sent 
by me to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and to explore that river, with 
a view to the establishment of a post, at some future day, as high up as 
practicable, failed to ascend the stream even to the distance of nine miles ; 
and what is equally strange, it does not appear that any express has been 
sent to the Old Town, on the Suwannee, to inform the commanding officer 
there of the necessity of attempting to succor the party on the Withla- 
coochee with the means suggested by the Governor, in case no relief 
could be afforded from Fort Drane. Instead of adoptingone or the other 
of those measures, the whole difficulty has been referred to me, at this 
distant point, whereby much precious time is necessarily lost. 

I differ from the opinion expressed by the council. I believe that 250 
men would be a sufficient force, (a part being mounted,) and that that 
number might be safely detached from Fort Drane and its vicinity. If, 
then, as I have reason to apprehend, no express has been sent on the 
subject to Governor Call, and the post on the Suwannee, to say that re- 
lief cannot be afforded from Fort Drane, it is my opinion, and order, that 
the largest practicable and safe detachment be immediately put in march 
from Fort Drane, including regulars and volunteers, and all the dragoons 
or mounted men that can be obtained, to march to a point on the With- 
lacoochee opposite to the block-house, and there, by aid of a raft or swim- 
ming, to bring off the garrison, or, at the least, to ascertain its fate. 
Troops should be instantly sent from this vicinity, but for distance, and 
the consequent delay. 

Of Major Read's failure to ascend the Withlacoochee, even to the ex- 
tent of nine miles, I say nothing at present, his report not being yet re- 
ceived. 

Please send a copy of this hasty note to .the Governor of Florida. 
I remain, with much respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To Brig. Gen. Clinch. 

A few light carts should accompany the detachments to the Withla- 
coochee. 



No. 127. 

Headquarters, Right Wing, Florida Army. 

Fort Drane, May 5, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 
2,) dated the 1st instant, in which you state that these enclosures from 
from me, to wit : Major Cooper's report, a letter from Governor Call, and 
a copy of the opinion of a council of the officers, highest in rank at this 
post, convened on the 29th ultimo, had reached you by express. 



315 [ 224 ] 

The language and tone of that part of your letter which relates to the 
opinion of the council, and the course pursued by the commandant of the 
right wing in conformity with that opinion, require a few remarks from 
me. Permit me to quote one paragraph of your letter, entirely at variance 
with the information officially communicated hy me, as you will perceive 
by referring again to mine addressed to the chief of your staff, which went 
under cover with the papers acknowledged to have been received by you. 

" And what is equally strange, it does not appear that any express has 
been sent to the Old town, on the Suwannee, to inform the commanding 
officer there, of the necessity of attempting to succor the party on the 
Withlacoochee with the means suggested by the Governor, in case no 
relief could be afforded from Fort Diane." 

Now, in my letter to Colonel Gadsden, dated 30th ultimo, I report to 
you that u I have, this morning, sent off an express to Major McCants, 
with a copy of the Governor's letter, and informed him that the relief of 
the block-house, on the Withlacoochee, could not be undertaken from 
this point." ( I also sent a copy of the opinion of the council to Governor 
Call, with the same information.) If, therefore, the retained copy of my 
letter of the 30th ultimo, be correct, I have " adopted one of those 
measures" which were held out to me. 

It is evident, from Governor Call's letter, that, considering it doubtful 
whether succor could be furnised from this post, he had made other ar- 
rangements, by which the object in view could be accomplished ; and his 
reputation, as a military man, stands too high to leave it doubtful as to the 
probable efficacy of those arrangements : this his letter to you clearly in- 
dicated. He had communication with the officers and men who established 
the post on the Withlacoochee — had lull information on the subject, and 
would not have adopted means not likely to succeed. He certainly knew 
the difficulties to be encountered, and the means which would overcome 
those difficulties, as the same party had overcome them before. 

Still thinking it possible that his plan might fail, and feeling satisfied 
that relief could not be given from this point without great sacrifice, I 
have called on the citizens of the adjacent counties to rally to the rescue 
of their fellow-citizens, and have every reason to expect a successful issue 
to my appeal, for 1 think I have taken the most effcient means of imbodying 
them. In a day or two I hope to have it in my power to make a strong effort 
for the relief of the block-house, or at least to learn its fate. The force 
of which I speak will be mounted — the species of force best calculated 
for the enterprise. 

As to the other of " those measures" I am compelled in justice to say 
that the officers composing the council are gentlemen of talent, high and 
honorable feeling, and that they were ready to attempt any thing within 
the range of possibility, if there had been, in their judgment, any necessity 
for doing so. They were, however, perfectly acquainted with the true 
condition of the men composing this wins; — they knew them to be enfeebled 
and worn out by the service in which they had been engaged, and which 
they had performed in a manner that would have done credit to veteran 
troops. Many of them were about to return home, and had still a long 
march before them. These considerations, and the advanced state of the 
season, forbade, in their judgment, a new expedition to the Withlacoo- 
chee, without subjecting it to consequences greatly to be deprecated ; 



[ 224 ] 346 

and the opinion of the council is sustained by subsequent occurrences ; 
the sick are becoming every day more numerous, and the enemy making 
incursions upon the settlements on this frontier, which require here all 
the force at this post. 

I regret to add, that Colonel Fitzpatrick, one of my aid-de-camps, 
whom I sent into the neighboring counties to endeavor to raise men for 
the expedition to the Withlacoochee, has returned without the success 
which I had promised myself. It is now uncertain and not probable, that 
the means will be derived from that quarter. 

The plan suggested by Governor Call in his letter, will, therefore, be 
the only one certainly to be relied on, and is no doubt now going on. I 
hope it may prove successful. 

Major Cooper's battalion will be at Black creek about the 15th, and 
will require transportation from that point, which it is desirable, on every 
account, to have provided against the arrival of the battalion. Its term 
of service expires on the 18th instant. 

With this I send the return of this post, required by you in your last. 
With sentiments of high respect, 

I am your most obedient servant, 

D. L. CLINCH, 
Brigadier General U. S. Army, commanding. 
Major General Scott, 

Commanding Florida Army. 



No. 128. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 7, 1836. 

Sir : I have had no late intelligence from the vicinity of Fort Diane. 
The last was orally received by Captain Drane. 

On reflecton, I am now willing to receive into the service of the United 
States, for six months, unless sooner discharged, one company of mounted 
Floridians, to aid in the defence of the Alachua settlements. This force, 
to be accepted, must be strictly organized according to the act of 1792, 
viz : sixty-lour privates, four corporals, four sergeants, two musicians, one 
captain, one first and one second lieutenant, and one ensign or cornet. 
The two musicians are not indispensable, and more than sixty-four privates, 
say seventy or eighty, would be received with the four officers. My 
meaning is, that the number of officers must not exceed four to sixty-four 
privates. If a force of that extent can be raised in the Alachua settlements, 
let it be done as soon as practicable, and let application be made to the 
Governor for the commissions for the officers. Without waiting for the 
instructions of the War Department, I will instantly cause the company to 
be mustered into the service of the United States. 

With Wharton's detachment of United States dr. (goons, eight companies 
of United States foot, and the proposed company of mounted men, I am 
pursuaded that the Alachua settlements may easily be defended until the 
return of the season for recommencing active operations against the enemy. 



347 f 224 J 

Please cause a copy of this letter to be sent to the Governor of Florida, 
and let it be generally known in the neigboring settlements, that a com- 
pany of mounted men are wanted and will be accepted. Correspond with 
such individuals as may be known to be willing to aid in raising that force, 
and give all the encouragement in your power. 

I have acted on but few applications for leave of absence which have 
reached me from the neighborhood of Fort Diane. 

A few only of the officers, who have obtained certificates of disability, 
may be permitted, in extreme cases, to retire, and to make their application 
to me at this place. 

A steamer (the Cherokee) is now at Picolata- to receive discharged 
troops, there or at Garey's ferry. She will be detained a few days longer 
to await the arrival of Major Cooper's battalion. 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General Clinch, 

or U. S. officer commanding Fort Drane. 



No. 129. 



Headquarters, Army of the Centre, 

Fort Brooke, (Florida,) May 7, 1836. 

Sir : In obedience to general order, dated at Tampa bay, April 14, 
1836, the force under my command marched for the forks of the Withla- 
coochee river on the evening of the 14th instant. To protect the wagon- 
train in its passage over the Hillsborough, part of the command, consist- 
ing of the dragoons, United States artillery, and Nelson's Georgia mount- 
ed infantry, was detached with orders to cross the river, scour the ham- 
mock on the north side, and encamp on the outer edge of the hammock, 
and there await the coming up of the force the next morning. Notwith- 
standing this precaution, one wagoner, a private in Campbell's company, 
Alabama regiment of volunteers, was killed by the Indians, and during 
the night, the Alabama regiment was fired upon, and a sentinel, a pri- 
vate of Captain Cooper's company, severely wounded. The remainder 
of our march was effected without any disturbance from the enemy, and 
on my arrival at the Withlacoochee, not deeming it advisable to pass ray 
wagon-train over the river, which was badly bridged, and subject, on the 
approach of the rainy season, now said to be at hand, to great freshets, I 
determined to pack my wagons and artillery, and pass over a light col- 
umn of infantry for the purpose of making the required exploration of 
the country lying in the forks of the river ; retaining, for the defence of 
the pack, the battalion of the 4th infantry, under the command of Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Foster, and the battalion of artillery, under the command 
of Major Belton. Colonel Chisolm was ordered with the regiment of 
Alabama volunteers, to scour the country in the forks, and report all 
the signs coming under his observation, indicating the movement or pres- 
ence of the enemy. This officer proceeded with his command down the 
big Withlacoochee until he came to a point where the two streams were 



[ 224 ] 348 

separated from each other by a distance of one and a half miles ; he then 
crossed over to the little Withlacoochee, and took up that stream until 
he fell in with the main road leading from Fort King to Tampa bay. re- 
turning to my encampment by that road. For the particulars of his ex- 
pedition I refer you to his report accompanying this communication, dated 
Cam]) Crabb, April 22, 1836. To whatever cause it may have been owing, 
whether to the knowledge, on the part of the Indians, of the concentration 
of the three corps of the army at the Withlacoochee, on the 21stand22d, 
or to the distraction produced in their views by the previous move- 
ment of the respective columns towards the point of concentration, I am 
unable to say ; but the fact that there was a total absence of all signs in- 
dicating the presence or movement of the enemy near my position, was 
obvious. It did not occur to me until subsequent events revealed it, that 
this tranquillity, on the part of the enemy, was delusive, and was the 
mask under which he was preparing to strike a blow which he no doubt 
trusted would crush us. My attention was directed to the execution of 
the ulterior duties connected with the expedition, to wit, the abruption 
of the post of Fort Alabama, and the more forcibly, as the want of for- 
age and the consequent attenuation of my teams began to admonish me 
that my transportion would scarcely be adequate to the effecting even of 
that object. All the disadvantages of inadequate transportation were ag- 
gravated by the fact that seventy of the most destitute and helpless of 
sick of Brigadier General Eustis's army were thrown off upon my corps ; 
two-thirds of this number were so reduced and enfeebled as to require 
transportation in wagons. My own sick, in the mean time, had consid- 
erably increased, and on my return to Fort Alabama, instead of being able 
to remove the public property and stores from the post as I had intended, I 
was brought reluctantly to the conclusion that the whole of my wagon-train 
was insufficient for the removal of the sick alone to Tampa bay, and that 
the abruption of the post must necessarily be deferred until the army could 
return with its transportation relieved from the encumbrance of the sick. 
Our march to Fort Brooke was not interrupted by the enemy, and after 
resting a day and a half, procuring all the transportation which could 
be furnished by the quartermaster's department, for the removal of 
all the public property and stores from Fort Alabama, Colonel Chisolm, 
of the regiment of Alabama volunteers, was ordered with a detachment 
composed of his own regiment, the battalion of 4th infantry, under Brevet 
Lieutenant Colonel Foster, and a party of twenty of the 2d artillery, com- 
manded by Lieutenant Morgan, to remove the troops at Fort Alabama, 
break up the post, and bring away all the United States property, whether 
of provisions or ammunition. The command had scarcely proceeded 
three miles from Fort Brooke when they began to discover considerable 
signs of Indians, all the trails leading towards Thlonotosassa creek, and 
after passing that creek, it was equally apparent that a party had crossed 
from the Hillsborough. The detachment, however, moved on unmo- 
lested to Fort Alabama, effected the duty on which it had been sent, and, 
on the return march, was attacked about 3 o'clock, P. M., just as the ad- 
vance guard was preparing to cross Thlonotosassa creek, a small stream 
whose banks are lined with hammock and scrub, and whose course at 
this point presented the form of a horse-shoe, thus furnishing the Indians 
a dense covert, from which they were enabled to fire almost at the same 



319 [ 224 ] 

moment on the front and both flanks of the column of march. The first 
lire, as is usually the case with Indians lying in ambuscade, and firing as 
it may be said at a rest, was stunning, killing and wounding a considera- 
ble number of the troops, and many horses of the baggage-train, in the cen- 
tre column, that they became ungovernable and rushed furiously through the 
ranks of the flank columns, which were for a moment broken and disordered 
by them ; but it soon occurred to Colonel Chisolm that although the front, 
rear, and flank were nearly simultaneously and vigorously attacked, the real 
strength of the enemy was directed against the advance guard and the 
front of the column. Accordingly, three companies, under the command 
of Major Taliaferro, were ordered to sustain the companies in the ad- 
vance and front of the column, who were suffering under a severe and 
galling fire from the enemy, which they vigorously returned. With a 
view to the relief of this part of the column, Lieutenant Colonel Foster 
also directed Lieutenant Morgan, 2d artillery, at the same instant, to open 
upon the enemy a fire from the six-pounder under his charge. The ser- 
vice was very promptly performed by Lieutenant Morgan, under a very 
heavy fire from the Indians, who hoped to silence the piece by cutting 
down the artillerists, and after a discharge of twelve or thirteen rounds, 
which it is believed galled the Indians very much, Lieutenant Colonel 
Foster, at the head of the infantry, charged into the hammock, attacked 
and drove the Indians, and thus put an end to a conflict which had been 
kept up with unremitting fierceness and rivalry on both sides for one hour. 
The enemy, as soon as repulsed, become invisible, retreating through 
the cover of the thick hammock on the right, and the detachment, after be- 
ing on the ground long enough to provide for the carriage of the dead 
and the wounded, and gather the scattered horses and teams, resumed 
the line of march, encamped about four miles from the battle-ground that 
night, and returned to Fort Brooke early the next day. It is impossible 
to read the reports of Colonel Chisolm, and Colonel Foster, herewith 
forwarded, without feeling the highest gratification at the gallantly and 
coolness of the officers and corps engaged in this action. Without in- 
tending to detract from the merits of the regular force by saying such 
conduct was expected from them, I must be permitted to observe that 
many of the companies of the Alabama volunteers were placed, for a con- 
siderable length of time, under a galling fire, which they sustained and 
returned with a spirit which would have been highly honorble even to 
older soldiers. The fury of the onset, and the completeness of the re- 
pulse, leave us at a loss for the motives of the enemy in making the at- 
tack with such a disparity of numbers, nor can the difficulty be solv- 
ed but by the supposition that their recent success on the north end of 
the Withlacoochee has inspired them with an overweening, insolent 
confidence in the superiority of their prowess, or that they rely on that 
power which makes them invincible in the twinkling of an eye to the 
enemy which proves too hard for them in the encounter. Prior to the 
return of this detachment to Fort Brooke, one-half of the Louisiana vol- 
unteers, with 120 sick of the Alabama regiment, had embarked for New 
Orleans and Mobile. Transportation for the embarkation of three more 
companies of the Alabama volunteers, and the companies remaining of 
the Louisiana volunteers, being in the bay, they were directed to sail for 
Key West, and land the company of 4th infantry, ordered to that post. Two 



[ 224 ] 350 

companies of the 4th infantry, under the command of Brevet Major Sands, 
are in readiness to sail for the Suwannee, whenever transportation shall be 
furnished by the quartermaster's department for that place. Lieutenant 
Colonel Foster, with the remainder of the battalion of 4th infantry not 
detained here, accompanied the Louisiana volunteers to New Orleans, on 
his way to Baton Rouge. A force of 320 regular soldiers, composed 
principally of the 2d artillery and 4th infantry, commanded by Major 
Wilson, of the 4th infantry, will constitute the permanent force at Fort 
Brooke. The rainy season is belived to have set in, and from what I 
have seen of it, 1 think it would be impossible to keep the field with 
bodies of troops without a great, and for any objects which could be ac- 
complished, a wanton waste of life. The weather, for some days 
past, has presented an alternation of heavy falls of rain, for one or two 
hours continuance, succeeded by a hot sun, thus exhibiting the two great 
agents of disease, heat and moisture, in their most active form. Two 
stockade redoubts are being constructed and cannon mounted in them, 
with the view to sweep the entire plain on which Fort Brooke stands. 
Parties are also detached for clearing off the brush which might cover or 
conceal the approach of the enemy ; and having made all the arrange- 
ments for the defence of the post, and the disbursement of the force 
composing the centre of the army, I shall embark to-morrow for Mobile, 
in one of the transports which carries Nott's company. I am urged to 
this step by the state of my health, which unfits me for active duties, and 
which could not be restored during the continuance of the rainy season. 
I have turned over the command to Lieutenant Colonel Crabb, who is 
only waiting for the arrival of transports to take home the remainder of 
the regiment, Alabama volunteers, to Mobile. 
I have the honor to be, sir, 
With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

WM. LINDSAY, 

Colonel 2d Artillery. 
Maj. Gen. W. Scott, 

Commanding Army of Florida. 



No. 130. 



Camp Crabb, on the Withlacoochee, 

April 22, 1836. 

Dear Sir : In compliance with your order of the 20th instant, direct- 
ing a movement of the Alabama regiment to be made the next day down 
the big Withlacoochee, with a view to scour the country in the forks of 
the river, I proceeded from this place on yesterday at sunrise, across the 
big Withlacoochee, where the Fort King road crosses the same, into the 
forks of the two rivers of that name. My couise, after leaving the Fort 
King road, about a mile from the river, was slightly north of west, and 
down the right bank of the stream just named, until I arrived at a ham- 
mock, represented by our guide as the " big hammock." At this place 



351 [ 224 J 

I proceeded with the regiment in nearly a north direction, for several 
miles, until I reached the little or western branch of the Withlacoochee ; 
thence up that stream for several miles, until its course was nearly north ; 
thence, leaving the course of that stream, I proceeded northeast for sev- 
eral miles ; thence south of east on my return to the camp. In the course 
of the scout, I crossed several old paths, observing continually the ap- 
pearance of the trails and woods for sign of the enemy. There appeared 
fewer evidences of Indians, cattle, or game, in the fork of those streams, 
than in any other suspected section of the country through which we 
have marched. The fresh tracks of a horse proceeding southwest with 
speed, along one of the trails alluded to, was the only recent sign we 
discovered of a probable hostile movement. The face of the country 
over which we passed was generally high and somewhat rolling, with 
occasional glades, lakes, and small hammocks, the growth was princi- 
pally pine, with undergrowth of palmetto and other shrubbery, until we 
reached the big hammock, when there was a continuation of low land 
from one fork to the other, covered with live-oak, cypress, and forming 
one of the most dismal places I have ever seen. 

Respectfully, &c. 

WM. CHISOLM, 



Col. Wm. Lindsay. 



Colonel Alabama Regiment. 



No. 131. 

Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, Florida, 

April 29, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that, on the 26th instant, in obedience 
to your order, I accompanied (in command of the 4th regiment of United 
States infantry and a detachment of the 2d United States artillery, with 
one six-pounder) the Alabama regiment of volunteers on the expedition 
to break up the temporary fort on the Hillsborough river, and to escort 
the garrison, and the ammunition and provisions in store there, to this 
post. My troops constituted the right column of the army during this 
operation. The command of the army was intrusted to Colonel Chis- 
olm, of the^Alabama regiment. The duty was performed in a prompt 
and efficient manner, and in a much shorter time than was supposed it 
would require. 

On the 27th instant, about 3 o'clock P. M., the army, marching in three 
columns, with the baggage in the centre, and passing over a savannah, 
approached a hammock, through which ran a creek of considerable depth, 
but concealed from the view of any one on the plain. The Indians posted 
in the hammock, and mostly opposite the front guard and right column 
on the farther bank of the creek, opened upon the 4th regiment and the 
artillery a close, heavy, and well-sustained fire, at a distance, in many 
places, (their line not being parallel with ours,) of not more than thirty 
paces — in other parts of from thirty to seventy, or one hundred paces. 

Their first and second fires killed and wounded a number of horses of 
the baggage-train, consequently some confusion prevailed there for a few 



[ 224 J 352 

moments. In the mean time I pointed out to Lieutenant Morgan, of the 
artillery, the position in which I wished his gun to be placed. Finding 
the matrosses too few in number to effect this promptly, I ordered Lieu- 
tenant Alvord, of the 4th regiment, with half his company, (B,) and the 
pioneers of the regiment, to assist the artillery. My object was effected ; 
and the gun was well and very successfully served during the action. It 
was essentially necessary to the army. 

The 4th regiment had, during this time, opened its fire. The left col- 
umn, composed of a part of the Alabama regiment, had entered the woods 
on their side. I found my command alone on the plain with the baggage — ■ 
Colonel Crabb having entered the woods on his Hank by order of Colonel 
Chisolm, who believed that position well calculated to defend the train. 
The fire of the Indians (completely concealed) was heavy; I did not 
hesitate ; I knew my officers and men. During the firing, the regiment 
being in one rank, a pace apart, I could not be heard by the whole line — 
dismounted, and on foot, I passed from company to company, and informed 
them we must charge the enemy in his ambush. 

At the moment I was ready I met Colonel Chisolm, who approved my 

plan ; but informed me the regiment would have to pass creek in the 

hammock. The charge was made ; the creek passed ; and the hammock 
won. The success of the 4th was announced to the army — and to the 
enemy by three loud and cheerful huzzas. The battle ended almost im- 
mediately at all points. 

The army was attacked by upwards of three hundred Indians. I judge 
from their fire and the ground occupied by them. The fire lasted about 
an hour. I had with me Major Sands, Lieutenants Alvord, Scott, Prince, 
Mitchell, Tibbatts, and Reeve, of the 4th infantry, and Lieutenant Mor- 
gan, of the 2d artillery ; and it affords me great pleasure to say to you 
that all in my command did their duty, and did it well; and I deem it a 
happy circumstance in my lite that I had the honor to command officers 
so brave and men so good. Major Sands had his horse shot under him. 

I met Colonel Chisolm twice during the battle. He was calm and 
determined in his acts, and does credit to his State and regiment; and it 
is the opinion of a soldier who has seen twenty-four years' service, in 
peace and in war, that Alabama may be justly proud of her regiment. 
I am, sir, with high respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

WM. S. FOSTER, 
Ll. Col. commanding 4th infantry. 

The 4th infantry lost, during the whole operation, 2 privates killed and 
3 privates wounded. Several severely hit, and 2 horses shot. 

To Colonel Wm. Lindsay, 

U. IS. Artillery, commanding. 



No. 132. 
Headquarters of the Alabama Regiment, 

Camp Crabb, April 30, 1836. 

Dear Sir : In obedience to your order, dated at Fort Brooke the 25th 
instant, requiring me to inarch, on the day following, " with the regiment 



353 [ 224 ] 

of Alabama volunteers, the battalion of the 4th infantry, under Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Foster, and Captain Marks's company of Louisiana volun- 
teers, to bring away the troops, ammunition, quartermaster's stores, 
subsistence, and public property of every description at that post," I 
commenced my march on the day following, and, with the troops desig- 
nated, excepting Captain Marks's company, in the place of which I had a 
piece of artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Morgan — the whole 
command consisting of little upwards of six hundred men. 1 pursued the 
usual route, and reached the fort a little before sunset. The next morn- 
ing (the 27th) I directed the wagons to be loaded, and the two compa- 
nii s which had occupied the fort (Captain Bonham's and Captain Noti's) 
to If: in readiness to march. The wagons, nine in number^ were loaded 
with the ammunition, subsistence, &c, and the pack-horses (flicked, and 
eing ascertained that a considerable quantity of pork and flour, (the 
damaged flour having first been selected and destroj ed, — 1 consulted with 
three senior officers in command, Colonel Foster, Colonel Crabb, and 
Major Sands, and, by their advice, ordered il to be destroyed — I began 
the inarch from the fort about 1) o'clock, A. M., and continued it, with- 
out interuption, until we arrived* at the hammock on the Thlonotosassa 
creek, about eight miles from Fort Alabama. The order of march was 
in three columns, the centre in the road, composed of Captain Campbell's 
company, second battalion Alabama regiment, as advance guard; the ar- 
tillery, the wagons, and the pack-horses, in the order mentioned ; and 
Captain Bonham's, of the 2d, and Captain Martin's, of the 1st battalion 
Alabama regiment in the rear, and forming the re I. The battalion 

of 4th infantry, under Colonel Foster, formed the right column, and seven 
companies oi tl e Alabam; nl formed the lefl column, three com- 

panies of the 2d battalion in front. In this order the advance guard ap- 
proached near the creek, in front, and the whole column extended back 
through an open prairie, the rear guard j ing too woods in the rear. 

A thick hammock, with the creek near its boundary, extended, from some 
distance in front of the advance guard, along and near its right, and 
along a portion of the right column. On the right of the n ar guard was 
pine woods, and a small hammock, and some thick undei xtended 

on the left of the rear gu; portion of the roar of the left 

column. Nearly all the intermediate space was open prairie, extending 
far on the right t< a large pond. In this situation a heavy fire of rifles 
was opened from the hammock, on the right, upon the advance guard, 
and oh the right of the column oi' regulars, to which the artillery, wagon 
train, and pad: horses, and the three or lour front companies of the left 
column, were entirely exposed. This fire was kepi up uninterruptedly, 
and was soon followed by a fire on the rear guard, from the light of the 
road, and a few shots from the small hammock on the left. A well-di- 
re tea lire was immediately returned by the artillery and the regulars, 
with good effect. The three companies of the left column in front — 
Captain Waters's, Captain Nott's, and Captain Minter's — were directed, 
under the command ol Major Taliaferro, to extend around in front of the 
advance; guard, where they took a position on the creek, and in the pine 
woods (thinly wooded,) over the creek, and returned the Indians' fire; 
which was kept up, in good gun-shot distance, until the close of tin 
23 



[ 224 J 354 

tion, and they retreated to the main body. The companies commanded 
by Captains Blount, Taylor, and Capus, under the command oi" Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Crabb, were ordered into the small hammock on the left, 
and the Indians retreated before them, and finally joined, as was supposed, 
those who were firing; on the rear guard. Captain Dent's company, un- 
der the command of Lieutenant Childress, as ordered by Lieut. Colonel 
Crabb, supported the rear guard, and they all fired upon, and drove the 
enemy, which, in that place, they estimated to have been more than one 
hundred, entirely off. 

Much praise is due to Colonel Foster, and to his officers and men, and 
to the artillery, for the part they took in the action, and the bravery and 
skill with which they directed a deadly fire on the Indians, and charged 
the hammock from which they fired — Colonel Foster evincing, during 
the whole action, the utmost deliberation and coolness. Captain Camp- 
bell's company was much exposed, being first attacked, and suffered 
much, and it is due to them to say, that they kept their ground and fought 
bravely. The adjutant, and other staff officers of the Alabama regiment, in- 
cluding the surgeons, were much exposed, and discharged their several 
duties faithfully. The officers and men, generally, (among whom Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Crabb ought to be mentioned for his coolness and intre- 
pidity,) went to the several posts to which they were directed with 
promptitude, and maintained them with courage, doing all that any troops 
could do under similar circumstances. Although there was some confusion 
from the surprise of the first fire — a great number of horses, not less 
than twenty, being killed or wounded, and the wagons and pack-horses 
were running in every direction — the men kept their ground until en- 
tire order was restored amongst them, so that all could occupy the best 
position to defeat the enemy. Colonel Foster, Major Sands, Captain 
Campbell, and two or three others of his company who were riding, for- 
agemaster Jamison, and some others, had horses shot under them and fell. 
The action continued for an hour; the Indians fighting bravely, and 
coming out of the hammock, in many instances, to obtain near positions 
for firing. Their number is of course unknown, but, from the length of 
their line, and their continued firing, there could not have been less than 
from 300 to 400 — the lowest estimate I have heard being 300, and the 
general estimate much higher. A considerable number of them must 
have been killed and wounded, it being impossible to form any thing like 
an accurate estimate, as it is well known that they have some employed 
in carrying their dead and wounded immediately off. 

On their retreat, which was sudden and rapid, I had all the wagons 
collected, one excepted, which was so broken as to render it necessary 
to leave it, and all the pack-horses which could be found, and marched 
on about five miles that evening, passing the large hammock near Sim- 
mons's old place, and encamped within ten miles of this place. 

The following is a list of the killed and wounded, as reported by 
Doctor Doric S. Ball, surgeon : . 

Field and staff — M. Jamison, quartermaster department, killed. 

Captain Dent's company — S. N. Archibald, Henry Webb, slightly 
wounded. 

Captain Capce's company — Benjamin Parker, Joshua Mclntyre, slightly 
wounded. 



355 [ 224 J 

Captain Blount's company — None. 

Captain Taylor's company — None. 

Captain Martin's company — James C. Butts, Jas. W. Dodson, Felix 
G. Dodson, John Morgan, slightly wounded. 

Captain Minter's company — W. Randall, badly wounded, H. Racford, 
slightly wounded. 

Captain Nott's company — James Sankey, badly wounded. 

Captain Campbell's company — W. J. Couch, dangerously wounded, 
S. P. Lewis, badly wounded, Danl. Prentice, badly wounded, Peter 
Feely, killed, Henry Taylor slightly wounded, Luke White, badly 
wounded, Wm. H. Orr, killed, L. B. Strange, badly wounded. 

Captain Waters's company — Lieutenant B. R. Mobley, J. C. Boyd, 
Ensign J. Handley, slightly wounded. 

Captain Bonham's company — James Vickey, slightly wounded. Three 
privates of the 4th infantry. 

Total, 3 killed and 25 wounded. 

Very respectfully, yours, 

VVM. CHISOLM, Colonel. 

To Col. William Lindsay, 

Commanding centre Army, Florida. 



No. 133. 

Fort Brooke, 
Tampa Bay, April 26, 1836. 

General : In conformity with your orders, the regiment under my 
command was embarked on board of the two transports furnished by the 
quartermaster. They commenced embarking on the 10th instant, about 
5 o'clock, P. M., and were all on hoard by 9 o'clock, having been assist- 
ed by a boat from the United States sloop of war Vandalia, and by one 
from the United States cutter Dallas. The wind having died away, they 
did not sail until the 11th, about 2 o'clock, P. M. I went on board of 
the cutter Dallas, and hastened towards Charlotte harbor to stop the Van- 
dalia's boats there, under the command of Lieutenant Powell. In order 
to be sure of meeting Lieutenant Powell, whose boats were necessary in 
ascending the river, I went out of Tampa bay at night, and the next 
morning had arrived within 20 miles of Boca-Grande, and, a few miles 
further, met Mr. Powell on his way to Tampa bay, with all the fisher- 
men and their boats. We did not get into the harbor until the 12th, 
when I sent for the boats of the Spaniards, and engaged them, and a man 
for each to manage it. The transports not having come out the night we 
did, were later in arriving. As soon as the last one came, we immedi- 
ately stood up the bay with the transports, the Dallas, the two boats of 
the Vandalia, and 14 barges; the larger vessels grounded about 3 miles 
from the anchorage marked on the map you gave me, being from 38 to 
40 miles from the bar. As it was near night we debarked but a part of 
the men, and concluded that duty and issued 5 days' provisions, and had 
them cooked the next day. The succeeding morning, the 18th, we 
started up the river. The boats, with the Spaniards and part of the crew 
of the Vandalia's boats, accompanied by Captain Green, of the cutter 



[ 224 ] 356 

Dallas, and 18 men, took the channel of the river, while my regiment 
and the remainder of the men under Lieutenant Powell, took the route 
by land, intending to keep the bank of the river in company with the 
boats. 1 soon found this impracticable, as it was very seldom, and at re- 
mote points, that the marshes and hammocks permitted any approach to 
the river bank. The weather being excessively hot, and our route be- 
ing through the pine woods, where there was no fresh water, the men 
suiFered extremely, and some of them, the mosc robust, fainted in the 
ranks. We at last struck the river bank at an open spot, and soon saw 
the boats arrive. As I saw it was impossible to keep up our communi- 
cation with the boats, and we might be embarrassed by our sick and fa- 
tigued men, I ordered the whole to return under Major Marks from this 
place, (12 miles,) except what could embark in the boats; for this pur- 
pose I sent back all the Spaniards, and deposited the surplus provisions 
in the bushes, and thus made room in the boats for 152 men and officers, 
and one day's provisions besides the 5 cooked. 

We then embarked, and went up the river until we found fresh water, 
where we landed and encamped. Our force now consisted of 91 of my 
regiment, under Colonel Lawson, 41 from the Vandalia, and 20 from the 
Dallas cutter, including officers. The next day we continued up the 
river, and encamped at the site of a deserted Indian village or camp, 
probably that mention* d by Colonel Gadsden. 

Here we found some signs of recent occupation, as if by a passing 
band of 10 or 12, probably those who burnt Dr. Grain's house. The next 
morning we continued our course up the stream ; but now found it, in 
many places, very shoal, and obstructed by fallen trees. After cutting 
away some of these, and drawing our boats over the shoals, I found it 
would cause too much delay, even if we succeeded in getting up the river 
in this way. I returned, then, to our last camp, and left the boats there. 
We then crossed the river to the southern bank, and, passing about 2 miles 
through a thick swamp and hammock, intersected with gullies, came out 
upon the pine hills, and, jailing into a trail which ran about a mile and a 
half to a cowpen, there encamped on the edge of the swamp. The next 
day we followed this trail, but finding it led from the river towards the 
S. E., across an immense prairie, and observing that it had not been 
trodden lately, we left it and returned towards the river, and upwards 
along its course, but not within sight of it ; about noon we descended to 
the river through the hammock and forded it, and then across the oppo- 
site swamp out to the pine woods ; after marching about 10 miles further, 
about N. E., we encamped. The next morning we took up our march 
in the same direction until 11 o'clock, when we halted, and, having no 
provisions except for this day, I determined to return — the men having 
suffered very much from the heat, and the very difficult nature of the 
country. Our route, from the vessels to this point, was in length sixty- 
nine miles, not including that in the shoal part of the river ; but, having 
made a devious course, we returned in a straight line to our boats, and 
thence descended, with a strong current, to our vessels, making our de- 
scending route 52 miles. We embarked the next day alter our arrival, 
and now (the afternoon of the 25th,) one of the transports is here, and 
the other, a slower sailer, is off the bar. 



357 f 224 ] 



There was no one among the fishermen or Indians at Choldez Roncho 
that knew any thing of the river, or who could communicate any intelli- 
gence in relation to the country. The Indian prisoner you sent with us 
had been up the river a short distance, but was unacquainted with any 
route or shore, and was of no further use except as possessing that sa- 
gacity which seems part of an Indian's nature — in finding his way in an 
unknown country. The result of our excursion is, I am sorry to say, far 
short of your expectations. We have only found a few deserted vil- 
lages, and a tract of country without any signs of occupation for several 
months past, except by a very small party, passing through in one direc- 
tion. I forgot to mention, in its proper place, that, just before fording 
the river the day before the last of our descent, we crossed a trail, run- 
ning from a deserted camp on the river towards the S. E., it appeared to 
be the path of about 100 men marching by once, without cattle, but was 
more than two months old. The river is very crooked, and runs through 
a tract of swamps and hammocks about 2 or 3 miles wide, and which, 
under ordinary circumstances, would be considered impassable. In 
meandering from one side to the other of this swamp, it sometimes reaches 
the pine lands which lie on its outside, and it is only here that the stream 
can be conveniently approached. It may, therefore, be considered im- 
possible to march troops on the banks of the river. At about two miles 
back from the swamp is a level tract of pine land, on which are the ponds 
we see throughout the whole country. These ponds feed a series of 
sloughs, overgrown with thick woods, and, at this point, very wide, but 
as the waters gather together they form little streams, which, as they ap- 
proach the river, cut deep gullies, but are very narrow, and furnish good 
water to drink ; and it is here that a road running along the river would 
most conveniently pass. Further from the river are the ponds, which 
do not, at this season, furnish water to drink, although the earth is moist. 
Next are the hammocks where tho waters are collected, and which are 
too wide to pass ; but where the gullies are deep and narrow the water 
is very good, and the hammocks very narrow; nearer the river you fall 
into the swamp. The country seems favorable for the pasturage of cat- 
tle, but, unless in the hammocks, the ground is not arable, and on the 
river all the hammocks seem to be overflowed when the river is high. 
The Indians seem to have entirely abandoned this part of the country, 
and the only trails seen, seem to indicate they have gone towards the 
head of the Sanibel. 

On our route we observed two considerable branches — one, the smaller, 
coming in from the north, the other, further up, from the south ; the lat- 
ter, at its mouth, seemed to be the deeper stream. Captain Thistle and 
two men went some distance up the first, and found it diminish to a small 
stream, at about eight miles. 

Lieutenant A. Ross, of the marine corps, accompanied the expedition 
as a volunteer, and was placed in command of one of the columns. I 
owe much to his zeal and exertions, and am sure his well-known gal- 
lantry would have displayed itself if any occasion had offered. Lt. Pow- 
ell, of the navy, headed a gallant band of 40 men from the Vandalia. 
He took charge of the fleet of boats while we were on the river, and 
left nothing undone to secure our success, nor was he less zealous when 
on the land. Captain Green, of the revenue cutter Dallas, also accom- 



[ 224 ] 358 



panied us the whole of the route, and, when they left their boats, rivalled 
the best soldiers, not only by their discipline, but their activity. Indeed 
the exertions which these officers have made, and the manner in which 
they have anticipated every wish 1 have expressed towards the objects 
of the expedition, merit my warmest thanks ; and if ever it should be 
my lot to co-operate with those branches of the service, I can wish no 
better fortune than to be connected with gentlemen of their character 
and abilities. 

The Spanish fishermen have, I believe, left Charlotte harbor, but with- 
out any good cause, for they have never been troubled by a party of 
more than 6 or 7, and they are 30 strong. As soon as the troops can re- 
embark we will sail for New Orleans. I will, however, pass by St. Mark's, 
in order to send this report. Although the result of our expedition must 
disappoint your expectations, you must incur the censure for having in- 
trusted it to one of so little experience. 

Your obedient servant, 

PERSEFOR F. SMITH, 

Colonel Louisiana volunteers. 

Major General Winfield Scott, 

Commanding the Army of Florida. 



No. 134. 



Sir : I was directed by his Excellency Major General Scott, to for- 
ward my report to you for your perusal, and to request that you would 
have it transmitted to him at Garey's ferry, on the St. John's, if at that 
place, or wherever else he might be at the time of its reception by you. 
I am, sir, most respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

LEIGH READ, 
Major, commanding Florida volunteers. 
To General U. L. Clinch. 



Tallahassee, Florida, 

April 27, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that I succeeded in getting my entire 
command aboard of the transports furnished me by the quartermaster^ 
and was off the mouth of the bay on the morning of the 18th instant. 
Midshipman Reid, of the Vandalia sloop of war, reported himself to me 
as in command of two cutters of that vessel, and ready to receive my 
orders: the second cutter was placed under Midshipman Drake. 

I had not the good fortune to procure the personal presence of Captain 
Bunco, upon whose acquaintance with the coast of Florida and general 
experience as a pilot I had relied very greatly. He furnished me, how- 
ever, with a small sloop and three Indian sailors, who were represented 
as being quite familiar with the coast, &c. I derived no further assistance 



359 [ 224 ] 

from them than what, in obedience to the orders of their master, they 
were obliged to impart, viz : to conduct me to the mouth of the Withla- 
coochee — and when asked about the character of the interior, no satis- 
factory information could be procured — it was often contradictory, i 
resorted to liberal potations of ardent spirits as a means of extracting 
from them information which I have no doubt they possessed ; but the 
characteristic caution of the people was still observed. Some of them 
were always sufficiently sober to prevent indiscreet or dangerous com- 
munications. In all this they did not, as I believe, and I wish your Ex- 
cellency so to understand me, intend faithlessness to me or the objects of the 
expedition, as far as they comprehended them; but they were only true 
to me as far as they understood the letter of their instructions; which, 
as above remarked, was to pilot me to the mouth of the river. They did 
not or would not believe that it was any part of their duty to do more, 
and I could not convince them to the contrary. 

I sailed as rapidly for the mouth of the Withlacoochee as the winds 
would permit me, and as near the shore as the small vessel, aboard of 
which I was myself, would allow; but could never get nearer than a 
quarter of a mile. The transports could not approach closer, during the 
two first days, than about 15 miles; and on the third day, when arrived 
off the mouth of the river, they were quite out of sight — upwards of 20 
miles distant. When informed that the mouth of the Withlacoochee was 
near, I despatched all the small-craft to the transports, with orders to the 
officers in command aboard of them to commence debarking their men 
as fast as possible, intending in their absence to make a selection myself 
of a key among the almost innumerable cluster lying off the mouth of the 
river, as the point upon which the debarkation was to be effected. On 
the return of the boats transporting, as I had ordered, as many men as 
they could receive, the morning reports of the officers in command were 
handed me, by which the frightful picture of an increase of forty (40) 
to the sick-list in less than two days was presented. Special communi- 
cations from the surgeons were also handed me, in which the most hor- 
rible consequences were predicted, unless the men could be taken forth- 
with to some place where medicines and good water could be procured. 
The water aboard of the schooner Caroline, it was said, had already 
become putrid. Without going aboard, I despatched an order for them 
to hoist all sail, and proceed, with the utmost possible despatch, to St. 
Mark's, the nearest port. I remanded aboard of the transports the de- 
tachment first ordered to debark, and directed a select number of them 
to join me on board of the small-craft, for the purpose of making the 
reconnaissance and surveys, which, I find upon perusing my order more 
carefully than at first I did, were the principal objects of the expedition. 
I have found the Withlacoochee to be as difficult to discover as it is to 
enter after discovery ; and in regard to the latter, it is worthy of that 
which may heretofore have been said of it. It disembogues itself by 
four large, that is wide, and almost innumerable small mouths, amongst 
oyster banks, rafts, sand-bars, islands, and without calculation. When 
informed by the pilot that we were almost at the mouth, I went, myself, 
into the second cutter of the Vandalia — it drew less water than the 
other — taking with me only two of my detachment, and attempted to 
enter it, but was under the necessity, in order to do so, to have the boat 



[ 224 ] 860 

hauled some fifty yards, the water not being over eight inches on the 
bar for that distance. J ultimately succeeded in getting over, and after 
•ascending near a mile, found two and a half fathoms. The mouth, the 
one on the south of a large island called Amarura island, by which I 
entered is much the ividest. The northern one, however, affords the 
best water; where, when a freshet above and high tide below may unite, 
four feet may be carried over the bar; but the channel on that side is 
of very dangerous navigation on account of the number of rocks in it. 

The country around the mouth of the river is a low flat marsh, through 
which I conceive it impossible to make an ingress with an army into 
the interior. When once fairly over the bar at the mouth of the river, 
there would be no difficulty in ascending the stream; but steam-boats 
only, and those must be of light draught, could effect that object. 

When I had gotten over the bar, 1 proceeded some two miles and 
upwards to within a short distance of a large smoke, the fire that aiforded 
which was perhaps three miles distant. I deemed not prudent to go 
further, and caused the boat to return, and went out by one of the small 
outlets. 1 had seen fires the night before near the mouth of the Wa- 
wau-ciu-a-yu-hacka, and from that place I discovered smoke during the 
day and (ires at night all round the coast to within a few miles of Su- 
wannee Old Town. The Indians are evidently there in great number, 
and are, I have very little doubt, engaged in preparing for a crop this 
season, by burning the old grass from the woods, for the benefit of their 
cattle, and putting their small potatoes in cultivation. 

I saw no smoke west of the Steinhache, or indeed nearer than fifteen 
miles of the Suwannee. During the whole voyage, I kept as near the 
shore as I could approach from Tampa bay to St. Mark's, and I am clearly 
of opinion that there is not, perhaps, any where to be found so shoal 
coast as the one along which I sailed. The average depth of water from 
one to the other of those places, where I sailed, cannot be more than seven 
feet; and the shore cannot be approached at any place, where 1 had an 
opportunity of examing it or it was deemed important to examine it, with 
that draught, nearer than two miles. 

From Cedar keys, by a S. S. E. direction, seven feet may be taken up to 
within two miles of the mouth of the Withlacooehee, but at every other point 
that might probably be selected to debark troops, reefs and oyster-bars 
abound. I have seen several islands near the mouth of the river that 
might possibly do very well for depots, where I have no doubt fifty men might 
repel any attack that the enemy could make upon them; but I doubt 
whether it might not be a better fate to send that number into the coun- 
try, to go the way that Dade's, and I much fear Ilolcoman's comrades have 
gone. If, however, the Government will employ a steamboat, there will 
be no difficulty in throwing into the country, either at the Wacassa or 
Wa-wau-cui-a-yu-hacka rivers, or both, any quantity of supplies, as well 
as any number of men that may be wanted. The latter river may be 
approached with five feet, and, as I understand, ascended to its head, some 
six miles, where a beautiful and elevated country is to be found, and 
where I am of opinion the women and children of the enemy have been 
secreted. I should deem the chance of success so great, in an expedition 
up that river, that I should be greatly gratified to have command of it. 
I am confident I should be able to make a good report. 



861 [ 224 ] 

Your Excellency did me the honor to desire that I should submit, 
after surveying the whole grounds as nearly as I could, a recommenda- 
tion of a plan of campaign against the enemy, from the mouth of the With- 
lacoochee, should such ever be determined upon. The plan I suggest 
is this : Let a steamboat of light draught of water be properly prepared 
with bulwarks, particularly on the hurricane deck, be manned with 
(say) five companies, and ordered to ascend, first one and then the other, 
of the rivers above named, viz : Wacassa, Withlacoochee, and Wa- 
wau-cui-a-yu-hacka. They will be able to produce a prodigious effect, I 
have no doubt. At all events, a healthy site may be found, at which to 
establish a depot, and from which operations may hereafter be commen- 
ced. 

I discovered, at the mouth of the river, the half of a flat-bottom boat, 
a common ferry flat-boat, it appeared to have been. It had been cut 
asunder by an awkward hand and a dull axe. When I arrived at St. 
Mark's, 1 found, much to my astonishment, mortification, and regret, that 
your Excellency had ordered Major McLemore to establish a depot at 
that place; and instead of being a " new field," as it was described to 
be, another had been ordered to precede me. All of ivhich was studi- 
ously concealed from me. I did not hear, either from your order or 
from the numerous interviews which I had the honor to hold with your 
Excellency, that Major McLemore was even in the field, much less that 
I was going to relieve a detachment of his command, ordered out by 
your Excellency. 

Your obedient servant, 

LEIGH READ, 
Major command' g Florida Volunteers. 

To his Ex'cy Major General Scott, 
Commanding Florida Army. 



No. 135. 



Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 11, 1836. 
Order No. 46. 

The commander of the left wing will immediately cause to be mount- 
ed, two of the companies of United States artillery of this wing, using for 
that purpose the horses of the baggage train. 

The companies, under a system of instructions which will be formed, 
will be immediately employed in patrolling and scouring the frontiers, 
and other exposed settlements this side of the St. John's. 

The three remaining companies of the same regiment will be placed 
in such positions as to afford the best point of support for the mounted 
companies. 

By command of Major General Scott. 

J. E. JOHNSTON, 
Aid-de-camp, and Asst. Adjutant General. 



224 ] .°62 

No. 136. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 11, 1836. 

Sir : I have been using my best endeavors, since my arrival here, to 
cause a company of mounted Floridians to be raised to aid in the defence 
of the settlements between the St. John's and the Atlantic. You have 
been recommended to me as an individual highly qualified to command 
such corps, and I am also informed that you have already enrolled about 
twenty-four men. I have to request that you will proceed in the busi- 
ness of enrolment, as it will give me great pleasure to recognise a com- 
pany with you at the head of it. 

A company, according to the act of Congress, (passed in 1792,) must 
consist of at least 64 privates. To that number, a captain, a first and sec- 
ond lieutenant, an ensign, a cornet, four sergeants, four corporals, and 
musicians, are allowed by the same law. I learn that a new act of Con- 
gress, that has not yet reached me, has been very recently passed, which 
may be more favorable to volunteers. 

I would prefer a company of 70 or 80 privates to one of 64, but so im- 
portant do I deem the company, that I will accept it with 40 privates. 
In this case, however, only a captain, a lieutenant, and a cornet can 
be accepted with it. 

I have to add, that the company, as soon as raised, shall be taken into 
the service of the United States for six months, unless sooner discharged, 
and in all respects placed on the most favorable footing. It will be in- 
dispensable that I should apply to his Excellency the Governor of the 
Territory for commissions for the officers of the company : this can be 
done after the company is accepted, so as to avoid delay ; and under pres- 
ent circumstances, not a day ought to be lost. 

I remain, with respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELU SCOTT. 

To Douglass Dummett, Esq. 



No. 137. 



Headquarters, Armv of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 16, 1836. 
Orders No. 47. 

The volunteers having returned to their respective homes, the distinc- 
tions of right and left wing, and centre, have ceased in this army. 

Major Heileman will repair to Fort Drane, and relieve Lieut. Col. 
Bankhead in the command of the troops on the Alachua and Suwannee 
frontiers. On being so relieved, the Lieutenant Colonel will be permit- 
ted — reporting himself to the adjutant general — to retire from Florida for 
the benefit of his health. 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 



363 [ 221 J 

No. 138. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

SI. Augustine, May 17, 1836. 

Orders No 48. 

The panics which have recently possessed the good people of several 
large districts of this Territory are infinitely humiliating. 

Within a few days, just five Indians penetrated a neighborhood in the 
heart of Middle Florida, and committed a murder. Instead of giving 
pursuit, the inhabitants abandoned their plantations and fled to Tallahas- 
see and Monticello. 

A similar party had but a few days before thrown the Micanopy set- 
tlement into the utmost confusion. A gang of cow-stealers adroitly added 
areport that an immense fresh Indian trail had been observed crossing the 
Tallahassee road, near the Santa Fe bridge. The whole country from 
Micanopy to Black creek, instantly became wild with fear. The daring 
falsehood was immediately exposed by Colonel Fitzpatrick and Captain 
Shannon of the army, who happened to pass that way, together with the 
motive of the propagators ; but the inhabitants could see nothing but an 
Indian in every bush, and therefore continued to fly. 

On this side ofthe St. John's a keen susceptibility of the same kind pre- 
vails. A small party of the enemy lately ventured within the settlements. 
A company of regular foot was promptly mounted, sent in pursuit, beat 
the enemy, and secured most of the property the marauders had taken. 
Now, although it is known to all cool people, that the greater number of 
the party were killed outright, and that a like fate awaits any body of 
the enemy that may follow, a panic is rife throughout the country. The 
inhabitants are still flying to St. Augustine, and from St. Augustine to 
Georgia and South Carolina. 

It is evident that no general, even with extensive means, can cure a 
disease in the public mind, so general and so degrading, without some 
little effort on the part of the people themselves. Thus the planters in 
the recent case near Tallahassee, who fled without knowing whether 
they ran from squaws or warriors, ought first to have ascertained that 
material fact. If they had turned upon the enemy, they would have 
found the case within the easy compass of any three or four resolute 
masters, and half as many overseers. This was the simple and manly 
course. That adopted was, to fly, to spread the panic, and to throw 
execrations upon the general who has the misfortune to command a 
handful of brave troops in the midst of such a population. 

Not a regular company has been sent out of the Territory, except, 
possibly, three from Tampa bay. Besides a strong garrison there, two 
companies were directed thence to occupy a post on the Suwannee ; two 
are posted at Fort King; five at Fort Drane ; one (mounted United 
States dragoons) at Oakland's, six miles off; one at Micanopy, and a 
twelfth at Garey's ferry. 

These forces ought, in the opinion of the commanding General, to give rea- 
sonable security to the Alachua and Suwannee frontiers, particularly if one 
or two companies of mounted men can be obtained to aid the company of dra- 
goons in scouring the country between the chain of fixed posts. Measures 



[224 864 



have been taken to encourage the enrolment of mounted men, and itisun- 
derstoodthatthe Governor isexertinghimselfinthe same way. His Excel- 
lency will, moreover, to complete the means of defence, be requested to 
hire on account of the United States, at Appalachicola or elsewhere, a suita- 
ble steamboat to cruise from the mouth of the Suwannee up that river as far 
practicable. One of the companies supposed to be already on the river 
will be instructed to embark and remain onboard the boat. 

On this side of .the St. John's, the means of defence, though much 
more limited, are deemed fully adequate, if aided by a single company of 
mounted volunteers ; arcd one, it is hoped, will soon present itself for the 
service. Of the five regular companies, one has already been mounted 
on horses belonging to the wagon-train, and in a few days another will 
be put on horseback by the same means. The commanding General has 
no power to purchase horses expressly for this purpose. The companies 
on foot will be posted, whilst the mounted will be kept constantly in 
movement: and it may be added that the little armed steamer called the 
Essayons, belonging to the United States, will be kept daily cruising 
up and down the St. John's. 

The post and steamboat on the Suwannee, Fort King, Oaklands, Mi- 
canopy, and Garey's Ferry, will all be under the immediate orders of 
the field officer, Major Heileman, statioKed at Fort Drane, and he will 
communicate freely with the Governor of the Territory. 

Should the post ordered to be established at Watson's or Dabney's 
plantation, prove to be unhealthy, the commanding officer is authorized 
to remove higher up the river, in search of a better position, giving the 
preference to the left bank of the stream. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 139. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 17, 1836. 

Sir : I had the honor to receive your Excellency's letter, dated the 
28th ultimo, a few days ago. I was then too sick to reply, and now, 
with much difficulty, hold my head up to write. 

I am happy to hear that you have taken measures to put a certain 
force of mounted men into the field to aid the regular troops in defend- 
ing the exposed frontiers. One or two companies of that description 
would be highly effective on the Alachua and Suwannee frontiers, and 
one other similar company is wanted on this side of the St. John's. I 
myself had taken such measures as were in my power to effect both 
objects, intending, of course, to refer the officers at the proper time to 
your Excellency for approval and commissions. Some of my views on 
those points are stated in my order No. 48, a copy of which I beg here- 
with to submit. 

Should a larger mounted volunteer force be deemed by you as necessary, 
on either or both of the frontiers, I shall cheerfully yield my judgment 
on the point to that of your Excellency. 

Permit me to ask you to carry out the suggestion of the enclosed order 



865 I 224 J 

in respect to the steamer to be employed in cruising up and down the 
Suwannee river. Instructions shall immediately go to the commanding 
officer on that river to place a company on board the steamer, and to 
take charge of her. His cruising orders will be, besides keeping the 
post well supplied with provisions, to move continually up and down the 
river, to prevent the enemy from passing to the west side ; to land the 
troops it' necessary to reach parties of the enemy ; to capture boats and 
canoes. 

All the horses at my disposal and fit for service are required to re- 
mount a company of United States dragoons, to mount two companies 
of foot on this side of the St. John's, and to supply the vicinity of Fort 
Diane with subsistence. 

Brigadier General Clinch's resignation left Lieutenant Colonel Bank- 
head in command on the Alachua and Suwannee frontiers ; but as his 
health is bad I send Major Heileman, a sound and intelligent oilicer, to 
replace him. 

1 have, from rumor, been for some days expecting to hear of your ar- 
rival in this vicinity. It would give me great pleasure to meet and to 
confer with you on ail points connected with with the defence of Florida, 
or the best manner of recommencing hostilities. 

Major Read, no doubt for good reasons, has neglected to report to me. 
I can only say to you that he had written and oral orders, explicit and 
emphatic, requiring him to ascend the Withlacoochee to the highest point 
of navigation ; to ascertain the best site for a military post, &c. He 
also unofficially knew that it was deemed, in the right wing of the army, 
just possible that he would find a blockhouse already there with a garri- 
son. Therefore, when he saw the part of the flat, described in a former 
letter of yours as being rudely cut it two by a dull axe, he must have 
had all previous uncertainties about such post cleared up at once. I, 
however, forbear to say more on this point at present. My corre- 
spondence with Brigadier General Clinch on the subject of the block- 
house has been, I presume, sent to you by that General, and I hope daily 
to learn that the expedition intended for its succor, from the Suwannee, 
has fully succeeded. The flat, I presume, got adrift, and thus fell into 
the hands of the Indians. 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

P. S. Colonel Lindsay had instructions, on his return to Tampa bay, 
not only to send two companies of the United States fourth infantry to 
the Suwannee, but one of the same regiment to Key West. It is presumed 
("hat both orders were executed.' I will beg your Excellency to cause a 
field-piece to be placed on the bow of the steamer to be hired for the 
Suwannee. If not nearer, one may be obtained at Tampa bay. 

I have already received a strong demand from the Mayor of Savan- 
nah for a company to be sent from Florida. Of course, I shall not 
comply. 

I will beg your Excellency to urge upon Commodore Dallas the im- 
portance of keeping the cutters and the smaller United States vessels 



[ 224 ] 866 

constantly cruising around Florida, to prevent the escape of captured 
slaves, and to prevent the Indians from receiving arms and ammunition 
from traders. W. S. 

His Excellency R. K. Call, 

Governor of Florida. 



No. 140. 



Tallahassee, May 2G, 183G. 

Sir : I have the satisfaction to acknowledge the receipt of your letter 
of the 17th instant, and a copy of your Order No. 48, by express. 

Before you return from the field, having heard that the Indians had 
reappeared in Alachua, I ordered Colonel Sanchez, of that county, to 
call out the whole available strength of his regiment, and Colonel War- 
ren to send fifty horsemen from Duval, for the purpose of protecting the 
frontier. I subsequently divided East Florida into two districts, giving 
Major Putman charge of that east of the St. John's, and Colonel Warren 
that between the St. John's and Suwannee rivers, with authority to each 
of those officers to call from the respective districts such a number of 
men as would effectually hold the enemy in check, and give security to 
the settlements. The population of that county was fully adequate, with 
the aid of the regular force, to perform this duty ; but it appears that they 
have retired without resistance, leaving the enemy in undisturbed pos- 
session of their homes. A panic highly dishonorable to the whole country 
has spread over the land, when, by one manly effort, the enemy might 
have been repulsed, and their homes and property defended. I shall 
adopt the necessary measures to hold the officers accountable for their 
neglect in not executing my orders. In Middle Florida I shall have in the 
field in a few days 200 men, the greater part of whom will be well mount- 
ed. This, with the regular force you propose stationing on the Suwannee, 
I think, will give ample protection to this section of country, if we are 
not invaded by the Creeks. To guard against that contingency, I have 
sent special agents to confer with the Governors of .Georgia and Alaba- 
ma, and to request that each of those States may place on the southern 
and eastern frontier of the Creek nation a formidable force to prevent 
the retreat of the Indians to Florida. 

The steamboat sent to the Withlacoochee for the relief of the block- 
house, has orders to ascend the Suwannee as far as the old town. She 
has about one hundred men on board, which, with the detachment of 
horse I have ordered to that place, I hope will meet them in time to cut 
off the Indians I mentioned in my last as crossing the river. This boat 
I will keep employed in the manner you have mentioned, until another 
can be procured. She wants a six-pounder and can be rendered very 
efficient. 

I shall by the mail of to-night address Commodore Dallas on the sub- 
ject of guarding the coast from the visits of Spanish fishermen, agreeably 
to your request. 

The plan of defence which I have had the honor of presenting by 



#67 [ 224 ] 

Colonel Fitzpatrick, appears to me to offer the greatest certainty of suc- 
cess, if it can be adopted. This, however, will depend on the number 
of regular troops you may be able to concentrate at the point designated. 
Four or five hundred militia can be drawn from the Territory, and if a 
force of 1,200 men can be assembled, I should think it sufficient; but of 
this you are the better judge. Should you think favorably of the plan, 
you will please advise me, in order that I may take the necessary meas- 
ures for calling out the militia. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. K. CALL. 
Major General W. Scott, 

Commanding the army in Florida. 



No. 141 



War Department, 

June 1, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor, b} r direction of the President, to transmit you 
a copy of a communication addressed to him by the honorable Joseph M. 
White, the delegate in Congress from Florida. 

You were advised, on the 25th ultimo, of the arrangements that had 
been made for the prosecution of the campaign in Florida, in the event 
of your having left that Territory, and General Clinch's having withdrawn 
from the service. The intelligence, recently received, of your illness at 
St. Augustine, rendered it doubtful whether you would be able to con- 
tinue in the command. The instructions to General Call were, there- 
fore, full, and gave him authority, if General Clinch retired from the 
army, to take the general direction of the operations in Florida. I am 
instructed to inform you that, under these circumstances, the President 
deems it unnecessary for you to leturn to the commanded in Florida. 
Very respectfully, 

Your most obedient servant, 

C. A. HARRIS, 
Acting Secretary of War. 
Major General Scott, 

Fort Mitchell, Alabama. 



No. 142. 

Washington, May 28, 1836. 
Sir : By orders recently issued from the War Department, it is directed 
that, should Major General Scott leave the headquarters of the army in 
Florida and retire from that command, it will devolve on Brigadier Gen- 
eral Clinch. This order leaves to the discretion of General Scott the 
period of his departure. It is with the greatest pain that I feel myself 



f 224 ] 868 

constrained, by a sense of duty to my constituents, respectfully to ask 
that General Scott be immediately relieved from the command. No man 
has more admiration for the gallantry or respect for the military achieve- 
ments of General Scott than I have. 

From the present attitude of affairs, and unfortunate and disagreeable 
occurrences which have happened in that quarter, the public interests, as 
well as the lives, security, and property of the inhabitants, imperiously 
require the order I have recommended. There is no harmony between 
him and the public authorities of the Territory ; and it is evident that he 
is in the highest state of exacerbated feeling, on account of an atrocious 
outrage on all decency and propriety, in burning him in effigy at Talla- 
hassee. This infamous proceeding, which ought to have been arrested 
and punished by the authorities at the seat of Government, does not jus- 
tify General Scott for the degrading epithets and insults he has offered to 
a whole population. In his published orders he represents the conduct of 
the people of Middle Florida as u infinitely humiliating," and the people 
"wild with fear," possessed of " a disease so general and so degrading." 

This is not the usual language of a Major General commanding on our 
frontiers, and should not, under any circumstances, be resorted to, what- 
ever may have been the disappointments and wounded sensibilities of 
a commanding general. I ask upon what authority he says there were 
just "five Indians" who have produced that consternation, panic, and 
flight, of which he has drawn a picture so derogatory to the whole pop- 
ulation ? It is well known that the Indians never show their whole force, 
and if five have penetrated into the country from the Indian boundary 
to within a few miles of the seat of Government, a much larger number 
will soon follow. As General Scott did not succeed with five thousand 
men in destroying five Indians, he might have spared the inhabitants he 
has left defenceless such degrading denunciations. As that, however, is 
an affair between him and the Governor, as to the number of the enemy, 
and the defence of Middle Floiida, I shall proceed to what is the object 
of this communication. 

My purpose is, most respectfully, to request an inquiry into the man- 
ner of conducting the late campaign in Florida, and into the conduct of 
the major general commanding, for having gone into summer quarters 
the last of April, leaving the country without defence, and the inhabit- 
ants at the mercy of the Indians. 

Major General Scott had power to call upon the Governors of South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, for any number of men that he 
might consider necessary to put an end to the war. Congress, by law, 
had provided ample means ; and whilst he was in command the Governor 
of Florida had no power to call for troops. General Scott, after one un- 
successful campaign, disbanded the whole militia force ; but the term of 
service of a portion of it had expired, and has neither called, by draught or 
for volunteers, for any other further military force. He has, on the con- 
trary, refused the acceptance of some that was offered, and has disarmed 
the militia of East Florida. 

When called upon now to furnish adequate force for the protection of 
that frontier, he complains of his limited means ; when it is apparent, 
from the above statement, that his means are only limited by his discre- 
tion ; and that he has power at any moment to order any number from 



3G9 f 224 ] 

Georgia or South Carolina. He admits that 3,000 men are necessary to 
subdue these Indians, and that he has but 1,000 under his command. 
Now, I ask why it is that he has not these 3,000 men in the field that 
he deems necessary ? He, and he alone, is responsible for all the lives 
and property of the inhabitants that may he destroyed for the want of 
that protection and security for which every citizen of the republic has a 
right to look for from his Government. Added to this the feelings of 
the people are outraged by representations calculated to degrade and 
expose them to ridicule throughout the United States. 

These people, you are aware, are sparsely settled over an extensive 
territory, in detached neighborhoods, without any dense population to fall 
back upon, or without any fortified places in which to place their wives and 
children for safety. If, upon the first sound of alarm, some small neigh- 
borhood should go in pursuit of even five Indians, they might, as they 
did with General Scott's grand arm)', dodge out of the way, and fall 
back upon the women and children in the rear. It is unnecessary, how- 
ever, to detain you with these details : the complaint I make is, that Ma- 
jor General Scott has left that country without adequate protection, and 
has not a sufficient force either for offensive or defensive operations. He 
has produced a state of feeling that forbids all harmony or concert with 
the local authorities, or people of the country ; and the public interests 
imperiously require his immediate withdrawal. 
I have the honor to be, 

With high considerations of respect, sir, 
Your most obedient servant, 

JOS. M. WHITE. 

To Andrew Jackson, 

President of the United States. 



No. 143. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 1836. 

Sir : In justice to myself, I beg leave to say a word in defence of my 
order issued in Florida, and numbered 48, on the subject of panics in 
several large districts of that Territory. That order was written when I 
was still quite sick ; but upon the most certain and precise information. 
It has brought upon me much abuse. A copy of it was enclosed by me, 
with a letter to his Excellency Governor call. In reply, I have just re- 
ceived from him a letter via St. Augustine, dated the 26th ultimo, in 
which he says : " A panic highly dishonorable to the whole country has 
spread over the land, when, by one manly effort, the enemy might have 
been repelled, and their homes and property defended." This is suffi- 
cient confirmation of my assertions, if any were wanted. Besides, I was 
advised, by respectable citizens of Florida, to come out with an order in 
that spirit, as likely to rally the inhabitants, and I have reason to know 
that the order did good. It further stated what had been done for the 
24 



[ 224 



370 



defence of the settlements, and what remained for the inhabitants to do 
for themselves ; that is, it was shown that, to complete the defence of 
the settlements, three companies of mounted Floridians were required. 

It is utterly false that I ever offered the slightest disrespect to the civil 
or political authorities of Florida ; and ail the candid and intelligent offi- 
cers of that Territory, with whom I conversed, agreed with me as to the 
inefficiency of their militia generally. 

I disbanded, nor caused to be disbanded, not a company of volunteers, 
until within a few days before or after its term of service was out. Ma- 
jor Ross's battalion of mounted Georgians that arrived at Picolata about 
the 10th of April, having then three months to serve, was sent home 
with honor by Lieutenant Colonel Crane, after advising with Major 
General Macomb. I had no hand in that act. On the contrary, I in- 
structed Lieutenant Colonel Crane that, in case more mounted men 
should arrive from Georgia, to receive them with honor, to muster them 
into service, and instruct them to wait for orders. 

There was one other, and only one company (Captain Nelson's 
mounted men) that was discharged before its time was out, or very nearly 
out. That company returned to Fort Drane with Brigadier General 
Clinch, who, on his own responsibility, and without any instructions 
from me, discharged it, with three other mounted companies of the same 
State, (Georgia,) and without causing the four companies to be paid. 
Yet, General Clinch detained, at Fort Drane, Major Cooper's battalion 
of foot some time longer, and quite to the end of the period for which it 
had been mustered. The reason seems to be, that General Clinch, like 
myself, had not, until some time after the horse had been discharged, the 
slightest expectation that the frontiers would be seriously annoyed by the 
enemy in the course of the summer and autumn. 

The horse were probably not paid from the indisposition of the pay- 
master, Major Lytle, an officer of great merit. 

I beg that this letter may be laid before the President, and 
Have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

W1NFIELD SCOTT. 

To the Hon. L. Cass, 

Secretary of War. 



No. 144. 



Washington, December 13, 1836. 

Sir: I was informed, for the first time, to-day, that my letter to the 
President of the United States of May last, had been communicated to 
the Court of Inquiry of which you are President, to be used as evidence 
against Major General Scott, whose conduct is now under examination. 

This places me in an attitude that I do not choose to occupy — that of 
an accuser of the distinguished officer into whose military operations you 
are now inquiring. 

Since the publication of that letter, I have, in the National Intelligencer, 



371 [ 224 ] 

over my own name, as an act of justice to General Scott, corrected, upon 
better information, the complaints which I deemed it my duty, as the 
representative of the people of Florida, to make against him. I am un- 
willing that the first letter shall be laid before the Court without the 
second ; and, as I have no copy of it with me at present, I take this 
occasion to say that I am satisfied, upon a full and impartial review of the 
facts and circumstances connected with the Florida campaign, and upon 
evidence not then before me, that the failure is not to be attributed to 
Major General Scott, nor to causes which it was in his power to con- 
trol or to remove. 

It was my intention to have availed myself of the first appropriate 
occasion, in the House of Representatives, to have declared this, in my 
place, as an act of justice to a distinguished officer. 

In saying this, I confine the corrigendum to his military operations. I 
neither intend to explain or retract any thing I said of " Order No. 48," 
reflecting on the people of Florida ; and, whilst I admit that there is 
much palliation in the order of a major general founded on the reports of 
two of the highest officers and most conspicuous citizens of Florida, I 
can never think that there was any justification for the charge, however 
it may have originated, or by whomsoever avouched or endorsed. 

If my letter has been laid before the Court, I have to request that you 
will present this for their consideration, in explanation of the other. 
I have the honor to be 

Your most obedient servant, 

JOSEPH M. WHITE. 

To Major General Macomb, 

President of the Court, fyc. 



No. 145'. 



Headquarters, St. Augustine, 

May 16, 1836. 

General: Major General Scott being still indisposed, and having no 
staff officer near him, has directed me to address this to you by a schooner 
about to sail for Charleston, and to say that it is his request that all the 
officers belonging to the companies now in Florida, who are absent from 
any other cause than surgeons' certificates, may be ordered immediately 
to join their companies; and, further, that he requests that six medical 
officers may be ordered to report to him for duty as soon as practicable. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your humble servant, 

ABM. EUSTIS, 
Brevet Brigadier General. 
To the Adjutant General, 

United States Army. 



[ 224 ] 372 

No. 14G. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 20, 1836. 

Sir : Since my letter to you of the 1 1th instant, I have been more sick 
than before ; that is, confined to bed the greater part of the time. I 
am now slowly recovering strength, but still unable to attend to more 
than ordinary and pressing business. 

I enclose the report [of Colonel Smith] of the expedition to Charlotte 
harbor, and up Pease creek. Nothing has been received from Colonel 
Lindsay ;• and Major Read, of course, remains silent, in order to conceal, 
as iar as he can, his shameful failure to ascend the Withlacoochee. He 
seems to prefer to rely on such false statements as he is enabled to im- 
pose upon the public through an obedient newspaper. I have none at 
my command. 

I enclose cooies of two Orders, Nos. 47 and 48, and of special Order 
No. 2G. 

No. 48, of course, has much excited the good people of this vicinity 
against me. It contains unpalatable truths; not one of which can be 
disputed. Good will come out of the order; and if it fail to stop emigra- 
tion, those who remain will see the necessity of their doing something 
for themselves. Thus, in a day or two, I have every reason to believe 
that a company of mounted men, with, however, but forty privates, will 
be presented to me for service on this side of the St. John's. I propose 
to accept it with but three officers. If the number of privates should be 
carried to the standard, (sixty-four,) I have promised the fourth officer. 

I have not heard what progress has been made in obtaining volun- 
teers for the Alachua and Suwannee frontiers; but, from the failure of Gen- 
eral Clinch, and the absence of all reports, I fear that the inhabitants of 
the neighboring counties will prefer flight to the defence of their homes. 

Among the accompanying papers will be found copies of letters from 
me to the Governor of the Territory [dated May 17th] and to Major 
Heileman, [also of May 17th.] 

From the Mayor of Savannah I have received a request for a company 
to be stationed in that city pending the ensuing summer and autumn. I 
have replied, that I could not detach one from the defences of Florida. 

I shall not be able to mount the second company of regular foot as soon 
as I had hoped, owing to the condition of the remaining horses of the 
late baggage-train. Many have sore backs, and all are low in flesh, 
though improving fast. In twelve or fifteen days, forty-five may be in a 
condition to be mounted. 

In the mean time, the first company (mounted) will be keft in move- 
ment. It has now been out on the Metanza frontier three or four days, 
supported by a company on foot. 

I have not received a line from the War Department, or your office, 
later than the letter advising me that Major General Macomb had been 
ordered to Florida. 

The contrast made by me, in a few words, between regulars and vol- 
unteers, in my letter to you of the 30th ultimo, being published, I am, of 
course, delivered over to the hostility of the whole body of the militia. 



373 [ 221 ] 

Now, no one entertains for the volunteers who have recently been under 
my command, from South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama, a 
more cordial and sincere respect than I do. There are hundreds and 
hundreds of them whom I should be most happy to call friends. They 
have patriotism, honor, intelligence, and individual courage ; but, in 
masses, but little of the latter quality. They would, however, I have no 
doubt, even fight, in masses, with desperation in defence of their own 
neighborhoods and homes. But, in a distant war like this, I utterly de- 
ny their efficiency, after the zeal of the first week or two has subsided. 
On this subject there are many wholesome, but most unpalatable truths 
to be told. Exceptions, however, are to be made, I acknowledge. Who 
shall tell those truths ? I know of no commander who has ever yet had 
the hardihood. Shall I do it? Believing the good of my country calls 
for it at my hands, if leisure and strength permit, it shall be done. My 
sacrifice will be inevitable. 

Weak as I am, I will make this declaration : If I can be convicted of 
having committed one serious blunder, in theory or practice, since I left 
Washington to conduct the war in Florida, let me be shot. No com- 
mander ought to escape from misconduct under a less penalty. 

What I meant to state, at the conclusion of my last letter, was this: 
the troops called for by me came into the field at too late a period, gen- 
erally, to enable me to prosecute the war to a conclusion. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

W1NFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



No. 147. 



Hradquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 17, 1836. 

Sir: By the accompanying Orders, Nos. 47 and 48, you will find 
yourself destined for the highly important command of the Alachua and 
Suwannee frontiers, with twelve companies of regulars, and a prospect of 
two or more of mounted volunteers which may be placed under your 
orders by the Governor of the Territory. Endeavors are now making 
to raise a volunteer force to that, and perhaps a larger amount. Should 
three companies present themselves, you are authorized to accept the 
whole, provided that each shall approximate within eight or ten privates 
the legal standard ; that is, sixty-four privates for one captain, one 
first and one second lieutenant, and one ensign or cornet. If the number 
privates be still less than that diminished number, (say only forty,) 
you will omit receiving the second lieutenant — unless there be something 
in a late act of Congress in favor of the particular organization of the 
several States and Territories. The act has not reached me. 

With three, and perhaps only two companies, probably a major, adju- 



[ 224 J 374 

tant, &c, will be pressed upon you. In the last resort you must yield, 
although it will be unfortunate to allow the companies to consider them- 
selves a battalion, as, from that moment, there will be an effort to be made 
to make a company act separately, and they cannot be highly useful with- 
out so acting almost universally. 

My wish is, that you keep the troop of United States dragoons, and 
any other mounted force that may come under your orders, almost con- 
stantly in movement — say in scouring the country in every direction, 
and particularly between the fixed posts. You will push the troop, with 
or without the support of a company of mounted men, occasionally as far 
as the Suwannee, so as to communicate with the post and the steamboat 
on that river. At Watson's and Dabney's plantations, thirty-five miles 
from the Gulf, a good supply of corn may yet be found. 

The steamboat mentioned will also be under your orders. You will 
cause one of the companies of the 4th infantry, now supposed to be on 
the Suwannee, to embark on board the boat, and the one or other con- 
stantly to remain on board. The commander of the company will be the 
immediate commander, under you, of the boat. You will instruct him 
to keep pretty constantly in motion, sometimes visiting the mouth of the 
Withlacoochee, and generally cruising up the river to the head of navi- 
gation, and back again towards the mouth, so as to prevent the enemy 
from passing to the west bank of the river. A primary duty of the de- 
tachment will be to capture any party of the enemy found in boats or 
canoes, or to capture the latter, and when necessary to reach the enemy, 
the party will land and pursue to a reasonable distance ashore. The 
object of all the movements of the steamer and the troops will be to give 
security and quiet to the inhabitants; and these great objects you will 
endeavor to attain by all the means in your power. 

The baggage-train now employed in taking subsistence and other sup- 
plies to Fort Drane, and its immediate dependencies, it is supposed will 
be sufficient to do all the hauling in the next three weeks which will be 
required before the middle of October. The horses will then, with the 
exception of a few teams, be sent to Garey's ferry, or other better place, 
for forage and grazing. 

I ought to have stated that the steamer, on the Suwannee, must occa- 
sionally be sent for the supplies that the troops on that river may require . 

On relieving Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, you will receive from him 
any instructions he may possess or have received from Brigadier General 
Clinch, relative to the protection and defence of the frontier. Measures 
of this character should be made generally known, to give confidence to 
the inhabitants. 

Besides corresponding with me, whilst I remain in (he Territory, you 
will communicate every thing interesting or important to the Governor at 
Tallahassee. 

With great confidence in your zeal, judgment, and intelligence, 
I remain, with much consideration, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Major F. Hf.ileman, 

United States Army, fyc. 



375 [ 224 1 

No. 148. 

Headquarters, Army of Florida, 

St. Augustine, May 20, 1836. 

Sir : Instructions from the War Department oblige me suddenly to 
leave Florida. 

I leave you in command of all the troops in the Territory. You will 
report directly to the Adjutant General of the army, and communicate 
freely with the Governor of Florida. 

I have, all along, endeavored to keep you advised of the measures 
adopted or contemplated by me for the defence of the several exposed 
frontiers. Those measures you will carry out, or modify, according to 
circumstances and your own judgment. 

I think it proper, however, to express a decided opinion upon a meas- 
ure not yet adopted or decided. A council of war recently held at Fort 
Drane, came to a unanimous decision that it is inexpedient to hold and 
garrison Fort King. For the reasons on which the council grounded that 
opinion, I fully concur in its decision. I therelore recommend that you 
cause Fort King to be abandoned, by withdrawing the garrison and all 
the public property there deposited, with as little delay as practicable, 
and that one of the companies so withdrawn be ordered to establish itself 
at Newnansville, and the other at Fort Drane, or the Oaklands, six 
miles off. 

You are aware that I have authorized Captain Dummett, and also Cap- 
tain Curry, to raise a company of mounted men, each for the defence of 
this side of the St. John's. If, with me, you should deem one such com- 
pany, added to the five companies of regulars, sufficient for this district 
of country, you will, as soon as one mounted company presents itself, 
take measures to prevent the raising of the other ; but if circumstances, 
in your judgment, should render both necessary, you will accept both, 
and muster them into the service of the United States for six months, 
unless sooner discharged. I promised both Captains Dummett and Curry 
that I would, with three officers, accept a company with only forty pri- 
vates. You may accept the company or companies with even a smaller 
number of privates, according to your views of the necessities of the 
service. 

I say nothing of the distribution and employment of the regular forces 
under your command on this side of the St. John's, and nothing in respect 
to the volunteers that may be raised for the defence of the same district 
of country. Your own judgment will govern in these matters, and 
the same in respect to the west of the St. John's. 

Fully relying on your experience, zeal, talents, and energy, 
I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Eustis, <!^c., 

Commanding, fyc. 



[ 224 ] 370 

No. 149. 

Fort Drane, Florida, 

March 11, 1836. 

Sir : The following statement of facts in relation to the recent move- 
ment of troops from Louisiana, under the immediate command of Major 
General Gaines, you may rely upon, and if you think proper, may use for 
the information of the public. 

General Gaines left his permanent headquarters, at Memphis, (Ten- 
nessee,) on a tour of inspection, and arrived at New Orleans about the 
15th of January, where he heard, for the first time, of a serious disturb- 
ance in Florida, and particularly of the melancholy massacre of Major 
Dade and his command, which occurred on the 28th of December. He 
immediately communicated with the Governor of Louisiana, and requested 
him to call upon, and hold in readiness a body of volunteers for service 
in subduing the Seminole Indians, and proceeded to Pensacola to solicit 
the co-operation of the naval force on that station. At Pensacola he found 
his wishes had been anticipated : Commodores Dallas and Bolton, and 
Captain Webb, having already directed their attention towards Tampa 
bay and other inlets of Florida, whither they had ordered marines and 
munitions of war. 

The General, on his way to Pensacola, feeling called upon to take the 
most prompt and decisive measures to sustain the military post within his 
command, and secure the peace of the frontier, issued his orders to Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Twiggs, to receive into service eight companies of the 
volunteers requested of the Governor of Louisiana, and, together with the 
regular force at Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and other stations in the im- 
mediate vicinity of New Orleans, to hold himself in readiness for a move- 
ment to Tampa bay. The whole force amounted to about eleven hundred 
men, including about seven hundred volunteers. This order was dated 
at Mobile, the 18th of January. 

The General visited Pensacola as stated, and then proceeded to New 
Orleans, where he arrived about the 26th. He organized and equipped 
his force, and moved on the 4th of February in three steamboats. He 
reached Tampa bay on the 9th, and on the 13th took the field in the 
enemy's country. It was first designed to search for and defeat a body 
of Indians reported to have been recently in the neighborhood of Fort 
Brooke — said to have been in battle, only a day or two before the arrival 
of the general, with the friendly Indians. Accordingly, the general 
marched in an easterly direction upon the Alalia river; but at the end of 
two days, having found two or three fields of turnips and other vegeta- 
bles, as also fodder stacks, not destroyed by (he enemy, it was readily con- 
cluded he could not have been in that vicinity in any considerable force ; 
and the general directed his march towards Fort King. He had taken 
ten days' rations only, but had reason to suppose that a large supply of 
stores was at Fort King, the quartermaster having shown him an official 
letter from the Quartermaster General, advising him that one hundred 
and twenty thousand rations had been ordered to that post. The letter 
was dated the 21st of January. 

The march was continued to Fort King, passing, on the 20th of Feb- 



li.IiiilJUlill 



377 [221 | 

ruary, the battle-ground of the gallant band cut off under Major Dade, 
on the 28th of December, where we interred the bodies of 106 heroes. 
No language can do justice to the scene. The remains of our mutilated 
brothers in arms were found where they had fallen, at their posts — the 
very position of the advance guard being clearly indicated. Our troops 
marched to solemn music around the little breastwork which had been 
hastily thrown up, and where the last of the party were destroyed; each 
individual lying at the breastworks, where, beyond a doubt, he fell in the 
execution of his duty. We continued our march a short distance that 
day ; and on the 22d, as if to celebrate the birth of him who was " first in 
war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen," we arrived 
at Fort King, and gave an agreeable surprise to one company of artillery, 
the garrison of that post, which, from its isolated and exposed situation, 
had been reported in the presses of the country as having been assaulted 
and destroyed by the Indians. The garrison had, indeed, been exposed, 
but was well prepared to give the enemy a warm reception. The guard, 
on the approach of General Gaines, was paraded, and the customary honor 
paid in due form ; but where were the hearts of all at that moment ? The 
writer of this confesses, " he turned aside to wipe away a tear." 

The general, contrary to his reasonable expectations, found no sufficient 
supply of stores of any kind. The next morning, the 23d, all the horses 
were sent to Fort Drane, 22 miles northwest, with a suitable convoy, for 
a supply of provisions. The 24th brought us all that could be procured, 
and it was ascertained to be but seven days' rations, which, with two 
days' supply found at Fort King, made up all that could be looked for in 
that quarter. The general had then to decide upon his next movement. 
To remain at Fort King, without supplies, was out of the question ; to 
proceed further north might embarrass the operations of another officer 
then ascertained to be employed at Picolata in preparing force and sup- 
plies to penetrate the enemy's country. After much and mature delibe- 
ration, the general decided to move south again by the battle-ground of 
General Clinch. If the enemy should not be found, the general would, 
at all events, reach supplies at Tampa bay. His movements would occu- 
py, and perhaps concentrate the enemy, and tend greatly to give security 
to the frontier, and enable families to return to their deserted plantations, 
and in safety recommence their peaceful avocations, the season having 
arrived for the commencement of planting operations. Lastly, but not 
the least of the considerations, we might find and beat the enemy. 

The general moved from Fort King on the 26th of February, and on 
the 27th, at 2 o'clock, we were on the right bank of the Withlacoochee, 
at the place where General Clinch crossed the river the 31st of Decem- 
ber preceding. The troops had advanced from Tampa bay, and to this 
time the same order of march has been preserved, in three columns, a 
right, centre, and left, respectively, about one hundred yards distance 
from each other, with a strong advanced and rear guard — the baggage 
being in the rear of the centre column. In this order it followed that we 
struck the river at three points ; the advanced guard, as the centre, being 
at the usual crossing place. The baggage and the rear had been ordered 
to halt, as the general only designed examining the crossing place. Up 
to this time no attack or annoyance had been offered us since we left 
Tampa bay, and but few of us expected it at the Withlacoochee. We 






224 J 



378 



were, therefore, many of us, fully exposed while sounding and examining 
the river, and our exposure was matter of jocular remark, when, for the 
first time, on our left flank, a spirited fire was heard, accompanied by the 
enlivening war yell of the savage. The fight was continued about half 
an hour, the enemy being on the left bank of the river, when the general 
ordered the troops to encamp near the river. We lost one killed and 
eight wounded. On the 28th we moved down the river about two miles, 
where the banks were less covered with thicket, and the advance guard 
was here fired upon, and Lieutenant Izard, of the United States dragoons, 
mortally wounded. He fell ; but partially recovering himself, commanded 
his men, with the utmost composure, to " to keep their positions and lie 
close ;" a command scarcely less remarkable than that of the lamented 
Lawrence — " Don't give up the ship." Lieutenant Izard, after five days 
of suffering, died on the 5th of March, and was buried on the banks of the 
Withlacoochee — himself a loss too great for the savage foe ever to com- 
pensate. 

The fight was continued on the 28th, with little or no intermission, from 
about 9 o'clock until 1 P. M., when we encamped again. During this 
period the Indians kept up a continuous yell, except during an interval, 
when they retreated for a short time. We lost this day, beside Lieuten- 
ant Izard, one killed, and Captain Sanders, commanding the friendly In- 
dians, and Captain Armstrong, of the United States schooner Motto, both 
volunteers, wounded, the latter slightly. In the evening of this day an 
express was sent to Fort Drane to report to the officer commanding in 
that quarter, that the enemy had been found in force, and to recommend 
an immediate movement, crossing the Withlacoochee some distance above, 
and thence to fall down upon the enemy's rear, which it was hoped would 
terminate the war. 

On the 29th, in the morning, the enemy was silent, but the experience 
of the general looked upon it as ominous, and he ordered one-third of the 
command to remain at the breastworks — the remainder of the force being 
employed in preparing timber and canoes for crossing the river. At about 
9 o'clock our working parties were fired upon, and simultaneously a vig- 
orous fire poured into camp from three sides, that nearest the river being 
the only one not assailed. The firing continued a little over two hours, 
during which we lost one man killed, and three officers and thirty non- 
commissioned and privates wounded. The force of the enemy was esti- 
mated at twelve hundred or fifteen hundred. General Gaines was wound- 
ed by a small rifle ball, which passed through his lower lip, making a 
very slight wound, but knocking out one lower tooth and slightly fractur- 
ing two upper teeth. This was a most startling incident to all as soon as 
known, but affected every body more than the gallant hero himself, who, 
with the most heart-cheering good humor, observed that it was extremely 
unkind for the enemy to take a tooth from him which he valued so highly. 
Lieutenant Duncan, of the artillery, was slightly wounded, and Lieutenant 
E. Smith, of the Louisiana volunteers, was wounded no less than three 
times. The enemy at length retired in some haste, for, contrary to their 
custom, they left one of their dead, after dragging the body some distance ; 
they took his rifle, but we found him well supplied with powder and about 
sixty bullets. 

The enemy, contrary to expectation, having crossed the river, it was 



379 [ 224 ] 

evidently unnecessary for the troops from Fort Drane to go higher up, 
and accordingly General Gaines sent another express that evening, sug- 
gesting the expediency of a movement directly to Camp Izard, (the name 
he had given his own camp,) requesting, as he had clone by the previous 
express, a supply of six thousand rations of pork, flour, and sugar. On the 
2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th days of March, the enemy fired at intervals, both day 
and night, upon our camp, which we secured by breastworks of pine logs, 
within which most of the command enjoyed themselves in conversation, 
and speculating upon probabilities as to whether supplies would reach us, 
while our sharp-shooters were amusing themselves in picking off the In- 
dians from behind the trees. 

As our provisions diminished, we began to inquire into the virtues of 
roots and the comparative excellence of horse meat. At a meeting of 
officers, all the corn was thrown into the public crib, and an issue of a 
pint made to those men whose bread had been exhausted. At length 
bread, corn, and meat, disappeared, and some of the men were two days 
without food. What was then the feeling in camp ? Let it be recorded 
to the honor of every man, and let no one, from false modesty, hesitate 
to yield his feelings to the gratification of noble pride, when he recollects 
that not a murmur was heard, nor a whisper of retreat circulated from any 
quarter. Far from it. Some horses were killed, and a very delicate 
piece was brought to the general, at his tent, who found it remarkably 
tender and well flavored. We felt very well able to maintain ourselves 
at least three weeks, if necessary ; and by that time, at least, the force 
from above must certainly come down, and the Indians would assuredly 
be taken. These were our reflections on the night of the 5th ; when, at 
about 10 o'clock, we heard some one calling from the woods and wishing 
to speak with us. The officer of the guard answered the man, and de- 
manded his designs : he distinctly stated that the Indians were tired of 
fighting, and wanted to make peace. The general ordered the officer of 
the guard to answer, that if he wanted to say any thing to come in the 
morning, with a white flag, and he should not be fired upon. He replied, 
" very well ;" repeating his desire to come in and have a friendly talk, 
and to shake hands. This was soon circulated throughout the camp, but 
from the well-known treachery of the Indians, we were ordered to be 
particularly en our guard, and continued so all night. 

During the day of the 5th we lost one man killed and had two wounded, 
the only casualties which had occurred since the 29th. On the morning 
of the 6th, at about 10 o'clock, about 300 of the Indians filed out from the 
river and took up a position in our rear, about 500 yards distant. They 
were armed, and we were fully in the belief that this was a mere feint, 
supposing the residue of their force in a neighboring hammock ; and we 
were confident of a desperate assault from some other quarter. We were 
at a stand, waiting their movements some minutes. At length one or 
two advanced a short distance, and after considerable hesitation on their 
parts, the result of their fears, lest we should entrap them, they approach- 
ed near enough to be heard, and after being joined by three or four others, 
came within about 200 yards, and repeated what had been declared the 
night before. The general then directed a staff officer to go out to them, 
and hear what they had to say. It was soon reported to the general that 
the Indians did not wish to fight any more, but they wanted him to retire 



[ 224 J 380 

from the Withlacoochee. The staff officer was then ordered to return to 
them, and, in the plainest language, to tell them the exact truth as to the 
force ordered into the country to subdue them ; that additional force was 
expected every day ; that the time was near when every Indian found 
with a rifle in his hand would be shot down. This was communicated 
with such explanations as were deemed necessary to give it force ; and 
they then said they would go and hold a council, and would assemble 
again in the afternoon to give an answer. In the afternoon they came as 
before, including, as in the morning, the celebrated Powell, and scarce 
less celebrated Jumper, with several others, and with the interpreter 
Abram. The general's staff officer had with him two or three others from 
our camp at the talk. Tne Indians repeated much of what they had said 
in the morning; that they had lost many men by death and wounds, and 
were tired of the war and wanted peace ; but as their Governor, as they 
called him, Micanopy, was not with them, they wanted time to consult 
him ; they therefore asked a cessation of the war. The staff officer, having 
been previously instructed by the general, told them that, if they would 
engage to cease from all acts of hostility, retire south of the Withlacoo- 
chee, and promise to attend a council when called upon by the United 
States commissioners, they should not for the present be molested. They 
answered, that for themselves they would, and did promise all that was 
required. At that moment a noise was heard from that portion of the 
Indians at a distance, and they were seen running towards the river. It 
was easy to conjecture the cause. Immediately afterwards General Clinch, 
with 500 men and supplies, came gallantly on ; and his advance guard of 
mounted men, seeing Indians, and not knowing the purpose of their being 
where they were, formed a line promptly to the left, and fired, but the 
fleetness of the Indians saved them — they were beyond the reach of gun- 
shot, and were soon out of sight and over the river. 

Then followed one of the most delightful greetings imaginable. Gen- 
eral Clinch's force moved onward, and was soon within hail of friends ; 
and were we not all friends indeed ? The new comers were soon divest- 
ed of their surplus bread, &c, until their haversacks were emptied, and 
our command feasted. General Clinch brought two days' supply of pork 
and bread, with sugar, besides about forty head of cattle, many of which 
did not live out that night. 

On the 8th a negro man was sent over the river, who had a wife among 
the hostiles, with orders to account for his appearance among them in any 
way he might choose ; to see and talk with them ; to ascertain their lo- 
cation and wishes. The 9th he did not return, and much doubt prevailed 
as to the position and disposition of the enemy. On this day, the 9th, 
General Gaines thought proper to deliver the command over to General 
Clinch. We all regretted, and yet were pleased with the change ; re- 
gretted to lose the presence of a tried, experienced, and gallant general, 
whose deportment commanded respect, whose judgment ensured confi- 
dence, and whose mild and amiable manners won the affectionate regard 
of every one ; but if a change was deemed a public duty, to whom could 
the command be assigned with so much satisfaction to his troops, as to 
General Clinch, who came nobly to their aid, with all the despatch and 
all the assistance in his power, and whose manners were an index of his 
generous and heart-ennobling qualities ? 



381 [ 224 ] 

General Clinch, for reasons assigned in orders, directed a movement to 
this place, to commence on the 10th instant, at 10 o'clock. In the midst 
of a heavy rain the march commenced, and the troops moved about seven 
miles and encamped. In the evening, the negro man who had been sent 
among the foe, came in, and to our great satisfaction confirmed, in the 
most precise manner, the truth and sincerity of all the Indians had pro- 
fessed. He went among them, and found they had moved some fifteen 
or twenty miles up the river, and had dispersed over a space of some two 
miles or more, in several encampments. They gave the negro every as- 
surance of a pacific disposition on their part, stated that they had ordered 
their young men to abstain from war, and that they had seen our men 
fishing in the river, and had abstained from firing upon them. They stated 
that thirty had been killed in the several battles on the Withlacoochee, 
between the 27th of February and 5th of March. It must be observed 
that no terms have been offered the Indians; and although there can be 
no doubt of their having been broken in spirit, it is yet to be seen whether 
they will suffer the dictation of terms which it is understood are to be 
imposed on them. It is certainly known through the negro man that they 
do not wish to go west, and they may refuse to comply with a require- 
ment to do so. 

General Gaines arrived at this place to-day in good health. 
I have the honor to be, 

With the highest respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

E. A. HITCHCOCK, 

Captain U. S. A. 
Hon. Francis S. Lyon, M. C, 

Washington city. 



No. 150. 
Camp Sabine, near the Sabine river, 

May 18, 1836. 

Dear Sir : I take the liberty to enclose, herewith, a copy of a letter 
to a friend, on the subject of the late movements in Florida under Gen- 
eral Gaines. 

I had written nothing relative to that campaign with a view for publi- 
cation, nor should I now send the enclosed, had I not lately seen in some 
of the papers, strange misrepresentations of facts which should not be 
permitted to pass unnoticed. 

I have had time only roughly to sketch the principal features of the 
campaign; but the letter is at the service of the public, and I shall be 
obliged by your giving it an insertion in your paper. 

I am, with great respect, &c, 

GEO. A. McCALL. 
To the Editor of the N. O. Bulletin. 



My Dear Sir : A rapid change of position and almost constant occu- 
pation during the last four months, have prevented until now, my making 
the Florida war the subject of a letter. The first intelligence of " actual 



[ 224 ] 382 

hostilities," in that section of his military department, was received by 
General Gaines at New Orleans, whilst on a tour of inspection to the Gulf 
posts. The news of the massacre of Dade's detachment, had burst like 
a thunder-clap upon the inhabitants of the great Southern emporium. On 
receiving the official report of this sad disaster, General Gaines im- 
mediately addressed to the Adjutant General at Washington, a letter, in 
which he urged that no time should be lost in applying to the savages on 
that frontier, the last and obvious means of correction. At the same time 
declaring, from his knowledge of the Seminole Indians and the country 
they inhabited, his conviction that the only sure means of speedily and 
effectually terminating the difficulties in that quarter, would be to bring 
into the field an army of at least 4,000 men, aided and supported by a 
strong naval force. Under this impression, he recommended that the 6th 
and part of the 1st and 7th regiments of infantry, be ordered to Florida, to 
reinforce the United States troops on the Gulf, and such volunteers from 
the adjoining States as the emergency might call forth. On the same 
day he made a requisition on the Governor of Louisiana for a regiment 
of riflemen or infantry ; and soon after requested of Commodore Bolton, 
at Pensacola, the co-operation of such naval force as he might feel 
authorized to order on that service. Some days subsequent to this, the 
receipt of intelligence that Fort Brooke (Tampa bay) was invested by 
the Indians and negroes, and the garrison in danger of being cut off, de- 
termined General Gaines to proceed at once to their relief with what 
force he might be able to collect at New Orleans. He accordingly 
wrote by express to General Clinch, who commanded in Florida, and 
was at that time at Fort King, 100 miles north of Fort Brooke, that he 
(General Gaines) would be at the latter post on the 8th of February, 
with 700 men. General Clinch, it was understood, would have, by that 
time, a respectable force (volunteers) from Georgia and the upper coun- 
ties of Florida. He was accordingly ordered, if strong enough to take 
the field, to march to the southward in time to effect a junction with 
General Gaines at or near Fort Brooke. Under these circumstances, 
General Gaines embarked at New Orleans on the night of the 3d of 
February, with a brigade of about eleven hundred men — to which num- 
ber his force had fortunately increased — consisting of six companies of 
the 4th infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, and a regiment of 
Louisiana volunteers, under the command of General P. F. Smith, adju- 
tant general of the State. The transports, being steamboats, were 
obliged to touch at Pensacola for wood ; and here it was that General 
Gaines met the Adjutant General's letter of the 22d January, which pur- 
ported to cover the " Order No. 7," directing General Scott to repair to 
Florida " and take command of the troops operating against the Indians 
in that quarter." This Order No. 7 was not enclosed, nor did General 
Gaines see it until his arrival at Fort King, sixteen days afterwards. 
This fact may be a matter of no great import ; but, as the continuance 
of the movement from Pensacola to Tampa, after his being notified that 
such an order had been issued, is one of the two prominent features of 
the campaign that has been very unhesitatingly criticised and condemned 
in some of the popular prints, it may be well to examine what might have 
been the consequences, had he abandoned the expedition at that ad- 
vanced stage of its progress. 



383 [ 224 ] 

In command of a military department, he bad received, at a point far 
distant from the seat of Federal Government, whence alone special or new- 
instructions could be sent him, the intelligence of a great and unlooked- 
for disaster having occurred on the extreme southern frontier of the 
country, occupied by the left wing of his division ; he learned the mel- 
ancholy news that a large white settlement had been overrun, sacked, 
and burnt, and many of the inhabitants killed ; the United States agent 
of Indian affairs murdered ; eight valuable officers, and ninety-eight 
brave soldiers of his division cut to pieces by an overwhelming savage 
foe ! and he was aware that the military posts on the borders of the In- 
dian country, viz : Forts Brooke, King, and Drane, with the station at 
Key West, all within his military department, were without any other 
work of defence, than such as a daring leader, with 500 men, might, at 
the risk of little loss, take and destroy in a few hours, the garrisons of 
three of those posts being insufficient for their defence. What then was 
the duty of the commander of the department ? Had he hesitated one 
single moment, he would indeed have merited the stern opprobrium of 
his fellow-citizens. He did not hesitate. He collected what force he 
could, and marched immediately for the theatre of war. On the route, 
and within two days' march (by steam) of the Indian borders, he re- 
ceived a notification that General Scott had been ordered to repair from 
the city of Washington to Florida, " and take command of the troops 
operating against the Indians in that quarter." At the same time he was 
informed that " the state of affairs west of the Mississippi might soon 
require his attention, if not his presence, in that quarter;" and he was 
directed to await further orders in the city of New Orleans. Had hos- 
tilities actually existed on the Louisiana frontier, and General Gaines 
received an order to repair thither immediately, it is difficult to say 
whether the historian would have approved or condemned his conduct at 
that stage of the game, had he obeyed the order, and, by so doing, left 
General Clinch, in expectation of a promised co-operation, to extricate 
himself as he could from any difficulty into which the failure on the part 
of General Gaines in preconcerted movements, might peradventure throw 
him. And without General Gaines, the volunteers, his principal Jorce, 
were unwilling to proceed ; for, before they left New Orleans, he had 
pledged himself to accompany them whithersoever they went, and to 
stand by them as long as they would stand by him, in repressing the 
rising spirit of savage devastation. Moreover, he was firmly persuaded 
that the instructions from the War Department, requiring him to await 
further orders in the city of New Orleans, were forwarded before that 
Department could possibly have received a detail of the circumstances, 
which rendered the immediate movement to Florida not only proper, 
but imperative. 

A little reflection determined him to continue the movement until the 
President should be apprized of all the particular circumstances attend- 
ing it ; or until the officer authorized to operate in his department should 
make his appearance in person in that part of the country which consti- 
tuted the principal theatre of the war, or the Indians be subdued, and 
the security of the frontier re-established. This view of the subject is 
based upon a sound principle of military law, and is supported by the 
ablest writers of all enlightened nations, whose arms have been crowned 



[ 224 J 384 

with success. Had General Gaines failed to comply with this wise pre- 
cept — had he disregarded this sacred injunction, he well knew that he 
might suffer the enemy to defeat a body of troops expecting his co-ope- 
ration, and consequently leave the citizens, dwelling within the limits of 
his command, quivering beneath the upraised tomahawk, and the blood- 
stained scalping-knife. 

Was it his duty, under such circumstances, to abandon an expedition 
on the prosecution of which the safety of the border people possibly 
hung ; or was it his duty to strike promptly at the enemy, if possible 
subdue him, or at all events endeavor to check his devastations until the 
President should have notice of his strength, and the determined spirit 
with which he seemed prepared to carry on the war ? 

General Gaines proceeded to Tampa bay. On his arrival at Fort 
Brooke, he learned that the day previous a party of about 100 of the 
friendly Indians had been attacked near the fort, and driven in by a su- 
perior force. The country occupied by the hostile tribes lying between 
Forts Brooke and King, no communication had been kept up between 
those posts since the massacre of Major Dade's command ; and, conse- 
quently, General Gaines, on arriving at the first-named station, was una- 
ble to gather any information from which he could form even a tolerable 
conjecture of General Clinch's strength or movements. But relying on 
the co-operation of that officer, he determined, as soon as his horses could 
be landed, to place a sufficient garrison in the pickets, and, with the re- 
mainder of his force, march out to meet him. 

Owing to the expense and difficulties attending the transportation of 
horses from New Orleans by sea, the baggage train brought with the 
brigade was necessarily small, and the expectation that the requisite 
number to complete the train might be procured at Tampa, was not 
realized ; the horses and cattle in that vicinity having been stolen or lost 
during the alarm which broke up the settlement, and drove the families 
for protection to the fort. Some half dozen Indian ponies were, I be- 
lieve, all that the quartermaster could procure, to add to the number 
brought from New Orleans. The question then, among both officers and 
soldiers, was, not " what they might get along with," but " what they 
could do without on their march ? " Ten days' rations were issued to 
the troops, (five of which were to be carried in the haversacks ; ) and on 
the morning of the 13th, the brigade took the field. The order of march 
was three columns, with an advance, and a strong rear-guard. The right 
was four companies of the second artillery, acting as infantry, commanded 
by Major Belton ; the centre seven companies of the fourth infantry, 
under Lieutenant Colonel Foster ; the left and rear being composed of 
the Louisiana volunteers, under Colonel Smith and Lieutenant Colonel 
Lawson, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs acting as brigadier. 

The friendly Indians, who to the number of seventy-seven, accompa- 
nied the brigade, having reported their belief that the war party which 
attacked them a few days before was not only formidable, but was prob- 
ably still encamped on the Alafia river, at a point some fifteen miles from 
Fort Brooke, and seven from the main road to Fort King, General Gaines 
made a detour to the right for the purpose of breaking it up, and driving 
before him this band of marauders. On the second day's march, how- 
ever, it was ascertained that the enemy had not been at Alafia in any 



3S5 | 224 ] 

strength; and the troops, having received two additional rations, which 
had been directed to meet them by water at Warren's, proceeded on their 
route. On approaching the Withlacjoch.ee, on Dade's line of march, 
and some thirty miles above Clinch's battle-ground, the friendly Indians 
expressed their firm belief that a vigorous attack would be made the fol- 
lowing day, and urged strenuously that they might bo permitted to return 
home, i. e. to Fort Brooke. This faltering on the approach of battle 
created some surprise, not unmingled with distrust of their fidelity. A 
half-hour's talk, however, reassured them, and they moved on without 
evincing any further timidity. 

The expected attack, however, was not made ; and the brigade arrived 
without annoyance at Dade's battle-ground, where funeral honors were 
paid to the gallant band, who had left on the trees around, abundant 
proof of a field nobly contested against an overwhelming foe. The sad 
scene can never be erased from the memory of those who witnessed it, 
out its images, still vivid in the mind, recall feelings too painful to permit 
me to dwell longer upon a scene which has already been described by 
many. 

Up to this lime, the eighth day since he marched from Fort Brooke, 
General Gaines had been in hourly expectation of meeting Clinch ; and 
the fall of a towering pine, which in those extensive wilds produces a 
sound it is difficult to distinguish from the report of distant artillery, and 
was on two occasions the cause of long and animated discussion among 
all ranks, whilst at the end of every mile some further indication of 
Clinch's approach was looked for. Knowing the promptness of that offi- 
cer, General Gaines could not now but apprehend that some serious ob- 
stacle had arisen, to prevent the desired junction. Being only about 
forty miles from Fort King, the General felt bound to proceed thither to 
ascertain the situation of Clinch's command, and if possible gain some 
information with regard to the movements of the enemy. His only doubt 
with regard to the expediency of proceeding thither was on the score of 
provisions. This he mentioned to me, on Dade's battle-ground, while a 
party detailed for the purpose was collecting the bodies of the slain to 
burial. He concluded by saying that the men had with them enough to 
carry them back to Tampa, if he returned immediately, and that there 
were abundant supplies : but that if he proceeded to Fort King, he might 
not find a sufficient provision to make that position the basis of his opera- 
tions, without embarrassing General Clinch, with whom he desired to co- 
operate, or General Scott, should he have arrived. I then remarked that 
an officer had just mentioned to me that the quartermaster had received, 
before he left Fort Brooke, a letter from the Quartermaster General, no- 
tifying him that 120,000 rations had been ordered to Fort King in January 
preceding. This letter was immediately called for. It was from the 
Quartermaster General's office, and dated the 19th (nineteenth) of Jan- 
uary. The passage that had been referred to was as follows : 

" Large supplies of provisions have been ordered from New York, for 
Fort King, and thirty thousand rations to St. Augustine, from the same 
place." 

This was the first time General Gaines saw the letter in question, or 
knew that a large additional supply had been ordered from New York 
to Fort King. He had brought a large supply of subsistence and forage 
25 



[ 224 j 386 

to Tampa bay, and had written to General Clinch to that effect from New 
Orleans, intending to make Tampa the basis of his operations. But now, 
unable to gain the least information of General Clinch's strength, or 
movements, or those of the enemy in any other way than by proceeding 
to Fort King, the acquisition of the information above detailed removed 
the only doubt he had entertained with regard to the expediency of the 
measure. He decided to push on without delay, and the order to march 
was given the moment the simple but solemn funeral rites of the band of 
heroes was concluded. I have been thus precise in this part of my nar- 
rative, because a want of knowledge of the circumstances attending this 
measure, has caused the whole movement to be so misconstrued, as to 
lay General Gaines liable to the charge of dashing heedlessly into the 
wilderness without any plan of operations ; suffering himself to be sepa- 
rated by a wide district of the enemy's country, from the depot of his 
supplies, and thus exposing his men to hardships and privations, as un- 
necessary as profitless. 

But this is the second principal feature of the campaign, that has been 
most unhesitatingly criticised, of which more anon — to return to the 
thread of my narrative. 

The troops reached Fort King on the 22d of February, without meet- 
ing with any accident worthy of remark. A single company of the 3d 
artillery constituted the garrison of this station. General Clinch, with 
his principal force, was at Fort Drane, 22 miles to the N. W. With 
great regret General Gaines now learned that Clinch had not received 
the expected reinforcements from the northern borders of the Territory, 
but two volunteer companies having joined him from that quarter. His 
force was four companies of artillery, and one of infantry, and the two 
companies of volunteers I have mentioned. General Gaines was not 
less disappointed when he was told that the supply of provisions at these 
two posts ( King and Drane) was little more than sufficient for their 
support. Whether this disappointment was consequent to a reasonable 
expectation or not, I shall not pretend to determine. The simple facts, 
from which must be determined the reasonableness or unreasonableness 
of the conclusion drawn from the information received by Gen- 
eral Gaines, on the battle-ground, are these : The troops had marched 
from Fort Brooke on the 13th, with ten days' rations. At the Alafia they 
received two days' rations, brought thither by water, making in all twelve. 
That is, they were provisioned to include the 24th of February. On the 
20th February General Gaines saw the letter of the 19th January, al- 
ready alluded to. From the date of the letter to the day he saw it, in- 
clusive, is 32 days, and to the 24th February, the day to which his troops 
had been provisioned, is 3G days. The supplies had been ordered on 
the 19th — how long before that, he knew not. The facilities of water 
transportation from New York to the mouth of the St. John's river, and 
up that river by steam, to Picolata, whence it is about 70 miles to Fort 
Drane, and 92 to Fort King, led to the conclusion that, in 36 days, the 
supply would have reached its destination. The roads the troops had 
travelled were in fine order, the season having been remarkably dry. 
We were told no rain had fallen from some time in September till 
the day before we reached Dade's battle-ground, when there was a 
slight rain. 

At Fort King it was learned that preparations were making for the 



387 [ 224 J 

campaign at Picolata, under direction of General Scott. It was thought, 
however, that he would not be enabled to take the field with any con- 
siderable force for some time. 

Finding he could expect no immediate co-operation from a quarter 
where he had expected to meet a considerable force — Clinch's command 
being barely sufficient to supply the necessary escorts to the provision 
wagons between Picolata and Fort Diane, and unwilling to draw upon the 
nucleus of supplies here collecting, Genera! Gaines decided on returning 
immediately to Tampa bay, and making that the basis of his operations. 
He informed General Clinch of this, and requested barely a sufficient 
supply to last him on the march. He had marched from Fort Brooke to 
Fort King by the main route, the common wagon road. This road is 
longer by a da^'s march than the route by Chocochater. He, therefore, 
determined to return by the latter. It was, indeed, the opinion at Fort 
King, that the Indians had established themselves near the point at which 
this trace crosses the Withlacooehee, viz : Clinch's battle-ground. If 
so, so much the better — he might beat them by the way ; at any rate 
the movement of 1,000 men through the country occupied by the Indians 
would have the effect of keeping them concentrated, and, therefore, re- 
lieve the frontier from petty depredations. Of the 77 friendly Indians 
who accompanied the brigade from Fort Brooke, ten returned with it, 
the balance remaining with General Clinch. These men, who acted as 
guides, promised to find a ford somewhere near the point at which Gen- 
eral Clinch had crossed. 

On the 27th, General Gaines reached the Withlacooehee, at this point ; 
and a half hour or more had been passed in searching for the ford, 
when the enemy opened a fire from the opposite bank. The stream is 
about forty yards wide, but deep and rapid. A few 7 companies were im- 
mediately brought into action, and very soon the fire became general, 
from the left to the centre. This skirmish, the first bush-fighting the 
men had seen, lasted half an hour. The loss of the troops w 7 as one killed 
and seven wounded. The troops encamped near the river, and the guides 
declared the ford must be about three miles below, where a trail leading 
to the right struck the river. The next morning by sunrise the three 
columns marched for the point indicated, on reaching which a spirted fire 
was immediately opened from the opposite bank; it was quickly return- 
ed, and continued, with occasional intermissions, till one o'clock. In 
the early part of this action, Lieutenant Izard, a gallant soldier, was mor- 
tally wounded. The loss this day was one killed and three wounded. 
The stream at this point also proved too deep to be forded ; and the 
guides, who had been accustomed to hunt in the lower country, and had 
not been in this section for many years, were totally at fault. The banks 
of the stream, however, at this point, were less thickly clad with the 
customary undergrowth, and the General determined to cross. A detail 
was accordingly made to prepare canoes, and the flooring of a pontoon 
bridge ; and the cheerful sound of the axe was soon mingled with the 
crack of the rifle and the animating war-cry. At four o'clock, P. M. a 
distant, but very loud, whooping was heard, which indicated the approach 
of a large reinforcement to the enemy, from the opposite side. The 
friendly Indians immediately declared it to be Micanopy, whose force 
they estimated at 800 warriors. 



L 224 ] 3S8 

General Gaines, then satisfied that the whole force of the enemy was 
in the held, considered the opportunity of bringing the war to a close too 
favorable to be lost. Under this impression he sent an express to Gen- 
eral Clinch, recommending an immediate movement of the force under 
his command, with an additional supply of ammunition and provisions. 
Clinch was desired to cross the river some ten miles above, and move 
down on the left bank. General Gaines added that he would, in the 
mean time, endeavor to amuse the enemy, prepare his boats, &c. for 
crossing, but would not cross until he heard from Fort Drane, where 
General Clinch expected by this time some accession to his force. 

By this movement it was believed the two brigades would be enabled 
to attack the enemy in front and rear at the same time, and probably ter- 
minate the war in a few days. The customary log breastwork was thrown 
up, about three feet high, and the troops slept undisturbed that night. 
The following morning an attack was thought not improbable from 
iome quarter, and one-third of the men were kept on duty at the breast- 
work. At 10 o'clock, A. M. the working parties were iired upon, and 
immediately afterwards a dashing attack was made on three sides of the 
camp. The Indians advanced boldly and fired with great rapidity, bat 
not with precision. At one time they set fire to the high grass and pal- 
metto on the windward side of the camp, and made a bold dash under 
cover of the smoke, which, mingled with flame, came rolling towards the 
breastwork like a heavy sea. The fire was coolly extinguished, and the 
audacity of the assailants punished by Louisiana riflemen. The light 
lasted till a few minutes past 12 o'clock M., when the enemy withdrew. 
Their numbers were estimated, by those considered the best judges, at 
1,500. The troops having the advantage of the slight breastwork before 
mentioned, lost this day only one sergeant killed, and 34 officers and men 
wounded. Among the latter was General Gaines himself. The loss of 
the enemy was considerable, the troops firing with a coolness and pre- 
cision that would do honor to veterans. Nor should the 29th of Febru- 
ry be passed without bestowing a word of praise on the marked gallantry 
of these red assailants, who fought — many an old Indian fighter present 
said, " as Indians never fought before." 

As the Indians had crossed the river, a runner was sent that night to 
General Clinch, informing him of the occurrences of the morning. In 
concluding this letter, General Gaines said, " I have abstained and shall 
abstain from a sortie till I hear from you, in expectation that this course 
will tend to keep them together, whiist a sortie might contribute to dis- 
perse them. I am now satisfied that a direct movement to this place is 
more desirable than to cross the river higher up, as I suggested in my 
letter of yesterday. I am moreover of opinion that, if mounted men can 
be obtained in a few days, your force should not move from Fort Drane 
without that description of troops." The Indians move with too much 
celerity to be pursued in that country, with any chance of success, by 
any other than mounted men. The following day, March 1, there was 
light skirmishing, and occasional shots were fired at those who passed 
out of camp. 

On the morning of the second of March, an attack was made nearly as 
vigorous as that of the 29th, and was kept up for one hour ; but the troops 
having raised the breastwork, sustained little loss. It was possible that 



389 [ 22! J 

General Clinch might arrive this afternoon, and many of the men who 
were getting hungry, began to look eagerly for his appearance ; though 
when they were told that, if he should be detained by the non-arrival of 
the mounted men, it might yet be some days before they received a sup- 
ply of provisions, in which case they must be content to dine on horse- 
meat until they could do better. I do not think there was a man but de- 
clared his willingness to do so, as long as there was a prospect of bring- 
ing the war to a successful termination by so doing. All the corn in 
camp was turned in, as common stock, and afforded about a pint per 
man, and afterwards some horses were killed, and the meat regularly is- 
sued. The 3d, 4th, and 5th of March did not produce any incidents 
greatly differing from those of the preceding days. The Indians were fre- 
quently firing into the camp, by night as well as by day, generally selecting 
the hour of guard mounting, or parade, when the men were most exposed. 
Our sharp-shooters, however, kept them at long shots, and their bullets 
whistled through the camp without doing much execution. On these 
occasions, as usual, the woods rung with the animating war-cry. During 
this time the troops lost but one man killed and two wound: 

At 10 o'clock, P. M., on the 5th, some one was heard hailing the comp. 
It was at first supposed to bo a return express from Fort Diane, who was 
thus giving notice of his approach, lest he should be fired on by the senti- 
nels. He was told to advance. In a few moments a negro called out at 
the top of his voice, " The Indians are tired of fighting, and wish to 
come in to-morrow to shake hands." He was told that if they had any 
thing to say they might come in the morning with a white flag, and they 
would be heard ; whereupon he retired, bidding us a hearty " good 
night." At 10 o'clock, A. M. on the 6th, 300 warriors, or thereabout, 
drew up in line facing the rear of the camp, at the distance of 150 or 
500 yards. After some delay and apparent hesitation on their part, two 
or three advanced about half way with a white flag. Here they were 
met by Adjutant Barrow, to whom they communicated their desire to 
have a talk with General Gaines. Captain Hitchcock, acting inspector 
general, was then sent to hear what they had to say. He returned and 
reported that the Indians did not wish to fight amy more, but that they 
were desirous that the troops should withdraw from the Witblacoochee. 
They said they had lost a great many warriors, and were unwilling to 
lose any more, except in the course of nature, or perchance by the fall 
of a forest tree. The celebrated Oceola was much dejected and appar- 
ently subdued in spirit. Captain Hitchcock was directed to return and 
tell them that a large force would soon be in the field, and the inevitable 
consequence of their refusing to come to terms would be the destruction 
of a great portion of the nation. They expressed a desire to treat with 
General Gaines, and said they would hold a council on the subject, and 
give their answer in the afternoon. They returned at the appointed 
time, and again expressed their desire to make peace with General 
Gaines, but said their act could not be binding without the sanction of 
Micanopy, the principal chief, who had gone to his town. They said 
they would send for him and then sign a treaty. Captain Hitchcock then 
communicated to them what he had been instructed to say, viz : that 
General Gaines had no authority to treat with them, but that if they would 
return to the south side of the Withlacoochee, and remain there without 



L 224 ] 390 

molesting the inhabitants of the country, until the United States com- 
missioners should appoint a time and place to meet them, they should not 
forthe present be disturbed. The chiefs presentgave their promise to do so. 
At this moment General Clinch's advance came in sight of the party that 
had accompanied the chiefs, and not knowing what was passing at the 
camp, wheeled into a line and poured a volley upon the Indians, who 
immediately fled and crossed the river, as did the chiefs who were with 
Captain H., fearing no doubt they would be shot down. This broke up 
the conference. 

The brigade with Clinch were met with heartfelt greetings. He 
brought the greater part of the garrison from Fort Drane, and a squad- 
ron of mounted men, raised in the counties immediately north of Fort 
Drane ; and with them all the supplies his slender means of transporta- 
tion would allow, together with 40 head of beef cattle. From this time 
up to the 9th March, the Indians remained true to their promise to abstain 
from hostilities, our men having frequently during these days fished and 
bathed in the river without molestation. Micanopy, however, did not 
arrive, and General Gaines decided this day (see Order No. 7) to place 
the troops under the command of General Clinch, whose gallantry and 
decision had proved him so worthy of the trust, and prepared to return 
immediately to New Orleans, in pursuance of the instructions he had re- 
ceived at Fensacola. 

On the 10th General Clinch took up the line of march for Fort Drane. 
That night a negro, who had a wife among the hostile Indians, and among 
whom he had been sent on the 8th, returned and reported that they as- 
sured him of their intention to adhere to their promises ; and told him 
they would meet the whites on the Withlacoochee in five days, and bring 
with them all the principal chiefs. They said they had seen our men 
fishing, but desiring to be at peace, did not fire on them. 

The troops encamped about three miles south of Fort Drane ; thither 
General Gaines proceeded, and soon after set out on his return to New 
Orleans, by the way of Tallahassee and Pensacola. At New Orleans he 
received the instructions from the War Department relative to this fron- 
tier, and immediately proceeded to Fort Jesup. 

This is a rough sketch, but you may rely on the facts, and you are at 
liberty to make use of the letter, if you think proper, for the information 
of the public. 

With constant regard, 

I am your most obedient servant, 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Acting Assistant Adjutant General 



No. 151 



Extract from a letter from Brigadier General Clinch to General R. Jones, 
Adjutant General, dated 

Fort King, January 22, 1835. 

Sir : I wrote you a few days since, via St. Augustine, but, as the let- 
may not reach you as soon as by the regular mail route, I have thought 



391 [ 224 ] 

it proper to write you again, on a subject which formed part of my last 
communication. 

In that communication, I stated that if it was the intention of the Gov- 
ernment to remove the Seminole Indians west, in the spring, with or 
without their consent, it would be necessary, in my opinion, to send four 
additional companies to this post, and two to Fort Brooke, and two six- 
pounders to each post. The more I see of this tribe of Indians the more 
fully I am convinced that they have not the least intention of fulfilling 
their treaty-stipulations, unless compelled to do so by a stronger force 
than mere words. Their minds have been so completely perverted, by 
a set of interested and designing men, that no argument or reasoning will 
have the least influence with them, except the argument of force ; and if 
a sufficient military force to overawe them is not sent into the nation, 
they will not be removed, and the whole frontier maybe laid waste by a 
combination of the Indians, Indian negroes, and the negroes on the plant- 
ations. It is useless to mince this question — it should be met, and met 
firmly, if their treaty is to be carried into effect ; and I do not hesitate 
to state, and I do so from some small knowledge of the Indian character, 
that a large majority of this nation have not the most distant idea of going 
west, and they will not so, unless compelled by a strong military force. 
I have, therefore, felt it my duty to make known to the General-in-chief 
my views on this subject, and to call lor a sufficient military force, com- 
pletely equipped for active field service, (and not with thirteen rounds of 
cartridges per man,) so as to enable me to assume any attitude that the 
Government may think proper to order me to take in relation to this wil- 
fully deluded tribe. 

I am, with high respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

D. L. CLINCH, 
Brevet Brig. Gen., Col. Ath Infantry, commanding. 



Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, Adjutant 

General, dated 

St. Augustine, 

October S, 1835. 

Sir : The time will soon arrive when a large number of the Seminole 
tribe of Indians have agreed to remove to the west. 

There are still, however, a large number that are unwilling to remove, 
and, from recent indications, I am induced to believe that force will have 
to be used to compel them to comply with their treaty- stipulations. When 
the peculiar nature, extent, and exposed state of the Indian frontier are 
taken into consideration, it will, I think, be readily admitted that the 
force placed under my command is inadequate to enforce a compliance 
with their treaty, and to give such protection to the frontier settlements 
as their apprehensions from the Indians, and from another species of pop- 
ulation, induce them to expect from the Government. Under this view 
of the case, I am induced respectfully to submit a few remarks for the 
consideration of the General-in-chief, and, if approved by him, for that 



[ 224 ] 392 

of the proper department. I consider the force already in Florida sufficient 
to meet and control the whole of the refractory Seminoles, if they could 
be concentrated. But when scattered over a large extent of country, 
composed of marshes and swamps that are almost impenetrable to the 
white man, it is entirely inadequate to give that protection and quit to 
the frontier inhabitants which they expect. 

Frequent applications have already been made from different sections 
of the country for protection, in case we should have any difficulty in re- 
moving the Seminoles, and some of the most respectable planters fear 
that there is alieady a secret and improper communication carried on be- 
tween the refractory Indians, Indian negroes, and some of the plantation 
negroes. For the better protection of the frontier settlements, and to 
stop all intercourse between the Indians and plantations, in case any dif- 
ficulty should arise in removing the Indians, I strongly and respectfully 
urge and recommend the calling into the service of the United States, 
for the terms of two or three months, 150 mounted volunteers, to be sta- 
tioned at such points as the commanding officer may think best to effect 
the object in view, and not to be ordered within the Indian boundary, un- 
less in case of absolute necessity. This force to be held ready, but not 
to be called into actual service until required, and to be disbanded as 
soon as their services could be dispensed with. 

This species of force would, in my opinion, owing to the nature of the 
country, be the most efficient and least expensive, under all the circum- 
stances of the case, that could be employed. Being well mounted, and 
all of them good woodsmen, good riders, and well acquainted with every 
part of the country, and many of them deeply interested in its protection, 
would give them a decided advantage over any other species of troops 
ior the kind of service they would be required to perform, and I have no 
doubt they could be raised without any difficulty. 

I have (lie honor further to request that one of the revenue cutters 
stationed on the Gulf of Mexico may be ordered to cruise along the coast 
from Charlotte's harbor to Tampa bay, between the 1st of December 
and the 1st of .January next, to co-operute with Brevet Major Dade's com- 
mand, in ordering in and securing, if necessary, all the Indians they may 
fmd on that coast ; and, on their arrival at Tampa bay, to remain subject 
to the orders of the officer commanding the troops in Florida. A small 
armed vessel of that class would, in my opinion, aid our operations very 
much, and could be placed on that kind of duty for a short time without 
the least injury to the revenue service. 

The service assigned me and the troops under my command, is arduous, 
disagreeable, and perplexing, and without the least prospect of reaping 
any honor; but it will be cheerfully performed to the best of my abilities. 

I feel deeply anxious to remove the Seminole nation without resorting 
to force ; but, being on the ground, and in possession of all the facts, I feel 
it my duty to state them for the information of the Gencral-in-chief and 
the Department of War, and to give it as my opinion that we shall have 
to strike a blow at the Mickasuky tribes before they will surrender the 
murderers of Dalton, or agree to comply with their treaty. This, how- 
ever, will be the last alternative ; but I earnestly request that the Gov- 
ernment will place the means in my hands to enable me, when it be- 



- 



393 [ 224 J 



comes absolutely necessary, to strike effectually, and to give protection 
to the frontier settlements; otherwise many lives and much property may 
be lost. 

I have the honor to be, &c, 

D. L. CLINCH, 
Brev. Brig. Gen., Col. 4th Infantry, commanding. 
To Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General, Washington. 



Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, Adjutant 

General, dated 

St. Augustine, 

October 17, 1835. 

Sir : The enclosed copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Fanning, 
is submitted for the consideration of the General-in-chief. My first wish 
is to carry out the humane and benevolent views of the Government in 
relation to the Seminole Indians, in the way most conducive to their com- 
fort and happiness, and least expensive to the nation. With these ob- 
jects constantly in view, I may have rather under-estimated the means 
necessary to carry into effect the views and plans of the Government. 
By referring, however, to my letter of the 18th of January last, you will 
perceive that I requested that six companies might be added to the com- 
mand in Florida, four of which only were ordered to Fort King. In my 
communication of the 8th instant I state, " I consider the whole force alrea- 
dy in Florida sufficient to meet and control the whole of the refractory Se- 
minoles, if they could be concentrated. But when scattered over a large 
extent of country, composed of marshes and swamps that are almost im- 
penetrable to the white man, it is entirely inadequate to give that pro- 
tection and quiet to the frontier inhabitants which they expect." 

Since writing the foregoing, I have been informed, by Assistant Sur- 
geon Archer, that nearly 100 of the command now at Fort King have 
been more or less sick, within the last 2 or 3 months, and, although many 
of them are fit for garrison duty, and most of the others are convalescent, 
they cannot be relied on for active and efficient service. I, therefore, 
have the honor respectfully to request that three additional companies 
be ordered to Fort King, with as little delay as practicable, with an am- 
ple supply of ball and buck-shot cartridges. 

Should this request be complied with, and the companies ordered from 
the North, it would be economy of time and money to engage transports, 
drawing not more than eight feet water, to take the troops direct to the 
St. John's river, and land them on the west side of that river, opposite to 
Picolata, where there is a good road leading to Fort King, and from which 
place transportation could be sent to meet them, if timely notice is given to 
the commanding officer at that post. . 

I have the honor to be, &c, 

D. L. CLINCH, 
Brev. Brig. Gen., Col. 4th Infantry, commd^g. 

To Brigadier General R. Jones, fyc. 



f 224 ] 394 

Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, Adjutant 

General, dated 

Fort Defiance, Micanopy, 

December 9, 1835. 

Sir : The uncertainty as to the time when the companies ordered from 
Louisiana will reach Tampa bay, and the distance they will have to march 
through a hostile country, before they can join my command, induces 
me to request that four additional companies be ordered to join me with 
the least possible delay, completely prepared to take the field, with a good 
supply of ball and buck-shot cartridges. It is also very desirable to have 
fifty good muskets and fifty rifles sent at the same time, as there is a 
great deficiency of arms in the country. 

All the information I receive, in relation to the movements of the In- 
dians, represent them as being in considerable force, and manifesting a 
determination to engage in murder and plunder. It appears, also, that 
they are joined by the negroes, and if they are not promptly put down, 
this spirit may extend to the plantations. 

If additional troops should be sent, they should be landed on the west 
bank of the St. John's, at Picolata, and marched from thence to Fort 
King. 

I am, with high respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

D. L. CLINCH, 
Brev. Brig. Gen., Col. 4th Inf., commanding. 
To Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General, Washington City. 



Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, Adjutant 

General, dated 

Headquarters, Troops in Florida, 

Fort Drane, December 16, 1835. 

Sir : It is also very much tobe regretted, as our Indian affairs have taken 
the course they have, that the four additional companies had not been or- 
dered from the Atlantic instead of the Gulf; as, in that event, they could 
have joined before this, and I should have been in sufficient force to have 
operated, as soon as a sufficient quantity of provisions could have been 
placed in store at Fort King. As it is, it is impossible for me to form any 
idea when they will arrive at Tampa bay, between which place and Fort 
King, a distance of 100 miles, through the centre of the hostile part of 
the Seminole nation, there is no communication, the Indians having, in 
several instances, stopped the runners, taken and broken open the letters. 

Thus, you will perceive, when the seven companies assemble at Fort 
Brooke, that my force will be equally divided, and neither part strong 
enough to affect much in a country like this. 

I am, sir, &c, 

D. L. CLINCH. 

To Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General. 



395 [ 224 J 

Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, dated 

Headquarters, Troops in Florida, 

January 11, 1836. 

Sir: Commodore Dallas has not informed me what direction he has 
given to the armed vessel ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to co- 
operate in the removal of the Indians. 

I am prepared to meet, and treat with silent contempt, the thousand 
false and malicious statements that are going the rounds of the newspa- 
pers, in relation to the operations of the troops in Florida ; but I feel it 
due to my honor and reputation to say, that I consider the Secretary of 
War has, (although I feel confident it was unintentional on his part,) in 
his official communication to the President of the United States, under 
date of the 30th November, 1835, done me a very serious injury. In 
that report, he states that " General Clinch has 14 companies placed un- 
der his command," which has induced the people of the United States to 
believe that I have actually had that number of companies disposable, and 
prepared to take the field ; when, in fact, I have had but six reduced 
companies, as it required one of the seven companies at Fort King to de- 
fend that place. 

At the time the Secretary's report was written, the 14 companies allu- 
ded to by him were stationed at the different military posts, as follows : 

1 company at Fort Marion, St. Augustine. 
6 at Fort King. 

2 at Fort Brooke, Tampa bay. 

1 at Key West, (the captain commanding it on leave of absence with- 
out my knowledge.) 

2 on their way from Fort Pickens, (Pensacola,) and Fort Morgan, 
Alabama, to Fort Brooke ; and 2 waiting orders at Forts Pike and Wood, 
(Louisiana.) 

Seven of the companies were ordered to concentrate at Fort Brooke, 
4 of which were ordered to proceed 100 miles, to Fort King, before the 
Indians commenced their hostile operations. Since which all communi- 
cation has been cut off between the two places. 

The loss of the public supplies, in November last, has caused great in- 
convenience, as it has taken nearly one-third of the regular troops to 
guard the provisions, &c. from Picolata to this post, and Fort King. 

I hope a sufficient regular force to enable me to take and keep the 
field has, ere this, been ordered into Florida. 

I am, sir, your most obedient, 

D. L. CLINCH. 
To Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General. 



No. 152. 
Assistant Quartermaster's Office, 

New Orleans, August 16, 1836. 

Sir : I have this day seen a publication, in the National Intelligencer 
of the 27th July, taken from the New York Star, on the subject of the 



wmauuaaum 



[ 224 



39G 



campaign in East Florida. The writer, in speaking of the arrival of the 
army at Tampa bay, says : We there learned that the quartermaster at 
New Orleans, influenced by the representations made, or caused (as it 
was said) to be made, by General Gaines, that the war was closed, had 
abstained from sending on provisions he had been ordered to forward 
from that place. The whole of this part of his statement is incor- 
rect. When or how he obtained this information, I know not. Gen- 
eral Gaines, on his return to New Orleans, told me to continue to send 
supplies, whieh was done promptly. Every exertion was made, both by 
myself and the assistant commissary, to obtain and forward the subsist- 
ence and forage required. There was great difficulty in obtaining hard 
bread, and every barrel that could be had was immediately shipped. 

On the 31st of March, the assistant commissary at Fort Brooke for- 
warded a statement to the assistant commissary at New Orleans, of the 
supplies on hand — 216,750 rations of meat, 304,423 rations of bread and 
flour, and the small rations in proportion ; at this time there were two 
vessels on the way, laden with subsistence and forage ; and the bills of 
lading show that they were received on the 6th of April, in good condi- 
tion. Now, it appears, the army arrived at Tampa bay the 3d, 4th, and 
5th April, and remained but a few days before they took their departure, 
and I cannot perceive where was the scarcity of provisions, unless it was 
in the hard bread. This was unavoidable, for it could not be obtained ; that 
is, the quantity required. 

My object in making this statement is, to correct the error that Gene- 
ral Gaines had, in any way, contributed to the withholding supplies from 
the army in Florida ; also, to show that there was no cessation on the 
part of the commissary, or myself, in procuring and forwarding the sup- 
plies at the earliest period possible. The proofs of this are contained in 
my list of shipments, now at Washington. 
I have the honor to be, sir, 

With high respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

J. CLARK, 
Assistant Quartermaster. 

To Major T. Cross, 

Acting Quartermaster GenH, Washington City. 



No. 153. 



Picolata, Florida, 

March 1, 1836. 

General : 1 have to day reported myself to Major General Scott, at 
this place, after being detained four days by sickness on the way. 

The department here is deficient in means of transportation. I am told 
that wagons and horses are daily expected from Savannah, but cannot 
ascertain the number so expected. The road from this to Fort Drane 
(sixty-five miles) is a very bad one ; parts of it deep sand, and other parts 
boggy, so that the teams cannot take more than half loads. 



397 [ 224 ] 

Fort Diane is at General Clinch's plantation, twenty miles nearly north 
of Fort King ; it is the Intention of General Scott to organize his princi- 
pal army at the former place. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 

With great respect, 

Your obedient serv't, 

S. SHANNON, 
Assistant Quartermaster. 
Major General T. S. Jesup, 

QuarVr GenH, U. S. A., Washington. 



No. 154. 



Tampa Bay, Florida, 

April 11, 1836. 

General : Though I have been five days at this place, I have not had 
time to make even my monthly papers for the last month, but will forward 
them by the next conveyance that offers. 

The right wing of the army, under the immediate orders of General 
Clinch, arrived here five days ago ; having crossed the Withlacoochee at 
General Gaines's camp, from which point a road was cut for the wagon- 
train, as the army marched to this place on the west side of the Hills- 
borough river. We found here the central army under Colonel Lindsay, 
and part of the left, under General Eustis, the other part being encamped 
fifteen miles north of this, on the Fort King road. 

Yesterday the Louisiana regiment, about six hundred strong, embarked 
for Charlotte's harbor, where they will be joined by two hundred mounted 
men from South Carolina, to make a tour to Pease creek, where it is said 
a few hundred of the hostile Indians are located. 

Boats are now constructing here to transport stores up the Withlacoo- 
chee — so soon as finished, (will be about three days,) a command will 
be sent with stores to the mouth of that river, and up it fifteen or twenty 
miles, to a suitable position for a depot, then the right wing will return by 
nearly the same route, to the large hammocks in the vicinity of the 
forks of the Withlacoochee ; the centre and left will march by the Fort 
King road, and turn to the left, so as to approach the same hammocks on 
the east side — the whole will be in motion on or about the 13th instant. 

We are still wanting in sufficient means of transportation, and have not 
now the time to increase it; a number of horses (180) and wagons, were 
required by assistant Quartermaster Newcomb from Major Clark, which 
have not yet come to hand, though time sufficient has elapsed ; and it is 
presumed they will not be sent, as we learn that Major Clark has been 
told by an officer of rank, from the seat of war, that the war is over, and 
concludes of course that they will not be wanted. 

In almost any other country, the means we have would be sufficient ; 
having with the right wing, for two thousand troops, about twenty-four 
four and five-horse wagons, besides a small allowance of two-horse wagons 
to the troops, for the transportation of tents, &c. The other two armies 



2SJ4 J 398 

have not quite so much in proportion to their strength. But, the state of 
the roads will not admit of the wagons being over half loaded, and the 
horses and mules with the greatest care, fail and break down to an alarm- 
ing extent. We have lost many by death, on the last march. 
1 have the honor to be, sir, 
With great respect, 

Your very obedient servant, 

S. SHANNON, 
Assistant Quartermaster. 
Major General Thomas S. Jesup, 

Quartermaster General, U. S. Army, Washington. 



No. 155. 



War Department, 

May 16, 1836. 

Sir: 1 enclose for your information the copy of a letter this day addressed 
to Governor Call. The general views of the President as to the measures 
necessary for the defence of Florida are therein stated ; and this letter, 
together with that to you of May 5th, from the Adjutant General, will 
communicate all the information which seems requisite, as to the opinions 
entertained here upon the subject. 1 have to request that you would make 
such arrangements as the circumstances call for, so as to afford adequate 
protection to the settlements, until it shall be deemed proper again to re- 
new offensive operations. 

General Clinch has tendered his resignation, but the President is not 
willing to accept it, having confidence in his experience and military ca- 
pacity. You are at liberty to leave Florida and resume the command of 
your department, whenever you think you can do so with a just regard 
to public interest. You will turn over the command to Brigadier Gen- 
eral Clinch, or, if he leaves the service, to the next officer in rank, furnish- 
ing such instructions as you shall think proper. 

The latest information from the Creek country, in Alabama, leads to the 
opinion that the Creek Indians meditate hostilities. The Governors of 
Alabama and Georgia have been authorized to call out such militia as may 
be necessary ; and General Fenwick has been ordered to proceed to that 
country with six companies of artillery. It is desirable that you should 
direct your personal attention to that quarter, and, if necessary, assume 
the command, calling for such a militia force, under your instructions of 
January 21, as you may find necessary. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

LEWIS CASS. 

Major General Scott, 

St. Augustine, Florida. 



399 [ 224 ] 

No. 156. 

War Department, 

May 16, 1S36. 

Sir: I have received your letter of May 4th. You will perceive that 
while Major General Scott is in Florida charged with the general meas- 
ures of defence, it would not do for this Department to authorize the or- 
ganization and employment of a force independent of his authority. Still, 
however, if any portion of the frontier is left without defence, and the 
inhabitants exposed to danger, the President will sanction the calling out 
by you of a force necessary to repel the attacks of the Indians. You may 
rely upon every disposition being felt here to afford due protection to the 
inhabitants of Florida, and to reduce the refractory Indians to submission. 

General Scott, by the last advices, was at St. Augustine, awaiting the 
orders of the Department. He will be authorized, after putting the frontier 
in a proper state of defence, to turn over the command to General Clinch, 
and to return to his department, if the state of affairs there will, in his 
opinion, permit. You will perceive the extreme difficulty of determining 
here what posts should be abandoned or established, when there is a con- 
trariety of opinion between officers of high rank in that country. My own 
impression respecting general defensive measures is, that healthful posi- 
tions should be sought along the lines, and temporary posts established, 
with slight defences, for the occupation of the troops during the summer 
season ; that it is better to have more posts with fewer men in each, than 
it is to have few posts with large garrisons ; that the Indians will scarcely 
collect in large masses, or attack fortified positions, but, that they will 
spread themselves along the frontiers in small parties, doing all the mis- 
chief they can. The troops should, at all times, be upon the alert, and 
there should be mounted men employed acquainted with the nature of the 
country and the habits of the Indians, who can instantly follow any ma- 
rauding parties which may strike upon the settlements. It is indispensable 
that the Indians should be pursued. If they find that their expeditions 
are successful, and that they are not followed to their fastnesses, they 
will lay waste the whole frontier. Certainly, where an Indian can go, a 
white man can follow. It is necessary, however, for this purpose, that a 
corps of spies and guides should be formed, and kept continually in motion. 
Whenever a hostile party is discovered, their trail should be followed, 
and the necessary force, infantry and mounted men, kept within supporting 
distance of these spies. Vigilance, activity, and decision are essentially 
necessary to secure the objects in view. 

From your representation, I am under the impression that a very small 
force at Tampa bay will be sufficient, and that the other troops had better 
be stationed upon the line of the frontier settlements. I shall transmit to 
General Scott copies of your letter, and this answer, that he may know 
the views of the Department. He will be authorized to keep in service 
such mounted men as may be necessary for defensive operations during 
the summer season. 

From what is understood here of the climate, men not accustomed to 
it cannot with safety carry on military operations. If this be so, the 
regular troops ought not to be required to do any more than defend their 



positions, overawe the Indians, and pursue any war parties that may make 
iheir appearance, and, perhaps, also, occasionallyranging through the 
more healthful parts of the country. 

I mentioned, in a preceding letter, that there was a bill pending before 
Congress for raising a volunteer force ; and that as soon as it passed, de- 
finitive measures would be taken on the subject of your proposition to 
imbody a force of this description. Congress has not finally acted upon 
this matter. But, in the mean time, you are authorized to take prepar- 
atory steps for raising one thousand volunteers, to be employed, whenever 
required, in operations against the Seminole Indians. 1 enclose you a 
copy of the bill for your infofmation ; but, you will please to observe that, 
as it has not passed, no definitive measures can be taken upon this subject, 
nor assurances given. The men may be enrolled, and the company offi* 
cers selected, so as to be ready to be imbodied the moment the bill 
passes. They should be organized with respect to officers, non-commis- 
sioned officers, and privates, agreeably to the existing militia laws of the 
United States. The question respecting the appointment of superior officers 
will be determined as soon as the law passes. All this will be considered 
as the mere voluntary act of the individuals, and will not subject the Gov- 
ernment to any expense whatever, until the necessary legal provision is 
made. It is merely preparatory to an organization. 

I have shown this letter to the President, who has authorized me to 
express to you his approbation of it. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

LEWIS CASS. 

His Excellency R. K. Call, 

Governor of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida. 

P. S. — The President suggests that whenever the Indian ponies and 
beef-cattle cannot be taken for the use of the army, they should be shot. 



No. 157. 



Headquarters, Georgia, 

Milledgeville, May 18, 1836. 

Sir : The Creek Indians are in a state of open war, killing and de- 
stroying everything in their way. They have crossed to the Georgia side 
of the Chattahoochie and burnt Roanoke, and an attack on Columbus is daily 
expected. All the white people of the nation who have not been mur- 
dered, have fled to Georgia. The people on our frontier are in a wretched 
condition — their lives and property being at the mercy of the savages. 
The militia of the adjoining counties have been called out almost en masse, 
and I have been making exertions to get troops to the field, but the want of 
proper organization of the militia makes this a difficult task. I am en- 
deavoring for the present to defend Georgia, and as soon as I can obtain 
a sufficient force I intend to carry the war into the enemy's country. 

I should have written you immediately on hearing of these difficulties, 



401 f ^24 ] 

but did not know until now where to address you. If you can spare any 
United States troops for this service they will be acceptable, and I should 
be glad if you can send an officer to muster the militia I have furnished, 
and" shall furnish, into the service of the United States. If your presence 
is not necessary in Florida, I shall be very glad to see you on the line of 
the Chattahoochie. We know so little of military matters and the economy 
of an army, that your presence will be quite acceptable. 
I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

WILLIAM SCHLEY. 
Major General Winfield Scott, 

St. Augustine, Florida. 



No. 158. 

War Department, 

• May 19, 1836. 

Sir : I transmit for your information a copy of a letter this day addressed 
to Brevet Major General Jesup, and copies of letters to the Governors of 
Alabama and Georgia. 

Very respectfully, 

Your most obedient servant, 

LEWIS CASS. 
Major General W. Scott, 

St. Augustine, Florida. 



No. 159. 

War Department, 

May 19, 183G. 

Sir: By direction of the President, you are hereby assigned, as a 
Brevet Major General, to the command of the troops of the United 
States, and of the militia which may be called into service from Georgia 
and Alabama, for the suppression of hostilities in the Creek country. 
Intelligence just received from that quarter shows that hostilities have 
commenced on the part of the Creek Indians against our settlements. 
You will, therefore, repair without delay to that quarter, and take such 
measures as you may find necessary for the reduction of the Indians. 
You will receive from the Adjutant General a statement of the regular 
force which has been ordered to that quarter. In addition to this the 
Governors of Georgia and Alabama have been authorized to call into the 
field such of the militia as they might find necessary, in the event of 
actual disturbances among the Indians, or of such a state of things as 
should leave no doubt that they meditate them. 

Letters have been this day addressed to the Governors of those 
26 



2U ] 



402 



States, requesting them to call into the field such militia force as yoii 
may require. It would be better, on all occasions, that these should be 
volunteers, and that they should engage to serve for six months, unless 
sooner discharged. If, however, it is necessary to resort to draughting', 
the term cannot be prolonged by law beyond three months. 

You are aware that a bill is pending before Congress for the organiza- 
tion of a volunteer force. Should this pass in time for your operations., 
it would no doubt be better that the troops required should be engaged 
under it. 

I have, as you will perceive, stated this view to the Governors of 
Georgia and Alabama, and informed them that as soon as this bill be- 
comes a law, 1 will communicate the fact to them, together with such 
suggestions as may appear necessary. 

Your efforts will be directed to the unconditional submission of the 
Indians. As fast as this is effected, and as any parties of them can be 
collected, they must be disarmed, and sent immediately to their country 
west of the Mississippi. For this purpose you will employ such officers 
and military detachments as may be necessary. 

You will call upon the Commissary General of Subsistence for a state- 
ment of the arrangements that have been made on the subject of the 
removal of these Indians. Captain Page of the army has at present the 
direction of the matter. A contract with a number of persons in that 
country has been entered into, for subsisting and transporting these 
Indians. If they arc able and willing to go on with their contracts, you 
will allow them to do so. But immediate action is necessary ; and if 
you experience any delay, you can cause the provisions, means of 
transportation, Sec, to.be purchased by the military agents. The great 
object is to remove them immediately ; and to this other considerations 
must yield. Captain Page will communicate to you all his instructions, 
and the regulations of the Department, by which you will see the sys- 
tem of administration that has been adopted upon this subject, This 
will be adhered to wherever the new state of things does not require a 
change. You will take care that all practical economy is preserved, and 
that the disbursements are faithfully accounted for. And with respect to 
your military operations generally, I have to request that you would 
direct your attention to an economical administration of your military 
expenditures, and a proper preservation and accountability of the public 
supplies. 

Should Major General Scott, under the instructions he has heretofore 
received, proceed to the theatre of operations, he will, of course, be en- 
titled to the command, and you will serve under him. You will take 
care and call on the chiefs of the military bureaus for such supplies as- 
you may require ; and, previous to your departure, make all the neces- 
sary arrangements, so that you may not experience any delay from want 
of funds, munitions of war, or other supplies. 

It is very probable that portions of the Creek Indians may not as yet 
have been concerned in actual hostilities, although from the predisposi- 
tion of the Indians for war, there is every reason to believe they will do 
so, unless prevented by a timely removal. It will be proper where this 
is the case, to treat these Indians with the kindest attention, and to send 
them off as speedily as practicable, in order to get them out of the reach of 
the scenes around them. Still, however, they must be removed by a mili- 



403 [ 224 ] 

tary force, if necessary. As all experience has shown that it is difficult, 
if not impracticable, to keep any considerable part of an Indian tribe at 
peace while the residue of it ia engaged in war. And, besides, it would 
be impossible to prevent the hostile warriors from taking shelter among 
the others; or, indeed, to determine with any reasonable certainty, and 
for any length of time, who are hostile and who are friendly. 

The President has been desirous of ascertaining what frauds have 
been committed upon these Indians, in the sale of their lands, with a 
view to remedy the evil, as far as possible. But this effort, a succinct 
account of which will be communicated to you by the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, has been now stopped by war. It is still, however, de- 
desirable, that the friendly part of the Creeks, if in fact any of them 
should remain friendly, should be relieved from the embarrassments un- 
der which they have labored with respect to their lands. 

I enclose the copy of a letter from Captain Page, by which you will 
perceive the views of that officer on the subject, and the proposition 
made by the Upper Creeks. This proposition has been approved, and 
Capt. Page advised of the fact. So far, therefore, as any part of this divi- 
sion of the Creeks shall remain peaceable, you are authorized to sanction 
the proceeding recommended. But, whatever is done must be done 
without delay, for it is very important that these people should be imme- 
diately sent off. You will assure them that the Government is anxious 
to do them justice, and that the claims of those who remain at peace, 
and remove to the country west of the Mississippi, will be duly attended 
to. A descriptive roll of all these persons will be taken, in order to de- 
termine their cases hereafter. It is impossible, for the want of time, to 
cause abstracts to be prepared, showing the sales that have been made 
by the Creek Indians ; and, therefore, no directions can be given for any 
definite proceedings upon that subject. There is no objection, however, 
in the cases of these friendly Indians, to permitting them to sell, agree- 
ably to the established regulations, a copy of which you will herewith 
receive, if the purchaser can satisfy himself that no contract has been 
heretofore made for the sale of the land. But if this is done he must do 
it upon his own responsibility ; for if a previous valid contract has been 
entered into, the first purchaser must hold the land. If the arrange- 
ments stated by Captain Page should take effect, you are authorized to 
select a competent officer, should the Indians desire it, to see that justice 
is done ; and also to appoint a certifying agent, to certify contracts, 
should any be entered into as above mentioned. His duties and com- 
pensation will be governed by the prescribed regulations. 

If, however, these matters cannot be satisfactorily arranged previous 
to the departure of the Indians, you will assure the friendly disposed 
part of them, that measures will be taken as early as practicable to see 
that justice is done to them, and that the land shall be disposed of at its 
fair value, and the proceeds paid over to them. 

The moment the annuity bill passes, arrangements will be made for 
paying to the peaceable Creeks their just proportion of it. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

LEWIS CASS. 
Brevet Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Jesup, 

Washington city. 



^^.-, m ^^. ^n^i. 



[ 224 ] 404 

No. 160. 

Headquarters, &c, 

Savannah, May 22, 183G. 

Sir : I landed here from St. Augustine a few minutes since, bound to 
the Creek nation via Augusta and Milledgeville. I wrote to you on the 
20th instant ; you will receive that letter with this. 

The same night I received the letter of the Secretary of War and one 
from your office, both dated the 15th ultimo. Those papers and others 
had gone to Newnansville, 35 miles north of Fort Drane, whore they 
were heard of by accident and sent for. 

My late indisposition is not to be attributed to either fatigue or cli- 
mate. At the beginning of the month I imprudently threw off my 
flannel, took a violent cold, and have been prostrate for more than two 
weeks. I am now fast recovering strength, and do not doubt, by the 
time I arrive at Augusta, going up by steam, I shall be equal to any ser- 
vice whatever, on foot and on horseback. 

My usefulness, however, I am told here, will have been much im- 
paired by the probable general publication, in the interior, of my letter 
to you of the 30th ultimo. 

No doubt seems to be entertained by any one that hostilities have 
been commenced by the Creeks. I shall spend one day in consultation 
with the Governor at Milledgeville, and proceed to the point where the 
greatest body of troops may be assembled. If sufficient numbers have 
not been put in the field, 1 shall call for the corps I may deem neces- 
sary from Georgia and Alabama. 

To organize the forces, and to push them on the enemy, will occupy 
my early attention ; but the first object will be to organize a commissa- 
riat, and to establish sufficient depots of subsistence. I have but one 
officer in my staff, at this moment, Paymaster Kirby, but he is a host 
within himself. An assistant commissary I shall certainly find at Fort 
Mitchell, and may hear of another at Augusta. Funds, by draft on the 
Department, I do not doubt I may raise lor the moment, till regularly 
supplied. Some spare officers, I hope, will be speedily sent to me for 
disbursements. Lieutenant Herring will soon join me as an aid-de-camp. 

I could not, prudently, take a single company from Florida. Some 
regulars, 1 may hope to hear of at Augusta, coming from the North. 

I shall send an order for Dr. Lawson, now supposed to be at New 
Orleans, and hope to obtain the services of Captain Shannon, of the 
Quartermaster's department, who is somewhere in the west of Florida, 
on the duties he was engaged in before the Seminole war. 

If I can recover myself with the volunteers, and I shall make every 
sacrifice but truth to accomplish the object, I do not doubt of meeting 
the wishes of the Government in this new Avar. The Creeks are acces- 
sible. Troops only are wanted to attack and subdue them. 

I have ordered the new musket accoutrements, the new arms, and the 
new tents, from Picolata and St. Augustine, to Augusta, and also some 
spare fixed ammunition from the former place. 

Four hundred barrels of hard bread, found here, and also some bacon, 



405 I" 224 



neither of which will be immediately wanted in Florida, will also be 
ordered up the river. 

I enclose a copy of my letter of instruction to Brigadier General Eustis, 
whom 1 left in command in Florida. 

The reasons assigned by the council of war for abandoning Fort King 
are many: the difficulty of furnishing wagons and escorts for supplies ; 
the post covers absolutely nothing; the want of its garrison (two com- 
panies) to occupy more important points, &c. I concur in those rea- 
sons. I shall write from Augusta. 1 do not doubt that I shall overcome 
all prejudices against me, and then overcome the enemy. 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brig. Gen. Jones, 

Adj. Gen. U. S. A. 



No. 161 



War Department, 

May 23, 183G. 

Sir : I consider it very important that you should, at the commence- 
ment of your operations, station a sufficient force at the south point of 
the Creek country, so as to prevent the retreat of the Creek Indians 
into Florida, and also to cut off all communication between them and 
the Seminole Indians. This matter was the subject of conversation pre- 
vious to your departure, but it seems to me so deeply interesting, as well 
to the successful result of your operations as to the proper safety of 
Florida, that I am again induced to present it to your notice. 

I have to request that Captain Page may be allowed to devote his 
exclusive attention to the arrangement of the Indian business, and the 
removal of the Indians. All I can expect from you in this matter is a 
general supervision. Captain Page is well acquainted with the whole 
subject, and to him it can safely be committed. 

Very repectfully, &c, 



Major General Jesup, 

Milled geville, Georgia. 



LEWIS CASS. 



No. 162. 



War Department, 

Washington, May 25, 1836. 

Sir : As from the permission previously given, and the events in 
the Creek country, there is reason to believe you may have left the 
Territory of Florida, arrangements have been made, should this be so, 



— — ' — 



[ M* ] 



406 



for the defence of the country against the operations of the hostile Seini- 
noles. As however it is possible this letter may yet find you in Florida, 
I enclose for your information, the instructions in relation to this sub- 
ject. Should you remain there, you are requested to carry them into 
effect. 

Very respectfully, &c, 

LEW. CASS. 
Major General Scott, 

St. Augustine, Florida. 



No. 163. 



Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, May 26, 1836. 
General Order, No. 34. 

Should Major General Scott and Brigadier General Clinch not con- 
tinue on duty in Florida, Governor Call, under instructions from the 
War Department, is, in such event, authorized to take command of the 
regular troops of the United States, and of the militia serving in Florida. 
The orders of the Governor of Florida will be obeyed accordingly, and 
his requisitions on the several departments of the general staff will be 
promptly complied with. 
By order : 

R. JONES, 
Adjutant General. 



No. 164. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Augusta, Geo., May 26, 1S36. 

Sir : I arrived here last night on my way to Fort Mitchell, to assume 
command in that quarter, and am restored to health. 

I should have proceeded to day, but find that I can occupy myself use- 
fully till to-morrow. 

I enclose a copy of a letter addressed by me to the Governor of Geor- 
gia, and the copy of one that I have just addressed jointly to the quarter- 
master and commissary of subsistence at New Orleans. 

I have just had the honor to receive two letters from the Secretary of 
War, dated the 16th and 17th instant, respectively. According to the 
permission contained in the first, I shall assume the direction of the war 
against the Creeks. 

I have also received your letter of the 17th instant, addressed to me, 
and copies of your letters to Brigadier General Fenwick, of the same 
date, and to Lieutenant Mackay of the 16th. 

The latter is temporarily charged with the duty of the quartermaster's 
department at Savannah, during the absence of Lieutenant Dimmock, 



407 [ 224 i 

who is here. On the return of the hitter, Lieutenant Mackay will he 
ordered to join me for duty on the Chattahoochie. He is a valuable 
young officer. 

I must further acknowledge the receipt of General Orders No. 29, 30, 
and 31. 

Colonel Lindsay I have not heard from directly since I saw him on the 
big Withlacooch.ee. Unofficial accounts represent him as sick. He will be 
instructed to join the army on the Chattahoochie as soon as practicable. 
I have time to add no more at present, but will write again to-morrow. 
With great respect, I remain, 

Your most obedient servant, 

W1NFIELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army. 

P. S. I received a letter at Savannah from the Governor of Georgia, 
requesting me to hasten to the theatre of the Creek war. I promptly 
replied that I was on my way thither ; but feared that the publication of 
my letter to you, of the 30th ultimo, would much impair my usefulness. 
Hence an allusion to my letter to his Excellency, a copy of which is here- 
with enclosed. 

W. S. 



No. 165. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Augusta, Geo., May 26, 1336. 

Sir : I arrived here last night, and intended to proceed to-day to Mil- 
ledgeville to wait upon your Excellency, and to arrange everything for 
the prompt and vigorous prosecution of the war against the Creeks. I 
am, however, advised to delay my journey twenty-four hours, to give time 
to counteract a strong prejudice against me, growing out of a letter of 
mine to the Government, recently published. To effect this object, the 
noble commander of the Augusta battalion, lately under my command, 
has addressed me a letter, to which my reply, I think, cannot fail to be 
satisfactory. Both will be, I understand, without any direct agency on 
my part, immediately published. 

My delay here will be of benefit in more important matters to the 
service. 

From Picolata, St. Augustine, Charleston, and Savannah, I have or- 
dered essential stores to be immediately transported towards the theatre 
of operations on the Chattahoochie. Some arms, ammunition, accoutre- 
ments, tents, and one hundred thousand rations, will immediately be 
shipped from those places, via Darien, to Hawkinsville, on the Ockmul- 
gee, which I suppose to be within seventy-five miles of Columbus. 
From New Orleans I have also ordered to be sent up to the highest 
navigable point on the Chattahoochie, in light steamers, two hundred and 
fifty thousand complete rations, and I shall take measures for the supply 
of two hundred bushels of cornmeal daily on the same river. This I 



[ 224 ] 



408 



shall do on my route between Macon and Columbus, and purchase up all 
the bacon which the same district of country may furnish. Ten wagons 
loaded with subsistence will leave this place for the same destination 
to-morrow morning. 

Of the ten companies of regulars expected from the North, one has 
already arrived here. [A mistake, a detachment of recruits have ar- 
rived.] 

If I do not find you at Milledgeville, I shall soon have the pleasure of 
seeing you further to the west. 

If the forces of the enemy amount to G,000 warriors, I shall wish to 
oppose to him a rather larger force. A little more than half I shall re- 
quire of your Excellency, and the remainder from Alabama ; perhaps, a 
part from Tennessee. 

I presume it will be best to assemble the great body of our forces as 
low down as Irwinton, and operate thence up the country. 
I have the honor, ice. 

VVINFIELD SCOTT. 

His Excellency W. Schley, 

Governor of Georgia. 



No. 166. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Augusta, Geo., May 26, 1836. 

Sir : The Creek Indians on the Chattahoochie river have commenced 
open war against the United States. The Governors of Georgia and 
Alabama have already put large forces in the field, and I am hastening to 
the theatre of operations. Ten thousand regulars, volunteers, and draughts 
may soon be expected to be assembled on that river, and the resources 
of the neighborhood cannot be expected to supply the necessary means 
of subsistence for many days. From Savannah and Charleston I have 
ordered about one hundred thousand rations to be sent, via Darien, up 
the Ockmulgee river to Hawkinsville, distant by land about seventy-five 
miles from Columbus; but our principal supplies of subsistence must be 
derived from New Orleans. 

You will, therefore, immediately on the receipt of this letter, begin to 
purchase and send rapidly up the Appalachicola and Chattahoochie rivers, 
bread, flour, bacon, and small rations, in all, until further requisitions, 
say two hundred and fifty thousand complete rations ; and I shall soon, 
no doubt, demand from you other large supplies. 

I understand that the Chattahoochie river may be expected to continue 
navigable for steamboats of light draught of water all the next month, at 
least as high as Fort Gaines or Irwinton, fifty or sixty miles below Co- 
lumbus, and I shall take care to have a person or persons on the river, 
(which I shall first clear of the enemy,) ready to receive the subsistence 
as it may arrive ; but, in chartering vessels, you will be careful to stipulate 
that the cargoes shall be delivered at the highest navigable point that may 
be required. 



409 [ 224 ] 

I look to your zeal and activity to execute this order with the least 
possible delay. Hard bread is preferred to flour, and bacon to pork ; but 
the rations must be sent, although you may be obliged to substitute large 
portions of flour and pork. For the second shipment, if not for the first, 
it is hoped you may cause a sufficient quantity of hard bread to be baked. 
I remain in haste, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
To Major J. Clark, 

U. S. Quartermaster ; 
Or, 
Lieutenant Grayson, 

U. S. Commissary, New Orleans. 

P. S. Cause to be made and shipped as speedily as possible, with the 
subsistence, say four hundred camp-kettles. Purchase and send at the 
same time about the same number of felling-axes. 

W. S. 



No. 167. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Augusta, Georgia, May 27, 1836. 

Sir : From my confidence in your administrative talents, derived from 
your services in Florida, I appoint you agent of the Quartermaster's and 
the Subsistence departments, at one hundred dollars per month. I have, 
from experience, equal confidence in your zeal and integrity. 

It is my wish that you proceed as soon as practicable to Hawkinsville, 
on the Ockmulgee river, to which point large quantities of subsistence, 
quartermaster's and ordnance stores, have been or will be speedily ship- 
ped. At that place, on this side, and in its neighborhood, I wish you to 
engage on the best terms for the United States, say from sixty to one 
hundred four, five, or six-horse wagons, to take those supplies to Colum- 
bus and Fort Mitchell, on or near the Chattahoochie river, without delay. 
Other wagons will be sent back from that river to aid in the transporta- 
tion of the stores from Hawkinsville to the army on the Chattahoochie. 

I shall, probably, not leave you long stationary at Hawkinsville, for 
besides causing the stores to be put into wagons at that place for the 
army on the Chattahoochie, you will be wanted at or near my head- 
quarters for other purposes. Lieutenant Hcintzelman, of the United 
States second infantry, it is hoped, will soon replace you at Hawkins- 
ville, in the business of forwarding the stores expected there. In the 
mean time you will purchase in that vicinity any quantity of good bacon 
which you can obtain at a fair price, for the army, and forward the same, 
without delay, to Columbus or Fort Mitchell. 

For the amount of such purchases you may make of bacon, beef- 
cattle on the hoof, and of corn-meal for the use of the army — in the 
purchase of bacon you are limited (for the present) to sixty thou- 



UIWHIIIII« MU . M ,. Bm u 



[ 224 ] 



410 



sand pounds; in the. purchase of beef-cattle to 350 head, and in the 
purchase of corn-meal to fifteen hundred bushels. These several items 
of subsistence you will endeavor to obtain as near to Fort Mitchell or 
Columbus as possible, so as to diminish the expense of transportation, 
and it will be better that each should arrive at the army in portions say 
of one-third each, at intervals of from three to five days. Farther sup- 
plies of bacon, beef-cattle, and corn-meal, will be wanted ; but in respect 
to these you will receive from me subsequent instructions. 

To enable you the better to execute my orders and wishes, five thou- 
sand dollars are now placed in your hands, for which you will pass your 
duplicate receipts to the officer (Major Kirby) from whom you will re- 
ceive the money. 

It is possible that you may find it more economical to transport a por- 
tion or even the whole of the supplies ordered to Ilawkinsville to Ma- 
con. Should you find that the case, you will direct the boats to take the 
supplies to the higher point on the Ockmulgee, and cause them to be 
thence transported in wagons to the army on the Chattahoochie river. 

In this matter I rely on you to exercise a sound discretion. 

Every train of wagons that you may despatch from Hawkinsville or 
Macon for the army, you will cause to be accompanied by a respectable 
wagon-master or agent, whom you will engage to be paid by the United 
States at reasonable prices. 

I remain with great respect, 

Your obediednt servant, 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 

Joseph A. Beard, Esq., 

Agent for the Quartermaster 

and Commissary departments. 



No. 168. 

Augusta Arsenal, Ga., 

May 31, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a communication 
received from his Excellency Governor Schley, and upon this requisition 
I have this day turned over to the assistant quartermaster here for trans- 
portation to Columbus, to the address of Captain R. P. Parrott, ordnance 
officer, one thousand muskets. I respectfully request to be informed 
whether the issue will be considered to the State of Georgia for "arming 
and equipping the whole body of militia," or for the use of the militia 
called into the service of the United States. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

N. BADEN, Major U. S. A. 
Major General VV. Scott, 

United States Army. 



411 [ '224 J 

No. 169. 

Headquarters, Georgia, 

Milledgeville, May 27, 1836. 

Sir : I have not arms enough for the militia called to the protection of 
the frontier. You will therefore confer a favor on me by furnishing one 
thousand stand of muskets, &c. with a suitable quantity of flints and fixed 
ammunition. 

Messrs. Stovall and Simmons will employ wagons to transport them 
to Columbus or to Milledgeville, if any thing should occur before their 
arrival here to render it unnecessary for them to proceed to Columbus. 

If General Jesup or General Scott should have made arrangements 
for these articles before the receipt of this, you wiLl of course not send 
those now requested. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

WILLIAM SCHLEY, 

Governor of Georgia. 
To the Officer in Command 

of the U. S. Arsenal, near Augusta, Ga. 



No. 170. 



Postscript to letter to Major J. Clark, Assistant Quartermaster, or 
Lieutenant Grayson, Assistant Commissariat, at New Orleans, dated 
Augusta, May 26, a copy of which was sent from Milledgeville May 
28, 1836. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Milledgeville, May 28, 1836. 

Sir : My letter to you of the 26th instant is of so much importance, 
that, for safety, I send you a copy of it. 

Major General Jesup, who is with me, has also made large requisitions 
upon you. These you will consider in addition to what I have demand- 
ed, and send the articles accordingly by both to Chattahoochie and to 
Fort Montgomery. 

In haste. Yours, &c. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

P. S. Send forty or fifty sacks of salt to the Chattahoochie for the fresh 
beef that may be issued to the troops, and to be given to horses. W. S. 



No. 171 



Assistant Quartermaster's Office, 

Augusta, Ga., May 29, 1836. 

General : I enclose herewith several communications received for you 
since your departure. Mr. L'Engle writes me, dated the 27th, thus : 



[ 224 ] 412 

"Your letter of the 25th instant was received too late to change the di- 
rection of a very large quantity of provisions purchased by Lieutenant 
Simpson, the assistant commissary of subsistence at this place, and 
forwarded by the railroad to Augusta." 

I learn that a large quantity of the provisions here referred to is on 
the way, and I anticipate much, very much difficulty, in procuring the 
number of wagons necessary. I shall, early in the morning, despatch 
agents into the country to engage all to be found on almost any terms. 
That I shall do all I can the General may be assured. Ten wagons left 
here on the 28th. Captain Monroe's company arrived here on the even- 
ing of your departure. It awaits at the arsenal the arrival of Major 
Pierce's command. These companies I find have 75 days' of subsist- 
ence with them. This requires about five wagons per company. Mr. 
Mackay writes me' the articles via Daiien can go up to Hawkinsville 
without difficulty. Mr. L'Engle says, " the rifles ordered hence to Sa- 
vannah left here this morning," (27th.) 

Major Garland writes to me to furnish you with camp and garrison 
equipage from the accumulation at Savannah. It is almost needless to 
inform you there is not even one camp-kettle or mess-pan, or any thing 
else of his department at Savannah. I am anxious about the delay 
which I fear must inevitably occur in forwarding the great quantity of 
stores coming through me. Three hundred wagons will be required, 
and where they are all to come from I cannot yet say. 

I have again written to Mr. L'Engle to forward all else up the river. 
I remain, General, 

With very great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

CHS. DIMMOCK, Lt. fy<r. 

To Major General Scott, 

Commanding army in Creek war, Columbus. 



No. 172. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 2, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to report, for the information of the Secretary 
and General-in-chief, that I arrived here three days ago in company 
with his Excellency Governor Schley and Major General Jesup. 

No event of importance has occurred in or about the Creek country 
in a week or two. A small party of the enemy crossed into Georgia the 
day before I arrived, murdered a few individuals, and burnt some houses. 
Until the troops are mustered into the service of the United States, they 
are not under my command. This ceremony commenced yesterday, and 
will proceed as rapidly as possible. In the mean time the Governor, 
whose own military views are excellent, and who has the best possible 
dispositions towards the General Government and its officers, makes me 
the compliment to consult me on all points of importance. lie has al- 
ready taken measures to guard the frontier of Georgia, above and below 



413 [ 224 ] 

this place, against incursions, and particularly to prevent parties of the 
enemy from escaping across the river in the direction of Florida. Ad- 
ditional measures shall be immediately adopted to effect this great object, 
first, by the employment of a steamer hourly expected with a company 
on board, and by pushing some companies of mounted men to points 
fifty and sixty miles below. It is not thought here that there is any 
danger of the Indians attempting to cross the river lower down. 

The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by well-informed 
persons, from 2,500 to 5,000. Captain Page thinks that there are at 
least 3,000 hostile warriors. 

I suppose there may have arrived on this frontier about 1,500 Geor- 
gians, mostly, I think, volunteers. As they are distributed over a line 
of more than forty miles on the river, the Governor has not been able as 
yet to obtain returns of the detachments. He expects as many more, 
and the companies almost daily arrive ; but it is not expected that all will 
be up before the 12th, perhaps the 15th instant. 

The Governor of Alabama will probably have in the field about an 
equal number of men. By his letter of the 28th ultimo, a copy of which 
is enclosed, it will be seen that he thinks he will be ready to march upon 
the enemy the 5th instant. I doubt, however, whether he has been 
able to secure subsistence for his men, in advance, for eight or even five 
days. On this side there are no magazines. The troops have not suf- 
fered, but the supplies have been rather precarious. This state of things 
must continue at least eight days longer, when the 100,000 rations and 
other indispensable stores shipped from Picolata, St. Augustine, Savan- 
nah, and Charleston, may begin to arrive from Macon and Hawkinsville, 
on the Ockmulgee, by wagons. The supplies ordered from New Or- 
leans cannot be expected before the 18th or 20th instant. Late, long, 
and heavy rains in this quarter, have greatly injured the roads, but im- 
proved the navigation of the rivers. 

I enclose copies of my two letters to Governor Clay, and a copy of my 
instructions to Major General Jesup, who will probably set out to-morrow 
for Montgomery. He will require a good escort to Tuskegee, forty miles. 
Beyond that point the communication is understood to be perfectly free. 

There is an idea that I have not developed in my letters to Governor 
Clay : if we fight the Indians with inferior numbers, we should, never- 
theless, in all probability, beat them, but with a great loss of valuable 
lives on our part; whereas, if we wait for the arrival of all, or nearly 
all, of our forces, regular and militia, and till we have ample means of 
subsistence secured for twenty days in advance, I suppose the war may 
be successfully terminated on our part with but a small loss of lives. 
This consideration has great weight with me, and it has been developed 
in a letter from Governor Schley to Governor Clay. A delay of ten 
days has therefore been urged. 

I remain, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

W1NFIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. General Jones, 

Adjutant General, U. S. A. 



wuuawim**** 



[ 221 ] 414 

No. 173. 

Headquarters, Montgomery, 

May 28, 1836. 

Sir : You are aware that hostilities have been commenced by the 
Creek Indians, upon the inhabitants of Alabama, as well as those of 
Georgia. At the commencement they perpetrated many outrages, though 
they have apparently suspended active operations, since a portion of our 
volunteer militia entered, and have occupied several commanding posi- 
tions, within the limits of the territory over which they are dispersed. 
The hostile Indians are, no doubt, still within the limits of Russell and 
Barbour counties. The important object is to cut off the possibility of 
their retreat or escape, and terminate the war by a simultaneous move- 
ment and co-operation of the several corps which are now, and shortly 
will be, in the fiehi. 

There are now seven or eight hundred volunteers at Tuskegee ; and 
that number will shortly be increased to twelve or fifteen hundred, be- 
sides the friendly Creeks, who will act with us. Colonel McLemore, 
commanding the regiment of the county of Chambers, has tendered his 
own and their services, and they have been accepted. He will be noti- 
fied by express, at what time the troops under the commanding General 
will advance from Tuskegee, in the direction of Fort Mitchell and Co- 
lumbus, and will at the same time move upon the enemy from his quar- 
ter. 

There is already at Irwinton a battalion of infantry, which will, with- 
in a week, be reinforced by a regiment of mounted gun-men, from the 
4th division, to be under the command of Brigadier General Moore, be- 
sides other troops. This force will be competent to intercept and pre- 
vent the flight of the enemy to Florida, on this side of the Chattahoo- 
chie. If his retreat across the Chattahoochie, and through the south- 
western corner of your State could be obstructed, I see nothing to pre- 
vent his being, at once, overwhelmed and reduced to unconditional sub- 
mission. 

The object of this communication is, to invite the co-operation of the 
troops that may be in the service of Georgia. To accomplish the object 
in view, it is deemed very important to guard the east bank of the Chat- 
tahoochie, opposite to the whole line of Barbour county. 

I would be glad to learn by the return of my express, whether these 
views meet the approbation of the military officer in command, and 
whether the desired co-operation may be expected. We shall probably 
be in readiness to advance from the several points mentioned, by the 5th 
proximo at farthest. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

C. C. CLAY. 
To the Commanding Officer of the Georgia Militia !, 

at Columbus. 



415 [ 224 ] 

No. 174. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, May 31, 1836. 

Sir : 1 have the honor to inform your Excellency that I reached this 
place last night, and shall immediately charge myself with the direction 
of the war against the hostile Creeks. 

His Excellency the Governor of Georgia arrived here at the same 
time, as also Major General Jesup, who, in case I had remained in Flori- 
da, would, by direction of the President of the United States, have 
been charged with the chief command. 

I am very anxious to send General Jesup to Montgomery, as well to 
confer with your Excellency on all points interesting to the service, as 
to take command of all the troops assembled, or to be assembled, on that 
side of the Creek country. He will accordingly pass over to Montgom- 
ery, as soon as a sufficient escort can be procured from this or that side 
of the enemy, for the purpose. 1 mean sufficient, in my judgment — for 
General Jesup would be willing to set out with but a small number of 
men to protect him. 

1 am anxious to communicate freely and fully with your Excellency : 
first, to learn at what numbers you estimate the hostile warriors ; the 
forces you have in the field, or expect to join you ; the present disposi- 
tion of the forces actually out, whether mounted or on foot, and the num- 
ber of each ; whether fully armed and equipped — with what artillery, &c. 

From Washington, about the 18th instant, a requisition went to your 
Excellency for 2,000 men, 500 to be mounted. From my present inform- 
ation (which as yet is very imperfect) 1 do not believe that a larger 
force will be required of Alabama. I hope, however, that the 2,000 men 
are already, or soon will be in the field, and that one-fourth are, or will 
be mounted. 

The Governor of Georgia, whom I am happy to be with, expects, from 
the orders which he has given, to have on the Cliattahoochie, (say) 
in the next ten days, 3,000 men at least, of whom, perhaps a little 
more than a fourth will be on horseback. Besides these volunteers and 
draughts, there are now, on this side of Charleston, coming by the rail- 
road, Augusta, Milledgeville, &c, about 1,000 regular troops (including 
marines) to take part in the war. They may be expected to begin to 
arrive here in seven or eight days ; but the rear cannot be up in twelve 
or fifteen. Half this force is intended to be placed in line with the Ala- 
bam ians. 

Large supplies were ordered by General Jesup, before leaving Wash- 
ington, from New Orleans to Montgomery, including subsistence for men, 
and corn for horses. From the same place 1 have ordered 250,000 rations 
to be immediately sent to this river, and 100,000 rations, with other 
stores, are now ascending the Altamaha and Ockmulgee, to be wagoned 
across to the Cliattahoochie. In the mean time, the resources of this 
neighborhood, in corn, corn-meal, bacon, and cattle, may suffice. 

Detachments of troops (I have not had time to learn in what numbers) 
are now taking positions on the left bank of this river, and as low down 
as Roanoke, to prevent parties of the enemy from crossing, either for 



""■"" —"■™ UMMB 



I 221 J 410 

the purpose of escaping towards Florida, or that of committing depreda- 
tions. The day before yesterday, I learn, some individuals were mur- 
dered, and several houses burned on the Georgia side. 

I am opposed to all premature operations against the enemy. Our for- 
ces must first be assembled (in sufficient numbers) and organized, our 
magazines established, and adequate means of transportation provided. 
In this opinion I am fully supported by his Excellency Governor Schley, 
and hope to receive your concurrence. In ten or fifteen days every 
thing will be in readiness on this side, but in the mean time, besides 
preventing parties of the enemy from escaping to Florida something may 
be advantageously undertaken ; for example : as soon as we have a sur- 
plus force on this side of the enemy, beyond what is necessary to 
guard the Chattahoochie, we may with that surplus, in conjunction with 
the Alabamians, begin operations against the lower hostile bands, say 
from a point below Irwinton. This, however, must be done after hear- 
ing from you, and after I shall be able to send Major General Jesup to 
cause to be mustered into service the Alabama forces, and to assume the 
command in that quarter. I am besides, yet ignorant of the routes taken 
by troops from the Tallapoosa and Alabama rivers, to a point on the 
Chattahoochie as low down as Irwinton, and of the means of transporta- 
tion with these troops, &c. I do not mean that the Alabamians should 
march to the Chattahoochie, but that they ought to place themselves below 
the enemy, and act upwards in concert with the Georgians, who will be 
thrown for the purpose down the river, at least as low as Irwinton. 

In haste, I have the honor to remain, with high respect, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To his Excellency C. C. Clay, 

Governor of Alabama. 

P. S. Besides the information specifically requested above, I shall be 
happy to receive any views of your Excellency, on the subject of this 
war. 

Permit me to say that, according to the views expressed above, it will 
not be necessary to send troops from your side of the enemy to Fort 
Mitchell. 

I have requested Captain Page, of the army, who is here, to answer 
some inquiries contained in your letter to the commanding officer at Fort 
Mitchell, to save time. 

W. S. 



No. 175. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, May 31, 1836. 

Sir : Since my letter of this morning, your Excellency's dated the 
28th instant, and addressed to " the commanding officer of the Georgia 
militia at Columbus," has been received. I have just read it, with his 



417 f 224 ] 

Excellency the Governor of Georgia, who concurs with me, for the reasons 
mentioned in my letter to you of this morning, that it is desirable that you 
should delay vigorous operations against the enemy to a day at least as late 
as the 1 2th proximo. By that period all the Georgia troops will have arri- 
ved and been organized, and mustered into service, and the regular 
troops will be near at hand. Major General Jesup, too, who has funds 
for the war, and is in possession of the general views of the Govern- 
ment, and my own, will have, in the mean time, joined you, and have 
arranged every thing on that side of the enemy according to those views. 

I am, on reflection, even of the opinion that it will be better to postpone 
the system of general operations against the enemy to the 15th proximo, 
in order that the regular troops may be up with a good tiain of artillery, 
and our magazines of every sort fully supplied. The proposed delay 
would, in all probability, abridge the period of active operations, and 
place the successful termination of the war beyond the reach of hazard. 
To effect this great object your Excellency cannot be more desirous than 
myself. For its accomplishment, means and efforts shall not be spared. 

My knowledge of the theatre of operations, of the numbers and distri- 
bution of the enemy, must, for a day or two longer, necessarily continue 
imperfect. As I get information, my views and plans may be modified. 
Every change, and every important fact, shall be freely communicated. 
I have the honor to be, with high respect, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To his Excellency C. C. Clay, 

Governor of Alabama. 

P. S. There is not a steamer here at present. As soon as they 
arrive, two at least shall be engaged ; one to cruise up and down this 
river, with troops on board, to prevent the enemy from crossing ; and 
the other to go immediately to the Mount Vernon arsenal, on the Mobile, 
for arms, ammunition, &c. 

W. S. 



No. 176. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 1, 1836. 

Sir : I wish you to repair, by any route deemed by the intelligence 
of this place as perfectly safe, to Montgomery, in Alabama, or to the 
headquarters of his Excellency the Governor of that State, for the pur- 
pose of charging yourself with the direction of the war against the hos- 
tile Creek Indians on that side of the country occupied by them. Your 
first step, if there be time, will be to cause all the volunteers and draught- 
ed men, ordered into the field, to be duly mustered into the service of 
the United States, in the manner indicated in my Order of yesterday, 
numbered one. 

27 



mamaauaamumu 



[ 224 J 



418 



For the composition of a company, a battalion, and a regiment, see 
the organic law of the United States, passed in 1792, amended in respect 
to the field and staff of a regiment by an act passed in 1816. Two re- 
giments you may consider a brigade, and two brigades a division. These 
points are here mentioned, because they are not so clearly settled by the 
act of 1792 as they might have been. 

Sixty-four privates constitute the basis of a company, according to the 
organic law, and I have the positive instructions of the War Department 
to see that the number of officers of every grade do not exceed (in pro- 
portion) the number of men. Nevertheless, as the forces of Alabama 
have, no doubt, like those of Georgia, been suddenly pushed upon the 
enemy's frontier without a nice regard to the organization prescribed by 
the act of 1792 — some companies consisting of more, and others of les9 
than sixty -four privates each — I mean myself to look to the average 
strength, and act liberally in respect to officers: that is to say, 1 shall 
not hesitate, if the companies (whether of foot or mounted men) present 
as many officers, to accept with a company, one captain, one first, one 
second lieutenant, and one ensign. With a view to uniformity, I wish 
you to observe a like liberality. 

For a regiment of ten companies, you will accept and muster all the 
field and staff officers provided for by the act of 181G ; but should the 
regiment present only six or seven companies, no colonel can be al- 
lowed ; to a battalion of four or five companies only, a major can be given, 
with one adjutant, one quartermaster, one sergeant major, and quarter- 
master sergeant, and one drum or fife major. 

The staff of a division, and of a brigade, you will find clearly fixed by 
the act of 1792; and 1 am not aware of any amendment of that law in 
this respect. 

I have given you the above details, in order that all the volunteers and 
draughted men of this army may be placed on the same footing. 

His Excellency the Governor of Alabama has proposed, in a letter 
that you have seen, to commence vigorous operations against the enemy 
as early as the 5th instant. You have seen my reply to that letter, and 
aie well acquainted with all the considerations which have induced me 
to propose a postponement to the 15th. In the mean time, however, and 
before the regulars and all the forces of Georgia shall arrive, I think 
something very advantageous may be safely attempted from a point at or 
below Irwinton, operating up the country. I shall wish you, therefore, 
as soon as you are in command, to send as many of the Alabamians as 
can be safely spared from other great objects to the vicinity of Irwinton, 
to co-operate with any surplus troops of Georgia that we may have for 
the field, after guarding the impoit3nt points on this river. What this 
surplus may be, at the end of (say) eight or ten days, I cannot speak 
with confidence; but from the expectations of his Excellency Governor 
Schley, I think we shall, by that time, be able to send to that point from 
1,000 to 1,300 men, including horse and foot. This force, with a little 
addition to that which Governor Clay, as you have seen, proposes to 
send to Irwinton, and some four or five companies of regulars that may 
be expected here in time, I think we may clear the lower part of this 
river — that is to say, the whole of Barbour county, of the enemy, by the 
17th instant, and before the arrival of the last of the regulars expected 



419 [ 224 ] 

from the North. By that time all our forces on this side will be up and 
ready to be thrown across this river for vigorous co-operation ; and as 
we advance up the country, a portion of the volunteers guarding the 
river may be crossed over and united with the pursuing army. 

In respect to the removal of Indians who have been uniformly friendly, 
or who may come in or surrender themselves for emigration, you are fully 
acquainted with the views of the Government, and I can only add, carry 
out those views. 

I learn that a body of friendly Creek warriors have been organized 
into a corps, under General Woodward, to co-operate with our troops as 
auxiliaries in this war. Their fidelity might be much more safely relied 
upon if their families were first sent to a secure place beyond the Creek 
country. On this subject you will please advise with Governor Clay, 
who will be a much better judge of it than you or myself. You will take 
care to communicate to me fully, from time to time, your means, your 
movements, and your plans, and you will hear from me frequently. 

Entertaining the highest confidence in your zeal, abilities, and ex- 
perience, 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Maj. Gen. T. S. Jesup, 

U. S. Army, fyc. 



No. 177. 



Mount Vernon Arsenal, 

Alabama, February 8, 1836. 

Sir: I am directed by the Government of the United States to issue, 
on the requsitions of the generals or field officers commanding any por- 
tion of the forces operating against the hostile Indians, such arms and 
munitions of war as may be required for this service. Having noticed 
through the public press that the Creek Indians are likely to become 
troublesome, I deem it proper to communicate to you, as the Chief Ma- 
gistrate of the State of Alabama, the orders of the War Department to 
me in relation to this matter. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

E. HARDING, 

Capt. Ordnance. 
To his Excellency C. C. Clay, Esq., 

Governor of Alabama. 

N. B. It is proper to acquaint you what kind of stores we have on 
hand : 10,000 superior new muskets, with buck-shot and ball-cartridges ; 
and 10 pieces of field artillery, completely equipped. 



mam 



[ 224 J 420 

No. 178. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 3, 1836. 
Sir : On the receipt of this, you will lose no time in hiring a steamer 
of light draught of water, and put on board of her, for this place, four 
pieces of ordnance, two howitzers, and two six-pounders, with harness 
and implements complete, and at least one hundred and fifty rounds of 
ammunition (fixed) for each piece. If you have no howitzers, you will 
send four six-pounders. Let the greater number of rounds of fixed am- 
munition be grape and canister, with some shells for the howitzers, and 
some round shots for the six-pounders. 

Put on board the same boat 3,000 stand of muskets complete, but I 
fear you have no accoutrements ; nevertheless, send the arms with prick- 
ers, primers, &c. Send further, 100,000 rounds of fixed musket, buck 
and ball, and some buck cartridges, and 50,000 flints. 

I rely upon your using the utmost despatch. If you can engage the 
steamer by the month, on reasonable terms, do so, as I shall require at 
least two on this river. 

Respectfully, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Captain Harding, Commanding 

U. S. Arsenal, Mount Vernon. 



No. 179. 



Mount Vernon Arsenal, 

June 14, 1836. 

Sir: Your letter of the 3d instant, making a demand on this arsenal 
for ordnance and ordnance stores, was received last evening. Not hav- 
ing the articles on hand which you call for, and there being no mail in 
the direction of Columbus before to-morrow, I despatched at once a 
trusty artificer with a copy of your order to Captain Newton, the com- 
mander of the Baton Rouge arsenal, with instructions to furnish imme- 
diately all that was required. By the same messenger I sent another 
copy of the order to Major Clark, assistant quartermaster at New Orleans, 
with a request that he would charter a " steamer" in New Orleans, and 
order her to Baton Rouge for the stores. Captain Newton, by this time, 
has received large supplies of ordnance and ordnance stores from the 
Alleghany arsenal, and I have every reason to hope, from the promptness 
and energy of Captain N. and Major Clark, that you will be supplied 
from the Baton Rouge arsenal earlier, perhaps, than the limited force at 
my control would allow, even admitting I had the munitions which you 
want in store at this arsenal. 

The Governors of Alabama and Florida have completely exhausted 
my stock of arms and ammunition. They each had unlimited authority 



421 [ 224 1 

from the Secretary of War to call for whatever they wanted, and I was 
directed to issue accordingly. Governor Clay has drawn from this de- 
pot the following ordnance and ordnance stores, to wit: 
4 6-pounders, complete. 
6,800 muskets, do. 

175,000 buck-shot and ball cartridges. 
307 6-pounder canister. 
105 6-pounder strapped shot. 
9,700 flints. 
1,492 sets of infantry accoutrements. 

50 yards of slow-match. 
1,000 priming tubes. 
133 portfires. 
Of the above, 6,000 muskets, the four pieces of ordnance, and a due 
proportion of other stores, were shipped to Montgomery, and the balance 
were ordered to Claiborne, for the troops called out by the Governor, 
and to be rendezvoused at lrwinton, Barbour county, in this State. 

I am at this moment engaged in preparing ammunition, and shipping it 
to Montgomery, which I shall continue to do until the close of the cam- 
paign. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

E. HARDING, 



Major General Scott, U. S. Army. 



Cayt. Ordnance. 



No. 180. 
Headquarters, Army or the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 3, 1836. 

Sir : Of the large amount of stores which must now be high up the 
Ockmulgee, and which you are to cause to be wagoned to this place, 
either from Hawkinsville or Macon, as you may find most advantageous 
to the United States, I wish you to load up the first division of wagons, 
say sixty or one hundred, with hard bread, bacon, Hall's patent rifles, 
fixed ammunition for muskets, (if any, ) muskets, accoutrements, flints, 
and a portion of tents. If you are stinted for room in the wagons, it may 
be sufficient if 15,000 rations arrive here by the 10th or 12th instant; 
30,000 by the 15th or 16th, and the remainder towards the 20th or 25th 
instant. 

It is hoped that some ordnance and ordnance stores may come up the 
Ockmulgee from Charleston ; if 20, send one howitzer and one six- 
pounder without delay, and one hundred and fifty rounds of fixed am- 
munition for each, together with all their implements. Of the ammuni- 
tion, I prefer that the greater part should consist of grape and cannister. 

For each piece of ordnance you will purchase four good horses, and 
harness for the same, unless harness should come with the pieces ; you 
will also purchase a strong close ammunition wagon for each piece of 
ordnance. Should those operations be made at Macon, you will turn 
over to the first detachment of United States troops that passes that 



aamBmmmmmmmmmim 



\ 224 422 

place the pieces and their wagons; otherwise you will hire drivers and 
despatch them to Columbus. 1 have sent an order to Lieutenant Dim- 
mock, at Augusta, to send no more provisions from that place to the Chat- 
tahoochie, except for troops on the march. 

I received your letter of the 28th ultimo, which I approve. Mr. Hutch- 
inson left here this morning. 

Show this letter to any regular officer that you may see, and particularly 
to Major Mackay and Lieutenant Waite, United States quartermasters. 

Respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Joseph A. Beard, 

U. S. Agent. 

P. S. Should Lieutenant Heintzelman arrive in any short time at 
Hawkinsville or Macon, turn over this letter of instructions to him, and 
proceed immediately yourself to headquarters. W. S. 



No. 181. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, June 2, 1836. 

Sir : I am directed by Major General Scott to say that the supplies of 
provisions, &c, may be expected to arrive at this place from the Ock- 
mulgee within ten days, and from New Orleans, by the Chattahoochie,in 
sixteen or seventeen days. As soon as a sufficient number of men, 
whether regulars or volunteers, are assembled in this neighborhood, with- 
out waiting for those who may still be in the rear, General Scott will oc- 
cupy several positions on and near the Chattachoochie, below the hostile 
Indians, and thence move up in conjunction with the troops of Alabama, 
in a sufficient number of columns to sweep the whole Indian country, 
and pressing upon the hostiles till they shall be reduced to unconditional 
submission. 

I have the honor to be, sir, • 

Very respectfully, &c, 

E. KIRBY, 



To Maj. Gen. John Irvine, 

of Alabama. 



Paymaster U. S. A. 



No. 1S2. 



Assistant Quartermaster's Office, 

June 2, 1836. 

Major : By this day's line of cars, from Charleston, I have received 
a further quantity of subsistence stores, commissioned through Lieuten- 



423 [ 224 ] 

ant L'Engle. The date of the agent's receipt at Charleston is the 1st 
June. Mr. L'Engle writes: "these barrels were delivered at the rail- 
road previous to the receipt of your (Lieutenant Dimmock's) letter of 
the 27th ultimo, therefore could not change their direction." I shall do 
all I can to hasten this provision on, and only write now to inform the 
General of my increased store, without adequate means to transport 
them. 

I am, sir, very truly, 

Your obedient servant, 

CHARLES DIMMOCK, 

Lieutenant, A. Q. M. 
To Major E. Kirby, 

A. A. Adjutant General, Columbus. 



No. 183. 



Assistant Quartermaster's Office, 

Augusta, June 2, 1836. 

Major : Will you inform the General that I have now on the road 42 
wagon-loads of provisions, in one of which are his articles. I find it ex- 
ceedingly difficult to obtain wagons, and the same extortion practised 
here as at Savannah. Captain Monroe left here this morning with his 
company and two baggage wagons. Captain Lyon leaves to-morrow 
morning with four companies, one G-pounder, one ammunition wagon, 
and seven baggage wagons, the number required by him. I have fur- 
nished funds to each of these detachments as required. I shall charter a 
steamboat the moment one arrives, to take a load of provisions from 
this to Darien, thence up the river. I must do this, or I shall never 
get all the stores to you in less than six months. I have now ready for 
the troops coming about 20 or 25 wagons, all I can get, and therefore 
cannot send any more off till these troops arc on the route from here. 
General Fenwick, with his adjutant, is here. Lieutenant Waite is 
waiting orders, I hope, to relieve me, for Mr. Mackay wiites me 
he is already mired in papers. Lieutenant Simpson awaits here the 
sending oft" the boat of subsistence stores. With the wagons above enu- 
merated are 12 bought by me for the United States; the horses attached 
to which are branded U. S. I will, from time to time, inform you how I 
am progressing. I doubt not, however, but I shall be relieved and sent 
to Savannah to settle business there, and then go North for a while. 

I am, Major, 

Your obedient servant, 

CHARLES DIMMOCK, 

Lieutenant, A. Q. M. 

To Major E. Kirby, 

A. A. Adjutant General, Columbus. 

Note. — General Fenwick desires me to say he has written to General 
Scott for orders, and awaits them daily. 



[ 224 ] 424 

No. 184. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, June 3, 1836. 

Sir : I am directed by Major General Scott to say that you will not 
forward any more subsistence from Augusta to this place. It will be suf- 
ficient for the troops on the march to leave Augusta with twenty days' 
rations. 

The state of the roads, and the difficulty of procuring transportation, 
forbid the bringing of large supplies over the long land route from 
Augusta. 

The country about here is not yet exhausted, and abundant supplies 
can be procured at much less expense from New Orleans. Besides, the 
100,000 rations ordered by the Ockmulgee will begin to arrive in seven 
days. 

You will therefore report to General Eustis, commanding in Florida, 
at St. Augustine, the surplus provisions which shall remain in depot 
at Augusta, after supplying the troops on the march, and inquire whether 
they will be wanted in Florida; in which case you will forward them to 
his order. 

Very respectfully, &c, 

E. KIRBY, 
Paymaster, A. A. A. G. 

Lieut. C. Dimmock, 

Assist. Quartermaster, Augusta. 



No. 185. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, May 31, 1836. 
Orders No. 1. 

Major General Scott, in conformity with the orders of the President 
of the United States, assumes the direction of the war against the hos- 
tile Creek Indians. 

His staff not being yet organized, the names of the individuals who 
will compose it will be announced in subsequent orders. In the mean 
time, Major E. Kirby, Captains Page and Parrott, all of the army, will 
act in the several capacities of assistant adjutants general, assistant in- 
spectors general, and aids-de-camp. Any orders which either of them 
may communicate, in writing or orally, in the name of the Commanding 
General, will be obeyed as if given under his own signature or in 
person. 

Those officers will proceed, without delay, to organize and to muster 
into the service of the United States the Georgia volunteers and draughted 
men who have arrived, and who are daily expected on this frontier. 
The volunteers will be accepted, according to their wishes, for a period 



425 [ 224 ] 

of not less than three nor more than six months, unless sooner discharged. 
The draughted companies will be accepted as above, for the period of 
three months. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 5, 1836. 
Orders No. 2. 

The detachment of recruits just arrived under Lieutenant Freeman, 
4th artillery, will march to Fort Mitchell ; seventeen of the recruits, as 
designated by the Adjutant General, will join company I, 2d artillery. 

The recruits destined for company F, 4th infantry, at Camp Cass, will 
be temporarily attached to company C, 4th infantry, at Fort Mitchell, 
and be mustered as a detachment. 

Lieutenant Freeman will report himself for duty till further orders to 
the officer commanding company I, 2d artillery, at Fort Mitchell. 
By order of Major General Scott : 

E. KIRBY, 
Paymaster, A. A. A. General. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 7, 1836. 
Orders No. 3. 

Major John Erving, of the army, having arrived, will relieve Major 
E. Kirby from the duty of mustering into the service of the United 
States the troops as they successively arrive on this frontier. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 8, 1836. 
Orders No. 4. 

Lieutenant J. W. McCrabb, assistant commissary of subsistence, will 
temporarily take charge of the subsistence department of the army. 

He will establish a system of accountability in the issues, and make 
such purchases as may be necessary for the subsistence of the army till 
the arrival of the supplies daily expected from the Ockmulgee, from New 
Orleans, and from Augusta. 

By order of Major General Scott : 

E. KIRBY, 
Paymaster, A. A. A. General. 



1" 221 J 426 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 8, 1836. 
Orders No. 5. 

The Commanding General is happy to announce to the troops that a 
supply of genuine vaccine matter has been received from the Surgeon 
General of the army at Washington. It is in the hands of Assistant 
Surgeon Randall, of the United States army, now at this place, who will 
be ready to distribute the matter among the surgeons of the volunteer 
corps, or personally to vaccinate any such corps as may require his ser- 
vices. 

By order of Major General Scott: 

E. KIRBY, 
Paymaster, A. A. A. General. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 9, 1836. 
Orders No. 6. 

Assistant Quartermaster C. A. Waite, of the United States army, hav- 
ing reported himself, will take charge of the quartermaster's department 
of the army till the arrival of a senior quartermaster. He will establish 
a system of accountability in that department, and give the necessary 
instructions to the subordinate quartermasters for carrying the same into 
effect. 

By order of Major General Scott : 

E. KIRBY, 
Paymaster, A. A. A. General. 



No. 186. 

Hawkinsville, June 5, 1836. 

Sir : On my arrival at this town on the 2d instant, I proceeded to act 
according to your letter of instructions. I find myself surrounded with 
difficulties I did not anticipate in the first place. Not the first article of 
the stores or provisions are yet arrived, and I am fearful several days 
will elapse before I shall receive them. This delay has been occasioned 
by the circumstance of the two steamboats at this end of the Ockmul- 
gee being dismantled in part for the season. On my arrival, application 
was made through the agent for one at least to be despatched with all 
possible speed to assist the pole boats up the river, and accordingly the 
Crockett steamboat was sent down forthwith, but unfortunately bursted 
her boiler forty miles below this town. In the mean time I have engaged 
another boat, (the Darien,) not belonging to the company's line, to pro- 
ceed to Darien for a cargo of bacon, hard bread, Hall's rifles, and quar- 
termaster's stores ; have advised Lieutenant Heintzelman to have the 



427 [ 224 ] 

boat loaded and forwarded with all possible despach, and hope he has 
not quitted Darien for this place. 

In the interim I have employed several persons in the adjacent coun- 
ties for the purpose of procuring wagons ; have also visited the surround- 
ing country myself for the same purpose. I find nearly the whole force 
of the farmer engaged on their farms at this season, consequently have 
considerable difficulty in procuring the quantity I shall require. If, on 
arrival of the stores, I find the Ockmulgee navigable to Macon, I intend 
forwarding a portion of the stores to that place. 

The two first trains of wagons that may arrive at headquarters, I would 
suggest be immediately forwarded to this place. Should you think it 
necessary, I would also suggest the propriety of my remaining at this 
town until I have started at least a portion of the stores for the army, as 
I understand Lieutenant Heintzelman is in bad health, and it will require 
great exertions to procure sufficient transportation in time. Rest satisfied, 
General, my whole exertions shall be used for the public good, and to 
forward your wishes and commands. 

I have the honor to be, 
With respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

JOSEPH A. BEARD, 
Agent to the Quartermaster and Commissary 
Departments, U. S. 
Major General Winfield Scott. 



No. 187. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, June 7, 1836. 

Sir : I am directed by Major General Scott to say that he is anxious 
to hear from you, and know what progress you have made in the duties 
assigned to you. 

You will please keep the General advised of your operations in detail. 
State what supplies have been received either at Hawkinsville or Macon — 
what have been forwarded. 

You will purchase eight or ten horses fit for the saddle, (not high 
priced,) and forward them to this place. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

E. KIRBY, 
Paymaster, A. A. Adj. General. 
Joseph A. Beard, 

Agent of the Quartermaster and Commissary Depots., 

Hawkinsville or Macon. 



[ 224 ] 428 

No. 188. 

Darien, Ga., 

[Should be dated from Hawkinsville.] 

June 8, 1836. 
Sir : I have the honor to report my arrival here from Darien, Georgia, 
having there made all the necessary arrangements for the forwarding of 
supplies to this place. 

I enclose a list of subsistence and ordnance stores received by me at 
Darien, Georgia, before I left. Three boats were loaded, including all 
the arms, accoutrements, camp and garrison equipage, and some of the 
provisions. The first boats are expected here to-morrow. Mr. Beard, 
agent for the quartermaster and subsistence departments, is here engaging 
wagons for their transportation. 

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, 
Lieutenant, acting AssH Quartermaster. 
Major E. Kirby, 

Paymaster, acting Assistant Adjutant General, 

Army of the South. 



List of articles of subsistence, ordnance stores, fyc. received at Darien 
before the 4th June, 1836, to be forwarded to Hawkinsville, Georgia. 

270 barrels of pork. 
464 barrels of flour. 
417 barrels of hard bread. 
29 barrels of vinegar. 
16 boxes of candles. 
24 boxes of soap. 
97 boxes of bacon. 
54 barrels of beans. 
10 barrels of salt. 
2 barrels of sugar. 
10 barrels of coffee. 
6984 tent pins. 

75 sets wall tent poles. 
343 sets common tent poles. 
315 common tents. 
72 wall tents. 
65 tent flies. 
1 hospital tent. 
517 camp kettles. 
1800 complete sets infantry accoutrements, including brushes, pricks, 
and plates. 
500 Hall's rifles, complete. 
500 Hall's rifle accoutrements. 

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, 
Lieutenant and acting Assistant Quartermaster. 

Hawkinsville, G a., June 8, 1836. 



429 f 224 

No. 189. 

Tusregee, June 8, 1836. 

General : I have detained the escort until this morning in conse- 
quence of the danger of exposing so small a force beyond supporting 
distance from this post, but the captains are both anxious to return, and 
I have consented to permit them to proceed by a route which I am as- 
sured will be perfectly safe ; they have fine companies, and should they 
meet an enemy on any thing like equal terms, I am sure they will give 
a good account of him. I have not yet obtained the command of the troops, 
but if I obtain it at all I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow. 

I wish a small regular force as soon as possible. If I had only two or 
three companies I should feel myself able to commence the removal of 
the Indians at once. 

The hostile Indians are committing the most cruel and distressing out- 
rages on the inhabitants a few miles below. A movement in that direc- 
tion will be necessary, as well to cover the settlements as to hold Nea- 
Mico in check, who is decidedly hostile, and to obtain forage, which can- 
not be had here. 

I desire that Captain Page, Dr. Randall, and the other officers con- 
nected with the Indian service, be sent to me as soon as they can be 
spared. Their services would be important to me at this time, and will 
every day become more so. 

I learn from the Governor, that General Moore will arrive at Ir- 
winton about the 10th instant, but it is doubtful, I think, whether he can 
protect the entire line confided to him. 

If a movement be determined on, I will send you information of it by 
a runner. 

I request that Dr. Waite be directed to join me as soon as possible, 
and I would be glad to be informed at what point provisions and forage 
can be obtained on the Chattahoochie, either below or above Irvvinton. 
I am, General, 

Most respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP, 

Major General. 

To Maj. Gen. W. Scott, 

Commanding the Southern Army, 

Columbus, Georgia. 

P. S. Neah-Mathla is certainly sick, and his next chief was disabled 
in the skirmish the day I left Columbus, or perhaps, the evening before. 

T. S. J. 



No. 190. 



Headquarters, 2d Army Corps of the Southern Army, 

Tuskegee, June 10, 1836. 

Sir : I have here about 900 volunteers and militia of Alabama, and 
about 200 friendly Indian warriors. I shall move to-morrow or next 



[ 224 J 430 

day, at farthest, against the hostile Indians. I expect to be joined on 
my route by five hundred mounted men, under Brigadier General Moore, 
and by two hundred Indian warriors, and I hope to strike the enemy in 
less than five days. 

Captain Parrott and Lieutenant Lane are my aids-de-camp, and I re- 
spectfully ask for them the extra pay and emoluments of aids ; with that 
addition to their compensation they will find it extremely difficult in this 
country, at this time, too keep their expenses within their income. The 
aids of Major General Patterson, who is serving under my orders, are 
entitled to the full pay and emoluments of majors, and my aids should, 
in common justice, be placed upon a footing of equality with them, at 
least in compensation. 

I further respectfully ask that the first vacancy in the quartermaster's 
department be filled by Lieutenant Chambers. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 
Respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP, 

Major General. 
The Hon. Lewis Cass, 

Secretary of War, Washington city. 



No. 191 



Headquarters, 2d Army Corps, Southern Army, 

Taskegee, June 11, 1836. 

Sir : I expected to have moved to-day, but have been delayed in con- 
sequence of a heavy rain, and of the Indian warriors not being in readi- 
ness. I shall move forward to-morrow, however, and occupy a position 
on the Fort Mitchell road, about twenty-eight miles in advance, and 
there wait the arrival of the Indian warriors under Opotheohola, or if I 
can find the enemy without Indian guides, attack him immediately. The 
country is almost without supplies, and none of those ordered before I 
left Washington have arrived. Cartridge boxes and flints, particu- 
larly, are wanted, but that shall not check my movement. The horses 
must be put on half rations, and the deficiency supplied from the cane 
swamps. I held a council yesterday with several Indian chiefs, and re- 
quired them to disarm a party from the hostile camp ; thirty-four were 
disarmed and five escaped. I think it would have a good effect to pay 
the whole annuity to those who take an active part with us, and I most 
earnestly recommend ihe measure, as well on the score of justice as 
policy. The communication with Columbus is in the hands of the ene- 
my, and I have no means of communicating directly with General Scott. 
This circumstance inclines me to strike a blow at once, though there is 
some hazard in it. General Scott, when I parted with him, expected to 
be ready to move by the 15th ; it he should commence operations on that 
day, he will be within thirty or forty miles of me, and may prevent a 
junction between the hostile chiefs, and enable me to strike them in 
succession. 



431 [ 224 ] 

A corps of artificers and laborers is necessary to the efficiency of the 
quartermaster's department. Southern militia and volunteers cannot be 
induced to labor. Such a corps, if authorized, should be employed en- 
tirely in the Southern States. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP, 
Major General, commanding 2d Army Corps. 
The Hon. Lewis Cass, 

Secretary of War, Washington city. 



No. 193. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 10, 1S36. 

Sir : Major General Scott is filled with extreme anxiety at the delay 
of the supplies ascending the Ockmulgee. Many articles expected by 
that route are of indispensable importance. Hall's rifles, the musket 
accoutrements, and the tents, are needed to complete the equipment of the 
troops already assembled, a portion of whom are without arms or shelter. 
The subsistence and other stores are also greatly wanted. The troops 
cannot take the field till some portion of these supplies shall arrive. 

The General relies upon your zeal and activity in using every possi- 
ble means for hastening forward these articles. Spare neither pains nor 
expense by sending agents below to hasten them up the river, and in 
pushing them forward when they shall come into your hands, and keep 
the General constantly advised of every circumstance calculated either 
to advance or retard them. 

The General thinks you will be able to procure in the country around 
Hawkinsville and Macon, a sufficient number of wagons for the trans- 
portation of these supplies from the Ockmulgee to this place. It' you 
should find this impracticable advise the General. 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

E. KIRBY, 
Paymaster, A. A. A, G. 
J. A. Beard, Esq., 

Agent of Qr. Mr. and Subsist. Depts., 

Macon or Hawkinsville. 



No. 193. 



Headquarters, Army of the SoutHj 

Columbus, Georgia, June 10, 1836. 

Sir : I was happy to learn that you arrived safely at Tuskegee. The 
iscort has not yet been able to return. We shall be much delayed in taking 



[ 224 ] 432 

the field on this side by the non-arrival of our most essential supplies — rifles, 
muskets, musket-accoutrements, ammunition, &c. I had expected these, 
with subsistence stores, to begin to arrive here from the Ockmulgee by 
the 7th instant, but here is a letter from the agent, Mr. Beard, dated at 
Hawkinsville the 5th, in which he reports that nothing had reached the 
place. He immediately despatched a boat to Darien to make inquiries, 
to hasten, &c. We have now on the Chattahoochie about 2,000 Georgi- 
ans, most of them remarkably fine men ; of the whole number, howev- 
er, not a third have sufficient arms, and a still smaller number good ac- 
coutrements ; it will, therefore, be impossible to arm and equip the re- 
maining two-thirds without the muskets, the Hall's rifles, and mus- 
ket-accoutrements expected by the Ockmulgee. From the foregoing it 
will be seen that it is impossible for the Georgians to commence opera- 
tions from the neighborhood of Irwinton, say in eight or ten days, nor 
even then, unless the arms and accoutrements should have arrived. I 
have not had aline from his Excellency Governor Clay. The regulars are 
advancing handsomely from Augusta. 1 think all but a small detach- 
ment of marines had reached that place at the last dates. Brigadier 
General Fenwick is very anxious (I learn) that the regulars should be 
held together as a brigade under his command. Major Mackay has 
been excused from this campaign, and nobody substituted in his place. 
Lieutenant Waite arrived yesterday. I have been obliged to place him 
on duty here. 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Maj. Gen. T. S. Jesup, 

U. S. Army, commanding, fyc. 

We have more than doubled the force placed in the lower counties of 
Georgia, to prevent the Creeks from escaping to the Seminoles. 

W. S. 



No. 194. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 12, 1S36. 

Sir : I wrote to you on the 2d instant, with a burning fever ©n me, 
which had then continued more than two days. I have since been quite 
sick, and have passed through a course of medicine, that has fully re- 
moved the cause of disease, but left me rather feeble. I have, however, 
already recovered much strength in the last forty hours, and to-morrow 
expect to be on horse-back. My cure has been so systematic that a 
relapse is deemed impossible. 

During my confinement there was but little of importance to do, and 
the Governor very promptly and ably supplied my place. 

We have on this frontier about 3,300 Georgia volunteers and draughts ; 
the former contain a large portion of the chivalry, intelligence, and prop- 
erty of the State. Of this force, we have not as yet been able to arm 



433 [ 224 ] 

more than a third. Muskets in sufficient numbers are approaching, but 
no accoutrements, except the 1,S00 that I ordered from St. Augustine 
and Picolata. Without these, which I expect from the Ockmulgee in 
six days, it would have been utterly impossible to have equipped the 
Georgians for the field; for there were no accoutrements in any of the 
Southern arsenals. 

In six oi eight days, then, I hope to be able to arm and equip the whole 
ol the Georgia forces ; and as a respectable number of the regular troops 
may be expected here by that time, I shall lose not a moment in com- 
mencing active operations. 

Major General Jesup has joined the Alabamians at Tuskegee. I have 
letters from him of the 5th, 6th, and Sth instant. Although he does not 
state the fact, it seems that he met Governor Clay at Lime creek, twen- 
ty-five miles west of Tuskegee, and thence returned to the latter 
place, preceding the Governor by a few miles. Something unpleasant 
must have occurred at the interview. In his letter of the Sth, General 
Jesup only says : " I have not yet obtained the command of the troops, but 
I obtain it at ail, I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow." 

Some ot the very intelligent Georgians who accompanied General 
Jesup as an escort, say that the Alabamians do not wish to come into the 
service of the United States; that the Governor, Major Genera! Patter- 
son, and Adjutant and Inspector General Ilogan, are all opposed to the 
change, &c. It is singular that General Jesup has not been more explicit 
in his communications with me on these points. In lact, but for the es- 
cort that has returned, I should not have known that he had seen the 
Governor at all. 

The same letters represent the Alabamians to be well armed with mus- 
kets, but to be without, accoutrements, without cartridges, and without 
Hints. The deficiency in flints and ammunition, I shall be able to supply 
on the arrival of our stores by the Ockmulgee, say in six and eight days. 

The Governor and myself, in proportion as we have been >le to ob- 
tain armed men, have sent oil' detachments to guard the left bank of this 
river. Some of these detachments have been pushed below t!.o country 
occupied by the Creeks on the opposite bank. Several of the middle 
detachments have, within eight or ten days, been surprised by small par- 
ties of the enemy, coming over for marauding purposes, and in each case 
the advantage has been against us. To keep up a communication all 
along the river, to check and to destroy the enemy, we now have con- 
stantly cruising, two steamers, both of which are well manned, but only 
one armed with a six-pounder. We had no other piece of artillery. 

I am sorry to say, for the information of the Secretary, that no volun- 
teer force can be sent from this quarter cither before or after the Creek 
war, to aid the operations against the Seminoles in Florida. All the 
Georgians, as Governor Schley informs me, who are now in the field, 
were expressly called for to put down the Creeks. Many of the com- 
panies which first presented themselves for muster, made it a point that 
they should be so, and not otherwise employed. This the Governor fully 
assented to in his speeches on the several occasions. The Alabamians 
too, I am confident, if they have conversed with the members of Colonel 
Chisolm's regiment, lately from Florida, will be equally repugnant to a 
28 



[ 224 " 48 i 

campaign in that country at this season of the year. I passed that regi- 
ment on the 20th of April, at the Big Withlacoochee, when all its ener- 
gies appeared to he entirely prostrated by the heat of the weather. 

I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Foster, 
written on a request from Governor Call. 

When I ordered the 100,000 rations from Savannah, via Darien, Haw- 
kinsville, &c. to this place, I knew that no supplies of that sort could be 
wanted in Florida in four or five weeks, and I immediately caused notice 
to be given of the measure. At the time I gave the order, I knew that 
the Altamaha and Ockmulgee rivers were becoming daily lower and 
lower, and that a sufficient number of wagons could not be found in the 
country to haul from Augusta to Columbus the immense supplies that 
would be wanted in this war. No time was, therefore, to be lost, and 
the rations were ordered by water to a point only ninety miles from this 
place. It is true that very heavy and unexpected showers of rain followed 
for the next ten days, which have kept the rivers up and spoiled the 
roads. 

Beyond those 100,000 rations, provided we receive the supplies de- 
manded from New Orleans, not another pound of subsistence is wanted 
from the North and East. 

In haste, I have the honor to be, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General, U. S. A. 



No. 195. 



Augusta Arsenal, Georgia, 

June 11, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that the following ordnance and ord- 
nance stores have been received at this arsenal from the Charleston de- 
pot, and respectfully request to be informed whether the stores are to 
remain here or be forwarded on to the ordnance officer at Columbus, 
Georgia, viz : 

500 Hall's rifles (brown) complete 
500 flasks and belts 
500 Hall's rifles (bright) complete 
500 sets rifle accoutrements 
1000 screw-drivers 
1000 wipers 
100 spring vices 
100 bullet moulds 
200 pounds rifle powder 
2500 infantry cartridge-boxes 
2500 do do belts 

2500 bayonet scabbards 
2500 do do belts 



435 [ 224 ] 

2500 bayonet scabbard plates 

2500 gun slings 

2039 brushes and picks 

Very respectfully, I am, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

N. BADEN, 
Major United States Army. 
Major E. Kirby, Aid-de-camp. 



No. 196. 



Headquarters, Army or the South, 

Columbus, June 14, 1836. 

Sir: Your letter of the 11th instant, containing a list of certain ord- 
inance stores received by you at Augusta arsenal, has been submitted to 
Major General Scott. The General directs that you forward to this 
place, without delay, the following articles embraced in that list, viz : 
500 Hall's rifles (brown) complete 
500 flasks and belts 
500 screw-drivers 
500 wipers 
50 spring vices 
50 bullet moulds 
200 pounds rifle powder 
1000 infantry cartridge boxes 
1000 do do belts 

1000 bayonet scabbards 
1000 do do belts 

1000 do do plates 

1000 gun slings 
1000 brushes and picks 
The General desires to have these articles disposed in light loads, say 
not to exceed two-thirds the ordinary loads, and despatched without any 
delay to this place. They are immediately and urgently wanted here. 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

E. KIRBY, 
Paymaster, A. A. A. General 
Major N. Baden, U. S. A., 

Commanding, Augusta Arsenal. 



No. 197. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, June 11, 1836. 

Sir : You will proceed forthwith to Hawkinsville, hiring such relays 
•of horses upon the road as to proceed expeditiously. 

On your arrival, ascertain from Lieutenant Heintzelman of the army, 



[ 224 ] 436 

or Major J. C. Beard, agent of the United States for forwarding supplies. 
&c, whether any of Kail's patent rifles and accoutrements have been re- 
ceived at that place with other public stores from below. If they have 
ived, you will direct, by the authority of Major General Scott, the 
officer having charge of them to forward those articles to this place with 
all despatch. Should these rifles and accoutrements have been turned 
over to General Wilcox, of the Georgia militia, or any other officer, you 
will recover possession of them, even should it be necessary to pursue 
them beyond Hawkinsville. These arms are wanted immediately and 
urgently at this place, to supply the unarmed troops assembled here. 

You will also direct that the muskets and musket accoutrements, and 
amunition, which have arrived or may arrive at Hawkinsville, be for- 
warded to this place without any delay. Next to these the tents and 
camp equipage will be forwarded. 

Major Beard will turn over the instructions which he received from 
Major General Scott to Lieutenant Heintzelman, for whose guidance 
they are intended ; and after completing the duties assigned him by the 
General, in that quarter, will proceed to this place. 

You will show this order to Major Beard and Lieutenant Heintzel- 
man, and to General Wilcox, should he have received the arms, who will 
respectively be governed by it in the premises. Having completed this 
duty, you will return to this place and report your doings. 

By order of Major General Scott. 



Lieutenant Ed. Deas. 

United States army. 



E. KIRBY. 
Paymaster, acting A. A. General. 



No. 198. 



Hawkinsville. Georcia, 

June 12, 1636. 

Sir : I have the honor to inform you that the steamboat Comet arrived 
at this place yesterday, with two boats in tow, containing supplies for the 
army. 

I have just finished loading ten teams, which will leave this early to- 
morrow for Columbus, crossing the Flint at Traveller's Rest. Enclosed 
herewith you will receive a list of the supplies sent by them. 

General Wilcox, just from headquarters, and on his way to organize a 
force a little south of this, has called on me for arms for 200 men, and 
also for a company of mounted men under his command, being sixty 
more, making 2G0 in all. 

Having no special instructions, and from the necessity of the case, I 
have promised to supply him with the arms, and also with provisions, 
agreeably to your order to Major Beard. 

Major Beard left here a lew days ago for Macon, to procure wagons to 
forward the supplies, on board one boat expected here to-morrow, by the 



437 [ 224 J 

steamboat Crockett, as it is impossible to get a sufficient number of wagons 
in this neighborhood. He will return to this place in a few days. 

Six wagons arrived this evening from Warrenton, and to-morrow we 
expect five or six more ; so I hope to be able by next day to start another 
train of ten. It will be loaded entirely with provisions. 

I have retained the tents, as I supposed the arms, accoutrements, and 
provisions, were more needed. With the tents are poles and pins; the 
latter are very heavy, and scarcely worth the transportation at the pres- 
ent time, with the limited means of transport to be obtained. Would it 
not be better to retain the pins here ? 

I have not been furnished with any funds. 
I have the honor to be, sir, 

Very respectfullv, vour obedient servant, 

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, 
Lieutenant, and acting Assistant Quartermaster. 
Major E. Kirby, Paymaster, and 

Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Columbus, Georgia. 



No. 199. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 14, 1836. 

Sir: We are still held in a state of inactivity, from the non-arrival of 
arms, ammunition, &c. These essential supplies we have reason to hope 
will be here in sufficient numbers and quantities in a few days, from Au- 
gusta, and first from Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, to which point 
shipments via Darien, were made by my orders, from Florida, Savannah, 
and Charleston. Nearly all the Georgians ordered out by the Governor, 
a little more than 3,000, are already on the frontier; but, as I have be- 
fore reported, by far the greater number of the companies have come 
without arms and accoutrements. As fast as the mounted companies can 
be armed, I shall send them down the country, on the Georgia side, at 
least as low as Irwinton, whence I shall commence operations. With 
the aid of the flats which 1 have caused to be constructed, it will be easy, at 
the proper time, to pass those troops over to the Alabama side, and the 
foot, regular and volunteer, not wanted to guard the river above and be- 
low this place, I shall send to the same rendezvous in steamboats. The 
first company of regulars (Monroe's) arrived yesterday, and a detach- 
ment of four or six, under Major Lomax, may be expected the day after 
to-morrow. Other detachments will follow at intervals of a day or two, 
and the whole, including marines, may be expected in a week. I have 
not, however, all-important as I deem those regulars, been waiting for 
them. The volunteers cannot march without arms, accoutrements, and 
ammunition. 

Subsistence in abundance will also arrive from the Ockmulgee, with 
the arms, accoutrements, &c. 

It is extremely doubtful, judging from circumstances, whether the 
Governor of Alabama will place his forces under the authority of the 



I" 224 ] 438 

United States. He was on the 8th instant at Tuskegee, only forty-odd 
miles from this place, and may be presumed to be still there. Yet he has 
not condescended to notice my letters to him of the 31st ultimo, nor that 
of Governor Schley of the same date, and to the same effect. The latter 
neglect, which I have no right to comment upon, is more extraordinary 
than the former. Nor can I hear any thing explicit from Major General 
Jesup. His letter of the 8th instant to me, written after he met the Gov- 
ernor at Lime creek, beyond Tuskegee, and after they had both travelled 
from the former to the latter place, is absolutely dark and mysterious. I 
gave a quotation from this letter in mine of the 12th. I have not had a 
line from him since, although, as yet, friendly Indian runners have had 
no difficulty in passing and repassing. One of these runners I sent to 
him a few days since, and who may be expected back to night. By his 
return, the mystery that hangs over the intentions and purposes of the 
Governor of Alabama may be removed. I know, from many sources, that 
his forces are not prepared to take the field with effect. They at least 
want ammunition and flints. I also unofficially learn, that Brigadier 
General Moore, of that State, has arrived at Irwinton, with a reinforce- 
ment of 750 mounted men, and that he thinks of commencing operations 
forthwith. I shall write to him to-day, to say that I have the direction 
of the war, and request that he may wait till my arrival in that quarter. 
I remain, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



No. 200. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 
Orders No. 8. Columbus, Georgia, June 16, 1836. 

All the troops of the Georgia line will hold themselves in readiness 
to take the field the moment the arms and ammunition, now daily expect- 
ed, shall arrive. 

As an indispensable preparation, every mounted officer, of every rank, 
and every mounted man, will immediately provide himself with a wallet 
capable of carrying three days' supply of corn for his horse. Command- 
ing officers will see that this preparation be made at once. 

Haversacks are provided for all the volunteers and draughted men, 
whether mounted or on foot. To obtain them, requisitions will be made 
on the United States quartermaster at this place. Each man will be 
careful to mark his wallet and haversack with his name, as soon as they 
come into his hands. 

The baggage of officers and companies, at the commencement of the first 
march, must be reduced to the smallest amount. All heavy and superfluous 
articles will be left behind. Troops to pursue an enemy with success must 
move lightly ; no company, therefore, can be allowed to take into the 



439 [ 224 J 



enemy's country more than four tents for officers and men. Command- 
ers of every rank will look strictly to the due execution of this order, or 
the army will be rendered utterly incapable of active movements, by the 
overwhelming weight of its baggage-train. 

Light camp-kettles and mess-pans have been provided for the troops. 
Cast-iron ovens, skillets, and the like, are too heavy to be allowed to go 
into the wagons, which are principally to be loaded with ammunition and 
subsistence for men. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 201 



Knoxville, June 16, 1S36. 

Sir : Agreeably to order, I to-day met the wagons conveying the guns 
and ammunition to Columbus, between this place. I found it much more 
difficult to procure wagons as lighters than I had anticipated. I, how- 
ever, succeeded in procuring two or three, which will take in their load- 
ing to-morrow, and hasten on to Columbus. Unless some very serious 
accident happens, they will all be in Columbus by the night of the 19th 
instant. The wagons seem to move at this time with some spiiit. 

Yours, truly, 

JNO. CROvVELL, Jr. 
Maj. Gen. W. Scott, 

U. S. A., Headquarters, Columbus, Georgia. 



No. 202. 



Macon, June 16, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to inform you twenty-one wagons and one 
howitzer was forwarded to headquarters yesterday and this morning from 
Hawkinsville. An invoice of contents of the wagons will be handed 
you by the wagon-masters in charge. A great portion of the musket ac- 
coutrements you require, and the whole of Hall's rifles, are with these 
trains. We find no ammunition on either boats or invoices. 

The subsistence stores forwarded consist principally of bacon, bread, 
and flour; also, tents, ball, and cannon, in proportion, taken out of tierces 
to lessen transportation, also camp-kettles. 

According to your instructions, I purchased horses for the howitzer, 
and have likewise purchased seven wagons and teams. 

Lieutenant Heintzelman receipted to me for those articles. After 
making my arrangements in Hawkinsville, for the furthering of your or- 
ders, I handed your instructions to Lieutenant H. and left him in charge, 
and left for this city in the night, and arrived to-day, noon, in time to 
start thirteen wagons laden with subsistence and other stores, viz : 
22 bbls of prime beef, (purchased here.) 
139 boxes, (contents not known,) a portion of hospital stores. 



[ 224 J 440 

\ bbl barley. 
23 bbls pork. 

6C bbls flour. 
\G bbls beans. 
12 bbls bard bread. 
The Darien steamboat arrived at Hawkinsville yesterday evening. I 
ordered her to this place to discharge her cargo. She is under charge of 
Lieutenant Simpson, A. C. S. I expect her here this night. 

I shall proceed to forward her freight immediately, and, after arranging 
this business to my satisfaction, shall proceed forthwith to headquarters. 
My funds are expended. I enclose a hasty statement of my disburse- 
ments, and shall draw again on your paymaster for two thousand dollars 
to meet casualties, previous to my arrival at headquarters. 

The difficulties! have had to surmount have been far greater than I an- 
ticipated. I have been ably assisted in Hawkinsville by Lieutenant 
Heintzelraan. 1 have not taken rest the last four nights, and find my- 
self quite sick, but hope to rise to-morrow with renewed energies. 

I wrote Lieutenant Di.nmock respecting the fixed ammunition you so 
much require, and suggested to him to have some forwarded forthwith — 
viz. canister and grape — by omnibus of stage. I find, on looking over 
the invoices received, no mention made of any ammunition having 
been shipped. 

No six-pounder yet arrived. I found a gun-carriage on board of the 
Darien, which I ordered on shore at Hawkinsville. 

Captain Seymour, of the Macon volunteers, desires me to offer his re- 
spects to you, and kindly wishes for your success in the approaching 
campaign. I think it probable he will accompany me to your headquar- 
ters to oiler his respects in person. 

I would suggest three trains, at least, be sent (on their arrival,) back 
to Hawkinsville. 

The marines are in this neighborhood — will pass through in the 
morning. 

I have the honor to be, General, with respect, 
Your obedient servant, 

JOSEPH A. BEARD, 

Agent to U. S. Army. 
To Maj. Gen. W. Scott, 

Commander-in-chief of the army of the South, 

Headquarters, Columbus. 



No. 203. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 17, 1836. 

StR : I enclose a copy of my letter to Major General Jesup, dated yes- 
terday ; and also a copy of my Order No. 8. These papers will show 
our present condition and prospects. The troops here are becoming im- 



441 , \ 224 ] 

patient to move, and so am I ; but I must avoid all premature and false 
movements. Arms and ammunition are indispensable, and so are a cer- 
tain number of days' subsistence. All these objects, I think, we shall 
certainly have in possession by the 21st instant. No time has been lost 
since the arrival of the arms, &c. at Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee. 
The delay occurred with the transportation line between Darien and that 
point. I caused agents to be stationed at both places, and have reason 
to believe that they have been active and pushing. As to the arms 
coming from Augusta, the distance (220 miles,) and the badness of the 
roads, rendered worse by the storms of rain at the end of May and the 
beginning of June, have caused the delay. 

Paymaster Kirby leaves me to-day (without an experienced staff offi- 
cer,) for Florida, according to the reiterated orders of his department. 
He has been of the greatest use to Governor Schley, in matters 
of accounts, and to me generally. We both part with him with extreme 
reluctance. Major Erving has been with me since the 7th, and employ- 
ed as mustering officer. 1 had designed him for the office of acting in- 
spector general; but he labors under a disability, which he thinks will 
prevent his encountering the fatigues of that office. I have not a regu- 
lar aid-de-camp. Lieutenant Herring, by the last advices, lay danger- 
ously ill at Garey's ferry, in Florida. 1 fear that he is no more. 
I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 

P. S. Of the officers mentioned in my Order No. 1, for staff duties, 
Major Kirby has just left me, Captain Page confines himself exclusively 
to his duties in the Indian department, and Captain Parrott accompanied 
Major General Jesup. 

W. S. 

Brig. Gen. R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army. 



No. 204. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbia, Ga., June 1G, 1836. 

Sir : Since I wrote to you on the 12th, [10th,] I have heard of the ar- 
rival at Hawkinsville and Macon of most of the supplies I had ordered via 
Darien. These are now in wagons, and within two, three, and four days 
of this place. I have also just heard that the muskets ordered from Au- 
gusta may be expected here perhaps to-morrow. With these arms and 
the 1,800 accoutrements from Hawkinsville, nearly the whole of the 
Georgia line may be fitted for the field. At present, of the. 2,200 men 
Major General Sanford has in his camp (on the other side of the river) 
only about 400 are armed. All the other armed men have been detached 



[ £24 442 

below to guard the river, and which, as yet, from the want of men, is but 
very imperfectly guarded. 

After writing to you on the 12th [10th] I received your letter of the 
8th. This would completely have mystified me but for the explanations 
given by some of the Georgia gentlemen who accompanied you from this 
place. For example, you wrote to me on the 6th that you were just 
about to set out for Montgomery, and yet I find you back at Tuskegee 
on the 8th. You do not tell me that you had been absent as far as 
Line creek, and that you there had met the Governor. You are si- 
lent as to any interview you had had with him, either at Line creek or 
Tuskegee, to which place, I understand from others, he followed you. 
Some difficulties you undoubtedly experienced in getting the command of 
the Alabama troops ; but what these difficulties were you carefully con- 
ceal from me. You content yourself with saying, " I have not yet ob- 
tained the command of the troops, but if I obtain it at all, I shall prob- 
ably enter on duty to-morrow." But why you had not at first obtained 
the command of the troops, and why the doubt whether you would ob- 
tain it all, you again carefully conceal from me. 

In a subsequent part of your letter you say, " I learn from the Gov- 
ernor that General Moore will," &c. How did you learn this from the 
Governor ? You do not tell me that you had met him at Line creek, 
and that, turning back yourself, he had followed you to Tuskegee. It 
might have been by letter. 

Allow me to say that the whole letter is mysterious and enigmatical 
in the extreme, and that it is not such a communication as you ought to 
have made me. If the Governor made the difficulties about placing you 
in the command of the troops, that important fact ought not to have been 
concealed from me, and if he did not, who else interposed difficulties ? 

You further tell me that, " if a movement be determined on, I will send 
you information of it by a runner." A movement to be determined on 
by whom ? The Alabama commanders, or these in conjunction with 
yourself? Either you were placed in command, or you have not been. 
In the first case, you would certainly determine on no scheme of offen- 
sive operations without my previous concurrence and readiness to co- 
operate ; yet, without receiving any runner from you, or communication 
of any kind, since the 8th instant, a passenger in the stage, by the upper 
route, just arrived here, reports that you, at the head of about 3,000 
Alabamians, and 1,000 friendly Indians, was about to march upon Neo- 
mico's band, and to commence offensive operations on a great scale ! 
I have no doubt there is a gross mistake in this report. You may per- 
haps have been about to make some defensive movement or operation to 
clear a frontier settlement of a portion of the enemy ; but I will not be- 
lieve that you have declared your independence of my authority. 

It is certain that Brigadier General Moore, of Alabama, has com- 
menced a course of offensive operations from Irwinton up the country. 
From this fact, I have rather inferred that you have not even yet been 
invested with the command of the Alabamians, or you certainly would 
have stopped his premature and isolated movement. These doubts 
and conjectures, in the absence of all direct intelligence from you, are 
sufficiently harassing. 

I mean to be explicit and precise on my part. I desire you instantly 



443 [ 224 ] 

to stop all offensive movements (if you are in command) on the part of 
the Alabamians, until the Georgians are ready to act, say on the 21st 
instant, when the greater number of them will be armed and ready for 
the field. By that time, too, there will be on this frontier, the greater 
part of the regulars and marines ordered from the North. On that day, 
if the movements of General Moore shall not render a modification of 
my plan necessary, I shall begin to assemble the troops on this side of 
the nation, somewhere in the neighborhood of Irwinton, and operate up 
the country. It is my desire that you meet me about that time and 
place, and that you bring with you any disposable force you convenient- 
ly can ; or that you hold the whole of the Alabamians in defensive posi- 
tions on the frontier settlements till I shall bring the war into their 
neighborhood, when you can come into the general line of operations 
with me. 

No quartermaster has arrived here but Lieutenant Waite. Captain 
Page says that, under his instructions from the War Department, his 
presence in this quarter is indispensable. No flints and no ammunition 
has yet arrived. I have heard of shipments from New Orleans of army 
supplies; but none have arrived. Subsistence, with arms and accoutre- 
ments from Hawkinsville, will begin to come in to-morrow. 

I shall cause a large deposite of subsistence to be made at Irwinton, 
another at Fort Mitchell, and a third at this place. I am inquiring, and 
may establish a fourth depot at some convenient point between Irwin- 
ton and Fort Mitchell. 

Six companies of regulars have arrived, five to-day, and Monroe's three 
days ago. They are sent to guard the Indians, &c, at Fort Mitchell. 
I remain with undiminished confidence, 

Yours, most respectfully, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Maj. Gen. T. S. Jesup, U. S.A. 
Commanding, S{C. 



No. 205. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June IS, 1836. 

Sir : Enclosed herewith you will receive copies of two letters from 
Major General Jesup to me, and a copy of my reply. His movement 
and appearance at Fort Mitchell (whither I go this morning) have em- 
barrassed me exceedingly, and if our subsistence, ordered by me from 
Savannah, via Darien and the Ockmulgee, should not begin to arrive to- 
morrow, or, at the latest, the following day, all the troops must be put 
on half or third rations. 

I hardly know how to get General Jesup's corps in its true position, 
from the false one he has placed himself in. I want him down the 
country at least as low as Irwinton, and if I send him by land, on the 
Alabama side, he will invert my plan of campaign, by operating down in- 
stead of up the country. His foot I may be able to send below in steam- 



[ 224 J 441. 

boats, and cross his horse to this shore, march it to a point opposite to 
Irwin ton, and thence recross it. But these movements will give me a 
great deal of trouble and delay. Than to be so embarrassed, I would in- 
finitely have preferred that these Alabamians and Indians had marched 
five hundred miles in any other direction. 

In haste, I remain, with high respect, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brig. Gen. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army. 



No. 206. 



Headquarters, at Long's, June 15, 1836. 

General : I have received your letter of the 10th since I left Tuske- 
gee for Irwinton, or rather for the lower line of the Creek country. 1 
arrived here about five o'clock yesterday. Having been deceived by the 
mistake of a guide, I passed the Irvvinton road nine miles. I am within 
four miles of Nehomico's camp. He has gone to the neighborhood of 
Tuskegee to surrender himself. I received and disarmed thirty-five of 
his people, who had left his camp, professing to be friendly. I have with 
me twelve companies, seven mounted and five infantry, and expect to 
be reinforced by two companies to-night. I have, also, four hundred 
Indian warriors, and expect to be reinforced to-morrow by five hundred, 
under the celebrated chief Opothleyoholo. I find it impossible to obtain 
either corn or subsistence here, the hostile Indians have destroyed all 
that they have not taken away. 

June 16. I am now at the " Big Spring," within fourteen miles of Fort 
Mitchell, and shall move on Nehomico's camp to-morrow. A detach- 
ment of Indian warriors, from this division, captured Nehomico and his 
son last evening, and they are now prisoners in my camp. 

I wish Captain Page to join me as soon as possible. If he had been 
with me I could have organized before this time an emigrating party of 
several hundred. I have to request that provisions and corn be sent to 
Fort Mitchell. I have only five days' rations, and not a grain of corn. 
My movement to this point has, I understand by a gentleman who ar- 
rived to-day, tranquillized the frontier. A party of two came through 
to-day. 

If I should not obtain supplies at Nehomico's camp, I shall probably 
be compelled to fall back on Fort Mitchell, or to a position near it. I 
hope to receive orders from you at that place, to which, if I do not go 
myself, I shall send wagons for subsistence. 

I am, General, most respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

THS. S. JESUP, 
Maj. Gen. commcPg 2d army corps of the Southern Army, 

Major General Scott, 

Commanding the Southern Army, Columbus > Georgia. 



445 [ 224 ] 

No. 207. 

June 17, 1836. 
General : I find that wo have less than two days' rations, in addition 
to two days' rations in the hands of the men. Whether successful or not, 
against the force of NehoEmathla, I shall be compelled to go to Fort Mitch- 
ell. Can you give us provisions and corn there ? By all means do so. 
I have an Indian force which will enable you to drive the whole country. 

Yours, 



TH. S. JESUP. 



General Scott, 

Columbus. 



No. 208. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 17, 1836. 

Sir: I have this moment received your two letters of the 15th and 
17th instant. 

I am infinitely astonished and distressed to hear of your near approach, 
and in a starving condition, to Fort Mitchell. You knew that your forces 
were not wanted there. You knew that no supplies could reach Irwin- 
ton, from New Orleans, earlier than the 21st instant, if .so soon ; and }-ou 
knew, by my letter of the tenth, that nothing had arrived, as high as 
Hawkinsville, upon the Ockmulgee, and, consequently, nothing could 
have reached this place by the present date from that river. { also ought 
to add, that you knew, when you left here, that the troops, daily increas- 
ing, were living from hand to mouth on the precarious supplies of the 
neighborhood. Under these circumstances, imagine my astonishment 
to learn that, instead of marching the disposable force of Alabama upon 
Irwinton, with subsistence for at least ten or five days in advance, to hear 
that you had come through the heart of the Indian country, seeking pri- 
vate adventures, which, if successful, could hardly have advanced the 
war, and against my known plan of operations, to Fort Mitchell, forty- 
five miles out of position ! It is precisely General Gaines's movement 
upon Fort King, where there was no subsistence ; and there is none, as 
you ought to have known, at Fort Mitchell. My grief and distress are 
at their utmost height. This strange movement you have made, without 
giving me the slightest notice. You had not informed me — you do not 
even now tell me, that you are in command of the Alabamians ; and 
your last letter, of the 8th instant, stated that it was doubtful whether you 
would ever be invested with that command. All this is infinitely strange, 
and was the last thing in the world that was to be expected from you. 

Well, to prevent starvation, I have called for the quartermaster and 
commissary, and demanded of them what rations and forage they could 
supply. Lieutenant Waite, the quartermaster, has, with great difficulty, 
provided some corn for my movement at the head of the Georgians, on 
the 21st or 22d ; and Lieutenant McCrabb has just nearly exhausted the' 



[ 224 ' 446 

market to obtain two or three days' rations for the troops already at Fort 
Mitchell. At the risk of starving the troops on the river, (the Georgians 
and regulars,) I have ordered the quartermaster to send you 500 bushels 
of corn, and the commissary to move heaven and earth to send two or 
three days' subsistence for the troops brought with y.ou. To prevent, 
however, all further erratic movements, I desire you to encamp your 
forces somewhere in the neighborhood of Fort Mitchell till further 
orders, or until I can see you. We will keep your forces, and those pre- 
viously on the river, from starving, if possible, till the arrival of the Ock- 
mulgee supplies, which, I suppose, will precede those from New Orleans 
by some days. 

The first, and one of the worst effects of your arrival will be, to pre- 
vent a movement of the Georgians and regulars as early as I intended ; 
the former have pushed their impatience for active operations almost to 
a slate of mutiny — a result which I may not be able to prevent, if they 
should learn that the arrival of the Alabamiansis to hold them in a state 
of inglorious inactivity many days longer. 

I wrote to you yesterday, and despatched the letter by a runner from 
Fort Mitchell. 

I shall endeavor to visit Fort Mitchell to-morrow or the next day. 
Though in grief, I still remain yours, 

With great regard, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Maj. Gen. T. S. Jesup, 

U. S. Army, commanding, <^c. 

P. S. Some wagons with subsistence are despatched to-night, but can- 
not arrive, I learn from Mr. Waite, till to-morrow morning. Some corn 
(250 of 300 hushels) will be down by 10 o'clock to-morrow, in the boat. 

W. S. 



No. 209. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 1836. 

Sir : A thousand muskets arrived here last night, and have been 
issued to as many troops this morning, who will immediately commence 
the march for a point on the Chattahoochie, (say) the mouth of the 
Cowaggee creek, below the enemy. The accoutrements for those mus- 
kets will be here to-morrow, and will be sent down the river in a steam- 
boat the following day. With the accoutrements will come five hundred 
rifles, and a battalion of mounted men will remain to receive them. The 
delay in the arrival of those essential supplies, I now know has been 
occasioned by steamboat accidents between Darien and Hawkinsville, 
and a difficulty in procuring wagons, although 1 had two agents for the 
purpose in that neighborhood. The horse will probably overtake the 
foot (I shall personally march with the former) on this side of a point on 
the Chattahoochie opposite to the Cowaggee creek. The enemy are 
understood to be entirely above that creek. If I find this to be so, I 
shall cross the troops to the Alabama side about that point. 



447 [ 224 J 

Major Pierce, at the head of a small battalion of artillery, marched 
down on this side of the river yesterday. Major Lomax, at the head of 
a similar battalion, follows him closely. The first detachment of marines, 
under Colonel Henderson, will, I understand, be here to-morrow. He 
will immediately take the same route, and the same thing of the remain- 
ing detachments of regulars. Brigadier General Fenwick is here, and 
will command all the regulars, formed into a brigade. I shall not hesitate, 
however, to detach from him freely, according to circumstances, and 
hence his forces are to be divided into light battalions. 

Surgeon Lawson has arrived and entered on duty. 

After leaving the necessary guards on the left bank of this river above, 
and particularly below Columbus, I may have left about two thousand 
Georgians, besides the regulars that may be up in time, for the com- 
mencement of active operations against the enemy, together with one 
hundred friendly Indians. 

From the copies of two letters from Major General Jesup to me, and 
copies of two from me to him, his position and strength may be inferred. 
I learn, this morning, that his fifteen or sixteen hundred friendly Indians 
have deserted him in whole or great part. This, however, is but a rumor. 
His exact position he has not communicated to me. I suppose him to 
have been, on the 19th instant, about twelve miles from Fort Mitchell; 
and it will be seen that I have suggested that he should, during his halt 
of a few days, approach nearer to that place, for the convenience of re- 
ceiving supplies. 

It will be seen, in his communication of the 17th, that he says : " I 
would have struck the enemy to-night, but for your letter." I have it 
from a respectable gentleman, to whom he made the communication on 
the 19th instant, at Fort Mitchell, that he did, nevertheless, attempt the 
blow, and found that the enemy had fled ! We (the Governor of Geor- 
gia and myself) have great fears that the movements of Major General 
Jesup will render the enemy more desperate in his attempts to escape, in 
parties, across the river towards Florida. Hence, besides sending down 
to guard the river, all the armed volunteers except four hundred, I have 
hastened in the same direction the two detachments of regulars mentioned 
above. 

My intention is to give Major General Jesup instructions in time, to 
act downwards from his present false position, simultaneously with the 
forces which are to be landed below the enemy. It is now the best dis- 
position I can conveniently make of his forces. 

With respect to this distinguished officer, I have every motive in the 
world, public and private, to act in perfect harmony. All my ancient 
aifection for him is fast returning. I hope it will be entirely restored in 
a day or two ; that is, as soon as I shall learn that he conforms himself to 
my plans and instructions. 

I remain, sir, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. Gen. Jones, Adjutant General U. S. A. 

P. S. It may be well to contradict a ridiculous letter going the rounds 
of the public papers, and well calculated to alarm the good people of 



[ 224 ] 448 

lower Georgia, and of all Florida, from Major General Irvine, of Ala- 
bama to Brigadier General Wilcox, of this State ; in which he says, 
besides many other strange things, that two thousand Creek Indians had 
escaped across the Chattahoochie towards Florida. There is not the 
least truth in that formal and pompous statement. From the best inform- 
ation from below, we have reason to be confident that not a party — 
probably not an individual Creek Indian has escaped in that direction. 

W. S. 



No. 210. 



Headquarters, Second Army Corps, 
Camp on (he waters of Halchychubby, June 17, 1836*. 

General: I have this instant received your letter of yesterday. I 
regret that my operations have met your disapprobation ; but they were 
commenced, and have been continued, for the purpose of staying the 
tomahawk and scalping-knife, and preventing the devastation of entire 
settlements or neighborhoods on the frontier; they have had the effect of 
tranquillizing, in some measure, the frontier people, and of inducing them 
to remain at their homes. I regret the censure implied in your remarks, 
because it is unmerited. I acted in accordance with what I believed <o 
be the spirit of your instructions ; but even were my conduct in direct 
opposition to your instructions given at a former period, the altered cir- 
cumstances of the country is, I should think, a full justification. I con- 
sider it so; for I have none of that courage that would enable me to re- 
main inactive, when women and children are daily falling beneath the 
blows of the savage. Writing in the open field, while I am interrupted 
every moment by matters of detail of every kind, even to the placing of 
a wagon, I cannot now explain the remarks in my letter which you have 
considered so ''enigmatical," further than to say, in justice to Governor 
Clav, that he made no opposition to my assuming command, but made 
every effort to sustain me; and to add that, if successful in my present 
operations, I shall owe much of that success to his able arrangements; 
the troops, or rather a part of them, were opposed not to me, personally, 
but to any officer of the United States taking command of them; and I 
would take command of militia and volunteers on no other terms than 
their consent. I would resign my commission first. 

I am now within live miles of Enea Mathla's camp, with twelve com- 
panies of volunteers, and four or five bundled Indian warriors ; eleven 
hundred warriors, under Opotheola, will join to-night, and perhaps five 
hundred volunteers from Alabama. I made such arrangements for the de- 
fence of the settlements in my rear, that I feel assured of their entire 
security. I would have struck the enemy to-night, but for your letter; 
if he is not struck to-morrow morning, he will escape for the present ; 
but the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and reduce him. 

With every disposition to perform their duty, the volunteers and mill- 



449 [ 224 

tia are necessarily extremely irregular in their returns, &c. I am not, 
therefore, able to send you a return in form of the force under my com- 
mand, 

I am, sir, respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP, 

Major General. 
Major General Scott, 

Com'g Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia. 



No. 211. 

Fort Mitchell, June 19, 1836. 

Sir : I came here with your express, and an escort of an officer and 
two mounted men, expecting to meet you. I have halted the army under 
my command on the Irvvinton road, below the road to this place. In re- 
ply to that part of your letter upbraiding me for asking a small supply of 
subsistence and forage for the troops and horses of my corps, I owe it 
to myself to say that I knew supplies ought to arrive from New Orleans 
before I should want them ; and to show that my calculation was correct, 
I have to inform you that a steamboat is here from New Orleans with 
supplies. I have ordered eight days' rations for my command. I look, 
yesterday, from the neighborhood of the hostile camp, upwards of a hun- 
dred head of cattle ; and, as I had a good supply of rice, I could have 
reached Irvvinton, without any supply from this place, had I been permitted 
to proceed. You have treated me with a degree of harshness which is 
cruel in the extreme. You charge me with deranging your plan of cam- 
paign. I understood one part of that plan to be the protection to the 
frontier settlements of Alabama. I may have failed in judgment as to the 
proper mode of protecting it ; but, give me leave to say, the course I 
adopted has been successful: that frontier is now secure. I have up- 
wards of twelve hundred Indian warriors in my camp ; they will not 
remain inactive ; what shall I do with them ? Shall I dismiss or retain 
them, and employ them in scouring the swamps? 

You charge me with not communicating with you, and giving you in- 
formation on several points. With the duties I have had to perform, that 
was impossible. My occupation has been so incessant that I have not 
averaged three hours' sleep in the twenty-four for two weeks. I have kept 
you apprized of every thing important to be known. As to the reasons 
for my own acts, or those of others, I had not thought it necessary to say 
any thing. You knew me ; and, from the perfect candor and fairness 
with which I acted towards you, and the efforts I made to sustain 
you, both with the Georgians and Alabamians, I had a right to ex- 
pect different treatment from you. Under the circumstances, the harsh- 
ness with which you have treated me is the extreme of cruelty. That 
matters not at this time ; we have important duties to perform. If you 
will move to-day, General, with your disposable force, we can end the 
war before to-morrow night. Captain Page will give you important 
information. I am not ambitious of the honors of Indian warfare. I am 
content that the whole of them shall be yours; but let me entreat you to 
29 



[ 224 ] 450 

act promptly. I can prevent the escape of the enemy on this side of 
the country ; and if you attack them in front, they are yours. If you 
hesitate, you are lost. 1 felt resentment this morning ; I feel it no longer. 
By our former friendship, let me entreat you again to act promptly. 

Yours, truly, 

THOMAS S. JESUP. 
Maj. Gen. W. Scott, 

Comm'g Southern Army, Columbus, Ga. 

P. S. Let me have two or three companies of regular troops, if you 
decide to attack these Indians. Page will tell you where they are. 



No. 212. 
Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 19, 1836. 

Sir : In your first letter of the 17th instant, you tell me that you will 
be compelled to go to Fort Mitchell ; and, according to an intimation in 
my reply to you of the same date, I went down yesterday, with great 
inconvenience, not doubting that I should meet you or hear of you in the 
immediate vicinity of that place. The only news received of you there, 
was a rumor representing you to be on the return march to Tuskegee, 
which I could not credit, under the positive declaration in your letter of 
the 17th quoted above; and Captain Page reported that he had, a few 
hours before, forwarded a despatch to Columbus from you to me. 

Besides some rations sent down the night before, in wagons, the steam- 
boat in which I was a passenger took down a further supply of subsist- 
ence, and some corn, all for the use of your troops, and in conformity 
with your requests of the 15th and 17th instant. 

On my return to Columbus, late last evening, I received your second 
of the 17th instant. This is fully as strange as any of your previous com- 
munications. In it you repeat nothing of your previous intention 
of marching upon Fort Mitchell ; but you take care to insert two 
or three topics which would furnish a good basis for a popular 
appeal against the hardship imposed on you of undertaking no 
system of offensive operations without my previous concurrence and 
readiness to act in concert with you. It would seem to be for this pur- 
pose — I can imagine no other — that you tell me that your operations have 
been " commenced, and have been continued, for the purpose of staying 
the tomahawk and scalping-knife, and preventing the devastation of en- 
tire settlements or neighborhoods on the frontier." Nothing, certainly, 
could be more meritorious. The direct protection of the Alabama set- 
tlements was within your competency, and, indeed, among your para- 
mount duties. But why commence a grand system of offensive opera- 
tions which has brought you out on this side of the Creek nation, at a 
point where I did not want you, without giving me the slightest intima- 
tion that you were about to commence, and of course without waiting for 
my approbation and co-operation ? To have waited for such co-opera- 
tion, and to have given me notice of your intended movements, were, 
allow me to say, also among your paramount duties. 

Your next popular flourish is in these words : " I have none of that 



451 j 224 J 

courage that would enable me to remain inactive, when women and chil- 
dren are daily falling beneath the blows of the savage." 1 certainly be- 
lieve that you have not — and there was not the slightest objection, in any 
quarter, to your protecting the women and children of the frontier, with 
the defence of which you were directly charged. Again : nothing could 
have been more praiseworthy ; but how does this excuse your leaving 
those women and children, and, instead of marching upon Irwinton, where 
you were required, marching in hostile array, seeking battles, upon Fort 
Mitchell, where you were neither expected nor wanted ? 

On the subject of the Alabama frontier settlements, I am happy to 
learn, by your letter, that you made such arrangements for their safety, 
as to leave you assured on that point. 

The last dead point you make, as if it were for future use against me, is 
this: "I would have struck the enemy to-night, but for your letter : if 
he is not struck to-morrow morning, he will escape for the present ; but 
the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and reduce him." Here 
I am made to deprive you and the country of a great imaginary victory. 
I say imaginary, for I am inclined to think that you are, on this occasion, 
a little too sanguine in your calculations. But the true answer is this : 
who gave you authority to roam, at pleasure, through the Creek nation, 
at the head of the Alabamians, and a body of friendly Indians, without 
giving notice to, and without concert with, the Georgians and regulars 
brought to this frontier for the same war, and at an enormous expense to 
the Government ? Besides, from the position occupied by you, you are 
forced to operate down the country, instead of getting below the enemy, 
and operating up. This precisely inverts what you know to be my plan 
of campaign ; apian fully developed in conversation with you, and to 
which you did not in the least object, although you were invited to dis- 
cuss in freely. 

Whilst writing the above, I received your letter of this date, written at 
Fort Mitchell. You charge me with harshness. I have, certainly, in 
previous letters, complained heavily of you, as in the beginning of this, 
and have, in every instance, I think, given the grounds of those com- 
plaints. The facts stated by me, I think, bear the construction that I have 
placed upon them ; and I have infinitely regretted the existence of those 
facts. 

. You are mistaken in supposing that I upbraided you for asking for 
small supplies of rations and forage for your troops. I regretted the 
scarcity of our resources in such supplies, and apprehended a scarcity 
bordering on starvation, for a few days. Fortunately, eighty thousand 
rations have arrived at Fort Mitchell, and about twenty thousand here, 
which, yesterday, were not expected earlier than the 22d instant, perhaps 
the 23d instant ; and I am confident, when here, that we both, by calcu- 
lation, did not expect any thing from New Orleans before the 21st or 
22d. I am rejoiced, as much on your account as my own, that we both 
have an abundant supply of rations for the present, and we know that 
one hundred and fifty thousand more will soon follow. I have ordered 
twelve thousand to be landed from the steamboat at Fort Mitchell, in- 
tending to distribute the remainder of that cargo among the posts below, 
for the benefit of all the troops in the field equally. 



\ 224 ] 452 

General, in haste, I have not intended to say any thing to injure JOS- 
I have shown, in strong terms, the construction I had a right to place 
upon your acts and letters. This, I know, may appear harsh. But, on the 
other hand, allow me to say that I have the greatest and an undiminished 
confidence in your honor, your intelligence, gallantry, and capacity for 
war. You use the word friendship. I have cherished for you, for more 
than twenty-two years, a warm and sincere affection, -which I would not 
part with on any consideration. It has heen a little shaken since I saw 
you ; hut one expression of your letter goes far to recall it. I think you 
have not been attentive to my plans and instructions. In this, I certainly 
think that you have erred, and also in your failure to report fully to me. 
Throwing, for a moment, seniority aside, I ask it of your ancient connex- 
ion with me, to be more careful in those particulars in future. It will 
give me sincere delight to put down this war with you, and to give you 
all the fame which I know you arc so capable of winning. 

I presume that you have approached a little nearer to Fort Mitchell, 
for the convenience of obtaining supplies. Some corn has been sent 
thither for your use, and I understand eight hundred or a thousand bush- 
els may be had at a plantation below. 

I shall not detain you in a state of inactivity many days. The arms, 
and some ammunition, must reach this place to-morrow, and the troops 
will march down, on the Georgia side, to place themselves below the 
enemy on the 22d. I think we shall cross the river about the mouth of 
the Cow-ag-gee. It is said there are no Indians below. I wish you 
could come into line with me there ; but, as that cannot well be, without 
cros .-ing you over to the Georgia side, and thence rccrossing the river, 
I shall wish you to act downwards, as soon r-3 the Georgians are in posi- 
tion to march in the opposite direction. More particular instructions, you 
will receive from me, on this point, in a day or two. In the mean time, 
1 wish you to send a force to the foot of the Uchee shoals, which, I under- 
stand, is just about a mile above the creek of the same name, in order to 
construct at that place a shed, closed at the ends and sides, capable of 
receiving and sheltering (say) one hundred thousand rations, with about 
five thousand bushels of corn. The lumber, (boards and scantling,) as 
also nails, shall be shipped from this place to-morrow or the next day. 
The number of men to be sent for this purpose, and to remain as a guard, 
you will please designate. Axes, spades, saws, and hammers shall also 
be sent to the spot by Tuesday evening. A field-work, of slight con- 
strue! ion, will, no doubt, be necessary for the guard ; and you will give 
instructions accordingly. 

I shall have to leave not less than fifteen hundred Georgians to guard the 
left bank of this river. The Alabamians must protect the depot at the 
tool of the Uchee shoals. 

You shall hear from me again, probably, to-morrow. Let me have a 
report from you on the above subjects, and suggestions as many as you 
please. 

With renewed regard, 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Major General T. S. Jesup, 

Commanding Division Army of the South. 



453 [ 221 ] 

No. 213. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 1836. 

Sir: In my letter to you of the 19th, I requested that you would send 
a detachment to the foot of the Uchee shoals for the purposes then suted. 
I have since heard that there is another difficulty in the river, just above 
Fort Twiggs, called the Belton rock, nearly as bad as the Uchee shoals. 
I have, therefore, after consulting the best pilots belonging to the river, 
determined to make the establishment for the shelter and safety of army 
supplies, including a picket-work for the defence of the detachment, at 
Bryant's landing, nearly or quite opposite to Fort Twiggs. To this 
point, then, I have to request that, you will direct the detachment for the 
purposes mentioned in my letter of the 19th instant; but, as it is a few 
miles nearer to the supposed great body of the lower Creeks, I suggest 
the propriety of increasing the strength of the detachment. The lum- 
ber (boards and scantling) for the shed for provisions and other stores, 
together with nails, and the proper tools, will all be despatched in a 
steamboat this morning. The boat will lie at Fort Twiggs until the de- 
tachment appears on the opposite side. 

A thousand muskets will be distributed to the Georgia line this morn- 
ing, when the whole will march for Roanoke, and a point below. The 
accoutrements for those muskets, and the five hundred rifles for the un- 
armed horse, cannot be here from the Ockmulgee till to-morrow. I pro- 
pose to send them after the troops in a steamboat. Perhaps a battalion 
of horse will prefer to remain and receive their rifles here; and, in that 
case, 1 shall personally march with the battalion, at the latest, the day 
after to-morrow. 

I shall cross the Georgians, &c, into Alabama below the Indians — say 
in the vicinity of the mouth of the Cowikee. Major Pierce marched 
down the river yesterday with four companies of regulars. Major Lo- 
max will follow to-day with a like battalion. I have pushed those troops 
below, as it is feared that your movements have quickened the desire of 
the enemy to escape across the river towards Florida. I have deter- 
mined to keep the whole of the regulars in a brigade together, under the 
command of Biigadier General Fenwick. When you come into line 
with me, that brigade may make a part of your command. 

About one hundred friendly Indians will march with the Georgia line, 
under Paddy Carr. I have felt some hesitation about the employment of 
these friendly Indians. 

I shall write to you again respecting your movements. In haste. 
1 remain, with great respect and esteem, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Major General Jesup, U. S. A., 

Commanding 2d Division Army of the South, 






[ 221 j 454 

No. 214. 

[Private.} Fort Mitchell, Alabama, 

June 20, 1836. 

Dcar Sir: We have the Florida scenes enacted over again. This 
v, ar ought to have been ended a week ago. I commenced operations 
on the Alabama side, and have succeeded in tranquillizing the whole 
frontier. One principal hostile chief, Enea Mico, came in, with many 
of his people, to a camp which I had formed for the purpose of feeding 
the starving Indians preparatory to their removal. Another, Enea 
Mathla, is a prisoner in my camp; and I was in full march, with a force 
sufficient to have terminated the war in five days, when my progress was 
arrested by an order from General Scott. He has censured me in the 
most unmeasured and unwarrantable manner; and I shall be compelled 
to have the whole subject of this campaign investigated. There was 
force sufficient at Tuskegee, Columbus, and this place, one week after 
our arrival, to have put an end to this war, if it had been properly used ; 
but it was thought necessary to adopt a splendid plan of campaign upon 
paper, and make every thing bend to it. To have waited the develop- 
ments of that plan, would have left nothing to defend — bloodshed and con- 
flagration would have pervaded entire counties of Alabama. If noi ar- 
rested by General Scott, I shall apply to be relieved ; for I disapprove, 
entirely, the course he has thought proper to pursue, and believe that his 
delay has been destructive of the best interests of the country. 

Let the President see this letter; he, I am sure, will approve the 
promptness with which I have acted, when he shall be sensible that I 
have, by the movement I have made, tranquillized the whole Alabama 
frontier. 

Make my respectful compliments to Mrs. Blair and your family. 
Yours, most truly, 

THOMAS S. JESUP. 

Francis P. Blair, Esq., 

Washington city. 

Endorsement. 

[Referred to the Secretary of War; that he forthwith order General 
Scott to this place, in order that an inquiry be had into the unaccountable 
delay in prosecuting the Creek war, and the failure of the campaigns in 
Florida. Let General Jesup assume the command. A. J.] 



No. 215. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 23, 1836. 

Sir: I set out, in a few minutes, to overtake Major General Sanford. 
of this State, who marched down on the left bank of the river yesterday 
with a part of his division. A thousand muskets were distributed among 



455 [ 224 ] 

his troops the day before ; but the accoutrements and rifles coming from 
Hawkinsville will not be here in two or three days to come. Major 
General Irwin's letter to Brigadier General Wilcox, alluded to in my 
last communication, put the people towards Hawkinsville in such alarm, 
that the conductor of the wagon-train took a panic, and turned off the 
direct road, by which two or three days have been lost. I have sent an 
agent to iorce the train to this place. s 

The rifles and musket accoutrements, with many other essential 
articles expected by that train, will follow in a steamboat ; that is, the 
rifles remaining after arming a battalion of mounted men left here to re- 
ceive them. Besides this battalion, Major General Sanford has with him 
about one hundred and sixty unarmed men. 

The enemy, I have every reason to believe, is imbodied, and princi- 
pally between the Hatchychubby and the Cow-ag-gee creeks. 1 shall 
cross the troops below the latter. 

We are confident (the Governor and myself) that no Indians have yet 
escaped across the Chattahoochie towards Florida. By an intelligent 
negro, who got off from them two or three days ago, we know, however, 
that the approach of Major General Jesup from above has induced them 
to make many endeavors to get across with their families. They 
approached the river, and prepared canoes, (most of winch our 
steamboats have destroyed,) but found the guards on this side too 
strong to risk a passage and an escape. I speak of the more desper- 
ate of the lower bands. 

Colonel Henderson has just arrived with the first detachment of the 
United States marines. 

You must pardon me for not sending a return of the troops, particu- 
larly of the volunteers and draughts. There are about six hundred above 
this, guarding the passes across the river, and about eight hundred or 
a thousand were in positions below, before the march of Major General 
Sanford. The enclosed is an imperfect return showing the force he had 
remaining with him ; of which the unarmed mounted battalion left here, 
to receive rifles, makes part. I will endeavor to have something in the 
manner of a general return for you in a few days; for it has only 
been within a few days that I have had an organized staff. Major 
Ansart is yet in the rear. 

I send with this copies of several letters from Major General Jesup to 
me, and of my replies. I have no doubt that we shall, in future, act 
together with the best feelings towards each other, and in perfect har- 
mony. In haste. 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



2-24 J 456 

No. 216. 

Headquarters, Camp, Hatchychubby, 

June 20, 183G. 

Sir : I have the honor to report the operations of this corps of the 
army, from the time I assumed the command to the present time. 

I assumed the command of the troops on the Alabama frontier, on the 
9th instant. I was informed, on my arrival, that the volunteers were 
utterly averse to be placed under the command of an officer of the 
army, and I determined not to attempt to exercise command over men 
actuated by such feelings, particularly as I had no means at my disposal 
of enforcing an order if given. By the active and patriotic exertions 
of Governor Clay and Major General Patterson, all feeling subsided, and 
I entered upon my duties, apparently with the best feelings of both 
officers and men in my favor. 

I found, when I assumed the command, the frontier in a blaze, and 
so great a panic prevailing, that the entire abandonment of the country 
was apprehended. By the aid of Governor Clay, who had arrived at 
Tuskegee on the 8th, I succeeded in preparing the army for the field 
in the best manner the resources at my command would admit. To 
quiet the frontier and to induce the inhabitants to remain at their homes, 
I took measures to ascertain the disposition of the Indians, and to em- 
ploy a portion of them in service. I authorized Colonel Hogan to bring 
Opoth-le-yo-holo, the chief of the Upper Creeks, into service, with as 
many of his warriors as possible. I also authorized General Woodward 
to employ as many warriors as he could raise. He soon engaged about 
two hundred; and Opoth-le-yo-holo promised to raise five hundred. 

On the 10th instant I received information that about a hundred Indians 
had come in from EneaMico^s camp. They professed to be friendly and 
desired to join me in the field. Thirty-nine of them were armed. I 
refused to permit them to join me, and required the chiefs to disarm 
them, which was immediately done. 

In consequence of information from Pike county of several murders 
and conflagrations by the Indians, and of the danger of the inhabitants 
abandoning the country, I considered it my duty to put the troops under 
my command in motion, for the purpose of taking a position at Long's, 
on the road to Fort Mitchell, where 1 was told a large supply of forage 
was to be found. I was also told that it was on the direct route to Irwin- 
ton. My objects in taking this position were, 1st, to give protection to 
the citizens of Pike county ; 2d, to hold the hostile chief Enea Mico in 
check ;and, 3d, to collect the forage said to remain in the country. The 
two first objects were completely attained ; the latter but partially, the 
Indians having removed or destroyed a large portion of the corn. On 
arriving at Long's, I ascertained that there were two roads to Irwinton, 
and that I had passed that which I intended to take (and which I had 
been assured passed Long's) about nine or ten miles. Finding no forage, 
I was compelled to proceed or fall back. The latter would have been 
fatal. After due reflection, I determined to proceed, as the best of two 
evils, believing that I could reach Irwinton before you would be ready 
to operate, and could receive your final instructions on my way. The road 



457 L 224 J 

was so intolerably bad that I was not able to move more than from nine 
to fourteen miles a day ; and in consequence of not finding a fort at 
Long's, as I had been assured I should, and where I had intended to 
leave the baggage- wagons, I was compelled to take them on. I risked 
nothing by my movement, as I was in sufficient force to beat any body 
of Indians in the Creek country. I was on the shortest route to Irwinton, 
and so near the enemy as to compel them to remain imbodied where 
they were numerous, and to disperse where they were weak. The effect 
of the movement has been to put an end to all murders and conflagra- 
tions, and tranquillize, completely, the whole frontier of Alabama. 

I received your letter of the 16th on the 17th, being then on the 
Irwinton road, in a southwesterly direction from Fort Mitchell. I pro- 
ceeded the next day, and, on arriving in the vicinity of Enea Mathla's 
camp, I obtained upwards of a hundred head of cattle and a small supply 
of corn. In the camp, which had been but recently deserted, I received 
your letter of the 17th. I hastened to Fort Mitchell to meet you, but you 
had returned to Columbus. I found the advance of the supplies which I 
had required to be sent from New Orleans at Fort Mitchell. 

On my return to camp, I found General Patterson had left early in the 
morning, with the Indian warriors and mounted men, to make a recon- 
noissance of the country in advance. He returned in the evening, the 
Indians having made between thirty and forty prisoners, including 
negroes. 

I am now encamped about twenty-two miles from Irwinton and eigh- 
teen southwest of Fort Mitchell. The hostile Indians have dispersed, 
and, by the advice of the principal friendly chiefs, I have sent runners 
into their camps to endeavor to induce part of them to come in. I sent 
the prisoners taken yesterday to Fort Mitchell — among them is a chief, 
Kia Mothola, of some importance in his tribe. 

The impossibility of obtaining supplies on the Alabama side of the 
Creek country, in sufficient quantity to supply the army, has induced me 
to direct Major Brandt to cause the forage and subsistence collected at 
Natchitoches for General Gaines's command, to be sent to Montgomery 
or Columbus. There is a large supply of both, and it is feared a sufficient 
quantity for our purposes cannot be obtained short of that place. I am, 
through Lieutenants Chambers and Barry and Major Brandt, making every 
effort to form a depot of forage and subsistence at Tuskegee ; but I have 
little hope of succeeding. The Appalachicola and Chattahoochie are the 
only route through which we can calculate with certainty on receiving 
supplies. 

1 was not aware, until yesterday, that a letter which I wrote to you on 
the 9th instant had not been sent to you. It was accidentally put up with 
a bundle of papers, and I found it only yesterday morning ; and, from no 
notice having been taken of my letter of the 12th, I fear it has not been 
received. It was sent by a runner. I enclose a copy of it. 

Two negroes have just come into camp, who report that the Indians 
broke up in great consternation yesterday, and are on their way to 
Florida. Had I not been halted I would have given you a good account 
of them. 

As I was placed on this service by the express order of the President, 
I shall apply to him to be relieved, and shall demand a Court of Inquiry. 



[ 224 ] 458 

I shall await your orders here as to the disposition of the force under 
my command. Neither volunteers nor Indians can be long restrained. 
I have the honor to be, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

THOMAS S. JESUP, 

Major General. 
Major General W. Scott, 

Commanding the Southern army, Columbus, Georgia. 



No. 217. 
Headquarters, Second Army Corps S. A. 
Tuskegee, June 12, 1836. 

Sir : I shall move forward this morning, in order to take a position at 
Long's, on the road to Fort Mitchell, where I shall be able to communi- 
cate readily with Major General Moore. From the best information I 
can obtain I shall then be within twenty-two miles of Fort Mitchell. 

A force of several hundred men, I accidentally learned, are assembled 
in Pike county, at Watson's, on the Pensacola and Columbus road ; they 
are within two miles of the position I shall occupy ; and I yesterday sent 
a despatch to Brigadier General Moore, directing him, if not otherwise 
ordered, to take a position in advance of Irwinton, where he may join 
me by a single march. 

Opoth-le-yoholo will join me on the 16th instant, with from five to 
twelve hundred friendly Indian warriors. With that Indian force united 
to the regular and militia force, the war, I should think, may be brought 
to a close in ten or fifteen days. If, however, the hostile force should 
be larger than we apprehend, our united force will be sufficient to beat 
(them) in a month, and for my part I should prefer fighting them here 
than on the western frontier ; where, no matter whether they go off 
peaceably or are removed by force, we shall have to meet and fight them 
in less than twelve months. 

I would be glad to have a few regular troops •, if two companies can 
be spared, I desire that they join me as soon as practicable. 
I have the honor to be, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

THOMAS S. JESUP, 

Major General. 

Major General W. Scott, 

Commanding the Southern army. 



No. 218. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Ga., June 21, 1836. 

Sir: I have received, by the hands of your aid-de-camp, Lieutenant 
Lane, your letter of yesterday, and a copy of one of the 12th instant, 
the original oi which has not reached me. 



459 [ 224 J 

The letter of the 20th is an excellent military report of your opera- 
tions. I regret the conclusion. I should be sorry to lose your services 
in the campaign. I am truly of opinion that your assistance cannot fail 
to be valuable. 

I have no objection to your asking for a court of inquiry, or pursuing 
any other mode of redress against what you may esteem an injury at my 
hands. I do not think I have injured you. If I could be convinced of 
the contrary, there is no atonement, public or private, which I should 
not be ready to make. 

I send you a copy of my Order No. 15. It, of course, excuses your 
command from the establishment of the place of depot at Bryant's Land- 
ing, opposite to Fort Twiggs. This is done upon representations made 
to me by your aid-de-camp, and from a desire to prevent misconceptions 
on the part of the Alabamians. The duty I shall probably assign to the 
detachment of marines, which is the next body of regulars expected at 
this place. 

I remain, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Major General T. S. Jesup, 

Commanding, §>c. 

P. S. I have just learned that the rifles, accoutrements, &c, expected 
to-morrow from Hawkinsville, cannot arrive here before the 24th in- 
stant, the conductor of the train of wagons having heard a ridiculous re- 
port of there being Indians in the interior of Georgia, and thereupon 
changing his route, which will cause a loss of two days. I shall, the 
day after to-morrow, follow the armed troops, and leave here a body of 
unarmed horse to receive the rifles. W. S. 



No. 219. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Ga., June 23, 1836. 

Sir : I have this moment received your letter of this date. There is 
an expression in it that gives me great delight. I already feel the return 
of all my ancient affection for you. As to my confidence in your high 
honor, intelligence, and capacity for war, nothing has ever shaken that. 

You must this morning have received my letter of yesterday, and also 
my order No. 15. 

I am sorry to learn that you are a little indisposed. I trust not seri- 
ously so. If well enough, I wish you to conduct the march of the Ala- 
bamians and friendly Indians, indicated in Order No. 15. 

By what route are the Tennesseans approaching ? I did not know, 
until the arrival of your aid-de-camp, that they were in march. If I 
knew where an order could find the commander I would send instruc- 
tions to him. When will he arrive in this neighborhood? Please, if you 
know his named route, send him instructions to march upon the depot 



[ 224 460 

about to be established by the marines for the army opposite to Fort 
Twiggs, that is to say, on the right bank of this river, at the place called 
Bryant's landing. 

I shall pass by Fort Mitchell on this side of the river between the 
hours of 1 1 and 2 o'clock to-morrow. I will not ask you to wait for me, 
but should you still be there it would give me great pleasure to see you 
at the ferry for a few moments. I shall be in a great hurry. If you 
happen to be too much indisposed to come to the river, send me word, 
and J will try to cross over to you. 

In haste. Very truly yours, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
To Major General T. S. Jesup, U. S. A., 

Commanding, fyc. 



No. 220. 



Headquarters, Fort Mitchell, 

June 22, 1836. 

Sir : I arrived here yesterday, on my way to your headquarters, but 
was so ill with a severe attack of gravel that I could go no further, and 
I was in so much agony that I could not write. I, however, desired 
my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Lane, to state to you the difficulties ex- 
isting in my camp — difficulties which I fear will be attended with serious 
consequences. 

I have despatched an express to Colonel Hogan, who commands the 
Indians, directing him to make such a disposition of the warriors under 
his command as to secure the frontier above from the depredations of the 
hostile Indians who may fly before us; and I have required Opoth 
Yoholo to disarm all who left my camp contrary to his orders. I have also 
required him to disarm, and send to this place, the son-in-law of Enea 
Mathla, the leading hostile chief. 

My report, which Lieutenant Lane was directed to hand to you, was 
prepared previously to the reception of your two last letters ; had those 
letters been received the last paragraph of the report would have been 
modified. 

I desire to be permitted to place Major General Patterson in the im- 
mediate command of his own division, at least so soon as Brigadier 
General Moore shall come into line. The effect on the service will be 
beneficial — he is a man every way to be relied on. The regular troops, 
the marines, the Indian warriors, and the Tennessee volunteers now on 
their march, will form a large division. If you will allow them to form 
my division, I will cheerfully go on to the close of the campaign, and 
afford you every support in my power. General Patterson will not con- 
tinue in his present situation, nor would I, if I were in his place. He is a 
plain, sensible man, of great energy of character, and excellent military 
notions. He served with much reputation under General Jackson in the 
Creek war. I have no personal objects in view ; my only desire is to 



461 ' 224 ] 

serve the country in the best manner possible ; and if the arrangement 
which I propose cannot be made, it would be better for the service that 
I should retire than that General Patterson should. 

I am not able to ride on horseback this morning, but hope to be able 
to join the troops in the afternoon. I sent by express your last letter to 
General Patterson, with orders to perform the service required. 
I have the honor to be, General, 

Your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP, Maj. Gen. 

Major General Scott, 

Commanding the Southern Army, Columbus, Ga, 



No. 221. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, June 23, 1836. 

Sir : By another letter of this date you will perceive that 1 have been 
stopped at this place, as well to confer freely with Major General Jesup, 
as by the interesting occurrences of the last forty-eight hours. 

Permit me to say, though in a public letter, that my friend, General 
Jesup, has, by luller explanations perfectly, satisfied me that he moved 
from Tuskegee and operated in this direction upon what he deemed an 
imperious necessity ; and although I do not yet altogether concur with 
him in that conviction, I am satified that it was too strong upon him to 
have been resisted. 

Indeed, if I had received his letter of the 9th instant, which, by acci- 
dent, was never sent, or his letter of the 12th, which, by accident again, 
came to hand (a copy) on the 21st, no unkind remark on his correspond- 
ence or operations would probably have been made by me. 

For the above reasons, I earnestly request the permission of the Sec- 
retary of War to return any and every letter of mine to the Adjutant 
General, with the copies of General Jesup's letters to me, which were 
enclosed, containing any animadversion whatever on the correspondence 
or operations of that distinguished officer and commander, so that, as we 
are again friends, no trace may remain on record that we ever had the 
slightest misunderstanding with each other. I trust that the Secretary 
will allow you to oblige me in this request, which is now equally the 
wish of Major General Jesup. 

I am now further persuaded that, whether his operations were strictly 
in conformity with my plans or not, that very favorable results have fol- 
lowed those operations. 

I remain, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINF1ELD SCOTT. 

Biigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



[ 224 ] 462 

No. 222. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Ga., June 17, 1836. 

Sir : I do myself the honor to enclose herewith a copy of an order 
that I despatched the day of its date to Lieutenant Colonel Foster, at 
Baton Rouge. 

It no doubt will be interesting to you to learn the preparations made 
and making to put down the hostile Creek Indians, who are variously 
estimated at from 3,000 to 5,000 warriors. 

Nearly the whole Georgia quota of volunteers and draughted men are 
already assembled on this river, but, unfortunately, of the 3, GOO men, we 
have not as yet been able to arm and equip quite one-half. Muskets and 
rirlcs for the remainder are approaching in wagons and by water, together 
with accoutrements, but cannot be here before the 21st instant. 

Nearly all the companies that have been armed have been despatched 
to the lower counties on this side of the river, to prevent the hostile In- 
dians from escaping into Florida. Still the force sent in that direction 
has not been half as large as I could have wished. We have retained 
here but 400 armed men with about 19,000 unarmed. I have, however, 
the consolation of believing that not a single party of the enemy has 
crossed the river for Florida. 

My second object in pushing troops, as fast as armed, below, is to com- 
mence operations from a point at least as low as Irwinton, intending 
them to drive the enemy up the country, taking care not to leave a con- 
siderable body, not even a party of twenty or ten behind me. As I ad- 
vance up the country, and clear the river, it is my intention to call over a 
portion of the troops posted as guards on this side, to join in the pur- 
suit. This plan of operations I now have good reasons to hope I shall 
be able to command by the 23d instant, having engaged four steamboats 
to aid in circulating the troops and supplies, and having provided myself 
with flats for a prompt passage of the river wherever I may find ne- 
cessary. 

Six companies of regulars have already arrived from the North, and 
eight more, with a detachment of United States marines, about 450 
strong, may be expected in few days, but all cannot be up before the 
commencement of active actions. 

Of the force of Alabama assembled below and on the other side of 
the Creek country, I have no official or accurate information. 1 have 
sent Major General Jesup, of the United States army, to Governor 
Clay, who was recently at Tuskegee, 43 miles only west of this place, 
to muster into service the Alabamians, and to take upon himself, under 
my orders, the direction of the war in that quarter ; but I cannot learn 
that the Alabamians have consented to come under the laws and author- 
ity of the United States. I only know that there was some difficulty 
on this point up to the 8th instant, and I have no later intelligence from 
Major General Jesup. As to Governor Clay, he has not answered the 
letter from Governor Schley, who is here, nor condescended to acknowl- 
edge two letters from me of the same date, (May 31st,) in which we 
requested that no offensive movement should be made on that side until 



463 [ 224 ] 

the Georgians and the United States troops should be ready to co-ope- 
rate. In the mean time, it is known that Brigadier General Moore, of 
Alabama, with about 1,000 men, has moved from Irwinton upon the 
enemy; and it is reported that the remainder of the forces of the same 
State have within a few days commenced offensive operations. I have 
ordered Major General Jesup, if in command, to stop those movements 
till the 23d, and have requested Brigadier General Moore, who is pre- 
sumed not to be mustered into the service of the United States, to desist 
from his premature and isolated operations. The latter, however, I have 
since heard, has been stopped by other causes at about 15 miles above 
Irwinton. This is all the information I have at present the power to 
give your Excellency. The expresses of Major General Jesup, since the 
8th instant, have probably been cut off by the enemy. Our supplies of 
subsistence in a few days will be ample. 

For your operations in Florida it is probable that you may look for re- 
inforcements from this quarter after the termination of the Creek war. 
I am sorry to inform you that not a Georgian will consent to march in 
that direction. Before I had received an intimation that reinforcements 
would be expected in Florida, many companies refused to be mustered 
into service till the Governor assured them that, as the whole quota of 
Georgia was expressly called into service for the Creek war, they could 
not be sent into Florida, unless the Creeks fled in that direction. 

I shall be happy, as leisure may offer, to keep you advised of every 
event in this quarter that may be interesting to your Excellency. 
I have the honor to remain, 
With great respect, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

To his Excellency R. K. Call, 

Governor of Florida. 



No. 223. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 20, 1836. 

Sir : It is probable that the 100,000 rations shipped from Georgetown, 
D. C, to Darien, to be accompanied thence by an agent to Macon, may 
now be beyond your control, that is, already beyond Darien. They can 
hardly be wanted here, as I had previously caused about 100,000 rations 
from Savannah to take the same route, and about 70,000 have just arri- 
ved from New Orleans, to be followed by 180,000 more. Still, if the 
100,000 rations have passed Darien, they must come to Macon or Haw- 
kinsville below, and I may have occasion for them in whole or in part. 
But General Gibson, in his letter to me of the 7th, mentions another 
100,000 rations, shipped from New York to Charleston, which he pre- 
sumes will take the same route. These I wish stopped. The waters of the 
Altamaha and Ockmulgee are falling rapidly, and the expense of trans- 
porting from Hawkinsville to this place (110 miles) very great. Be- 



[ 224 J 464 

sides the 250,000 rations arrived and expected from New Orleans, on 
this river, a large number has been ordered to Montgomery, on the other 
side of the Creek country. 

With respect, your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
This letter is written in triplicate to Lieutenants L'Engle, Dimmock, 
and Mackay. W. S. 



No. 224. 

Hawkinsville, Georgia, 

June 22, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to inform you that the steamboat Comet arrived 
the day before yesterday, having in tow a boat partly loaded with United 
States stores. 

The remainder of the howitzer-carriage has arrived, and the gun, 
together with ammunition and quartermaster's stores, provisions, &c. 

Enclosed you will receive a list of what I have put in four wagons 
here now. This evening I expect wagons enough to make up a train of 
nine and a team for the howitzer ; so all will be able to start by evening. 
or at farthest next morning. 

I will forward, by this train, all the ammunition, hospital stores, the 
most important of the quartermaster's stores, and some clothing. 

Seventeen wagons are expected in a day or two from Augusta, and the 
teamsters, arrived last night, state that nine wagons are on their way from 
Columbus. A few more can be obtained in this vicinity. 
I have the honor to be, sir, 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, 

Lieut. A. A. Quar termors. 
Major E. Kiirby, 

Paymaster and A. A. Adj. General 

Army of the South, Columbus, Ga. 

List of stores turned over for transportation to Columbus, Georgia, by 
Lieutenant Heintzelman, U. S. army, viz : 

16 boxes musket ball and buck-shot cartridges, 2,160 each, 
2 boxes buckshot cartridges, 1,680 each. 
8 kegs cartridges, m. b. and b. shot, 900 each. 
1 box rille cartridges, 11 to 1,200. 

1 cask, (supposed to be ordnance stores.) 

2 boxes, do do. 

3 boxes howitzer canister shot, 10 each. 
5 kegs howitzer cartridges, 45 each. 

1 box artillery equipments. 

1 box fuzes 

1 box laboratory tools. 

3 boxes small-arms. 



465 



[ 224 ] 



4 boxes hospital stores. 
7^ boxes telling axes. 

3 boxes broad axes. 
35 common tents. 
21 wall tents. 
13 flies for wall tents. 

5 boxes camp-kettles. 

1 24-pounder howitzer, with implements. 

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, 

Lt. and A. A. Qr. Mast. 
Hawkinsville, Ga., June 21, 1836. 

P. S. In addition to the above are 100 howitzers, 6 boxes howitzer 
canister shot, &c. I have no invoice of the ordnance stores. S. P. H. 



No. 225. 

War Department, 

June 20, 1836. 

Sir : Your letter of the 12th instant to the Adjutant General has been 
laid before the President. 

I am instructed by the President to inform you that he cannot but hope 
that the well known patriotism of the Governor and citizens of Alabama 
will prevent a resort to so dangerous a measure as that of withholding the 
militia from the service of the United States, during a period of openhos- 
tilities, and when it has become essentially necessary for the protection 
of the frontiers that the General Government should take the direction of 
the operations necessary to reduce the hostile Creek Indians. 

Should, however, the President be disappointed in his just expectations, 
and should the militia of the State of Alabama not have been mustered 
into the service of the United States, agreeably to the requisition of the 
Department, you wiil immediately stop all expenditures and supplies, of 
every kind whatever, on the part of the United States, for such militia ; 
and you will, without delay, give instructions to this effect to the disbursing 
and issuing officers of the United States in that quarter. 

Should this course become necessary, you will be pleased to commu- 
nicate a copy of these instructions to the Governor of Alabama. 

Very respectfully, &c, 

LEWIS CASS. 

Major General Scott, 

Fort Mitchell, Alabama. 



No. 226. 

War Department, 

June 20, 1836. 

Sir: I presume Major General Jesup communicated to you a copy of 
my letter to him of the 25th ultimo. Lest, however, he should not have 
done this, a copy of it is herewith enclosed. 
30 



[ 224 ] 4G6 

By a letter just received from Governor Cannon, it appears that the 
western brigade of mounted men will rendezvous at Fayetteville on the 
1st of July. They will be armed and equipped from the State arsenal, 
and will proceed, I presume, without delay, to report themselves to you. 

Brigadier General Clinch has resigned his commission in the army, and, 
by direction of the President, the. command of the regular forces and mi- 
litia serving in Florida has been assigned to Governor Call. It was hoped 
that a body of volunteers, under the recent act of Congress, might have 
been raised in that Territory ; and Governor Call was requested to raise 
a brigade amounting to 1,000 men. I am apprehensive, however, by in- 
formation received from him, that he will not be able to raise this force, 
in that event, it will be absolutely necessary that some other aid should 
be afforded for the defence of Florida ; and, as it appears in your letter of 
the 12th instant to the Adjutant General, that there is no probability that 
any portion of the Georgia or Alabama troops will consent to serve in 
Florida, resort must be had to the West Tennessee brigade. You will 
please to direct at least one thousand of them to proceed without delay, 
and report themselves to Governor Call. If necessary, you will cause 
them to be met on the road with this information, in order that they may 
be able to take the nearest route to their destination. 1 will thank you 
to communicate freely with Governor Call on the subject of your own 
operations and his. Should you find, however, by communicating with 
Governor Call, that he has succeeded in raising such a force as he deems 
adequate to the defence of the Territory, you will then stop the western 
Tennessee troops, and employ them as you deem proper, or cause them 
to be discharged. 

I have to request that one or more of the steamboats authorized to be 
employed, may be placed under the direction of Governor Call, so as to 
ply in the w r aters of Florida, if you can spare them. I presume that, as 
soon as those expected from New Orleans arrive, you will be able to de- 
tach some of them to his aid. 

Very respectfully, 

LEWIS CASS. 

Major General Scott, 

Fort Mitchell, Alabama. 



No. 227. 



War Department, 

June 24, 1836. 

Sir: I have received your letter of the 14th instant; and I received, 
some time since, your letter of the 30th of April to the Adjutant General, 
suggesting the adoption of such measures as have occurred to you pre- 
paratory to operations against the Seminole Indians in the autumn. 

As Governor Call has been allowed, upon his suggestion, to conduct an 
expedition against the Indians during the summer, it would not be proper 
for this Department to carry into effect any arrangements looking to a 
campaign in the fall, until it is ascertained that the state of things will re- 



467 [ 224 ] 

quire that measure. The whole matter has, therefore, been committed 
to Governor Call, with full authority to make such preparations as may 
be necessary for a vigorous prosecution of operations against the Indians 
in the autumn, the moment he finds that such a course will be required. 
I shall state to the proper committee the difficulties that are now ex- 
perienced in the enlistment of men, in the hope that some arrangements 
will be adopted to obviate them. 

Very respectfully, &c. 

LEWIS CASS. 
Major General Scott, 

Columbus, Georgia. 



No. 228. 



Headquarters, mouth of the Cowaggee, 

South Alabama Brigade, June 25, 1836. 

Sir: I received your communication dated Roanoke. June 25,1836, 
in which you express some doubts as to the position I hold in the service. 
In answer, I have to inform you that I was ordered into service by the 
Governor of Alabama, and blank-rolls furnished by his E\c°!leucy to have 
the troops enrolled into the service of the United States ; which rolls have 
been filled agreeable to orders. I was instructed, at the same time, to 
obey the orders of Major General Patterson or General Jesup — and that 
General Winfield Scott would give general direction to the war. I have 
received orders from both Generals Patterson and Jesup, with discretion- 
ary power — all which I have endeavored to comply with. A return of 
strength and condition has been made to the Governor, to Geueral Pat- 
terson, and General Jesup. I was furnished with, arm' to a certain ex- 
tent from the arsenal at Mount Vernon, Alabama. T strength of my 
command, at this time, is about 1,300 privates, of which six hundred are 
mounted infantry. Since my arrival at Irwinton I have occupied a point, 
with a detachment, on the frontier of Pike county ; a detachment at Ir- 
winton : with the main body of my iorcc I have occupied different posi- 
tions, viz: Irwinton; Cowaggee fort, 12 miles from the river; Fort Bar- 
bour, 15 miles from Irwinton; and have visited High Log town; burnt 
sixty or seventy houses at that place ; passed over the south, middle, and 
north branches of the Cowaggee ; encamped 24 hours on the Llatchy- 
chubby — there was sign of the Indians having made a pr "ipitate retreat 
from their houses. I am now at the mouth of the Cowaggee, and have 
just learned from a party of my scouts, that a part of your army is at pres- 
ent in position on the upper side of the creek, about two miles distant. 
I send this letter to the commanding officer of the detachment, with a re- 
quest that he will forward it immediately to you. I will again remark 
that 1 have visited High Log town, burnt the houses, and scoured the 
creek (Hatchychubby ) for eight or ten miles up and down — crossed 
all the branches of the Cowaggee, and entered their folks. Few Indians 
were seen. My advance guard fired upon some on the north prong of 



[ 224 ] 468 

the Cowaggee. A detachment of my troops arrested and made prisoners of 
300 Eufaula Indians, 200 of whom were warriors, and five chiefs, Elky- 
hago, FJartis-micco, Tustinuggee-hago, &c. Among them were the two 
Indians who were identified as the murderers of the Watsons, in Pike 
county. These Indians were delivered over to Walker, by the order of 
General Jesup. I think it would he nothing but right that the Indians 
thus identified should be delivered up to the civil authorities of Pike 
county. 

Your most obedient servant, 

JOHN W. MOORE, 
Brig^r GenH command' g Alabama volunteers. 
Major General Winfield Scott, 

Commanding army of the South. 



No. 229. 



Headquarters, Army of the South,. 

Columbus, Georgia, Jane 16, 1836. 
Orders No. 8. 

All the troops of the Georgia line will hold themselves in readiness io 
take the field the moment the arms and ammunition, now daily expected, 
shall arrive. 

As an indispensable preparation, every mounted officer of every raid;, 
and every mounted man, will immediately provide himself with a wallet 
capable of carrying three days' supply of corn lor his horse. Commanding 
officers will see that this preparation be made at once. 

Haversacks are provided for all the volunteers and draughted men, 
whether mounted or on foot. To obtain them, requisitions will be made on 
the United States quartermaster at ibis place. Each man will be careful to 
mark his wallet and haversack with his name, as soon as they come into 
his hands. 

The baggage of officers and companies, at the commencement of the 
first march, must be reduced to the smallest amount. All heavy and su- 
perfluous articles will be left behind. Troops, to pursue an enemy with 
success, must move lightly ; no company, therefore, can be allowed to 
take into the enemy's country more than lour tents for officers and men. 
Commanders of every rank will look strictly to the due execution of this 
order, or the army will be rendered utterly incapable of active move- 
ments by the overwhelming weight of its baggage train. 

Light camp-kettles and mess-pans have been provided for the troops. 
Cast-iron ovens, skillets, and the like, are too heavy to be allowed to go 
into the wagons, which are principally to be loaded with ammunition and 
subsistence for men. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



469 [ 224 ] 

No. 230. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 20, 1836. 
Orders No. 1 1. 

Major General Sanford will, as fast as he can arm and equip the troops 
of his division, put them in march by detachments on this side of the 
Chattahoochie for Roanoke, and a point below, which will be given in 
time. All the regular troops which have already arrived, and which are 
daily expected, including the United States marines, will take the same 
route without delay. 

The quartermaster will furnish the necessary land transportation for 
those several detachments, including three days' subsistence in wagons. 
Besides this provision, every man will commence the march with two 
days' rations in his haversack ; and every mounted officer and mounted 
man will take corn in his wallet sufficient for his horse for two days. 

Major General Sanford will, as soon as practicable, designate two com- 
panies, in addition to the three now in Columbus, to be left for the defence 
of this city; and he will designate one other company to proceed to Fort 
Mitchell, as a part of the garrison of that place. These companies will 
all be infantry, and not mounted men. They probably will not long be 
left stationary, but, if practicable, shall have an opportunity of partici- 
pating in the events of the field. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 231 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 20, 1S3G. 
Orders No. 13. 

Colonel A. H. Kenan, one of the aids of his Excellency the Governor 
of Georgia, has been appointed the volunteer aid-de-camp of the Major 
General commanding this army. The regular aids of the latter are : 
Lieutenant T. J. Lee, of the United States 4th artillery, and Lieutenant 
W. H. Betts, of the United States 1st artillery. 

Major Ansart, of the United States 3d artillery, is appointed to act as 
inspector general. 

Any orders, whether oral or in writing, which may be communicated 
by either of those officers in the name, or by the authority of the Com- 
manding General, will be obeyed as if they were given by him in person, 
or under his own signature. 

Dr. Lawson,the senior surgeon of the United States army, is appointed 
medical director to this army. He will have the general control over all 
hospitals, and the distribution of duty among the surgeons, assistant sur- 
geons, and surgeons' mates of this army, as well as the distribution, among 
the medical officers, of medicines and hospital stores. 

WINFIELD SCOTT, 



f 224 ] 470 

No. 232. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 183G. 
Orders No. 15. 

Major General Scott has received with great satisfaction a report of the 
zeal, gallantry, and general good conduct of the Alabama troops, in their 
march through the enemy's country upon the waters of the llatchychubby, 
under the able command of Major General Jesup. 

Major General Jesup will march his forces by the best practicable route 
down to the country to a point a little below the enemy, where, in a very 
few days, he wiil come into line with the Georgia volunteers and a brigade 
of regular troops. This brigade is destined to constitute a part of his 
command. 

On the union of the forces mentioned, the whole will move up the 
country in concert against the enemy, when it is confidently hoped that 
no feeling other than a generous rivalry will be entertained by the forces 
of the different States, or between those of a State and the troops of the 
United States. The whole will be engaged in a common cause against 
a common enemy, whom all must be equally desirous to punish and to 
crush for the innumerable atrocities which that enemy has committed. 

WINFJELD SCOTT. 



No. 233. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 22, 1836. 
Orders No. 17. 

On the arrival of the wagon-train from Hawkinsville, Major Alford's 
battalion of mounted volunteers will receive the number of rifles with 
flasks necessary to arm it. 

The remainder of the rifles, with their flasks, &c, together with thir- 
teen hundred musket accoutrements, two hundred camp-kettles, a hospital 
tent, four wall-tents with poles and pins, live thousand rifle flints, twelve 
thousand musket flints, kegs of rifle powder, and all the musket, 

cartridges that can be furnished by the ordnance officer here, will be put 
on board the steamboat Reindeer, and instantly despatched to overtake 
the army at or near Roanoke. 

There will be likewise shipped on board the same boat, which will 
take two of the new flats in tow, one ferry-rope, and as much corn and 
other essential supplies as will complete her load. The remainder of the 
corn collected here will be shipped in other boats, and sent to the same 
destination. 

The unarmed troops stationed on the river above, will be armed out 
of the next supply of muskets and rifles which may arrive at this place. 
The muskets will be accompanied by accoutrements, and a suitable num- 
ber of cartridges. 

By order of Major General Scott : 

THOMAS J. LEE, 
Lieutenant and Aid-de-camp. 



471 [ 224 ] 

No. 234. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, July 6, 1836. 
Orders No. 27. 

Under orders already given, Major Erving's battalion of the United 
States artillery will take up a good position, (with reference to health, 
wood, and water, ) at or near Adams's or Elliot's stand, about twelve miles 
from Columbus, and the battalion of United States artillery under the 
command of Major Whiting, will occupy a position at or near McClellan's, 
or Caswell's, about fourteen miles from Tuskegee. 

The objects of these positions are, to open and hold secure the com- 
munication by mail on the great post road from Columbus to the West. 

Both battalions will remain under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 
Brooks, and each will daily send out patrols to the distance of some miles, 
both ways, on the post road. They will take subsistence with them, as 
follows: Major Erving's battalion for eight, and Major Whiting's for ten 
days. 

Captain Garmany's company of mounted volunteers will march by the 
great post road from Columbus for Tuskegee on the 8th instant. Each 
man will take on his horse subsistence and corn for three days. On his 
return march from Tuskegee, he will find similar supplies at McClellan's 
to last his company back to Columbus, and which supplies will be sent 
in advance by the United States quartermaster and commissary at this 
place. The same company will repeat the same tour, after resting two 
days at Columbus, taking care to report, in going and returning, every 
thing they may observe at all interesting to the service, to the command- 
ers at the two ends of the route, and at the two intermediate posts. 

By order of Major General Scott: 

A. H. KENAN, 
Colonel and Aid-de-camp. 



No. 235. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, July 6, 1836. 
Orders No. 28. 

The second regiment of Georgia foot volunteers, under Colonel Wil- 
liamson, will be immediately mustered for an honorable discharge from 
the service of the United States, by the acting inspector general of the 
army, Major Ansart. The companies will be paid off in succession, as 
fast as mustered, or as fast as practicable, by Paymaster Major Randall. 
The officers of every grade will lend such assistance in writing to Majors 
Ansart and Randall as will facilitate the discharge and payment. 

The commanding General hopes to be able, in a few days, to discharge 
the other regiments of volunteer infantry of the Georgia line, and, at a 
period a little later, to begin the discharge of the mounted troops. But 
he can give no pledge to that effect, and he is sure that no patriotic 



[ 224 ] 472 

Georgian will murmur at any little delay which may be dictated by the 
high considerations of public safety and public good. 

Paymaster Major Muhlenberg will report himself to Major General 
Jesup for duty, in the pay department. 

Colonel Williamson's regiment will, upon being discharged, turn over 
to the United States quartermaster, and the United States ordnance offi- 
cer, all the public property in its possession. 

By order of Major General Scott : 

FELIX ANSART, 
Acting Inspector General. 



No. 236. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, June 24, 1836. 

Sir : I left Columbus yesterday with a small escort, ( forty mounted men, ) 
now eight miles below, which I shall overtake this morning, and proceed 
rapidly to the point of crossing the Georgia line, and some regulars who 
have preceded me two or three days, to this side of the river. I had 
arranged a meeting with Major General Jesup, who has been here three 
days, at the ferry, a mile and a half from this fort, but missed the turn- 
off road, and had got five miles below, when I received despatches of 
importance ; turned back, met him, and was induced to come here for 
the night. Copies of the letters contained in that despatch will be found 
enclosed. 

General Jesup and many of the officers with him consider the war as 
mainly over. They estimate that there only remain out some one hun- 
dred and fifty decidedly hostile warriors, under the noted and atrocious 
leader Jim Henry, besides the party of Neomico, who have for some 
time stood fast in the\r camp, in a state of doubtful inactivity or neutral- 
ity. They will probably in a short time unconditionally surrender them- 
selves. They are nearer to Tuskegec than to the Chattahoochie. 

The numbers of the hostile parties yet to be compelled to surrender 
or to be beaten, are, however, differently estimated by others. Captain 
Page, and some other well-informed persons in Indian affairs, in this 
quarter, think that there may yet be outstanding as many as one thousand 
hostile warriors. As the number, whose hostility was well known a lew 
weeks ago, was certainly as great as two thousand five hundred, if not 
three thousand, and as not more than eight hundred or nine hundred are 
known to have surrendered themselves here and at Tuskegee, (not 
reckoning the principal part of Neomico's band mentioned above, and 
which may amount to six hundred or seven hundred,) there must be re- 
maining about one thousand who are yet to come in or to be subdued. 
Of the three hundred and ten who, the day before yesterday, voluntarily 
gave themselves up to Major General Patterson and Colonel Hogan, both 
of this State, at the two camps some twenty-odd miles southeast of this 
place, and who were yesterday put under a strong escort of Alabamians 
and friendly Indians, to be brought here, it is thought that not less than 



473 [ 224 ] 

eighty escaped on the wa£. At the time of surrender, there were about 
that number of warriors more than there were arms. It is now believed 
by Major General Jesup and others, that these warriors concealed their 
arms before the surrender; and their object in coming in was to get in- 
formation and then to escape. It is admitted by the prisoners themselves, 
that before coming in, they sold or gave to the hostile parties still out all 
their powder and lead. These hostile parties, whatever their numbers, 
are admitted to be among the most desperate of the nation. They are 
known to be now between the Hatchychubby and Cowaggee creeks ; 
principally on the waters and in the swamps of the latter. They still 
cherish the hope of escaping to Florida, and must give us a great deal of 
trouble to capture, if they do not voluntarily come in. I think, with the 
measures already adopted and in contemplation for guarding the river, 
it will be impossible for them to escape to Florida. 

The Georgia line, and two battalions of regulars, already below, will 
still be crossed as I have heretofore contemplated, below the Cowaggee; 
that is, below the enemy, to scour the country upwards, whilst General 
Jesup moves with his forces in the opposite direction. No time will be 
lost in putting this combined movement in execution. The flats, for 
crossing the river, will pass down to-day. 

I am only restrained, since recent events, from discharging a part of 
the Georgia line, (say six or seven companies of horse, left at Columbus 
without arms,) from the fear of giving offence to brave and patriotic men 
who have come a great distance to seek an opportunity of distinction. 
They moreover may be useful in guarding the left bank of the river, 
whilst operations are going on on the right ; and if the corn expected 
daily from New Orleans should arrive, not sweated, I shall have no dif- 
ficulty in feeding horses. On this point I shall be better able to decide 
in a day or two, and after consulting his Excellency Governor Schley, 
still at Columbus, whose judgment and dispositions are worthy of all 
respect. 

General Jesup has received, through Major Brandt, at Montgomery, 
news of the approach of a body of Tennessee horse ; but he does not 
know precisely by what route. I shall desire the General to write to the 
commander of the Tennesseans, through Major Brandt, who may have 
received later and more precise information of the position of those 
troops. I would prefer to stop them ; but, if they are near us, measures 
must be taken for their reception and subsistence. 
I remain, with high respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFJELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier Gen. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 

P. S. — The movements of Major General Jesup, the strong guards 
placed on the river below, rendering an escape towards Florida hopeless, 
and the large assemblage of troops all around the Creek country, showing 
that their early subjugation was inevitable, has caused the early surrender 
of the hostile parties who have come in. Besides those who gave them- 
selves up to the Alabamians and friendly Indians, between fifty and 



f 224 ] 474 

seventy came in to this place previously, without any escort. The num- 
ber of warriors who are now in confinement here, is a little more than 
three hundred. There are a greater number of their women and chil- 
dren. I cannot get an exact return of their numbers, ages, and sexes. 

W. S. 



No. 237. 

Headquarters, Fort Mitchell, 

June 23, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to enclose copies of reports from Major General 
Patterson and Captain Parrott, by which you will observe that little re- 
mains to be done. Jim Henty is still out with about one hundred and 
fifty warriors, but my Indian warriors, who have halted, and await my 
orders at the Big spring, say they can take him. I have just received 
information that a Seminole chief, with a number of his warriors, is with 
Henry — the information comes from a negro taken last night. 
I have the honor to be, General, 

Your obedient servant, 

THOMAS S. JESUP, 

Major General commanding. 
Major General Scott, 

Commanding Southern army on the march. 



No. 238. 

Camp, near Hatchychubby, 

June 22, 183G. 

Sir : I have the pleasure to inform your that the hostile Indians, with 
the exception of a part of the Ilitchitees, and a small party of the Uchees, 
under Jim Henry, have all come into camp and surrendered themselves 
unconditionally as prisoners. Their number, including women and chil- 
dren, is about eight hundred to one thousand. It is stated by the prisoners 
that the Hitchitees have gone to Fort Mitchell, for which place I shall 
march with my command, together with the prisoners, on to-morrow 
morning. 

B. PATTERSON, 
Major General commanding. 
Major General Jesup, 

Fort Mitchell. 



No. 239. 



Headquarters, 2d Army Corps of the Southern Army, 

Camp on the Halchy chubby* June 22, 183G. 

General : Soon after your departure yesterday, the prisoners whom 
you had despatched the day before, to the hostile camps, returned. 



475 \ 224 | 

They brought with them a few of the hostile party; and their object ap- 
peared to be to understand fully the terms on which the hostile Indians, 
generally, would be received. General Patterson repeated to them 
what had been said by yourself — that they must surrender their arms 
and submit unconditionally, and that justice should be dealt out to them. 
Those who came in yesterday, represented the Uchee, Hitchitee and Che- 
haw towns. They stated the Uchee warriors to be 200 ; and the Che- 
haw and Hitchitee*, 60 each ; making 320 in all, and that these composed 
the great body of the hostile Indians. 

To-day nearly all of the Uchees have come in, as well as some of the 
Hitchitees, and many of the Chehaws. The Uchees arc the most numer- 
ous and warlike of the enemy. We have reports that several of the hos- 
tiles have gone to Echa Hadge camp, and Fort Mitchell, rather than 
surrender here. Two have been captured to-day by Opoth Yoholo's In- 
dians, and sent to this camp. General Patterson will march from Fort 
Mitchell very early in the morning. 

There are a great many Indian women and children, and many negroes 
in camp, who have come in with the hostile Indians. It is expected here, 
from a hasty examination, that 250 Uchees and 54 Hitchitees and Che- 
haws, capable of bearing arms, have surrendered. These are the num- 
bers — very nearly several hundred women and children and about 60 
negroes have accompanied them. The best informed in camp consider 
this a finishing to the war. 

With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. P. PARROTT, 
Captain and acting Adj. Gen. 

To Major General Jesup, 

Commanding, fyc. 



No. 240. 

Headquarters, Fort Mitchell, 

June 25, 1836. 

Sir: In obedience to your instructions, and the command of the Pres- 
ident, I departed from Washington for this frontier on the 22d of May, 
to take command of the army, and the direction of the operations against 
the Creek Indians. At Augusta, Georgia, I found Major General Scott, 
on his way to the same point, and for the same purpose. We proceeded 
in company, to Columbus, Georgia, where Major General Scott estab- 
lished his headquarters, and assumed the command of the army. He 
ordered me to proceed to the western frontier of the Creek country, and 
assume the command of the troops assembling in Alabama. The com- 
munication between Columbus and Tuskegee being in the possession of 
the enemy, and commanded by one of his hostile camps, an escort was 
required to accompany me through. 

On the 4th instant I set out, accompanied by about 120 mounted men, 
and dashed directly through the hostile country, passing within three 



t 224 ] 476 

miles of Neah Mico's camp, where there were several hundred warriors 
assembled. I arrived at Tuskegee on the evening of the 5th instant, 
where I found Major General Patterson, of the Alabama militia in 
command of about seven hundred volunteers and militia. On the 
7th I departed for Montgomery, to confer with his Excellency Gov- 
ernor Clay. I was so fortunate as to meet the Governor at Line creek, 
and returned with him on the 8th. On the 9th I assumed the command 
of the frontier. At this time a general panic pervaded the whole coun- 
try : the Indians were plundering, murdering, and burning, in all direc- 
tions ; and there seemed to me to be great danger of several of the fron- 
tier counties breaking up entirely, unless some decisive movements were 
made. I determined to move forward to the vicinity of Neah Mico's 
camp, to hold it in check to cover the frontier of Pike county, and to 
obtain a supply of corn for the horses of the mounted men. Major Gen- 
eral Patterson had but about 720 men disposable, after furnishing a suffi- 
cient garrison to protect the depot and the inhabitants at Tuskegee ; 
but I had previously held councils with the Indian chiefs Opoth Yoholo, 
Jim Boy, Tucabatche Hadjo, and others, who I understood to be favora- 
ble to our cause, and had authorized Captain William Walker, formerly 
an officer of the army, and General Woodward, of Tuskegee, and Col- 
onel John B. Hogan, inspector general of the Alabama volunteers, to 
raise and bring into service, from one to two thousand Indian warriors. 
I advanced into the Indian country on the 12th and proceeded about five 
miles. On the 13th I advanced to Stone's, on the old Federal road, 
and on the 14th to Long's, the Indian chiefs Jim Boy and Tuckabatche 
Hadjo having joined during the march, with about four hundred and fifty 
Indian warriors. Not finding a supply of corn at Long's, as I had been 
induced to believe I should, I determined to proceed direct to Irwinton, the 
point indicated by General Scott, as that whence operations should com- 
mence. I moved forward on the 1 5th, to the Big Spring, and being 
then among the hostile Indians, expected an attack during the march; 
but the conduct and countenance of both volunteers and Indian warriors 
were such as to give me no apprehension of the result, should the 
enemy venture to dispute the ground. About one o'clock, the advance 
of the army, under General Woodward, succeeded in capturing Enea 
Mathla, the principal and most determined of the hostile chiefs. I en- 
camped at the Big Spring, and having received information there that 
the camp of Enea Mathla was directly on our route, the next day was 
spent at the Spring, waiting the arrival of five companies of mounted 
men, then on their march and reported to be near. 

On the morning of the 17th I moved forward (the five companies not 
having come up) and encamped on the waters of the Hatchy chubby, 
on the Irwinton road, about eight or nine miles from Enea Mathla's camp. 
Here the Indian chief Opoth Yoholo joined me, with 1,150 warri- 
ors. On the evening of this day, I received a despatch from General 
Scott, censuring me for my movement, and directing me to stop all offen- 
sive movements. In the situation in which I then found myself, to com- 
ply with those instructions would have been fatal. I had fifteen hundred 
friendly warriors, who, had I halted, would have become dissatisfied, 
would have lost all confidence in me, and would have left me. The vol- 
unteers were animated by the most admirable spirit ; to have checked 
them at that moment would have been productive of the greatest disap- 



477 [ 224 ] 

pointment, and would have depressed their morale, if had not elevated 
that of the enemy. As General Scott was necessarily unacquainted with 
the circumstances under which I was placed, I felt it to he my duty to 
disregard the order to " stop all offensive movements." I accordingly 
put the army in motion on the morning of the 18th, my force being in- 
creased to 2.300 men, including the Indian warriors, and advanced to 
the ford of the Hatchychubby — the enemy fled before me, and in the 
afternoon I took possession of Enea Mathla's camp, and obtained there, 
and in the vicinity, a small supply of corn and about a hundred head of 
cattle. Whilst in the enemy's camp I received a second peremptory 
order from General Scott to halt and " encamp" my " forces somewhere 
in the neighborhood of Fort Mitchell, until further orders." My dispo- 
sitions at the time I received General Scott's order, were such that I 
could not have failed to bring the enemy to action in twenty-four hours; 
and victory was certain. I however did not feel myself at liberty to dis- 
obey the second order, but directed Major General Patterson to encamp 
the troops, and assume the command of them ; and I proceeded to Fort 
Mitchell to confer with General Scott, and to obtain his sanction to the 
prosecution of the operations which I had commenced. He had return- 
ed to Columbus before I arrived at Fort Mitchell, and I was compelled 
to go to camp without having had an interview with him. 

On my return to camp, I found that General Patterson, with the mount- 
ed men of his division, had made an excursion down the north side of 
the Hatchychubby, and the Indian warriors had been thrown below, to 
scour the country on the south side. The latter succeeded in capturing 
several Indians, among them a principal chief. By the advice of the 
friendly Indian chiefs, I sent out messengers on the morning of the 20th 
to advise the hostile Indians to surrender. On the 21st, before they 
returned, I left the army, and came to this place to see General Scott, and 
become acquainted with his future plans. On the 22d the messengers 
returned to camp, and upwards of three hundred warriors and five hun- 
dred and fifty women and children surrendered prisoners, and were sent 
hither by General Patterson, on the 23d, accompanied by six companies 
of mounted men. I ordered General Patterson to this post with the 
troops of his division, and the Indian warriors under Jim Boy, where he 
arrived on the evening of the 24th. — Opoth Yoholo with his warriors 
having been previously ordered to the Big Spring. On the 24th having 
received information that one of the hostile chiefs was between the 
mouth of the Uchee creek and Hatchychubby, below this post, deter- 
mined to make a reconnoissance of the country in that direction. Ac- 
cordingly I proceeded with six companies of mounted men, and about 
sixty Indian warriors under Jim Boy. I scoured the country for many 
miles, and a part of my force fell in with a party of the enemy, and 
captured upwards of thirty warriors, which, with the women and children 
taken at the same time, amounted to one hundred and thirteen. 

I consider the war at an end. My operations have broken the power 
of the hostile chiefs, dissolved their formidable confederacy, and given 
entire security to the country. The hostile Indians that have not sur- 
rendered, are wandering without concert or object, and I believe only 
wait a favorable opportunity to come in. 

I have been severely censured by General Scott for my movements, 



f 224 J 478 

but I feel that I have clone my duty to the best of my abilities : to 
have acted otherwise would have doubled the Indian force against us, 
and have cause the destruction of the fairest portion of Alabama. 

To disregard the positive order of a military superior is, I am aware, a 
high military offence ; but, in the circumstances in which I found myself 
surrounded, the best interests of my country required of me prompt and 
decisive action. I have acted on my own responsibility, and am willing 
to meet the consequences; and whatsoever of censure may be east 
upon me, I never can regret what I have done. I desire that this com- 
munication be laid before the President, that my motives as well as my 
acts may be understood by him ; and I beg you to assure him that, what- 
ever his decision in my case maybe, I shall be satisfied. I would infin- 
itely prefer to lose my commission for what I have done, than to receive 
the highest honors of the country, had I remained inactive, and permitted 
the country around me to have been devastated. 

To Major General Patterson and the officers and soldiers of his divis- 
ion, I feel deeply indebted for their kindness, liberality, and good con- 
duct. Every individual performed his duty with promptness and energy ; 
and I have never served with any body of men in whom I had greater 
confidence, or who, I am persuaded, would have given a better account 
of the enemy had he ventured to meet us in battle. 

To my acting adjutant general, Captain Parrott, and my acting 
quartermaster, Lieutenant Chambers, as well as to my aid-de-camp, 
Captain Lane, and my volunteer aids, Colonel Goldthwait and Major 
Baykin, I am under the greatest obligations for the promptness and abil- 
ity with which they have discharged their respective duties, and the 
good temper and prudence which they have on all occasions displayed 
in their intercourse with the troops. 

To the able arrangements of Governor Clay, made before my arrival, 
and to the energy and talent of Major General Patterson, and the gen- 
tlemen of his staiF, much of the success which has attended my opera- 
tions, it is but justice to say, is due. 

To Colonel Hogan, General Woodward, and Captain Walker, who 
commanded the Indian warriors, as well as to the chiefs Opoth Yoholo, 
Tucabatchee Mico, Jim Boy, and Tucabatchee Hadjo, I am under great 
obligations ; they all deserve the notice of the Government. 

The censures passed upon me by General Scott, have, I understand 
from him, been recalled, and his letters to the War Department with- 
drawn : had this not been done my personal feelings should not have 
influenced my public conduct. Having no object in view but the public 
good, I should have co-operated with him, as I shall now co-operate 
most heartily in the consumation of all his plans. But, if a single doubt 
remains on the mind of the President, or on your mind, as to the entire 
propriety and necessity of my course, I owe it to myself as well as to my 
children, to ask for an immediate investigation. 

I have the honor to be, with high consideration and respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

T. S JESUP. 
Major General. 
The Hon. Lewis Cass, 

Secretary of War, Washington City. 



479 [ 224 ] 

No. 241. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Camp Sanford, opposite to Roanoke, June 26, 1S3G. 

Sir: I have received your two letters of the 24th and 25th instant, 
and write by the return express who brought me the letters. 

I think with you it is time to seize Neo Mico and to disarm his party, 
and I also highly approve of your proposition to establish stockades on 
the post road between Columbus and Tuskegee, for the deposite of sub- 
sistence for men and horses. I shall give instructions henceforth for the 
next boat that may ascend the river to leave some rations and corn at this 
place, and to deposite one-half of the remainder at Bryant's landing, 
Colonel Henderson's post, and the other at Fort Mitchell, provided that 
the boat can ascend so high, or a boat of a smaller draught of water 
should offer for transshipment. 

I think it desirable under any circumstances, that a part of the Alaba- 
mians should be retained, say a detachment of mounted men, to escort, 
in conjunction with a portion of the regulars, the Indian prisoners as far 
as the dense settlements of Alabama, whence the Indians may be escort- 
ed to the Mississippi or Montgomery for embarkation by the regulars 
alone. The remainder of the Alabamians you may honorably discharge, 
(and their good conduct deserves it,) as soon as you may deem it prudent 
to do so, retaining the friendly Indians as auxiliaries. But the informa- 
tion received in this vicinity, and from Fort Twiggs, by express to 
day, represent the outstanding hostile Indians as not contemptible in 
number. A party of four or five hundred, including women and children, 
were, but a few days ago, between the north and middle forks of the 
Cowaggee creek ; and to day I learn, upon good evidence, that there 
was a considerable party opposite to Fort Twiggs yesterday. 

Besides the Georgia line, which of itself is sufficient to scour this 
lower country and rid it of the enemy, although his numbers were more 
numerous than estimated above, I have just learned that Brigadier 
General Moore, with some 700 or 800 troops, crossed the main Cowag- 
gee creek to-day to operate north of all the branches, or between the upper 
and middle. This is just the direction I was about to give the Georgians 
and regulars, who have crossed or will cross the Chattahoochie in the 
morning. I have written to General Moore, requesting him earnestly 
(I believe that he has not been mustered into the service of the United 
States) to recross that creek, and to extend his forces well to the west 
below the south fork. I shall probably see him in the morning. If he 
should not comply, I shall be much thwarted, and a portion of the enemy 
may escape below. 

I had yesterday undoubted evidence that some forty or sixty Indians, 
including women and children, had crossed the Chattahoochie one or two 
days before, three miles below Roanoke, notwithstanding the detachments 
posted to guard the river above and below. I immediately despatched 
two parties of horse in pursuit (the trails pointed towards Florida) and 
hope to hear good news from them in a few days. 

I should not have crossed into Alabama above the Cowaggee but 
for the certainty that I thought I had that General Moore, to whom I 



[ 224 ] 4S0 

had written, was still at or near Irwinton. All the branches of the Cow- 
aggee I have ascertained to be more difficult to pass and to scour than I 
represented to you a few days ago. 

Organize emigrating parties as soon as the contractors shall be ready 
to take charge of them, and as soon as you can furnish the proper escorts. 
The two companies of regulars under Major McClintock, and the next 
detachment, commanded by Major Dearborn, are at your disposition for 
that service. Before, however, sending off* the prisoners, I wish you to 
make inquiries of his Excellency Governor Schley, whether there be 
any individuals among them who are amenable to the penal laws of 
Georgia. If there be any such you will turn them over to the authori- 
ties of that State. 

I remain, with great, respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Major General Jesup, U. S. A. 

Commanding, fyc. 

P. S. I wish you to stop the Tennesseans, marching to take post against 
the hostile Creeks at some suitable place in respect to subsistence, to 
await further orders. W. S. 



No. 242. 

Headquarters, Fort Mitchell, 

June 28, 1S36. 

General : Having observed in the Globe of the 20th instant, an or- 
der directing all officers of the second regiment of dragoons to join their 
regiment for the recruiting service, I must ask the favor of you to repre- 
sent to the General and the Secretary of War my extreme desire that Cap- 
tain Lane be allowed to remain with me until the operations in this quarter 
be brought to a close. I consider the war over, if ordinary prudence 
and energy mark our future progress ; but there is much to be done be- 
fore the body of the Creeks be removed ; and Captain Lane has that 
acquaintance with the duties in detail, with which I am charged, that I 
could not, without great inconvenience, dispense with his services. It 
is the more necessary that he remain, as captain Parrott's services are 
required in his own department, and he necessarily leaves me in a day 
or two. 

I hope to hear from you on this subject by the return mail. 
I have the honor to be, 
Most respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP, 
Major General Commanding. 
Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General, Washington City. 



48 i f 224 J 

No. 243. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 2, 183G. 

Sir: Since my last letter I have been down the river to organize 
the service as low as Irwinton, and to put the disposable force of Geor- 
gia, after nearly doubling the guards on the left bank of this river, hand- 
somely in the held. I am now but just emerged from the creeks and 
swamps to the south and southwest. The Georgians moved in two col- 
umns, with three small battalions of United States artillery, under Ma- 
jors Pierce, Lomax, and Erving. I retained the immediate command of 
one of those columns, and gave the other to Major General Sanford. 
The two amounted to about 1,200 men. We moved with pack-horses, 
the country being so deluged with rain that no wagon could accompany 
either column. I shall be back at Roanoke to night, (by means of a 
steamboat,) where I shall receive General Sanford's report. I saw no 
recent trail of more than two or three Indians, which were directed to- 
wards this place or Tuskegee, no doubt for the purpose of surrender. 
One hostile warrior only we picked up, who declared that he was going 
in to give himself up. 

The number of hostile warriors now here in confinement is about 480, 
most of them with their families. The whole number of prisoners at 
Tuskegee, the Alabama and friendly Indian camps west of this, Major 
General Jesup is unable to give me with accuracy. He thinks there might 
have been yesterday about 350 warriors at the three places, besides wo- 
men and children, and the party of Neah Mico, 150, whom I desired 
him some days ago to cause to be disarmed. This service will probably 
be performed to day. I enclose a note from Major General Patterson to 
Major General Jesup, which shows that 100 warriors may be added to 
the foregoing number, including a noted leader, Jim Henry. 

I received yesterday a letter from Colenel Henderson, who is engaged 
in erecting a shed, &c. on this side of the river, at the head of the sum- 
mer navigation, for the reception of army supplies from New Orleans. 
It contains this paragraph : " I am led to believe that the position you 
directed my command to occupy has been productive of important re- 
sults. The day after the expedition of our two companies and part of 
Captain Love's troop, 250 of the hostile Indians, men, women, &c, be- 
longing to Jim Henry's band, surrendered to General Watson, without 
firing a gun." 

I am afraid that Colonel Henderson has written this upon an unfound- 
ed report. Fie does not state where those prisoners are, and General 
Watson has not taken them to Columbus, or we should know it here. 
The latter has a farm in the neighborhood of Colonel Henderson, re- 
sides in Columbus, and has written to no one at this place on the subject. 
The transaction, if it occured at all, took place on the 26th ultimo. 

It is now thought by the best informed,, that there cannot be in the 
Creek country more than from forty to sixty hostile warriors. Some of 
these have sent word that they will soon be here, and are probably only 
delayed by the swell in the Uchee creek, which renders it difficult to 
pass. 

31 



[ 224 ] 482 

The contractors for removing the Indians west of the Mississippi, 
having reported themselves in readiness, about 1,900, including families, 
will be put in march, under a suitable escort, as soon as the creeks shall 
have subsided. A detachment of regulars is now engaged in repairing 
the bridges across the two Uchees, on the old Federal road, to save 
time. 

A few minutes after my arrival at Roanoke, 15 miles above Irwinton, 
on the 25th ultimo, two Indian trails leading to Florida were reported to 
me, one three and a half, the <thcr one and a half miles below me, and 
respectively one and two days old. Not a minute was lost in organizing 
two detachments of horse to give pursuit. I have a note from Colonel 
Beall, who commanded one of the detachments, (three companies and 
six friendly Indians, with subsistence for four days,) from which I am 
afraid he halted at Fort Gaines, and hearing that the fugitives were kill- 
ing the inhabitants of Baker county, contented himself with sending 30 
men to their assistance, instead of marching with his whole force, about 
175 men. His note is inexplicable, and I trust I shall not find him as 
criminal as that would represent him. He was instructed specially and 
minutely, in a letter written with my own hand, never to give up the 
pursuit till stopped by starvation. I have better hopes of the other de- 
tachment, commanded by an excellent partisan, Captain Jerningon. No 
report is received from him. It was expected, however, that the two 
trails would unite and the two detachments become one. I think that 
no other party has got across the river, and such are now the numbers 
(since the Georgians got their arms) and the vigilance displayed on the 
other side, that it would seem impossible for emigrating parties to escape 
to Florida. 

I believe there has hardly been a sharp skirmish on this side of the 
river, whilst there have been many shot rencontres on the Georgia bank. 
The latter were made by the more desperate of the enemy, and in every 
instance, probably, to cover the passage of families endeavoring to emi- 
grate to Florida, or to capture the horses, provisions, &c, necessary to 
facilitate emigration. Partial successes were obtained by the enemy in 
several of those affairs. In others they were repulsed, and in all it was 
seen that, to escape with families, packs, &c. it would be extremely 
hazardous. Consequently the Hitchitces have generally sent in or 
abandoned their families, and with a few individuals of other tribes have, 
by some extraordinary neglect at and below Roanoke, succeeded in get- 
ting over the Chattahoochie. 

The general surrender, in most cases voluntary, of the enemy, may be 
attributed to many movements and arrangements on our part. It was 
known that large iorces were gathering all around the country ; the river 
was early pretty well guarded by the Georgians, aided by two well- 
manned steamers cruising up and down. One of these destroyed many 
canoes, rafts, &c. Major General Sanford crossed the bridge at Colum- 
bus, and took up his camp four miles farther early in June ; and although 
he had about 2,000 unarmed men, with but 400 armed, the enemy 
thought all Georgia was pouring into their country. About the same 
time Major General Jesup made his entry into the heart of the nation, 
with a large force of Alabamiahs and friendly Indians. This latter move- 
ment precipitated and favored a general surrender, 



483 [ 224 ] 

I shall necessarily be absent from this place, after a few minutes, to com- 
plete arrangements below, for two days. As it is the centre of corre- 
spondence and business, I shall return at the end of that time. 

Brigadier General Moore, of this State, whose basis of operations has 
been at Irwinton, is placed by my order below the South branch of the 
Cowaggee, extending himself far to the right and left. I shall instruct 
him to send a company of horse or two as far to the southwest as Pea 
river. He appears, from his movements and correspondence, to be an 
officer of much merit. His force, mostly mounted, consists of about 
1,300 men. 

I shall direct Major General Sanford to keep out small detachments on 
the branches of the Cowaggee and on the Hatchychubby, to precipi- 
tate the surrender of the small parties of the enemy yet out. General 
Jesup will take measures of a similar character on the upper parts of 
those streams which are nearer to his depots at Tuskegee, &c. 

I have twice written to the Governor of Florida in great detail. The 
copy of my last letter is herewith enclosed, and I would send a copy of 
the other but that I am separated from my books and papers. 

A copy of an order is enclosed respecting the West Tennesseans. 

I have directed Major General Jesup to post two small battalions of 
artillery (here) in positions on the post road from Columbus to Tuskegee. 
This will be done in a few days, and I have caused the agent of the Gen- 
eral Post Office to be advised of the directions. 

On my return to this place I shall open a correspondence with Briga- 
dier General Wool, and hope soon to be able to spare him the detach- 
ment of the United States marines, and some companies of Georgia and 
Alabama volunteers, should they be needed in the Cherokee country. 

General Jesup never received the Secretary's original letter to him, 
dated the 25th of May, and addressed to Milledgeville. The copy that 
I received last night was immediately shown to him. 
I have the honor to be, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General United States Army. 



No. 244. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 1, 1836. 

Sir : Major General Jesup has just turned over to me the letter of 
your Excellency to him of the 25th ultimo. 

The War Department, as I perceive by the copy of a letter to Briga- 
dier General Wool, has charged him with certain duties in the Cherokee 
country, and has placed the Tennessee troops under his command. They 
were to rendezvous at Athens on the 7th instant, and it is possible 
(though not probable) that, under the instructions of the Department, I 
may have to reinforce him from this quarter. 



f 224 ] 484 

My last information from the Cherokees (which is not recent) repre- 
sented them as inclined to.be quiet. 

In my letter to you, dated some ten or fifteen days ago, (my books 
and papers are not at hand,) I reported that his Excellency Governor 
Schley had been obliged to pledge himself to the Georgia volunteers and 
draughts now in the field, that they should not be sent to Florida, except in 
the hot pursuit of the Creeks, to induce those troops to be mustered in the 
service of the United States. Major General Jesup, who is in the imme- 
diate command of the Alabamians, informs me that he was obliged, 
under the same circumstance, to make the like pledge to the latter. 

Should I be obliged to reinforce Brigadier General Wool, I shall send 
him a portion of the regulars and some part of the Georgians from the 
upper country. The remainder of the regulars and United States ma- 
rines cannot fail to be wanted to escort the hostile Indians who have 
surrendered themselves, and to wind up the war in this quarter, until 
late in the summer. 

Of the hostile Creek warriors, we have here about four hundred and 
seventy. A part of them have been captured, but the greater number, 
seeing that they would be inevitably crushed, voluntarily surrendered. 
How many may be at Tuskegee, under like circumstances, I may not 
learn in a day or two. This war, however, is believed to be virtually 
over. Yet there are, doubtless, many small parties yet to come in, or 
to be subdued. Two, making about sixty individuals, succeeded in 
getting across the Chattahoochie, between two of our posts, at and below 
Roanoke, on the 23d and 24th ultimo. From that place, the instant that 
the trails were observed, I despatched two parties of horse in pursuit. 
Having just emerged from the woods to the southwest of this, I have 
received no report from those expeditions, but have no doubt, from the 
strength and character of the pursuing detatchments, that the fugitives 
have been overtaken and captured or killed. I have every reason to 
believe that not five other Creeks have escaped towards Florida, and 
from the means now employed it seems almost impossible for another 
individual to follow. I have more than doubled the forces on the 
Georgia bank of this river, and steamboats are daily passing up and 
down. 

I have the honor to remain, with high respect, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
His Excellency R. K. Call, 

Governor of Florida. 

P. S. I have just heard from the prisoners here, that, if the fugitives 
who crossed this river should not be overtaken, their object will be to 
take up a temporary residence in the Opeekeenokee swamp. 

2d P. S. I have this moment received a letter from the Secretary of 
War requesting me to send you one thousand of the West Tennessee 
brigade, (at least,) should you not be likely to raise a similar force in 
Florida. This is the first notice I have had of Western and Eastern 
brigades being ordered from that State. The latter is designated to act 
under General Wool. I shall immediately send orders to the Western 
corps to despatch one thousand men, by a route that I shall give them, 



485 | 224 J 

and order them to report to you for (at) Tallahassee. This brigade we 
have unofficially heard of before, and,, by my desire, Major General 
Jesup wrote to the quartermaster at Montgomery to cause it to halt, if 
coming in that direction, in some place where it could be conveniently 
subsisted, and to await further orders. 

My intention then, was to hold in reserve for events in the Creek 
and Cherokee countries. I am now satisfied that it will not be required 
in either of those quarters. 

I am also directed by the Secretary to send you one or more steam- 
boats from the three ordered to be armed and manned by the navy 
commander at Pensacola, for this river. I am inclined to believe that 
but one has been purchased at New Orleans and sent for those purposes 
to Commodore Dallas. Should she arrive here, I shall send her imme- 
diately back to you, and I beg your Excellency, if there be any other 
boat at Pensacola, to take her into the service of Florida. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 245. 

Headquarters, Army of thf South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 1, 1836. 

Sir : Major General Jesup has just turned over to me your letter of 
the 10th ultimo, which probably came to him at this place via Montgomery. 

I have now employed, partly in cruising and partly in transporting 
army supplies, four small steamboats belonging to this river, and there 
are two others, not specially hired, that bring up stores from St. 
Joseph's. 

I heard, a week ago, that a steamer purchased by the United States 
for the purpose of cruising up and down this river, had gone from New 
Orleans to Pensacola, to be armed and manned by the United States, 
under your orders. This boat may now be daily expected below, and I 
shall send her instructions (to Irwinton) for her government. The war 
against the hostile Creeks is supposed to be virtually over. Neverthe- 
less, there are several hostile parties which have not surrendered them- 
selves, and who are seeking opportunities to escape across the Chattahoo- 
chie towards Florida. The boat last mentioned will be highly useful in 
observing the river, and giving prompt intelligence to the posts on the 
Georgia side, in case any such party should succeed in crossing. 

The zeal and promptitude which have uniformly been displayed by 
yourself and officers, in co-operating with the land service, deserves a 
higher commendation than any that I could bestow. 

I shall, therefore, subscribe myself, 

With the highest respect, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Commodore A. J. Dallas, 

Commanding, &fc. 

P. S. If a second or third steamer should arrive at Pensacola, to be 
armed and manned for this river, please report them (or the one) to Gov- 
ernor Call for his orders. W. S. 



r 221 J 48G 

No. 246. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 2, 1836. 

Sir : The enclosed order is issued in conformity with express instruc- 
tions from the War Department. As Brigadier General, you may either 
accompany the detachment to Florida, or send the officer next in rank to 
command it. 

I remain, sir, respectfully, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
To the Brigadier General 

of the West Tennessee Brigade, 

expected at Montgomery. 



No. 247. 



Orders No. 22. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 2, 1836. 



A brigade of West Tennessee mounted volunteers or militia may 
soon be expected to arrive at Montgomery. It will probably be at Shel- 
by ville about the 8th instant. On its arrival at Montgomery, Major Brandt 
will muster it into the service of the United States for three months, unless 
sooner discharged. 

One thousand men of this brigade, with the proper officers, will, with- 
out delay, take up the line of march, by the best practicable route, for 
Tallahassee, in Florida, in order to place themselves under the order of 
his Excellency Governor Call. 

The remainder of the brigade will remain in position, in the neighbor- 
hood of Montgomery, until further orders. 

Before the arrival of those troops at Montgomery, Major Brandt will 
ascertain the best route to Tallahassee, so as to be able to advise the 
commander of the detachment destined to Florida, to whom he will give 
all the aid and assistance that may be required of the quartermaster's 
department. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

By command. 

Thos. J. Lee, 

Lieut. 4th U. S. ArVy, Aid-de-Camp. 



No. 248. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 4, 1836. 

Sir: I have this moment returned here from Roanoke below, where* 
I think, I have so arranged the service with Major General Sanford, of the 



487 [ 224 ] 

Georgia line, and Brigadier General Moore, at the head of an Alabama 
brigade, as to secure the remaining objects to be accomplished in those 
directions in this war. 

No official report had been received up to the time of my leaving 
Roanoke, from Colonel Beall and Captain Jernigan, who commanded 
the two detachments of horse, sent by me, on the 25th ultimo, in pursuit 
of the parties of Indians who had crossed the Chattahoochie on the 23d 
and 24th. I know, however, through respectable channels, that the two 
detachments had overtaken the Indians about the 28th, in Baker county, 
and had surrounded the latter in a large swamp. The fugitives probably 
do not exceed sixty warriors, although represented by rumor to amount 
to more than three hundred. Colonel Beall, I again hope, will give a 
good account of them. He was collecting the forces of the neighborhood 
to make sure of his game. By a singular mistake, into which I was led 
by a letter supposed to be from this officer, but which was written by 
another, I did him great injustice in my last report of events in this 
quarter. I hope soon to be able, officially, to speak of him with all the 
praise due to success. 

Parties will be continually kept scouring the Indian country to force in 
the handfulls of the enemy remaining out. Major Generals Jesup and 
Sanford, as well as Brigadier General Moore, have my instructions to that 
effect. The former, after a detention here of ten or twelve days, pro- 
ceeded last evening to the headquarters of Major General Patterson to 
the West. 

Yesterda}' a party of United States marines, a few mounted volunteers 
and friendly Indians, scoured the country between the Euchee and 
Hatchychubby thoroughly, and to the extent of about twelve miles up 
those creeks. Coming up last night in a steamboat, I learned from Colonel 
Henderson, at his camp, that sixteen women, boys, and children, were 
captured on the Chattahoochie — the warriors of the same party having 
escaped across the river, abandoning their families. I immediately sent 
off an express to give the intelligence to all the posts as low as Roanoke, 
with precise instructions for discovering the trail and pursuing. I do not 
doubt that two or three companies of horse were in motion by day-light 
this morning, in pursuit of the fugitives. 

I have not time to add more, nor have I any thing material to add, ex- 
cept that the armed steamer, the American, from Pensacola, is above, and 
that 1 shall immediately order her to Florida, to report to Governor Call, 
and that I shall, to-morrow, send off Colonel Broome, (a volunteer,) of 
the marine corps, with a communication addressed to Brigadier General 
Wool. 

With high respect, I remain 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

P. S. General Scott, who is much occupied at this moment, desires me 
to add that his objects in sending Colonel Broome to General Wool, are 
to learn the state of things in the Cherokee country, and to say to General 
Wool that, probably, the detachment of United States marines (about four 



I 224 ] 488 

hundred) and some companies of Georgia and Alabama volunteers, may 
soon be spared from this quarter, to reinforce the Cherokee army, should 
they be required. 

Most respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

A. H. KENAN. 

Aid-de-camp. 
Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



No. 249. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, July 6, 1G36* 

Sir : 1 came up from Fort Mitchell last evening, on business with his 
Excellency Governor Schley, and shall return this evening. 

I have had no report from Major General Jesup since he left Fort 
Mitchell to join the Alabamians, twenty two miles west, on the 3d instant. 

By a letter just received from Colonel Beall, I learn that he has the 
party of Indians he was sent in pursuit of, shut up in a large swamp, in 
Baker county, about one hundred and ten miles below this, and a little 
southeast of Fort Gaines. He has had several affairs with that party — 
killed nine and wounded many more. The swamp being long and deep, 
he has called for reinforcements, and I am in the act of sending off in 
two steamboats, which will probably ascend the Flint river some twenty 
or forty miles, about one hundred and sixty foot volunteers, and forty 
friendly Indians, to him. The Indians in the swamp, who may amount to 
about one hundred and fifty warriors, are supposed to have with them, 
not only nearly all the Creek slaves, but most of the blacks taken in the 
war from our people. 

I think it impossible for the hostile fugitives to escape. Below the 
swamp, towards Florida, there is a wide tract of open pine-wood country, 
and Colonel Beall will have, by to-night, about four hundred volunteer 
horse with him, besides many individual volunteers of Baker county. 

I send copies of letters addressed by me to Brigadier General Moore, 
and Lieutenant Johnson of the navy. It seems, however, that I have not 
brought with me the copy of my communication to Brigadier General 
Wool, which was despatched from this place yesterday morning. [Per- 
haps it was sent by m} r aid-de-camp with a previous letter to you ; I shall 
inquire on my return to Fort Mitchell.] 

In that letter I gave him a statement of affairs in this quarter, and said 
that I should probably be able to send him, if needed, the detachment of 
United States marines, and some companies (belonging to the upper 
country of Georgia and Alabama) of volunteers. 

I have no report from the parties of horse ordered to pursue the sixteen 



489 \ 224 ] 

hostile Creeks, who got across the Chattahoochie, on the 3d instant, 
eighteen miles below this. This party of fugitives cannot escape. 
In haste, I remain, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 



No. 250. 

Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell July 4, 1836. 

Sir : I addressed a letter to you yesterday from Roanoke, and despatched 
it by a party of Georgia horse. 

That letter was, in great haste, an answer, by anticipation, to yours of 
the 2d instant, which I had the pleasure of receiving this morning by the 
hands of Major Huger. 

If the outstanding hostile parties of Creek Indians can be captured or 
forced to come in and to surrender, in eight or ten days, (and I think they 

may by great activity on the of the Georgia and Alabama volunteers, ) 

it will give me great pleasure to have all the volunteers discharged at the 
end of that time. But little remains to be accomplished, and the mounted 
troops are the best calculated to perform what remains to be done. I 
therefore, (and I think you will concur with me,) adhere to the opinion 
expressed to you in my letter of yesterday. 

I have made many suggestions to Major Huger, which he will commu- 
nicate to you, respecting, among other things, the payment of your brigade 
on its discharge from the service. 

I remain, sir, with high respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brigadier General Moore, 

Commanding brigade Alabama volunteers. 



No. 251, 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 5, 1836. 

Sir : I should be glad to avail myself of the services of the armed 
steamer under your command, for a week or two on this river ; but, ap- 
prehending that she will be still more important to his Excellency Gov- 
ernor Call, in the prosecution of the war against the Seminole Indians, 
I have to request that you repair to St. Mark's in her, and report yourself 
to him. 



[ 224 ] 490 

In descending this river, I wish you to stop at Colonel Henderson's post, 
a few miles below this, and bring up the detachment of United States 
marines under his command, or so much of it as your boat can conven- 
iently accommodate, to Fort Mitchell. 

If, in descending this river, you should discover any party of hostile 
Creek Indians crossing, I need not say that you will do what you can to 
capture or destroy them, but I will beg you to give the promptest in- 
formation of the movement to the nearest military post, that pursuit may 
be made by land without delay. 

I do not know that any other armed steamer may be expected in this 
river from Pensacola. Should you, however, meet with one, you will 
direct her to accompany you to St. Mark's, and report her for service as 
above. If you should speak another, please let her proceed to report to 
me, or rather send to me the boat of the lightest draught of water of the 
two. She may be highly useful if here in the next two weeks. 

Wishing you a prosperous return to Florida, 

I remain, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Lieutenant Johnson, U. S. Navy, 

Commanding the armed steamer the American. 



No. 252. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 5, 1836. 

Sir : I have the honor to report, by direction of Major General Scott, 
that, owing to the position of the troops, and their having been contin- 
ually in motion, it has been impossible to obtain a correct return of the 
force under his command. 

As an approximation, there are of United States artillery, at and about 
this post, 547, and 156 of infantry, about 400 United States marines 
eight miles below, 4,155 of the Georgia line at and between Columbus 
and Roanoke, including the three companies of mounted volunteers, de- 
tached in the direction of Baker county, in this State, and about 600 
Georgians at West Point, twenty-live miles above Columbus on this 
river. Major General Patterson's command of Alabamians, at and about 
Tuskegee, consists of about 3,000 men, and Brigadier General Moore's 
brigade south of the Cowackec of about 1,300 men, making in all an 
aggregate of 10,158, of whom 1,103 are regulars, 4,755 Georgians, and 
4,300 Alabamians. 

A return of this force will be forwarded as soon as the necessary in- 
formation can be obtained. 

I am, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

THOS. J. LEE, 
Lieut. 4th Arfy, aid-de-camp. 
To Brig. Gen. Jones, 

Adjutant General. 



491 



[ 254 J 



Recapitulation of force serving in the Creek campaign under Major 
General Scott, in June — taken from the annexed official statement, 
dated Fort Mitchell, July 5, 1836. 

RECAPITULATION. 



REGULARS. 


militia - 


Total regulars. 


Total militia. 


Aggregate regu- 
lars and militia. 


Artillery - 

Infantry - 
Marines - 


547 
156 
400 


- 


547 
156 

400 


MILITIA. 

Georgia line 

Georgians 

Alabamians 


- 


4,155 

600 
4,300 


4,155 

600 
4,300 


Aggregate regulars and 


1,103 


9,055 


10,158 



Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, July 18, 1836. 



No. 253. 






Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July 4, 1836. 

Sir : I have received a copy of your instructions from the War De- 
partment, and been directed to open a communication with you. Lieut. 
Col. Broome, of the United States marines, from the mere impulse of 
patriotism, has volunteered to bear this, my first letter. It will prob- 
ably be agreeable to him to bring me your reply. 

1 think it probable that you will find the Cherokees very generally 
disposed to observe the relations of amity with our people about them. 
My latest information is to that effect, and I have not the time to refer 
to his Excellency Governor Schley, now at Columbus, for better and 
more recent intelligence. It is my belief, however, that some, if not 
many of the hostile Creeks have taken refuge among the Cherokees ; 
and had you not been specially charged with representing the United 
States, in that quarter, I should have inquired, at the proper time, into 
this matter, and have marched against the Cherokees, if every fugitive 
had not been delivered over to my orders. As it is, I can only call your 
attention to the subject. 



[ 224 ] 492 

By far the greater number of hostile Creek warriors have voluntarily 
and unconditionally surrendered themselves ; another portion has been 
captured without resistance, and the remainder, probably less than two 
hundred, are yet to be captured or forced in. Some of the latter, we 
know, have crossed the river in the hope of finding their way into Flo- 
rida. I have, in two or three cases, despatched strong parties of horse in 
pursuit, with, I think, good hopes of success ; and I shall constantly scour 
the country lately occupied by them, in search of the handfulls who are 
lurking in the swamps, for concealment, or watching opportunities to get 
off to Florida. These employments occupy a very large number of 
troops : for example, the left bank of the Chattahoochie, for more than 
forty miles, is kept lined with Georgia mounted men ; an Alabama brig- 
ade, consisting, mostly, of the same kind of troops, is kept extended 
from east to west, a little above Irwinton. Scouring parties are kept 
constantly out, between this place and that line, and two or three small 
battalions of regulars are immediately to take positions on the great mail 
road between Columbus and Montgomery, in order to restore the com- 
munication between those places. Besides the troops so employed, de- 
tachments of regulars are needed to escort the Indian prisoners and emi- 
grants, at least as far as Montgomery, if not all the way to Arkansas. 
The West Tennesseans have not arrived at Montgomery. A thousand 
of these, by direction of the War Department, I have ordered to Florida. 
The remainder will be held, for a short time in reserve. 

Notwithstanding all the calls for troops, and which will be continued 
perhaps for ten or twenty days more, some of them for a much longer 
period, I shall, I do not doubt, very soon be able to send you very effi- 
cient reinforcement : about 400 United States marines certainly ; 2. 
Some three or four companies of volunteers from Georgia, and as many 
from Alabama, (all from the neighborhood of the Cherokees,) probably ; 
and, 3. The remainder of the West Tennessee brigade to be held in 
reserve, near Montgomery, pretty certainly. 

I have requested Lieut. Col. Broome, whom I have pleasure in pre- 
senting to you, to get, in going and returning, the best information as to 
the routes leading to the Cherokee country, the means of subsistence, 
&c. 

I remain, sir, with great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Brig. Gen. Wool, 

U. S. A., Commanding, fyc. 



No. 254. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Fort Mitchell, July G, 1836. 

Sir : With the effective men of your battalion, which has so hand- 
somely volunteered for the service, you will, on board the Metamora 
and Reindeer, embark without delay, and proceed by water and land to 



493 f 224 ] 

that part of the Chikasahatchee swamp, where Colonel Beall, of the 
Georgia volunteers, is now operating against a party of hostile Creek 
Indians, who have been pursued to that fastness. In preference you 
will approach the swamp from beloiu, unless the position of Col. Beall 
and his forces should take you in a different direction in order to join 
him ; of course you will report yourself to him and receive his orders. 

At or before your arrival at Fort Gaines, you will inquire and satisfy 
yourself as to the best route of reaching the theatre of operations in the 
shortest time. Perhaps the information you may receive will lead you 
to debark your detachment on the Chattahoochie, and thence proceed by 
land ; but, more probably, you will find it best to ascend the Flint river, 
as high as practicable, and thence to march to the theatre of operations. 

You are at liberty to employ a few wagons from the point of landing, 
sufficient to take your surplus provisions and ammunition, a portion of 
w r hich, no doubt, is much needed by the troops already with Colonel 
Beall. 

If you can find the means of communicating to Colonel Beall (or com- 
manding officer) by express, the route by which you are approaching 
him, you will not fail to do so. Inform him of the surplus stores you 
may have with you. 

I leave it to your discretion to retain the two steamboats for your re- 
turn, directing them to meet you at such point as you may designate. 
The boats may also be needed to bring up all the sick and wounded of 
the detachments now engaged with the Indians in that quarter. 

Wishing you and your gallant battalion success, and fully persuaded 
that every thing will be done to ensure success, 
I remain, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

I have directed the medical director of the army, Dr. Lawson, in con- 
currence with your surgeon, to have a good supply of medicines and hos- 
pital stores to be put on board your two boats. 

I have sent Paddy Carr to you, to say I have directed him to have 
ready immediately a party of thirty or forty of his best Indian warriors 
to accompany you. He will be obliged to obtain a part of them at Fort 
Mitchell. Please direct one of your boats to stop there a short time to 
get those warriors. Keep the whole of Paddy's party with your bat- 
talion, unless otherwise ordered by Colonel Beall, and please subsist 
and treat them kindly — they have heretofore behaved well. 

W. S. 

To Major Hoxie, 

Coni'g Columbus vol., Columbus. 



No. 255. 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, June 25, 1836. 

Sir : It is represented to the War Department that a large force of 
hostile Creek Indians will probably make their way into Florida, and, 



f 224 ] 494 

in consequence, the Secretary deems it very important that a strong 
force should be stationed so as to prevent the escape of the Creeks in 
that direction ; it is, therefore, the order of the Secretary of War, that 
you station a sufficient force so as to prevent them making their escape 
and taking that direction. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

ALEX. MACOMB, 
Major General, Command, in chief. 
To Major General Scott. 



No. 256. 



Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, June 28, 1836. 

Sir : I have received, through the Secretary of War, the order of the 
President to call you to the seat of Government. You will, therefore, 
on the receipt of this letter, turn over to Brevet Major General Jesup 
the command of the troops serving against the hostile Creeks, and re- 
pair to the city of Washington. 

I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, sir, 

Your most obedient servant, 

ALEX. MACOMB, 
Major General, Commanding in chief. 
To Major General Winfield Scott, 

Fort Mitchell, Alabama. 



No. 257. 



Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, June 28, 1836. 

Sir : Major General Scott having been ordered to the seat of Gov- 
ernment, the command of the troops serving against the hostile Creeks 
is, by direction of the President, hereby vested in you. The instruc- 
tions which you received from the War Department, on leaving Wash- 
ington for the Creek nation, will be your guide in executing the im- 
portant duties which are hereby again devolved on you. 
I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

ALEX. MACOMB, 
Major General, Comm. in chief. 
Major General Jesup, 

Fort Mitchell. 



495 f 224 

No. 258. 

Columbus, Georgia, July 8, 1836. 

Sir : Late in the evening of the Gth instant, I had the honor to re- 
ceive your letter of the 2Sth ultimo, and one of the same date from the 
Adjutant General. I had transacted much business that day, besides 
issuing the orders, copies of which will be enclosed to the Adjutant 
General. 

Yesterday I wrote and despatched to Major General Jesup the order 
turning over the command to him, and have confined myself to the 
mere business of advising with Major General Sanford, Brigadier Gene- 
ral Fenwick, the quartermaster and commissary, (to prevent the public 
service from suffering, Major General Jesup being at a distance from 
this place,) since the receipt of the letter recalling me. 

To put my successor fully in possession of every thing material to his 
station, I have carefully looked over my books and papers, and caused 
copies of a great many papers to be made out for him, which will be 
transmitted. 

Many other copies of papers will be transmitted to the Adjutant Gene- 
ral to day, by Lieutenant Lee, my late aid-de-camp. 

I set out this morning for the North, in order to reach Charleston this 
day week, to take the steamboat of that day for Norfolk, and shall lose 
no time in presenting myself at Washington. 
1 have the honor to be, sir, 
With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Major General Macomb, 

General-in-Chief U. S. A. 



No. 259. 

Headquarters, Army or the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, July 7, 1836. 
Order No. 29. 

Major General Scott has been called to Washington, and the command 
of this army devolves, from the publication of this Order, on Major 
General Jesup, to whom, in future, all reports and applications will be 
made. 

The Creek war, though yet to be wound up, may be considered as 
virtually over. Two parties of the hostile Indians, which have escaped 
to this side of the Chattahoochie, arc now hotly pursued. The larger 
of those parties is shut up in a swamp, and from the strength of Colonel 
Beall's detachment, that under Captain Jernigan, and the reinforcement 
sent hence, under Major Hoxie, a capture of the whole body of the fugi- 
tives seems to be inevitable. The other hostile party will, probably, 
from the measures in operation, share the same fate. In the late Creek 
country the number of the enemy to be captured or forced to surrender 
is considered quite inconsiderable. 



[ 244 ] 496 

Major General Scott regrets that, from the suddenness of his separa- 
tion from the army, the opportunity is lost to him of doing that full justice 
to all the corps he has had the honor to command, which their patriotism, 
zeal, and gallantry claim at his hands, and indeed from the highest 
sources — the Government and country. 

To his Excellency the Governor of Georgia, who has remained on the 
frontier in order to lend himself in every way powerfully to the prose- 
cution of the war, the particular thanks of Major General Scott are due. 
Before the Georgia line could be mustered into the service of the United 
States, his Excellency had made dispositions of his armed troops, not 
only to protect his own frontier, but to prevent the escape of the enemy 
in the direction of Florida. This was the great danger to be guarded 
against, and all that zeal and ability could effect on his part, has been 
put in practice and accomplished. It is hoped that this slight acknowl- 
edgment made to the Chief Magistrate of a powerful and patriotic State 
may not be deemed impertinent because coming from a military func- 
tionary of the United States. It is eminently deserved. Of the Georgia 
line, which has constantly acted under the immediate observation of 
Major General Scott, he will ever be happy to speak in terms of the 
highest approbation. That line, has under its immediate and able com- 
mander, Major General Sanford, throughout evinced the best disposi- 
tions — a readiness to obey orders, to march against the enemy, and to 
win honor for itself, for Georgia, and the Union. The greater part of it, 
for a longtime, was held inactive for the want of arms, which, by a series 
of strange accidents, failed to arrive, whilst other portions of the same 
line, in positions on the river, had frequent and severe combats with the 
enemy. In these, if the Georgian detachments were not always suc- 
cessful, they at least were ready to oppose an obstinate resistance to 
superior numbers. Captains Garmany, Jernigan, Ball, and Fluellen, 
with their companies, won for themselves much distinction on those oc- 
casions, whilst Captains Dawson and Pearson, cruising wit!) their com- 
panies on board steamboats, rendered highly valuable services. Captain 
Dawson, on several occasions, displayed the greatest judgment and in- 
trepidity in marching to the relief of the fixed posts, and landing in the 
presence of the enemy, in order to destroy his means of passing the 
river. 

Of the Alabama line, with the exception of Brigadier General Moore's 
brigade, Major General Scott cannot speak, either from his own observa- 
tion or on a direct correspondence. Major General Jesup, himself an 
able commander and a competent judge, in his reports, speaks highly of 
Major General Patterson and his division, and it is directly known that 
Brigadier General Moore, placed on the lower line of operations, has, 
acting almost independently, made able dispositions of his brigade, and 
has captured more than two hundred prisoners. 

To the regular troops, including the United States marines, the usual 
praise is due : they have exhibited steadiness, discipline, and an eager 
desire to come in contact with the enemy. Although disappointed in 
that favorite wish, they have, in all other respects, rendered themselves 
highly useful. 

It is known that the friendly Indians acting as auxiliaries under 
General Woodward and others, have rendered valuable services. To 



497 [ 224 ] 

them a great number of the captures and voluntary surrenders are to be 
attributed. 

With his temporary staff — Colonel Kenan, volunteer aid-de-camp ; 
Major Ansart, acting inspector general, and Lieutenants T. J. Lee and 
Betts, aids-de-camp ; also Surgeon Dr. Lavvson, medical director of the 
army — Major General Scott cannot take leave without expressing his 
hearty thanks for the zeal, ability, and courtesy which each has displayed 
in the performance of his particular duties. 

Major Ansart, 3d artillery, having tendered the resignation of his 
commission, which will be forwarded to Washington, he has permission 
to repair to that place, after having performed the special duties in which 
he is now engaged, and await the decision of the Government. 

Colonel Kenan, duly mustered into the service of the United States 
on the 1st ultimo, is hereby discharged with honor and thanks from that 
service. 

Lieutenant T. J. Lee, at the expiration of a week, and Lieutenant 
Betts at the expiration of a month, will join their respective companies 
for duty. 

Surgeon Law 7 son will report by letter to Major General Jesup. 

W1NFIELD SCOTT. 



No. 260. 
Headquarters, Eastern Department, 

Washington, July 20, 1S36. 

Sir: For the information of the proper authority, I have the honor to 
enclose a copy of a letter, dated at Tuskegee the 7th instant, from Major 
General Jesup to me, and which contains important intelligence. 

The letter was written before it was known to General Jesup that I 
had turned over the command of the army of the South to him, and 
overtook me at Charleston, South Carolina. 
I remain, sir, 

With great respect, 

Your most obedient servant, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Brigadier General Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 

P. S. As early as the 26th ultimo, I requested Major General Jesup 
to Neo Mico and his band to be disarmed and secured. 

W. S. 



No. 261. 

Headquarters, 2d Army Corps, Southern Army, 

Tuskegee, July 7, 1836. 

Sir : I arrived here yesterday with the volunteers of General Patter- 
son's command, and expected to start a party of four hundred Indians, 
but at least a thousand of Neo Mico's party went off yesterday and last 
night, and have proceeded up the country to Tuckabatche Hajo's camp, 
32 



[ 224 ] 498 

or town, in Chambers county. I shall send the mounted men in pursuit 
to-morrow. 

If the marines can be spared, I request that they may be placed on the 
mail road from Columbus to Tuskegee, subject to my orders, say twelve 
or fourteen miles from Columbus, at the stage-house. I will place a de- 
tachment about twelve miles from Tuskegee. Those posts established, 
an order or proclamation, directing all Indians to go north of the mail 
road, and confine themselves to their camps or villages, and declaring 
all to be hostile who shall be found south of it, or traversing any portion 
of the country north or south, and directing that they be treated as such, 
would have the effect to close the difficulties in this country. 

The negotiation with Neo Mico has proved that the best argument with 
Indians is formed, not of words, but of powder and lead ; and I have 
this moment informed the chief, from whose camp Neo Mico's party has 
fled, that I shall use no other argument in future. 

I enclose a letter from General Moore, referred to me by General 
Patterson ; and 

I am, sir, respectfully, 

TH. S. JESUP, 

Major General. 

Major General Scott, 

Commanding Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia. 



No. 262. 
Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Tuskegee, Ala., September 9, 1836. 

Sir : I have just received from a friend a Richmond Enquirer of the 
15th of July, which contains a report of General Scott, dated at Fort 
Mitchell on the 2d of July. In that report the General has stated, upon 
the authority of Colonel Henderson, that two hundred and fifty Indians 
had surrendered to General Watson. 

I enclose a copy of a letter from Colonel Henderson, and an extract 
from a letter of General Watson on the subject. 

I have to request that this communication, with the papers enclosed, 
be laid before the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief ; and, if 
General Scott has not corrected his report, I desire that they may be 
published. 

I have the honor to be, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP, Major General. 
Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army, Washington city. 

Memorandum. 

The only reply that I have to make to this letter is to request that the 
Court will refer to my letter, in evidence, to the Adjutant General, dated 
July 2d, (document No. 243.) 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Fredericktown, Md., January 19,1837. 



499 [ 224 J 



Headquarters of the Marine Corps, 

Tallahassee, August 30, 1836. 

General : I have just received your letter of this date. 
In the report made by me to General Scott, dated the 28th June, I was 
led by information derived from a lieutenant of Captain Love's company 
of mounted volunteers, to state to General Scott that two hundred and 
fifty Indians had surrendered to General Watson without firing a gun. 
The volunteer officer's statement was so distinct that I did not doubt its 
correctness. 

A day or two afterwards, I ascertained that no such event had taken 
place, and meeting General Scott on board of a steamboat passing up the 
Chattahoochie, I told him in what manner I was led into the error. He 
mentioned at the time that he had seen General Watson, and had found 
that my statement was erroneous. 

I remain, general, 

With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

ARCH. HENDERSON, 

Colonel Commandant. 
.Major General Thomas S. Jesup, 

Commanding Army of the South, 

Headquarters, Tallassec. 



Extract of a letter from General J. Watson, of Georgia, to Major Gen- 
eral Jesup, commanding Army of the South, dated 

Tallassee, August 30, 1836. 

I was at the taking of no party of hostiles, except that of Jim Henry, 
some fifteen or twenty miles south of Fort Mitchell, where } r ou were 
present yourself, and in command. I was with you without rank, as 
a volunteer private citizen. 

With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

J. WATSON. 



No. 263. 



Remarks upon an editorial article headed " The Army," published in the 
Courier and Enquirer of the 26th of July, 1836. 

The article is offensive in the language used, and incorrect in the state- 
ments presented, in reference to the difficulties between General Scott 
and General Jesup. 

But for the injurious character of these misstatements, their correction 
might be left to the anticipated investigation, or to the voluntary action of 
General Scott, who will, it is hoped, indignantly contradict imputations 
upon a brother officer which he well knows to be untrue. 



I" 22 1 } 500 



A brief sketch of (he facts will at least suspend public opinion, until 
official inquiry shall exhibit a conclusive exposition of the questions in 
issue. 

While there was yet a probability of bringing the Seminole war to a 
close, General Scott was directed to give his attention to the Creek diffi- 
culties. Some time after these difficulties grew more serious, and Gen- 
eral Scott being deemed fully occupied by the, as yet, unchecked Semi- 
noles, Major General Jesup was, on the 19th of May, specially charged 
with the direction of the Creek war. 

lie met at Augusta, Georgia, Major General Scott, who had left Flori- 
da, where much certainly remained to be done, to assume the command 
in the Creek country. General Jesup willingly consented to take the 
second place; proceeded with General Scott to Columbus, and thence to 
Tuskegee, Alabama, and assumed command, on the 9th of June, of the 
western or Alabama frontier, General Scott reserving to himself the im- 
mediate command of the eastern or Georgia frontier. 

The editorial assertion that General Jesup, " as soon as he found that 
Scott had been ordered to conduct the war against the Creeks * 
determined * * * to procure the recall of his superior officer," is 
not merely incorrect in every particular, but the extreme reverse is truth. 

So far from desiring the recall of General Scott, he willingly served 
under him ; and next to his solicitude for the public service, was his 
anxious desire to enable an old brother in arms to recover in Alabama the 
military reputation lost in Florida. 

Even in the heat and excitement of the collision with General Jesup, 
General Scott frankly recognised and acknowledged the chivalric courtesy 
and self-sacrificing spirit which had marked his conduct from the moment 
of their meeting at Augusta. 

As the collision is at present purely official, it is to be regretted that the 
partisans of General Scott should render the discussion personal. For 
tin's e.ror they will merit the censure of the distinguished individual they 
mean to serve. 

Returning to the sketch of operations, we find General Scott's plan of 
campaign announced to be — 

First. To man the south and southeast frontier, to prevent the Indians 
from passing to Florida. 

Secondly. The first being accomplished, to unite the disposable forces 
at the south line and sweep northward through the Creek country. 

As a preliminary part oi this plan, General Jesup was directed to move 
southward to Irwinton, with such force as he should succeed in raising, 
and, there uniting with General Scott's forces, move northward. 

The number of troops needed to sentinel this extended line of some 
hundred miles, the time required to raise, organize, equip, and station 
them, their probable inability when stationed to effect the object proposed, 
and the intervening unstayed progress of Indian barbarities, were consid- 
erations lost on none but General Scott. 

It is unnecessary to examine this plan in detail.* . Had all the means 
been in readiness, and had they been energetically and rapidly applied, 

* General Jesup wa< understood to disapprove tbe dklay in executing the plan, not the 
plan ilsetf. 



501 [ 221 ] 

it is possible that the result might have been successful. As it was, all 
felt its inapplicability. 

The frequent alarms, the excited state of public feeling, the eager rest- 
lessness of the volunteer troops, and, above all, the devastations daily re- 
ported, called imperatively for immediate and effective action. 

The mode of operations kept in view by General Jesup was, to strike 
the enemy at once, to check barbarities upon the whites by forcing the 
Indians to defend their own families; and, instead of forcing them from 
Florida by sentinels posted from Columbus to Flint river, and from Ir- 
winton to Montgomery, to seek them in their camps, find, tight, and cap- 
ture them. 

Anxious to secure the country and General Scott himself from the evil 
consequences of a plan which there were neither means nor time fo exe- 
cute, General Jesup determined to protect his frontier by prompt move- 
ments upon the Indians, in as far as it was possible to make them without 
disobeying the orders of General Scott. 

On the 9th of June he assumed command of the Alabama troops, the 
disposable force being seven hundred volunteers under Major General 
Patterson. 

The friendly Indians were ordered to rendezvous, the warriors to join 
as auxiliaries — their families to remain at the rendezvous and be fed by 
the Government. The hostile and doubtful Indians in the vicinity were 
disarmed, and placed in charge of friendly chiefs. 

June 12. Pursuant to General Scott's order, he started to Irwinton, 
taking in his route the camp of Eneah Mico and Eneah Mathla, 
where the hostile Indians were concentrated with their families, proper- 
ty, plunder, &c. 

Eneah Mico's camp was broken up : the chief, with a portion of his 
band, came in to a friendly camp, and asked to be treated as hostilcs dis- 
armed. 

June 15. While on the march, Eneah Mathla, the active head of the 
hostile party, was apprehended by an advance scout of friendly Indians, 
four bundled of whom joined on the 1 3th. 

June 17. Approached within five miles of Eneah Mathla's camp — was 
joined by eleven hundred and fifty Indian warriors. 

The singular order from General Scott "to cease all offensive move- 
ments," was here received. Confident that if General Scott knew his 
force and position, he would desire him to improve the sought-lor oppor- 
tunity of striking the enemy, General Jesup despatched an express with a 
letter, from which the sentence below is extracted, and on the morning 
of the ISth of June, pushed forward to the enemy's camp. 

General Jesup to General Scott, in reply to first letter forbidding of- 
fensive movements. 

EXTRACT. 

u Camp on the Hatchychubby, 
" Five miles from Eneah Mathla's camp, June 17, 1836. 

" I would have struck the enemy to-night but for your letter. If he is 
not struck to-morrow morning he will escape for the present ; but the 
force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and reduce him." 



f 224 ] 502 

The answer reached General Jesup in the just-deserted camp of Eneab 
Mathla, when active pursuit was alone necessary to entire success — con- 
taining a peremptory repetition of the order to cease instantly all offensive 
operations. 

General Jesup gave directions for large reconnoitring parties to hold 
the enemy in check, and hastened in person to Fort Mitchell, 18 miles 
distant, to see General Scott. The latter having left for Columbus, a 
second express was sent to him, with a letter stating frankly General 
Jesup's opinions, and earnestly entreating him (General Scott) to adopt 
a different and more efficient course. The question of its publication is 
referred to General Scott, who can thus satisfactorily answer some of the 
offensive imputations upon General Jesup's motives. 

The memoranda of this date by the writer refute the charge attempted 
to be made against General Jesup, of taking a position in which subsist- 
ence and forage could not be procured. Besides that taken from the 
enemy, eighty thousand rations ordered from New Orleans, by General 
Jesup, before he left Washington city, arrived on the 18th of June, five 
days before his rations were exhausted, within 18 miles of his camp, and 
a considerable quantity of forage, pursuant to his previous directions, was 
provided and ready at a point 20 miles distant. 

June 19. General Jesup returned to camp. The reconnoitring parties 
brought in several prisoners, and certain information of the hostile parties. 
This information removed the only serious objection that had been made 
against General Jesup's operations, viz : that he would force the Indians 
across the river towards Florida. Directly the reverse had actually 
occurred. 

The parties on the river preparing to cross, fled inwards to the swamps, 
under shelter of the main body; in a few instances leaving their families 
in their flight. Some of them were brought in with the prisoners. 

June 20. General Scott continued unshaken in his resolution that the 
enemy should not be beaten, except by the regular course of his own 
"plan of campaign." 

The communications earnestly urging a change of this determination, 
had elicited only replies of the most exceptionable nature. 

As the orders were well known to all, an offensive movement could 
not be made without avowed disobedience of orders, and this in a camp 
only preserved from mutiny against the " unaccountable firmness," of 
General Scott by 'the most strenuous efforts of the officers. 

Even had General Jesup determined to disregard the repeated and per- 
emptory order, it would have been impossible to attack and effectually 
conquer the enemy before an order for his arrest could have reached him 
from General Scott, (only 28 miles distant.) 

Thus compelled to inaction, he sent out some of the prisoners to sum- 
mon the enemy to surrender, and kept the troops in position to enforce 
the summons. The consequence was, that, on the 22d, three hundred 
hostile warriors laid down their arms, and one thousand of the hostile 
party surrendered themselves unconditionally prisoners. 

The position of General Jesup presented no alternative. He could not 
remain under the command of one who had alike disregarded the good of 
the public service, and the personal feelings and professional reputation 
of those who had labored most zealously and efficiently. 



503 [ 224 ] 

In three days after assuming command, General Jesup had marched 
upon the strong holds of the enemy, with a volunteer force not greater 
than General Scott could have called together at any point of the Georgia 
line; had checked the devastations, and effectually secured the. Alabama 
frontier; had raised an auxiliary force of fifteen hundred Indian warriors, 
from materials alike accessible to General Scott and himself; had seized 
the principal chiefs ; broken up the hostile confederacy ; taken and dis- 
armed a portion of the hostiles ; and, on the eve of closing the war, is ar- 
rested from doing it — because, forsooth, General Scott's plan of operations 
prescribed a later day and a larger force, (facing north instead of south 
for effecting it.) 

In these measures General Jesup had been greatly aided by the judi- 
cious arrangements of Governor Clay, and ably seconded by the prompt 
and energetic efforts of Major General Patteison, his officers and troops, 
and by the active and efficient corps of Indian warriors he had called into 
the United States service. By these the advantages had been obtained. 
And being thus halted in their consummation, General Jesup determined 
to ask to be relieved, and to place the immediate command of the Ala- 
bama troops with the State officers. 

June 20. General Jesup made full report of the operations of the 2d 
army corps, and closed with the following paragraph: 

EXTRACT. 

" Camp Hatchychubby, 

"June 20, 1836. 

" As I was placed on this service by the express order of the President, 
I shall apply to him to be relieved, and shall demand a Court of Inquiry. 
" I shall await your order as to the disposition of force," &c. 

The channel of official communication was through General Scott. To 
make the application through him to the President would have been in- 
delicate, if not improper, especially until it was seen whether he would 
or would not arrest General Jesup for his advance upon the enemy. 

An official communication direct to the President, or through any offi- 
cers of the War Department, must have, in substance, preferred charges 
against General Scott, and rendered necessary his immediate arrest. 

Desirous of withdrawing himself from the duty with the least prejudice 
to General Scott and the public service, yet without admitting he was in 
error, he perceived and determined to adopt the only mode that would 
relieve the subject from all embarrassments, viz : expressing to the Pres- 
ident, in a communication which was not of necessity official, his desire 
to be relieved. This could only be done through a mutual acquaintance 
— it was so done — by letter of same date with that to General Scott just 
quoted. 

The President thought proper to render this letter an official document, 
and as such it is to be considered. 

The documents, forwarded by General Scott, including his letters to 
General Jesup, attacking him with the severest censures, and in effect 
preferring the most serious charges, were then before the Government, 



224 ] 504 



were considered by the President, and on General Scott's own showing 
the decision was probably founded. 

The editor's assertion that the communication to the President was " a 
stab in the dark," "an attack upon General Scott," "an attempt to pro- 
cure his removal," can now be understood and appreciated. 

General Scott was advised on the 20th that the application to be re- 
lieved would be made. As it was not sent through him, he knew it was 
an unofficial communication, and should have appreciated the motive 
which induced General Jesup to thus decline preferring charges against 
him. 

General Jesup's opinions of his errors and delays were fully, emphati- 
cally, and earnestly urged upon him. 

The papers containing the whole correspondence were placed by Gen- 
eral Scott before the Government ; his recall was the revulsion of his own 
attack on General Jesup, or rather the inevitable result of exhibiting the 
circumstances. 

The request to be relieved having been made, General Jesup left Camp 
Hatchychubby to report in person to General Scott. Illness, the con- 
sequence of excessive fatigue, stopped him at Fort Mitchell, and the 
writer, a member of his staff, was ordered to Columbus to communicate 
with General Scott. 

In the course of the protracted official conversation with General Scott, 
the considerations bearing upon the unpleasant difference were mentioned 
and discussed, especially those having reference to General Jesup's re- 
quest to be relieved. The occasion being presented, it gave the writer 
great pleasure to bear witness to the unvarying tenor of General Jesup's 
expressions and conduct towards General Scott, and still greater pleasure 
to hear them gratefully acknowledged by him. 

The subsequent withdrawal by General Scott of what was personally 
offensive, reduced the differences to questions purely official, and, until 
decided upon by the Government, before which General Scott had laid 
them, both officers continued in the performance of their respective 
duties. 

June 23, 2d Army Corps. 

Hostile Indian prisoners were brought to Fort Mitchell, and retained 
there, nine days, to enable the civil authorities (of Georgia particularly) 
to identify and demand the offenders against their laws. 

June 24, 2d Army Corps. 

General Jesup, with a detachment of Alabama volunteers and Indian 
warriors, seized Jim Henry's party, the chief and a few men only es- 
caping. 

1st Army Corps. 

On the same day, General Scott moved south, and commenced active 
operations, pursuant to his plan of campaign — without having received 
the arms and ordnance stores for which he had been some time waiting. 

On July 2d, he reached Fort Mitchell ; having, by fatiguing and diffi- 
cult marches, swept the country, as proposed in his plan, from the south 
northward, and captured one Indian and one Indian negro. 



505 221 J 



2d Army Corps. 

The chief Jim Henry, taken by the Indian warriors, in the vicinity of 
General Patterson's camp. 

July 5, 2d Army Corps. 

A detachment of 600 men passed into the camp where the hostiles had 
taken refuge. All, with the exception of Neahmicco and thirty men, es- 
caped. Having ascertained their routes — 900 of them were taken on 
the 9th and 10th July. 

Twenty-seven hundred of the hostile party, including eight hundred 
warriors, and including forty criminals delivered to the civil authorities, 
have been taken, sent west, and are now probably at their destined homes. 

Their capture closed the Creek war. The subsequent difficulties have 
grown out of causes connected with the removal. 

The incidents of the war are mentioned without any intent to claim 
credit for any individual — especially not for General Jesup, who, in his 
official reports, has assigned the merit of what was done by the army 
corps he commanded, to the officers and soldiers of the Alabama troops, 
and to the officers and friendly warriors of the Indian bands who com- 
posed that corps. 

It is doubtless true that the successful issue was aided and hastened by 
the tone General Jesup assumed towards the Indians, from the day when, 
to enter upon his command, he, with an escort of 120 men, pushed through 
the heart of the enemy's country, near the camp of Neahmicco, where 
were 600 hostile warriors, to the time when his orders were (and are) 
obeyed by the Indian chiefs with the punctuality and promptness of mil- 
itary discipline — by his measures for raising an Indian force for separating 
the friendly and the warriors from those decidedly hostile — and by his 
exertions as commanding General of the corps. 

The Georgia troops, however restless under the inaction imposed on 
them by want of arms, and by Major General Scott's " plan of campaign," 
have nobly redeemed the time then lost, by their conduct in the Creek 
country, and more recently in the contest with the Creeks, some of whom, 
in consequence of the late orders for removal, are endeavoring to make 
their way to Florida, across the line whose defence General Jesup con- 
fided to General Sanford. 

The foregoing remarks answer the abusive article of the Courier and 
Enquirer, in all things except the inapplicable epithets, which I regret to 
find in an appeal to " officers of the army" by a person who has served 
long enough in our ranks to have learned a different language. 

I close these remarks as the editor closed his article, by saying, they 
are respectfully submitted to the public, in order that the officers of the 
army may properly appreciate the conduct of Major General Jesup. 

J. F. LANE, 
Captain United Stales Army. 
Creek Country, August 8, 1836. 



[ 224 ] 50G 

No. 264. 

Washington City, January S, 1837. 

Sir : I intended to have attended the Court of Inquiry at Frederick, 
in conformity with your notification of the 2d instant, but perceiving from 
a letter of General Scott, just published in the Richmond Enquirer, that 
interrogatories (by letter) may be propounded to those at a distance who 
cannot conveniently appear in Court personally, I must beg the favor of 
the Court to be permitted to give my deposition in this way. From the 
circumstance that General Jesup's letter to me (which appears in the 
Globe of 26th September) being called for in your summons, I presume 
that my testimony is only wanted to verify it as his. I know nothing of 
the causes of the failure of the Southern campaigns, and if, as I suppose, 
the proof that the letter published as General Jesup's is really his, be all 
that is expected of me, it can be so readily obtained by my deposition, 
that I have felt it my duty (being an officer of the House of Represent- 
atives and .engaged in daily attendance upon it) to decline the journey 
to Frederick for the present. If it should be the wish of General Scott, 
at whose instance I am summoned, to interrogate me as to any thing I 
may know of occurrences in this city, having relation to the officers, the 
army, or the campaigns, I will most cheerfully respond by a deposition, 
stating all I know, or respond to particular questions he may propound. 
If it should turn out that the examination in this way prove unsatisfac- 
tory, I will then go to Frederick and answer personally. 

I send you the Globe of 26th of September, containing GeneralJesup's 
letter, which I am ready to verify as his. 

Your most obedient servant, 

F. P. BLAIR. 

S. Cooper, Judge Advocate, 

Recorder of the Court. 



No. 265. 

[1: bom the Globe of the 26th of Septembeb, 1836.] 

Tallassee, Alabama, September 3, 1836. 

Dear Sir: I regret that I should have been the cause of bringing yon 
into difficulty. I wrote to you, at the moment information reached me 
that General Scott had not only sent copies of his extraordinary letters to 
me to the War Department, but that he was representing me in his con- 
versations as having deranged his plan of campaign, and brought a starv- 
ing corps of two or three thousand men to consume the small quantity of 
subsistence and forage which he had collected for the Georgia volunteers 
and regular troops. Writing under the iniluence of the exasperated feel- 
ings produced by the wrong which I believed he had done me, and which 
I shall be able to show at the proper time he did rae, I used language 
stronger, perhaps, than I should, under other circumstances, have thought 
necessary ; but the language used expressed my opinions then ; it ex- 
presses my opinions now. 



507 f 224 J 

Occupied with my public duties, I have no time for defence ; and as I 
do not meddle with the politics of the country, I would not consent to be 
defended on party grounds. The questions in regard to the campaign 
should be decided on their own merits. I wrote to you, not as a party 
man, but as a private friend. It is true, I wrote to you because you hap- 
pened to be the editor of the Globe, in the columns of which 1 expected 
to see General Scott's letters spread before the public. I requested you 
to show my letter to the President, as a measure of defence against the 
charges contained in General Scott's letters. The result was such as I 
neither expected nor desired. My command having been halted by 
General Scott, when in the presence of the enemy's principal force, I 
believed the Indians would disperse into small parties ; and that, in 
place of fighting their force united, we should have to hunt their parties 
through the swamps, as had been necessary in Florida. Having been 
censured for that which I considered the true course of operations, and 
believing I could render no useful service to the country in chasing 
small parties through the swamps, I desired, at the time I wrote, to be 
withdrawn from the army. I informed General Scott officially, on the 
20th of June, that I should apply to the President to be relieved, and 
should demand a Court of Inquiry. On the evening of the 23d we met, 
and an explanation took place. About 10 o'clock that night, he put into 
my hands a letter addressed to the Secretary of War or the Adjutant 
General, I do not remember which, to part of which 1 objected, in the 
presence of his aid and mine. On the morning of the 24th, he informed 
me he would ask to withdraw from the files of the War Department the 
offensive letters ; and on the 25th I addressed a letter to the Secretary 
of War, in which I expressed my readiness to continue under his com- 
mand until the close of the campaign. I considered all personal differ- 
ence at an end ; but I believed, and so expressed myself to those around 
me, that the Government owed it to the country to have the whole sub- 
ject of the campaign investigated. I considered it no longer a question 
between General Scott and me, but between him and the country, or me 
and the country. 

Respectfully, your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP. 

Francis P. Blair, Esq., 

Washington city. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 16, 1836. 

Sir: Since I wrote to you on the 12th, I have heard of the arrival at 
Hawkinsville and Macon of most of the supplies I had ordered via Da- 
rien. These are now in wagons, and within two, three, and four days of 
this place. I have also just heard that the muskets ordered from Au- 
gusta may be expected here perhaps to-morrow. With these arms and 
the 1,800 accoutrements from Hawkinsville, nearly the whole of the 
Georgia line may be fitted for the field. At present, of the 2,200 men 



\ 224 J 508 

Major General Sanford has in his camp on the other side of the river, 
only about 400 are armed. All the other armed men have been detached 
below to guard the river, and which, as yet, from the want of men, is but 
very imperfectly guarded. 

After writing to you on the 12th, I received your letter of the 8th. 
This would completely have mystified me, but for the explanations given 
by some of the Georgia gentlemen who accompanied you from this place. 
For example, you wrote to me on the 6th that you were just about to set 
out lor Montgomery, and yet I find you back at Tuskegee on the 8th. 
You do not tell me that you had been absent as far as Line creek, and 
that you there had met the Governor. You are silent as to any inter- 
views you had had with him, either at Line creek or at Tuskegee, to 
which place, I understand from others, he followed you. Some difficul- 
ties you undoubtedly experienced in getting the command of the Alabama 
troops ; but what those difficulties were, you carefully conceal from me. 
You content yourself with saying, " I have not yet obtained the com- 
mand of the troops, but if I obtain it at all, I shall probably enter on duty 
to-morrow." But why you had not at first obtained the command of the 
troops, and why the doubt whether you would obtain it at all, you again 
carefully conceal from me. 

In a subsequent part of your letter you say, " I learn from the Gov- 
ernor that General Moore will," &c. How did you learn this from the 
Governor ? You do not tell me that you had met him at Line creek, and 
that, turning back yourself, he had followed you to Tuskegee. It might 
have been by letter.* 

Allow me to say that the whole letter is mysterious and enigmatical in 
the extreme, and that it is not such a communication as you ought to have 
made me. If the Governor made the difficulties about placing you in 
the command of the troops, that important fact ought not to have been 
concealed from me ; and if he did not, who else interposed difficulties? 

You further tell me that " if a movement be determined on, I will send 
you information of it by a runner." A movement to be determined on 
by whom ? The Alabama commanders, or those in conjunction with 
yourself? Either you were placed in command, or you have not been. 
In the first place you would certainly determine on no scheme of offen- 
sive operations without my previous concurrence and readiness to co- 
operate ; yet, without receiving any runner from you, or communication 
of any kind, since the 8th instant, a passenger in the stage by the upper 
route, just arrived here, reports that you, at the head of about 3,000 Ala- 
bamians and 1,000 friendly Indians, was about to march upon Neo Mic- 
co's band, and to commence offensive operations on a great scale ! I 
have no doubt there is a gross mistake in this report. You may, perhaps, 
have been about to make some defensive movement or operation to clear 
a frontier settlement of a portion of the enemy, but I will not believe that 
you have declared your independence of my authority. 

It is certain that Brigadier General Moore, of Alabama, has commenced 
a course of offensive operations, from Irwinton up the country. From 
this fact, I have rather inferred that you have not even yet been invested 
with the command of the Alabamians, or you certainly would have 

* Note furnished with the copy. — So the fact was communicated, the importance of adding 
that it was communicated by letter or orally cannot be perceived. 



509 [ 221 J 

stopped his premature and isolated [movement.] These doubts and con- 
jectures, in the absence of all direct intelligence from you, are sufficiently 
harassing. I mean to be explicit and precise on my part. I desire you 
instantly to stop all offensive movements (if you are in command) on the 
part of the Alabamians, until the Georgians are ready to act, say on the 
21st instant, when the greater number of them will be armed and ready 
for the field. By that time, too, there will be on the frontier the greater 
part of the regulars and marines ordered from the North. On that day, if 
the movements of General Moore shall not render a modification of my 
plan necessary, I shall begin to assemble the troops on this side of the 
nation, somewhere in the neighborhood of Irwinton, and operate up the 
country. It is my desire that you meet me about that time and place, 
and that you bring with you any disposable force you conveniently can, 
or that you hold the whole of the Alabamians in defensive positions on 
the frontier settlements till 1 shall bring the war into their neighborhood, 
when you can come into the general line of operations with me. 

No quartermaster has arrived here but Dr. YVaite. Captain Page says 
that, under his instructions from the War Department, his presence in 
this quarter is indispensable. No flints and no ammunition have yet 
arrived. 

I have heard of shipments from New Orleans of army supplies ; but 
none have arrived. Subsistence, with arms and accoutrements, from 
Hawkinsville, will begin to come in to-morrow. 

I shall cause a large deposite of subsistence to be made at Irwinton, 
another at Fort Mitchell, and a third at this place. I am inquiring, and 
may establish a fourth depot at some convenient point between Irwinton 
and Fort Mitchell. 

Six companies of regulars have arrived here to-day, and Monroe's three 
days ago; they are sent to guard the Indians at Fort Mitchell. 
I remain, with undiminished confidence, 

Yours, most respectfully, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Major General T. S. Jesup, 

United States Army, commanding, fyc. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Columbus, Georgia, June 17, 1836. 
Sir: I have this moment received your two letters of the 15th and 
17th instant. 

I am infinitely astonished and distressed to hear of your near approach, 
and in a starving condition,* to Fort Mitchell. You knew that your 

Note furnished with, the copy. 

MVhen General Jesup arrived at Fort Mitchell, on t>>e night of the 18th of June, he* 
found a steamboat with 70,000 rations, which he had ordered from New Orleans before he 
left Washington city ; and he found in the neighborhood several thousand bushels of corn, 
which he had directed Captain Page to secure early in June. He was surely entitled t>> 
some small share of the benefits of his own arrangement'. If General Scott was not ac- 
quainted with the resources at his command, it was not the fault of General Jesup. 



[ 224 ] 510 

forces were not wanted there ; you kew that no supplies could reach 
even Irwinton from New Orleans, earlier than the 21st instant, if so soon ; 
and you knew, by my letter of the 10th, that nothing had arrived as high 
as Hawkinsville, upon the Ockmulgee, and, consequently, nothing could 
have reached this place by the present date from that river. I also ought 
to add that you knew, when you left here, that the troops, daily increas- 
ing, were living from hand to mouth on the precarious supplies of the 
neighborhood. Under these circumstances, imagine my astonish- 
ment to learn that, instead of marching the disposable force of Ala- 
bama upon Irwinton, with subsistence for at least ten or five days 
in advance, you have come, through the heart of the Indian coun- 
try, seeking private adventures, which, if successful, could hardly 
have advanced the war, and against my known plan of operations, to 
Fort Mitchell, forty-five miles out of position ! It is precisely General 
Gaines's movement upon Fort King, where there was no subsistence; 
and there is none, as you ought to have known, at Fort Mitchell.* 
My grief and distress are at their utmost height. This strange move- 
ment you have made without giving me the slightest notice. You 
had not informed me, you do not even now tell me, that you are in 
command of the Alabamians, and your last letter, of the 8th instant, 
stated that it was doubtful whether you would even be invested with 
that command. All this is infinitely strange, and was the last thing 
in the world that was to be expected from you. 

Well, to prevent starvation, I have called for the quartermaster and 
commissary, and demanded of them what rations and forage they could 
supply. Lieutenant VVaite, the quartermaster, had with great diffi- 
culty provided some corn for my movement at the head of the Geor- 
gians on the 21st or 22d, and Lieutenant McCrabb had just nearly 
exhausted the market to obtain two or three days' rations for the 
troops already at Fort Mitchell. At the risk of starving the troops on 
the river, (the Georgians and regulars,) I have ordered the quarter- 
master to send you five hundred bushels of corn, and the commissary 
to move heaven and earth to send two or three days' subsistence for 
the troops brought with you. To prevent, however, all further erratic 
movements, I desire you to encamp your forces somewhere in the 
neighborhood of Fort Mitchell, till further orders, or until I can see 
you. We will keep your forces, and those previously on the river, from 
starving, if possible, till the arrival of the Ockmulgee supplies, which I 
suppose will precede those from New Orleans by some days. 

The first, and one of the worst effects of your arrival, will be to prevent 
a movement of the Georgians and regulars as early as I intended. The 
former have pushed their impatience for active operations almost to a 
state of mutiny ; a result which I may not be able to prevent, if they 
should learn that the arrival of the Alabamians is to hold them in a 
state of inglorious activity many days longer. 

I wrote to you yesterday, and despatched the letter by a runner 

Note furnished with the copy. 

* General .Temp knew that the navigation was good, and he expected the arrival of steam- 
boats with supplies, at Columbus, by the 15th of June. He had subsistence sufficient for 
the troops under his command to the 22d of June. 



0m 



511 224 



from Fort Mitchell. I shall endeavor to visit Fort Mitchell to-morrow 
or the next clay. 

Though in grief, I still remain yours, with great regard, 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Some wagons with subsistence are despatched to-night, but cannot 
arrive, 1 learn from Mr. Waite, till to-morrow morning. Some corn (two 
hundred and fifty or three hundred bushels) will be down by ten o'clock 
to-morrow in a boat. 

W. S. 



Headquarters, Second Army Corps, Southern Army, 
Camp on the waters of the Hatchy chubby, June 17, 183G. 

General : I have this instant received your letter of yesterday. I 
regret that my operations have met your disapprobation ; but they were 
commenced, and have been continued, for the purpose of staying the 
tomahawk and scalping-knife, and preventing the devastation of entire 
settlements or neighborhoods on the frontier. They have had the effect 
of tranquillizing, in some measure, the frontier people, and of inducing 
them to remain at their homes. I regret the censure implied in your re- 
marks, because it is unmerited. I acted in accordance with what i be- 
lieved to be the spirit of your instructions; but even were my conduct in 
direct opposition to your instructions given at a former period, the alter- 
ed circumstances of the country is, 1 should think, a full justification. I 
consider it so, for I have none of that courage that would enable me to 
remain inactive when women and children are daily falling beneath the 
blows of the savage. Writing in the open field, where 1 am interrupted 
every moment by matters of detail of every kind, even to the placing of a 
wagon, I cannot now explain the remarks in my letter which you have 
considered so enigmatical, further than to say, in justice to Governor 
Clay, that he made no opposition to my assuming command, but made 
every effort to sustain me ; and to add that, if successful in my present 
operations, I shall owe much of that success to his able arrangements. 
The troops, or rather a part of them, were opposed, not to me personally, 
but to any officer of the United States taking command of them ; and I 
would take command of militia and volunteers on no other terms than 
their consent. I would resign my commission first. 

I am now within five miles of Enea Mathla's camp, with twelve com- 
panies of volunteers and four or five hundred Indian warriors. Eleven 
hundred warriors, under Hopothle Yoholo, will join to-night, and per- 
haps five hundred volunteers from Alabama. I made such arrangements 
for the defence of the settlements in my rear, that 1 feel assured of their 
entire security. I would have struck the enemy to-night, but for your 
letter ; if he is not struck to-morrow morning he will escape for the pres- 
ent, but the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and reduce 
him. 

With every disposition to perform their duty, the volunteers and militia 



[ 224 J 512 

are necessarily extremely irregular in their returns, &c. I am not, there- 
fore, able to send you a return in. form of the force under my command. 
1 am, sir, respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

T. S. JESUP, 
Major General commanding. 
Major General Scott, 

Commander of the Southern Army, Columbus, Ga. 



No. 266. 



Tuskegee, November 27, 1836. 

Sir : I have received your note summoning me to attend a court of in- 
quiry at Frederick city, Maryland ; and, just as I was preparing to take 
the stage for that place, I was served with a notice to attend the district 
court at Mobile, Alabama, which last summons I must obey. I do not 
know that my testimony would be of any service to General Scott, 
though I am certain it could do him no injury. And should the court of 
inquiry remain in session till after the court in Mobile is over, and Gen- 
eral Scott wishes my attendance, and I can be notified of the tact, I will 
attend without delay. The court at Mobile will adjourn, or at least I 
shall be able to leave that place, about the fifteenth of December next. 
As you belong to the army, and I in the habit of giving my opinion can- 
didly about men in office, and, moreover, as to what I say is not offered 
as testimony in favor of General Scott, or against any one else, but 
merely my statement to you, I will not close this without stating to you 
one fact — do General Scott justice, and it would not require my testimony, 
or that of any one else, to place him far beyond the reach of his accu- 
sers. One thing I know, and I have the right to say, that General Scott's 
orders have been violated, or disobeyed ; he has been censured for the 
improper conduct of others, and has been badly treated by those on 
whom he has bestowed honors and favors, and when, I am inclined to 
think, they were not merited. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

T. S. WOODWARD. ) 

Captain Cooper, 

United Stales Army. 



No. 267. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Tuskegee, Alabama, August 2, 1836. 

Sir : Knowing that I had written to you in reply to your communica- 
tions, I was surprised when I received a copy of a letter you wrote to 
the President, in which you declare that I had treated with " silent con- 



513 [ 221 J 

tempt the reasonable request of (he Governor of Georgia." I examined 
ray letter-book, and found my letters to you recorded in their proper 
places, in the handwriting of my aid-de-camp, Colonel Goldthwait. I ielt 
indignant that a charge so entirely unfounded, as I then thought, should 
have been made ; but 1 am now induced to believe that, by some over- 
sight or omission, my letters, or at least one of them, had not been sent 
to you. Captain Parrott, who acted as adjutant general of my division, 
during the active part of the ca npaign, leit Fort Mitchell for Washing- 
ton city on (he 1st of July. In looking over a tile of papers put up by 
him the morning he left, and not opened since, until last night, I found 
the enclosed letter; the endorsement is in Captain Parrott's hand, and I 
think it probable that it was put upon file in place of being sent to you. 
I will be greatly obliged to you to inform me whether you received a 
duplicate of that letter. Had I been even hostile to you, which was not 
the fact, the courtesy due from one gentleman to another would have pre- 
vented me from neglecting your communications. 

1 have thought it due to myself to enter into the particulars above- 
stated ; and 

I am, sir, respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP. 

His Excellency W. Schley, 

Governor of Georgia, Milledgeville, Georgia. 



No. 268. 



Headquarters, Army of the South, 

Tuskegee, Alabama, August 28, 183G. 

Sir: I received your letter of the 15th instant at the moment I was 
setting out for Tallassee, on duty connected with the Indian emigra- 
tion, and, expecting then to return in a day or two, I left it in my ollice 
here. I was detained longer than I expected, and only returned this 
morning. Your letter of the 30th of June was not answered, but the 
omission was inadvertent, not intentional. I had forgotten that letter un- 
til I received yours of the 15th. I can only account for the omission to 
answer it from the fact that 1 was then actively engaged in measures for the 
security of about fourteen hundred hostile Indians, who had been allow- 
ed to go into the camp of a friendly Indian chief near Tuskegee, and 
who, 1 was informed, would, in consequence of my delay at Fort Mitch- 
ell, probably escape. They did escape in consequence of that delay ; 
and my division of the army was occupied in recapturing a part of them 
until the 17th of July. About a thousand were recaptured; and I have 
been informed recently, by several friendly chiefs, that the party which 
crossed into Georgia, about the 2dth of July, was that portion of the party 
referred to who had not been recaptured. 

In my movement from Fort Mitchell, I believed that I was perform- 
ing my duty. I believe so still. And I could not then, nor can I now, 

33 



[ 221 ] 514 

perceive any sufficient ground for the censure which has heen heaped 
upon me (or that act. The movement of the troops was required, and 
the Indian prisoners could not he left without them. Besides, my in- 
structions required that 1 should remove the prisoners as rapidly as pos- 
sible. That I was disposed to afford every facility in my power to Geor- 
gia will have been seen in my communication to your Excellency of the 
28th of June. I there informed you that three warriors had been iden- 
tified, and awaited your order. I had not then received the information 
which rendered the movement to the neighborhood of Tuskegee neces- 
sary. 

I regret as sincerely as you do that any circumstance should have oc« 
curred to interrupt the harmony and good understanding, at least on my 
part, previously to my march from Fort Mitchell ; but, until I found my 
letter of the 30th of June, 1 considered myself greatly aggrieved by your 
letter to the President. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

TH. S. JESUP. 

His Excellency W. Schley, 

Governor of Georgia, Milledgeville, Georgia. 



515 



[ 221 ] 



No. 3. 



PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY 



IJf THE CASE OF 



MAJOR GENERAL GAINES. 



[FAILURE OF THE SEMINOLE CAMPAIGN IN 1836.] 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS. 



No. 1. General Gaines to Adjutant General, 

2. Requisition for ordnance and ordnance stores, 

3. Requisition for subsistence stores, 

4. Requisition for quartermaster stores, 

5 General Gaines to Governor of Louisiana, 



6. 


G 


eneral Gains s' 


s special order, 


7. 




Do. 


do. 


8. 




Do. 


order No. 4, 


9. 




Do. 


special order No. 5, 


LO. 




Do. 


to Adjutant General, 


11. 




Do. 


to General Clinch, 


12. 




Do. 


special order No. 7, 


13. 




Do. 


to Governor of Louisiana, 



14. Adjutant General to General Gaines, 

15. General Gaines to Adjutant General, 

16. Adjutant General to General Gaines, 

17. General Gaines's order No. 4, 

18. Do. No. 6, 

19. Do. special order No. 11, 

20. Do. do. No. 12, 

21. Do. to Adjutant General, 

22. Do. to General Clinch, 

23. Captain Hitchci>ck'6 report, 

24. General Gaines's special order No. 13, 

25. Do. do. No. 15, 
26 Do. do. No. 16, 

27. Do. do. No. 17, 

28. Do. to General Clinch, 

29. Do. do. 

30. Do. special order No. 18, 

31. Do. order No. 7, (see Doc. 
ral Scott's case,) 

32. Adjutant General to General Gaines, 

33. General Gaines to Adjutant Genera!, 

34. F. Marks to Captain Hitchcock, 

35. Dr. Harral to do. 

36. Map of Florida. 

37. Map of Camp Izard. 

38. "New York Courier and Enquirer," oi 

34 





January 


15, 


1836. 




January 


15, 


1836. 




January 


15, 


1836. 




January 


15, 


1836. 




January 


15, 


1836. 




January 


16, 


1836 




January 


16, 


1836 




January 


18, 


1836 




January 


18, 


1836 




January 


25, 


1836 




February 


o 


1836 




February 


3, 


1836 




February 


4, 


1836 




January 


22, 


1836 




February 


6, 


1836 




February 


22, 


1836 




February 


10, 


1836. 




February 


12, 


1836 




February 


12, 


1836 




February 


12, 


1836 




February 


22, 


1836 




February 


22, 


1836. 




February 


22, 


1836. 




February 


22, 


1836. 




February 


26, 


1836. 




February 


26, 


1836 




February 


28, 


1836 




February 


28, 


1836. 




February 


29, 


1836. 




March 


9, 


1836 


78, 


in Gene- 








March 


9, 


1836. 




■March 


10, 


1836. 




July 


4, 


1836 




October 


29, 


1836 




October 


9, 


1836 



April 



2, 1836. 



[ 224 ] 510 



No. 39. General Gibson to Lieutenant Morrison, .Inly 1, 1836. 

40. Do. do. September 23, 1S.S6. 

41. Statement of subsistence at Tampa, March 31, 18S6. 

42. " New Orleans Bulletin" of September 25, 1836. 

43. General Gaines to General Smith and Colonel Christie, September 18, 1836. 

44. Deposition of Surgeon General Thomas Lawson. 

45. General Gaines to the President of the United States, with 

general order No. 37, of the 11th June, 1S36, Juu ■ 20, 1836. 

General Gaines to Secretary of War, enclosing letter from 

Major Graham, February 28, 1837. 



PROCEEDINGS 



Of a Court of Inquiry, held at the city of Frederick, Maryland, by virtue 
of the following Orders, to ivit : 

War Department, 
Adjutant General* s Office, Washington, October 3, 1S3G. 

General Order No. 65. 

The following Order is published for the information of all concerned 

By direction of the President of the United States, a Court of Inquiry, 
to consist of Major General Macomb, President, and Brevet Brigadiers 
General Atkinson and Brady, members, is hereby ordered to assemble 
at the city of Frederick, in Maryland, as soon as the state of the military 
operations against the Indians will permit the witnesses to attend, (of 
which the President of the Court is to judge and determine, and to give 
notice to all concerned,) to inquire and examine into the causes of the 
failure of the campaigns in Florida against the Seminole Indians, under 
the command of Major General Gaines and of Major General Scott, in 
1836 ; and the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the cam- 
paign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians, in the 
year 1836 ; and into every subject connected with the military operations 
in the campaigns aforesaid : and, after fully investigating the same, the 
Court will report the facts, together with its Opinion on the whole 
subject, for the information of the President of the United States. 

Captain Samuel Cooper, of the 4th regiment of artillery, is hereby ap- 
pointed to act as Jud^e Advocate and Recorder of the Court. 

LEWIS CASS. 

War Department, 

October 3, 1836. 

R. JONES, Adjutant General. 



\i 



517 [ 221 ] 



Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, October 14, 1836. 

General Order No. 68. 

The following Order has been received from the War Department, and 
is published for the information of all concerned : 

War Department, 

October IS, 1836. 

1. It appearing by the public prints that the official report of Brevet 
Major General Gaines, dated " Headquarters, Western Department, 
Camp Sabine, 4th July, 1836," made to the Adjutant General of the 
army, has been published, and the said publication being without the 
sanction of the War Department, or other proper authority, the Court of 
Inquiry of which Major General Alexander Macomb is President, will, in 
addition to the duties already assigned to it, inquire into the facts as to the 
manner, and by whose authority, the said official report was made public. 

2. The Court will also report its Opinion as to the violation of the 
rules of the service by such publication ; and as to the character of said 
report, in reference to all its bearings and consequences, as it concerns 
general military propriety and the discipline of the army. 

3. And, further, the Court will examine and inquire into any otherre- 
ports and publications made by Brevet Major General Gaines, or by any 
other olficer of the army, having reference to military affairs, and pub- 
lished without the sanction of the War Department, or other proper 
auihority, and give its Opinion on the tendency of snob reports and pub- 
lications, in the same manner as it is herein required to do in the case 
referred to in the foregoing paragraph of this Order. 

C. A. HARRIS, 
Acting Secretary of War. 
By order of Major General Macomb : 

R. JONES, Adjutant General. 



Frederick, January 11, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. 

Present: Major General Macomb, President, Brevet Brigadiers General 
Atkinson and Brady, members, Captain Cooper, Judge Advocate and 
Recorder. 

The Orders constituting the Court having been read, and Major Gene- 
ral Gaines making no objections to any of the members therein named, 
the Court was duly sworn in his presence. 

The Judge Advocate then proceeded to read the documentary testi- 
mony which accompanies these Proceedings. (See documents.) 

The testimony being read, the Court adjourned to meet again to-mor- 
row mornins; at 1 1 o'clock. 



[ 224 ] 518 

January 12, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Captain E. A. Hitchcock, of the 1st regiment of infantry, a witness, being 
duly sworn, ivas interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by the Court. Were you with Major General Gaines on 
his campaign in Florida, in 1S3G ; and if so, in what capacity ? 

Answer. I was appointed by Major General Gaines, at Mobile, on the 
ISth of January, 133G, acting assistant adjutant general. That order was 
subsequently superseded by another, appointing me inspector general of 
the western department. 1 continued with General Gaines, in his military 
family, from the date of the first order, through the campaign in Florida, 
and until some time after he left that section of the country. 

2. Question by the Court. Will you state to the Court, as nearly as you 
can recollect, the occurrences that transpired on the match of the army 
under Major General Gaines, from Tampa bay to the Withlacoochee, and 
afterwards, whilst at Camp Izard ? 

Answer. The army under General Gaines left Tampa bay on the 13th 
of February ; there was nothing of material importance occurred until 
the 17th of the month, when some Indian villages were burned ; they 
appeared to have been abandoned a number of days. At this time there 
was a general expectation, so far as I know, in the army, that General 
Scott would be somewhere in that vicinity, in considerable force, within 
a short time. While these villages were burning, a detachment of the 
army was distant about two miles from the main force — I was myself 
about a mile from the main force, when a loud report was heard, similar 
to that of a cannon. On joining the army, I found this report the subject 
of conversation, and the opinion seemed to be almost unanimous, that it 
was the report of a piece of ordnance with General Scott. I heard, in- 
deed, but one dissenting voice, and one other that was doubtful, among 
all those I conversed with. The army continued its march, and, on the 
19th of February, encamped about four miles on the north of the north 
branch of the Withlacoochee, burning another town, just previously to 
occupying that camp, which appeared, also, to have been abandoned sev- 
eral days. We found, at this camp, the remains of what appeared to have 
been the encampment of Major Dade, consisting of a smalt square breast- 
work. On the following morning, about I) o'clock, the army arrived at 
tlie scene of the massacre of Major Dade and his command, which was 
reported to have occurred on the 28th of December previous. The bodies 
of the dead, found at that place, received honorable burial, and the army 
continued its march, arriving, on the 22d of the month, at Fort King. 
The day following, to wit, the 23d, a detachment of the 4th infantry, un- 
der the command of Lieutenant Colonel Foster, was despatched to Fort 
Diane, for information and supplies, there being no supplies adequate to 
the purposes of a campaign at Fort King. Colonel Foster returned on 
the evening of the next day, by a forced march, bringing with him, I 
think, seven days' rations for the command of General Gaines, lie was 
accompanied from Fort Drane by General Clinch. On the 2Gth of Feb- 
ruary, General Gaines resumed his maich, in the direction towards a point 
on the Withlacoochee river where it was understood General Clinch had 



519 [ 224 ] 

fought a battle on the 31st of December. The army arrived at this point 
on the afternoon of the 27th. While the General was reconnoitring 
the river, a little above the crossing, the centre and the left wing were 
fired on by the Seminoles, from the opposite side of the river. The bag- 
gage-train had been ordered to halt at a convenient place for encamp- 
ment, as it was understood not to be the purpose of the General to cross 
the river that night. The firing of the enemy was, of course, returned, 
and, alter continuing perhaps half an hour, the General directed Colonel 
Twiggs, his second in command, and who had been appointed to the im- 
mediate command of the brigade, as a light brigade, to withdraw from the 
river, after the men should have become familial with the new scene that 
had been presented to them, or words to this effect. The army withdrew 
and encamped accordingly, having sustained a loss of one man killed and 
several wounded. The crossing-place, at this point of the river, was 
covered with a dense swamp of about a quarter of a mile in width. It 
was understood that a few miles below, the open pine woods approached 
the bank of the river upon both sides, where the friendly Indians with us 
reported it to be the habit of the Indians to drive cattle across. The 
army, on the morning of the 28th, moved down to this place, perhaps two 
miles from the point last mentioned. The advance-guard, commanded 
by Lieutenant Izard, of the dragoons, acting brigade major, was here 
fired upon, and Lieutenant Izard mortally wounded The advance was 
sustained by two companies of the 4th infantry, and a portion of the vol- 
unteers were this day also on the bank of the river. The firing contin- 
ued actoss the river, I think, until between 12 and 1 o'clock. The In- 
dian yell was continuous nearly the whole of this time. At one time it 
appeared to be very greatly increased, as if by the accession of new force. 
This was attributed by the friendly Indians to the arrival of Micanopy, 
the principal chief of the nation, with his warriors, supposed to be 800 in 
number, and the opinion was general that the main force of the enemy 
was then in our neighborhood. The army encamped that afternoon, and 
in the evening, an express was despatched by General Gaines to Fort 
Drane, with a communication for General Clinch, or the officer command- 
ing the forces in that part of Florida. On the morning of the 2Dth of 
February, the Indian yell, which had continued the principal part of the 
previous night, ceased entirely, until about 10 o'clock in the morning, 
when a firing w T as poured into our camp upon three sides. The firing 
continued about two hours, or a little over, when the enemy was driven 
olf, leaving, contrary to their custom, one of their killed, who fell into 
our possession. On the evening of this day, another despatch was sent 
to Fort Drane, directed as in the former instance. From about mid-day 
of the 29th of February until the afternoon of the 2d of March, there was 
no tiring whatever upon our camp. In the afternoon of the 2d, a small 
party of the enemy, from a westerly direction, threw in a volley and dis- 
appeared. This mode of annoyance continued, more or less, from that 
time until the evening of the 5th of the month, sometimes at night. Up 
to this time, the loss at that camp, on our side, had been Lieutenant Izard, 
wounded on the 28th, who died on the 5th of March ; one sergeant of 
artillery killed ; two Louisiana volunteers also killed, and thirty or forty 
wounded. In the evening of the 5th of March, about 10 o'clock, a loud 
voice was heard from the woods, hailing our camp, and some one declar- 
ed that the Indians had had fighting enough — that they wanted to come 



[ 224 ] 520 

in, have a friendly talk with the white people, and make peace. He was 
answered, by direction of the General, that if their chief would come in 
with a white flag the next morning they should not be fired upon. The 
man from the woods answered — " Very well, they would come in after 
breakfast," and bade us good night. On the morning following, I think 
about 10 o'clock, Indians were seen filing from the west and east sides 
of the camp, several hundred yards distant, passing out from the river, 
and uniting in the rear of our camp, perhaps GOO yards distant. They 
were estimated to be about 300 in number. From this body, a few In- 
dians were seen advancing towards the camp, with a white flag. They 
were first met from our camp by Adjutant Barrow, of the Louisiana vol- 
unteers, who reported to General Gaines that the Indians stated that 
they did not wish to fight any more, but they wished him to go away. I 
was directed by the General to go out, and hear what the Indians had to 
sa"y. I requested two gentlemen to go with me, Doctor Harra!, of the 
Louisiana volunteers, and Adjutant Barrow, before mentioned, desiring 
them to bear in mind that I had the instructions of the General, and would 
attend to them, requesting them to witness what passed. On this occa- 
sion, I met, at the distance of about 150 yards from the camp, several of 
the Indian chiefs, with their principal interpreter ; among the former 
were Jumper, understood to be the principal adviser of Micanopy, the 
king of the nation, and Occola, or Powell, who was regarded to be among 
the principal war chiefs — there was another, who was called Alligator. 
The names of the others were unknown to me. On the part of the In- 
dians, the council was conducted by Jumper, through his interpreter. I 
had with me an employed interpreter, from our camp, who was directed 
not to make himself known, but to listen to what might be said among 
the Indians. Jumper, at first, inquired of me what I had to say. I an- 
swered — " Nothing, to him, but that 1 had come to hear what they had 
to say." They then repeated the purport of what had been declared the 
night before, from- the woods, adding that they had lost many of their 
warriors, killed and wounded, or disabled ; that they did not wish to 
lose any more, but wanted to make peace. I communicated this to the 
General. 

I will state that I had had many conversations with the General, on the 
subject of the proper manner of treating with Indians. In these conversa- 
tions, he had invariably declared that he would not deal with them on any 
other than the known and acknowledged principles which should govern 
in the intercourse of civilized nations ; 'declaring that the ignorance and 
dependance of the Indians made it more obligatory, on our part, to deal 
with them honorably and justly. It was in reference to these conversa- 
tion^, as I understood, that the General had directed me to confer with 
the Indians, observing, " You know my principles," or something to this 
effect. In accordance with this, I stated, in general terms to the Indians, 
that General Gaines was the commanding officer in our camp- The In- 
dians said they knew General Gaines, had seen him many years before, 
expressed their confidence in him — that he was a good man, and appeared 
pleased to find that he was the commanding officer in our camp. 1 stated 
to them that General Gaines was but one of several chiefs who had been 
sent by the President of the United States among them to enforce upon 
them a peace. I desired to show them that they would of necessity be 



521 f 221 J 

compelled to submit, and, for this purpose, I endeavored to give them an 
idea of the extent of territory occupied by the whites, and of their dense 
population, using the simile' perhaps often resorted to in Indian councils, 
that the whites covered the country like the trees of their forests. After 
talking to them some little time, in language like this, assuring them over 
and over again that they would be compelled to submit, they answered 
that they would take council among themselves — would assemble again 
in the afternoon, and we would have another talk. At this council with 
the Indians, I stated that General Gaines had not come among them for 
the purpose of investigating the causes of the war. That possibly they 
might suppose they had been much wronged ; but that, if so, I presumed 
they had satisfied themselves — alluding to the destruction of Major Dade, 
and the like instances of success on their part. Oceola remarked, " I am 
satisfied," as it was interpreted. I supposed he alluded to an act attrib- 
uted to him near Fort King, by which the Indian agent, who had put him 
in chains, came by his death. 

In the afternoon, the chiefs came to council in the same manner as in 
the morning. I had, in the mean time, been advised by the General that 
he did not feel authorized to make any terms with them ; that if, how- 
ever, they persisted in asking for peace, I must give to them conditions, 
and require them to pledge themselves to obedience to them. These 
conditions were, that they should cease entirely from all acts of hostility 
against the whites ; that they should cross to the south side of the With- 
lacoochee, and promise to attend a council, when and where they should 
be sent for by a chief who was soon expected to be there. This relerred 
to General Scott, who was believed to be in the vicinity of our camp, 
not more than thirty miles distant. The chiefs answered that their prin- 
cipal chief, Micanopy, was not with them, and had not been with them 
for several days ; they wanted time to consult him ; that they could not 
make any permanent arrangement without doing so ; but that, for their 
own parts, they engaged to comply with the terms dictated to them by 
GeneralGaines. To preventany misunderstanding of these terms, I repeat- 
ed them, one by one, distinctly twice over. On concluding the last, there 
was an indication of some approaching force from the north. The Indi- 
ans at a distance called to those in council, and made signs to them to go 
away. I immediately supposed this to arise from the approach of troops 
from Fort Drane, and told the chiefs to hasten their men away and put 
them in security. They accordingly went off, and went into a hammock 
to the east of our camp. The force, as I supposed, approached our camp, 
but, contrary to my expectation, instead of being commanded by General 
Scott, was commanded by General Clinch. General Clinch brought sup- 
plies of two days' rations of pork and flour, with about forty head of cat- 
tle. The rations in our camp had become almost entirely exhausted, in 
so much that some of the volunteer companies, from improvidence, or 
want of acquaintance with the proper means of taking care of their ra- 
tions, had been three or four days without the proper army ration ; the 
orders of the General, given, I think, on the 28th of the month, for the 
command to go on half rations, not having been strictly complied with, it 
was about, the 4th of March, if I mistake not, that some horses were kill- 
ed, and the meat distributed to those who desired it ; and this was again 
done on the 5th. 



[ 224 ] 522 

After the council, stated in my testimony, the troops continued at Camp 
Izard, until the morning of the 10th, during which time I heard not a 
rifle or an Indian yell. Our own men were on the banks of the river, at 
pleasure, without being disturbed. About the 10th, the command was 
assigned to General Clinch, under whose orders the troops marched to 
Fort Drane. 

1 will remark that, during the councils held with the Indians, there 
was much repetition, as is usual, I believe, in Indian councils ; but the 
purport is what I have stated in my testimony. At the time I attended 
this council, besides the two gentlemen who went, at my request, there 
was another, Captain Marks, who went, I believe, of his own accord. 
Some few weeks ago, I thought proper to address letters to two of these 
gentlemen, requesting them to furnish me a statement of what took place 
at the council. I did not write to Adjutant Barrow solely because I did 
not know where a letter would find him. These are the letters which I 
have received in answer. 

[The Judge Advocate here read the two letters which will be found 
accompanying these Proceedings, Nos. 34, 35.] 

3. Question by the Court. Were there any sorties made from the camp 
upon the enemy in any one of the attacks made by him whilst the army 
lay there ; and what was the strength of the army at the time ? 

Answer. The army was about one thousand strong, a (ew over per- 
haps, and no sortie was made. It may be proper to add to this answer 
that one wing of each of the several bodies occupying the faces of the 
square had been ordered by General Gaines to be held in readiness for 
a sortie, should he think proper to order one. This order was given on 
the afternoon of the 29th of February. 

4. Question by the Court. When and how many attacks did the enemy 
make upon the army whilst fortified at Camp Izard, and with what re- 
sults ? 

Answer. My answer is imbodied already in my testimony. Subse- 
quently to the 29th of February, but very small parties appeared in the 
neighborhood of our camp, or fired upon us ; the largest was on the 3d 
day of the month, when there was considerable firing, but, I believe, no 
injury done whatever. During these several days, it was a subject of very 
frequent, and, on my part, anxious [doubt] with the General, as to whether 
the Indians had not abandoned that part of the country, so few of them 
appearing about our camp. I was apprehensive that the Indians, finding 
it impossible to move us, would leave that section of the country, and go 
into what is called the Ever-glades. I frequently expressed this appre- 
hension to the General, suggesting that activity of movement on his part 
at that place might be likely to produce that result, in which case the 
campaign would be lengthened, embarrassed, if not defeated, and the 
blame of it would attach to him. He remarked upon his want of mount- 
ed men to pursue any advantage he might gain in a sortie, and referred 
to his letter of express to Fort Drane, confidently expressing his expect- 
ation that General Scott would be there in person to receive his express 
with the species of force most needed, and that he would certainly come 
down. 

5. Question by the Court. What effect did it have on the spirit and 



523 f 224 J 

conduct of the troops, in being held within our lines, when the enemy 
made his several attacks upon them ? 

Answer. I am not aware of any special effect produced by that state 
of things. There was the most perfect order prevailing in camp ; a 
prompt obedience to every order, and indeed a spirit altogether worthy 
the soldier. 

6. Questlonby the Court. Was the army on the Withlacoochee, under 
Major General Gaines, strong enough and well enough appointed to have 
attacked the enemy with a prospect of success ? 

Ansiver. In my opinion, the army could have beaten the enemy at that 
place, and driven him at any time ; but there were no means for pursuing 
him with any effect. 

7. Question by the Court. What do you suppose was the strength of 
the enemy that invested Camp Izard, and how do you form an estimate ? 

Answer. I believe the enemy was not less than 1,300 strong on the 
29th of February, possibly more numerous. This opinion is founded 
upon the extent of ground occupied by them, to wit : On the east face 
of the camp, against about the middle of it, rested their left, and from 
that place they extended around the rear and the right, running into the 
hammock on the right, at a distance of, perhaps, from fifty to one hun- 
dred yards. The faces of our camp were about two hundred yards in 
extent. A circumstance occurred on the 1st of March of this nature : 
The Indians passed out from the river, east of our camp, in single file, 
marching past the rear of it about six hundred yards distance, and re- 
crossed the river west of us. They were observed, as I understood from 
Doctor Heiskell, by a watch, passing a given point of space, and 
he assured me, on two several occasions, that they were thirty minutes 
in passing in a rapid movement. From this data it would appear that 
there scarcely could have been less than fifteen hundred ; there might 
have been four or five hundred negroes among them. 

8. Question by the Court. What was the condition of the troops, whilst 
at Camp Izard, in respect to supplies of arms and ammunition ? 

Answer. At Fort King, previously to marching to the Withlacoochee, 
there was an average of about fifty cartridges to a man. I derive this 
from personal inspection of the troops at that place. The field-piece, a 
six-pounder, was furnished with fifty rounds of grape, and a few charges 
of round shot. The arms were chiefly muskets and yeagers ; the yeagers 
having been issued to perhaps three or four of the companies of the vol- 
unteers ; they were in good firing order. 

9. Question by the Court. Do you think that Major General Gaines 
had it in his power at any time, with the means in his hands, and the 
appointments of his forces, to have marched upon the enemy and subdued 
him, had the enemy availed himself of the fastnesses of the country 
well known to him ? 

Answer. I believe they would have escaped any pursuit he might have 
made with his force. With regard to the effect of a sortie, it is a problem 
of which, perhaps, any one may form an opinion, from a consideration of 
the facts which I will state. The Indians appeared to have a great faci- 
lity in crossing the river ; the banks of the river above and below our 
camp were lined with a dense swamp. Had a sortie been made, the In- 



[ 224 ] 524 

dians would have rushed into this swamp on one side or the other, and 
by their knowledge of the best passages through it, and their facility in 
crossing the river, would, in all probability, have alluded any pursuit that 
could have been made from our camp. In the event of a sortie, there 
would, in all probability, have been a loss on both sides, but, it is my 
impression, without producing any beneficial results. The Indians were 
expending their ammunition, while our fire was reserved, and we were 
daily in the expectation of force from Fort Drane, especially of mounted 
men, a species of force of which we had none. 

1. Question by General Gaines. Was the river passable without boats 
or rafts at the place first approached ? 

Answer. It was not. 

2. Question by General Gaines. Will you state the cause of our eating 
the meat of horses? whether it was not deemed to be more manly and 
proper for troops to eat horse-meat, than to suffer the enemy to attack the 
frontier ? 

Answer. I have always considered that the readiness and willingness 
with which the men sustained themselves upon that food, rather than fall 
back from the position assumed, did them the highest credit, as evincing 
a noble spirit. 

3. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to state what 
he knows in reference to my view's and wishes towards Major General 
Scott, relating to the campaign in Florida. 

Answer. The first intimation received by General Gaines of the orders 
assigning General Scott to duty in Florida, was at Pensacola, about the 
Gth of February. I saw General Gaines very soon after he received this 
information. He made no especial remarks that I remember, in relation 
to General Scott himself at that time. On our way to Tampa bay he 
frequently spoke of him, and of difficulties which had existed between 
himself and General Scott in years gone by. He declared many times, 
indeed, invariably, in effect, that he had outlived all feelings of personal 
animosity towards that officer; that, on no account whatever, would he 
suffer any private or personal feelings to interpose any obstacles to the 
accomplishment of the duties then contemplated in Florida, declaring it 
to be his purpose, without making it a question, to relinquish the com- 
mand to General Scott, on meeting with him, should he desire it ; or, if 
General Scott pleased, General Gaines would unite with him in efforts 
to put an end to the war. These sentiments were expressed repeatedly 
from Pensacola, by Tampa bay, at Fort King, and on the Withlacoochee 
river, where, at this latter place, on one occasion in particular, lie spoke 
of the certainty with which he expected the arrival of General Scott at 
that place, and declared it to be his purpose to offer him his hand in the 
presence of a common enemy, and endeavor then and there for ever to 
put an end to their personal difficulties as an appropriate place. 

The Court here adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock. 

January 13, 1S37. 
The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 



t»i» 



525 f 224 J 

Captain's Hitchcock'' s testimony continued. 

4. Question by General Gaines. What circumstances occurred to 
change the views and feelings of General Gaines towards General Scott, 
as expressed by the witness in his last answer ? 

Answer. When General Clinch arrived at the Withiacoochee river on 
the Gth of March, he brought with him certain letters from General Scott, 
addressed to himself, in which the conduct of General Gaines under- 
went very severe strictures. It was also reported that General Scott 
had been much in the habit of making extraordinary remarks upon the 
movement of General Gaines, even in the hearing of his volunteers. 
One of the letters alluded to was shown to General Gaines by General 
Clinch ; the other, I believe, was not exhibited, in consequence of the 
extraordinary nature of its contents, but the purport of it was matter of 
general conversation in the camp. General Gaines appeared to be much 
inflamed and highly incensed at these letters and rumors. 

[The Judge Advocate here read to the Court the letters (referred to 
in this answer) from General Scott to General Clinch, dated the 1st and 
4th of March, 1836.] 

5. Question by General Gaines. State what were the motives and cir- 
cumstances which induced me to undertake the campaign to East Florida 
against the Seminole Indians in the last winter. 

Answer. Major General Gaines arrived at Mobile on the 17th of Jan- 
uary, 1836. A few days previous to this, intelligence had been 
received of the entire destruction of Major Dade and his command in 
Florida, of about eight officers and one hundred men. I received a mes- 
sage from General Gaines, (being in Mobile myself, and on leave of 
absence,) requesting to see me. J called upon him immediately, and he 
stated that he had but a short time previously left his headquarters at 
Memphis, but with no expectation of being required to take the field 
against an enemy ; that he was without his personal staff, and referring 
to the intelligence stated above, he did me the honor to request me to 
join his military family, for purposes connected with the protection of the 
people of Florida. The day following (the 18th January) further intel- 
ligence was received from Florida, to the effect that General Clinch had 
had a meeting with the enemy ; had fought a battle with them ; had been 
abandoned by the volunteers who had joined him, (their term of service 
having expired ;) and that, in consequence, he had been obliged to fall 
back upon Fort King, where, as the report said, he was invested by the 
enemy, and in danger of being' cut off. It was in consequence of this 
new information, as I believe, that the order of that date, addressed to 
Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, in New Orleans, was issued. General Gaines 
proceeded to Pensacola, with the view to request the co-operation of the 
navy on that station, in the purpose he then contemplated of going to 
Florida. His wishes in this respect had been anticipated. He returned 
to New Orleans, arriving there about the 26th of January, and the most 
active exertions were made to receive into the service, and equip for a 
campaign, the volunteers alluded to in the order above mentioned. The 
troops being in readiness to embark, left New Orleans about the morning 
of the 4th February. During the whole of this period, and for some time 



[ 224 ] 526 

after, the prevailing sentiment of General Gaines, as discovered by the 
whole tenor of his remarks, and by his conduct, was a profound sensi- 
bility to the loss of our brave brothers in arms in Florida, and to the ex- 
posed condition of the people in that section of the country. Previous 
to leaving New Orleans, among other reports that were circulated, it 
was stated that Tallahassee had been burned and destroyed by the ene- 
my. This and other rumors produced a general excitement throughout 
the section of country in Louisiana, that induced extraordinary exertions 
on the part of the Executive and Legislative authorities of the State, and 
I suppose it would have been impossible for any officer, situated as Gene- 
ral Gaines then was, having proper feelings, and a proper sense of his 
duty, to have hesitated a moment, but that he must have gone on the ex- 
pedition to Florida. 

In consequence of the indisposition of one of the members of the 
Court, the Court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock. 

January 14, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The testimony of Captain Hitchcock continued. 

6. Question by General Gaines. You have said that General Gaines, 
while at Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, expected the arrival of 
General Scott at that place, soon after he should hear that the principal 
force of the enemy were found upon that section of the Withlacoochee. 
Will you state to the Court the grounds of this expectation ? whether it 
was that he had expressed a wish to know where the principal force of 
the enemy could be found, or that it was his duty to hasten to that theatre 
of the war ? 

Answer. The expectation alluded to in this question, that General Scott 
would arrive on the Withlacoochee very soon after receiving the inform- 
ation from General Gaines that the Indians were there in force, was 
founded, first, upon a letter from General Scott to General Clinch, and 
by General Clinch shown to General Gaines at Fort King, in which he 
inquires where the enemy's force may be found, or to that effect, ex- 
pressing a strong hope that they would be found in the upper part of the 
Territory, rather than in what is called the Everglades ; and from inform- 
ation communicated by General Clinch at the same time and place, that 
General Scott had despatched a force from Picolata, of mounted men, 
to Fort Drane ; that he himself would be there, as nearly as I can recol- 
lect, about the time of the arrival of this force. The time of the arrival, 
in the opinion of General Clinch, would be within the month of Feb- 
ruary. The mounted force alluded to in my testimony was referred to, 
I believe, in one of the despatches of General Gaines from the Withla- 
coochee. 

7. Question by General Gaines. Did General Gaines express any other 
reasons for believing that General Scott would not nor could not, upon 
known principles of military law, hesitate to repair to the Withlacoochee, 
on hearing of the enemy being at that place ? If so, what were the rea- 
sons so expressed by General Gaines ? 






527 [ 224 ] 

Answer. The confidence of General Gaines that General Scott would 
come down to the Withlacoochee was without reservation. He appeared 
to have an undoubting belief of General Scott's being at Fort Drane, 
and often spoke of his duty to come down, under the circumstances, in 
the most positive terms. His language on the subject was very strong, 
to wit : that he must come down ; he will be disgraced if he does not 
come down ; he will commit suicide upon his military reputation if he 
fails to come down — or language of similar import. On one occasion, I 
took the liberty of suggesting to General Gaines the expediency of pre- 
paring litters to move the wounded, in the event of General Scott's not 
joining us. He declined authorizing me to give the order, explaining 
himself by the use of language like that I have stated in reference to 
General Scott's coming down. In all the conversations had on the With- 
lacoochee, in reference to the force coming from Fort Drane, General 
Scott was the officer spoken of as commanding at Fort Drane, and I do 
not remember a single instance where any doubt was suggested as to his 
being there. In many conversations with General Gaines at the With- 
lacoochee, he dwelt with great emphasis upon the great importance and 
duty of officers complying with their engagements affecting movements 
in the field, especially in an enemy's country. He considered General 
Scott under an engagement to be at Fort Drane, the exact day is unknown 
to me, but about the time of the arrival of General Gaines's despatches 
to Fort Drane. 

8. Question by General Gaines. The witness is requested to describe 
the hammocks near my encampment on the Withlacoochee, and state the 
time at which that encampment was formed ? 

Answer. The hammocks bordering the river, very nearly united im- 
mediately in front of the camp : from this point, both above and below, 
they gained very rapidly in width and were extremely dense, especially 
to the east or above the camp, where the hammock extends considerably 
back from the stream, but at a distance of several hundred yards from the 
camp. The river itself has not the bend as represented in the map I 
hold, the curve being much larger. A slight breastwork was made around 
the camp on the afternoon of the 28th of February, according to custom. 

9. Question by General Gaines. How many Indians does the witness 
believe could have secreted themselves in either of those hammocks, 
and within 200 to GOO yards of my camp, without being seen by my 
troops at any time during the day ? 

Answer. An indefinite number. The hammocks were very extensive, 
and might have contained, perhaps, three times the whole strength of the 
nation. 

10. Question by the Court. Do you know any thing of the motives 
which induced Major General Gaines to proceed to Florida, after re- 
ceiving, at Pensacola, the letter of the Adjutant General, dated the 22d 
of January ? 

Answer. One of the first remarks made by General Gaines on receiv- 
ing that letter — I mean in the first interview I had with him — he said he 
believed it to be his solemn duty to go on. 1 think he spoke of some 
pledge made, I believe to the volunteers; but he alluded more particu- 
larly to his letter to General Clinch, promising him aid and co-operation. 
I think all these points were matters of conversation at the very first, and 



f 224 528 

were never deviated from. I took the liberty of urging General Gaines 
by no means to abandon the expedition at that place, (Pensacola,) giving 
it as my belief that his presence was necessary to the efficient organiza- 
tion of the troops. 1 am not positive as to the extent of these remarks 
at Pensacola; but between that place and Tampa bay, they were more 
or less referred to. It was my belief that his abandoning the troops 
would be very nearly equivalent to rendering the expedition fruitless. 
I placed great stress upon the effect of the reputation acquired by (Gen- 
eral Gaines during the war with Great Britain, and upon his knowledge 
and experience as a soldier. I do not wish to imply or convey an idea 
to the Court that the several officers immediately junior to General 
Gaines were not officers of great merit; but neither one of them pos- ] 
sessed all the requisites united in General Gaines, for securing success 
to the campaign. 

1 1. Question by the Court. What was the amount and character of the 
force brought by General Clinch to the relief General Gaines at Camp 
Izard ? 

Answer. He brought about five hundred men with him, artillery, in- 
fantry, and volunteers, including one troop of mounted men, the number 
I do not recollect. 

12. Question by the Court. World not that force, united with the 
force then at Camp Izard, have been sufficient to meet the enemy suc- 
cessfully ; or to have pursued them to their fastnesses, with a prospect of 
finding and subduing them? 

Answer. This question calls for my opinion. I will state that the 
facility which the Indians seemed to possess, renders it, in my opinion, 
indispensable to have had a force sufficient to occupy both sides of the 
river at the same time, in order to operate with effect against them. To 
sustain this opinion, I will refer the Court to later operations on the 
Withlacoochee, about the end of March, when a very much larger force 
came in contact with a body of those Indians, more or less numerous; 
being on the same side with them, pursued them several miles, but did 
not take or subdue them. The more recent operations against those 
Indians may serve to throw much light upon this question, as in no 
instance does it appear that a pursuit of the Indians has been success- 
ful. 

13. Question by the Court. Do you believe the Indians were sincere 
in proposing a truce ? 

Answer. I believe they were perfectly sincere. I will remark, in 
reference to this question, that there was nothing in the manner or 
matter of the interview which 1 had with the Indians on the Withla- 
coochee, to give me the smallest suspicion of their sincerity. There 
seemed to be a peculiar sadness over them, as if thoughtful of the 1 
misfortunes of their tribe, indicating that further hostility on their part 
was hopeless. I thought them sincere, and, in that opinion, all who 
were present entirely concurred with me; and I am the more inclined to 
continue in that belief from several considerations. Although wars 
among Indian tribes are, sometimes, of very long duration, it is seldom 
that active warlike movements among them continue for any great 
length of time. With tribes at war, there may be years of cessation 
of the war, when a war-party, as it is called, is got up, with con- 



E*b 



529 [ 224 ] 

siderable formality, with a feast and a war-dance, and the party will 
make what they call a strike at the enemy, return from the expedition, 
and celebrate their success, if successful, with the scalp-dance. But this 
kind of war cannot be carried on against the whites. To carry on war 
against the whites, the Indians are compelled to imbody themselves in 
large numbers, making it difficult for them to obtain supplies of ammunition, 
provision, or clothing. In Florida, the enemy had, I believe, been so 
imbodied for some length of time ; they had had, I believe, some special 
causes for the war, which had, in part, been removed, especially by the 
conduct of Oceola, near Fort King, and 1 believed his language to me in 
council, that " he was satisfied," had reference to that conduct. I have 
heard of other similar instances. The Indians had been successful in 
the destruction of Major Dade's command, and they had killed many 
more than they had lost. General Gaines having taken a position in 
their neighborhood, which they had found it impossible to move, they 
must have seen that they could not, in future, have procured from above 
the supply of provisions, consisting of cattle, which they had before 
drawn from thence. The opinion among them, that this position was 
likely to be permanently held, was calculated to break down their spirit. 
I have never doubted that the Indians were informed of the movement 
of General Clinch from Fort Drane on the 5th of March. I believe that 
the Indians, in the knowledge of this, saw additional reason to suppose 
that they could not maintain themselves in the country; and that, taking 
council on the evening of the 5th, they had concluded to make overtures 
of peace ; and I have always believed they would have accepted terms 
such as would have been worthy of this great nation to dictate to them, 
had there been authority there to conclude a peace. There was not, in 
the council I held with the Indians, any thing said about the terms of a 
peace. They made no proposition to me whatever. They asked for 
nothing; stipulated for nothing beyond what I have stated in my testi- 
mony. They were told by me that they should be sent for to council ; 
but that, in the mean time, they must abstain from war, and promise to 
attend the council when sent for. They engaged to all that freely, and 
with apparent alacrity. During the time that the troops remained at 
Fort Drane, after that, to wit, from the 11th to the 2Gth of March, as I 
have understood and believe, there was no sign of any hostility of the 
Indians in that part of the country. They had abundant opportunities to 
annoy the troops at that post, which were scattered over an extent of 
country of several miles in diameter, accommodating themselves with 
wood and water. Even before I left there, and, as I have heard after- 
wards, the officers and men were passing, at pleasure, between the sev- 
eral corps of the army thus dispersed, and provisions were sent to these 
several corps without once being disturbed. General Gaines and his 
staff, a party of four, during that time, travelled from Fort Drane to 
Tallahassee, through a country that had been before, and was afterwards, 
in possession of the Indians, without molestation, and without suspicion 
of danger, so far as I know. I have always believed that the Indians 
had a right to suppose that no further hostile demonstrations would be 
made against them, until they should have been sent for and heard in 
council. When the hostile movement took place from Fort Drane, about 
the 20th of March, the rear was fired upon by the Indians, and, I have 



( 224 530 

understood, a baggage-wagon, or perhaps two, cut off. I have regarded 
this as an evidence that the Indians w r ere fully informed of the exposed 
position of the several corps around Fort Drane ; but, as long as they 
could hope to be sent for to council, they abstained from annoying those 
corps, in compliance with their engagement on the Withlacoochee river. 

10. Question by General Gaines. What reason had General Gaines 
for suspending his operations against the Seminole Indians, on and after 
the 6th of March, 1836? 

Answer. The fact that the enemy had raised a white flag ; had asked 
for peace ; had been told the conditions ; had promised to abide by those 
conditions, by which they were to have a council with a view to settle 
the terms of that peace. 

14. Question by the Court. Were they informed, in council, that a 
large army was approaching ? 

Ansiver. I stated, in the body of my testimony, that I informed 
the Indians that General Gaines was but one of several chiefs sent against 
them by the President of the United States, to enforce a peace upon 
them. I of course intended to convey to the Court the fact that those 
chiefs were not alone, but were accompanied by large forces. The ob- 
ject of this information was that stated in the body of my testimony, to 
assure the enemy of the great power of the white people ; that they, the 
Indians, could not withstand it, and that they would be compelled to 
submit. I was not myself informed, and of course did not communicate 
to the Indians, the time at which these forces would arrive. That in- 
formation was communicated by the signal-guns, which, I have under- 
stood, were directed to be fired by the several divisions of the army 
aproaching the Withlacoochee. The Indians occupied a central position, 
and were much more likely to have heard those guns than the army 
divisions themselves. I will add to this answer, that the Indians are, 
perhaps, the best scouts and spies in the world, and it would have been 
next to impossible for a large force to have approached their strong- 
hold, in that stage of the war, without their knowledge. 

11. Question by General Gaines. Was it or was it not after the In- 
dians sued for peace, that they were told that other forces were ordered 
into the country against them ? 

Answer. It was after they sued for peace. 

15. Question by the Court. While you were in the fortified camp on 
the Withlacoochee, were there any preparations made for a sortie by 
order of General Gaines ? If so, state the force or corps, and the officers 
appointed to the command of the troops ordered for that purpose. 

Answer. The troops in the camp were disposed in the form of a 
square. The order was for one wing of each face of the square to be 
held in readiness for a sortie, directions being given for the other wing 
to extend. Colonel Foster would have been one of the officers on the 
right. I believe General Smith himself would have commanded the sor- 
tie on the left. I am not able, at this time, to give the names of the 
other officers. The order was given on the 29th of February, in the 
afternoon, and communicated by myself to Colonel Twiggs, commanding 
the light brigade. A previous order on the subject had, I believe, been 
communicated by some other officer. It is my opinion that, had the attack 
been renewed, in character, like that of the morning of the 29th, a sortie 



ma 



531 [ C24 J 



would have been made ; but, after that attack, there was no serious at- 
tack made while we were on the Withlacoochee. There were but 
small parties engaged, from time to time, in endeavors to annoy us. 
This circumstance was itself a source of alarm, lest the Indians had aban- 
doned that part of the country, to the disappointment of the hope of 
General Scott, expressed in a letter to General Clinch, and which had 
been seen at Fort King. The first order for the preparations for a sortie 
was, I believe, given, not through myself, but through some other officer. 
Colonel Foster came to me and made a suggestion as to a mere de- 
tail, desiring me to communicate it to General Gaines, f did so, and 
received his orders thereon, which were communicated as above stated. 
General Gaines, on several occasions, spoke of the probability of an ar- 
rival of troops, other than those expected from Fort Drane, especially 
speaking of Colonel Lindsay, who was supposed to have arrived at 
Tampa bay, and declared it to be his purpose instantly to move in any 
direction from which reports of firing might be heard. Log canoes 
were constructed, and were then in the camp, with rived boards, to 
be used for purposes of making platforms on the canoes, to cross the 
river; the General saying that he would cross the river instantly, on 
hearing a gun from the other side. 

The Court adjourned to meet on the 17th instant, at 11 o'clock. 

Tuesday, January IT, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Captain G. A. McCall, of the 4th regiment of infantry, a witness, 
being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by the Court. Will you state to the Court, as nearly as 
you can recollect, the occurrences that transpired on the Withlacoochee, 
after the army, under Major General Gaines, reached that place, and 
during the time it remained in Camp Izard ? 

Answer. The army reached the Withlacoochee between one and two 
o'clock on the 27th of February. On arriving at the encamping ground 
of General Clinch, the column was halted, and the rear guard left in 
charge of the baggage-train. With the advance and main column, General 
Gaines proceeded to the river bank for the purpose of reconnoitring the 
crossing. A half hour, or more, had been passed in examining the depth 
of the water where the trail struck, when the General was fired upon by a 
party of eight or ten Indians, and, immediately after, the fight commenced 
from across the river. In half an hour the firing very nearly ceased, 
after which, the troops encamped on the ground formerly occupied by 
General Clinch. The Indians who had acted as guides then declared 
that the ford they were seeking must be some miles lower down. The 
General determined to proci , d u, the point indicated, and the next morn- 
ing, a little after sunrise, the columns were in motion for that point. As 
the advance-guard arrived on the river-bank, the Indians from the oppo- 
site bank opened a fire upon them, by which Lieutenant Izard, in com- 
mand of the advance, was mortally wounded. The advance was imme- 
35 



[ 224 ] 532 

diately sustained by two companies of the 4th infantry ; and one company 
of volunteers was posted higher up the river. The tire was kept up, at 
intervals, across the river until about one o'clock. In the mean time, a 
working-party had been detailed to prepare canoes and flooring for a 
pontoon bridge, and it was expected that every thing would be in readi- 
ness for crossing by noon the next day. At about four o'clock that after- 
noon, a very loud whooping was heard, as of a party advancing down 
the river on the opposite side. This was answered by the Indians op- 
posite to us ; and the friendly Indians with us declared it to be Micanopy, 
whose force they estimated at about eight hundred warriors, coming to 
reinforce the Mickasuky Indians. They remarked, also, that they must 
be whipped for three days in succession before they would give up. 
These circumstances determined General Gaines to write to General 
Clinch for an additional supply of ammunition and provisions, requesting 
him to bring down any mounted force he might have with him, as he con- 
sidered that species of troops essential. The following morning I accom- 
panied General Gaines on a reconnaisance of the ground immediately in 
front, and on the left of the encampment on the river. Very soon after he 
returned, the working-party, which was a short distance to the left of the 
encampment, was fired upon, and immediately afterwards, a heavy fire 
was opened on three sides of the encampment. The troops had been 
directed not to throw away a shot, and never to fire 'without good aim, 
and a foil striking distance. This order was observed with great cool- 
ness, and a heavy fire was sometimes sustained for several minutes, with- 
out a shot being returned. The fight continued, without intermission, 
for upwards of two hours, when the Indians retired, and did not make 
their appearance again that day. The loss of the troops this day, was 
one sergeant killed, and thirty-odd officers and men wounded ; among 
the latter were General Gaines and Lieutenant Duncan. After the 
action, the work was resumed, for the purpose of completing the mate- 
rials for the bridge. That evening General Gaines sent another express 
to General Clinch, informing him of the occurrences of the morning, 
saying that he had abstained from a sortie, and should continue to do so 
until he heard from him, lest a sortie might disperse the Indians, without 
resulting in any important advantage. On the following morning the 
Indians did not reappear, as was expected, nor did they appear in force 
again until the 3d of March, when they directed upon the camp, for about 
an hour, a fire nearly as warm as that of the 29th of February, and, at 
intervals, until the 5th of March ; on which day, at about nine P. M., a 
voice was heard hailing the camp. It was at first supposed to be a re- 
turn express, and he was desired to advance. The voice of the negro 
was then heard to say " that the Indians were tired of fighting, and 
wished to come in in the morning and shake hands." He was told 
that if the Indians appeared in the morning with a white flag, they 
would be heard. About nine o'clock the following morning, a body 
of about three hundred Indians appeared some four or six hundred yards 
in the rear of the encampment, with a white flag. After some hesitation, 
three of their party advanced, and were met by Adjutant Barrow, of the 
Louisiana volunteers, who, after a short time, returned and said that the 
Indians told him they had lost many warriors, desired peace, and were 
willing to shake hands. Captain Hitchcock was then directed to meet 



fiEA 



533 [ 224 ] 

them and hear particularly what they had to say. On his return, he 
reported that the Indians were apparently subdued in spirit, and 
seemed extremely anxious to makepeace; they had told him they would 
meet him again in the afternoon, and give him their final answer. About 
the appointed time the Indians returned, and, after some time passed in 
conference, a party of Indians, who were in their rear, were fired on by 
General Clinch's flankers, approaching from Fort Drane in that direc- 
tion, which broke up the meeting. On the morning of the 8th of March, 
the Indians not having appeared since the 5th, General Clinch sent an 
interpreter to ascertain their situation, numbers, and disposition. On the 
evening of the 9th, General Gaines turned over the command to Gen- 
eral Clinch, who assumed command, in orders, on the following morning. 
That afternoon the troops took up the line of march, under command of 
General Clinch, for Fort Drane. 

2. Question by the Court. What was the number of Indians that in- 
vested the camp on the Withlacoochee, and how many attacks were made 
by them ? 

Answer. The number of warriors on the morning of the 29th was, in 
my opinion, between twelve and fifteen hundred, including negroes, 
judging from the extent of ground they covered, their fire, and their war- 
cry. On the morning of the 3d, their numbers, though apparently not 
so numerous as on the 29th of February, were greater than at any sub- 
sequent time. They made five or six attacks, or fired into the camp five 
or six times, altogether : occasional shots were fired both by day and night. 

3. Question by the Court. No sortie was made on the enemy at the 
several attacks made on the camp. What were the reasons that withheld 
or prevented such a movement on the part of General Gaines? 

Answer. He did not explain to me, particularly, his reasons, but my 
impression was that it would not have resulted in any important advan- 
tage. 

4. Question by the Court. Did no officer, during the siege, urge the 
propriety of making a sortie ? 

Answer. I did not myself hear any officer, and my impression at the 
time was, that there was no officer there who differed with the General 
on that point. 

5. Question by the Court. What is your opinion of the ability of the 
forces under General Gaines, to drive and beat the enemy, if a sortie had 
been made ? 

Ansiver. I have not the smallest doubt that they would have been able 
to do it ; but, from the nature of the ground, the hammocks which bor- 
dered the river being thick and extremely difficult of access to the troops, 
would have enabled the Indians, lying concealed, to deliver their fire, 
and then, owing to their superior celerity and knowledge of the ground, 
to have passed through the hammock and crossed the river before the 
troops could have come up with them, their facilities for crossing the 
river being great, and the troops without the means of following them. 

1. Question by General Gaines. What part of the force was out of 
the limits of my breast-work during the action of the 29th of February ; 
and state whether one or two companies were not often engaged in firing 
at the enemy across the river prior to the 6th of March ? 

Answer. There was one company without the limits of the breast-work 



[ 224 ] 534 

on the 29th of February. Several companies were engaged in firing at 
the enemy across the river prior to the Gth of March. 

2. Question by General Gaines. What is your opinion as to the prac- 
ticability of ascertaining, a week or two weeks after the Seminole In- 
dians had left a battle-ground or encampment, what number had occupied 
said encampment or battle-ground? State whether the Indians usually 
leave at their encampments as much evidence of numbers as the whites 
usually leave. 

Answer. I think it would be impracticable, a week or two weeks after 
a battle, to ascertain from the signs commonly left by Indians, what 
number had been on the battle-ground ; and, as a principal object of the 
Indians in encamping in time of war is to conceal their numbers, it 
would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to make even a tolera- 
ble guess at the numbers that occupied an encampment, unless they had 
occupied it for some length of time. In reply to the latter part of the 
question, the Indians do not usually leave at their encampments any thing 
like as much evidence of numbers as the whites usually leave. 

3. Question by General Gaines. What were the sentiments and wishes 
of the Louisiana volunteers, on board the steamboat Watchman, on the 
Gth and 7th of February, 1836, as expressed in your presence and hear- 
ing, in reference to the continuance of General Gaines to command them 
in person, on the campaign against the Seminole Indians? 

Answer. On the arrival of the steamboat Watchman at Pensacola on 
the Gth of February, 183G, it was ascertained that the steamboat Mer- 
chant, with one battalion of the regiment of volunteers, under the imme- 
diate command of Colonel Smith, commanding officer of the regiment, 
had sailed the day before for Tampa bay. On landing at Pensacola, 
General Gaines received the letter from the Adjutant General, notifying 
him that General Scott had been ordered to proceed to Florida, and 
directing him to await further orders in New Orleans. On receiving this 
letter, General Gaines remarked to me that he would go, with great 
readiness, wherever his seivices might be most useful tohis country, and 
said then that he thought he should return to New Orleans. I left him 
immediately to attend to some duties. When the troops learned the pur- 
port of the letter received, many of the volunteers collected around me, 
and inquired if the General intended to proceed or return. I replied, " I 
believed he would return." They then expressed, in strong terms, their 
regret at this information, and the general opinion, as far as I learned, 
was, that he should proceed. After this, the commanding officer of that 
battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Lawson, came to me and made the same 
inquiry. I replied as before. He said "he thought General Gaines 
was bound to proceed, at least, to Tampa bay ; that he would be se- 
verely censured if he relinquished the command ;" and he requested me 
to urge the General to proceed. He spoke of the confusion that would 
probably ensue in the event of his giving up the command. Colonel 
Smith, the next in rank to General Gaines, was willing, through per- 
sonal regard to Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, of the 4th infantry, to waive 
rank with that officer, for the purpose of giving him the command of the 
brigade ; but, if General Gaines relinquished the command of the expe- 
dition, Major Foster, of the 4th infantry, and lieutenant colonel by 
brevet, would assert his right to the command of the brigade, in virtue of 



535 [ 224 ] 

his brevet commission, which was senior to Colonel Twiggs's commis- 
sion in the line, and contention for the command of the brigade would 
arise, which might cause the separation of the troops, and, in that way, 
endanger the success of the expedition." He left me, saying he would 
call on the General, and converse with him on the subject. I saw General 
Gaines very soon after this, and he told me he had determined to proceed, 
at' least, to Tampa bay ; and that he would be governed by circumstances 
in his future determinations. On the passage to Tampa bay, he showed 
me the rough draught of a letter, which he said he intended to address to 
General Scott, in case he found him in the field. That letter was an- 
nouncing his arrival, with the troops under his command, and proposing a 
co-operation with those under General Scott. He, at the same time, re- 
marked to me that, if General Scott preferred to take the sole conduct of 
the war, he would, without hesitation, turn over the command to him. 

4. Question by General Gaines. Did any thing occur at Dade's battle- 
ground which tended to confirm General Gaines in the determination to 
proceed to Fort King ? 

Ansiver. On Dade's battle-ground, whilst a party, detailed to bury the 
dead, were collecting the bodies, General Gaines expressed to me his 
anxiety to know where the enemy was, not having met him, as was ex- 
pected, on the march to that point, and his desire to know the situation 
of the command under General Clinch. He stated that the surest means 
of acquiring this information was to proceed to Fort King, but expressed 
an unwillingness to draw upon the supplies of that post, which might be 
slender. I then remarked that it had been that morning mentioned to 
me that the quartermaster present had been notified by his department 
that large supplies had been already ordered to Fort King. General 
Gaines expressed great satisfaction at learning this, and the quartermas- 
ter was immediately sent for. He produced a letter from the Quarter- 
master General's office, dated the 19th of January preceding, informing 
him that a large supply of provisions had been ordered from New York 
to Fort King, and thirty thousand rations to St. Augustine from the same 
point. On receiving this information, General Gaines expressed his de- 
termination to proceed forthwith to Fort King, and the order for the 
march was given the moment the funeral rites were concluded. 

5. Question by General Gaines. On General Gaines's arrival at Fort 
King, finding neither the supplies nor the troops he had expected, what 
plan of operations did he decide upon ? 

Answer. On arriving at Fort King, finding that the garrison consisted 
of but one company of artillery, and that the supplies of provisions at 
that post would only afford him two days' rations, he told me, in cover- 
sation, that it was his determination to take up the line of march for Fort 
Brooke, (Tampa bay,) where he had supplies; and, should he not find 
the enemy on the route thither, he would then operate in the direction 
of Talloptchupko, on Pease creek, for the purpose of intercepting the 
retreat of the Indians towards the Ever-glades, should they be driven in 
that direction by the troops operating above. In proceeding to Tampa 
bay, the route by Clinch's battle-ground was chosen for two reasons : 
first, because it was the shortest route, and, second, there was a greater 
probability of meeting the enemy on that route. 

6. Question by General Gaines. Was it General Gaines's intention to 



[ 224 J 536 

make a sortie, in the event of his hearing General Clinch's or Colonel 
Lindsay's guns ? 

Answer. General Gaines remarked several times, while lying at Camp 
Izard, that he should not be surprised at hearing Lindsay's guns on the 
other side, and, in that event, he would cross immediately and march to 
his aid ; or, should the Indians engage Clinch on his advance, he would 
immediately march out and support him. 

Captain Thistle, a citizen of Louisiana, and ivitness, being duly sivorn, 
ivas interrogated as follows : 

1. Questionby the Court. Were you in the campaign in Florida under 
Major General Gaines in 1836 ; if so, in what capacity ? 

Answer. I was. I commanded a company seventy strong, officers in- 
cluded, in Colonel Smith's regiment of volunteers, commanded by Major 
General Gaines. 

2. Question by the Court. Please state to the Court, as nearly as you 
can recollect, the occurrences that transpired on the Withlacoochee, after 
the army reached that place, and during the time it remained in Camp 
Izard. 

Answer. On the 27th of February, I think, as the advance guard ap- 
proached the river, it was fired upon from across the river, and sustained 
some injury. I think there were several wounded. Orders were then 
given to withdraw and encamp on General Clinch's old encamping 
ground. I made some inquiry that evening of the cause of our not cross- 
ing the river, (it was understood, on our march before we got to the 
river, that we were going to a ford,) and I was informed, by Colonel 
Smith, that the Indians had made a mistake in some manner ; he was not 
certain whether purposely or accidentally. They stated the ford was 
two or three miles further down the river. Next morning, about sunrise, 
or a little after, the order was given to take up the line of march for the 
ford. We reached the place we started for about 9 or 10 o'clock in the 
morning. General Gaines and Colonel Smith, with a detachment, went 
to examine the river, as I was informed by Colonel Smith. As they were 
in the act of crossing the river, and partly in the water, they were fired 
on, and, as far as I recollect, the fire was kept up for some length of time, 
perhaps an hour, or an hour and a half, with a tremendous war-yell. It 
appeared to me to extend for a quarter of a mile up and down the river. 
Being stationed on a rise of ground, I had advantage in hearing the sound. 
The firing ceased, and orders were given for us to encamp ; whilst there 
was a party making canoes, and others preparing breastworks. The 
breastworks were thrown up temporarily for the night, and the canoes 
principally finished — having worked on them till 10 or 11 o'clock that 
night. I understood that evening that we would cross the river the next 
day. Next morning I was called upon early, with an order from Gene- 
ral Gaines, to have my select marksmen ready to go on the river. About 
8 or 9 o'clock I paraded my men opposite to General Gaines's quarters. 
At that place there were fifty regulars, who had volunteered from 
different companies. 20 more volunteered from Colonel Williams's com- 
pany ; 12 from Captain Bulk's ; and, from Captain Kerr's and Captain 
Alexander's, enough to make 110, including my own men — 36. I was 



537 f 224 ] 

cautioned by General Gaines to use caution ; that he did not send me on 
the river to have my men killed, but to kill the Indians. Col. Twiggs 
shook hands with me, and likewise cautioned me to use great caution — 
to get men on the river bank without being discovered by the enemy, if 
possible. General Gaines had previously given me the same orders. I 
was accompanied, for about 150 yards, by Captain Kerr, to show me 
where I had better enter the hammock, as, the day previously, he had 
been on the river-bank where Lieutenant Izard got his mortal wound. 
My men were then put in open order. I directed them to get on the 
river the best way they thought proper, so as not to be discovered — either 
to crawl or roll, and take their stations as near 10 feet apart as circum- 
stances and shelter would permit. I then commenced examining the 
line, to see if my order had been obeyed. I found that every man had 
taken caution to get behind a log or tree, and where they had nothing of 
this kind, they laid up chunks so they could fire under the chunk and 
over the bank. I had almost reached the extreme left of my line when 
one of my men fired. I, being within ten steps of him, asked him, in a 
low voice, "what he fired at?" He said he saw one Indian, and that, 
having deliberate aim, fired at him. I returned from him to take my 
station, when I heard the crack of from 15 to 20 rifles upon my side. In- 
stantly there was a war-yell, and a heavy fire opened, the whole length 
of the line, from the enemy on the opposite side of the river. I had a 
space of about 60 yards of open ground to pass ; in which space there 
was one pine tree standing by itself. I saw one of my men behind 
that tree. Then I attempted to cross this space, which I did by crawl- 
ing. I should judge, from the shots fired at me and at this man, partly 
concealed behind this tree, that 50 or 60 shots were fired during the time 
I was passing this distance of 50 or 60 yards. I heard a tremendous fire 
in the rear, which I took to be an attack on the camp. About that time, 
or a little after, a recall was sounded. I had my non-commissioned offi- 
cers stationed at intervals, which enabled me (o pass the command for 
every man to keep his place and not leave his shelter, deeming it im- 
prudent to have my men leave their cover under such a heavy fire as was 
then made on my small detachment. I had estimated the number to be 
from 375 to 450 of the enemy ; across the river, from 35 to 40 yards wide. 
In about an hour afterwards, the Indians principally ceased firing. I had 
just commenced passing the order to throw out Hankers as the second re- 
call was sounded, which was immediately obeyed. I returned to camp 
in good order ; ten men slightly wounded. On reaching the camp, I 
found a number of men that had been wounded, amongst them General 
Gaines. I perceived that the palmettoes were partly burnt in the enclo- 
sure of the camp, on the east side ; which was effected by a fire commu- 
nicated from the outside by the Indians, and, as I was informed, the In- 
dians had come up to within 30 or 40 yards of the camp, under cover of 
the smoke, while the palmettoes were burning That evening I made a 
verbal report to General Gaines that I was confident that I had done the 
enemy some considerable injury, for I had seen three fall under my own 
eyes. He then gave me some instructions, as I was on the reserve, in- 
forming me they had had a very severe attack on the camp, and expected 
one that night ; charging me particularly to give orders to my men not to 
fire in haste ; that if the Indians undertook to storm the work, to let them 



f 224 ] 538 

come up to within 25 or 30 yards, so that every man might be sure of his 
object, as we had not a great supply of ammunition. I was informed that 
from 1 ,200 to 1 ,400 Indians had made an attack on the camp during my ab- 
sence. The next day we repaired our breast-works, and a few Indians 
showed themselves and fired on those who were preparing the timber, and 
the men were driven in. I made some inquiry as to our movements the 
next day, and I understood an express had been sent to General Clinch to 
come down with a reinforcement, and that it was not deemed proper to 
make an attack upon the enemy, or cross the river until such time as we 
had a force able to pursue him. I will remark, that it was my opinion that 
we ought not to undertake to charge the enemy unless we had mounted 
men. My reason for this was, the Indians are lightly clad, and nothing to 
encumber them but the rifle, powder-horn, and the bullet-pouch. The 
general usually cautioned the men, and gave them great praise for not 
wasting their ammunition. On the 2d of March, a few shots were occa- 
sionally fired into camp. On the 3d of March, a very severe attack was 
made on the camp. I think it commenced about 10 o'clock, and continued 
for an hour or an hour and a half, keeping at a long distance — some lew 
occasionally coming up under shelter of some underbrush, &c. to within 
75 yards of our camp. I took great care that day, as there had been some 
little argument previously, as to the number of the Indians, to estimate 
their number, and I could not make the number of Indians and negroes 
less than 1,200 or 1,400. The Indians having ceased firing, the main body 
of them withdrew; some 15 or 20 would occasionally throw in a few shots, 
on the east side of the camp. I proposed the next day to General Gaines 
to give me permission to mount about 20 or 25 of my men on the broken- 
down pack-horses ; the general's reply was, that he expected a reinforce- 
ment, and this charge which I wished to make could not be very effectual, 
on account of the horses not being in order for a charge. It readily struck 
me the general was in the right, and I wrong. The next day, the 4th of 
March, there were a few scattering shots fired, as the staff were dealing out 
some corn to the troops, but no one wounded to my knowledge. On the 
5th, I think, there were some shots fired. 

The Court here adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock. 

January 18, 1S37. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Captain Thistle's testimony continued. 

On the evening of the 4th or 5th of March, some one hailed the camp, 
which we took to be a reinforcement from Fort Diane. He was answered 
by Captain Burk, the officer of the day, asking what was wanted. He 
said the Indians were tired of fighting, and wished to make peace. He 
was told to come the next morning with a white flag and they should be 
heard. The next morning, accordingly, at the appointed hour, I saw 
a group of Indians, about 300, in the rear of our camp, from five to six 
hundred yards. Then two or three advanced slowly towards the en- 
campment, and hailed the camp. They were answered by Adjutant. 
Barrow to come nigher, that they should not be fired on, or injured. After 



539 [ 221 | 

some conversation with General Gaines, Adjutant Barrow took a white 
handkerchief, crossed the breastworks, advanced a few yards towards 
the enemy, and placed himself on a stump, and showed his flag. After 
some hesitation on the part of the Indians, they sat upon a log, about 275 
steps from the breastwork. They were then met by Adjutant Barrow, 
afterwards by Captain Hitchcock and some others of the staft". I don't 
know what there took place, as I was not present at the interview. The 
same erening they met again, about 3 or 4 o'clock. Whilst they were 
holding the council this time they were fired upon by General Clinch's 
advance guard, and instantly they fled to the hammock. Colonel Twiggs 
was standing, at this time, in front of my company, which was a reserve. 
General Gaines had always cautioned me to have my company always in 
readiness, especially during the time they were holding the council, lest 
the Indians should betray their trust. He had not, however, the least 
idea they would ; but he said there was no harm in being prepared for 
them. Colonel Twiggs, when the Indians were fired upon, expressed, 
" ! my God ! whata pity ! what a pity !" He said that if it had not 
been for this unfortunate circumstance, that every thing would have been 
accomplished in the way of peace. I made observations myself, that I 
wished that General Clinch had had the good fortune to kill the whole 
of them ; for I did not believe, myself, that there was any sincerity in 
them — no more than to suit their convenience. But I would state that 
those officers, according to the best of my judgment, did sincerely be- 
lieve that the Indians were sincere, That evening, about 9 or 10 o'clock, 
our camp was hailed, in front, by the same one who had previously hailed 
us, asking for two days to see Micanopy, and to hold a council amongst 
themselves. I heard them agree to return, at the end of two days, to 
council. The next day I asked permission from General Gaines to take six 
men and examine the river, to find the crossing-place. He told me he 
had no objection, that Colonel Smith would give me permission ; which 
was done. I selected my men, and left the camp about 2 o'clock. I took 
an easterly direction, and entered the hammock. I discovered a large 
Indian trail ; it led into a swamp which was very thick with under growth 
and brier-vines. You could scarcely see a man ten yards, unless it was 
in the Indian trail. I followed this Indian trail for about a mile. It was 
miry. I then came to a run, or branch of an old river. I found one part 
of the trail led across this branch, on a large log ; the other turned to the 
left. I followed the one that went to the left about one hundred yards, 
where I found a ford. I crossed, and came on to a small island, about 20 
yards wide : this descended from the river. The bank on the opposite 
side of the river was plain to my view, being seven or eight feet higher 
than the bank on which I stood. I hesitated for a moment to approach 
the bank. I saw the opposite bank was completely fortified by trees, 
which had fallen accidentally. I likewise placed myself behind a large 
cypress that stood on the summit of the bank. I had no shelter from the 
opposite bank, except in front, and, from my view of the river, the ene- 
my could have thrown in fires on me right and left. I then discovered 
several rafts on the opposite side, which appeared to be lashed together 
with vines or raw hides, and, apparently, extended across the river. The 
view r I took of this position was, that the Indians had selected it, and that 
they could make good their crossing, and beat us, if we had pursued them 



[ 224 ] 540 

to that point, against all our force ; provided they had not been more than 
500 strong; but I always judged their force something like three times that 
number. I returned to camp between 10 and 11 o'clock that evening. I 
went immediately and reported myself and my men, and learned that it 
had been suggested by Colonel Lawson, and, I also understood, by Gen- 
eral Gaines and Colonel Smith, that they were afraid I had met with 
some serious accident. Nothing more of any importance took place. We 
waited three days for the return of those Indians in council, as they had 
promised us. I had often had conversation, between that period, with a 
number of the officers, and they all believed the Indians were sincere. 
Some went so far as to say that I was stubborn, and would not believe 
the truth when it was so plain before me. After the end of two days, I 
asked Adjutant Barrow, who had great confidence in the sincerity of the 
Indians, what he then thought of their promise to return. He said he 
would not hesitate to cross the river and go to the enemy's camp. We 
waited two days longer; no Indians made their appearance. A negro, 
named Primus, I think, was sent the evening of the 7th, if I mistake not, 
to see what information he could obtain from the enemy. He had not re- 
turned when we took up our line of march for Fort Drane, under the 
command of General Clinch, on the evening of the 10th. The evening 
of the 10th I was informed that Primus had returned. I made some little 
inquiry, and was informed that the Indians had gone thirty miles into the 
Wahoo or Black swamp, and were there with their warriors and families. 
We marched to Fort Drane, where we encamped ; we lay there for a 
number of days. While we were on the Withlacoochee, and after the 
council was held with the Indians, our men used to fish on the river bank 
without being molested by the enemy. 

1. Question by General Gaines. The witness has stated that he did 
not believe in the sincerity of the Indians, in suing for peace on the 5th 
and 6th of March, 1836, and yet that he, on the 6th, asked and obtained 
leave to go out of camp, and did go some distance out of camp with his 
six men. The witness is desired to state whether he would have be- 
lieved it quite safe or prudent to go out so far with so small a detachment 
if the Indians were indeed insincere in their attempts to sue for peace ? 

Answer. I will first state that I consider myself a first-rate woodsman. 
I have hunted with the Indians, I have traded with them, and know their 
character, I think, almost as well as any other person who has not spent 
the principal part of his life with them. I would consider myself capa- 
ble of keeping myself concealed from the enemy, if I did not choose to 
come in contact with them. I would refer to one instance, when I was 
under the command of Major General Scott. After we had effected our 
crossing, in part, of the Withlacoochee, and the Louisiana regiment of 
volunteers had crossed the river, my station being on the left, mine was the 
last company that crossed. I had been previously detailed to cover the 
landing. After crossing, I took my station on the left. I was ordered to 
erect a breast-work, and send out 5 or 6 men as spies or picket guard. 
After my men had commenced the work, and my picket guard set out, I 
took the liberty to take with me my first lieutenant. We proceeded in 
the direction of the crossing-place I have alluded to ; being then on the 
opposite side from that at which I had before examined the crossing. We 
passed between a pond on the right, and the river on our left, about the 



541 [ 224 J 

distance of three-quarters of a mile from camp, where we heard some In- 
dian giving the word of command to his warriors. I took this to be the 
word of command from the sound rapidly advancing, and being the same 
tone of voice that we had the pleasure of hearing so often in our camp. 
We immediately retraced our steps. I gave directions to my lieuten- 
ant to tell my picket guard to conceal themselves behind trees. I 
gave this information of the approach of the enemy to Colonel Smith, 
and likewise mentioned to him that I concluded this was the Indian's ad- 
vance guard. 

At the request of Major General Gaines, the Court here instructed the 
Judge Advocate to enter on the record certain extracts from the docu- 
ments which accompany the Proceedings in the case of Major General 
Scott. These extracts are as follows : 

EXTRACTS. 

From General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836 — 

Document No. 18. 

" It is now my opinion that the Seminoles cannot be promptly reduced 
to submission by a force much short of five thousand men, and that the 
greater part of this force ought to be mounted." 

From the same to the same, dated Augusta, Georgia, February 2, 1836 — Document No. 20. 

" Cannot the 4th infantry be ordered from Louisiana to the theatre 
of operations ?" 

From General Scott to Colonel Lindsay, dated Augusta, Georgia, February 2, 1836— Docu- 
ment No. 29. 

" By the 20th of this month, at the latest, I hope to be in sufficient 
force on the St. John's, or at Fort King, or at Fort Diane, to commence 
a system of vigorous operations against the Seminole Indians. 

" It is unofficially reported that Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, with a 
detachment of the 4th infantry, has been ordered from New Orleans to 
Tampa bay. If this should be true, your force may be sufficient to ena- 
ble you to leave the necessary garrison and to operate a junction with 
the main army at the distance of three or four marches." 

From General Scott to the Adjutant Genera', dated Augusta, Georgia, February 6, 1836 — 

Document No. 34. 

" The moment we are in force on the St. John's, and take up the ex- 
pected line of operations, St. Augustine will become an interior posi- 
tion. That line of operations will probably be, first, from Picolata to 
Tampa bay, in order to open communications with Forts King and Diane, 
and with Colonel Lindsay. My object will be to cut the enemy off from 
the country to the left of that line, and to force him to the right. If I 
succeed, the theatre of operations, though favorable to him, will be much 
less bad for us than the southern part of the peninsula. 

" I am more and persuaded that I have not called for too large a force. 
By the 25th instant I may, perhaps, have in Florida, in all, 4,000 men, 
and by March, 500 more. It is not probable that I shall delay offensive 
movements quite so long." 

From the same to the same, dated Savannah, February 16, 1836 — Document No. 38. 

" Colonel Hawkins, the aid-de-camp of Governor Eaton, arrived here 
a few days since, bringing despatches, and he has set out, on his return, 



[ 224 J 542 

with my answer. I had anticipated his inquiries, generally, by my let- 
ter to his Excellency, dated the first instant, (a copy of which has been 
forwarded,) and I have said to him, more in detail, that it will be prefer- 
able to place any force he may have in the field, or find it necessary to 
call out, (not exceeding from 400 to GOO men,) in defensive positions for 
the protection of the settlements of Middle Florida, as it was still my 
hope to cut off the hostile Indians from the southeast and drive them to- 
wards those settlements. 

"I learn by newspapers that from 600 to 1,000 men, mostly volun- 
teers, have sailed from New Orleans for Florida, 1 think Tampa bay. I 
have not called for a single man, of the regulars or militia, from Louisi- 
ana. Perhaps the reported force volunteered for the temporary protec- 
tion of Tampa bay, as certain companies sailed hence and from Charles- 
ton for the specific defence of Picolata and St. Augustine, some weeks 
ago. Hence I could not rely on the troops from Louisiana for the gen- 
eral purposes of the campaign, and, therefore, did nothing to arrest the 
detaching and the march of troops from this quarter. But if Tampa bay 
has been reinforced from Louisiana, and to the extent reported, Colonel 
Lindsay will be in a condition, on arriving with the Alabama regiment, 
to act offensively in any direction, and independent of support." 

General Scott to General Clinch, dated Savannah, Febrviary 12, 1836— Document No. 41. 
" I am unable, as yet, from the want of recent information from the 
theatre of war, and better topographical knowledge of that theatre, to 
lay down any definitive plan of operations. I shall rely much on com- 
munications to be received from you, on all points necessary to the form- 
ation of such plan ; but my present idea is, that it may be best to move 
upon the road from St. Augustine to Tampa bay, till joined by Colonel 
Lindsay from the latter place, and if possible, to cutoff the greater num- 
ber of the Indians from the fastnesses below that line." 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Picolata, Florida, February 26, 1836 — Docu- 
ment No. 47. 

" Observing by returns from Brigadier General Clinch, that his sup- 
plies were but limited, and desirous of placing at Fort Drane subsistence 
for the right wing for at least twenty days, in order to give confidence 
and effect to any movement to be made from that point, I have been oc- 
cupied in devising means to send thither additional supplies to the amount 
of seventy tons. To enable me to do this, I have been waiting for the 
wagons, horses, and pack-saddles, provided at Augusta and Savannah. 
Some of these wagons have arrived, but as yet, no horses. The remain- 
der of that baggage-train cannot be expect here from Savannah in less 
than ten days. 

" It seems that Major General Gaines arrived at Fort King from Tampa 
bay on the 22d. 

" I have time to add no more. All my plans are thwarted — the prin- 
cipal of which was to move in concert from Fort Drane, Volusia, and 
Tampa, on the 8th of March, upon the enemy, who are supposed to be 
(at this time) principally upon the Withlacoochee." 



Kl 



543 [ 224 ] 

Notes appended to General Scott's Order No. 4, dated Picolata, February 26, 1836 — Docu- 
ment No. 55. 

" The right wing was intended to he concentrated at Fort Di ane, say by 
the Sth of" March, when it was expected that General Clinch would have 
had all the Georgia troops, companies of United States artillery, and 
the detachment of United States dragoons, in all, about 1,400 men. 

" On the 25th instant it was known that General Clinch would have 
had, but for General Gaines, 19,000 rations for men, and about 3,000 
bushels of corn for horses. That amount of subsistence at Fort Diane 
I should more than have maintained by the Sth of March, by means of 
the baggage-train expected from Savannah and Charleston, and by the 
aid of boating on the Ochlawaha to Payne's landing." 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Picolata, March 2, 1836 — Document No. 52. 

"All hope of sending supplies hence by the Ochlawahais abandoned. 
We have to rely solely on the road to Fort Drane, which is bad enough, 
and the horses and mules which were to have followed me closely from 
Savannah have not arrived. 

" The company of mounted Georgia volunteers that arrived here about 
six days ago, and with which I had expected to march to Fort Drane, re- 
fused to be mustered into service, and refused to come under the rules and 
articles of war, with the exception of a small part that remains. The rest 
went off, without leave, from their gallant and patriotic captain (Kenan) 
yesterday and the day before. The other four companies of the same bat- 
talion are this moment reported to have arrived on the opposite shore. I 
have sent an officer over to muster them into service. If 1 can get two of 
the companies I shall be most happy. I may obtain the four, but will march 
with one to Fort Drane. Some mounted men are indispensable, and I 
know not that the United States dragoons will arrive in a month. I wish 
I had never relied upon the arrival of that detachment. Expecting it 
hourly at Savannah, ( I had expected it at Charleston as early as the 4th 
ultimo,) I left all the horses, in order that the mounts might first be cho- 
sen, and the remainder of the lot sent here for the baggage-train. That 
error I corrected, as far as practicable, by an order given to Lieutenant 
Dimmock on the 21st ultimo. No horses, however, have arrived from 
Savannah. 

" We have heard nothing recently from Colonel Goodwyn's regiment 
of mounted South Carolinians, but presume it has reached Jacksonville 
below. 

" I ordered from Savannah the little steamer belonging to the Engi- 
neer department, called the Essayons, to be sent here, for the express 
purpose of communicating with that post, (Volusia,) and of supplying it 
with stores from Picolata, but that boat, like everything else (almost) 
left behind, has not arrived. 

" I have at length received a letter from Colonel Lindsay, dated at 
Mobile, the 13th ultimo. He was about to set out for Tuscaloosa to has- 
ten the Alabama regiment. It is now evident that he cannot be at Tam- 
pa before the 10th, probably the 15th, instant. 

" Brigadier General Eustis cannot cross the Ochlawaha earlier than 
the 14th instant." 



[ 224 ] 544 

General Scott to General Clinch, dated Picolata, March 1, 1836— Document No. 60. 

a By the arrival, at daylight this morning, of the express from Fort 
Drane, I have your note of yesterday's date, accompanied by a letter to 
you from Major General Gaines, dated the day before. 

" I regret, in every point of view, the premature and unauthorized 
movement from Tampa bay, made by that General, and the very awk- 
ward and responsible position he has placed himself in by his subsequent 
march from Fort King. I presume that, as instructed, you sent him my 
Order No. 4, dated the 26th ultimo. By that he saw that if the troops he 
brought with him from Tampa bay could not be subsisted at Fort King 
by means of supplies derived from this place through the Ochlawaha, it 
was expressly commanded that the column should march to Volusia without 
delay, where subsistence in abundance would be immediately provided. 
But he had, before that order reached him, taken from Fort Drane a large 
part of the subsistence relied upon for a more systematic course of opera- 
tions, and decamped. The order, however, I take it for granted, was sent 
after him, and in time to reach him within twenty miles of Fort King. In 
any event, the responsibility of his movements and actual position is his 
own, for he must have known, as early as the. 10th ultimo, if not before, 
that I had been charged with the general direction of the war in Flori- 
da, and that by interfering he constituted himself an interloper. 

" Even if you had sufficientstoreson hand and means of transportation, I 
should, under the circumstances, command you to send no subsistence to 
him, unless to prevent starvation ; but you have neither. Let him, 
therefore, in time, extricate himself from the embarrassment he has placed 
himself in, by marching upon Volusia, where, I have no reason to doubt 
that 20,000 rations, sent hence on the 27th ultimo, have safely arrived. 
As he appears to have a retreat open to him, or is in no peril to prevent his 
taking that step, you, of course, will make no detachment or movement 
to join him. 

" The train you have ordered hither is expected to-night. As yet, 
we have here but few wagons to add to your number. The whole train 
shall be immediately loaded with subsistence, and sent back to Fort 
Drane. I have only time to say that, should the troops under Major 
General Gaines be compelled to march back to Fort King or to Fort 
Drane, instead of proceeding to Volusia, as heretofore commanded, and 
as I still wish that they should do, on account of the extreme difficulty of 
sending subsistence to your neighborhood, you will only issue rations to 
them for their current subsistence, and not for further false expeditions. 

" As the first consequence of the arrival of the troops from Tampa 
bay to Fort King, and the demand made upon Fort Drane for subsist- 
ence, I was obliged to order back a battalion of Georgia volunteers that 
had then been nearly two days in route to join you. 

" The company of mounted men from the same State, now on the op- 
posite side of the river, refuse to be mustered into service, and refuse 
to come under the rules and articles of war. The other companies of 
the same battalion may follow their example. If they do I shall lose 
no time in ordering the whole back to their homes. 

" Major Gates, with his three companies, has not arrived, and I have 
no intelligence respecting the United States dragoons of a recent date. 



Btt 



545 f 224 ] 



Finally, the horses for some days expected from Savannah have not ar- 
rived. These embarrassments may detain me here I know not how long. 

" The left wing is moving upon Volusia with system and success. 
The South Carolina foot constitutes the advance, and I suppose the 
mounted regiment from the same State is now crossing the St. John's at 
Jacksonville. 

" Send another copy of my Order No. 4 to Major General Gaines, and 
a copy of Order No. 1, which is enclosed for the purpose. The former is 
reiterated so far as respects the march to Volusia, if this be practicable ; 
and enclose him a certified copy of this letter, for his government and 
your justification. I remain, in haste, your obedient servant, Winfield 
Scott. 

"P. S. I am instructed by Major General Scott to say that the quar- 
termaster's return did not accompany your letter of the 27th ultimo. No 
return has been received of your ordnance or ordnance stores, particu- 
larly the fixed ammunition for muskets. Please to send one. Respect- 
fully, A. Van Buren, aid-de-camp." 

General Scott to General Clinch, dated Picolata March 4, 1836. Doc No. 69. 

" I still presume that Major General Gaines will be obliged to fall back 
on Fort Drane, which increases my anxiety to send the wagons (with 
some additions) loaded. I would prefer much that the force brought with 
him was back to Tampa bay, or rather that it had not marched from that 
place ; provided that the movement fails to crush the enemy, or to ter- 
minate the war. The worst result, next to the loss of that fine body of 
men or a third of it, would be mere success in driving the enemy into the 
lower country, where, I suppose, it would be almost impossible for us to 
follow — I mean below the waters of Charlotte harbor. Hence my indigna- 
tion that an isolated attack should have been made from your vicinity, well 
calculated to produce that result, and, at a time too, when you knew, and 
Major General Gaines must have known, through you, (and before,) that 
my plan, with ample means, was to move simultaneously upon the With- 
lacoochee in three columns — from Tampa bay, the upper-crossing on the 
Ochlawaha, and Fort Drane — so as to make it impossible for the enemy 
to escape to the lower country. 

" I have not yet supposed that Major General Gaines has not his retreat 
upon Fort Drane or King perfectly in his power. On account of sub- 
sistence, if he can cut his way through the enemy to Tampa bay, I should 
much prefer that his force should be there ; and when I wished him to 
march or send that force to Volusia, it was because it would be infinitely 
more easily subsisted there than at Fort Drane. Should he, however, be 
in any difficulty in operating a retreat from the Withlacoochee, I certainly 
wish you to afford any succor that the slender means within your reach 
may allow; and this, doubtless, you would render without any special 
permission to that effect. If the force return to Fort Drane or Kin?, it 
must be sustained for at least five or six days from the means derived 
from this place ; and hence, I now prefer it should become a part of the 
right wing, rather than take that quantity of subsistence from you, and 
march back to Tampa bay." 






[ 224 ] 546 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Picolata, March 6, 1836. Doc. No. 68. 

" I at length know that the South Carolina mounted regiment reached 
Jacksonville yesterday. It is destined to make part of the left wing. 

" Besides, Brigadier General Eustishas necessarily been compelled to 
wait for the South Carolina mounted regiment, which cannot reach St. 
Augustine before the day after to-morrow, and Volusia before the 12th. 

" If the column under Major General Gaines had fallen back upon 
Fort Drane or King, the right wing would have wanted nothing but sub- 
sistence, and the forces now in this vicinity and known to be coming up, 
to act with vigor and effect. 

" To add to my numerous vexations, the wagons reported to have 
been shipped at Baltimore in the Arctic have been left behind. 

" I send no more troops, for the present, to Fort Drane, on account of 
the difficulty of subsisting them there. If Major General Ganes shall 
not fall back on that point it will be indispensable to wait for Captain 
Wharton." 

Aid-de-camp Van Buren to the Adjutant General, dated Fort Drane, March 25, 1836. 

Document No. 97. 

" Captain Wharton, with his detachment of dragoon recruits, reached 
this the day before yesterday." 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated between Picolata and Garey's Ferry, March 
9, 1836. Document No. 71. 

" I have just set out for Fort Drane, via Garey's ferry, on Black creek, 
with two companies of regulars, and intending to take with me from the 
latter place the small battalion of mounted Georgians, (heretofore men- 
tioned,) under the command of Major Douglass. Lieutenant Colonel 
Bankhead is at the head of the first detachment, and the two together 
may make a total of about 240. But even this small force may be im- 
portant to rescue Major General Gaines. 

" I had not received the slightest information of the operations on the 
Withlacoochee (official or otherwise) of a later date than the 29th ulti- 
mo up to this morning, and had concluded that he had effected his 
march, with more or less success, against the enemy upon Tampa bay; 
when, at day-light, the steamer that I am now in arrived, and brought 
the rumor which is confirmed by the two accompanying notes from Pay- 
master Lytle, received about six hours afterwards. On the reception 
of the rumor, I immediately commenced preparations for this move- 
ment ; but being delayed by the necessity of unlading and relading the 
boat, I am now at anchor at the mouth of Black creek. I hope to put 
the troops in march from Garey's Ferry early in the day to-morrow, and 
to reach Fort Drane with a small escort the day following. It is possible 
that even these little detachments of horse and foot may reach the 
Withlacoochee in time to render a valuable service. 

" I am aware that the movement that I am making may be condemned, 
if regarded in any other light than a rescue, as premature. Colonel 
Goodwyn's mounted regiment only arrived at St. Augustine last night 
or this morning; and consequently the left wing cannot be in force on 
the Ochlavvaha, in the direction of Pelaklikaha, earlier than the 17th, 
or up with the enemy before the 20th instant. . Colonel Lindsay, who 
may have already arrived at Tampa bay, cannot operate more than two 



547 [ 224 ] 

days' march from that place, for the want of transportation — Major Gen- 
eral Gaines having taken away the horses which were there, and the 
basis of the right wing is meiged in the force brought by that General 
into the field, and must participate in his success or failure. If it falls 
back with him upon Fort Diane it must Suffer great loss, and if it follow 
him to Tampa bay it will be wholly out of position. 

tw In this, and even a greater state of uncertainty, I have been held 
since the 26th ultimo, the day after I ordered back Major Cooper's bat- 
talion orGeorgia foot, to prevent starvation at Fort Diane; and though 
daily from friat time in the expectation of receiving from Savannah 
horses and serviceable wagons, not one has arrived. The quantity of 
subsistence that will be at Fort Diane (say) to-morrow, will only be that 
sent from Picolata on the 6th instant, viz: 17,497 rations of bread and 
Hour, 11,000 rations of pork, (with beef-cattle in the neighborhood,) 
8,000 rations of beans, some coffee, and vinegar, &e. And the troops 
now about to proceed, perhaps, as far as the Withlacoochee, will not 
have the means of taking with them the rations for more than six 
days. 

"I beg leave to recapitulate the causes of my great deficiency in the 
means of transportation. 1st. The wagons and horses which I knew Briga- 
dier Clinch to possess early in February, have been more broken down by 
hard service and bad roads than I had expected to find them. 2d. 1 had, upon 
what was considered in Georgia, and even at Picolata, the best informa- 
tion, confidently relied upon the use of the Ochlawaha as late as the 2d 
instant. 3d. No bacon has arrived, and the difference between it and pork, 
including wood and brine, is fifty per centum against the latter. 4th. The 
wagons purchased at Charleston and Augusta, by Assistant Quartermas- 
ters L'Engle and Peyton, are generally poor, and many of them un- 
serviceable. 5th. The six or ten wagons actually reported to have been 
shipped at Baltimore in, I think, the Arctic, with Major Gates, were all 
left behind. 6th. Of the 19,000 rations known to be at Fort Drane about 
the 25th ultimo, nearly the whole have been drawn by a force not ex- 
pected by the Government or myself to appear in that quarter; and 7th. 
Not a horse for the baggage-train left by me at Savannah, or which I 
have since ordered to be purchased by Assistant Quartermaster Dim- 
mock, has arrived in Florida. 

" On the 21st ultimo, when I was but twenty hours from Savannah, I 
sent back by a steamer that was met, an order to Lieutenant Dimmock 
to ship about forty horses for the baggage-train to Picolata. This order 
was strongly reiterated by a return steamer five days afterwards, and 
again, on the 2d instant, by another boat, he was instructed to send im- 
mediately, and by the speediest conveyance, seventy horses for the 
train, and six four-horse wagons. I had this morning a report from him, 
saying, after he had received my first and second orders, that he had 
sent all the horses wanted for draught and packs by land, except a few 
which were to come as packs with Captain Wharton. Now, as the latter 
was about twenty-four days in New York, after receiving orders for 
Florida, and expected to remain ten in Savannah, he cannot be looked for 
in this neighborhood before the 18th or 20th instant. The other parts of the 
lot were, it seems, given as packs to the tenth company of South Caro- 
36 



[ 22-1 ] 548 

Una mounted men, and sent forward in a drove. They must, it is feared, 
arrive in a state unfit for the baggage-train (say) about the IGth instant. 
Such has been the failure of human agents. The weather has been 
equally adverse. 

" If the force on the Withlacoochee should fall back on Fort Diane, it 
will be seen from the foregoing, that a part at least must, probably, march 
upon Volusia or Carey's Ferry to be within reach of subsistence. ^.In- 
structions have been left behind me to send forward rations, should the 
means of transportation arrive in time, and the troops already in the 
neighborhood of Picolata — Major Cooper's and the remaining company 
of Major Gates's battalions. I have also desired Brigadier General Eus- 
tis, in the same event, to order to Fort Diane two companies of mounted 
men of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment, and a fourth order will go back in 
this boat to Lieutenant Dimmock on the subject of horses and wagons. 

" Some rifles and the tents arrived this morning at Picolata ; but 
Colonel Goodwyn had marched through six or eight storms, without 
cover, and now all companies in march are to be reduced to three tents 
each. 

" P. S. Please remark that, in his letter to Brigadier General Clinch, 
dated at New Orleans, the 2d ultimo, Major General Gaines speaks of 
" an efficient co-operation ," promises to be " in readiness" at Tampa 
bay "■ by the 8th of the present month, to form a junction at or near that 
that place, with the force under your command, whenever, and as soon 
as, in your judgment, your force shallbe sufficient to justify the move- 
ment" and concludes by saying, " a sufficient quantity of ammunition and 
provisions have been transported to Fort Brooke, to divide ivith you 7 
until further supplies are received." Yet he did not wait till the Brig- 
adier gave notice that he was u in force ;" came to Fort King, and swept 
nearly the whole of the subsistence collected at Fort Drane. A copy 
of that letter is in your office, and I now enclose one from Governor 
Eaton, from which it will appear that Major General Gaines knew at 
Tampa bay, about the 14th ultimo, that I had been charged with the di- 
rection of this war. He first heard this at Pensacola, and received Gov- 
ernor Eaton's despatch at Tampa, as I can establish ; hence his haste, 
and neglect of the assurances given to Brigadier General Clinch ; his 
isolated attack, &c." 
Paymaster Lytic to General Scott, dated Fort Drane, March 5, 1836. Document No. 72. 

" I have been directed by General Clinch to inform you that your 
communications of yesterday's date reached him at this post after he had 
mounted his horse, and was on the move with the forces under his com- 
mand, to escort supplies to General Gaines. He directed me likewise 
to say to you that the distance from this post to Garey's (or Black creek) 
is about the same as the distance- from here to Picolata. As you may 
wish, however, to obtain all the information possible on the subject, 1 
will take the liberty of adding, from my own knowledge, that the road 
from Garey's to this place is sandy, consequently almost invariably dry, 
while the road from Picolata here is muddy after heavy rains, particularly 
such as we have just experienced. 

" Colonel Gadsden arrived here from Tallahassee on the 4th (yester- 
day) and accompanied General Clinch this morning to the Withla- 
coochee." 



549 [ 224 ] 

From the same to the s.ime, dated Fort Drane, March 8, 1836. Document No. 72. 

" By direction of General Clinch I opened your communication of 
the 6th instant, which arrived late last night, in advance of the wagons. 
You will perceive by my letter of the 5th, that General Clinch, with 
all the forces at this post, and 100 mounted men from the vicinity, had 
left for Withlacoochee, to escort a small supply of cattle, ammunition, 
&c, to General Gaines, having received the night before a third express 
from that officer. No word has been received from either of these Gen- 
erals since the 5th. When General Clinch left here he expected to be 
back on the 9th. 

"The probability is that the wagons will return without an escort, 
there being at present no troops here, and should General Clinch get 
back before the wagons depart, his men may be too much fatigued to 
march again immediately ; but this of course is merely conjecture. I am 
satisfied, however, that General Clinch would advise that an escort ac- 
company the wagons back to this place when reloaded. Captain Gra- 
ham being directed by General Clinch to send back the wagons for sup- 
plies after their arrival here, will send them to Garey's, it being the 
best road. 

" N. B. The amount of General Gaines's last express to General 
Clinch, dated 3d instant, was merely copies of his previous letters, with 
a note, stating that the Indians were still around them, but little or no 
fighting taken place since his last communication." 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Fort Drane, March 14, 1836. Doc. No. 77. 

" On my arrival here, I found that the force which had been upon the 
Withlacoochee had fallen back on this vicinity. 

" Brigadier General Clinch, with some means of subsistence, and 
about 600 men, (of whom 150 were mounted Floridians,) joined Major 
General Gaines on the 6th instant. The force under the latter had 
already been reduced to the necessity of commencing on horses and 
dogs for their subsistence. After receiving that timely and important 
succor, the army remained in position until the 10th. 

" It may be remarked that, from the time of entrance into the in- 
trenched camp, up to the retreat in this direction, not a sortie was 
attempted ; and that, to save the pride of the higher officer, the command 
was relinquished to the next in rank, in order that he might give the 
order to retreat. 

" A copy of Major General Gaines's order, yielding the immediate 
command of their joint forces to Brigadier General Clinch, is enclosed. 
This extraordinary paper I have but little time to comment upon. The 
poor sneer against me, as the diplomatic agent of the War Department, 
is in character with all his recent acts; for, at the moment of the arri- 
val of the succor, on the 6th, he had already opened a negotiation 
with the enemy, in which it is said, on good authority, he was willing to 
leave them in the quiet possession of the country below the Withlacoo- 
chee, until the arrival of the "diplomatic agent;" but in which Powell 
insisted that that river should be the perpetual boundary between us 
and the Seminoles. But for Brigadier General Clinch, 1 have no 
doubt some treaty, on the one or the other basis, would have been 
formed between the parties. He alleged the positive instructions of 



[ 224 ] 550 

the War Department against all negotiating, and he enabled Major Gen- 
eral Gaines to save the original force with him. Not a sortie was 
made from the intrenched camp, from the time of its formation up to 
the retreat, and on the approach of the succor a large detachment of 
the enemy had taken a position to intercept the retreat in this direction. 
How, under such circumstances, it can be alleged that the enemy had 
been beaten, it would be difficult to reconcile with facts. 

" I have reason to hope that the enemy remains nearly in the same 
position as before the isolated, and therefore false movement of Major 
General Gaines. This is fortunate. 

"I have instructed Brigadier General Eustis, after scouring the coun- 
( \ through which he will have to pass to some extent, to place his col- 
umn in position, somewhere in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha, about 
the 25th instant. Colonel Lindsay, by the same day, is to be with his 
force at Chickuchatty, (about two marches from Tampa,) and means 
are suggested to each, in order to multiply the chances of communica- 
ting with each other. 

" The right wing will move hence (say) on the 24th instant, to attack 
in front. This column will pass the Withlacoochee about half a mile 
below the late intrenched camp, where there is a good ford ; and of 
which Major General Gaines might have availed himself if he had had 
the strength or inclination. 

The 25th instant is appointed in order that I may be certain of giving 
Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay time to put themselves 
in position respectively, and further, to give time for the harassed 
troops lately under Major General Gaines to recruit themselves for 
effective operations. The same interval is equally important to enable 
Brigadier General Clinch to receive from Picolata or Garey's Ferry, 
the quantity of subsistence indispensable to give confidence to the move- 
ments of the right wing. I have time to add no more. 

" Enclosed are copies of the order of Major General Gaines, mention- 
ed above, and of Brigadier General Clinch's letter to me." 

General Scott's Order No. 13, dated Fort Drane, March 14, 1836. Document No. 82. 
" General Thomas Woodward, of Macon county, Alabama, is author- 
ized, aided by Majors J. H. Watson and W. B. Flournoy, to accept the 
services of any 500 Creek warriors, to be employed as auxiliaries in the 
present war against the Seminole Indians. Should General Woodward 
decline taking the command of the friendly Indians, Major Watson, assist- 
ed by Major Flournoy, will take the command of them." 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Fort Dranc, March 20, 1836. Doc. No. 94. 

" This wing is waiting to give time for Brigadier General Eustis and 
Colonel Lindsay to gain their respective positions, Pelaklikaha and 
Chickuchatty, for the arrival of the wagons sent hence to Garey's Ferry 
for subsistence ; the last of which may be expected by the 24th, with 
(it is hoped) some additional teams for Savannah, and for the troops 
from New Orleans to recruit their strength. 

"Some wagons (six) and twelve horses arrived at Picolata, from 
Savannah, about the. 12th instant, and a few horses or packs, with the 
last company of South Carolina mounted men, a little before. All those 
means of transportation were indispensable to the left wing. 



Mfl t 



551 [ 224 ] 

"Brigadier General Eustis, in a letter just received, doubts whether 
he can reach Pelaklikaha earlier than the 27th or 28th. The movement 
of the right wing may or may not be delayed a few days accordingly. 
This will depend on a calculation of Lindsay's movements, and the 
amount of subsistence that may arrive by the 24th from below. The lat- 
ter may be so small as not to allow of any delay here, as we must take 
enough to give the right wing time to beat the enemy, and to march to 
Tampa bay." 

General Eustis to General Scott, dated Volusia, 22J of March, 1836. Document No. 98. 

" Owing to a misunderstanding of my orders, on the part of Brigadier 

General Bull, a part of my force, viz : Lieutenant Colonel Butler, with 

four companies of mounted men, and Major Kirby, with two companies 

of artillery, have not yet reached this place." 

General Sett to the Adjutant General, dated Tampa bay, April 12, 1836. Doc. No. 103. 
" The long halt here has been for the purpose of recruiting the hor- 
ses a little — corn and hay, though of an indifferent quality, being found 
in abundance. This forage has been sent from New Orleans, by Major 
Clark, assistant quartermaster, under my orders of the 14th of February. 
"The three columns were for several days within thirty miles of 
each other. Owing to the direction of the wind, Clinch's column heard 
the signal-guns fired by the other two, but neither of the latter could hear 
any response." 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Picolata, April 30, 1836. Document No. 116. 

"That officer (General Gaines) it is said, caused Powell and his 
chiefs to be informed, by way of inducing them to agree to accept the 
Withlacoochee as a temporary boundary, that large armies were ap- 
proaching, which would fill up the Indian country, or crush every thing 
in the way. The wily chiefs profited by the information : sent off their 
families, and dispersed their warriors into small parties. In this way 
Powell expects to make good his threat, viz : that he ivould protract the 
war three years." 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated St. Augustine, May 20, 1836. Doc. No. 146. 

" What I meant to state at the conclusion of my last letter, was this : 
the troops called for by me came into the field at too late a period, gen- 
erally, to enable me to prosecute the war to a conclusion." 

[End of Extracts.] 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. 

January 19, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Captain Hitchcock presented himself before the Court, and asked permis- 
sion to add to his testimony the following, as a continuation of his 
answer to the \bth interrogatory by the Court : 

I will state to the Court that yesterday, on referring to some official docu- 
ments from Tampa bay, I saw it stated that General Gaines had an escort 
from Fort Drane to Tallahassee. That statement is not correct ; but, I pre- 



[ 224 j 552 

sume, was founded upon this: that Major McLemore was about to pro- 
ceed from Fort Diane in the direction of Tallahassee, with a mounted 
troop ; that he tendered to General Gaines, unsolicited, as I believe, on 
the part of General Gaines, a small detachment of his troop, as an escort. 
This detachment remained a day, or perhaps a day and a half, and com- 
menced its march as an escort to General Gaines. But General Gaines, 
after the first day's ride, dismissed the escort, halting himself, permitting 
the escort to leave him, and afterwards moved on without it. I did 
not refer to this in my testimony, because the escort was entirely unsoli- 
cited, I believe, and not even desired. Major McLemore's troop was 
returning to their homes at the time — they were not detached as an 
escort. 

In consequence of the absence of witnesses, the Court adjourned to 
meet at a future day. 

January 27, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Lieutenant A. M. Mitchell, of the 4th regiment of infantry, a witness, 
being duly sworn, ivas interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by the Court. Were you in the campaign in Florida, 
under Major General Gaines, and in 'what capacity ? 

Ansiver. J was in the campaign, and was in command of a company 
of the 4th regiment of United States infantry. 

2. Question by the Court. When, and how many attacks did the enemy 
make upon the army, whilst fortified at Camp Izard, and with what 
results ? 

Answer. They fired upon the breast-works, I think, seven days in 
succession, from the 29th of February until the night of the 5th of 
March. It was attended with a loss of a few lives, and some wounded ; 
and also resulted in their sending in some one to know if we were will- 
ing to treat with them. 

3. Questionby the Court. What did you estimate the number of the 
enemy ? 

Answer. I supposed there must have been seven or eight hundred, 
judging from the yells and from the firing. 

4. Question by the Court. Were there any preparations made for a 
sortie, and what were the views of (he officers generally, on the subject 
of a sortie ? 

Ansiver. My impression is that the field officers were called together 
by General Gaines, to consult on the expediency of making a sortie. It 
was the impression of many of the officers that a sortie should be made, 
and might be attended with favorable results. 

5. Question by the Court. What is your opinion of the ability of the 
forces under Major General Gaines, to drive and beat the enemy, if a 
sortie had been made ? 

Answer. It is my opinion that they could have done it with a great 
deal of ease, and I don't think it was doubted by any one in the breast- 
work but that we could have done it. 



ki£ffi 



553 [ 224 J 

6. Question by the Court. Would it have been safe for the troops to 
have left the breast-work, and retired on Fort Diane, without the addi- 
tional force brought by General Clinch ? 

Answer. Yes. 

7. Question by the Court. Was it the impression, generally, that 
the Indians were sincere in proposing a truce ? 

Answer. It is my opinion that it was the general impression of those 
who were inside the breast-work. 

1. Question by General Gaines. What was the general opinion 
among the officers at Camp Izard, on the 29th of February, 1836, as to 
the number of Indians engaged in the action that day ? 

Answer. I heard different opinions expressed. Some supposed that 
there were 1,000 or 1,500; others thought that there were not so many, 
perhaps not more than 500 or 600. As far as I can recollect, it was 
Colonel Twigg's opinion that there were 800 or 1,000. As to the 
opinion of others, I can't recollect their names. 

2. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to state the 
means he had of judging as to the number of the enemy near Camp Izard ; 
and whether he had ever been much accustomed to seeing large collec- 
tions of Indian warriors? 

Answer. The only means I had of judging was what I could see from 
the breast-work, from their yells, and from their firing at the breast-work. 
I have never been accustomed to seeing large bodies of Indians. 

3. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to state what 
officer, if any to his knowledge, expressed to General Gaines the opin- 
ion that a sortie should be made ? 

Answer. I don't know of any having expressed to General Gaines that 
opinion. I referred to the conversation of the officers among themselves. 

4. Question by General Gaines. The witness having stated that the 
Indians fired on Camp Izard during several days, he is desired to explain 
whether the actions of the 27th and 28th of February did not take place 
before Camp Izard was constructed ? 

Answer. We arrived at the Withlacoochee on the 27th, and approach- 
ed the river near where General Clinch had crossed it on the 31st of 
December ; and whilst some of the officers were searching for a suitable 
place to cross the river, ( it being very deep, and a very dense hammock on 
the opposite side, ) they were fired upon by the Indians, who were secreted 
in the bushes. The firing was continued on both sides, for perhaps two 
hours. It being late, and not being able to ford the river, it was deem- 
ed expedient by the General to march back a short distance, and encamp 
for the night. On the morning of the 2Sth, we took up the march down 
the river, to seek for a place where there was an open pine woods on 
the opposite side. After proceeding about four miles, the advance guard, 
under the command of Lieutenant Izard, whilst marching along the 
bank of the river, was fired upon from the opposite side, by the Indians, 
and Lieutenant Izard and several others were wounded. The command 
was then halted at that place, and I think the General called together 
the field officers to consult whether we should proceed further. This is, 
however, merely my opinion. The General came to the determination 
that we should encamp there for the night. The breast- work spoken of, was 
put up that afternoon. We remained there the next day, after putting 



[ 224 554 

up the breast-work about three logs high. The Indians commenced firing 
upon us from every direction, about 10 o'clock next morning, after the 
breast-work was put up ; and they fired upon us from that time, as be- 
fore stated, until the 5th, occasionally, except the first day, when the fire 
was continuous for three or four hours. On the 5th they commenced 
firing earlier, and continued later, than on any previous day — from about 
4 o'clock in the morning till about 5 or 6 in the afternoon. It was on 
that night that a negro called to the breast-work to know if a white flag 
would be a protection to the cneni) in case it should be brought in. 

5. Question by General Gaines. Was the witness with the right wing 
of the army of General Scott, in March and April, 183G ; and what is his 
opinion as to the position of the families of Indians on the Withlacoo- 
chee, during the movements of that army, and how is the opinion deri- 
ved ? 

Ansiucr. I was with the right wing of the army under General Scott. 
After we had crossed the river at Camp Izard, I marched up to the cove, 
and crossed over a swamp, the morning after our arrival ; there was a 
well-beaten track, with the appearance that many persons had been in 
the habit of travelling over it. I being among the number who crossed 
over first, had an opportunity of observing small tracks, which I took to 
be children's tracks, and which gave me the opinion that the families of 
some of them had not long since crossed that place. In our pursuit of 
the Indians during that day, we followed a well-beaten Indian trail, lead- 
ing up the river, that had been recently very much used. 

G. Question by General Gaines. Was the search made by that wing, 
into the cove of the Withlacoochee, for the Indians, sufficient to deter- 
mine whether the Indians or their families were or were not in the cove ? 

Answer. I should say it was not. 

7. Question by General Gaines. How long was the army in the neigh- 
borhood of the cove, in March and April ; and was its march conducted 
through the cove, or in the adjacent open country ; and were any detach- 
ments made, or other means resorted to, in order to ascertain whether 
the Indians or their families had dispersed from the cove ? 

Answer. We arrived at the cove on the 30th ; crossed the swamp I 
have referred to on the 31st ; pursued the Indians three or four miles, 
as well as I could judge, and returned to our encampment, and proceed- 
ed thence to Tampa bay. There were no other detachments made, 
or other means resorted to, to my knowledge, on that march, to ascer- 
tain whether the Indians or their families had dispersed from the eove ? 

8. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to state whe- 
ther any, and if any, how much, subsistence was left at Fort Diane, on the 
26th of March, 1836 ; and what quantity, or how many days' rations were 
received by the troops of the right wing, on that day, or prior to their 
leaving Fort Diane ? 

Answer. I don't know how much subsistence was left at Fort Drane. 
As well as I can recollect, we started with ten days' provisions. 



555 f 224 ] 



Captain G. S. Dram, of the 2d regiment of artillery, a witness on 
the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interroga- 
ted as follows : 

1. Question by General Gaines. It having been stated, officially, to 
the War Department, and more recently urged before this Court, by 
General Scott, that the Indians had removed their families from the cove, 
so called, on the Withlacoochee river, and had also themselves dispersed 
from that place, in March and April last, and thereby eluded the 
pursuit of the army, and having attributed these alleged facts to the 
movement of General Gaines, I therefore call the attention of the 
witness to the following points, and desire his answers, viz: Were 
you with the right wing of General Scott's army in Florida, on its 
march from Fort Diane to Tampa bay, and thence returning back to 
Fort Drane ? Did you find any Indians south of the Withlacoochee, at 
or near the cove ? Were they pursued ? How far, and with what effect ? 
State the extent of the cove, and how far it was penetrated by the army, 
and whether, from the search then or subsequently made by the right 
wing, any opinion could be formed, as to whether the Indians were or 
were not in force in the cove ? and what is the opinion of the witness, 
as to whether the families of the Indians were in the cove or not? and 
on what the opinion is founded, and whether the opinion was general, 
so far as the witness knows ? Was there a post established near the cove, 
on going down to Tampa bay ? When was the post relieved, and were 
the Indians and their families, in the opinion of the witness, still in the 
cove, and was the cove then penetrated by the army ? Was the cove, es- 
pecially south of the Withlacoochee, penetrated by either of the other 
divisions of General Scott's army, to wit : the left wing or centre in the 
campaign ? And what is the opinion of the witness, as to the force of the 
Indians on the Withlacoochee, about the month of March, and upon 
what does the witness found his opinion ? And what, in the opinion of 
the witness, is the strength of the Seminole nation, including the Mick- 
asuky Indians ? 

Answer. I was with the army under General Scott, on its march from 
Fort Drane to Tampa bay, and thence back. We met with Indians at 
what is called the lower point of the cove ; probably a force of about 250, 
They were pursued by the army into the cove, about, I think, not more 
than two and a half miles. I am not able to say with what effect. The 
best information I have been able to collect, the cove is about 15 or 
20 miles from its commencement to its termination, near the Wahoo 
swamp. The army penetrated this cove no more than about two miles 
and a half in pursuit of the Indians. At that particular time, I think no 
opinion could be formed as to whether the Indians were or were not in 
force in the cove. It is my opinion that the families were there. I do 
not believe that the opinion was general. I formed my opinion on the 
fact that after Major Cooper had established his stockade, southwest of 
the cove a short distance, the army had left him but a few hours, when 
he was attacked by the Indians from the cove, or coming from that direc- 
tion ; and believing that the operations of the army on the Withlacoochee 
were not such as to disturb their families, as we were some distance 
from their strong hold. The post of Fort Cooper was relieved on the 
return of the right wing of the army. The Indians and their families 



[ 224 ] 556 

were still in the cove at that time, in my opinion. The army at that 
time marched through a very small portion of the cove, on the south side, 
in the march to the crossing of the Big VVithlacoochee, on the Tampa 
road. I do not know whether the cove was penetrated by either of the 
other divisions of the army. I am not able to say what was the force of 
the Indians on the Withlacoochee in March. Judging of the numbers 
that usually resort on that river, from what I saw on the 31st of Decem- 
ber, 1835, I should think they would be able to bring into the field about 
1,000 warriors, including negroes. I have always estimated the strength 
of the Seminoles, including the Mickasuky Indians, from the best informa- 
tion I could collect, and from my own personal knowledge, to amount to 
eighteen hundred or two thousand warriors, including negroes. The 
whole of this force did not serve on the Withlacoochee, nor do I believe 
the whole force has ever been there at one time. The Mickasuky tribe to 
which I refer inhabit the country north of the Withlacoochee, in the di- 
rection of Fort King. Their range of country extends also in a south- 
westerly direction from Fort King, better understood as the Wetumpka 
country. 

2. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to state 
whether any, and if any, what number of cannon were fired by the 
troops at and near the Withlacoochee in the latter end of March, 1836, 
and by whose order ; and whether the Indians in and about the cove 
were not near enough to hear those cannon ; and whether it is not his 
opinion that they were thereby apprized of the movement of the troops 
against them under General Scott ? 

Ansioer. There were cannon fired, the number I do not recollect. 
They were fired, as I understood, by order of General Scott. I think 
the Indians were near enough to hear the cannon, and undoubtedly they 
must have been apprized of the movement of the troops by the firing of 
those cannon. I do not think, however, that the reports of the cannon 
affected them much, or that they were much alarmed at the reports. 

3. Question by General Gaines. Did the witness see any of the In- 
dians near the Withlacoochee, as General Scott's right wing marched 
towards Tampa bay, holding up their hands, and thereby intimating 
a desire to have a parley ? The witness is desired to state all he knows 
in reference to the matter here referred to. 

Answer. I saw some Indians on the Withlacoochee, while we were 
crossing. I saw them after we had crossed, and previously to the attack 
at the foot of the cove. I did not see them holding up their hands, nor 
do I know myself that they did so. It was the impression of the army 
generally, and I saw some officers who informed me of the fact, that they 
had seen some few of them come out and hold up their hands and make 
the sign of peace. The interpreter and guide were sent out to meet 
them, and while talking with them, they saw evidently a disposition 
made among the Indians to capture the individuals, instead of holding a 
peaceable talk. They were evidently desirous of getting possession of 
Billy Omathla, the interpreter, and the guide Nero. I conversed with 
Nero on the subject afterwards. Both Nero and Billy Omathla were de- 
cidedly of opinion that the Indians meant to prove treacherous, and not 
to hold a talk. The next morning, after the Indians had made the signs, 
the 4th regiment of infantry, on approaching the spot, was fired upon by 



537 [ 224 J 

the Indians. Both Billy Omathla and Nero informed me that, while 
talking with the Indians, they saw, both on the right and left, several 
Indians creeping through the palmetto and grass, with a design to get in 
their rear. My knowledge of the character of Billy Omathla and Nero 
is such, that I do not believe that tear had any influence over them at all, 
and I believe they were very sincere in the opinion they gave. 

4. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to state 
whether the St. John's river, at Picolata, has, at any time within his 
knowledge, been impassable during a whole day, as to prevent the com- 
mon ferry-boats from crossing, and whether the steamboat u Essayons" 
could or could not cross in any state of the winds ? 

Answer. I have known the river to be so rough that the common 
ferry-boat could not cross for two or three days ; but this is not usual. I 
have never known the river to be so rough as to prevent the steam- 
boat Essayons, or a boat of her class, with the assistance of scows, to 
cross the river and land on the opposite bank. The width of the river 
St. John's, at Picolata, is about one and three-quarters of a mile. I 
have crossed it there a number of times myself, and two or three times 
with my company and baggage, and never was detained. 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock. 

January 28, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
The Court was occupied until the 30th with the case of General Scott, 
when it adjourned to meet on the 31st, at 11 o'clock. 

January 31, 1S37. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present but the Judge 
Advocate, who was prevented by indisposition from attending the Court, 
whereupon the Court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock. 

February 1, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Colonel D. E. Twiggs, of the 2d regiment of dragoons, a witness on the 
part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated 
as follows : 

1 . Question by General Gaines. What was your opinion of the sin- 
cerity of the Indians in their proposition for peace at Camp Izard, the 
6th of March last ; and please state what motive, if any, the Indians could 
have had for treachery ; and finally, have you heard any observations on 
the subject from Indian countrymen, or other persons acquainted with 
the Indian character, calculated to strengthen or destroy your opinion ? 

Answer. The first night, (the night of the 5th,) when the Indians 
came and hailed the camp, I did not believe them sincere, or that they 
had any intention of coming in at all. The next morning, I went to 



f 224 558 

General Gaines and told him, " whenever you show me men coming 
from the moon, I will believe the Indians are coming in." Before we 
separated, some person standing near spoke and said, " here the Indians 
come." In a short time, having halted some distance from the breast- 
work, one or two of them came forward with a white flag. One of the 
volunteer officers, (I think Adjutant Barrow,) went out and met them. 
When I saw them conversing with Mr. Barrow, I then changed my 
opinion, and believed they were in earnest. I have thought a good deal 
on the subject, and I could think of no motive for their being otherwise 
than sincere. I judge they were sincere from what I had seen of the 
upper part of the Creek nation on previous occasions. It was at the 
Hickory Ground with General Jackson, I think in 1813, after the first 
Indian came in there, I never heard of another act of hostility on the part 
of the nation towards the whites. The next occasion was on the Sem- 
inole campaign with General Jackson — I know after the first Indian came 
in there was no act of hostility. I know this, for I was left in the coun- 
try. I had a conversation with Colonel Dill, at Jacksonville, who has 
been a long time in that country. After detailing the circumstances to 
him as they happened at Fort Izard, he said he had not a doubt but that 
they were sincere in their wish for peace, so much so, that he advised 
the people to go back again on their plantations, on the road from Mi- 
canopy to Fort Drane. 

2. Question by General Gaines. Please state what conversation you 
had, if any, with General Clinch, on the subject of the effect of the 
movement of General Gaines upon the operations of General Scott's 
army in East Florida ? 

Answer. I had some conversation with General Clinch on the sub- 
ject, and he stated to me pretty much what he has stated to the Court ; 
that General Gaines's movement had no influence on the movements of 
General Scott. He stated to me a few days ago, that he regretted he had 
not been a little more explicit, and informed the Court that the wagon- 
train at Fort Drane had time to go to Picolata or Black creek (I don't 
recollect which) for provisions, and return time enough for that part of 
the army to get in position, agreeably to the plan of operations. 

3. Question by General Gaines. Colonel Twiggs is requested to state 
whether he met a wagon-train, about the middle of March last, between 
Fort Drane and Black creek, and if so, whether the wagons were or were 
not accompanied with a guard ? 

Answer. I left Micanopy, ten miles on this side of Fort Drane, on 
the 19th of March last. On that day, I met the wagon-train, with the 
provisions, about twenty miles from Black creek. 1 inquired of the per- 
son having charge of the wagon-train, (called the wagon-master,) where 
the escort was. He said he had none, and did not see any guard with it 
at all. 

4. Question by General Gaines. Be pleased to state whether the 
Louisiana volunteers were, or were not, ready or willing to march at any 
time after the middle of March, 183G, and what were your reasons for 
the opinion which you entertain in this case ? 

Answer. I have no doubt but the Louisiana volunteers, had they been 
ordered, would have marched the next day after their arrival from the 
Withlacoochee near to Fort Drane. I had a conversation with General 



_I 



559 [ 224 ] 

Smith on this subject, and his opinion and mine coincided, that both our 
commands, the regulars and volunteers, were ready to march, and that 
we should not ask to detain the army on their account. 

5. Question by General Gaines. Colonel Twiggs is requested to state 
what he knows on the subject of making a sortie at or from Camp Jzard, 
in February and March, 1836 ? 

Answer. I received an order on the 29th of February, after the Indi- 
ans had retired from making an attack on us, to hold the comaiand in 
readiness for a sortie. After the 29th, in a conversation with General 
Gaines, I think he stated to me he had written to the officer in command 
at Fort Diane, and he expected him down with some mounted troops ; 
that as soon as they made their appearance, the command was to leave 
the breast-work to attack the Indians. I think he stated to me that he 
had so written, that he would not make the sortie, until the troops should 
come down. I had frequent conversations with the General on the sub- 
ject, and he stated to me his views : that we could do no good by going 
out ; that the Indians would fly before us, and that as soon as any troops 
made their appearance, we should go out and attack the Indians. It was 
expected that troops would arrive, from the direction of Tampa bay, on 
the opposite side of the river. This was before the 5th of March. 

6. Question by General Gaines. Be pleased to state whether any, and 
if any, what officers of the light brigade, expressed a doubt as to the sin- 
cerity of the Indians in their desire to fight no more and make peace, 
after they came in with a white flag on the 6th of March, 1836 ? 

Ansiver. I never heard one express a doubt while I staid there 
— not one. 

1. Question by the Court. What is your opinion of the number of the 
enemy that invested Camp Izard ; and were the forces under General 
Gaines sufficient to have driven or dispersed the enemy, had a sortie 
been made ? 

Answer. I estimated the Indians on the 29th, that were firing on Camp 
Izard, at about 1,000. I believe the force was quite sufficient to have 
driven them at any time. 

2. Question by the Court. Do you believe that the Indians were 
aware of the destitute situation of the troops as respects provisions, be- 
fore they made overtures for peace ? 

Ansiver. It is impossible, in my opinion, that they could have had 
any knowledge of it. 

3. Question by the Court. What is your opinion as to the propriety of 
making a sortie from Camp Izard, whilst invested by the enemy ? 

The witness here requested the Court to excuse him from answering 
the question. It would be merely an expression of opinion, and might 
place him in a situation towards General Gaines which it was his wish to 
avoid. 

General Gaines observed that the answer of the witness could make 
no difference in his feelings towards him, ; but that he was then preparing 
a question similar in import to the one just proposed by the Court, which 
would relieve the witness from any delicacy which he might feel on the 
subject. 

The Court excused the witness from answering the question, when 
General Gaines proposed the following : 



[ 224 ] 560 

7. Question by General Gaines. Colonel Twiggs is desired to state 
whether or not it was his opinion, at any time between the 27th of Feb- 
ruary and 6th of March, that the enemy could have been subdued by 
making a sortie, or whether it would not have contributed only to dis- 
perse the Indians ? and state whether the Indians could not have con- 
cealed themselves in a thick hammock, at any moment, in three or lour 
minutes' time ; and state whatever opinion he entertained on the subject 
at the time, and whether he communicated to General Gaines such 
opinion ? 

Answer. To the first part of the question, from the 27th to the 28th, 
and including the 28th, the Indians were on the opposite side of the river, 
and we had not boats to cross the river. From the 29th of February to 
the 5th of March, we could, at any time the Indians made their appear- 
ance, have driven them ; but we had not the means to follow them. 
I cannot say whether we should have dispersed them or not ; as our 
camp fronted the river, there was an extensive hammock and scrub on 
the left. There was a hammock also on the right, both of them two or 
three hundred yards of the camp, or probably a shorter distance, and the 
Indians could have taken shelter in either of those hammocks, in a few 
minutes. I never gave General Gaines, while at Camp Izard, any opin- 
ion as to the propriety of a sortie. 

8. Question by General Gai7ics. Colonel Twiggs is requested to state 
whether any officers, and if any, who, of the light brigade, at Camp Iz- 
ard, in February and March, 1S36, expressed the opinion that a sortie 
ought to have been made ? 

Answer. Not one, while I was there, expressed such an opinion. I 
had, and as far as I could learn from the opinion of the command gener- 
ally, they had entire confidence in General Gaines, and we were willing 
to submit to his judgment. 

Captain Drane, a ivitness, again called. 

5. Question by General Gaines. Please state what reasons you had, 
if any, after returning with the right wing of the Florida army to Fort 
Diane, for believing the families of the Indians were still in the cove, 
and whether any doubt remained on your mind as to their being there 
in March and April last ? 

Answer. The night before the right wing of the army crossed the 
Bi°" Withlacoochee, returning, I was called at 12 o'clock that night by 
Major Cooper, who was the officer of the day, to listen to the talk of 
both Indians and negroes, on the north bank of the Big Withlacoochee. 
The next morning the army had marched but about half a mile, when we 
crossed a trail of Indians coming out of a swamp, passing to the south. 
A little further on, about two or three hundred yards, we discovered a 
trail leading into the swamp. The trails were evidently fresh and made 
that morning. The second day after crossing the Little Withlacoochee, 
on our route to Fort King, the army crossed several small trails, some 
leading to the east and to the west ; those west, leading into Wahoo 
swamp, or in that direction. The day following (the day we reached 
Fort King) our left flankers were attacked by a small party of Indians 
that soonfled, also in the direction of the Wahoo swamp, or Withla- 



561 [ 224 ] 

coochee. On our arrival at Fort King, we were there informed that 
Billy Omathla's wife, and one other squaw, I believe her sister, had 
been captured, during the absence of the army from Fort Drane, and 
taken off by the hostile Indians. Some days after the army arrived at 
Fort Drane, Billy Omathla's wife made her escape and returned to the 
right wing of the army to her husband. I had several conversations with 
her (through the interpreter.) She informed me that the Indians had 
not moved from the Wahoo swamp and the coves on the Withlacoochee ; 
that their women and children were still there ; that they had planted 
their grounds ; that the crops were very fine, and described the corn and 
rice as being about a foot high. She stated that, in ner opinion, they 
would have a better crop than they had ever had. I inquired of her if 
the Indians had moved their families from there at any time during the 
war ? She informed me that they had not. She there had had a con- 
versation with Powell, who advised her to quit her husband and join the 
Mickasukies, and not return back to the white people; that his men had 
whipped all the white men, and driven them out of the country, and that 
they had gone home ; that he meant to assemble his warriors and drive 
the pale faces from Fort King, and then he would go to Fort Drane, 
and drive them away from there, where they would get a large sup- 
ply of ammunition ; they would then drive all the Alachewa's (mean- 
ing volunteers,) out of the country, as far as the Suwannee, when 
they would have all the country from the Suwannee south to them- 
selves. She informed me that she had heard Powell repeatedly say, 
during the time she was in captivity, that he never would make peace 
with the white man. These are the reasons why I have never had 
a doubt that the Indians had never quitted the cove, or their strong 
holds on the Withlacoochee. After the army had returned from the 
Withlacoochee, with General Gaines, I was sent to Oakland, five or 
six miles northeast from Fort Drane, where I remained until General 
Scott arrived. During the time I occupied that post with my com- 
mand, and a i'ew days after I returned from the Withlacoochee, very 
frequent signs of Indians were discovered on the plantation of Colonel 
John Mcintosh, and crossing the main road leading to Micanopy. I 
had frequently seen fires on the opposite side of Orange lake, during 
this period, and I felt satisfied they were Indian fires. The Indian 
women spoken of in this answer, were captured during the time the 
army was absent on its march from Fort Drane to Tampa bay. They 
returned from captivity, after the army arrived at Fort Drane from 
Tampa bay. 

6. Question by General Gaines. Please state, as far as you know, 
the disposition of the troops at and near Fort Drane, from the 11th 
to the 26th of March ; whether individuals or small parties were ex- 
posed to the enemy during that time ; whether any attack was made 
by the enemy; and whether, from your knowledge of the scouting 
habits of the Indians, they could have been ignorant of the exposed 
situation of individuals, parties, or detachments, during the time speci- 
fied? 

Answer. After the army returned from the Withlacoochee, they were 
encamped in a range of country, extending, I think, eleven or twelve 
miles, Fort Drane being the centre. The only troops on the left of the 



[ 22 1 ] 56 2 

centre were my own command nt Oakland. Those encamped in a south- 
westerly direction from Fort Drane, or on its right, were the Louisiana 
volunteers and the regulars that had been at Camp Izard. There were 
small parties and individuals passing to and from the encampments, and 
were exposed to the enemy. I never heard of their being attacked, or 
any attempt to attack them. The Indians were not ignorant that these 
parties were passing back and forth, as frequently in going between Oak- 
land and Fort Drane, I saw small Indian trails crossing the road in both 
directions passing to the north and south. I also saw Indian tracks in 
many other directions, as far north as within seventeen miles of the ferry 
at Picolata. 

7. Question by General Gaines. Is the witness of opinion that it was 
known or believed at Fort Drane that the General commanding in 
Florida, had required 500 Creek warriors as an auxiliary force against 
the Seminoles; and does the witness know, or believe, that information 
of that requisition was communicated to the Seminoles by means of a 
negro named Primus ? 

Answer. Not to my knowledge. I had understood that Primus was 
sent into the nation, but I was not at that post at the time ; nor do I know 
for what purpose he was sent. 

8. Question by General Gaines. Does the witness suppose that, from 
the information likely to be communicated by Primus to the Seminoles, 
they could have anticipated any other than a spirit of exterminating hos- 
tility from the troops, on the movement of the right wing ? 

Answer. I am not able to say. 

The Court here adjourned, to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock. 

February 2, 1837. 
The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
Lieutenant Mitchell, a witness, again called. 

9. Question by General Gaines. Lieutenant Mitchell is requested to 
state what was said in his presence or hearing by the Indian women who 
had been with the hostile party, as to the location and views of the party 
in the spring or summer oi 183G ? 

Answer. On the 12th of October, we arrived within about four miles 
of the Withlacoochee. The advance guard surprised and took some In- 
dian women and children prisoners. These women were interrogated 
by Governor Call, as to the then location of the Indians, and they re- 
ported that the Mickasuky tribe was still on the Withlacoochee, in the 
cove. The Indian families, they said, were on the opposite side of the 
river from where we were at that time, and the negroes and their fami- 
lies were on the side with us, between the river and a lake that emp- 
tied into the river. They said that Micanopy with his party, was located 
in the Wahoo swamp. 

10. Question by General Gaines. Lieutenant Mitchell is desired to 
state whether any guards were ordered to accompany the baggage-train, 
or other wagons, or other parties that passed to and from Black creek, 



Hj 



563 [224 ] 

and round about Fort Diane, to and from the several encampments, from 
to six miles from Fort Diane, in March, 1836? 

Answer. I am unable to say whether a guard accompanied the bag- 
gage from Black creek ; but there never was a guard, that I know of, 
that accompanied the train from Fort Drane to the encampment occu- 
pied by the 4th infantry and the Louisiana volunteers, about four miles 
from Fort Drane. Individuals and small parties were frequently passing 
between Fort Drane and the several encampments. Individuals were 
also in the habit of hunting in the vicinity of our encampment. 

11. Question by General Gaines. Does the witness believe that 
wagons, or small parties, or single individuals, would have been allowed 
to pass and repass between the camp of the Louisiana volunteers and 
Fort Drane, if no effort had been made by the enemy to sue for 
peace ? 

Answer. I know it was the opinion of the Louisiana volunteers and 
the 4th infantry, that there was no danger in passing and repassing in the 
vicinity of the encampments, and that it was their opinion that the Indians 
were sincere in their proposition for peace at Cam}) Izard. As to whether 
this impression prevailed throughout General Scott's camp at Fort Drane, 
I am unable to say. 

12. Question by General Gaines. Is the witness of opinion that it 
was known or believed at Fort Drane, that the General commanding in 
Florida had required 500 Creek warriors as an auxiliary force against 
the Seminoles ; and does the witness know or believe that information of 
that requisition was communicated to the Seminoles by means of a negro 
named Primus ? 

Answer. 1 heard it spoken of at Fort Drane, by a gentleman named 
Watson, who said he could go and bring these Indians down, if permitted 
by General Scott ; but it is my impression it was not believed that he 
would ever bring them. He, however, went off with that intention ; 
but returned without the Indians. The reason why he did not bring them, 
I am unable to say. I don't know of any such information having ever 
been communicated to the Indians. The reports about camp were, that 
Watson had gone after these 500 Indians. I think Primus was sent to 
the enemy after these reports were in circulation, and that he did not 
return. 

Mr. CummingSj of the United States navy, a witness on the part of 
Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated as 
follows : 

Question by General Gaines. Were you on an expedition from 
Tampa bay to Pease creek, or its neighborhood, about April, 1836 ? and 
if so, state what evidences were discovered of Indians being or having 
been in force in that neighborhood. 

Answer. I was with General Smith at that time (the last part of 
April.) I was at Charlotte harbor when he arrived there ; joined him 
and remained with him until he re-embarked for Tampa bay. While 
with General Smith, I saw no Indians at all. An old trail, probably of 
some ten or twelve men, was the only sign of Indians that we met. 
37 



224 ] 564 

While I was in the neighborhood there were some signs of Indians in the 
vicinity of the residence of the collector; these Indians had been there 
before General Smith arrived. We went up Pease creek in canoes about 
forty miles, returned to the old encampment, and then went through the 
country about fifty or sixty miles, and saw no signs of Indians but the old 
trail I have mentioned. 

General Gaines here presented to the Court the paper numbered 38, ( see 
documents,) being a copy of the "New York Courier and Enquirer," of 
the 2d of April, 1836. 

At the request of General Gaines, certain passages in that paper (edi- 
torial,) were read to the Court by the Judge Advocate ; after which, at 
the instance of General Gaines — 

Colonel William De Peyster, of Florida, was duly sworn as a ivilness, 
and interrogated asfolloivs : 

1. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to state 
whether he has, or has not, reason to believe, that the article from the 
" Courier and Enquirer," of the 2d of April, 1836, was not written by, 
or at the suggestion of Major General Scott? If so, he is desired to state 
the grounds of his belief. 

Answer. I don't believe that it was written by General Scott, or with 
his knowledge. Further, I do not believe that General Scott ever pub- 
lished or caused to be published an article of the kind, or that there was 
ever one published with his knowledge. I have been associated a good deal 
with General Scott, and have known him to disapprove of any publica- 
tion of the kind ; and have heard him say, himself, that he never did au- 
thorize or request any public or private publication, and that he did not 
believe that any of his staff had published any thing. As to this individ- 
ual publication, I never saw or heard of it until this moment, and it ap- 
pears to be an editorial article, written by the editor. 

2. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to state 
whether he has or has not heard Major General Scott express in con- 
versation sentiments similar to those expressed in the article alluded to 
in the last interrogatory? If so, state when and where. 

The witness here asked whether General Gaines expected him to re- 
late a private conversation with a friend. He had no objection on his 
own aecount to answer the question. After some remarks made by 
General Gaines and the witness, the Court was cleared, and decided that 
the question was not a proper question to be put. 

After the Court was resumed, General Gaines asked that his case 
might be laid over until the 9th instant, to give time for an important 
witness to present himself for examination, and to afford him time also to 
prepare his final Address : whereupon the Court adjourned, to meet on 
the 9th of February, at 11 o'clock A. M. 

Thursday, February 9, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present but General 
Atkinson, in consequence of whose absence the Court adjourned to meet 
to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock. 



565 [ 224 I 

February 10, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

General P. F. Smith, adjutant general of the State of Louisiana, and 
witness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, 
was interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by General Games. General Smith is desired to state 
what command ho had in the campaign in Florida under General Gaines, 
and by whose request the corps of Louisiana volunteers were raised 
and called into the service of the United States. 

Answer. 1 served as third in command in the army under General 
Gaines, having waived my rank as Colonel in favor of Lieut. Colonel 
Twiggs. I had been a long time acquainted with Colonel Twiggs, and 
highly respected him as an officer, and thought it would be hardly fair 
that 1 should derive the advantages of his experience, and receive the 
honors that might possibly accrue by having him with me. The corps 
of Louisiana volunteers was raised on the requisition of General Gaines. 

2. Question by General Gaines. General Smith is requested to state 
his opinion as to the best mode of fighting the Indians at Camp Izard, 
between the 28th of February and the 5th of March, 1836, inclusively, 
taking into consideration all the circumstances attending the service 
there, and particularly whether, in his opinion, a sortie would have been 
attended with advantages. 

Answer. I believe that the only mode of righting Indians is to wound 
or kill Indian warriors, but that simply to attempt to disperse them would 
produce no great benefit ; therefore, if the Indians occupy a position 
which we desire to occupy ourselves, we must certainly attack and drive 
them ; but, under other circumstances, whatever method offers the great- 
est facilities of wounding or killing them, is the best method of fighting 
them. The position which General Gaines occupied at Camp Izard at 
the period mentioned, was one that he was desirous of maintaining, and 
I therefore think that he was likely to do more injury to the Indians in 
repulsing their advance on his position, than lie would do in quitting it 
to follow them through the woods. It is impossible for a soldier on foot 
in that country to overtake an Indian. The Indian could at the first 
attack withdraw himself from the fire; and the facilities of the ham- 
mocks in the neighborhood afford them a retreat in which they could 
hide themselves immediately. I believe that, as in attacks on positions 
fortified or not, the loss is always greater on the attacking party than in 
any other kind of combat, where the object is to destroy the life of the 
enemy, that species of combat affords more advantages than any other. 
The battle of New Orleans, the attack on Sandusky, and, in fact, all the 
attacks which were repelled during the last war, are evidences of this. 
On the 29th of February, when, I think, the largest body of Indians ap- 
peared, I think it likely that fewer of our men would have suffered if 
we had made a sortie; but far fewer of the enemy would have fallen. 
The defences that weie afterwards made of the camp were hardly then 
begun, and especially the whole interior of the camp was entirely ex- 
posed. General Gaines himself, who was sitting near the centre of the 



224 ] 



506 



camp, received a wound in his mouth. I, therefore, think that, unu\ { 
all the circumstances, there was a greater injury inflicted on the enemy, 
as they approached the camp through the open ground around it, than if 
the troops had gone out and followed them through the woods. I would 
remark, however, that the whole of the troops were not in the camp: 
two companies of the Louisiana regiment were posted down on the river, 
and a part of them were drawn in afterwards to cover a part of the line. 

3. Question by General Gaines. What is the opinion of General 
Smith upon the motives of the Indians in seeking an interview, and ex- 
pressing a desire for peace at the Withlacoochee ? and state how far the 
Indians manifested a desire for peace hy their conduct previous to the 
hostile movement of the troops from Fort Diane the 26th of March, under 
the orders of General Scott. 

Answer. I think, indeed I feel assured, that the Indians were perfectly 
sincere in seeking a peace. I don't know on what terms they may 
have wished it ; hut I believe they desired a peace. A great many rea- 
sons operated on my mind to produce this conviction. The first was, 
that, on the night of the 29th, after the Indians had retired across the 
liver, 1 heard some one, in a peculiar voice, by the tones of which I 
judged it to be Powell's, making an address to his followers, apparently. 
The friendly Indians and their interpreter lay close by me. I called 
to them through the interpreter, and desired them to listen, and try if 
they could catch any of the expressions. When the speech was finished 
the Indians said to me, through the interpreter, that it was an address of 
the chief, intended to encourage them ; that he told them that no mat- 
ter if they had suffered on our side of the river, that when we attempted 
to cross, they would then have the advantage ; and he suggested to me 
that it was apparent from this, that a portion of the Indians were dissat- 
isfied. The Indians did not appear again the next day, nor until the 
evening of the second day, when a few shots were fired out of one of the 
hammocks on the river; nor did there ever seem to be one-fourth of tlic 
number of Indians on our side of the river that appeared on the 29th. 
On the evening when the first offer to treat was made, a voice of a 
ne -to hailed the camp in English. He called out that the Indians were 
tired of fighting, and desired to come in and make friends. He was 
answered, by direction of General Gaines, that if the chiefs sent in a flag 
the next day it would be respected. They held a talk next day with the 
officers sent by General Gaines, precisely as they were directed to do. 
From all these circumstances, it suggested itself to me that there was a 
large portion of the Indians who were averse to continue the war, so 
large that the hostile party was obliged to conform to their desires ; that 
they had nothing to gain under any view of the subject, by delay ; that 
they were then as well prepared to cany on the war, and better than 
they would be at any subsequent period ; whereas they must have ex- 
pected that the whites would increase in force and strength every day ; 
that if their object was to gain time in order to escape, that they could 
always have done that, as they could always outmarch us, and that in 
fact they did not make use of it for that purpose, for Primus, who was 
sent to them afterwards, must have found them in the upper part of the 
cove, or in the Wahoo swamp. From the time the Indians held the talk 
with General Gaines, there was not the slightest hostile movement on 



567 [ 22 4 ] 

their part. Our men were fishing and bathing in the river every day by 
hundreds while we staid there ; and, as there was a thick swamp on the 
other side, in the vicinity where they were bathing, the Indians might 
at any moment have shot down two hundred men, with perfect security 
to themselves. We encamped about four or five miles southwest from 
Fort Drane, between Fort Diane and the VVithlacoochee ; and small parties, 
and often single individuals, were often passing between the different 
encampments and Fort Drane, and were scattered over the whole woods 
for ten miles around, and I never heard of the sign of an Indian. The first 
that was heard of, or met with after this period, was on the evening of 
the day General Scott commenced his march to the VVithlacoochee, 
when a wagoner belonging to the Georgia horse, and who was left be- 
hind on the road, was shot by the Indians. 

4. Question by General Gaines. Does the witness know of General 
Scott's having authorized the employment of 500 Creek Indians against 
the Seminoles, and does he believe that fact could have been communi- 
cated to the Seminoles by a negro named Primus ? 

Answer. The fact was known generally in camp and at Fort Diane ; 
but I don't know whether Primus had been sent then or not. I was in 
camp four or five miles from Fort Drane ; and was but twice at Fort 
Drane. 

5. Question by General Gaines. When the right wing marched, the 
26th of March, from Fort Diane, was all the transportation made use of 
by General Scott ? and the witness is requested to state what reason 
Captain Shannon, assistant quartermaster, gave for leaving some com- 
missary stores at Fort Drane. 

Answer. I asked Captain Shannon, the quartermaster, some questions 
in relation to the transportation for my own regiment. In his answer 
he remarked to me that the means of transportation for the army were 
not sufficient to convey all the provisions that were at Fort Drane ; and 
I understod him that some portion was left for want of transportation. 
I understood that the great want was the means of transportation rather 
than provisions. I know that General Scott had used every means in 
his power to obtain means of transportation. 

6. Question by General Gaines. To what extent was the cove swamp 
penetrated by General Scott, in March or April, J836, and was the 
search for the Indians by him sufficient to enable him to pronounce upon 
the position of the Indians or their families? 

Answer. On the 30th of March General Scott left all the baggage 
under the charge of Major Wilson and a detachment, at what, I presume, 
may be called the entrance of the cove. We marched without the bag- 
gage that afternoon, probably about four and a half miles. The next 
morning we crossed the foot over a deep and difficult bog, which was 
in front of our encampment. The right column, which was under my 
command, attacked a small party of Indians that was in front, and pur- 
sued them three or four miles, to utmost extent of the pursuit. Part 
of the column had arrived, by taking one direction on the banks of the 
river ; the other part, with which I was myself, was pursuing the trail 
down through the woods to the right, when one of General Clinch's staff 
brought an order for us to return. We then retraced our steps to where 
the baggage was, and the next morning took up our march round the 



[ 224 ] 568 

outside of the cove ; and after leaving Major Cooper, with his battalion, 
towards the southern extremity of it, we went to Tampa bay. The 
farthest extent to which the cove was penetrated was by the party 
which I commanded. Both the columns that entered the cove met al- 
together in the cove about 120 or 130 Indians. We had lost all trace of 
the Indians in the cove before we were recalled. We were on an old 
path, but we had lost all trace of the particular party we were pursuing. 

7. Question by General, Gaines. What is the opinion of the witness 
as to the location of the Indian families in March and April, and does 
the witness know whether they had or had not gone down to Pease 
creek ? 

Answer. 1 had no idea of where they were at that time. They could 
not have been on Pease creek, unless possibly at the very head of it, a 
point beyond which I went. I do not think there was any large body 
of Indians on Pease creek, as I ascended it with only about 140 men, 
and the Indians would have known of our approach. We crossed two 
considerable trails leading to the south, but they must have been two or 
three months old. 

8. Question by General Gaines. General Smith is requested to state 
in what manner the movement of General Gaines affected the movements 
of General Scott in Florida. 

Answer. My impression has always been that every effort that Gene- 
ral Scott could make to advance his movement was made by him ; but 
such were the difficulties in obtaining the means of transportation that 
I do not think he could have been able to commence his movements 
earlier than he did; that, therefore, no operation of General Gaines 
delayed General Scott's movements ; and that General Scott would not 
have been ready sooner or later, whether General Gaines was there or 
not. General Gaines brought from New Orleans with him some means 
of transportation ; he added to General Scott's forces at Fort Drane 
about 1,000 effective men; he had acquired some knowledge of the 
country around the Withlacoochee ; his position on the Withlacoochee 
had restrained the Indians during the period General Scott was occupied 
in transporting provisions to Fort Drane ; and that, therefore, in these 
respects, General Gaines's movements were of great advantage to the 
movements of General Scott. I might add that, after all, the means of 
transportation were not sufficient to allow General Scott to operate a 
long time on the Withlacoochee, and that, therefore, he was not able to 
derive all those advantages which he otherwise would have derived. 

9. Question by General Gaines. The witness is requested to state 
what purpose was expressed to him in maintaining the position at Camp 
Izard, and what importance was attached to that position by General 
Gaines. 

Answer. After we had encamped at Camp Izard, and, I think, on the 
night of the 29th, General Gaines, a little after dark,' came to me and 
Stated that, as it was then evident that the Indians were in our imme- 
diate neighborhood, and that, as all the operations, if any, must be in 
that neighborhood, and that as that appeared to be the most convenient 
crossing-place, whether the operations of the Alabama troops expected 
from Tampa bay, or from General Scott's coming from the North, that he 
had made up his miud to maintain that position, provided the troops, 



*_. 



569 [ 224 ] 

under his command were disposed to submit to all the privations they 
might be subjected to, in case the convoy of provisions expected from 
Fort Drane did not arrive. Fie argued that the position then kept the 
whole body of Indians in check ; that it was evident we must be in the 
neighborhood of their establishments, and they would not dare to quit 
them to undertake any predatory expedition, as long as the force under 
General Gaines was so near the position where their families were. 
But he stated that something might prevent our receiving any supply of 
provisions for some days ; that then we would be obliged to have re- 
course to killing the horses; that i'i I (bought that my regiment would 
not willingly submit to these privations, it would be easy to retire to 
Fort Drane, where there were provisions ; but that he considered it of 
the highest importance that he should maintain the position we then oc- 
cupied on the banks of the Withlacoochec. I told General Gaines that 
whatever measure he should decide on would be heartily seconded by 
the whole of the regiment ; that they were prepared to do or suffer any 
thing that was necessary for the object of the campaign. He then ex- 
pressed his determination to remain there and keep the Indians in 
check, until the forces that were expected would be prepared to assem- 
ble around that country. General Gaines was principally desirous to 
maintain that particular position, as it was the best crossing-place, and 
indeed it was afterwards selected by General Scott, in crossing his army. 
It was also General Gaines's belief that if we were to retreat from that 
point, or to push across to Tampa bay, the Indians would then be let 
loose over the whole country, and that then, beside the forces that 
would be necessary to protect the convoys of provisions coming from 
the North, it would require a great many men scattered through the set- 
tlements to protect them from the ravages of the Indians. 

Captain P. Morrison, of the 4th regiment of infantry, a witness on the 
part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated 
as follows : 

1. Question by General Gaines. General Scott having endeavored 
to show that a report of the war being ended caused a detention in New 
Orleans of supplies called for by requisitions for Florida, the witness is 
desired to state whether he was commissary in New Orleans from 
January to April, 1836, inclusive ; whether any such detention took 
place with regard to commissary supplies ; whether he had opportuni- 
ties of judging whether quartermaster's stores were detained, and whether 
they were so detained ; and is requested to state whether he understood 
from the quartermaster whether he would or would not feel authorized 
to detain supplies under the supposed circumstances of there being a 
report like that in question. -And the witness will also please state 
what rations returned to New Orleans with the Louisiana volunteers 
from Tampa bay; whether a part was in bulk, and by him issued to 
the volunteers ; and whether he made any remarks to Captain Thistle 
on the subject of the bacon so returned, and what remarks he made. 

Answer. I was assistant commissary at New Orleans from January to 
April, and have been for ten years past. No detention took place in 
the furnishing of supplies. Every exertion was used to procure hard 



\ 224 ] £70 

bread and bacon, as required by General Scott. The bread and bacon 
could not be procured in sufficient quantities ; the other parts of the 
ration, consisting of pork and flour, were delivered to the quartei master, 
to make up the deficiency. A duty which I owe to Major Clark, as he 
is not present, compels me to state that every exertion was made use of 
on his part to furnish supplies and transportation. We both felt a deep 
interest that nothing should be wanted, and that no complaint should be 
made. From the 7th to the 16th of May, when the regiment of Louis- 
iana volunteers returned to New Orleans from Florida, there were 720 
pounds of bacon and 2,160 pounds of bread, surplus rations, which were 
sent to the commissary's store at New Orleans, besides other rations in 
proportion. Captain Thistle came to me somewhere between the 10th 
and 16th of May, with a return for back-rations. In offering Captain 
Thistle his choice of pork, bacon, flour or hard bread, I observed that 
I regretted that the hard bread and bacon had ever come back after the 
difficulty I had in sending it to Florida. As to Captain Thistle's asking 
me why I did not send the bacon, I have no recollection of his having 
made such an observation to me, neither do I believe he did. No ob- 
servation was made by me to Captain Thistle that the Florida war was 
closed. [The witness here presented to the Court papers Nos. 39 and 
40, (see documents,) as evidence that he had discharged his duties 
promptly, and to the satisfaction of his department.] 

2. Question by General Gaines. What conversation had the witness 
with General Gaines in New Orleans, in April, on the subject of sending 
supplies to Florida, and what did General Gaines urge ? 

Answer. About the beginning of April, I had understood that General 
Gaines had arrived in New Orleans, and was on my way to pay my 
respects to him, when I met Major Clark, who requested me to get a 
requisition from General Gaines, which he had left with the General 
the evening previous or the same morning. I found General Gaines at 
his quarters ; he was unwell, and after a little conversation, I asked him 
for the requisition left by Major Clark. He handed it to me, and ob- 
served, very impressively, " furnish every thing that you are ordered to 
furnish." Commodore Dallas, of the navy, came in and I withdrew. I 
did not ask General Gaines about furnishing the supplies. His remarks 
were applied both to Major Clark and myself. [The witness here pro- 
duced paper No. 41, (sec documents,) showing the quantity of certain 
supplies at Tampa bay on the 31st of March, 1836.] 

Lieutenant Gouverneur Morris, of the 4th infantry, a ivitness on the 
part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated 
as follows : 

1. Question by General Gaines. General Scott having charged that 
General Gaines took the public transportation from Tampa bay, to the 
disadvantage of the movement of Colonel Lindsay, the witness is desired 
to state what amount of transportation was taken by General Gaines; 
also, whether it was or was not more than replaced by Lieutenant 
Casey; when Lieutenant Casey arrived at Tampa; what amount of 
transportation he brought ; whether Colonel Lindsay had the benefit of 
that transportation ; and by whose order, when, and where, so far as wit- 



■1 



571 [ 224 1 

ness knows or believes, Lieutenant Casey was sent for said transporta- 
tion. 

Answer. There were only four or five indifferent horses taken by 
General Gaines that belonged to the post, besides the number that was 
directed to be sent by him from New Orleans. It is proper to state that 
there were sixty horses sent at first; but from disease and rough weather 
at sea, five or six died, and some of the others were in a poor condition 
for service. Lieutenant Casey, the acting quartermaster at Tampa bay, 
had been sent, I suppose by the orders of the commanding officer, to 
Middle Florida, (Tallahassee,) to procure means of transportation for 
General Gaines's army, which was expected to arrive soon. The trans- 
portation (six or eight teams complete) arrived a short time after 
General Gaines's departure with his forces from Tampa bay. This trans- 
portation was put in requisition by Colonel Lindsay, after he arrived 
there, and formed the principal transportation of his column. To the 
best of my recollection there were forty-two or forty-eight horses or 
mules which formed the teams for the wagons which arrived from St. 
Mark's. 

2. Question by General Gaines. Was it known at Tampa bay, at the 
time Lieutenant Casey was sent for transportion, that any other troops 
were expected at Tampa bay than those taken there by General Gaines? 

Answer. I knew of no other, and I believe it was not known then 
that Colonel Lindsay's or any other troops were expected to arrive at 
that time. 

The Court adjourned till to-morrow, at 11 o'clock, A. M. 

February 11, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

Mr. Potter, a icitness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly 
sworn, ivas interrogated as follows : 

1. Question by General Gaines. Were you at Fort Drane in March, 
after the council on the Withlacoochee, and previous to the movement 
of the right wing on the 26th of that month, and what exposure of 
individuals or small. parties to the hostility of the Seminoles occcurred, 
and was any hostility exhibited by the Indians? 

Answer. I arrived at Fort Drane with General Gaines on the 11th of 
March. I remained at Fort Drane until about the 10th of April. Pre- 
vious to the movement of the right wing, on the 26th of March, small 
parties of from two to iive individuals frequently passed between the 
various camps and Fort Drane. I, myself, mounted the horse of Ma- 
jor Lytle to go in search of Camp Twiggs on some business for Major 
Mountfort. 1 took the wrong road, and proceeded a distance of about 
six miles, as I was afterwards informed, when I met three of the Georgia 
volunteers. I asked them how far it was to Camp Twiggs ; they answered, 
" eight miles in a contrary direction." They told me they had been 
nineteen miles that day, and were then returning; they had seen Indian 
tracks, and had heard of Indians being in the neighborhood where they 
had been. In short, to the best of my knowledge, there was no hostility 



f 224 ] 572 

exhibited by the Indians before the march of General Scott from Fort 
Diane. I had never been from Fort Diane to any of the encampments, 
which accounts for my taking the wrong road. 

2. Question by General Gaines. Please to state, as far as you know, 
whether the information likely to be communicated by Primus, who was 
sent among the Indians, was calculated to encourage their hopes of being 
heard in council, according to the arrangement of General Gaines, or 
otherwise ; and on what do you found your opinion ? 

Answer. At Fort Drane, on the 14th or 15th of March, I was standing 
near a squad of friendly Indians and an interpreter. 1 heard General 
Scott say to the interpreter, " tell them that I am determined to carry on 
a war of extermination among them — I will shoot down every man." 
I'll take occasion to remark to the Court, that I know not what preceded 
this conversation, but think it more than probable he told them that they 
must lay down their arms. Not having had sufficient intercourse with 
the troops generally, my intercourse was principally with the officers at 
Fort Drane, and they were generally very guarded in expressing any 
opinion. I am therefore unable to say what impressions were produced 
on their minds. I merely know that the Creek Indians had been sent 
for, and I subsequently heard that the order had been countermanded. 

3. Question by General Gaines. The witness is desired to describe 
the country in the vicinity of Camp Izard ? 

Answer. The country in the vicinity of Camp Izard is very ham- 
mocky. Here is a drawing made by myself; the hammocks laid down 
in this drawing were about 150 or 200 yards from Camp Izard. I am 
aware that the map is imperfect as respects the scale. I suppose the 
encampment was about 200 yards square, and I suppose it to be about 
450 yards, or rather more, from the camp to the river on the west side of 
the camp. I suppose the river to be about 100 to 120 yards from the 
front of the encampment. There was an opening to the river in front of 
the camp ; but the river could not be seen from the camp. 

Colonel J. Watson Webb, editor of the " New York Courier and En- 
quirer" a witness, being duly sworn, ivas interrogated as follows: 

Question by the Court. You are requested to state whether you know, 
or have reason to believe, that Major General Scott is the author of the 
article in the " Courier and Enquirer" of the 2d of April, 1S36, or wheth- 
er it was written or published with his knowledge. 

Answer. I will state to the Court that I saw General Scott a short time 
previous to his being ordered to Florida ; that I did not see him again 
until after his recall from that country. The article in question was writ- 
ten by myself, and contained my views of what had transpired in Florida 
up to that period. During the ten months which have since elapsed, I 
have seen no cause to change, in any respects, those views. I do not 
know that General Scott has ever seen, read, or heard of the article in 
question. 

Question by General Gaines. Had the editor of the Courier and En- 
quirer a correspondent in Florida during the early part of the campaigns 
of 1836? Did that correspondent write from St. Augustine in a tone 
very highly complimentary to General Gaines of the movement of that 



*ai 



573 f 22 1 J 

General in Florida, quoting, in reference to that movement, that it was 
calling forth golden opinions from all sorts of people, and did not the tone 
of the letters'of said correspondent entirely change after joining General 
Scott and going to Picolata ? 

And further, the witness is requested to state whether the article in 
the Courier and Enquirer, besides the basis it confessedly has upon the 
official correspondence of General Scott, as published in the Globe, and 
upon the article from the Richmond Enquirer, published at the residence 
of General Scott's immediate friends, was or was not founded upon the 
communications of the correspondent in Florida, and if not, upon what 
was the said article fabricated ? 

Answer. I had a correspondent in Florida at that time. That corre- 
spondent did write from St. Augustine. I have not the slightest recol- 
lection of the tone of his correspondence in relation to General Gaines; 
but I know, from my own feelings at that time, that if he did write any- 
thing complimentary to the General, it was very cheerfully published by 
me. I do not know precisely when the tone of those letters changed, 
but I am very certain that if they had contained anything favorable to 
General Gaines's conduct after the affair of the Withlacoocb.ee and the 
facts in relation to the army's being intrenched there being known to me, 
I would have considered it unjust to the public to have given currency to 
such opinions. The article had, as its base, an order issued by General 
Gaines, and published in the " Savannah Georgian," which order met 
my eye on the evening of the 1st of April. The article alluded to, and 
based upon that order, was written after 10 o'clock at night, without con- 
sulting any person or persons whatsoever. I never wrote any article, 
either of praise or censure, of either General Scott or General Gaines, 
founded upon the opinions or judgment of my correspondent, or of any 
other person or persons whatsoever. I have never exchanged any opin- 
ions in writing with General Scott in relation to that campaign, and, to 
the best of my recollection, have only seen him once for the period of 
about five minutes, in Broadway, in the city of New York, at which time 
he refused to express any opinions in relation to General Gaines, General 
Jesup, or others ; but said " that, as regarded himself, he would compel 
the whole country, by the mere force of truth, to do him justice." The 
article alluded to is not a fabrication, but contains my views founded upon 
the news which I had received from the seat of war, and such opinions 
in relation to military matters and military conduct as I have acquired 
during more than eight years' service in the army, and the greater part of 
it under the immediate command of the officers composing this Court. I 
believed them to be correct then ; I believe them to be correct now, as 
I also do the deductions drawn from the premises assumed in the article. 

General Gaines having requested that his case might be laid over till 
Thursday, the 16th instant, to enable him to prepare his final Address, his 
case was laid over to that day accordingly ; and the Court adjourned to 
meet on Monday, the 13th instant, at 11 o'clock, A. M. 

February lfi, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 



[ 224 ] 574 

Major General Gaines presented to the Court paper No. 43, (see doc- 
uments,) on the subject of the publication of his letter of the 4th of 
July, 1836, in the New Orleans Bulletin, 27th September, 1836 ; and, in 
reference to that publication, made the following remarks: 

In submitting the foregoing letter for the consideration of the Court, I 
have to state in writing what 1 have already intimated in reference to the 
publication of my letter to the Adjutant General, under date the 4th of 
July, 1836. 

That letter was published as an act of self-defence, and self-preserva- 
tion, in obedience to the first law of nature. This law authorizes me 
and my household, my staff, and every other member of my family, civil 
and military, when assailed by assassins or pirates with deadly weapons 
in their hands, to repel force by force, until the assailants are subdued or 
disarmed ; and upon the same principle, when attacked by assassins of 
reputation, armed ivith the weapons of falsehood, that law authorizes me 
and my family to employ the weapons of truth to disarm the assassins of 
reputation. I availed myself of this sacred right, in giving publicity to 
my letter of the 4th of July, 1836, to repel the attacks made on me and 
my faithful companions in arms by the author and publishers of the 
atrocious calumnies contained in the official letters and orders upon your 
table, signed by Major General Winfield Scott, or by his authority, and 
published by certain editors of newspapers, and by the authority of cer- 
tain persons, not in the power of this Court, more especially the letters 
and reports of Major General Scott of the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 14th of 
March, which have been laid before this Court; and the falsehoods which 
they contain, detected and exposed by the testimony of General Smith, 
Colonel Twiggs, Captain Hitchcock, Captain Drane, Captain McCall, 
Lieutenant Morris, Lieutenant Mitchell, and Mr. W. Potter, to all 
which the Court is referred. In repelling these attacks, however, I have 
in no case violated any know law, regulation, or order. But even if it 
were otherwise ; if, indeed, I had, in self-defence, and in the essential 
work of self preservation, deviated from a law, a regulation, or an order, 
I could not but avail myself of the plea that " all human authority ceases 
at the point where obedience becomes criminal." I could not have re- 
mained silent under such calumnies as those to which I have referred, 
without committing a crime of omission, equal to the crime of sitting 
still in silence whilst assassins or pirates were engaged near me in the 
act of firing at my house, my children, or myself. My silence under 
such attacks would have been, in a moral point of view, highly criminal. 

The old Army Regulations contain the provision which follows : 

" 650. Private letters or reports, relative to military marches and 
operations, are frequently mischievous in design, and always disgraceful 
to the army; they are, therefore, strictly forbidden. And any officer 
found guilty of making such report for publication, without special per- 
mission, or of placing the writing beyond his control, so that it finds its 
way to the press, within one month after the termination of the campaign 
to which it relates, shall be dismissed from the service." 

I have underscored the parts to which I desire the particular attention 
of the Court. 

In referring to the first member of this paragraph, it may be remarked 



575 [ 224 J 

that, although " private letters ov reports relative to military marches and 
operations are frequently mischievous in design," they are not always 
so, nor " ahvays disgraceful to the army." This is too obvious to require 
illustration or argument. All must admit that there may be and often 
have been "private letters or reports relative to military marches an4 
operations" not " always disgraceful to the army :" for example, the meri- 
torious soldier, regular or volunteer, who, seeing in a published report, 
probably from the pen of a secret enemy, assertions that he had deserted 
the service in the moment of battle, and had at a stated time and place 
gone over to the enemy, he would naturally feel inclined to contradict 
the report, if possible, before it should have time to reach his parents, 
his wife, children, or friends. In doing this, he might deem it proper 
himself to write or to desire some brother soldier to state that he had dis- 
charged his duty faithfully in battle at the time and place referred to in the 
report, and had afterwards continued to discharge his duty from place to 
place, (naming the places visited by the army,) up to the time and place 
at which his letter is dated. Surely no man in his proper senses would 
venture to say that such a private letter, or such a report, was " always 
disgraceful to the army," notwithstanding it may have been written 
"relative to military marches and operations," and in the apparent con- 
templation of the order or regulation in question. What " private letters 
or reports ," then, are obviously allowed or not allowed to be published ? 
In answer I have to remark, that I have deemed it to be right to inquire 
what description of " private letters or reports" are manifestly "mis- 
chievous in design and always disgraceful to the army?" and to come 
to the conclusion that the publication of such as these only were forbid- 
den : for example, the letter written by Captain Hitchcock, my acting 
inspector general, to my friend Mr. Lyon, of the House of Representa- 
tives, dated at Fort Drane, 13th of March, 1836, and the letter written 
by Captain McCall, my aid-de-camp, to the editor of the New Oi leans 
Commercial Bulletin, dated Camp Sabine, 18th May, 1836, letters vol- 
untarily written with the most scrupulous regard to truth, and without 
anything like acrimonious animadversion or censure towards any officer, 
soldier, or citizen,! deemed to be liable to no objection. I was not ap- 
prized of the contents of these letters until after they were written and 
voluntarily submitted to me by the writers respectively. I expressly 
gave my sanction to their publiction, convinced, as I was in giving pub- 
licity to mine of the 4th July, 1836, that they contained nothing that 
could tend to violate the regulation No. 650, or any other description of 
military law or orders. 

On the other hand, I have considered such letters and reports as those 
upon your table, written by Major General Scott, dated the 1st, 4th, 9th, 
and 14th of March, to be " mischievous in design and ahvays disgrace* 
ful to the army." 

The testimony upon your table, and to which I have expressly refer- 
red, will enable the Court, in the Opinion which they are required to give, 
to say whether any, and if any, which of the letters and reports to which 
I have referred, are such as were written and published in violation of 
the spirit — the true intent and meaning of the regulation in question. 

All which is respectfully submitted. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General U. S. A. by Brevet. 



[ 221 J 576 

After the foregoing remarks, Major General Gaines commenced his 
final Address, (which accompanies these Proceedings,) and continued its 
reading for some length of time, when, at his request, the Court ad- 
journed, to meet to-morrow at 10 o'clock. 

February 17, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
Major General Gaines took up and finished his Address, after which 
the Court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. 

February 18, 1S37. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 
The Court was occupied on this day and on Monday the 20th, in re- 
vising its Proceedings in reference to the Creek campaign. 

February 21, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Court took up the testimony in reference to the campaign in Flor- 
ida, under Major General Gaines, and, after a careful examination, finds 
that Major General Gaines, on receiving at Mohile, about the 17th of 
January, 1S3C, information of the massacre of Major Dade, and his com- 
mand, by the Seminole Indians in Florida, repaired with promptness to 
the city of New Orleans, where he, with great zeal, organized a force 
of regular and volunteer troops, amounting to about 1,100 men, and pro- 
ceeded without delay to Tampa bay, where he arrived about the 10th of 
February, and after making preparations for the field, moved on the Fort 
King road on the 13th, and reached Dade's battle-ground on the 20th, 
where he buried the meritorious dead with the honors of war. He then 
proceeded for Fort King, where he arrived on the 22d. After drawing 
nine or ten days' supply of subsistence from Fort Diane, and receiving a 
small supply of ammunition, he moved on the \Vithlacoochec, where he 
arrived on the 27th, and encountered the same day the enemy across the 
river in a sharp conflict of half an hour, when the troops withdrew for 
the night, after a loss of one killed and six wounded. On the morning 
of the 2Sth, the troops marched down the river to a point two and a half 
miles below, where it was understood the crossing was practicable. 
Here the advance of the army was fired upon from across the river, and 
an action ensued, which continued until 12 or 1 o'clock, in which Lieu- 
tenant Izard was mortally wounded. The army here encamped that af- 
ternoon, and an express was despatched by Major General Gaines to 
General Clinch, or the officer commanding at Fort Drane ; the troops in 
the mean time throwing up a slight breast-work of logs. On the morn- 
ing of the 29th, at 9 or 10 o'clock, the enemy, in force, estimated at 
about 1,000 or 1,500 men, made an attack on three sides of the foitified 
camp, which was continued for two hours, when he withdrew, leaving 
one of his dead on the field. On this day another despatch was scut by 
Major General Gaines to Fort Drane. From the 2d of March to the 5th 
the enemy made more or less spirited attacks upon the camp; in which 






£21*1 



577 [ 224 ] 

several conflicts the loss on the part of our troops amounted to some 
three killed and about forty wounded. On the night of the 5th of March 
a proposition was made from the woods, hy the enemy, for peace. On 
the next day a strong party of Indians appeared within 500 or 600 yards 
of the camp ; a few of whom advanced with a flag to within 150 to 200 
yards, and Adjutant Barrow, of the volunteers, was sent out to confer 
with them, when they informed him they did not wish to fight any more, 
but wanted General Gaines to go away ; upon which information General 
Gaines sent out Captain Hitchcock, who was accompanied by two or 
three officers, to hold a further conference with them. The Indians re- 
peated to him their proposition for peace, and stated they had lost a great 
many of their men. Before the conference was finally closed, the ad- 
vance of the troops under General Clinch, came up, and commenced a 
fire upon the Indians standing in the rear, when they and the chiefs in 
council fled, and covered themselves in the hammocks, and were no 
more heard of up to the 10th of March, when the army (the command 
of which had been turned over by Major General Gaines to General 
Clinch the day preceding) fell back upon Fort Drane, where it arrived 
on the 11th. 

The Court, after carefully reviewing and collating the testimony of 
Captains Hitchcock and McCall, Colonel Twiggs, General Smith, and 
others, in reference to the operations and peculiar situation of the army 
at Camp Izard, finds it difficult to come to a conclusion as to the real 
causes of the failure of the campaign. It appears, although the army 
was surrounded and repeatedly assailed by the enemy in its fortified po- 
sition from the 29th of February to the 5th of March, and straitened in 
its means of subsistence, that, however important to the chivalry and 
reputation of the troops, no sally was made to test the result of such a 
movement, which it is possible might have issued in the defeat and sub- 
jection of the enemy, and have brought the war to a close. But the 
Court, however, judging from subsequent events in prosecuting the war 
under other commanders, and the indomitable spirit of hostility evinced 
by the enemy, is of opinion that, had a sortie been made by Major Gen- 
eral Gaines, though he might have been able to beat and drive the enemy 
into the surrounding hammocks and swamps, they would have eluded 
pursuit and retired to their more remote fastnesses. But, if such had 
been the result of a sortie, Major General Gaines had not the means of 
subsistence to have enabled him to remain long enough in or about the 
cove of the Withlacoochee to seek out the enemy and press the war to a 
successful conclusion. Still, the Court, without impugning the motives 
that influenced Major General Gaines, is of opinion that a sortie, under 
all the circumstances of the case, should have been made. 

The Court, therefore, in taking a full and impartial view of all the cir- 
cumstances appertaining to the operations of Major General Gaines at 
Camp Izard, is of opinion that the failure of the campaign should rather 
be attributed to the want of the means of subsistence to prosecute the 
war, than to the contingent result of a sortie. 

The attention of the Court was next called to a consideration of the 
publication of Major General Gaines's official report of the 4th of July, 
1836, to the Adjutant General, in the public prints. The fact of its pub- 
lication in the " New Orleans Bulletin" of the 27th of September, is 



I 224 



587 



admitted by Major General Gaines (as will appear in the Proceedings of 
the Court) as authorized by him, and without any authority but his own 
action. The Court is not aware that its publication in the public journals 
as late as the 29th of September, is in violation of any rule or regulation 
of the service : but is of opinion that all publications in the public prints 
tending to excite public opinion, or ttv produce recriminations between 
officers, are prejudicial to the interests of the public service and injurious 
to the discipline of the army. The publication of the official report of 
Major General Gaines, of the 4th of July, to the Adjutant General, is 
considered by the Court as falling under publications of this description, 
by its personal allusions. 

The Court cannot close its Proceedings without adverting to the strain 
of invective and vituperation used by Major General Gaines, in the lan- 
guage generally of his Summary of the Evidence touching the operations 
of his Seminole campaign ; particularly the part of it couched in the 
following terms : " the atrocious machinations of the second United States 
general officer who has ever dared to aid and assist the open enemy of 
the republic in their operations against United States forces employed in 
the protection of the frontier people. The first great offender was Major 
General Benedict Arnold ', the second, as your finding must show, is Ma- 
jor General Winfield Scott." Assertions without facts or circumstances 
to sustain them, and unbecoming his, Major General Gaines's, high rank 
and station — remarks and assertions which the Court condemn in the most 
decided terms of reprehension. 

The Court, in continuation, feels itself compelled to notice the censure 
in the official letters of Major General Scott (spread upon the record of 
these Proceedings) cast upon Major General Gaines, in reference to 
his operations in Florida ; and in a tone of language that it could not be 
otherwise than offensive to the latter General; and in terms, the Court 
is of opinion, not called for under the circumstances of the case, and 
ought not to have been indulged in. 

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, 

President of the Court of Inquiry. 

S. Cooper, Judge Advocate, 

Recorder of the Court. 



iAi 



579 [ 224 ] 



DEFENCE OF MAJOR GENERAL E. P. GAINES, 

Before the Court of Inquiry of which Major General Macomb 
is President. 

Frederick, Maryland, February, 1837. 



Mr. President : 

My first object is to show that the order given me to command the 
Western Department, made it my duty, on hearing of the outbreak of savage 
war upon the troops and frontier inhabitants of East Florida, within the 
known limits of my department, to collect together whatever disposable 
force I could obtain near me, and fly to the theatre of the war, to " repel 
the invasion ," and beat the enemy, or hold them in check, and stand be- 
tween them and the bleeding frontier, until the President of the United 
States should be advised of the state of the war, and of my movements 
and measures, and thereupon make whatever arrangements he might see 
fit for affording protection to the frontier and terminating the war. 

I stand before this Court as one of the accused. Major General Scott, 
though placed as I am placed, in the attitude which the law recognises 
as one of the " accused " (see the 91st article of the Rules and Articles of 
War,) has been erroneously, as I have endeavored to show, suffered by 
the Court to act as my accuser — and thus to act in my absence. Protest- 
ing again, as I have protested, against this proceeding, I can but avail 
myself of the restricted means which the Court has seen fit to impose in 
the vindication of my conduct : and, since the Court has denied me the 
privilege of meeting my accuser and his witnesses face to face, and thus scru- 
tinizing the accusations against me, and " cross-examining and interroga- 
ting the witnesses," as authorized by the 91st article of war, I find myself 
compelled to proceed under all the disadvantages of repelling accusations 
that have not only been so far sanctioned by the Secretary of War as to 
be published by his authority, and then acted on by the Court in my ab- 
sence, and ultimately forwarded to the Department of War, as I have 
been given to understand, with the final decision of this Court. 

Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, Mr. President, I do not despair. 
The strength of my cause, the strict military propriety of my measures, 
with the patient hearing which the Court has given to the testimony be- 
fore you, assure me that, whatever may have been the force of appearances 
against me, I cannot but feel satisfied that the testimony upon your table 
will convince you of the correctness of my conduct, as set forth in my 
letter of the 4th of July to the Adjutant General, to every part of which, 
and to my correspondence and orders to which it refers, I desire the par- 
ticular attention of the Court, as a part of this, my final vindication. 
38 



[ 224 J 580 

Mr, President : When last before the Court you notified me, whether 
with or without the concurrence of the Court 1 did not understand, that 
Major General Scott was not considered my accuser. I then endeavored 
to convince the Court, from a basty reference to the official letters and 
reports of that officer, that he was in fact my accuser. I have since seen, 
in an article purporting to be the Defence of General Scott before this 
Court, a declaration that he is not my accuser. If this is tiue, sir, the 
letters bearing the signature of that officer, dated at Picolata, the 1st and 
4th of March, with his letters dated the 9th and 14th of March, which I 
have seen before the Court, must be considered as forgeries ; otherwise, 
the receiver of those letters, who authorized their publication, must be my 
accuser; for I can truly affirm that, during the long period of my service, 
I have never known an officer to be more palpably charged with crimes 
than the writer of those letters has seen fit to charge me. I therefore 
deem it to be due to the public service, and to my own reputation, aspersed 
by these accusations, to establish their authorship, whilst I prove them to 
be false and calumnious. The question between the icriter and the re- 
ceiver, I leave to be settled between them. The writer is in the power 
of the Court — the receive)' is not. 

In my letter of the 4th of July, 1836, addressed to the Adjutant General, 
I made the statement which follows : 

" The Order No. 7 of the present year, requiring General Scott to repair 
to the left wing of my department, was never seen by me until my arrival at 
Fort King, the 22d of February. I state this fact simply because it is a 
fact hitherto, I apprehend, unknown at your office — but it is a fact to which 
I attach little or no importance. Had I received this order at Pensacola, 
I should have viewed it as a measure of the Secretary of War, taken 
without a full knowledge of the progress of the war upon that frontier, and 
of the circumstances which had rendered my movement to Florida proper ; 
and that therefore my movement thither ought to continue until I should 
feel assured that the President was apprized of all the material facts bearing 
upon the subject; and more especially until the officer authorized to enter 
upon that part of my command assigned to him, and which formed the 
principal theatre of the war, should make his appearance in person upon 
that theatre of the war — unless indeed my attention had been called to 
other, and apparently more important military operations, also in actual 
war, than those which called me to East Florida. 

" This view of the subject is based upon an essential principle of military 
law, derived from the laws of nature, and incorporated in our institutions — 
a principle sustained by the ablest writers of all enlightened nations to 
whose works I have had access — a principle, without the strict of obser- 
vance of which, no nation, whose geographical limits exceed twenty 
miles square, could be successfully defended — a principle deeply inter- 
woven with the highest attributes of sovereignity and of self-government 
— namely, self-defence and self-perservation as a nation or a state ; or, in 
other words, protection — immediate, instantaneous protecton to 
the exposed feeble members of the community from savage war. Yes, sir, 
immediate, instantaneous protection by the military officer intrusted with 
the command of the particular section of country threatened with savage 
attack — until relieved before the enemy by the new commander. 



ml 



581 [ 224 ] 

" Let us look into a few of the principal features of the case in question 
and see what would probably have been the effect of a contrary rule of 
conduct on my part. In command of the Western Department, I had met, 
at New Orleans, intelligence of a great and unlocked for disaster having 
occurred upon the left wing of my department, far distant from the seat 
of the Federal Government, from whence alone could I hope to receive 
new orders, or special instructions, more applicable to the case in all its 

1 bearings than the orders of the President embraced in my commission to 
serve the United States diligently as a general officer — with the orders 
which he had given me to command the Western Department. An 
important white settlement within my department was reported to be 
overrun, sacked, and burnt — a U. S. agent of Indian affairs, and eight 
valuable officers, and ninety-eight faithful soldiers, with many worthy 
frontier citizens, killed, and their property stolen or destroyed ; and I was 
aware that most of the neighboring military posts, namely, Forts Brooke, 
King, Diane, and Key West, all within my military department, were 
without any other works of defence than such as an efficient force of live 
hundred men might have taken and destroyed in a few hours, with little 
loss or risk on their part — the garrisons of two of those posts (Fort King 
and Key West) being insufficient for their defence. I was moreover ap- 
prized that there were but about six hundred troops of the regular army 
at that time in Florida, and that these were separated by a wilderness, sup- 
posed to be occupied by the enemy, comprehending near twenty thousand 
square miles, extending near two hundred and fifty miles from north to 
south, and from one hundred and twenty to forty miles from east to west 
— with our six hundred regulars stationed at the opposite angles and sides 
of this extensive wilderness, without disposable force sufficient to ensure 
a concentration at any one important vulnerable point from one side of 
the wilderness in question to the other, without the most imminent danger 
of having such force destroyed in its movements to the point of con- 

1 centration. The destruction of the brave but unfortunate Major Dade, with 
his heroic officers and men, affords an impressive lesson upon this xiew 
of the subject, which no prudent American soldier or citizen should ever 
lose sight of. Under these circumstances what was the duty of the com- 
mander of the Western Department ? What, I ask, was the proper course 
for me to pursue ? These questions may be most readily answered by 
asking another — What had I promised upon my oath to do? I had prom- 
ised upon my oath, prescribed by law, ' to bear true faith and allegiance 
to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully 
against their enemies or opposers whomsoever, and to observe and obey 
the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the 
officers appointed over me, according to the Rules and Articles of war.' 
" I had with me my sword and my commission, with the orders of the 
President of the United States to " command." this department. Now it 

1 is well known that for me to command a military department, or any par- 
ticular section of country upon the frontier, great or small, is, in a plain 
military sense, so to order and employ the men and means confided to my 
direction as to protect our own people of the United States upon that section 
of frontier, ' against their enemies or opposers whomsoever,' as set forth 
in the aforementioned oath ; and if it he in time of war, to continue so to 



[ 224 j 58-2 

command until duly relieved by the new commander — in his own proper 
person — and on the theatre of war. 

"In failing to comply with this sacred injunction, I well knew that I might 
thereby have suffered the enemy to kill great numbers of the citizens and 
troops, in addition to those already slain, within the limits of my command, 
and burn their houses, and take their property. It was my bounden duty 
therefore, without waiting for new orders or special instructions, to col- 
lect together my disposable force found within my department, which I 
might deem sufficient to enable me promptly to strike at the enemy, and 
if possible subdue them, or check their devastations, until the President 
should have notice of them, and of my efforts to arrest them — and then 
give such new orders as he might think fit. 

" But it is contended, principally indeed by those who have proven them- 
selves to be better qualified for the quiet vocation of a writing-desk than 
the turbulent scenes of an Indian war, that I ought to have abandoned 
the expedition at Pensacola, because I received, on my arrival at that city, 
your letter, notifying me — not that General Scott had actually arrived at 
the theatre of the war in Florida, but that he had been ordered thither by 
the Secretary of War ! But little reflection is necessary to see the fallacy 
of this closet-view of the subject. I had embarked, pursuant to my letter of 
the 2d February, addressed 'to General Clinch, or the officer command- 
ing the forces assembling on the northeast border of East Florida,' with 
a view to co-operate with that officer in subduing the enemy ; I had more- 
over given a pledge to the principal force then with me — the Louisiana 
volunteers — that I would not require them to go further than I would 
myself go, and that I "would stand by them as long as they ivould stand by 
me, in bringing the war to an honorable close. I had thus promised, on 
the 2d February, with a force of seven hundred men so to co-operate; 
this force had been fortunately increased before the embarkation was ef- 
fected to near one thousand one hundred men. With this very respect- 
able force embarked and in its movement for Tampa bay, and within two 
days' march (by steam) of that place, I received at Pensacola the notifi- 
cation from you that General Scott had been ordered by the Secretary of 
Mar to that part of my command to which I was, under the above-men- 
tioned circumstances, destined. But what assurance could I have had 
that he was there ? Did you notify me that he was at the post of honor 
assigned to him by the Secretary of War, or that such arrangements 
had been made as afforded reasonable ground to hope that General 
Scott ivould be prepared soon to breast the storm of savage desolation, and 
protect from the scalping-knife and firebrand the helpless citizens of both 
sexes and of all ages in that region, who had looked to me as their pro- 
tector ? Did you tell me that Oceola and his war-chiefs had given to the 
President satisfactory assurance that they would suspend their massacres 
and conflagrations until General Scott should complete his plan of oper- 
ations, and be quite ready to subdue them ? No such thing is found in 
your letter. Nor had I any reason, from the previous Northern or Western 
wilderness movements of that officer, to anticipate anything like a prompt 
movement on his part into the wilds of Florida, longer than he should 
find himself and his forces and supplies propelled by steam-power." 

-■at, sir, I had been notified, not that General Scott was there, bu| 
that he had been ordered thither; I was assured, not that Oceola and 
i . ferocious chieftains and braves had promised to suspend their wonted 



MiBffi 



583 [ 224 ] 

havoc until General Scott should have full leisure to mature his plan of 
operations, and be quite ready to surround and annihilate the enemy ; 
but was simply notified that this officer was ordered to extend his opera- 
tions into my department, without regard to imaginary lines. It is here 
proper, and essential to my complete vindication, to advert to the well- 
known fact, that, on a previous occasion, when General Scott was order- 
ed into my department against the Black Hawk and his red warriors, 
that officer did not arrive at the theatre of the war until the enemy had 
been met and beaten by the gallant troops headed by the commander of 
the right wing of my department, now a member of this Court, seconded 
and sustained by another member of this Court, with Taylor of the 
United States army, and Dodge of the volunteers. Major General Scott, 
with his troops, did certainly move with very considerable rapidity from 
Albany, N. Y., to Chicago, at the southern extremity of Lake Michigan, 
as long as he loas propelled by steam-power, but when this mighty power 
could no longer be rendered subservient to bis movement, the General, 
with a large portion of his army, fell prostrate upon the threshold of the 
then theatre of the war, afflicted with disease, and mortified that they 
were thus deprived of the professional gratification of leading in the 
vigorous chase, and winning the honors of the victory which ensued. 
He arrived at the theatre of that war, not until after the enemy had been 
surjdued, and in time only to perform the diplomatic duties assigned to 
him by the Secretary of War. 

I was warranted, therefore, by his Northwestern tardy movements, 
and misfortunes, in the apprehension that the same officer might possibly 
be tardy and unfortunate while in quest of Southern laurels. But it was 
enough for me to know, as I did full well know, that, even had each one 
of us, with our troops, been blessed with the unerring means of Hying 
rapidly as an eagle to the protection of the suffering frontier, it were 
better to " make assurance doubly sure," and for each of us thus to hasten 
our movement thither, than that any possible chance of a failure to afford 
timely protection should be hazarded ; and hazarded too, by uncalled for 
haste in my complying with a notification or suggestion like that which 
met me at Pcnsacola from Adjutant General Jones, requiring no imme- 
diate action on my part — a notification which was obviously written with- 
out any knowledge of the extraordinary circumstances and irrevocable 
arrangements which made it my duty to proceed to Florida, and to act 
with all possible effect in protecting the frontier inhabitants and subdu- 
ing the enemy ; until these circumstances and arrangements should be 
known to the Department of War, and other measures be taken there ; 
or until I should meet with the officer authorized to relieve me ; or, final- 
ly, until I should beat the enemy and force them to sue for peace, as I 
ultimately had the satisfaction to do, between the 27th of February and 
6th of March, 1S36, as the evidence upon your table abundantly proves; 
a fact to which 1 shall again advert somewhat more in detail. 

General Scott left Washington for East Florida on the 22d of Janu- 
ary. On the 2d of February he writes officially to Colonel Lindsay, and 
communicates his expectation of being in readiness to act decisively in 
East Florida by the 25th of that month. When I heard of his having 
been ordered to East Florida, I made a similar calculation, and confi- 
dently expected to meet him about or before that time upon the theatre of 



[ 224 ] 584 

the war. I have shown to this Court my readiness and willingness to 
yield my command to him, or to co-operate with him — leaving the elec- 
tion entirely to himself — my sole purpose being to afford protection to 
the frontier, by acting immediately upon the enemy. If General Scott, 
in the full knowledge of his own resources, and with as ample authority 
as was ever furnished to any General in the field, was induced thus to 
anticipate the contemplated time of action in the enemy's country, my 
own expectations in respect to him can be regarded only as an evidence 
of my confidence in him, which his subsequent movements most lament- 
ably disappointed, with no fault of mine. Had he fulfilled my expect- 
ations, our two forces might have, united in a most solemn duty upon the 
battle-ground of the gallant and lamented Dade ; for it was upon the 
20th of February, 1 performed the deeply- affecting duty of giving honor- 
able interment to the bodies of our military brethren, sacrificed fifty-two 
days before, by an overwhelming band of savages ; and having thus uni- 
ted our forces at that melancholy scene, we might at once have directed 
our march upon ihe enemy, and crushed him at a blow. 

But to return to the actual movements of General Scott. He arrived 
at Picolata on the 21st of February, in advance of his troops, and in ad- 
vance of his transportation for his army. On the 26th of February, he 
hears of my arrival at Fort King, and immediately writes to the War 
Department a denunciatory letter against me, formally reporting that my 
movement had thwarted his plan of campaign, and stating distinctly that 
his plan was to have marched upon the enemy on the 8th of March. 

I will pause here, to call the attention of the Court to this formal an- 
nunciation of his plan, and the defeat of it by my movement, in order to 
connect with it, in the view of the Court, the seveial passages which I 
have caused to be spread upon the record, all taken from the original 
letters of General Scott, wherein that General over and over again, re- 
ports officially to the War Department, that, of his means of transporta- 
tion, " not a horse or a mule has arrived" — " not a wagon, &c, has 
arrived" — " the steamboat Essayons, like every thing else left behind, 
has not arrived" — u the South Carolina troops have not arrived ;" some- 
times he writes, " they have not been heard of." Captain Wharton and 
his dragoons had not arrived. Certain troops that had arrived, had re- 
fused to be mustered into service, and thus crippled him to such an extent 
that, finally, the strong necessity of the case compelled him to lean upon 
the brave Louisianians and regulars under my command ; for, on the 6th of 
March, we find him still at Picolata, writing that, if the Louisiana troops 
or those of General Gaines shall not be at Fort Drane, it will be indis- 
pensable for him to suspend his movement, until the arrival of Captain 
Wharton. In his strong agony, General Scott, who had been directed to 
prosecute the war, and had authority to command into service men and 
means, was obliged formally to report that, unless the troops of General 
Gaines were at Fort Drane, it would become indispensable for him to 
await the arrival of Captain Wharton. I have caused to be placed upon 
your record the official report, showing that Captain Wharton did not 
reach Fort Drane until the 23d of March. Of course, by General Scott's 
own showing, he could not have marched upon the enemy until that 
date ; and it is upon your record that he did actually move within three 



HfiiiS 



585 [ 224 J 

days after it. So that, under no possible statement of facts, can it be 
made to appear that my movement delayed him over three days' time. 

But, Mr. President, since I am upon this topic, I will proceed to show 
that he was not delayed, by my movement, even those three days. I 
refer you to General Scott's own letters written from Fort Drane — they 
are upon your record — reporting officially his reasons for assigning the 
25th of March for the movement of his divisions upon the Withlacoochee. 

Among those reasons, General Scott dwells upon the necessity of fix- 
ing a day that late, in order to be certain that General Eustis and Col- 
onel Lindsay would be in position. It is here to be remarked that 
General Scott's plan contemplated a simultaneous movement from Fort 
Drane from the north, Volusia from the east, and Tampa bay from the 
south. Hence, on a philosophical principle in determining the strength of 
abeam in architecture, that the weakest point in the beam is the measure 
of its strength — on the like principle, the slowest, most tardy, or most 
obstructed division of the three divisions of the army advancing upon 
the Withlacoochee, mast necessarily have determined the whole move- 
ment. That division was not the right wing, at Fort Drane, into which 
my force had been merged, and which of course was the only one that 
could in any manner be delayed by my movement ; but it was the left 
wing, at Volusia, under General Eustis : for, I refer to your record again, 
where you will find an official letter from General Eustis to General 
Scott, reporting his fear that, with all his efforts, he might not be able to 
reach Pelaklikaha before the 27th or 28th of March. In fact, Mr. Presi- 
dent, he did not arrive in position, ( I use a favorite term of Gen- 
eral Scott,) he did not arrive in position at Pelaklikaha, until the 31st 
of March, where he should have been by the 27th of that month, in order 
to make a simultaneous movement upon the strong hold of the enemy 
with the other divisions of General Scott's army. Thus I have shown that, 
while my troops made an essential portion of the right wing of General 
Scott's grand army, without which that wing would have been the weakest 
of his three divisions, and altogether below the original design of General 
Scott, (owing to the disgust or defection of a certain portion of the Georgia 
volunteers, who refused to be mustered into service,) yet that wing 
could not have been delayed more than three days ; but what still more 
strikingly illustrates the perverse and untiring efforts of General Scott 
to throw the responsibility of his delay upon my movement, I have shown 
that his left wing, that of General Eustis, at Volusia, (and the zeal and 
energy of General Eustis have often been eulogized by General Scott 
himself — see his report from Tampa bay,) the left wing, I repeat, was 
not able to get into position until the 31st of March ; whereas the right 
wing, embracing my command, was actually on the Withlacoochee, under 
General Scott's orders, on the 28th of that month. It is worthy of re- 
mark here, that General Scott, although he arrived as late as the 28th of 
March on the Withlacoochee, had appointed the 25th for leaving Fort 
Drane. But it seems it rained on the 25th, and the movement was 
deferred that day, possibly because the little steamboat Essayons was 
not there, with her comfortable cabin. It can hardly be urged that I 
caused it to rain on the day appointed for the march. The 25th being 
the day appointed for the movement, it may seem strange that the " right 
wing" did not reach the Withlacoochee until the evening of the 28th, a 



[ 221 ] 586 

period of four days — the distance being less than thirty-five miles. Every 
previous movement between Fort Diane and the Withlacoochee had 
been accomplished in a day and a half; but, as soon as General Scott 
presented himself in person, it required four days (including the rainy 
25th) to accomplish the same march; and this fact presents a tangible, 
palpable, undeniable instance of delay, that can in no manner be attibu- 
ted to me or to my movement. With what pretence, or with what shadow 
of reason, then, can it be asserted that my movements delayed those of 
General Scott? 

I refer the Court to the testimony of General Clinch upon this point, 
and I will return again to General Scott at Picolata ; apoligizing to the 
Court for having left him there so long, hastening, myself, into the ene- 
my's country in advance of him — I can only plead the force of habit. 

General Scott, as I have said, heard of my arrival at Fort King on the 
26th of February, but made no movement from Picolata until the Oth day 
of March, although he had reported, from Augustine, his expectation of 
moving by the 20th of February, and although he had also reported that 
his plan of moving on the 8th of March had been thwarted by my march 
upon Fort King. Had he thus been ready, why did he not move ? I had 
the men ; he should have had the means. Had he been thus ready, it 
would have been a veiy simple matter to have lei't " in position" at Pi- 
colata a portion of his force, to be substituted by the troops of my imme- 
diate command, at Fort King or at the Withlacoochee, and, taking up his 
means, have rushed to the theatre of the war, there to co-operate with 
me, or take command of the troops, which I was always, from my first 
arrival in Florida, ready and willing to turn over to him, on finding him 
authorized and willing to employ them for the protection of the frontier 
and in subduing the enemy. Had he been thus ready for action, his duty 
was plain ; if not, what can justify the perseverance in wrong exhibited 
by the entire absence from your record of all explanation on his part. In 
all that voluminous pile of papers upon your table he nowhere has shown 
the magnanimity to correct the false impression to which he vainly gave 
currency with the sanction of his official signature. But, Mr. President, 
I will return to Picolata. I really find it as difficult to remain there as 
General Scott did to get away from there. It was on the 1st of March 
that General Scott, still at Picolata, received my despatch from the With- 
lacoochee of the 29th of February, in which 1 suggest a co-operation 
from Fort Drane, in order to occupy both sides of the river at the same 
time — the enemy having shown so great facility in crossing that river, 
and requesting, as I did, a supply of 6,000 rations. 

It is important for the Court to bear in mind that my despatch of the 
29th of February was received by General Scott on the 2d of March; 
and also important to bear in mind that my despatch of the 2Sth of Feb- 
ruary, making precisely the same call for supplies as that of the 29th, was 
received by General Scott on the 1st of March. 1 now pass to the 9th 
of. March, and I request the Judge Advocate to read the official letter of 
General Scott of that date, written between Picolata and Carey's ferry. 
In the letter just now read General Scott declares he had not received 
any information of the operations on the Withlacoochee of a date later 
than the 29th of February, (referring to my despatch,) either official or 
otherwise. He goes on to state that, on the morning of the 9th, he heard 



587 [ 221 ] 

of a certain rumor by a steamboat — a rumor by a steamboat! — which 
rumor he states was confirmed by letters received by him six hours later, 
and he refers to the letters. In order to ascertain the character of that 
rumor, I desire the Judge Advocate to read the two letters referred to by 
General Scott. They are from Major Lytle, paymaster of the army; a 
most gallant and distinguished volunteer aid-de-camp to General Clinch 
in the memorable fight of the 31st of December, 1835. 

Mr. President, in neither of these letters is there any allusion to any 
rumor whatever. Major Lytle, with all possible business-like brevity, 
simply communicates to General Scott the fact that General Clinch, with 
the troops at Fort Drane, had gone down to the Withlacoochee to escort 
supplies of provisions and ammunition to. General Gaines. The Court 
will not fail to remark that in both letters the same phraseology is used 
in allusion to General Clinch's movement. He had gone down to escort 
supplies. There is not one word about any matter foreign to that object, 
in confirmation of any rumor whatever ; and in neither of these letters 
from Major Lytle, expressly referred to by General Scott, is there the 
remotest hint of necessity for a rescue on the Withlacoochee. Yet Gen- 
eral Scott officially reported to the War Department that he is moving 
to the rescue of General Gaines ; and, to convey an idea of the imminent 
danger of General Gaines, he reports that, of some 240 men ordered on 
from Picolata, " even that small force may arrive in time to render es- 
sential service." 

I must stop here to remark that this letter from General Scott, together 
with others from the same source, was published, as I have recently un- 
derstood, in all the principal newspapers in the country, and was calcu- 
lated, if not expressly designed, to misrepresent my efforts to put an end 
to the war, and to heap calumny and disgrace upon me and the force un- 
der my command, as far as the reckless author and publisher had weight 
of character to give effect to their official calumnies. 

This remarkable rescue-letter, I go on to observe, was written upon 
the receipt of two letters from Major Lytle, in which that officer reports, 
in the simplest manner, without hurry, without urgency, a movement of 
General Clinch in escort of supplies to General Gaines. But this is not 
all of Major Lytle's communications. He proceeds to inform General 
Scott that General Clinch expected to return by the 9th day of the month. 
In so simple and unsophisticated a light was that movement regarded by 
Major Lytle, and by General Clinch himself, that, without calling upon 
General Scott for aid of any sort, either of men or supplies, he commu- 
nicates the expectation of General Clinch, that he would return to Fort 
Drane by the 9th of March — the very day of the writing by General 
Scott of the rescue-letter. At the very moment of writing that letter, so 
studiously worded to convey the idea of my being in danger, and of his, 
General Scott's, hastening, in defiance of all his plans of campaign, to 
my rescue, had he honestly read the letters of Major Lytle, he would 
have seen that General Clinch was probably back again at Fort Drane 
with his escort, as he had expected to be on the 9th, and as, in point of fact, 
he was on the llth of March. But this is not all — worse, much worse, 
remains to be told ; for, on referring again to the letters of Major Lytle, 
it will be seen that, in a postscript, in a mere memorandum, so little im- 
portance did he attach to it, he refers to a third express having been re- 



[ 224 ] 588 

ceived from General Gaines, but describes it as a mere copy of the pre- 
vious despatch of the 28th of February. The Court will now see why I 
desired its attention to the fact that the despatch in question had been 
received by General Scott on the 1st of March. The very identical in- 
formation upon which the rescue-letter was written, so far as it called 
upon General Scott for aid, had been received as early as the 1st of 
March. But how was it acted upon at that time? This Court and my 
country shall see. I request the Judge Advocate to read the letters from 
General Scott to General Clinch of the 1st and 4th of March, 1836. 

In these letters the Court will not perceive any thing like hastening 
to the rescue. Very far from it. The truth is General Scott, at this 
stage of the business, imagined he had it in his power, not indeed to starve 
me and my command in my position on the Withlacoochee, but to starve 
me out of it — calling me an interloper, and using, in connexion with 
my name, an expression of his indignation. His indignation ! ! 

" When Hainan saw Mordecai in the king's gate, that he stood not up, 
nor moved for him, he was full of indignation against Mordecai." 

My accuser, Major General Winfield Scott, commanded General Clinch 
to afford me no supplies, and prohibited his making any detachment to 
me. There are the evidences upon your table, in the hand-writing of 
General Scott. Let him escape from the consequences if he can. For 
the honor of my country I could wish it were possible ; but, with every 
allowance that can be made, there must inevitably be in reserve a blank- 
leaf in the annals of war to be foully blotted with the. story of that trans- 
action. 

I proceed. After attempting to starve me out of my position, and 
force me back upon Fort Drane — a movement that must have been fatal 
to the security of the then recently bleeding frontier of Florida — my ac- 
cuser quietly waited, in security himself, at Picolata, from the 1st till the 
9th of March, beyond all doubt hoping daily to hear of my disgrace, and 
not of the defeat of the Indians. On the 9th of the month, instead of 
hearing the long and anxiously-looked-for intelligence of my retreat, he 
received two letters from Major Lytle, reporting identically the informa- 
tion that had been received by him (General Scott) as early as the 1st 
of the month, without inducing the smallest effort at a rescue, with the 
addition that Clinch, in defiance of his orders, and, beyond all doubt, in 
contempt of them, had gone down — not with a force to the rescue, but in 
command of an escort with supplies ; and, if need be, to fight his way to 
the position which he knew, and General Scott knew, from my despatch 
of the 29th of February, I had deemed it proper to maintain, where I 
could hold the enemy in check, and where I ultimately subdued them, 
and forced them to sue for peace. What could General Scott see in the 
movement of the noble-hearted Clinch taken in contrast to his own heart- 
less inactivity, but disgrace for himself? And how clearly does it prove 
the truth of my remarks to the officers of my command upon the With- 
lacoochee, which you have in evidence, that, in failing to move, upon the 
receipt of my despatch, he could not but commit suicide upon his repu- 
tation ! 

I have not introduced these letters and remarks for the purpose of 
throwing blame upon General Scott. That a deep and abiding odium 



fafif 



589 I 224 ] 



must indeed attach to him, upon this showing of the case, is a necessary 
consequence, but not the object, of this exposition. 

General Scott, by the letters here exhibited, had, and intended to have 
had, a powerful effect, not only upon my movement, but upon my repu- 
tation ; and down to, this day his reports and his showing have had al- 
most exclusive possession of the public attention, excepting, indeed, 
upon the Southern and Southwestern frontier, where my conduct has 
been witnessed and approved. 

But there is still another letter which must pass under my examination ; 
and well would it have been for General Scott had he never written it. 

I remained on the Withlacoochee until the 10th of March, and moved 
to Fort Diane on the 11th, where I remained until near 10 o'clock on the 
14th. General Scott arrived at that place on the 13th with a mounted 
escort, having been four days in travelling Go miles, moving, be it re- 
membered, " to the rescue of General Gaines." 

I will here take occasion to contrast with his rescue-march of about 
15 miles a day, the movement of an efficient officer in a recent case. 
During the past summer, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, then a 
major, being at Garey's ferry, on Black creek, a point at a distance from 
Fort Drane the same as that of Picolata, (about 65 miles, as shown by 
one of the letters of Major Lytle,) received by express, at 10 o'clock 
at night, intelligence of a movement of troops upon Fort Drane, and 
calling on him for supplies. This call was promptly met by Col. Pierce. 
He mounted his horse ; packed his supplies ; paraded his small body of 
troops as an escort, and, at 2 o'clock in the morning, but four hours after 
the receipt of the express, he was on his way to Fort Drane, and, push- 
ing on with all his ability, arrived there the following evening ; having 
in two days accomplished the march, G5 miles, escorting at the time 
a baggage-train with supplies for the troops commanded by Governor 
Call. VVill it be said that General Scott was without the means of trans- 
position? Although much of that which he had ordered from Savan- 
nah had not arrived, yet the baggage-train of General Clinch from Fort 
Drane had reached Picolata on the 2d of March, the very day on which 
my despatch of the 29th February was received by General Scott at Pico- 
lata. The baggage-train was, however, there detained until the Gth of the 
month, when it was allowed to move slowly to Fort Drane, where it ar- 
rived on the 10th or 11th of March. Besides, some of his own wagons 
had arrived from Savannah, and there was a mounted corps of about 360 
men then at Garey's ferry, every horse of which, in case of need, was 
available as a pack or draught animal. There must also have been 
in Picolata and the neighborhood some horses, mules, wagons, and carts 
within reach ; and the town of St. Augustine was but eighteen miles 
distant. 

The river St. John's, which is supposed to be near 3,000 yards wide 
at Picolata, may have been a little boisterous; but there was a steamboat 
at Picolata, and it is apparant, from the testimony of Captain Drane, that 
this small steamboat, (the Essayons, ) aided by a common ferry-boat, 
would cross with supplies in any state of the winds or weather. But it 
seems, from General Scott's statements in his letters before referred to, 
that he was satisfied with the plea that the river was rough and difficult 
to cross from the 2d to the 6th of March ; and hence it was that instead 



[ 22 i ] 590 

of my supplies being promptly forwarded by the baggage-train of Gene- 
ral Clinch, its movement was suspended for four days' time, to finable 
General Scott to accomplish his starving-scheme of the 1st and 4th of 
March, and then to get up his rescue- scheme. 

I come now to a new exhibition of the evil geniue of General Scott, 
which I will take leave to designate his sortie- scheme. For this purpose 
I request the Judge Advocate to read the official letter of General Scott 
to the Adjutant General, dated at Fort Drane the 14th March, 1836. 

The Court must perceive in this letter the obvious spirit of the rescue- 
letter, exaggerated to an amazing enormity. In this letter General Scott, 
believing that he had access to the public through the habit of publishing 
official correspondence at Washington, availing himself of this advan- 
tage, misrepresenting the facts connected with my movement, and de- 
faming, or attempting to defame, my public and military character — he 
deliberately states, and certifies that he has it upon good authority, that 
I had opened a communication with the Indians on the Withlacoocb.ee ; 
that the Indians were stipulating that the Withlacoochee should either 
be the temporary or permanent boundary between the red and white 
men, and he falsely records that, but for the timely arrival of General 
Clinch, he has no doubt General Gaines would have concluded a treaty 
upon one basis or the other; stating, moreover, that the Indians had 
taken a position in my rear to intercept my retreat upon Fort Drane. 

General Scott wrote this sortie-letter at Fort Drane the 14th of March, 
where he had arrived on the 13th. From the time of his arrival until 
near 10 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, (the date of his letter,) all 
the officers who were at the council with the Indians upon the Withla- 
coochee were present at Fort Diane, and entirely accessible to General 
Scott. He did not send for nor consult any one of those officers, but 
made the statement contained in his letter upon some carefully-concealed 
anonymous authority, which however he endorses. Of those officers 
who were at the council, you have, upon your record, the testimony of 
Captain Hitchcock, my acting inspector general, who had my immediate 
instructions in conducting the council on my part. You have also two 
letters from two of the other officers, in all material respects coincident 
with the testimony of Captain Hitchcock. The fourth officer you have 
it in evidence was not applied to for a statement because his place of 
residence was not known ; but Captain Thistle has sworn to the belief of 
that officer in the sincerity of the Indians. 

The Court will pardon my dwelling a moment upon the extraordinary 
fact that General Scott, at Fort Drane, should have carefully avoided 
every known and acknowledged source of correct information upon the 
subject, and officially have given the sanction of his name to a statement 
utterly at variance with truth, and that statement not merely calculated 
or intended to degrade me individually, but to fix a stain upon the Amer- 
ican arms. That General Scott could, by any force of prejudice, pas- 
sion, envy, or disappointment, be induced to place on record in the 
archives of the War Department a statement calculated or designed to 
disgrace his profession and country in my person, without making the 
least exertion to obtain the truth from those only xvho were acquainted 
with it — I mean the officers at the council — is a most astonishing instance 
of folly and malice. 



mi 



591 [ 5224 J 

General Scott states that I opened the negotiation with the Indians. 
You have it on record, gentlemen of the Court, that the Indians, and not 
ray seli", opened the council. It was the Indians who sought the interview 
with me at Camp Izard, and the very first declaration they made was, that 
they did not wish to fight any more — that they had had fighting enough, and 
wanted to make peace. General Scott states that the Indians stipulated 
the possession of the country, on their part, with the Withlacoochee as a 
boundary. The evidence on your record is in positive contradiction to 
that statement. Not only did they not make such a stipulation, but you 
have it in evidence that they were told over and over again that they 
would be compelled to submit to the whites. Well knowing, as General 
Scott must have known, that the Indians in the rear of my camp were 
under the protection of a white flag, he makes no hesitation in asserting 
that those Indians had assumed a position there for the purpose of inter- 
cepting my retreat. 

I will now pass from Fort Drane to this place, to show the persever- 
ance by which General Scott, not satisfied with writing the letter of the 
14th of March, comes before this Court and voluntarily condescends to 
act over again that deliberate scheme of detraction. 

General Scott has called before this Court, as a witness, a volunteer of- 
ficer of my command on the Withlacoochee, who was not at the council, 
and could not, by any possibility, have been informed of the history of it 
in any other manner than by unauthenticated camp stories. This igno- 
rant man, whose detail of unimportant particulars, carrying on their very 
face the evidence of their hearsay character, now encumbers your docu- 
ment, was permitted, I must think by some inadvertence of the Court, 
to place on the record his hearsay impressions of what passed at the 
council ; and upon this slender foundation — this shade of a shadow of 
evidence, General Scott has been willing to build the fabric of an ar- 
gument, when he had himself called before this Court, Captain Hitch- 
cock, my acting inspector general, who conducted the council, and whose 
knowledge of what occurred must have been at least equal to that of 
the volunteer officer, but who was not questioned by General Scott on 
that very important matter. It did not suit his purpose to place on the 
record the truth. Captain Hitchcock was here before the Court, and a 
sworn witness ; a letter attributed to him, giving an account of what oc- 
curred at the council, was laid before the Court, and Captian Hitchcock, 
on being questioned on the points, answered that he wrote the letter, and 
that he was the staff officer alluded to in it, who conducted the council. 
With all this before General Scott, and knowing, as he did, that not a 
single fact stated in the letter (such is the rule of evidence) could legal- 
ly be used as testimony unless sworn to, he failed to put a single ques- 
tion to the witness on the subject of the council. 

If, in speaking of the letters of the 9th and 14th of March, I use lan- 
guage of a strong, indignant tone, I have no other apology to offer than 
the deep provocation arising out of the character of the letters themselves. 
The starving-letters of the 1st and 4th of March, addressed to General 
Clinch, though disgraceful in the highest degree, have not the peculiar 
atrocity which attaches to the rescue-letter of the 9th of March, and its 
postscriptum of the 14th of March. The starving-letters could only 
operate a temporary inconvenience, and, in fact, as they fell into the 



f 224 ] 592 

hands of a man like General Clinch, who despised them, they were pow- 
erless in their object, and the disgrace of their depravity must, of neces- 
sity, be visited upon their author. But the other letters, designed to work a 
disgrace upon the American arms, in my person, must, by the ordinary 
course of tilings, if not checked and marked as I shall mark them, work 
evil in one of two ways : either they would be published by the War 
Department, as the official despatches from a commander in the field 
usually are, and thus abuse and poison the public mind, certified to as 
they are by the official signature of the commander, and receiving addi- 
tional strength from the channel through which they are given to the 
public, or they must be deposited in the archives of the Department of 
War, there to be covered up and concealed in their loathsome enormity, 
for a time, until death shall remove the innocent victim of their false- 
hood, when some curious searcher after materials for a history brings 
them to light, spreads them far and wide, and transmits them to posteri- 
ty beyond the reach of contradiction or question. 

In truth, one of the letters, that of the 9th of March, was published, 
as I understand, by the War Department, and down to this day has been 
instrumental in spreading the poison of its falsehood. The other, possi- 
bly from its very enormity, was not published, and was in a fair way to 
take the other channel to posterity, and but for the investigations of this 
Court, might have reached, uncontradicted, its destination. 

Having shown, as 1 doubt not, to the satisfaction of the Court, that it 
was my right and my duty, under the deeply-afflictive circumstances of 
the case, (as the commander of the Western department,) to collect to- 
gether at New Orleans the force at my disposal, and make to General 
Clinch the solemn and irrevocable pledge contained in my letter of the 
2d of February, 1836, to co-operate with him in subduing the enemy, 
and for that purpose to march to Fort Brooke, and thence to Fort King ; 
and in pursuance of my plan of operations announced to that meritorious 
officer in my letter of the 22d of February, " to search for the enemy until 
I should find them, and then beat them or be myself beaten," and to 
continue my operations against them whithersoever they might go until 
I should subdue them, or until 1 should find General Scott at the theatre 
of the war, the only proper place for him to relieve me, or if he prefer- 
red it, to co-operate with me ; and that it] was my right and my duty to 
avail myself of whatever supplies and force I could find within the limits 
of my department ; it remains for me show that, when so reinforced and 
replenished, it was my right and my duty to continue my movement to 
the Withlacoochee ; and on meeting at that place the enemy's principal 
force, to fight them precisely as 1 did, according to my own plan and my 
own judgment, in the best possible way to subdue them effectually, and 
at the least possible risk of dispersing them, until the arrival of supplies 
and mounted force from Fort Drane, and to subdue them without the use- 
less sacrifice of my troops, who were always more than willing to en- 
counter every privation of food and rest and every danger. 

Mr. President, I affirm that there was no law, order, or regulation 
tending to restrict me in the full and perfect right of meeting the enemy 
in the manner I met them at the Withlacoochee. The evidence of Col- 
onel Twiggs, the efficient commander of the " light brigade," General 
(acting Colonel) Smith, who would do honor to the command of any corps 



593 [ 224 ] 

in the regular service, Captain Hitchcock, my excellent acting inspector 
general, and Captain MeCall, my long-tried and faithful aid-de-camp, 
officers who have proven themselves to possess a high grade of moral 
courage, and talents, and efficiency, (whose statements are in every ma- 
terial point in accordance with the recollections of every other intelli- 
gent officer with me on the campaign, whose impressions were known to 
me,) concur in the facts that in every conflict 1 had with the Indians I 
effected the object in view. 

In the first affair (on the 27th of February) I had ordered my rear 
guard and baggage-train to halt at the nearest open plain adjacent to the 
river-hammock, and within 400 or 500 yards of the river, at General 
Clinch's crossing place. My object was to examine the place, and then 
encamp for the night upon the open plain, where I had left my rearguard 
and baggage. The river was examined and found unfordable, when the 
action commenced. The action continued across the river, where it was 
but 25 to 30 yards wide, for some 30 to 40 minutes, and until the enemy's 
slackened fire proved that they had principally retired from the conflict. 
This fight was without a breastwork. The next day's conflict took place 
about "Zh. miles lower down the river, at a more convenient point for 
crossing. This fight also took place without a breastwork. Here I deemed 
it proper to prepare canoes and other means for crossing. These prep- 
arations could not be completed until the 29th of February, when I found 
undoubted evidence of the fact which I had reason, on the 28th, to sus- 
pect, that 1 had before me the principal force of the enemy, consisting, as I 
then believed, and as I do still believe, of near fifteen hundred Indian and 
black warriors. It has been vaguely surmised by my accuser, who, at 
the time of the several conflicts, was then at Picolata, that the principal 
force of the enemy was not before me at or near Camp Izard. The 
principal and most intelligent officers of my command concurred with me 
in opinion, (see the testimony of Colonel Twiggs, General Smith, Cap- 
tain Hitchcock, and Captain MeCall ;) and upon this point permit me to 
ask, if the principal force of the enemy was not before me on the 29th of 
February, where is a shadow of proof to be found that any considerable 
portion of the enemy was on that day, or for weeks after that time, at any 
other place than the cove or Withlacoochee swamps, near Camp Izard ? 

I then deemed it proper, as stated in my communication to General 
Clinch, to await the arrival of that officer or General Scott, with mounted 
force and supplies, as I felt convinced that these officers would gladly 
hasten to the theatre of action, having a few days previously seen a letter 
in the hands of General Clinch, written by General Scott, expressing a 
wish to know where the principal force of the enemy could be found. I 
could not doubt that, as he had arrived safely at Picolata, the termination 
of steam navigation, and but two days' ride distant, he would come prompt- 
ly to the place, where I was convinced that, with the aid of a small corps 
of mounted men, either of us could have put an end to the war before the 
20th of March. My " Order No. 7," of the 9th of March, gives a concise 
outline of the result of my operations. Compare that " Order" with the 
testimony to which I have referred, and you cannot fail to find the facts 
which I have in that order stated, fully and completely established ; that, 
with the chivalric Louisianians under General Smith, the brave infantry 
and artillery under Colonel Foster and Major Belton, the whole forming 



[ 224 ] 594 

the "light brigade" under Colonel, acting Brigadier Twiggs, I did " sub' 
due the enemy, and did force them to sue for peace." 

But this honorable Court is told — as the War Department and the peo- 
ple of this nation have been told through a thousand channels, (as corrupt 
as the spirit of party could render them) — that the enemy could not be 
sincere in their admission that they were tired of fighting, and that they 
wished to make peace : and for why ? Because, forsooth, the alleged 
beating and suing for peace was accomplished without my having made 
a sortie ! — and that Major General Winfield Scott said so ! ! 

The word sortie appears to have had in it for General Scott a singular 
charm. He had seen my letter of the 29th of February, stating that / 
had abstained and should abstain from a sortie, until I heard from him or 
General Clinch. He appears thus to have taken up the idea of a sortie; 
and instead of reasoning as I did, and as every man of sound principles 
and military mind would, he endeavors to' torture it into an accusation 
against me. Who authorized General Scott to animadvert upon my 
measures in the command of my department? Mr. President, do you, 
does the Court know of any law or authority by which that officer could 
properly interfere with me, or himself sit in judgment upon my conduct? 
No such authority ever existed. He was never authorized to command 
me. He was authorized to extend his operations into my department ; 
and it is in proof before this Court that I was ready and willing to place 
under his command the forces near me, whenever he appeared in person, 
ready and willing to command those forces ; but I knew too well what 
was due to them, the frontier, the service, and my own reputation, to 
abandon them before the enemy, merely upon the receipt of a report that 
he was ordered on to take charge of the war, when I had also learned 
that he had halted for some ten or twelve days, sixty miles from my de- 
partment. This Court is in possession of the first and only authority ever 
given to any officer or tribunal to call in question or animadvert upon my 
conduct in relation to the Seminole war. This Court possesses the pre- 
cise power comprehended in the orders given by the President, to inquire 
into the causes of the failure of the campaigns against the Seminole In- 
dians. 

Mr. President : Your powers in reference to my movements in East 
Florida hath this extent — no more. If you find that, by any omission or 
by any act of mine, a failure ensued in any one of the campaigns against 
the Seminole Indians in the year 1836, it is your duty to mark and to an- 
imadvert on such act or omission. But even this Court has no right to 
animadvert on or object to any such omission as that which General Scott 
has thus condemned, namely, the omission to make a sortie, unless, in- 
deed, this Court can upon its oath say, in the spirit of the Order, that such 
omission to make a sortie tended in some way to occasion a failure. But, 
when it is obvious from the testimony upon your table a sortie would have 
been attended with no possible benefit to the service, and that it might, 
on the contrary, have contributed to disperse the enemy, whilst the de- 
nounced act of omission was followed by irrefragable evidence that the 
enemy were subdued and sued for peace, I cannot but anticipate the ex- 
pression of an opinion by this Court approving my r conduct, and awarding 
to my accuser the marked rebuke which his numerous vindictive accu- 
sations in his several letters and orders upon the subject, so loudly call 



Ul 



595 [ 224 ] 

for. It is obvious, from the labored and long-continued efforts of General 
Scott to distort the facts connected with my measures on the Withlacoo- 
chee, that he must have felt convinced that nothing short of my conviction 
of some great error or misconduct could save him from inevitable dis- 
grace. Hence it was that, after making use of the most glaring and 
clumsy pretexts to get up the starving-scheme of the 1st and 4th of March, 
and then his rescue-scheme of the 9th of March — alter exhausting his 
powers in vain to prevent General Clinch from furnishing me with sup- 
plies, the sortie-scheme was devised and put forth with a zeal and a per- 
severance which, if properly applied to preparatory measures and move- 
ments against the enemy during the month of February and first five days 
of March, would probably have contributed to enable that officer to re- 
lieve me, and appropriate to himself the honors of subduing the enemy, 
and forcing them, as I did, to sue for peace. 

Had General Scott arrived at Camp Izard at 9 o'clock on the night of 
the 5th of March, attended only by his staff or a corporal's guard, and an 
hour after his arrival the black herald of the enemy had announced to 
him, as in point of fact he did to me, that the Indians did not want to fight 
any more, and desired to come in on the next morning and shake hands 
and make peace ; and had their chiefs the next morning approached the 
camp with a white Hag and stated to General Scott, as they did to me, 
that they were tired of lighting, and having had many of their warriors 
killed and others disabled by wounds, and therefore wished to make 
peace and fight no more — can this honorable Court doubt but that Gen- 
eral Scott's modest 1 / would have yielded to such an appeal ? Can it be 
doubted that General Scott would, in so trying an emergency, have ar- 
gued himself into the conclusion that his arrival in camp had electrified 
the savage foe, and induced them to sue to him for peace? Extravagant 
as such a conclusion would certainly have been, under all the circum- 
stances of the case, it would have been viewed by me as a very trivial 
fault compared with the atrocious fraud and perfidy practised by that offi- 
cer upon his Government and country, the army and myself, and, though 
last not least in point ot atrocity, upon the deceived and miserable In- 
dians : first, by a false and malicious statement, in his letter to the Ad- 
jutant General of the 14th of March, [see page (-03;] and, secondly, dis- 
regarding my arrangements with the Indians, and vainly attempting to get 
up an exterminating war against them. 

The Starving-Letter of March 1, 1S3G. 
General Scott to General Clinch, (document No. CO J dated 

" Picolata, March 1, 1836. 

" By the arrival, at daylight this morning, of the express from Fort 
Drane, I have your note of yesterday's date, accompanied by a letter to 
you from Major General Gaines, dated the day before. 

" I regret, in every point of view, the premature and unauthorized 
movement from Tampa bay, made by that General, and the very awk- 
ward and responsible position he has placed himself in by his subsequent 
march from Fort King. I presume that, as instructed, you sent him my 
Order No. 4, dated the 26th ultimo. By that he saw that, if the troops 
39 



[ 224 ] 596 

he brought with him from Tampa bay could not be subsisted at Fort King, 
by means of supplies derived from this place, through the Ochlawaha, it 
was expressly commanded that the column should march to Volusia with- 
out delay, where subsistence in abundance would be immediately provided. 
But he had, before that order reached him, taken from Fort Diane 
a large part of the subsistence relied upon for a more systematic course 
of operations, and decamped. The order, however, I take it for granted, 
was sent after him, and in time to reach him within twenty miles of Fort 
King. In any event, the responsibility of his movements, and actual 
position, is his own ; for he must have known, as early as the 10th ulti- 
mo, if not before, that I had been charged with the general direction of 
the war in Florida, and that, by interfering, he constituted himself an 
interloper. 

" Even if you had sufficient stores on hand, and means of transportation, 
I should, under the circumstances, command you to send no subsistence 
to him unless to prevent starvation ; but you have neither. Let him, 
therefore, in time, extricate himself from the embarrassment he has 
placed himself in by marching upon Volusia,* where I have no reason 
to doubt that 20,000 rations, sent hence on the 27th ultimo, have safely 
arrived. As he appears to have a retreat open to him, or is in no peril 
to prevent his taking that step, you, of course, will make no detachment 
or movement to join him.f 

" The train you have ordered hither is expected to night : as yet, we 
have here but few wagons to add to your numbers. The whole train 
shall be immediately loaded with subsistence and sent back to Fort Diane. 
I have only time to say that, should the troops under Major General 
Gaines be compelled to march back to Fort King, or to Fort Diane, in- 
stead of proceeding to Volusia, as heretofore commanded, and as I still 
wish that they should do, on account of the extreme difficulty of sending 
subsistence to your neighborhood, you will only issue rations to them for 
their current subsistence, and not for further false expeditions. 

" As the first consequence of the arrival of the troops from Tampa bay 
to Fort King, and the demand made upon Fort Drane for subsistence, I 
was obliged to order back a battalion of Georgia volunteers, that had then 
been nearly two days in route to join you. 

" The company of mounted men from the same State, now on the op- 
posite side of the river, refuse to be mustered into service, and refuse^ 
to come under the rules and articles of war. The other companies of 
the same battalion may follow their example ; if they do, I shall lose no 
time in ordering the whole back to their homes. § 

" Major Gates, with his three companies, has not arrived, and I have 
no intelligence respecting the United States dragoons, of a recent date. 
Finally, the horses for some days expected for Savannah have not arri- 
ved. These embarrassments may detain me here I know not how long. 

* This move would give the Indians the uninterrupted control of the frontier of Middle Forida. 

E. P. G. 
t Supplies could not be sent to me without the detachment or movement here forbiddrn. 

E. P. G. 
i And yet. whilst the troops near him arc refusing to serve, he is giving orders for the troops 
in the field to be starved ! 

E. P. G. 
§ This is protecting the frontier, with a vengeance! 

E. P. G. 



597 [ 224 J 

" The left wing is moving upon Volusia with system and success. The 
South Carolina foot constitutes the advance, and I suppose the mounted 
regiment from the same State is now crossing the St. John's at Jackson- 
ville. 

" Send another copy of my Order No. 4 to Major General Gaines, and 
a copy of Order No. 1, which is enclosed for the purpose. The former 
is reiterated so far as respecis the march to Volusia, if this be practica- 
ble ; and enclose him a certified copy of this letter for his government 
and your justification. 

" I remain, in haste, 

" Your obedient servant, 

*' WINFIELD SCOTT. 

" P. S. I am instructed by Major General Scott to say that the quar- 
termaster's return did not accompany your letter of the 27th ultimo. No 
return has been received of your ordnance, or ordnance stores, particu- 
larly the fixed ammunition for muskets. Please to send one. 

" Respectfully, 

"A. VAN BUR EN, 

" Aid-de-camp" 

The Starving-Letter of March 4, 1S3G. 

General Scoll to General Clinch, (document No. G9,) dated 

" Picolata, March 4, 1836. 

" I still presume that Major General Gaines will be obliged to fall back 
to Fort Drane, which increases my anxiety to send the wagons (with 
some additions; loaded. 1 would prefermuch that the force brought with 
him was back at Tampa bay, or rather, that it had not marched from that 
place ; provided that the movement fails to crush the enemy, or to termi- 
nate the war. The worst result, next to the loss of that fine body of men 
or a third of it, would he mere success in driving the enemy into the 
loioer country, where I suppose it would be almost impossible for us to 
follow — I mean below the waters of Charlotte harbor. Hence my indig- 
nation that an isolated attack should have been made from your vicinity, 
well calculated to produce that result, and at a time when you knew, and 
Major General Gaines must have known, through you, (and before,) that 
my plan, with ample means, was to move simultaneously upon the With- 
lacoochee, in three columns, from Tampa bay, the upper crossing on the 
Ochlawaha, and Fort Drane — so as to make it impossible for the enemy 
to escape to the lower country. 

" I have not yet supposed that Major General Gaines has not his re- 
treat upon Fort Drane or King perfectly in his power. On account of 
subsistence, if he can cut his way through the enemy to Tampa bay, I 
should much prefer that his force should be there ; and when 1 wished 
him to march or send that force to Volusia, it was because it could be 
infinitel). more easily subsisted there than at Fort Drane. Should he, 
however, be in any difficulty in operating a retreat from the Withlacoo- 
chee, I certainly wish you to afford any succors that the slender means 
within your reach may allow ; and this, doubtless, you would render 



[ 224 ] 598 



without any special permission to that effect. If the force return to Fort 
Drane or Kin;:., it must be sustained for at least five or six days from the 
in; ans derfveti from this place ; and hence, I now prefer that it should be- 
come a part of the sight wing rather than take that quantity of subsistence 
from you, and march back to Tampa buy." 

General Scott to the Adjutant General, (document No. 68, j dated 

"Picolata, March 6, 1836. 

" i at length know that the South Carolina mounted regiment reached 
Jacksonville yesterday. It is destined to make part of the left wing. 

" Besides, Brigadier General Eustis has necessarily been compelled to 
wait for the South Carolina mounted regiment, which cannot reach St, 
Augustine before the day after to-morrow, and Volusia before the 12th. 

" If the column under Major General Gaines had fallen back upon Fort 
Drane or King, the right wing would have wanted nothing but subsist- 
ence, and the forces now in this vicinity, and known to be coming up, to 
act with vigor and effect. 

" To add to my numerous vexations, the wagons reported to have been 
shipped at Baltimore in the Arctic have been left behind. 

" I send no more troops, for the present, to Fort Drane, on account of 
the difficulty of subsisting them there. If Major General Gaines shall 
■not fall bach on that point, it will he indispensable to wait for Captain 
Wharton" 

Aid-de-camp Van Bur en to the Adjutant General, (document No. 91,) 

dated 

Fort Drane, March 25, 1836. 

" Captain Wharton, with his detachment of dragoons, reached this the 
day before yesterday." 



General Scott's Rescue-Letter, March 9, 1836. 
General Scott to the Adjutant General, (document No. 71, J dated 

"Between Picolata and Garey's Ferry, 

" March 9, IS36. 

" I have just set out for Fort Drane, via Garey's ferry, on Black creek, 
with two companies of regulars, and intending to take with me from the 
latter place, the small battalion of mounted Georgians, (heretofore men- 
tioned,) under the command of Major Douglass. Lieutenant Colonel 
Bankhead is at the head of the first detachment, and the two, together, 
may make a total of about 240 ; but even this small force may be impor- 
tant to rescue Major General Gaines. 



tfcffii 



599 [ 224 J 

"I had not received the slighest information of the operations on tlie 
Withlacoochee (official or otherwise) of a later date than the 29th ulti- 
mo, up to this morning, and had concluded that he had effected his march, 
with more or less success against the enemy, upon Tampa bay, when, at 
day-light, the steamer that I am now in arrived and brought the rumor, 
which is confirmed by the two accompanying notes from Paymaster Lytic, 
received about six hours afterwards. On the reception of the rumor, 
I immediately commenced preparations for this movement ; but being 
delayed by the necessity of unlading and relading the boat, I am now 
at anchor at the mouth of Black creek. I hope to put the troops in march, 
from Garey's ferry, early in the day to-morrow, and to reach Fort Drane 
with a small escort the day following. It is possible that even these 
little detachments of horse and foot may reach the Withlacoochee in 
time to render a valuable service. 

" I am aware that the movement I am making may be condemned, 
if regarded in any other light than a rescue, as premature. Colonel 
Goodwyn's mounted regiment only arrived at St. Augustine last night, 
and this morning, and consequently the left wing cannot be in force on 
up the Ochlawaha, in the direction of Pelaklikaha, earlier than the l?th, or 
with the enemy before the 20th instant. Colonel Lindsay, who may have 
already arrived at Tampa bay, cannot operate more than two days' march 
from that place, from the want of the means of transportation,* Major 
General Gaines having taken away the horses which ivere there, and the 
basis of the right wing is merged in the force brought by that General 
into the field, and must participate in his success or failure. If it /alls 
back with him upon Fort Drane, if, must suffer great loss, and, if it-fol- 
low him to Tampa buy, it will be wholly out of position. 

" In this, and even a gi eater state of uncertainty, I have been held 
since the 26th ultimo. The day after I ordered back Major Cooper's 
battalion of Georgia loot, to prevent starvation at Fort Drane ; and th< ! 
daily, from that time, in the expectation of receiving from Savannah 
horses and serviceable wagons, not one has arrived. The quantity of 
subsistence that will be at Fort Drane (say) to-morrow, xviil only be that 
sent from Picolata on the 6th instant, viz : 17,497 rations of bread and 
flour, 11,000 rations of pork, (with beef and cattle in the neighborhood,) 
SO, 000 rations of beans, some coffee, vinegar, &c. And the troops now 
about to proceed, perhaps as far as the cooehee, will not have the 

means of taking with them rations for more than six days. 

" I beg leave to recapitulate the causes of my great deficiency in the 
means of transportation : 

" 1. The wagons and horses, which I knew Brigadier General Clinch 
to possess early in February, have been more broken down by hard i er- 
vice and bad loads than I had expected to find them. 

" 2. I had, upon what was considered in Georgia, and even in Picolata, 
the best information, confidently relied upon the use of the Ochlawaha 
as late as the 2d instant. 

* See the testimony of Lieutenant Morris, by which it will he found that Colonel Lindsay 
found near ten times as much transportation at Tampa hay us that which General Gaines found 
Shere. 

E. P. G. 



[ 224 ] 600 

" 3. No bacon has arrived, and the difference between it and pork, 
including wood and brine, is fifty per centum against the latter.* 

" 4. The wagons purchased at Charleston and Augusta, by Assistant 
Quartermasters L'Engle and Peyton, are generally poor, and many of 
them unserviceable. 

" o. The six or ten wagons actually reported to have been shipped at 
Baltimore in, I think, the Arctic, with Major Gates, were all left behind. 

" G. Of the 19,0001 rations known to be at Fort Drane, about the 
25tb ultimo, nearly the whole have been drawn by a force not expected 
by the Government or myself to appear in that quarter. 

" And, 7. Not a horse for the baggage-train left by me at Savannah, or 
which 1 have since ordered to be purchased by Assistant Quartermaster 
Dimmock, has arrived in Florida. 

"On the 21st ultimo, when I was but twenty hours from Savannah, I 
sent back by a steamer that was met an order to Lieutenant Dimmock 
to ship about 40 horses for the baggage-train to Picolata. This order was 
strongly reiterated by a return steamer five days afterwards; and again 
on the 2d instant, by another boat, he was instructed to send immediately, 
and by the speediest conveyance, 70 horses for the train, and six four- 
horse wagons. I had this morning a report from him, saying, after he had 
received my first and second orders, that he had sent all the horses 
wanted for draughts and packs by land, except a lew which were to come 
as packs with Captain Wharton. Now, as the latter was about 24 days 
in New York, alter receiving orders for Florida, and expected to remain 
10 in Savannah, he cannot be looked for in this neighborhood before the 
18th or 20th instant. The other parts of the lot were, it seems, given as 
packs to the tenth company of South Carolina mounted men, and sent 
forward in a drove. They must, it is feared, arrive in a state unfit for the 
baggage-train (say) about the Glh instant. Such has been the failure of 
human agents. The weather has been equally adverse. 

" If the force on the Withlacoochee should fall back on Fort Drane, it 
will be seen from the foregoing, that a part, at least, must probably inarch 
upon Volusia or Garey's ferry, to be within reach of subsistence. Instruc- 
tions have been left behind me to send forward rations, should the means 
of transportation arrive in time, and the troops already in the neighborhood 
of Picolata — Major Cooper's and the remaining company of Major Gates's 
battalion. 1 have also desired Brigadier General Eustis, in the same 
event, to order to Fort Diane two companies of mounted men of Colo- 
nel Goodwyn's regiment, and a fourth order will go back in this boat to 
Lieutenant Dimmock on the subject of horses and wagons. 

" Some rifles and the tents arrived this morning at Picolata ; but Colo- 
nel Goodwyn had marched through six or eight storms without cover, 
and now all companies in march are to be reduced to three tents each." 

" P. S. Please to remark that, in his letter to Brigadier General Clinch, 
dated at New Orleans the 2d ultimo, Major General Gaines speaks of 
' an efficient co-operation ;' promises to be ' in readiness at Tampa 

* This statement is untrue. Pork and flour is a safer and more portable subsistence for a 
march in the wilderness than bacon and hard bread. 

E. P. G. 
1 1 took less than 1C.000 complete rations. 

E. P. G. 



£21 



601 [ 224 ] 

bay by the 8th* of the present month, to form a junction at or near that 
place with the force under your command, whenever, and as soon as, 
in your judgment, your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement ;' 
and concludes by saying, ' a sufficient quantity of ammunition and pro- 
visions have been transported to Fort Brooke to divide with you until 
further supplies are received ;' yet he did not wait till the brigadier gave 
notice that he was ' in force ;' came to Fort King, and swept nearly the 
whole of the subsistence! collected at Fort Drane. A copy of that letter 
is in your office, and 1 now enclose one from Governor Eaton, from which 
it will appear that Major General Gaines knew, at Tampa bay, about the 
14th ultimo, that I had been charged with the direction of this war. 
He first heard this at Pensacola, and received Governor Eaton's despatch 
at Tampa, as I can establish. Hence his haste, and neglect of the as- 
surance given to Brigadier General Clinch ;J his isolated attack, &c." 

Paymaster Lytle's Letters of the 5th and 8th Makch, 1836. 

Paymaster Lytic to General Scott, (document No. 72 J dated 

" Fort Drake, March 5, 1836. 

" I have been directed by General Clinch to inform you that your com- 
munications of yesterday's date reached him at this post after he had 
mounted his horse, and was on the move, with the forces under his com- 
mand, to escort supplies to General Gaines. He directed me likewise to 
say to you that the distance from this post to Garey's (or Black creek) is 
about the same as the distance from here to Picolata. As you wish, 
however, to obtain all the information possible on the subject, I will 
take the liberty of adding, from my own knowledge, that the road from 
Garey's to this place is sandy, consequently, almost invariably dry; while 
the load from Picolata here is muddy after heavy rains, particularly such, 
as we have just experienced. 

" Colonel Gadsden arrived here from Tallahassee on the 4th, (yester- 
day,) and accompanied General Clinch this morning to the Withla- 
coochee." 

From the same to the same, (document No. 72,) dated 

" Fort Drake, March 8, 1836. 

" By direction of General Clinch, I opened your communication of the 
6th instant, which arrived late last night, in advance of the wagons. You 
will perceive, by my letter of the 5th, that General Clinch, with all the 
forces at this post, and 100 mounted men from the vicinity, had left for 
Withlacoochee, to escort a small supply of cattle, ammunition, &c. to 
General Gaines, having received, the night before, a third address from 

♦ I entered Tampa bay on the 9th of February, 1S3G. 

E. P. G. 

t The subsistence belonged to my own department. 

E. P. G. 
t To co-operate efficiently is to search for the enemy, and also to search for theforce with whom 
ice propose a co-operation. J did both. General Scott ought to have done the same. 

E. P. G. 



[ 224 J 602 

that officer. No word has been received from either of these generals 
since the 5th. When General Clinch left here, he expected to be back 
on the 9th. 

" The probability is that the wagons will return without an escort, 
there being at present no troops here ; v.nd, should General Clinch get 
back before the wagons depait, his men may be too much fatigued to 
march again immediately ; but this, of course, is merely conjecture. I 
am satisfied, however, that General Clinch would advise that an escort 
accompany the wagons back to this place, when reloaded. Captain 
Graham, being directed by General Clinch to send back the wagons for 
supplies after their arrival here, will send them to Garey's, it being the 
best road. 

" N. B. The amount of General Gaines's last express to General 
Clinch, dated 3d instant, was merely copies of his previous letters, with 
a note stating that the Indians were still around them ; but little or no 
fighting taken place since his last communication." 

General Scott's Sortie-Letter of March 14, 1836. 

General Scotl to the Adjutant Genera!, (document No. 77 J dated 

" Fort Drane, March 14, 1836. 

" On my arrival here, I found that the force which had been upon the 
Witblacoochee had fallen back on this vicinity. 

" Brigadier General Clinch, with some means of subsistence, and about 
600 men, (of whom 150 were mounted Floridians,) joined Major Gene- 
ral Gaines on the 6th instant. The force under the latter had already 
been reduced to the necessity of commencing on horses and dogs for their 
subsistence. After receiving that timely and important succor, the army 
remained in position until the 10th. 

" It may be remarked thai, from the Nine of entrance into the intrenched 
camp, up to the retreat m this direction, not a sortie was attempted ; and 
that, to save the pride of the higher officer, the command was relinquished 
to the next in rank, in order that he might give the order to retreat * 

; ' A copy of Major General Gaines's order, yielding the immediate com- 
mand of their joint forces to Brigadier General Clinch, is enclosed. This 
extraordinary paper I have but little time to comment upon. The poor 
sneer against me, as the diplomatic agent of the War Department, is in 
character with all his recent acts, far, at the moment of the succor on the 
6th, he had already opened anegoliation with the enemy,* in which, it is 
said, on good authority, that he was willing to leave them in the quiet 
possession of the country below the Witblacoochee until the arrival of 
the ' diplomatic agent ;' but in which Powell insisted that that river should 
be the perpetual, boundary between us and the Seminolcs. But for Brig- 
adier General Clinch, I have no doubt that some treaty on the one or the 
other basis would have been formed between (he parlies ;* he alleged the 
positive instructions of the War Department against all negotiations, and 

* See the testimony of Captain Hitchcock, General Smith, Colonel Twiggs, and Captain 
McCall. proving this to be false. 

e. p. a 



603 f 224 ] 

he enabled .Major General Gaines to save the original force with him. 
Not a sortie was made from the intrenched camp, from the time of its 
formation up to the retreat ; and, on the approach of the succor, a large 
detachment of the enemy had taken a position to intercept the retreat in 
this direction.* How, under such circumstances, it can be alleged that 
the enemy has been beaten, it would be difficult to reconcile with facts. 

" I have reason to hope that the enemy remain nearly in the same po- 
sition as before the isolated, and, therefore, false movement of Major 
General Gaines. This is fortunate. 

" I have instructed Brigadier General Eustis, after scouring the coun- 
try through which he will have to pass to some extent, to place his column 
in position somewhere in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha about the 25th 
instant. Colonel Lindsay, by the same day, is to be with his force at 
Chickuchatty, (about two marches from Tampa,) and means are sug- 
gested to each in order to multiply the chances of communicating with 
each other. 

"The right wing will move hence (say) on the 24th instant to attack 
in front. This column will pass the Withlacoochee about half a mile be- 
low the late intrenched camp, where there is a good ford, and of which 
Major General Gaines might have availed himself, if he had had the 
strength or inclination. "f 

Mr. President, let us look into the subject of sorties or sallies, and 
see what objects are usually attained or sought for in making them. The 
first, is to force the enemy to abandon the siege, or otherwise to beat 
them. Secondly, to retard and embarrass their approaches, by driving 
their guards and working-parties from their trenches, in order, if practi- 
cable, to prevent or otherwise to delay the completion of their trenches, 
and thus to prevent or put off as long as possible the apprehended evil 
hour of a breach or an assault. I was particularly desirous to abstain 
from forcing the enemy to abandon their supposed siege, as will appear 
from my letter of the 29th of February, lest I should disperse the enemy : 
and I am sure nothing could have been more gratifying to me, and to 
every officer and soldier with me, volunteer and regular, than for the 
enemy to have opened trenches and attempted a breach or an assault. 
Whilst I abstained from a sortie, every Indian that approached in view 
of my breast-work did it at his peril; whereas by making a sortie the 
Indians could escape to their ambuscades in the thick hammock in two 
or three minutes' time. Under these circumstances nothing short of the 
extreme of folly or a disposition to trifle with the most important duties 
of the service could have prompted me to make a general sortie without 
an object — such as the arrival of troops or expresses, as Colonel Lind- 
say's brigade from Tampa bay, or that of General Scott or General 
Clinch, or other troops from Fort Drane or King — until I should have it 
in my power, by the aid of mounted men, with supplies, to continue the 
sortie or sally for some days in succession, until I should have had it in my 
power to scour the Withlacoochee swamps and give a good account of 

* See the testimony of General Smith, Colonel Twiggs, Captain Hitchcock, and Captain 
McCall, proving tiiis to be false. 

' E. P. G. 

t The " good ford" was not fordable, when found in March. 1836. 

E. P. G. 



[ 224 ] 604 

the place called The Cove. To speak seriously of any other description 
of sorties or sallies in an Indian war, is to me something worse than 
absurd. It will be seen by the testimony of several officers with me, 
including my staff, that orders were given for the troops to be held in 
readiness for a sortie on the happening of any contingency, such as those 
just now alluded to, to justify the measure. Small parties of from 50 to 
120 woodsmen and sharp-shooters were often permitted to look after the 
enemy for a short distance up and down the river. It is in proof before 
this Court, that a party of this description, composed of the companies of 
Captain Burt and Captain Thistle, consisting of volunteers and regulars, 
was out some 200 to 400 yards from camp during the action of the 29th 
of February, and were engaged in action with a large party of Indians 
(from 350 to 400, as Captain Thistle believes) on the opposite side of 
the river. The conflict continued across the river, with some short in- 
tervals, for about two hours. Captain Kerr, Lieutenant Grayson, and other 
officers of volunteers and regulars, were frequently out and employed in 
firing at the enemy across the river. 

But, since the Court has been pleased so far to tolerate General Scott's 
accusations, in reference to a sortie, as to make it the subject of special 
interrogatories to several of the witnesses, I have been disposed, so far 
from attempting to throw any impediment in the way of a full and free 
inquiry into all the bearings and probable tendencies of sorties or sal- 
lies, to extend the inquiry still further than my position at Camp 
Izard, as will be seen by my interrogatories to General Smith, the ac- 
complished commander of the Louisiana volunteers, to Captain Drane, 
a most efficient and experienced officer, and Lieutenant Mitchell, a young 
officer of great promise, with their answers. By the testimony of these 
very respectable witnesses, called before this Court by my accuser, it will 
be seen how far General Scott himself carried out, in honest matter-of- 
fact practice, the theories with which he had been attempting to edify 
the War Department and the newspaper press of our country upon the 
subject of sorties. 

Mr. President : The testimony of the witnesses last mentioned 
proves clearly that General Scott's practice was not in accordance with 
his theories. Sir, that officer, with over 2,000 men, as gallant troops as 
either of us ever commanded, and an outfit sufficient for at least fifteen 
days' good service, hurried across the Withlacoochee and thence toTampa 
bay, without devoting more than one day to what any officer acquainted 
with his duty would have deemed the great and leading object of the 
campaign, namely, an examination of the Big Cove swamp. Captain 
Drane testifies that that swamp, from 15 to 20 miles in width, was pene- 
trated by a part of the force under General Scott but two and a half 
miles ! General Smith estimates the distance at four and a half miles. My 
accuser, who had written so eloquently to nullify every measure of mine 
at the Withlacoochee, and to prove that the Indians could not have been 
beaten without a sortie, and that they could not be sincere in suing for 
peace without a sortie — this same General devoted but one day to the 
great duty of " searching for the Indians" where he could have had any 
reasonable ground to calculate on "Jinding them.'''' He could not find 
them because he would not take time to search for them in the cove 
swamp, where, it is in proof upon your record, they have been residing, 



605 f 224 ] 

with their families, for the most part of the time since the 6th of March, 
the da} r on which they sued for peace. The Big Cove swamp, 15 to 20 
miles in width and near 60 miles in circumference, was penetrated along 
a large path (exhibiting evidence of recent footsteps of the Indians, 
adults and children) but four and a half miles. The dismal aspect of 
that swamp probably contributed to give to my accuser the first really 
impressive lesson he had ever received upon the intrinsic difficulties at- 
tending an Indian war in Florida. The testimony is silent upon the sub- 
ject of what he wrote or what he said or thought at that swamp, in refer- 
ence to the propriety of making sorties. It is probable, however, that 
he said nothing upon the subject, as it is proven by Lieutenant Mitchell 
that arrangements were made to establish a post near the swamp, which 
was left under the command of Major Cooper, with a battalion of volun- 
teers, whereupon the General, with the residue of the right wing of his 
grand army, marched forthwith to Fort Brooke, Tampa bay, as the wit- 
ness believes, in order to obtain a supply of subsistence. " Hard bread 
and bacon," it would seem, and not sorties or Indian warriors, then occu- 
pied the thoughts of the new commander. My accuser, on his arrival at 
the Big Cove swamp, found himself in a dilemma. My simple plan of 
operations, communicated to General Clinch, and by him to my accuser, 
General Scott, was condemned by the last-mentioned General, who, on 
his arrival near the Big Cove swamp, found that he would be compelled 
to act in accordance with my plan, or to act not at all. My plan, the 
Court will recollect, was " to search for the enemy until we should find 
them, and then beat them, or they would beat us." 

The new General could not reconcile it to his views of propriety, after 
saying all manner of evil things against me, to condescend to search for 
the enemy, as my plan had suggested. The Big Swamp was accordingly 
left. without being disturbed by " a sortie," " a sally,'''' " a drive, or " a 
drag." This rough work could not have been accomplished without 
some considerable labor and difficulty ; whereas but very little was ne- 
cessary for General Scott to write a letter or two asserting that the In- 
dians were not in that swamp — that 500 warriors had not been within 
any space of ten miles square since the commencement of the war ; and 
that they had been frightened off to the Everglades by the accounts which, 
after they had sued for peace, I authorized Captain Hitchcock, my acting 
inspector general, to give them of the great forces expected soon to be 
in the country against them. It was easier, while reclining in the shade 
of a Florida ever-green magnolia, to make these random assertions, 
(whether true or false is for the Court to decide,) than to devote a 
few days time, with the consequent labor and privation of food and rest 
that must have attended a vigorous search throughout the swamp, than 
by such a search to give a practical illustration of the theory of sorties 
or sallies, so adroitly discussed by my accuser in his sortie-letter of the 
14th of March, and other productions of equal candor; but one of which 
remains to be noticed by me. I allude to the notorious sortie " Order 
No. — ," of 1836, based upon a nefarious scheme got up by my accuser in 
order to enable him to divert public attention from himself, by striking at 
me over the shoulders of Major Gates, and thus to keep up the hue-and- 
cry of sortie ! sortie ! Upon the same principle that a pick-pocket, 
when amidst the crowd he filches from an unguarded stranger his purse, 



[ 224 ] 606 

immediately raises the cry of stop thief! stop thief ! and thus diverts 
public attention from himself, the actual offender. 

I am aware, Mr. President, how exceedingly improper this view of 
the subject would be, if it had not truth and reason to sustain it. The 
evidence is before you. It is ior me to perform the disgusting duty of 
applying the testimony, furnished by my accuser himself, to enable you 
to do justice to him. It is for me to vindicate my own conduct, and in 
doing so, to correct the vagrant and profligate pretensions of a great pub- 
lic offender. 

In desiring your attention to the order in the case of Major Gates, I 
take leave to precede my remarks by a paper, which is a copy of the 
rough draught of a letter which I prepared on the twentieth of July 
last, the morning after receiving the order in question. This paper 
contains my views at that time. My views remain unchanged. After 
writing the letter, however, I determined, on reflection, that I would not 
send it until time and opportunity should be given to enable the Secre- 
tary himself to correct, unsolicted by me, an irregularity which I was 
willing to attribute to the haste and hurry of business which I was aware 
had often, in the War Department, led honorable men into error and 
apparent irregularity, at or near the close of a long and arduous session 
of Congress. I, therefore, retained my letter to the President, until the 
receipt of " Order No. G5" apprized me of the propriety of submitting 
it through this honorable Court. [See Document No. 45, page 688.] 

I have said that / could not, without the palpable violation of a fun- 
damental principle of military law, abandon the expedition until I should 
meet with the officer authorized to relieve or succeed me, unless expressly 
required by the President of the United States so to do, or the receipt of 
his order to that effect. 

Where, I may be asked by those who know no law but that which 
their own prejudices and passions enact, where is this great fundamental 
principle of military law to be found ? I answer, that it is incorporated 
in the constitution and laws of the United States, and in the constitution 
and laws of all the sovereign States of this great and growing confederacy. 
It will be found inscribed upon the heart and seen in the mind's eye of 
every free white man of the American Union, who feels and who knows 
how to appreciate his equal share of that sovereignty which give.-; him 
the inestimable right of self-government, with the inseparable, the kin- 
dred right of self-defence. 

We learn from our Federal, as well as from our State constitutions, that 
the primary object of the people in the adoption of each, was to provide for 
u the common defence" and "general welfare;" to suppress insurrection 
and repel invasion, and thus to afford, protection to the defenceless ; to 
keep the peace. For this purpose the President of the United States is 
expressly authorized to command the national forces, land and naval ; 
and the Governors of States are in like manner authorized to command the 
forces of their States respectively. The President has a full and perfect 
right not only to command throughout every part of the United States, and 
their Territories, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but also upon the high 
seas throughout the world, wherever any part of the land or naval forces 
may be, on duty or otherwise. 

My command extended to every section of the Western Department 



GOT f 224 J 

wherever any part of the forces assigned to me happened to be, and more 
especially to the whole of the Southern and Western frontier. Authority 
is given to Congress to declare war, and support an army, to serve under 
the authority of the President; and, being myself honored with a high 
commission in that army, and ordered by the President to command the 
Western Department, my right to employ the forces placed under me 
against a known savage foe at war with the frontier citizens, and troops 
of my department, to " repel invasion ," was as full and perfect a right as the 
President and the Congress of the United States could give me. He 
had ordered me to command the Western Department. This was suffi- 
cient to authorize me, on the sudden approach of war, to go whithersoever 
I deemed necessary to protect the people of that department " against 
their enemies and opposers whomsoever," as my official oath required 
me to do ; and to see where and how I could do the enemy the greatest 
harm, and my country the greatest good, with the means at my disposal, 
keeping myself always within the pale of our institutions, and of the laws 
of war. 

From my letter to the Adjutant General, dated at New Orleans, Jan- 
uary 15, 1836, it will be seen that I there suggest the propriety of im- 
mediate measures for the arrest or destruction of the enemy, before the 
dry weather of winter should pass away, and the rains of spring and sum- 
mer cover the swamps and fiats with water; and, for this purpose, I sug- 
gest the propriety of ordering the Gth, with parts of the 1st and 7th 
regiments of infantry, and urg^d the employment of an army of not less 
than four thousand men, to be aided by a strong naval force. 

Qy a letter from General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated at 
Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1S3G, it will be seen that that officer 
urges the propriety of an army of five thousand men, aided by a naval 
force, being employed against the enemy. 

In my letter to General Clinch, dated at New Orleans, the 2d of Feb- 
ruary, 1836, a copy of which was forwarded to the Adjutant General, I 
announce my intention to embark on the following day on board certain 
steamboats with a regiment of Louisiana volunteers, and some companies 
of the 4th United States infantry, for Tampa bay, making an irrevocable 
pledge to co-operate with General Clinch in bringing the war to a speedy 
close. In a letter from General Scott to the Adjutant General, written on 

the of February, that officer expresses a hope that the 4th infantry will 

be ordered from New Orleans to Tampa bay. And, in a letter written on 
the 2d of February, also to the Adjutant General, General Scott mentions 
the receipt of a report that Colonel Twiggs had embarked with a volunteer 
and regular force at New Orleans for Tampa bay, and expresses a hope 
that this force will enable Colonel Lindsay to act independently in a di- 
rection from Tampa bay towards Fort King, on precisely the same route 
upon which my movement was made between the 13th and the 22d of 
February. 

Mr. President, it will be seen by an inspection of these four letters, 
that they were written by myself and General Scott, without either of 
us having any knowledge of the views of the other, and that our views 
and wishes, accorded in our letters written near about the same time, 
whilst six or eight hundred miles apart, were, for the most part, in 



[ 22 4 ] 608 

strict accordance, so far, at least, as regarded the forces from New Oi»- 
leans and the movement from Tampa bay to Fort King, and variant 
only in this: that my estimate of the requisite force to terminate the 
war was four thousand men, whilst that of General Scott was five thousand 
men ; and my plan was to co operate with General Clinch, or the offi- 
cer commanding in East Florida; to search for the enemy until I should 
find them, and then, if possible, subdue them, and thus protect the fron- 
tier inhabitants; whereas General Scott's plan was to surround and pen 
up the enemy near the frontier: a plan which I could not approve; 
because it was wholly impracticable without an army of ten thousand 
men, principally mounted ; and, even with that force, the Indians could 
not be hemmed in upon the frontier of Florida, without endangering the 
lives of most of the remaining inhabitants for whose protection our troops 
were employed as a primary duty. It was not my purpose, however, to 
interfere with General Scott's plan of operations! I intended simply 
to command, as appeared to me proper, until I should meet with that offi- 
cer, and then co-operate with him, or, if he preferred it, turn over to 
him the troops with me, according to the notification received by me at 
Pensacoia, from the Adjutant General of the army. Nothing, therefore, 
appeared to disturb the harmony in which that officer was approaching 
the theatre of active operations until he learned tbat I was at the head of 
the forces from the West. The patriot spirit of harmonious co-operation 
seems then all at once to have abandoned that general, leaving him 
a prey to the furies of anarchy and discoid. He immediately reports his 
plans thwarted by my movement, notwithstanding he had so recently 
expressed his satisfaction at the prospect of a similar movement on the 
part of another officer. He immediately set about a scheme to arrest 
the movement of the supplies ordered for my department, before he had 
any thing to do ivith the affairs of the war in East Florida. 

Lest I should be deemed unjust to the General, 1 will, in due time, 
employ his own words to explain his object in arresting and withholding 
from me the subsistence destined for my command. 

Mr. President, 1 have passed in review a point in my vindication 
fraught with intense interest, not merely to myself and my faithful offi- 
cers and men, but to you and to every member of the army confided to 
your command ; and more especially to every citizen-soldier throughout 
America, whose duty it is, and in all future time will be, to enjoy the in- 
estimable right of participating in the national defence ; a point upon 
which you are solemnly bound to state facts as you find them established 
by evidence, and to give an opinion which cannot but contribute, as far 
as you have power, to relieve the army and tbe republic of a high mili- 
tary offender, who, in the hope of inflicting a wound on the reputation 
of his senior, and supposed rival, had the childish audacity to withhold, 
not only from that senior, but from (he patriotic troops who accompanied 
and nobly sustained him in action at the Withlacoochee,_/J«&Jic supplies, 
essential to their existence ; supplies ordered to be conveyed to the 
troops of my department before that officer was ordered thither; and 
he had the hardihood, also, to direct General Clinch not to afford me 
any of the supplies which I had required from him at Fort Diane, a post 
within the limits of my department, and which General Scott had not 
seen fit to approach nearer than Picolata, a distance of sixty miles within 



609 [ 224 ] 

the settlement near St. Augustine, and from ninety to a hundred miles 
from the theatre of the war, intending thereby, not to sustain me him- 
self, and, as far as he possibly could, to prevent the troops of my own 
department from sustaining me, in the position which I had taken against 
the enemy at the Withlacoochee, but, by cutting off my necessary sup- 
plies, to sfarv my troops out of that position ! a position which 1 could 
not abandon without suffering the principal force of the enemy (which I 
there held in check) to fall upon hundreds of helpless families — evils 
which must have followed, had not the chivalry of my troops triumphed 
over the enemy, and forced him to sue for peace. In doing so, they achieved 
at once a triple victory : a victory over their wants of regular supplies, 
a victory over the savage foe, and a victory over the atrocious machina- 
tions of the second United States general officer who has ever dared to 
aid and assist the open enemy of the republic in their operations against 
United States forces employed in the protection of the frontier people. 
The first great offender was Major General Benedict Arnold ; the second, 
as your finding must show, is Major General Winfield Scott. 

" Question by General Gaines to Colonel Twiggs. Colonel Twiggs 
is requested to state what he knows on the subject of making a sortie at 
or from Camp Izard, in February and March, 1836 ? 

" Answer. I received an order on the 29th of February, after the In- 
dians had retired from making an attack on us, to hold the command 
in readiness for a sortie. After the 20th, in a conversation with Gen- 
eral Gaines, I think he stated to me he had written to the officer in 
command at Fort Diane, and he expected him down with some mounted 
troops; that, as soon as they made their appearance, the command was 
to leave the break-work to attack the Indians. I think he stated to me 
that he had so written, that he would not make the sortie until the 
troops should come down. I had frequent conversations with the Gen- 
eral on this subject ; and he stated to me his views that we could do no 
good by going out; that the Indians would fly before us, and that, as 
soon as any troops made their appearance, we should go out and attack 
the Indians. It was expected that troops would arrive from Tampa bay 
on the opposite side of the river. This was before the 5th of March. 

'* Question by the Court. What is your own opinion as to the propriety 
of making a sortie from Camp Izard whilst invested by the enemy ?." 

The witness begged leave to decline answering the question, and 
was excused by the Court. 

" Question by General Gaines. Colonel Twiggs is desired to state 
whether or not it was his opinion, at any time between the 27th of Feb- 
ruary and 6th of March, that the enemy could have been subdued by 
making a sortie, or whether it would not have contributed only to disperse 
the Indians ? And state whether the Indians could not have concealed 
themselves in a thick hammock, at any moment, in three or four minutes 
time ? and state whatever opinion he entertained on the subject at the 
time, and whether he communicated to General Gaines such opinion ? 

" Answer to the first part of the question. From the 27th to the 23th, 
and including the 28th, the Indians were on the opposite side of the river, 
and we had not boats to cross the river. From the 29th February to the 
5th March, we could, at any time the Indians made their appearance, have 
driven them, but we had not the means to follow them. I cannot say 



f 224 1 G10 



whether we should have dispersed them or not. As our camp fronted 
the river, there was an extensive hammock and scrub on the left. There 
was a hammock, also, on the right, both of them two or three hundred 
yards of the camp, or probably a shorter distance, and the Indians could 
have taken shelter in either of those hammocks in a few minutes. I 
never gave General Gaines, while at Camp Izard, any opinion as to the 
propriety of a sortie. 

" Question by General Gaines. Colonel Twiggs is requested to state 
whether any officers, and, if any, who, of the light brigade, at Camp 
Izard, in February and March, 1836, expressed the opinion that a sortie 
ought to have been made. 

" Answer. Not one, while I was there, expressed such an opinion. I 
had, and, as far as I could learn from the opinion of the command gen- 
erally, they also had entire confidence in General Gaines, and we were 
willing to submit to his judgment ? 

" Question by General Gaines to General Smith. General Smith is 
requested to state his opinion as to the mode of fighting the Indians at 
Camp Izard, between the 2Sth of February and 5th of March, 183C, in- 
clusively, taking into consideration all the circumstances attending the 
service there, and particularly whether, in his opinion, a sortie would 
have been attended with advantages? 

" Answer. I believe that the only mode of fighting Indians is to wound 
or kill individual warriors, but that simply to attempt to disperse them 
would produce no great benefit. Therefore, if the Indians occupy a po- 
sition which we desire to occupy ourselves, we must certainly attack and 
drive them; but, under other circumstances, whatever method offers the 
greatest facilities of wounding or killing them, is the best method of fight- 
ing them. The position General Gaines occupied at Camp Izard, at the 
period mentioned, was one that he was desirous of maintaining, and I 
therefore think that he was likely to do more injury to the Indians in re- 
pulsing their advance on his position, than he would do in quitting it to fol- 
low them through the woods. It is impossible for a soldier on foot, in that 
country, to overtake an Indian. The Indian could, at the first attack, with- 
draw himself from the fire, and the position of the hammocks in the neigh- 
borhood offered them a retreat, in which they could hide themselves imme- 
diately. I believe that, as in attacks on positions, fortified or not, the loss is 
always greater on the attacking party than in any other kind of combat; where 
the object is to destroy the life of the enemy, that species of combat offers 
more advantages than any other. The battle of New Orleans, the attack 
on Sandusky, and, in fact, all the attacks which were repelled during the 
last war, are evidences of this. On the 29th of February, when, I think, 
the largest body of the Indians appeared, I think it likely that fewer of 
our men would have suffered if we had made a sortie, but far fewer of 
the enemy would have fallen. The defences that were afterwards made 
of the camp were hardly then begun, and especially the whole interior 
of the camp was entirely exposed. General Gaines himself, who was sit- 
ting near the centre of the camp, received a wound in his mouth. I, 
therefore, think that, under all the circumstances, there was a greater 
injury indicted on the enemy, as they approached the camp through the 
open ground around it, than if the troops had gone out and followed them 
through the woods. I would remark, however, that the whole of the 



611 [ 224 ] 

troops were not in the camp — two companies of the Louisiana regiment 
were posted clown on the river, and a part of them were drawn in after- 
wards to cover a part of the line. 

" Question by General Gaines to Colonel Tiviggs. What was your 
opinion of the sincerity of the Indians in their proposition for peace 
at Camp Izard, the 6th of March last; and please state what motive, if 
any, the Indians could have had for treachery — and, finally, have you heard 
any observations on the subject from Indian countrymen or other persons 
acquainted with the Indian character, calculated to strengthen or destroy 
your opinion ? 

" Answer. The first night (the night of the 5th) when the Indians came 
and hailed the camp, I did not believe them sincere, or that they had any 
intention of coming in at all. The next morning I went to General 
Gaines and told him ' whenever you show me men coming from the moon 
I will believe the Indians are coming in.' Before we separated, some 
person standing near spoke and said, ' here the Indians come.' In a short 
time, having halted some distance from the breast-work, one or two of 
them came forward with a white flag — one of the volunteer officers (I 
think Adjutant Barrow) went out and met them. When I saw them con- 
versing with Mr. Barrow I then changed my opinion, and believed they 
were in earnest. I have thought a good deal on the subject, and I could 
think of no motive for their being otherwise than sincere. I judged they 
were sincere from what I had seen of the upper part of the Creek nation 
on previous occasions. It was at the Hickory-ground, with General Jack- 
son, I think in 1814, after the first Indian came in there, I never heard 
of another act of hostility on the part of the nation towards the whites. 
The next occasion was on the Seminole campaign with General Jackson. 
I know that, after the first Indian came in, there was no act of hostility — 
I know this, for I was left in the country. 1 had a conversation with 
Colonel Dill, at Jacksonville, who has been a long time in that country. 
After detailing the circumstances to him as they happened at Fort Izard, 
he said he had not a doubt but that they were sincere in their wish for 
peace; so much so that he advised the people to go back again on the 
plantations — (on the road from Micanopy to Fort Drane.) 

" Question by General Gaines to General Smith. What is the opinion 
of General Smith upon the motives of the Indians in seeking an inter- 
view, and expressing a desire for peace at the Withlacoochee ? And state 
how far the Indians manifested a desire for peace by their conduct pre- 
vious to the hostile movement of the troops from Fort Drane the 26th of 
March, under the orders of General Scott. 

" Answer. I think I feel assured that the Indians were perfectly sincere 
in seeking a peace. I do not know on what terms they may have wished 
it, but I believe they desired a peace. A great many reasons operate on 
my mind to produce this conviction — the first was, that, on the night of 
the 29th, after the Indians had retired across the river, I heard someone, 
a peculiar voice, the tone of which I judged to be Powell's, making an 
address to his followers, apparently. The friendly Indians and their inter- 
preter lay close by me. I called to them, through the interpreter, and de- 
sired the Indians to listen and try if they could catch any of the expres- 
sions. When the speech was done, the Indians said to me, through the 
40 



[ 224 ] G12 

interpreter, that it was an address of the chief, intended to encourage them ; 
that he told them that no matter if they had suffered on oui side of the 
river, that when we attempted to cross they would then have the advan- 
tage ; and he suggested to me that it was apparent from that, that a portion 
of the Indians were dissatisfied ; that the Indians did not appear the next 
day, nor until the evening of the second day, when a few shots were fired 
out of one of the hammocks on the river, nor did there ever seem to be 
one-fourth of the number of Indians on our side of the river that appeared 
on the 20th. On the evening when the first offer to treat was made, a 
voice of a negro hailed the camp in English ; he called out that the Indians 
were tired of fighting, and desired to come in and make friends. He was 
answered, by direction of General Gaines, that if the chiefs sent in a flag 
the next day it would be respected. They held a talk the next day with 
the officer sent by General Gaines, precisely as they were directed to do. 
From all these circumstances it suggested itself to me that there was a 
large portion of the Indians who were averse to continuing the war, so 
large that the hostile party was obliged to conform to their desires; that 
they had nothing to gain under any view of the subject by delay; that 
they were then as well prepared to carry on the war, and better than they 
would be at any subsequent period ; whereas they must have expected 
that the whites would increase in force every day; that if the object was 
to gain time in order to escape, that they could always have done that, as 
they could always out-march us, and that in fact, they did not make use 
of it for that purpose, for Primus, who was sent to them afterwards, must 
have found them in the upper part of the cove or in the Wahoo swamp. 
From the time the Indians held a talk with General Gaines, there was not 
the slightest hostile movement on their part ; and our men were fishing 
and bathing in the river evciy day by hundreds while we staid there, 
and as there was a thick swamp on the other side in the vicinity were they 
were bathing, the Indians might at any moment have shot down two bun- 
dled men with perfect security to themselves. We encamped about four 
to five miles from Fort Drane, between Fort Drane and the Withlacoo- 
chee, and small parties were constantly passing, and often single individ- 
uals, between the different encampments and Fort Drane, and were scat- 
tered over the whole woods for ten miles round, and I never heard of a 
sign of an Indian. The first that was heard of or met with after this period, 
was on the evening of the day General Scott commenced his march to the 
Withlacoochee, when a wagoner, belonging to the General's train and 
who was left behind in the road, was shot by tiie Indians. * 

" Question by the Court to Captain Hitchcock. Do you believe the 
Indians were sincere in proposing a truce? 

" Answer. I believe they were perfectly sincere. I will remark, in 
reference to this question, that there was nothing in the manner or matter 
of the interview which I had with the Indians on the Withlacoochee to 
give me the smallest suspicion of their sincerity. There seemed to be a 
peculiar sadness over them, as if thoughtful of the misfortunes of their tribe, 

• Note by Major General Gaines. — It neems evident from the testimony of General Smith 
that (i meral Scotl hints :lf confided i-i the sin ;erity of the Indians in suing for p 
much as he suffered these small pa tie to pass and repass round about Fort Drane for several 
miles wilhi lit :i ;;< 

E. P. GAINES. 



6 13 [ 221 ] 

indicating that further hostility on their part was hopeless. I thought 
them sincere, and in that opinion all who were present entirely concurred 
with me, and I am the more inclined to continue in that belief from sev- 
eral considerations. Although wars among Indian tribes are sometimes of 
very long duration, it is seldom that active warlike movements among 
them continue for any great length of time. With tribes at war, there 
may be years of cessation of the war, and when a war-party, as it is called, 
is got up, with considerable formality, with a feast and war-dance, and the 
party will make what they call a strike at the enemy — return from the 
expedition and celebrate their success, if successful, with the scalp-dance; 
but this kind of war cannot be carried on against the whites. To carry 
on war against the whites the Indians are compelled to imbody themselves 
in large numbers, making it difficult for them to obtain supplies of ammu- 
nition, provisions, or clothing. In Florida, the enemy had, 1 believe, been 
so imbodied for some length of time ; they had had, I believe, some spe- 
cial causes for the war which had in part been removed, especially by the 
conduct of Oceola, near Fort King, and I believe his language to me in 
council, that ' he was satisfied,' had reference to that conduct. I have 
heard of other similar instances. The Indians had been successful in the 
destruction of Major Dade's command, and they had killed many more 
than they had lost. General Gaines having taken a position in their neigh- 
borhood, which they had found it impossible to move, they must have seen 
that they could not in future have procured from above the supply of 
provisions, consisting of cattle, which they had before drawn from thence. 
The opinion among them that this position was likely to be permanently 
held, was calculated to break down their spirits. I have never doubted 
that the Indians were informed of the movement of General Clinch from 
Fort Drane on the 5th March. I believe that the Indians, in the knowl- 
edge of this, saw additional reason to suppose that thoy could not main- 
tain themselves in the country, and that, taking council on the evening of 
the 5th, they had concluded to make overtures of peace ; and 1 have al- 
ways believed they would have accepted terms such as would have been 
worthy of this great nation to dictate to them, had there been authority 
there to conclude a peace. There was not, in the council I held with the 
Indians, anything said about the terms of peace ; they made no proposition 
to settle limits; they asked for nothing — stipulated for nothing beyond 
what I have stated in my testimony. They were told by me that they 
should be sent for to council, but that, in the mean time, they must abstain 
from war, and promise to attend the council when sent for. They engaged 
to all that freely, and with apparent alacrity. During the time that the 
troops remained at Fort Drane after that — to wit, from the 11th to 26th 
March, as I have understood, and believe, there was no sign of any hos- 
tility of the Indians in that part of the country ; they had abundant op- 
portunities to annoy the troops at that post, which were scattered over an 
extent of country of several miles in diameter, accommodating themselves 
with wood and water. Even before I left there, and as I have heard af- 
terwards, the officers and men were passing at pleasure between the sev- 
eral corps of the army thus dispersed, and provisions were sent to these 
several corps without once being disturbed. General Gaines and his staff, 
a party of four, during that time, travelled from Fort Drane to Tallahassee 
through a country that had been before and was afterwards in possession 



[ 224 J 614 

of the Indians, without molestation and without suspicion of danger so far 
as I know. I have always believed that the Indians had a right to suppose 
that no further hostile demonstrations would be made against them until 
they should have been sent for and heard in council. When the hostile 
movements took place from Fort Drane, about the 26th March, the rear was 
fired upon by the Indians, and I have understood a baggage-wagon or 
perhaps two, cut off. I have regarded this as an evidence that the Indians 
were fully informed of the exposed condition of the several corps around 
Fort Drane, but that so long as they could hope to be sent for to council 
they abstained from annoying those troops in compliance with their en- 
gagement on the Withlacoochee river." 

Some days after giving the above testimony, Captain Hitchcock pre- 
sented himself before the Court and asked permision to add to his testi- 
mony the following, as continuation of his answer to the 15th question by 
the Court. (The 16th question is that to which the above is an answer.) 

" Captain Hitchcock in reference to the \bth question by the Court. 
I will state to the Court that yesterday, on referring to some official docu- 
ments from Tampa bay, I saw it stated that General Gaines had an escort 
from Fort Drane to Tallahassee ; that statement is not correct, but I pre- 
sume it was founded upon this : that Major McLemore was about to pro- 
ceed from Fort Drane, in the direction of Tallahassee, with a mounted 
troop ; that he tendered to General Gaines, unsolicited, as I believe on 
the part of General Gaines, a small detachment of his troop as an escort. 
This detachment remained a day or perhaps a day and a half, and com- 
menced its march as an escort to General Gaines, but General Gaines, 
after the first day's ride, dismissed the escort — halting himself, permitting 
the escort to leave him, and moved on afterwards without it. I did not 
refer to this in my testimony, because the escort was entirely unsolicted, 
I believe not even desired. Major McLemore's troop was returning to 
their homes at the time — they were not detached as an escort. * 

" Question by General Gaines to Colonel Twiggs. Colonel Twiggs is 
requested to state whether he met a wagon-train, about the middle of 
March last, between Fort Drane and Black creek, and if so, whether the 
wagons were or were not accompanied with a guard ? 

" Answer. I left Micanopy, ten miles on this side of Fort Drane, on the 
19th of March last. On that day I met the wagon-train with provisions, 
about twenty miles from Black creek. I inquired of the person having 
charge of the wagon-train (called the wagon-master) where the escort 
was ? he said he had none, and I did not see any guard with it at all. f 

" Question by General Gaines to Colonel Twiggs. Be pleased to state 
whether the Louisiana volunteers were or were not ready or willing to 

* Note by Major General Gaines. — I desired no escort. The discharged men, or those per- 
mitted to go to Middle Florida, here referred to, travelled with ine the principal part of the 
first day's journey, the I4th March, and until breakfast time, about 9 A. M., on the morning 
of the Utii March, when 1 halted and desired them to go on without me. They never trav- 
elled with me another mile. 

E. P. GAINES. 

f Note by E. P. Gaines. — By 'his testimony it is obvious that General Scott confided in 
the sincerity of the enemy in their hav'n g l> • n subdued, and in their having sued fur peace. 
Otherwise, lie certianly would not have suffered the baggage-train to have passed and re- 
i assed so near (he enemy v-ithout a geard. 
' E. P. GAINES. 



615 [ 224 ] 

march at any time after the middle of March, 1836. And what were your 
reasons for the opinion which you entertain in this case ? 

" Answer. I have no doubt but the Louisiana volunteers, had they been 
ordered, would have marched the next day after their arrival from the 
Withlacoochce near to Fort Drane. I had a conversation with General 
Smith on this subject, and his opinion and mine coincided, that both our 
commands, the regulars and volunteers, were ready to march, and that 
we should not ask to detain the army on their account. * 

" Question by General Gaines to General Smith. General Smith is re- 
quested to state in what manner the movement of General Gaines affect- 
ed the movements of General Scott in Florida ? 

" Answer. My impression has always been, that every effort that Gen- 
eral Scott could make to advance his movement was made by him ; but 
such were the difficulties in obtaining the means of transportation, that I 
do not think he could have been able to commence his movement earlier 
than he did ; that therefore no operation of General Gaines delayed Gen- 
eral Scott's movements, and that General Scott would not have been 
ready sooner or later whether General Gaines was there or not. General 
Gaines brought from New Orleans with him some means of transportation. 
He added to General Scott's forces at Fort Drane about 1,000 effective 
men. He had acquired some knowledge of the country around the With- 
lacoochee. His position on the Withlacoochce had restrained the Indians 
during the time General Scott was occupied in transporting provisions to 
Fort Drane ; and that therefore, in these respects, General Gaines's 
movement was of great advantage to the movements of General Scott. 
I might add, that, after all, the means of transportation were not sufficient 
to allow General S. to operate along the North Withlacooeb.ee, and that 
therefore he was not able to derive all those advantages which he other- 
wise would have derived. 

" Question by the Court to Captain Hitchcock. Were there any sorties 
made from the fort upon the enemy on any one of the attacks made by 
him whilst the army lay there ; and what was the strength of the army 
at the time? 

" Answer. The army Avas about 1,000 strong — a few over, perhaps — 
and no sortie was made. It may be proper to add to this answer, that 
one wing of each of the several bodies occupying the faces of the square, 
had been ordered by General Gaines to be held in readiness for a sortie, 
should he think proper to order one. This order was given on the after- 
noon of the 29th February. 

" Question by the Court. Was the army on the Withlacoochee under 
General Gaines strong enough, and well enough appointed, to have at- 
tacked the enemy with a prospect of success ? 

" Answer. In my opinion the army could have beaten the enemy at that 
place, and driven him at any time ; but there were not means for pur- 
suing him with any effect. 

" Question by the Court. Do you think that Major General Gaines had 
it in his power at any time, with the means in his hands, and the appoint- 

*Note by Major General Gaines. — A>.d >et, notwithstanding t'.is fact must li^ve been 
known to Major General Scott, lie persisted in saying ttiat Ins c!e!.iy was necessary to enable 
these troops to test and refresh themselves. 

E. P. GAINES. 



[ 221 J GIG 

raent of his forces, to have inarched upon the enemy and suhdued him, 
had the enemy availed himself of the fastnesses of the country well 
know n to him ? 

" Answer. I believe they would have escaped any pursuit he might 
have made with his force. With regard to the effect of a sortie, it is a 
problem which perhaps any one may form an opinion, from a consider- 
ation of the facts which 1 will state. The Indians appeared to have a 
great facility in crossing the river ; the banks of the river, above and be- 
low our camp, were lined with a dense swamp. Had a sortie been made, 
the Indians would have rushed into this swamp on one side or the other, 
and, by their know ledge of the best passages through it, and their facility 
in crossing the river, would, in all probability, have eluded any pursuit 
that could have been made from our camp. In the event of a sortie there 
would, in all probability, have been a loss on both sides; but, it is my 
impression, without producing any beneficial results. The Indians were 
expending their ammunition, while our fire was reserved, and we were 
daily in the expectation of force from Fort Diane, especially of mounted 
men, a species of force of which we had none. 

" Question by the Court. While you were in the fortified camp on the 
Withlacoochee, was there any preparation made for a sortie by order of 
General Gaines ? if so, state the force or corps, and the officer appointed 
to the command of the troops ordered for that purpose. 

i ncer. The troops in the camp were disposed in the form of a square ; 
the order was, for one wing of each face of the square to be held in 
readiness for a sortie, directions being given for the other wing to ex- 
tend. Colonel Foster would have been one of the officers on the right; 
I believe General Smith himself would have commanded the sortie on 
the left. I am not able at this time to give the names of the other offi- 
cers. The order was given on the 29th February, in the afternoon, com- 
municated by myself to Colonel Twiggs, commanding the light brigade. 
.V previous order on the subject had, I believe, been communicated by 
some other officer. It is my opinion that, had the attack been renewed 
in character like that of the morning of the 29th, a sortie would have 
been made : but, after that attack, there was no serious attack made 
while we were on the Withlacoochee. There were but small paities 
iged from time to time, in endeavors to annoy us. This circumstance 
was itself a source of alarm, lest the Indians had abandoned that part of 
the country to the disappointment of the hopes of General Scott, ex- 
pressed in a letter to General Clinch, and which had been seen at Fort 
King. The first order for the preparations for a sortie was, I believe, 
given, not through myself, but through some other officer. Colonel Fos- 
came to me and made a suggestion as to mere detail, desiring me to 
communicate it to General Gaines. I did so, and received his orders 
thereon, which were communicated as above stated. General Gaines, on 
several occasions, spoke of the probability of an arrival of troops other 
than those expected from Fort Drane, especially speaking of Colonel 
Lindsay, who was supposed to have arrived at Tampa bay, and declared 
it to be his purpose instantly to move in any direction from which reports 
of firing might be heard. Log canoes were constructed, and were then 
in the camp, with rived boards to be used for purposes of making plat- 



hal 



617 f 224 

forms on the canoes, to cross the river ; the General saying that he would 
cross the river instantly on healing a gun from the other side. 

" Question by General Gaines. The witness is requested to describe 
the hammocks near my encampment en the Withlacoochee, and stat the 
time at which that encampment was fortified. 

" Answer. The hammocks bordering the river very nearly united, im- 
mediately in front of the camp; from this point, both above and below, 
they gained very rapidly in width, and were extremely dense, especially 
to the east or above the camp, where the hammock extends considerably 
back from the stream, but at a distance of several hundred yards from 
the camp. The river itself has not the bend as represented in the map 
I hold, (marked,) the curve being much larger. A light breastwork was 
made around the camp on the afternoon of the 28th of February, accord- 
ing to custom. 

" Question by the Court to Captain McCalL No sortie was made on 
the enemy at the several attacks made on the camp. What were the 
reasons which withheld or prevented such a movement on the part o( 
General Gaines ? 

li Answer. He did not explain to me particularly his reasons, but my 
impression was that it would not have resulted in any important advan- 
tage. 

" Question by the Court. Did no officer during the siege urge the pro- 
priety of making a sortie ? 

11 Answer. 1 did not myself hear any officer, and my impression at ihe 
time was that there was no officer there who differed with the Genera! 
on that point. 

" Question by the Court to Captain McCall. What is your opinion oi' 
the ability of the forces under General Gaines io drive and beat the 
enemy, if a sortie had been made : 

' ; Answer. I have not the smallest doubt that they would have been 
able to do it, but from the nature oi' the ground ; the hammocks which 
bordered the river being thick and extremely difficult oi a - 'he 
troops, would have enabled the Indians lying concealed to deliver their 
fire, and then, owing to their superior celerity and knowledge oi ihe 
ground, to have passed through the hair-mock and crossed the river be- 
fore the troops could have come up with them — their facilities for cross- 
ing the river being great, and the troops without the means of following 
them. 

" Question by General Gaines. What part oi the force was out oi the 
limits of my breastwork, during the action of the 29th oi February : and 
state whether one or two companies were not often engaged in tiring at 
the enemy across the river, prior to the bth March ? 

" Answer. There was one company out oi the Hunts oi the breastwork 
on the 29th February. Several companies were engaged in tiring at the 
enemy across ihe river, prior to the 6th March. 

" Question b]/ General Gaines. Was it General Gaines's intention to 
make a sortie, in the event of his hearing General Clinch's or Colonel 
Lindsay's guns ? 

" Answer. General Gaines remarked several times while lying at Camp 
Izard, that be should not be surprised at hearing Colonel Lindsay's guns 






[ 224 ] 618 

on the other side ; and in that event he would cross immediately and 
march to his aid ; or should the Indians engage Clinch on his advance, 
he would immediately march out and support him." 

31 r. President, and gentlemen of the Court : In desiring your attention 
to the evidence which I have adduced to disprove the accusations against 
me, it becomes my duty expressly to protest against that mass of papers 
which have been referred to as documentary evidence, consisting of the 
ial reports, letters, and orders, of Major General Scott. This mon- 
strous mass of words, recklessly jumbled together, no matter by ivhom 
they have been endorsed, embraces not a word of legal evidence which 
the Court can, upon their oath, bring to bear against me, or against any 
man in existence save and except the fabricator of those reports, orders, 
and letters. That it is your duty to bring them to bear against him is 
obvious ; but against me they can have no legal bearing whatever : not 
merely because they are palpably untrue, but also because they constitute 
nothing of the character of legal evidence as against any other than the 
writer of such reports, letters, or orders. 

" Truth is the basis of all excellence." And I have shown — I have 
demonstrated by the testimony of officers of the first character and stand- 
ing in the army, and Louisiana volunteers, that General Scott's state- 
ments in reference to me and my movements are in many respects false 
and malicious. Look for example at what he has said in his letter of 
the 14th March, in which he endeavors to show the necessity of my 
having made a sortie, and to disprove the facts stated in my " Order No. 7," 
of the 9th of March, that I had beaten the enemy and forced them to sue 
for peace. Sir, what is there in this letter that can possibly be found to 
embrace any of the elements of legal testimony against me ? Let us sup- 
pose, for the sake of illustration, (what the testimony of General Smith, 
Colonel Twiggs, Captain Hitchcock, Captain McCall, Lieutenant Mitch- 
ell, Mr. Potter, and other witnesses, will go far to disprove,) that General 
Scott was truly and sincerely of the opinion that his statements contained 
in that sortie-letter were correct: then, sir, by what authority can the 
Court employ against me the mere opinion of Major General Scott? 

Even if he had ever won a battle at the head of a division, or in the 
command of an army, or any other force, beyond the immediate authority 
of his senior and superior officer — an honor which he never enjoyed — 
he would not, in the event of his having achieved such an honor, have 
been able to give to his reports, letters, or orders, any of the essential 
properties of evidence against any man but himself: but he never achieved 
any thing in battle at the head of a division or other independent force. 

The opinions of experienced men are often very properly received by 
courts, both civil and military, in order to elucidate facts based upon le- 
gal evidence ; but the opinions of interested witnesses are of no validity 
otherwise than as against themselves. Need I tell the Court, what Gen- 
eral Scott has so fully demonstrated, that he is so much altogether an in- 
rerested witness in the case before you — the case of the United States^ 
regarding the causes of the failure of certain campaigns against the Sem- 
inole Indians in 1836 — that nothing but my arrest, trial, and condemna- 
tion can possibly save that officer from being found guilty of high mili- 
tary offences. 



619 [ 224 J 

The testimony of the officers last above named, that, notwithstanding 
General Scott's extraordinary letter of the 14th of March, in which he 
endeavors to prove that the Indians ivere not subdued and that they did 
not sue for peace, or that if they did sue for peace, they were not sincere, 
most clearly proves that General Scott himself, at the moment of writing 
that letter, and for twelve days after that time, did in fact confide in the 
truth and sincerity of the Indians, as the testimony w T ill demonstrate, in- 
asmuch as he suffered wagons, small parties, and individuals to pass and 
repass to and from the several encampments, from five to six miles round 
about Fort Drane, without a guard ; although that section of the Florida 
frontier was within twelve hours' march of the Withlacoochee, where the 
principal force of the Seminole Indians was known to be encamped. 

Besides the general evil inherent in all statements made in opposition 
to truth, there are peculiar evils in the representations of General Scott, 
arising out of the official sanction given to them by his signature, as the 
General specially authorized to command in the field, and also out of 
opinions founded upon them by the Executive head of these United States. 

It has been suggested to me that the President of the United States, 
forming his opinions upon the official representations of General Scott, 
has expressed sentiments unfavorable to my conduct on the Withlacoo- 
chee. The fact of my going to Florida, in the execution of my duty, 
could not easily be misrepresented, and though arguments have been 
sought and pressed into the question to impugn my motives, they have 
failed to produce the effect intended, and my movement to Florida, un- 
der the extraordinary and peculiar circumstances of the case, has not in 
any manner been censured by that high public functionary ; but my con- 
duct, while in the country of the enemy, was less visible, comprised a large 
mass of facts, was pursued at a distance from all direct communication 
with Washington ; and while I was in the heart of the country occupied 
by the enemy, in hearing of their war-hoop and rifle on the Withlacoo- 
chee, General Scott was snugly posted at the little quiet place called 
Picolata, within eighteen miles of the city of St. Augustine, making free 
use of his facilities for communicating with the Government, and writing 
the letters which I have deemed it proper to designate his starving-let- 
ters of the 1st and 4th of March ; and then from the little steamer, the Es- 
sayons, on his way from Picolata, his rescue-letter of the 9th of March ; 
and afterwards from Fort Drane, his sortie-letter of the 14th of March — 
all which were received with unsuspecting confidence at Washington, 
and upon which, false and slanderous as they were, my conduct was 
viewed by the Chief Magistrate with disapprobation. I look with con- 
fidence to the developments made before this Court for enabling the 
President to do me justice, and relieve me before the army and my coun- 
try from the odium which the publication by the War Department of 
these official slanders, and the suppression of all my correspondence upon 
the subject, reported for the information of that Department, was calcu- 
lated to produce. 

General Scott has said he is not my prosecutor nor my accuser ; and 
yet, without the slightest pretension of self-defence, he has deliberately 
fabricated or endorsed the most calumnious accusations, which he only has 
not prosecuted, because an investigation, as he knew full well, would in- 
evitably throw back upon himself the shafts poisoned by his own venom. 



\ £24 J G20 

Among the duties assigned to this Court, it is required to investigate 
all subjects connected with the campaigns in Florida, and I now there- 
fore solemnly call upon the Court to take that notice of the remarkable 
letters of General Scott, of the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 14th of March, which 
their extraordinary contents deserve. 

Thanks to the Almighty, I have lived to enjoy the privilege guaran- 
tied to every citizen and soldier of the republic, to vindicate my conduct, 
and to expose and demolish the weak and nefarious schemes contrived 
by my accuser, while in the use and abuse of a little brief authority, for 
my destruction ; and thanks to the high public functionaries of our be- 
loved country, for affording this privilege while I am yet in the land of 
the living, and in time to save my children and my military and volun- 
teer friends, the deep affliction, and the abiding mortification, of finding, 
when I shall be no more, the uncorrected accusations which you have 
received from the Department of War, and which now lie before you. 

That it was the duty of the head of that Department, as an act of natural 
equity and justice prescribed bylaw, (see the 77th and 79th Articles of 
War,) to have acted upon and notified me of these accusations the mo- 
ment they were received by him, and to have assembled, as soon there- 
after as the state of the service would permit, the proper tribunal for their 
investigation, there can be no ground to doubt. The omission of this ob- 
vious duty, and the placing me upon a most "delicate and important 
command," wherein I was honored with the Secretary's notification that 
the President of the United States had been pleased to approve my views 
and measures, ought, perhaps, to be considered as the strongest assu- 
rance that could be given me, of unshaken confidence in my fidelity and 
honor, and, on the other hand, of the little reliance placed in my accuser. 
Perhaps too, the honorable the Secretary of War was apprized, as I have 
been long apprized, of the fact that my accuser, never having learned 
how to govern himself, would, in due time, if allowed much latitude, de- 
feat himself, in his overheated zeal to destroy me ; for there is no prin- 
ciple in moral philosophy, natural law, or military science, better estab- 
lished, than that the officer who has not learned how to command him- 
self is wholly unqualified to command freemen, or American soldiers, 
volunteers or regulars, and will sooner or later, in his unbridled efforts to 
destroy his imagined rivals, destroy himself. 

My accuser charges me with the crime of having contributed to pre- 
vent or retard the forwarding of subsistence and other supplies required 
in East Florida. This charge is disproved by the testimony of Captain 
Morrison, the late assistant commissary for the post of New Orleans, re- 
cently examined by this Court. That officer testifies that, on my return 
from Florida to New Orleans, I directed him to forward promptly all the 
supplies that had been or might be required in Florida. The Captain's 
testimony upon this point is in the following words : 

" Question by General Gaines to Captain Morrison. General Scott 
having endeavored to show that a report of the war being ended caused a de- 
tention in New Orleans of supplies called for by requisitions for Florida, 
the witness is desired to state whether he was commissary in New Orleans 
from January to April, 1836, inclusive ; whether any such detention took 
place with regard to commissary supplies ; whether he had an opportunity 



iuai 



621 [ 224 ] 

of judging whether quartermasters stores were detained, and whether 
they were so detained ; and is requested to state whether he understood 
from the quartermaster, whether he would or would not feel authorized 
to detain supplies under the supposed circumstances of there being a re- 
port like that in question ? And the witness will also please state what 
rations returned to New Orleans with the Louisiana volunteers from 
Tampa bay ; whether a part was in bulk and by him issued to the volun- 
teers ; and whether he made any remarks to Captain Thistle on the sub- 
ject of the bacon so returned, and what remarks he made. 

" Answer. I was assistant commissary at New Orleans from January to 
April, and had been for ten years as such. No detention took place in the 
furnishing of supplies ; every exertion was used to procure hard bread 
and bacon, as required by General Scott. The bread and bacon could 
not be procured in sufficient quantities ; the other part of the ration, con- 
sisting of pork and flour, was delivered to the quartermaster to make up 
the deficiencies. A duty which I owe to Major Clark, as he is not present, 
compels me to state that every exertion was made on his part to furnish 
supplies and transportation ; we both felt a deep interest that nothing 
should be wanted. From the 7th to the lGth May, when the regiment of 
Louisiana volunteers returned to New Orleans from Florida, there was 
720 pounds of bacon, 2,160 pounds of bread, surplus rations, which were 
sent to the commissary store at New Orleans, besides other rations in 
proportion. Captain Thistle came to me somewhere between 10th and 
16th May, with a return for back-rations: in offering Captain Thistle 
his choice of pork, bacon, flour, or hard bread, J observed that I re- 
gretted that the hard bread and bacon had come back after the difficulty 
I had in sending it to Florida. As to Captain Thistle's asking me why 
I did not send the bacon and hard bread I have no recollection of his 
having made such an observation to me, nor do I believe he did. No 
observation was made by me to Captain Thistle, that the Florida war 
was closed. [The witness here presented to the Court papers Nos. 
39, 40, (see documents,) as evidence that he had discharged his duties 
promptly and to the satisfaction of his department.] 

" Questionby General Gaines. What conversation had the witness with 
General Gaines, in New Orleans, in April, on the subject of sending 
supplies to Florida, and what did General Gaines urge ? 

" Answer. About the beginning of April I had understood that General 
Gaines had arrived in New Orleans, and was on my way to pay my re- 
spects to him, when I met Major Clark, who requested me to get a re- 
quisition from General Gaines, which he had left with the General the 
previous evening or the same morning. I found General Gaines at his 
quarters ; he was unwell ; and, after a little conversation, I asked him 
for the requisition left by Major Clark ; he handed it to me, and ob- 
served, very impressively, " furnish every thing which you are ordered to 
furnish." Commodore Dallas, of the navy, came in, and I withdrew. I 
did not ask General Gaines about the furnishing the supplies. His re- 
marks were applied both to Major Clark and myself. [The witness 
produced paper No. 41, to show the quantity of certain supplies at 
Tampa bay on the 31st March, 1836.]" 

Upon this point, Major Clark, assistant quartermaster at New Orleans, 
with a promptness which does his heart and his sense of justice great 



[ 224 ' 622 

honor, distinctly asserts, in an official letter to the Quartermaster Gene- 
ral's office, written long before this Court was ordered, and without my 
solicitation or knowledge, that 1 directed him, on my return to New Or- 
leans, in the latter end of March, to forward promptly to Florida all the 
supplies that had been or might be required from his department. The 
Court is particularly desired to examine the testimony of these two offi- 
cers, Major Clark and Captain Morrison — compare their statements with 
the vague allegations upon which my accuser relies, and mark how com- 
pletely the plain simple statements of these most exemplary officers of 
the general staff disproves the hearsay stories upon which the charge of 
my accuser is based. By the testimony of these officers it will be seen 
that their efforts were unremitting to obtain and forward promptly every 
supply required. They were well aware of the probability that the war 
in Florida would be renewed. But even had it been otherwise — had 
they received official notice that a treaty of peace had been concluded, 
they understood their duty too well to relax in their efforts to forward 
supplies ; as they well knew that troops must have their rations, and 
public horses their forage, in peace as well as in war ; besides, they 
knew that a treaty of peace would create an additional call for subsist- 
ence, .inasmuch as it would impose on the United States the task of 
feeding some thousands of half-starved Indians of both sexes and all 
ages. 

Major Clark had been on duty in East Florida for several years sub- 
sequent to the year 1820; had superintended the construction of the 
military road from Fort Brooke to Fort King; had made himself well 
acquainted with the Indians, and with the topography of a considerable 
portion of the country they then occupied. My letter to the Adjutant 
General, under date the 15th of January, 1836, now before the Court, 
contains Major Clark's estimate of the number of the Indians and blacks, 
which he deemed to be over 2,000 warriors. His statement in refer- 
rence to the accusation in question is as follows: 

" Assistant Quartermaster's Office, 

" New Orleans, August 16, 1836. 

" Sir : I have this day seen a publication in the National Intelligencer, 
of the 27th July, taken from the New York Star, on the subject of the 
campaign in East Florida. The writer, in speaking of the arrival of the 
army at Tampa bay, says, ' we there learned that the quartermaster at 
New Orleans, influenced by the representations made or caused (as it 
w r as said) to be made by General Gaines, that the war was closed, had 
abstained from sending on provisions he had been ordered to forward 
from that place.' The whole of this part of his statement is incorrect. 
When or how he obtained this infonnation 1 know not. General Gaines, 
on his return to New Orleans, told me to continue to send supplies, which 
was done promptly. Every exertion was made, both by myself and the 
assistant commissary, to obtain and forward the subsistence and forage re- 
quired. There was great difficulty in obtaining hard bread, and every 
barrel that could be had was immediately shipped. 

" On the 31st of March, the assistant commissary at Fort Brooke for- 
warded a statement to the assistant commissary at New Orleans, of the 



623 [ 224 

supplies on hand — 216,750 rations of meat, 304,423 rations of bread and 
flour, and the small rations in proportion ; at this time there were two 
vessels on the way, laden with subsistence and forage, and the bills of 
lading show that they were received on the 6th of April in good condi- 
tion. Now, it appears the army arrived at Tampa bay the 3d, 4th, and 
5th April, and remained but a few days, before they took their depart- 
ure, and I cannot conceive where was the scarcity of provisions, unless 
it was in the hard bread ; this was unavoidable, for it could not be ob- 
tained ; that is, the quantity required. 

" My object in making this statement is to correct the error that Gene- 
ral Gaines had, in any way, contributed to the withholding supplies from 
the army in Florida; also, to show that there was no cessation on the 
part of the commissary or myself, in procuring and forwarding the sup- 
plies at the earliest period possible. The proofs of this are contained in 
my list of shipments now at Washington. 

" I have the honor to be, sir, 

" With high respect, 

" Your obedient servant, 

"J. CLARK, 
" Assistant Quartermaster. 
"To Maj. T. Cross, 

" AcVg Q. M. Gen., Washington." 

General Scott has urged, as among the causes of the failure of his 
campaign, the necessity of replacing the subsistence drawn from Fort 
Drane by General Gaines, and of providing for a larger force than was 
expected there ; and has desired the Court to remember who took from 
Tampa bay the means of transportation which were there early in Feb- 
ruary, and what prevented the arrival of new means from New Orleans. 

I remark, that the subsistence drawn by me from Fort Drane previous 
to the arrival of General Scott, was something less than 12,000 rations. 
By General Scott's letter of the 9th March, to the Adjutant General, it 
will be seen that the ordinary baggage-train of General Clinch conveyed 
in one single trip from Picolata to Fort Drane 17,497 rations of bread 
and flour, and 11,000 rations of pork, besides a quantity of beans, coffee, 
&c. The Court will perceive that, with the beef-cattle at Fort Drane 
(of which the principal part of the meat ration was composed) this sup- 
ply of 17,000 rations and upwards of bread and flour, nearly twice re- 
placed the whole amount of supplies drawn by my troops, and that this 
was done, not by the transportation ordered into the country, or provided 
by General Scott, but by a single expedition of the wagon-train of 
General Clinch, which had been despatched from Fort Drane and had 
arrived at Picolata on the 2d of March, the day on which my express of 
the 29th of February was received by General Scott. This wagon-train 
was detained, unnecessarily, until the 6th of Ptlarch, and was then four 
days in removing to Fort Drane, although a movement of the same ex- 
tent in the summer, the rainy season of the year, was effected some 
weeks afterwards by Colonel, then Major, Pierce, in two days' time. 
As to the necesity of providing for more force than was expected, this 
can in no manner be alleged by General Scott as an evil ; for, by his 



[ 224 ] 624 

letter of the Gth March, he admits the necessity of a part of that force 
to complete the right wing, (owing to the defection of the Georgia 
troops,) and if the force was larger than was desired, on account of sup- 
plies, he had it entirely in his power to relieve the commissariat, by de- 
taching as much to Picolata as he pleased, or dismissing the whole of it, 
if he thought necessary. But he retained the whole of it, merging it 
into the right wing, and taking it with him on his march to Tampa. 
There is a disingenuity in the allusion to my having taken the trans- 
portation from Tampa, in the argument of General Scott; for he would 
have the Court infer that it operated to the disadvantge of the move- 
ments of the right wing, whereas, whatever that transpostation was, it 
was at his own disposal, after it reached Fort Drane, and necessarily 
became a part of the transportation of the right wing ; so that, while the 
General had it entirely in his power to diminish the force ad libitum at 
Fort Drane, by discharging the surplus, he was actually in the use of all 
the transportation taken by me, not only from Tampa, but from New 
Orleans. From Tampa bay, 1 did indeed take but one single horse- 
cart, and 1 believe one horse and one mule of public property, not 
placed there by General Scott, and perhaps 8 or 10 Indian ponies. The 
principal part of my transportation was procured by myself at New 
Orleans, and General Scott not only had as much or as little of my force 
as suited his own pleasure, but he had all my transportation at Fort 
Drane. General Scott admonishes the Court to remember what pre- 
vented the arrival at Tampa of new means of transportation from New 
Orleans, alluding to the testimony of Lieutenant Morris; and here is the 
same disingenuity ; for, had the city of New Orleans itself been at Tampa 
bay at the time of the movement of the right wing, it could not have 
aided the operations of that wing in its attempts upon the cove in its 
downward march to Tampa. That this movement was necessarily and 
absolutely independent of Tampa, is too plain to require proof. But 
even if it had depended upon Tampa, all of the quartermaster's and 
commissary's stores, as seen by the letter of Major Clark, were there, 
and these were all that the Government had any control over, all that 
could have been or were ordered there, all that were at all necessary 
for the campaign. The only stores not there, even admitting the tes- 
timony of Lieutenant Morris, were some sutler's stores, mere articles 
of convenience or comfort in a permanent garrison : such as tobacco 
and herring, and sometimes cheese and bacon and crackers ; articles 
that could not have been carried on the campaign, if for no other 
reason than the want of transportation. It would have been strange in- 
deed to have thrown out of the wagons the substantial and necessary 
articles of pork and flour, and supplied their places with herring and 
tobacco. On this head, however, I have another remark, that Mr. Mor- 
ris, the writer of the letter to Lieut. Morris, in which was enclosed the 
scrap of a newspaper containing a report that the war was ended, and 
assigning this as a reason for not sending the herring and tobacco, was 
not a sutler, and w r as not in any manner bound to furnish those little 
comforts. He was a New Orleans merchant, and in the business of 
turning a penny by sutling, was an intruder, or, to use the more forcible 
language of General Scott, he was an " interloper." [Upon the subject 
of means of transportation at Tampa, see the testimony of Lieutenant 



•Ml 



(325 \ '224 ] 

Morris, by which it is obvious there was near ten times more public mean9 
of transportation brought to that place by me, and by order of Major 
Belton, for my use, than was there upon my arrival.] 

Question by General Gaines to Lieut. Morris. General Scott having 
charged that General Gaines took the public transportation from Tampa 
bay, to the disadvantage of the movement of Colonel Lindsay, the wit- 
ness is desired to state what amount of transportation was taken by 
General Gaines; also, whether it was or was not replaced by Lieutenant 
Casey ; when Lieutenant Casey arrived at Tampa; what amount of trans- 
portation he brought ; whether Colonel Lindsay had the benefit of that 
transportation, and by whose order; when and where, so far as witness 
knows or believes, Lieutenant Casey was sent for said transportation. 

"Answer. There were only four or five indifferent horses taken by 
General Gaines that belonged to the post, besides the number that was 
directed to be sent by him from New Orleans. It is proper to state that, 
there were 60 horses sent at first; but, from disease and rough weather 
at sea, 5 or 6 died, and some of the others were in a poor condition for 
service. Lieutenant Casey, the acting quartermaster at Tampa bay, had 
been sent, 1 suppose by order of the commanding officer, to Middle 
Florida, (Tallahassee, ) to procure means of transportation for General 
Gaines's army, which was expected to arrive soon. The transportation, 
6 or 8 teams complete, arrived a short time alter General Gaines's de- 
parture with his force from Tampa bay. This transportation w r as put in 
requisition by Colonel Lindsay, after he arrived there, and found the 
principal transportation of his column. To the best of my recollection 
there were 42 or 48 horses or mules, which formed the teams for the 
wagons arrived from St. Mark's. 

" Question by General Gaines. Was it known at Tampa bay, at the 
time Lieutenant Casey was sent for transportation, that any other troops 
were expected at Tampa bay than those taken there by General Gaines? 

"Answer. I knew of no other, and 1 believe it was not known there 
that Colonel Lindsay's or any other troops were expected to arrive at 
that time. 

" Question by General Gaines to Captain Drane. Please state what 
reason you had, if any, after returning with the right wing of the Florida 
army to Fort Drane, for believing that the families of the Indians were 
still in the cove, and whether any doubt remained on your mind as to 
their being there in March and April last ? 

" Answer. The night before the right wing of the army crossed the big 
Withlacoochee, returning, I was called, at 12 o'clock at night, by Major 
Cooper, who was the officer of the day, to listen to the talk of both In- 
dians and negroes, on the north bank of the big Withlacoochee. The 
next morning the army had marched but about one half mile, when 
wecrossed a trail of Indians coming out of a swamp ; passing to the south 
a little further on, about 200 or 300 yards, we discovered a trail leading 
into the swamp ; the trails were evidently fresh, and made that morning. 
The second day after crossing the little Withlacoochee on the route to 
Fort King, the army crossed several small trails, some leading to the cove 
and some to the west ; those west leading into Wahoo swamp, or that 
direction. The day following the day we marched to Fort King, our left 
flank was attacked by a small party of Indians that soon fled also in the 






224 



G26 



direction of the Wahoo swamp or Withlacoochee. On our arrival at Fort 
King, we were there informed that Billy Emathla's wife and one other 
squaw, I believe her sister, had been captured, during the absence of the 
army from Fort Drane, and taken off by the hostile Indians. Some days 
after the army arrived at Fort Drane, Billy Emathla's wife made her 
escape and returned to the right of the army to her husband. I had sev- 
eral conversations with her through the interpreter. She informed me 
that the Indians had not moved from the Wahoo swamp and the cove on 
the Withlacoochee — that their women and children were still there ; 
there, they had planted their grounds ; that the crops were very fine. 
She described the corn and rice as being about a foot high. She stated 
that, in her opinion, they would have a better crop than they ever had. 
I inquired of her if the Indians had moved their families from there at 
any time during the war. She informed me that they had not. She 
there had a coversation with Powell, who advised her to quit her hus- 
band, and join the Mickasukies, and not return back to the white people ; 
that his men had whipped all the white men, and driven them out of the 
country, and then they had gone home ; that he then meant to assemble 
his warriors and drive the pale-faces from Fort King; and then he would 
go to Fort Drane and drive them away from there, where they would 
get a large supply of ammunition, and they then would drive all the Ala- 
chuas (meaning volunteers) out of the country, as far as the Suwannee; 
and then that they would have all the country from the Suwannee, south, 
to themselves. She informed me that she had heard Powell repeatedly 
say, during the time she was in captivity, that he never would make 
peace with the white man. The above are the reasons why 1 have never 
had a doubt that the Indians had never quitted the cove or the strong 
holds on the Withlacoochee. After the army had returned to the Withla- 
coochee with General Gaines, I was sent to Oaklands, five or six miles 
northeast from Fort Drane, where I remained until General Scott 
arrived. During the time I occupied that post with my command, and a 
few days after I returned from the Withlacoochee, very frequent signs 
of Indians were discovered on the plantation of Colonel John Mcintosh, 
and crossing the main road leading to Micanopy. I had frequently seen 
fires on the opposite side of Orange lake during this period, and I felt 
satisfied they were Indian fires. 

"The Indian women spoken of in this account, were captured during 
the time the army was absent on its march from Fort Drane to Fort 
Brooke. They returned from captivity after the army arrived at Fort 
Drane from Fort Brooke. 

" Question by General Gaines to General Smith. To what extent 
was the cove swamp penetrated by General Scott in March or April, 
183G, and was the search for the Indians by him sufficient to enable him 
to pronounce upon the position of the Indians or their families ? 

" Answer. On the 30th March General Scott left all the baggage under 
the charge of Major Wilson, and a detachment at, what 1 presume, may 
be called the entrance of the cove. We marched without the baggage 
that afternoon probably about four and a half miles. Next morning we 
crossed the foot over a very deep and difficult bog which was in front of 
our encampment. The right column, which was under my command, at- 
tacked a small party of Indians that were in front, and pursued them 



lidl 



6 27 224 J 



three or four miles, to the utmost extent of the pursuit. Part of the 
column had arrived, by taking a direction on the banks of the river; the 
other part, with which I was myself, was pursuing the trail down through 
the woods to the right, when one of General Clinch's staff brought an 
order for us to return. We then tetraced our steps to where the bag- 
gage was, and the next morning took up our march round the outside ot 
the cove, and after leaving Major Cooper with his battalion towards the 
southern extremity of it, we went to Tampa bay. The farthest extent 
to which the cove was penetrated, was by the party which I commanded. 
Both the columns that entered the cove met in the cove altogether about 
120 or 130 Indians. We had lost all trace of the Indians in the cove 
before we were recalled. We were on an old path, but we had lost all 
trace of the particular party we were pursuing. 

" Question by the same to the same. What is the opinion of the witness 
as to the location of the Indian families in March and April ; and does the 
witness know whether they had or had not gone down to Pease creek? 

" Answer. I have no idea of where they were at that time. They 
could not have been on Pease creek, unless possibly at the very head of 
it, a point beyond which I went. I do not think there was any large 
body of Indians on Pease creek, as I ascended it with only 140 men, and 
the Indians would have known of our approach. We crossed two con- 
siderable trails leading to the south, but they must have been two or 
three months old.* 

*Note by Major General Gaines — General Scott lias labored very diligently to show 
that tin- Lillians removed their families and dispersed litems, hes from the cove of the Witli- 
lacoochee in M-rch, and has attributed the supposed movement tome. He formally re- 
ported his opinions to the War Department nrl the 30th of April, and has urged the same 
considerations before the Court of Inquiry, hut without introducing' am evidence upon the 
8 ibject. He has qun'ed his own letters, r.oit'ainin jr his opinion?, and asks very significantly 
how he is to account for not fin Imp, three weeks after Generil Gaines left the With. 
1 c 'ochee, any considerable body of the enemy, on any other supposition than that of their 
dispersion. 

The difricul'y is verv < asily solved, and since G' neral Scott has suggested it, in con- 
nexion with the eff'ec's of my movement, I hive thought proper to place on your record 
the testimony necessary for the purpo-^s of explanation, and the answer to the General's in- 
quiry may be embraced ir. a single sent< nee. He did not find the enemy, because he did 
not go where the enemy was to be found. The testimony of Captain Diane and L" u'enant 
Mitchell has shown thai Major General Scott penetrated 'he cove but two and a lialf miles, 
abont four miles from the ousting of the riv' r, although Captain Drane, who has been many 
years in that coiimry, and is well acquainted with it, has told yon that the cove is 15 or 20 
miles in extent It has a circumference of not less thin 40, perhaps 50 miles, and this cel- 
ebrated spot, the known and acknowledged strong hold of the t nemy, the object of all Gen- 
eral Scott's plans, ihe theme of Ins public letters and reports, was penetrated hut the short 
distance of two and a halt miles, when the pursuit was strangely abindoned, while a portion 
of the enemy was in view, and the remainder of the march was conducted in the open coun- 
try for many miles, adjacent to this celebrated hammock, to Fort Cooper, where a useless 
post was esaMished, and supplied with 17 or IS days' provisions for three or four hundred 
men, instead of penetrating the hammock with that supply of provision, and seaiching for the 
enemy. In connexion with this subject, I will observe that, if General Scott thought the 
force was too large in the right wing, he should have left a portion of it at Fort Drane, more 
especially if he was not able to supply it with provisions. Again, General Scott took with 
him all the transportation he had at Fort Drane, leaving still some supplies in depot at Fjrt 
Drane. No >v, this transportation wa9 more than all he had ordered into the country, not 
only by the addition of that possessed by General Clinch, but by that taken to Fort Drane 
by myself ; so that, if his force was out of proportion large, he c uld have left a portion of 
it, and then have moved on the Withlacoochee he'ter provided, in every respect, than it 
was po-sib!t ho- him to be independent of my movement ; yet, with all these advantages of 

41 



224 628 

I have seated (hat the proper time and place for Major General Scot? 
to enter upon (lie command of the forces under me, in that part of my 
department which formed the theatre of the war, was the precise time 
and place of his arrival in person at the position occupied by the force 
actively engaged under me at that position ; because, until the moment 
oi his arrival at my position, every duty and every responsibility neces- 
sarily rested with me, and therefore it was proper that I should be gov- 
erned in my movements and measures by the movements of the enemy,- 
with a view to the immediate protection of the frontier, and to subdue 
the enemy, or to hold them in cheek, until the arrival of additional force 
and supplies. This view of the subject is based upon a principle which 
has from time immemorial governed the interior and exterior police of the 
armies of the most enlightened nations of the world, during a state of war J 
a principle, therefore, strictly applicable to a state of war. Take, for 
example, a picket-guard, or a small out-post, near the enemy: who ever 
heard of the commander of either being relieved otherwise than upon 
the personal appearance of the officer authorized to take command. At 
a post, or in a department where there are several officers on duty, the 
commander may be relieved in time of war by a special order, directing 
him, on the receipt of stick order, to turn over his command to a particular 
officer near him, or to his next in rank ; but, without some such special 
authority, the officer to be relieved would remain in command, if near the 
enemy, until the new commander arrives in person at the position occu- 
pied by the principal force employed near the enemy. 

I have sought in vain for a case tending to justify or excuse the 
pretension of a right, on the part of General Scott, to assume the 
command of any part of the forces of my department, upon the theatre 
of the war, whether with me in the field or otherwise, previous to his 
arrival within the limits of my department and at the spot ivhere the 
troops were employed in an active campaign against the enemy. I have ? 
on the contrary, found many cases tending to establish the principle for 
which I contend, and upon which I acted— to one of the strongest of 
which I have desired, and again desire, the attention of the Court. I 
allude to the case connected with the battle of Vimera, in Portugal, 
fought in August, 1808, between the British army, under Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, and the French, under General Junot. 

men and means, he only nenetrated <he swamp two srnd a half miles, proceeded to Tampa 
bay, and dure reported to the War Depart ment ihat he hud penetrated the rove to its head, 
;,, he thought, and now ins sts upon it an :> matte? clearly ascertained that the Indians had 
■dispersed. 1 repeat, in answer to his question, why did lie not find the enemy f it « as he* 
tau«e he did not go where they were. Tlwy were in the rove. A body of some 250 was 
ally found in the edge of it hy (ieneia! Scott, and alter he left Fort Cooper that po.it 
was assailed hy Indians trom the cove for some 17 da\s in succession. 

On the return march (mm Tampa to Fort Drane, Fort Cooper was absorbed, and the 
much was thence conducted into tin- Tampa and Fort Kio^r road ; in passing to which. Cap- 
tain iJvane testifies that the southern ed^e of the hammock was traversed for a short dis- 
tance, btf/v the great cove itseft was not penetrated. 

In this march lr<>m Tamps, it might be readily supposed one select corps codd hsve been 
*>rgan'zed of the tine? divisions at Tampa, leaving the. remainder at Fort IJronke, and, with 
ihe whole of the transportation, this corps of choice troops might have been amply provided 
for .an examination of at least a week or ten days in die cove ; b it no, the division* returned 
as they went, and the great cove, as if avoid I with spec al care, uas passed on the west in 
going down, and on the east in returning, and, without examination, tile Irtdiane were offi- 
cially reported 'o hive dispersed. E. P. GAINES. 



6281 



629 [ 224 



Alter Sir Arthur embarked at Cork, in Ireland, with an arm}- of ten 
thousand men, tor the Peninsula, General Sir Harry Burrard JNeale, 
senior in rank to Sir Arthur, was ordered to take command of the forces 
proceeding to Spain, oi which Sir Arthur's division formed a part. About 
the same time General Sir Hugh Dalrymple, then at Gibraltar, received or- 
ders to take command of whatever British forces he should find in Portugal. 
Sir Arthur, on arriving near the coast of Portugal, learned that General 
Junot, with a French army of 14,000 men, was in the vicinity of Vimera; 
whereupon the British army, under Sir Arthur, landed, and was soon after 
attacked by the French. A severe conflict ensued. It so happened that, 
during the battle, General Neale arrived at Vimera ; he immediately 
sent an officer of his staff to the field of battle, in sight of Vimera, to an- 
nounce his arrival to Sir Arthur, notifying him, however, that lie was 
expected to continue his operations against the enemy according to his 
own plan. The battle continued for some hours. Previous to its ter- 
mination, General Sir Hugh Dalrymple arrived at Vimera. He also an- 
nounced his arrival to Sir Arthur, who was again notified by a superior, 
that he, Sir Arthur, would continue kis operations according to his own 
original plan, until the battle should be over. The French army was 
ultimately beaten, and was seen by General Dalrymple retiring rapidly 
in a direction towards Torres dc Vidras. On making this discovery, Gen- 
eral Dalrymple sent his aid to desire Sir Arthur to give up the pursuit, 
and return with his army to Vimera, Sir Arthur remonstrated, and in- 
sisted upon the propriety of pursuing and capturing the remnants of the 
French army, as an essential part of Lis original plan. General Dal- 
rymple persisted in recalling the victorious army, and sent a peremptory 
order to Sir Arthur, requiring him to retrace his steps to Vimera. He 
•complied. But the great error of this retrogade movement was soon de- 
monstrated by the arrival of a flag of truce, with a proposition from the 
French commander to capitulate, on condition that his army should be 
•conveyed by British transports to France as prisoners of war on parole. 
This capitulation was arranged at C intra, and it was termed " The 
Convention of Cintra." From the proceedings of a board ol" inquiry, 
consisting of several general officers, into the operations at Vimera 
which led to the convention of Cintra, there is no evidence of any effort 
by either of the general officers ordered to command the forces under Sir 
Arthur Wellesley to assume or exercise any command whatever until 
their arrival at Vimera ; and even then they both successively deemed it 
! to be their duty to abstain from taking command until the pending battle 
should be terminated. And General Dalrymple was censured for his in- 
terference before the pursuit and capture of the enemy was completed. 

Had either of those general officers halted from sixty to ninety miles 
from the theatre of the war in which Sir Arthur was engaged, it is not 
to be believed that any respect would have been paid to their orders, 
nor is it probable that the British Government would have tolerated so 
irregular and inefficient a measure. Suppose, sir, that either of those 
senior commanders had sat still at the very secure post of Gibraltar, and 
i had taken measures to withhold from Sir Arthur Wellesley's army their 
proper supplies of subsistence, and had thus attempted to starve that 
gallant army out of its position at Vimera — would it not have bi ought 
the author of so atrocious an outrage to a volley of bail cartridges ? Yes > 



224 ] 



630 



sir, even in the monarchical and aristocratic government of England, 
where favoritism has its all-powerful sway, I venture to affirm that such 
an outrage, on the part of any officer in the British army or navy, 
would have cost him his life ; and the ministry that would have sanction- 
ed or connived at such an outrage, would have been promptly hurled 
from power. 

I thank the Court for the patient hearing which they have given 
me. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General U. S. A. by brevet. 



Jj 



631 [ 224 ] 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE OF GENERAL GAINES. 



No. 1. 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

New Orleans, January 15, 1836. 

General : I do myself the honor to report, for the information of the 
proper authorities, that, having met, on my arrival at this city yesterday, 
the bad news of the defeat and massacre of Major Dade, with a detach- 
ment of United States troops, consisting of eight officers and nearly one 
hundred non-commissioned officers and soldiers, by the Seminole In- 
dians, near Tampa bay, East Florida ; and having reason to apprehend 
that the troops at Fort Brooke, with those which this sad disaster must 
speedily draw towards that post, will need more arms, ammunition, and 
subsistence, with axes and other tools, than the supply now there will af- 
ford, I have considered it to be my duty to order, and have, therefore, 
ordered, the articles specified in the requisitions of which I enclose 
herewith copies, (marked A, B, and C,) to be obtained and forwarded 
thither forthwith. 

Convinced, as I am, that no time should be lost in applying to these 
red and black savages the last and obvious means of correction, and not 
doubting but that the 6th and part of the 1st and 7th regiments of infant- 
ry will very soon be ordered, by the way of this city, to East Florida, to 
co-operate with the disposable companies of United States artillery and 
Territorial volunteers, in the arrest or destruction of those Indians and 
brigands, before the dry weather of winter shall pass away, and the rains 
of spring and summer cover the swamps and flats that surround them 
with water ; and believing that the forces to which I have alluded will 
not be able to arrest or punish a people so nearly amphibious as these 
savages are, without the aid of some naval force, with gun-boats, to co- 
operate with the troops along the sea-coast of Florida, I shall, by the 
first conveyance, request the commander of the naval station at Pensa- 
cola to furnish such force and boats as he may feel authorized to order 
on that service. 

Some experience and much reflection have convinced me that the only 
sure means of terminating speedily and effectually all difficulties with 
these savages, will be to march an army of at least four thousand men 
along the sea-coast, to which they usually take refuge, to be flanked and 
supported by the proposed naval force, whose aid will be necessary in 
crossing inlets, creeks, bays, lakes, and ponds, with which the whole of 
that sea-coast abounds, and in scouring the tangled thicket-woods and 
deep swamps into which the enemy would escape and be secure against 
any force that we would employ on land, unaided by naval force ; where- 



I" 224 ] 632 

as by the proposed co-operation of land and naval force, we should not 
fail to take or destroy most of them, and certainly take or destroy their 
boats and the boats of their allies, the fishermen and other stragglers 
and idlers, from the island of Cuba, from whom, there is reason to be- 
lieve, these Indians obtain supplies of ammunition and subsistence. We 
should thus cut off this source of supply and of escape, and we should 
thus force them to sue for peace. 

Their number of fighting men cannot, I am convinced, be less than 
two thousand four hundred. Our excellent quartermaster, Major Clark, 
who spent several years near them, and often surrounded by them, deems 
their force to be between 2,000 and 2,500; recent accounts state their 
number at near three thousand ; but, if they have not more than two thou- 
sond, it would be imprudent to send in pursuit of them, in a country so 
perfectly known to them, and so little known to our troops, and, moreover, 
a country affording them peculiar natural advantages, which might often 
enable them, with inferior numbers and inferior prowess, to overcome 
and destroy our troops. Indeed, Colonel Twiggs, who has had the 
means of appreciating the character of the country, as well as that of the 
enemy, concurs with me in the opinion that a land force often thousand 
men would find it extremely difficult to take or destroy this enemy, con- 
temptible as it is deemed to be, without the co-operation of naval force. 

All which is most respectfully submitted for the information of the 
proper authorities. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General command* g. 

To the Adjutant U. S. Army, 

Washington, D. C. 



No. 2. 

A. 

Requisition Jor ordnance and ordnance stores jor the year 1836. 

Musket-ball cartridges - - - 250,000 

Muket flints ----- 3,000 

Cartridges canister-shot, fixed, for six-pounders .2,000 

Sticks port-fue .... 50 

Pounds slow mateh - - - - 100 

Cartridges grape-shot, fixed, for six-pounders 200 

Rifles complete .... 200 

This requisition is rendered necessary in consequence of the Semi- 
nole Indians and blacks having commenced war in the Territory of Flor- 
ida, and having recently cut off a considerable force under Major Dade. 
4th infantry. Immediate concentration of force at Fort Brooke, Tampa 
bay, is necessary, and for which force these supplies will be required. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General command'g. 



am 



633 [ 224 *] 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

New Orleans, January 15, 1S36. 

The acting ordnance officer at Baton Rouge arsenal, will issue and 
deliver to Lieutenant Myers, the ordnance stores embraced in the abov^ 
requisition. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General command 'g. 



No. 3. 
B. 



40,000 rations pork equal 150 barrels. 

40,000 do flour do 235 do 

40,000 do beans do 

40,000 do candles do 

40,000 do soap do 

40,00d do salt do 

40,U00 do vinegar do 

40,000 do sugar do 

40,000 do coffee do 

Total 

New Orleans, January 18, 1836. 

The above articles of subsistence stores will be required to complete 
the loading of the transport destined for Fort Brooke, Tampa bay. 

P. MORRISON, 
1st Lieut. 4th Infant. A. C. S. 



26 


do 


9 


do 


9 


do 


7 


d(j 


13 


do 


1G 


do 


10 


do 


468 


barrels 



No. 4. 
C. 

Special requisition on the Quartermaster's department. 

For 200 lbs. lOd nails, 

200 lbs. double lOd nails, 

200 lbs. 8d do 

200 lbs. 4d do 

6 broad-axes, 

200 felling axes, 

100 picks or grubbing-hoes, with an axe one side, 

25 augers, assorted, 

12 cross-cut saws, 

200 lbs. oakum. 



[ 224 ] 631 

2 dozen gimlets, assorted, 
4 grind-stones, common size, 
50 hatchets, 
400 lbs. spikes, wrought for building boats, 
200 spades, 
12 hand-saws, 
20 coils (inch diameter) rope, 

2 dozen whip-saws, 

6 dozen whip-saw files, 
G dozen hand-saw files, 

3 dozen cross-cut files, 
2 dozen iron wedges, 
2 dozen iron froes, 

6 adzes, 

G hammers, 

1 set blacksmith's tools, screw-plate, &c. 

4 sets calking irons, 
300 lbs. iron, bar, 

200 lbs. rods for bolts, i inch thick. 

I certify that the above requisition is correct, and that the articles spe- 
cified are absolutely requisite for the public service, rendered so by the 
following circumstances : The Seminole Indians and blacks having com- 
menced war in the Territory of Florida, and having recently cut off a 
considerable force under Major Dade, 4th infantry. Immediate concen- 
tration of force at Tampa bay, Fort Brooke, and for which these sup- 
plies will be required. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General commanoVg. 

The quartermaster will issue the articles specified in the above re- 
quisition. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General command'g. 

Received, New Orleans, January, 1836, of Major J. Clarke, assistant 
quartermaster United States army, two hundred pounds lOd nails, two 
hundred pounds double lOd nails, two hundred pounds 8d nails, two hun- 
dred pounds 4d nails, six broad axes, two hundred felling axes, two hun- 
dred spades, one hundred picks or grubbing-hoes, twenty-five augers, as- 
sorted, two dozen gimlets, assorted, twelve cross-cut saws, twelve hand- 
saws, twenty coils of inch rope, two dozen whip-saws, six dozen whip- 
saw files, six dozen hand-saw files, three dozen cross-cut files, two doz- 
en iron wedges, two dozen iron froes, four grind-stones, fifty hatchets, 
four hundred pounds spikes, two hundred pounds of oakum, six adzes, 
six hammers, one set blacksmith's tools, four sets calking irons, three 
hundred pounds of iron bar, two hundred pounds rod | inch thick. 

In full of the above requisitions. 



UII 



635 [ 224 ] 

No. 5. 

Headquarters, Western Departmemt, 

Neiv Orleans, January 15, 1836. 

Sir : Being convinced, from the published reports of the late sanguin- 
ary conflicts in East Florida, between the United States troops and the 
Seminole Indians, that an immediate concentration in that quarter of ad- 
ditional force is necessary for the prompt punishment which the habitu- 
al faithlessness and inveterate hostility of those brigand tribes merit, 
I am sure I shall but anticipate the wishes of the President of the United 
States, by soliciting the services of a few corps of the high-minded and 
chivalric volunteers of Louisiana. I have, therefore, respectfully to 
request your Excellency to give orders authorizing a regiment of eight 
companies of riflemen and infantry, or of either of these arms, to hold 
themselves in readiness to assemble, at a moment's warning, at this city, 
for embarkation from hence to Fort Brooke, near Tampa bay. 

The United States quartermaster and assistant commissary of subsist- 
ence will be ordered to have in readiness, at this city, arms, ammunition, 
and subsistence, and camp equipage, hospital and medical stores, and 
medical attendance for the volunteers, who will be expected to provide 
themselves with a supply of clothing. 

Very respectfully, &c. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General, command^g. 

His Excellency E. D. White, 

Governor of Louisiana. 



No. 6. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

New Orleans, January 16, 1836. 
Special Order. 

The assistant commissary of subsistence at New Orleans will obtain 
and deliver to Lieutenant Myers, of the 4th regiment infantry, forty thou- 
sand complete rations of provisions, to be forwarded to Fort Brooke, 
East Florida, forthwith. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General, command'g. 



No. 7. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

New Orleans, January 16, 1836. 
Special Order. 

1. Lieutenant A. C. Myers, of the 4th infantry, will repair to Baton 
Rouge, and receive from the ordnance officer at that post, the arms and 



°2M J 



636 



ordnance stores specified in my requisition of yesterday's date, which 
supplies he will have shipped to this city, and placed on board the trans- 
ports to be furnished by the United States quartermaster, with the sub- 
sistence and tools required for Fort Brooke, Tampa bay ; which sup- 
plies will be receipted for, and be in charge of Lieutenant Myers, and 
be delivered by him to the commandant of Foit Brooke. 

2. To guard against accidents, Lieutenant Colonel Foster will furnish 
Lieutenant Myers with a non-commissioned officer and twenty sober 
men to accompany him, for the protection of the vessel and military 
stores ordered to Fort Brooke. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General command'g. 



No. 8. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Mobile, Alabama, January 18, 1836. 
Order No. 4. 

Captain Ethan A. Hitchcock is hereby appointed to act as assistant 
adjutant general. He will accompany the General to Pensacola, and 
thence on his intended visit of inspection in Florida and Louisiana. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General command^. 



No. 9. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Mobile, Alabama, January 18, 1836. 
Special Orders No. 5. 

1. Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Twiggs will receive and cause to be 
mustered into the service of the United States the corps of Louisiana 
volunteers requested of his Excellency the Governor on the 15th in- 
stant, and have them supplied with arms, ammunition, and camp equip- 
age, with a supply of subsistence sufficient for two months' issue. 

2. To the Louisiana volunteers, or to such four companies of them as 
may be first ready for service, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs will add such 
regular force as may have arrived at New Orleans previous to the time 
the volunteers shall receive their supplies, together with such of the 4th 
regiment of infantry at Baton Rouge and New Orleans as in his judg- 
ment can be considered disposable ; with which force he will embark on 
board the most serviceable vessels he can select for the contemplated 
voyage and peculiar service in view, and repair to Tampa bay, where he 
will report to and co-operate with Brigadier General Clinch, or the offi- 
cer commanding the present expedition against the Seminole Indians. 

3. Should an immediate communication with the main force now in 
Florida prove to be impracticable, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs will, in that 



637 I" 224 ] 

case, take command of such other force as he may find disposable at 
Tampa bay, and arrange, with the commander of such naval force as he 
shall find in that quarter, a plan of co-operation for the immediate arrest 
or destruction (in case of resistance) of all the Indian warriors and col- 
ored fishermen found in East Florida, with such as may be seen hovering 
upon the Florida coast without permission. 

4. The Louisiana volunteers will be mustered by Lieutenant Bu- 
chanan. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General command'g. 



No 10. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Pensacola, January 25, 1836. 

General : I have the honor to report, for the information of the 
proper authorities, that, in pursuance of my intention suggested in my 
letter to you under date the 15th of this month, from New Orleans, I 
proceeded, by the way of Mobile, to this place, where I had the sat- 
isfaction to learn that Commodore Dallas at Key West, and Commo- 
dore Bolton at the navy yard here, had, with the promptitude, zeal, and 
judgment for which they have been long and justly distinguished, order- 
ed to Tampa bay all the force which they deemed it practicable to dis- 
pose of, for the desired co-operation with the troops in that quarter, of 
which, I doubt not, the Navy Department has been duly advised. With 
these timely aids, added to the force which Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs 
is now collecting together for that service, with the 6th regiment infant- 
ry, which I trust will have been ordered by the General-in-chief in time 
to reach New Orleans between the 1st and 5th of February, next month, 
will, I am convinced, be sufficient, with the force which General Clinch 
has a right to calculate on from the Atlantic posts south of New York, 
inclusively, to take or destroy the enemy in the course of a few days 
after the concentration of the forces above referred to : possibly a month 
may be required for the accomplishment of this service. 

Having reason to believe that some volunteer companies of Louisiana 
were disposed to tender their services in the expedition to East Florida, 
I, on the 15th instant, requested his Excellency Governor White to give 
orders authorizing a regiment, to consist of eight companies of riflemen 
and infantry, or of either of those arms, to hold themselves in readiness 
to assemble at a moment's warning at New Orleans, for embarkation to 
Fort Brooke, Tampa bay. On my way to this place, on meeting the 
news of the sudden abandonment and homeward rush of the Floridian 
militia from Brigadier General Clinch, just when he had most need of 
them to rush upon the enemy, I, on the 18th instant, issued my special 
Orders No. 5, of which I send herewith a copy, directing Lieutenant 
Colonel Twiggs to receive in service the regiment of Louisiana volun- 
teers, and to proceed with that and all other disposable force at and near 
New Orleans, to Fort Brooke, to report to and co-operate with Brigadier 



[ 224 ] 638 

General Clinch, and, with the aid of the naval force sent thither, to take 
or destroy (in case of resistance) the hostile Indian warriors, with all 
other colored men in East Florida, or found hovering on that coast with- 
out authority. 

I very much regret to learn from Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, under 
date the 22d instant, that he has reason to apprehend there will be hut 
few volunteers ; and that his whole force of regulars will amount to not 
more than one hundred and forty fit for duty. Small as this force is I 
shall direct it to proceed to Tampa, with as many of the companies of 
volunteers required as may be in readiness in the present week ; not 
doubting but that the sixth infantry will follow as soon as practicable, 
after it receives the anticipated orders to march. Should the ice have 
obstructed the navigation of the Mississippi even as far down as New 
Madrid, the regiment could march thither without heavy baggage in five 
or six days, where it would embark on board steamboats ; there being 
always of late years some two or three, more or less, at or near the lower 
point of the obstructed section of the river. With such an obstruction 
the regiment would arrive at New Orleans twelve days from the time it 
received marching orders. Without the supposed probable obstruction, 
the movement would be accomplished in six or seven days after the re- 
ceipt of marching orders at Jefferson barracks. By suitable steamboats 
for the movement from New Orleans, the regiment, or any part of it 
deemed requisite to send to Tampa bay, would be landed there in two 
and a half to three days. 

I shall repair immediately to New Orleans, and avail myself of every 
proper occasion in my power to meet faithfully all exigencies as they may 
occur, and to carry into effect whatever plans of operation the constituted 
authorities may see fit to direct for the defence of the country, and for 
the interests and honor of the service, pursuant to the constitution and 
laws of the land, and more especially in accordance with the oath under 
which I have often rendered our beloved country some service, against 
enemies and opposers, without and within her limits, as you and a few 
other honorable brethren in arms (who, thanks to our heavenly Father 
are yet spared from an untimely grave) can and will testify. Let me 
have men and means, with the authority hitherto allowed to officers of 
my grade and station in times of war, or threatened war, and my life 
upon it I will not only soon inflict exemplary punishment on our too- 
much-despised red foe and his allies, but I will very soon put in a state 
of defence for giving our old friends the French a warm reception, our 
excellent forts on this frontier — forts that are now without the means of 
defence, whilst every infantry company in my department may be, and 
shall be, if placed at my disposal, rendered equal in a few weeks time to 
our artillery companies. 

All which is most earnestly and most respectfully submitted. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General commanding. 

To Brig. Gen. Roger Jones, 

Adjutant General. 



639 f 22 1 J 

No. 11. 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

New Orleans, February 2, 1836. 

Sir : With a view to an efficient co-operation of the forces now assem- 
bling in the northeast quarter of East Florida, under your command, with 
those ordered from this city by water to Tampa bay, against the Seminole 
Indians and their colored vassals and allies, I take much pleasure in ad- 
vising you that a fine battalion of the chivalric volunteers of Louisiana, 
consisting of eight companies, headed by Adjutant General Smith, are 
engaged to embark to-morrow with the regular troops at this post, under 
the command of Colonel Twiggs, on board the steamboats the Merchant, 
Captain Smyler, and the Watchman, Captain Vincent. These forces, 
amounting to near seven hundred men, added to two hundred and fifty 
artillerists and marines now at Tampa, to be sustained by an efficient 
naval force promptly furnished by Commodores Dallas and Bolton, for 
cutting off the enemy's boats and other means of escape to the islands 
on the coast, are intended to be in readiness at Fort Brooke, Tampa, by 
the 8th of the present month, to form a junction at or near that place with 
the force under your command, whenever and as soon as in your judg- 
ment your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement. 

In the interim, I shall be governed by such information as I may re- 
ceive at Tampa, or in my voyage thither, to effect the desired junction, 
and as soon as possible to operate against and take or destroy the enemy. 

I advise you to move with great caution, fortifying your camp at night, 
and marching in open order during the day, so as to be always ready for 
action at a moment's warning. A sufficient quantity of ammunition and 
provisions have been transported to Fort Brooke, to divide with you, 
until further supplies are received. 

With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General commanding. 

To Brig. Gen. D. L. Clinch, 

or officer commanding Fort King, Florida. 



No. 12. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

New Orleans, February 3, 1836. 
Special Order, No. 7. 

I. — On the arrival at this city of the sixth United States infantry, or 
such part of that regiment as shall arrive within the present month, the 
commanding officer will detach therefrom a guard, to consist of an officer 
and twenty-four non-commissioned officers and men, to each of the fol- 
lowing posts, viz : Forts Jackson, Wood, and Pike, and to Baton Rouge ; 
and post one company at the barracks in this city, for the defence and 



[ 224 ] 640 

protection of the said forts and posts, and to co-operate with the civil 
authorities in the maintenance of order. 

II. — In the interim, and until these arrangements can be made, Major 
Clark, the quartermaster, will take measures for the preservation of the 
public property at the above-named posts, by the employment of suitable 
officers or citizens to be stationed there for that purpose. 
By order of Major General Gaines: 

GEORGE A. McCALL, 
A. D. C., acting Assistant Adjutant. 



No. 13. 



Headquarters, on board the S. B. Watchman, 

Lake P on tchar train , 8 o'clock, A. M., February 4, 1836. 

Sir: I have the satisfaction to find that, in addition to the handsome 
battalion of Louisiana volunteers, under Adjutant General Smith, which 
you have had the goodness to raise, and, with the aid of the city authori- 
ties, supply with an outfit for the United States service, some other com- 
panies had yesterday offered their services. 

In the absence of authentic information from the theatre of the border 
war in East Florida, and being satisfied, Under existing circumstances, 
it is obviously more prudent and proper to have in the field a few com- 
panies, or even a battalion more, than to risk a single soldier less, than 
may be deemed sufficient to take or destroy the brigand enemy in that 
quarter, and thus terminate the war speedily and effectually, I can have 
no doubt of the propriety of requesting and accepting of two or three 
additional companies that have so gallantly offered their services. 

In addition to the supplies mentioned in my letter of the 15th ultimo, 
I have directed the quartermaster to furnish these additional companies 
with knapsacks and blankets. 

I have the honor to be, 

With perfect respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 
Major General commanding, 
To his Excellency E. D. White, 

Governor of Louisiana. 



No. 14. 



Adjutant General's Office 

January 22, 1 8.%. 

Sir: Your communication of the 5th instant is this day received and 
submitted to the General-in-chief ; and 1 have the pleasure to inform you 
that your proposed tour to the southern and eastern portion of your com- 
mand is approved. 



641 f 224 ] 



I am instructed to inform you, however, that the state of affairs west 
of the Mississippi, may soon require your attention, if not presence 
in that quarter ; accordingly, you will be pleased to await orders and in- 
structions in New Orleans. 

I herewith respectfully enclose " Order No. 7, " by which you will see 
that Major General Scott has been ordered to Florida. The turn which 
Indian affairs have recently taken in that quarter, has required consider- 
able draughts on the neighboring States for a volunteer and militia force, 
as well as an increase of the regular force drawn from the sea-board. 

As the operations against the Seminoles will oblige Major General 
Scott to cross the line of his command, authority is given to him to that 
effect, by instructions from the Secretary of War. As soon as the state 
of things will permit, General Scott will order the troops back to their 
respective stations. 

I am, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. JONES. 

To Major General Gaines. 

Extract from a letter from the Secretary of War to General Scott, 
dated January 21, 1836. 

"The line dividing your own department from that of General Gaines 
is at present an imaginary one ; and probably would, if run, actually 
pass through the scene of hostilities. You will pursue your operations, 
therefore, without regard to any such divisionary line." 



No. 15. 



Headquarters, West'jv Dkpt. on board S. B. Watchman, 

Pensacola Bay, February 6, 1836. 

General: I have to acknowledge the honor of your letter of the 22d 
of last month, written as I must infer, by order of the Secretary of War ; 
but upon this point you are not explicit — which letter I met here this 
day, this vessel having been aground, and come in here to obtain fuel. 

In your letter you refer to " Order No. 7 ;" no such order of the pres- 
ent year has been received by me. 

Referring you, for the information of the proper authorities, to my let- 
ter written to you for their information, under date the 15th and 25th 
of last month, and more especially to the copy of my letter of the 2d in- 
stant to General Clinch, reported also for the information of the Secre- 
tary of War, and General-in-chief, I have to state that I cannot, consist- 
ently with my plan of co-operation with General Clinch, (or with Gen- 
eral Scott, if indeed he be the immediate commanding officer of the 
troops in the northeast border of East Florida,) I cannot with proprie- 
ty abandon the proposed expedition or co-operation, until its results are 
known, or until I am authorized so to do, at a time subsequent to the 
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case being known at Washington; 



[ 224 ] 642 

for, in addition to the binding effect of my proposition to co-operate with 
the forces trom that quarter, I have made a pledge to the Governor and 
volunteers of Louisiana — a voluntary pledge — that I would not require 
this fine corps to go further than I myself would go ; and that I would 
stand by them as long as they would stand by me, in our contemplated 
efforts to take or destroy our red and black enemy in East Florida. I 
cannot but hope that this may be accomplished before the state of affairs 
west of the Mississippi " may soon " as you intimate " require my atten- 
tion, if not my presence, in that quarter, judging from the style of your 
letter upon this point ; and that I shall arrive at New Orleans in time to 
receive any orders, and execute any duties that may be assigned to me. 

In respect to the contents of the extract subjoined to your letter, touch- 
ing the " imaginary line" between the Western and Eastern departments, 
about which the honorable Secretary of War has again and again given 
himself so much trouble, that is a matter which I perfectly understand. 
The Rules and Articles of War, in accordance with which every responsi- 
ble personage honored with the President's commission is presumed to 
act under the sanction of an oath and upon honor, make this matter quite 
plain, the long-continued intrigues of all who have written, to mystify 
the subject, to the contrary notwithstanding. 

All which is submitted with profound respect. 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major General commanding. 

To Adjutant General Jones, 

Washington City. 



No. 1G. 

Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, February 22, 1836. 

Sir : Your communication dated " Pensacola Bay, on board steam- 
boat Watchman, February G, 1836," has this day been received and sub- 
mitted to the Secretary of War, and General-in-chief ; and, in answer, I am 
directed to say, it is expected that the Secretary of War's instructions to 
you, dated the 23d of January, have, 'ere this, been received, and that 
you will have proceeded accordingly, to the western frontier of the State 
of Louisiana, there to assume the personal command of all the troops 
which are or may be employed in any part of the region adjoining the 
Mexican boundary. Lest the instructions herein referred to may not 
have reached you, the Secretary of War directs that a triplicate copy be 
now forwarded ; and, that on receiving this communication, you will not 
delay your departure, but that you will be pleased to proceed immedi- 
ately to the western frontier, as herein required. 

I send copies of this communication to you at Fort King and Pensa- 
cola. 

I am, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. JONES, 
Adjutant General. 
To Major General Gaines, 

Fort Brooke, Florida. 



■fl 



643 [ 224 | 

No. 17. 

Headquarterrs, Western Department, 

Fort Brooke, F., February 10, 1836. 
Order No. 4. 

I. Captain E. A. Hitchcock, of the 1st regiment of United States in- 
fantry, is hereby appointed to act as assistant inspector general of the 
department. 

II. The troops at this post, consisting of A, B, G, and II companies of 
the 2d regiment of artillery, and A, B, E, G, II, I, and K companies of 
the 4th infantry, with the Louisiana volunteers, under* Adjutant General 
Smith, will constitute a brigade, to be designated the " light brigade," 
and will be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Twiggs, of the 4th 
regiment of infantry. 

III. Lieutenant J. Izard, of the dragoons, will perform the duties of 
brigade major, and will report to Colonel Twiggs accordingly. 

By order of Major General Gaines : 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-decamp, acting assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 18. 



Order No. G. 



Headquarters, Fort Brooke, 

February 12, 1836. 



Brevet Majors II. Wilson and W. W. Lear, of the 4th infantry, se- 
nior captains on duty with their regiment, will do duty as field officers, 
during the absence of the colonel and lieutenant colonel on other ser- 
vice, or until otherwise directed ; to take effect from the 10th instant. 
By order of Major General Gaines: 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-de-camp, acting assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 19. 



Headquarters, Fort Brooke, 

February 12, 1836. 
Special Order, No. 13. 

First Lieutenant S. McKenzie, of the 2d regiment of artillery, ord- 
nance officer at this post, will issue, for the use of the friendly Indians 
who have volunteered their services, 73 rifles, 17 wipers and drivers, 
and 10 bullet-moulds ; to be returned when their services on the cam- 
paign shall be dispensed with. 

By order of Major General Gaines : 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-de-camp, acting assistant Adjutant General. 
42 



[ 221 | 641 

No. 20. 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fort Brooke, February 13, 1836. 
Special Order, No. 12. 

Lieutenant McKenzie, ordnance officer, will issue to Captain Benja- 
min Ilallett, of the Indian d ent, 50 muskets, and one keg of pow- 
der, taking the proper receipts for the same. 
By order of Major General Gaines:. 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-de-camp, acting assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 21. 
Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fori King, East Florida, February 22, 1836. 

Gensral : I have the honor to report, for the information of the Pres- 
ident of the United States, my arrival at this post this afternoon, with the 
regular and volunteer force referred to in my plan of operations, enclo- 
sed to you from New Orleans, under date the 2d of the present month, 
all in good health, save two or three cases of chills and bad colds, which 
I have reason to believe two days of rest and medical attendance will 
remove — having sought at every point deemed most likely to present 
to me the principal force of our savage enemy, without being able to find 
him, or any visible evidence of the direction of his late movements. I 
shall continue to search for, and endeavor to rend a satisfactory account 
of these faithless barbarians. 

I shall take an occasion to write to you as soon as I shall have time to 
collect the information which this place and its vicinity may afford. In 
the mean time I enclose to you the report of my acting inspector gener- 
al, giving an account of my visit to (he battle-ground of Major Dade, and 
the burial of the gallant band of which he was the unfortunate leader. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 

To Adjutant General Jones. 



No. 22. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fort King, East Florida, February 22, 1836. 

General : I do myself the honor to annouce to you my arrival at this 
place this afternoon, pursuant to my plan of operations communicated to 
you under date the 2d of the present month, my force consisting of 
near eleven hundred regulars and volunteers, all in good health, save 
am l ome few cases of chills and colds, which I doubt not but two 

days' rest will remot i march to this place was by way of Warren's 



iftfli 



645 I 221 ] 

landing, on the Alalia river, and thence to " the military road," near the 
burnt bridge on the Hillsborough river, thence along the road to this 
post ; having found, nearly forty miles south of this post, the deeply afflic- 
tive exhibition of the slain and mutilated bodies of the gallant band who 
fell in battle under Major Dade, on the 28th of December, without being 
able to discover the savage foe by whom this and other numerous acts of 
barbarism had been perpetrated upon this ill-fated frontier. 

Hoping soon to see you or hear from you the results of your late move- 
ment upon the northern and eastern border of the theatre of war, with 
the information obtained by you as to the enejny's late movements, and 
present probable position, that we may concert measures for his speedy 
overthrow, in which I shall take much pleasure in a cordial co-operation 
with you, I offer you my best wishes that our joint efforts may tend to 
a speedy and honorable termination of the war. 

My present object is to march from this place by way of the lower bat- 
tle-ground on the Withlacoochee, and thence whithersoever any trail or 
trace of the enemy may be found ; and finally to return to Fort Brooke, 
obtain additional supplies, and then move in a direction to Charlotte har- 
bor, not doubting that, after securing the frontier north and east of this 
place, you will obtain such information of the movements of the enemy 
as to lead you from this place by the way of Toloc-chopko, on Pease 
creek, and thence toward Charlotte harbor, where you will find a supply 
of subsistence and ammunition, under the protection of a United States 
naval force. At Fort Brooke you will also find similar supplies, suffi- 
cient for your return to this place, or if necessary, to enable you to remain 
in that quarter with 1,000 or 1,200 men, until you can obtain supplies 
from New Orleans. 

These suggestions are necessarily imperfect ; but this must always be 
the case, more or less, in a war wi pie who take no prisoners — 

who have no fortifications — no intercourse with any other part of the hu- 
man family — no newspapers, nor any post office or intelligence depart- 
ment. I therefore leave you to act according to the best of your judg- 
ment, and the information you may from time to time obtain ; proceeding, 
as I shall proceed, upon the principle thrtt, to find the enemy, we must 
search for him ; and when we find him we must take or destroy him, or 
he will assuredly destroy us. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 
Major General Commanding. 

To Brigadier General D. L. Clinch, 

or the officer commanding on the northeast 

border of East Florida, Fort Drane. 



No. 23. 



Western Department, 
Fort King, Florida, February 22, 1836. 

General : Agreeably to your directions, I observed the battle-ground 
6 or 7 miles north of the Withlacoochee river, where Major Dade and his 



[ 224 ] 6 46 



somraand were destroyed by the Seminole Indians, on the 28th of De- 
cember last, and have the honor to submit the following report : 

The force under your command, which arrived at this post to-day, 
from Tampa bay, encamped on the night of the 1 9th instant, on the ground 
occupied by Major Dade en the night of the 27th of December. He 
and his party were destroyed on the morning of the 28th of December, 
about four miles in advance of that position. He was advancing towards 
this post, and was attacked from the north, so that on the 20th instant we 
came upon the rear of his battle-ground about nine o'clock in the morn- 
ing. Our advanced 2;uard had passed the ground without halting, when 
the General and his staff came upon one of the most appalling scenes that 
can be imagined. We first saw some broken and scattered boxes, then 
a cart, the two oxen of which -were lying dead, as if they had fallen 
asleep, their yokes still on them : a little to the right one or two horses 
were seen. We then came to a small enclosure made by telling trees 
in such a manner as to form a triangular breast-work for defence. With- 
in the triangle, along the north and west faces of it, were about thirty 
bodies, mostly mere skeletons, although much of the clothing was left 
upon them. These were lying, almost every one of them, in precisely 
the position they must have occupied during the fight, their heads next to 
the logs over which they had delivered their fire, and their bodies stretch- 
ed with striking regularity parallel to each other. They had evidently 
been shot dead at their posts, and the Indians had not disturbed them 
except by taking the scalps of most of them. Passing this little bi east- 
work, we found other bodies along the road, and by the side of the road, 
generally behind trees, which had been resorted to for covers from the 
enemy's fire. Advancing about 200 yards further, we found a cluster of 
bodies in the middle of the road : these were evidently the advanced 
guard, in the rear of which was the body of Major Dade ; and to the right, 
that of Captain Frazer. These were all doubtless shot down on the first 
fire of the Indians, except perhaps Captain Frazer. who must however 
have fallen very early in the light. Those in the road and by the trees 
fell during the tirst attack. It was during a cessation of the fire, that the 
little band still remaining, about thirty in number, threw up the triangu- 
lar breast-work, which, from the haste with which it was constructed, 
was necessarily defective, and could not protect the men in the second 
attack. 

We had with us many of the personal friends of the officers of Major 
Dade's command, and it is gratifying to be able to state that every offi- 
cer was identified by undoubted evidence. They were buried, and the 
cannon, a G-pounder, that the Indians had thrown into a swamp, was re- 
covered and placed vertically at (he head of the grave, where it is to be 
hoped it will long remain. The bodies of the non-commissioned officers 
and privates w r ere buried in two graves, and it was found that every 
man was accounted for. The command was composed of 8 officers and 
1<)2 non-commissioned officers and privates. The bodies of 8 officers 
and 98 men were interred, four men having escaped, three of whom 
reached Tampa bay; the fourth was killed (he day after the battle. 

It may be proper to observe that the attack was not made from a ham- 
mock, but in a thinly-wooded country, the Indians being concealed by 
palmetto and grass, which has been since burned. 



647 [ 224 ] 

The two companies were Captain Frazei's, of the 3d artillery, and 
Captain Gardiner's, of the 2d artillery. The officers were Major Dade of 
the 4th infantry, Captains Frazer and Gardiner, 2d Lieutenant Bas- 
inger, hrevet 2d Lieutenants J. E. Henderson, Mudge, and Keais, of the 
artillery, and Doctor J. S. Gatlin. 

I have the honor to be, 

With the highest respect, 
Your obedient servant, 

E. A. HITCHCOCK, 
Copt. 1st inf., acting Inspector General. 
Major General Edmund P. Gaines, 

Commanding Western Department, Fort King, Florida. 



No. 24. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fort King, Florida, February 22, 1S36. 
Special Order, No. 13. 

1. Lieutenant Colonel William S. Foster, of the 4th regiment of in- 
fantry, with the effective force of his regiment present, will proceed to 
Fort Diane, Auld Lang Syne, and procure, from the officer in command 
thereof, fourteen thousand rations of salted pork, and fourteen thousand 
rations of hard bread or flour, with a proportional quantity of salt, with 
which he will return to this post, with as little delay as practicable. Col. 
Foster will take with him all the public horses and carts at this post. 
Should these, together with the horses and light carts, or wagons, he may 
be able to procure at Fort Drane, be insufficient to transport the number 
of rations above specified, he will return with such number as the means 
of transportation afforded him will allow. 

2. Captain Shannon, assistant quartermaster, will accompany Colonel 
Foster, and will procure from the quartermaster at Fort Drane, or other- 
wise, if practicable, twenty-five horses for this - command. He will then 
take such measures as he may deem most expedient to forward provisions 
and quartermaster stores to the different points designated in his instruc- 
tions from the Quartermaster General. 

3. Lieutenant John H. Allen, of the 3d artillery, will, at the same 
time, proceed to join his company at Fort Drane. 

By order of Major General Gaines: 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-de-camp, acting Assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 25. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fort King, Florida, February 26, 1836. 
Special Order, No. 15. 

Lieutenant G. H. Talcott, acting quartermaster, will purchase three 



[ 224 ] 648 

horses, to be used in drawing the field-pieces in possession of the bat- 
talion of artillery under the command of Captain F. S. Belton, 2d artil- 
lery. 

By order of Major General Gaines : 

0. A. McCALL, 
Aid- de- camp, acting Assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 26. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Fort King, Florida, February 26, 1836. 
Special Order, No. 16. 

Lieutenant G. H. Talcott will furnish, on the requisition of Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Twiggs, commanding the light brigade, such articles as may 
be necessary for the troops under his command. 
By order of General Major Gaines : 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-de-camp, acting Assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 27. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Camp Izard, February 28, 1836. 
Special Order, No. 17. 

Lieutenant and Adjutant Buchanan, of the 4th infantry, will perform 
the duties of brigade major of the light brigade until the recovery of 
Lieutenant and Brigade Major Izard from the wound received this 
morning. 

By order of Major General Gaines : 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-de-camp, acting Assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 28. 



Headquarters, Camp Izard, 
On the right bank of the Withlacoochee, 2 miles ivest of 
General Clinch' 's battle-ground, February 28, 1836. 

General : I take much pleasure in stating to you that I have reason 
to believe I have now near me the principal force of the Seminole In- 
dians, with their black vassals and allies. I, yesterday afternoon, after 
halting my reserve and rear guard, with my baggage-train, in the upper 
pine woods, near the encampment north of the battle-ground, proceeded 
with the remaining part of my force to the Withlacoochee, with a view 



hMI 



649 | 224 ] 

to inspect and reconnoitre, in person, the adjacent section of the river, 
preparatory to my intended crossing; which I had designed to attempt 
this morning. I had been at the river only long enough to examine 250 
or 300 yards about and above the usual crossing-place, when the enemy 
commenced a spirited firing upon my party, and kept it up with the war- 
whoop for half an hour. The fire was of course returned. 

Having determined this morning, in consequence of the thick woods 
on the opposite side of the river, to extend my examinations to this point, 
at which I learned there were open pine woods on both sides ot the 
river, I accordingly marched with my whole force to this place, where I 
was promptly met by the enemy, whose force appears to have increased 
very considerably in the course of an hour or two. The river at this 
place is deemed to be about as wide, but much deeper and less rapid 
than at the first-mentioned place, with open pine woods on both sides. 
Neither of the places are fordable. My reconnoissancs, in conse- 
quence of the narrowness of the river, and the impossibility of finding 
materials for promptly bridging or rafting the stream, have resulted in the 
loss of two of the Louisiana volunteers killed and ten volunteers and 
regulars wounded. Among the latter, 5 deeply lament to find the gallant 
Lieutenant Izard, of the dragoons, dangerously. 

Being convinced that the principal force of the enemy is now assem- 
bled before me, and not doubting that their women and children are 
placed in a large cypress sw T amp within a few miles of this place, and 
that an immediate movement of a force equal or nearly equal to that now 
with me, consisting in part of mounted men, would enable us to put an 
end to the war in the next ten days, by a combined and simultaneous 
movement against them, I have deemed it my duty to propose to you 
such a movement, should the forces expected at Fort Drane have ar- 
rived; otherwise the force there on the 22d would, I think, be sufficient, 
but this is doubtful, and the case is one of too much importance to leave 
the question of force at all in doubt. In the expectation of this co-ope- 
ration, I shall endeavor to amuse the enemy in completing my boats and 
preparing to cross ; but I shall not cross until I hear from you. 

In any event I request of you six thousand rations of pork, and flour, 
and sugar, with the quartermaster's stores which follow- : 2 whip-saws, 
2 cross-cut saws, 2 hand-saws, 6 adzes, 6 froes, augers, assorted, 4 broad 
axes, 2 iron wedges, 200 iron spikes, and, if possible, two field-pieces, 
with 150 rounds canister and 50 round shot, 10,000 musket cartridges. 

Killed, Zeno Bouillie, Valentine Beck. 
I have the honor to be, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 

Brigadier General Clinch, 

or officer commanding the U. S. troops assembling at 

Fort Drane, East Florida. 

P. S. The forces from Fort Drane should cross the Withlacoochee at 
the ford eight or ten miles above the battle-ground, or at the point, and 
move down on the left bank of the river to this place. 



[ 224 ] 650 

No. 29. 

Headquarters, Camp Izard, 
Two miles west of General Clinch's battle-ground, 
February 29, 183G. 

General: I last night stated to you, by express, the occurrence of 
my meeting the Indians on my arrival at this place, suggesting the expe- 
diency of an immediate co-operation on the part of the disposable force 
under your command, under the strong conviction that, by such co-opera- 
tion, we should be able, in a few days, to bring the war to a close, having 
been convinced that the principal force of the enemy is assembled near 
me on this river. The occurrences of the day confirmed me in the opin- 
ion I then expressed to you. 

Having occupied myself in preparing a small work to command the 
crossing-place of the river, and making canoes for the purpose of con- 
structing a bridge, I had not deemed it necessary to strengthen my breast- 
works, not having apprehended that the enemy would have the temerity 
to attack me in my position. In this conclusion, however, I have been 
disappointed. At ten o'clock this morning, a spirited and vigorous attack 
was made by the enemy on three sides of my encampment, which con- 
tinued two hours, with little or no intermission: in the course oi which 
they frequently approached so near to my left (lank, commanded by Ad- 
jutant General Smith, of the Louisiana volunteers, as to wound several 
men on the opposite flank, a distance of 200 yards. They were how- 
ever repulsed, I have reason to believe, with considerable loss. 

The loss sustained by the force of my command was, 1 sergeant killed, 
and 1 officer ( Lieutenant Duncan ) and 10 men wounded, of the regulars, 
and 1 officer and 20 men wounded of the volunteers. The troops hav- 
ing been particularly instructed not to throw away their fire, or to fire 
without correct aim at a short distance, I was happy to find that the order 
was strictly attended to, and, consequently, but little ammunition was ex- 
pended. It is impossible to say, with any precision, what was the ene- 
my's force ; but the officers best acquainted with the service concur with 
me in opinion it was not less than 1,500. From the foregoing facts, I have 
no doubt the principal force of the enemy is now in this vicinity; that 
they are sensible of the desperate situation in which they have placed 
themselves, and that their temerity will prompt them to make a resist- 
ance commensurate with the circumstances in which they find them- 
selves. 

I have abstained and shall abstain from a sortie until I hear from you, 
in the expectation that this course will contribute to keep them together, 
whilst a sortie might tend to disperse them. I am now satisfied a move- 
ment directly to this place will be more advisable than to attempt to cross- 
the Withlacoochee higher up, as suggested in my letter of yesterday. I 
am, moreover, of the opinion, that if mounted men can be procured in 
the course of a i'cw days, your force should not move from Fort Drane 
without this description of troops. I repeat my request, that I may be 
furnished 6,000 rations of flour, pork, and sugar, 5 bushels of salt, some 
corn, with tools to build block-houses, 2 field-pieces, 150 rounds of 



* 



651 [ 224 ] 

canister and 50 of round shot, 10,000 musket-ball cartridges, with as 
many light wagons as can be spared, as my wounded are increasing daily, 
and my horses decreasing. 

I have the honor to be, &c. 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 
To General D. L. Clinch, 

or officer commanding troops assembled at Fort Drane, 

Auld Lang Syne. 



N<>. 30. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 

Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, March 9, 1835. 
Special Order, No. 18. 

Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Twiggs, of the 4th infantry, will repair to 
New Orleans and resume command of the post. Until otherwise direct- 
ed he will make occasional visits of inspection to the military posts in his 
immediate vicinity. 

By order of Major General Gaines: 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-de-camp, acting Assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 31. 



Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, March 10, 1836. 

Sir: Your communication, dated Fort King, February 22, reporting 
your arrival at that post with the regular and volunteer force under your 
command, (number not stated,) has been submitted to the General-in- 
chief, the Secretary of War, and by him to the President. Without de- 
termining, at this time, on the circumstances which induced you to repair 
with a considerable volunteer force from Louisiana to Florida, and sub- 
sequently to Fort King, the President directs that you will be pleased to 
report, for the information of the Executive, the circumstances and rea- 
sons which have prompted your recent movements in Florida ; especially 
as regards the plan of operations detailed in your despatch to General 
Clinch from Foit King, under date of February 22, 1836, as seen by the 
copy this day received through Major General Scott, and to him forward- 
ed by General Clinch — the said despatch to General Clinch being con- 
sidered by the President as interfering with the previous plan of opera- 
tions in Florida, and the command of the troops in that quarter, which, 
by the orders of the President, had, in January, been assigned to Major 
General Scott, as you have already been apprized. 

I am further directed respectfully to request that you will be pleased 
to state why you did not report your arrival at Tampa bay, the force there 
assembled under your command, the condition of the service in general 
at that post, as well as any intelligence respecting Indian affairs, &c. — 



I IIMBIIII 



[ 224 ] 652 

as circumstances at the time would have enabled the commanding officer 
to communicate, and as required by the regulations. 

I respectfully enclose, herewith, for your information, a copy of my 
letter to General Arbuckle of this date, by which you will see that, in 
your absence, he has been ordered to the western frontier of Louisiana. 
I am, sir, with great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. JONES, 

Adjutant General. 
Major General Gaines, 

U. S. Army t Tampa bay, via Fort King, Florida. 



No. 32. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 
Fort Izard, on the Withlacoochee, Florida, March 9, 1836. 

Order No. 7. 

1. Called to East Florida by the savage massacres and conflagrations 
of the 28th December and the following month, the commanding Gen- 
eral hastily collected in Louisiana the forces which accompanied him 
from that patriotic State. These troops, in the short space of thirty-six 
days, have marched by land and water nearly eight hundred miles, one 
hundred and forty of which was through the country occupied by the 
enemy, whose principal force they have met, beaten, and forced to sue 
for peace. 

2. These important objects of the campaign having been accomplished 
with the hearty and cordial co-operation of Brigadier General Clinch, (to 
whose sound judgment the defence of this frontier had been wisely con- 
fided, and by whose gallantry the enemy had been chastised on the 31st 
of December, and since held in check as far as his limited means would 
allow,) the troops from Louisiana arc placed under his command, in order 
to guard against the known faithlessness of the enemy until the arrival of 
the forces under the officer charged with the diplomatic arrangements of 
the War Department. Whenever and as soon as that officer shall mature 
his plan of operations, and accomplish the duties assigned him, the forces 
from Louisiana will return to New Orleans. 

3. The commanding General cannot, consistently with his views of 
propriety, take leave of the troops by whom lie has been so manfully sus-r 
tained, without tendering them his grateful acknowledgments for the con- 
stancy and courage with which they have performed every duty, and 
borne privations, the recital of which would not fail to command the ad- 
miration of the virtuous and wise of every section of the republic. The 
officers and soldiers of the whole of these forces (including the artillery 
from Tampa bay) acting as a light brigade, under command of Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Twiggs, of the 4th infantry, have performed their duty so 
much to the satisfaction of the General, that he cannot discriminate be- 
tween the relative claims of corps, of officers, or other individuals, with- 
out the risk of individious distinctions: all did their duty cheerfully and 
gallantly ; and when it became necessary to meet the question whether 
to eat the meat of their own horses or to abandon an important position, 



mi 



653 [ 224 ] 

all cheerfully preferred this unpleasant subsistence to any movement that 
would endanger the frontier — the horse-meat was accordingly eaten by 
officers and men, until the enemy was beaten and sued for peace. A 
timely supply of provisions arrived, escorted by the brave Georgians, 
Floridians, and regulars, under General Clinch, at the moment the pa- 
cific propositions of the enemy were in the act of being answered. The 
Indians were fired on by the General's light troops before he could be 
notified of the object of their being near the camp. They have since 
disappeared. 

4. The General deeply regrets the fall of 1st Lieut. J. F. Izard, of the 
dragoons, acting brigade major, and in command of the advance guard. 
He fell at the head of his corps, and though mortally wounded, had the 
heroic presence of mind to order " keep your positions men, and lie close." 
2d Lieutenant Duncan, of 2d artillery, was slightly wounded; Captain 
Sanders, commanding the friendly Indians, was severely wounded; Cap- 
tain Armstrong, of the United States transport schooner Motto, was 
slightly wounded. The two last-named officers were in the advance, 
where their services had been highly useful during the march. Lieutenant 
Ephraim P. Smith, of Captain Williams's company of Louisiana volun- 
teers, received three wounds. This officer and twenty-nine non-com- 
missioned officers and soldiers of other companies of the regiment, 
evinced their gallantry by their good conduct, as well as by their honora- 
ble wounds. The General is convinced that he never commanded a finer 
corps ; its chief would do honor to any service. 

The officers of the medical department merit the approbation of the 
General for the attentive and skilful manner in which their duties were 
discharged. 

List of killed and ivounded. 

Killed — 1st Lieutenant J. F. Izard, dragoons - 1 

" Sergeant F. Dunn, of the 2d artillery - 1 

" Private Z. Bolie, of Louisiana volunteers - 1 

" " Val. Beck - - - 1 

" " Henry Butler 1 

- Total 5 
Wounded — of officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. 
" 2d artillery 8 

" 4th infantry .... 8 

" Louisiana volunteers 30 

— Total 46 
By order of Major General Gaines : 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Aid-de-camp, acting assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 33. 
Headquarters, Western Department, 

Camp Sabine, July 4, 1836. 

Sir : I received, on the 25th, at Pensacola, on my way to this place, 
your letter of the 10th of March. 

I have delayed replying until now, from a firm conviction that my let- 



[ 224 ] 651 

ters of the 15th and 25th of January, and 6th of February, to vou, with 
those of the 2d, 22d, 28th, and 29th of February, and 2d of March, to 
General Clinch, with my orders and special orders of the 18th of Janu- 
ary to the 9th of March, 183G, inclusively, reported to you by my acting 
assistant adjutant general, for the information of the proper authorities, 
would fully exculpate me from the imputations of General Scott, that I 
had " interfered with his command ," or " disturbed his plan of opera- 
tions" &c. ; more especially as the complainant's accusations were not 
deemed to be of sufficient importance for me to be furnished with a copy. 
But, having recently seen the attacks made on me, through the newspa- 
per called the " Globe," and some other papers of equal respectability, 
and of all political parties, since the 1st of April last, purporting to be 
from the pen of that officer, or from his dictation or sanction, aided by 
the Quartermaster General, a franking bureau officer of the War Depart- 
ment — these insidious publications assure me that 1 am again wantonly 
assailed. These combined attacks suggest to me the propriety of making, 
for the information of the proper authorities, the remarks and explana- 
tions which follow, and which I deem necessary and proper, in vindica- 
tion of my conduct, my movements, and measures, in connexion with the 
war in East Florida, between the 15th of January and 9th of March 
last — a task which I was more than willing to abstain from, or leave to 
others, as I could not, consistenly with my own self-respect, and justice 
to my command, repel the calumnious accusations, without calling in 
question the opinions of high public functionaries whose judgment and 
patriotism I had long sincerely respected ; nor, indeed, without seeming 
disposed to join in an acrimonious controversy, which nothing short of 
an order from the President, or the absolute necessity of self-defence, 
could prompt me to do. 

The Order No. 7 of the present year, requiring General Seott to repair 
to the left wing of my department, was never seen by me until my arri- 
val at Fort King, the 22d of February, i state this fact simply because 
it is a fact hitherto, I apprehend, unknown at your office — but it is a fact 
to which I attach little or no importance. Had I received this order at 
Pensacola, I should have viewed it as a measure of the Secretary of War, 
taken without a full knowledge of the progress of the war upon that fron- 
tier, and of the circumstances which had rendered my movement to Flo- 
rida proper ; and that, therefore, my movement thither ought to continue 
until I should feel assured that the President was apprized of all the ma- 
terial facts bearing upon the subject ; and more especially until the offi- 
cer authorized to enter upon that part of my command assigned to him, 
and ichich formed the principal theatre of the war, should make his ap- 
pearance in person upon that theatre of the war, unless, indeed, my atten- 
tion had been called to other and apparently more important military opera- 
tions, also in actual tear, than those which called me to East Florida. 

This view of the subject is based upon an essential principle of mili- 
tary law, derived from the laws of nature, and incorporated in our insti- 
tutions — a principle sustained by the ablest writers of all enlightened 
nations to whose works I have had access — a principle without the strict 
observance of which no nation whose geographical limits exceed twenty 
miles square could be successfully defended — a principle deeply inter- 
woven with the highest attributes of sovereignty and of self-government \ 



m* 



655 [ 224 ] 

namely, self-defence and self-preservation, as a nation or a state ; or, in 
other words, protection — immediate, instantaneous protection, to 
the exposed feeble members of the community from savage tvar. Yes, sir, 
immediate, instantaneous protection by the military officer intrusted with 
the command of the particular section of country threatened with savage 
attack, until relieved before the enemy by the new commander. 

Let us look into a few of the principal features of the case in question, 
and see what would probably have been the effect of a contrary rule of 
conduct on my part. In command of the Western Department, I had met 
at New Orleans intelligence of a great and unlooked-for disaster having 
occurred upon the left wing of my department, far distant from the seat 
of the Federal Government, from whence alone could I hope to receive 
new orders, or special instructions more applicable to the case, in all its 
bearings, than the orders of the President embraced in my commission 
to serve the United States diligently as a general officer — with the orders 
which he had given me to command the Western Department. An impor- 
tant white settlement within my department was reported to be overrun, 
sacked, and burnt — a United States agent of Indian affairs, and eight val- 
uable officers, and ninety-eight faithful soldiers, with many worthy frontier 
citizens killed, and their property stolen or destroyed. x\.nd I was aware 
that most of the neighboring military posts, namely, Forts Brooke, King, 
Diane, and Key West, all within my military department, were without 
any other works of defence than such as an efficient force of 500 men 
might have taken and destroyed in a few hours, with little loss or risk on 
their part — the garrisons of two of those posts (Fort King and Key West) 
being insufficient for their defence. I was, moreover, apprized that there 
were but about GOO troops of the regular army at that time in Florida, and 
these were separated by a wilderness, supposed to be occupied by the ene- 
my, comprehending near 20,000 square miles, extending nearly 250 miles 
from north to south, and from 120 to 40 miles from east to west, with our 
600 regulars stationed at the opposite angles and sides of this extensive wil- 
derness, without disposable force sufficient to ensure a concentration at 
any one important vulnerable point, from one side of the wilderness in 
question to the other, without the most imminent danger of having such 
force destroyed in its movement to the point of concentration. The de- 
struction of the brave but unfortunate Major Dade, with his heroic officers 
and men, affords an impressive lesson upon this view of the subject which 
no prudent American, soldier or citizen, should ever lose sight of. Un- 
der these circumstances, what was the duty of the commander of the 
Western Department ? What, I ask, was the proper course for me to pur- 
sue ? These questions may be most readily answered by asking another, 
What had 1 promised upon my oath to do ? I had promised, upon my 
oath prescribed by law, " to bear true faith and allegiance to the United 
States of America, andtoserye them honestly and faithfully against their 
enemies or opposers whomsoever, and to observe and obey the orders 
of the President of the United States, and the orders of the officers ap- 
pointed over me according to the Rides and Articles of War.'''' 

I had with me my sword and my commission, with the orders of the 
President of the United States to " command" this department. Now, 
it is well known, that for me to command a military department, or 
any particular section of country upon the frontier, great or small, is, in 



[ 224 ] 656 

a plain military sense, so to order and employ the men and means confi- 
ded to my direction as to protect our own people of the United States 
upon that section of frontier "against their enemies or opposers whomso- 
ever," as set forth in the afore-mentioned oath ; and, if it be in lime of 
war to continue so to command until duly relieved by the new com- 
mander, in his own proper person, and on the theatre of the war. 

In failing to comply with this sacred injunction, I well knew that I 
might thereby have suffered the enemy to kill great numbers of the citi- 
zens and troops, in addition to those already slain within the limits of my 
command, and burn their houses, and take their property. It was my 
bounden duty, therefore, without waiting for new orders, or special in- 
structions, to collect together any disposable force found within my de- 
partment which I might deem sufficient to enable me promptly to strike 
at the enemy, and, if possible, subdue them, or check their devastations, 
until the President should have notice of them, and of my efforts to arrest 
them, and then give such new orders as he might think fit. 

But it is contended, principally indeed by those who have proven them- 
selves to be better qualified for the quiet vocation of a writing-desk than the 
turbulent scenes of an Indian war, that I ought to have abandoned the ex- 
pedition at Pensacola, because I received, on my arrival at that city, your 
letter notifying me — not that General Scott had actually arrived at the 
theatre of the war in Florida, but that he had been ordered thither by the 
Secretary of War ! But little reflection is necessary to see the fallacy 
of this closet-view of the subject. I had embarked, pursuant to my letter 
of the 2d of February, addressed " to General Clinch, or the officer com- 
manding the forces assembling on the northeast border of East Florida," 
with a view to co-operate with that officer in subduing the enemy. I had, 
moreover, given a pledge to the principal force then with me (the Lou- 
isiana volunteers) that i would not require them to go further than I 
would myself go, and that I would stand by them as long as they woidd 
stand by me, in bringing the war to an honorable close. I had thus 
promised, on the 2d of February, with a force of 700 men, so to co-op- 
erate ; this force had been fortunately increased, before the embarkation 
was effected, to near 1,100 men. With this very respectable force em- 
barked, and in its movement for Tampa bay, and within two days' march 
(by steam) of that place, I received at Pensacola the notification from 
you that General Scott had been ordered by the Secretary of War to that 
part of my command to which I was, under the above-mentioned circum- 
stances, destined. But what assurance could I have had that he was 
there ? Did you notify me that he was at the post of honor assigned to 
him by the Secretary of War ? or that such arrangements had been made 
as afforded reasonable ground to hope that General Scott would be pre- 
pared soon to breast the storm of savage desolation, and protect from the 
scalping-knife and firebrand the helpless citizens of both sexes, and of all 
ages, in that region, who had looked to me as their protector ? Did you 
tell me that Oceola and his war-chiefs had given to the President satis- 
factory assurance that they would suspend their massacres and conflagra- 
tions until General Scott should complete his plan of operations, and be 
quite ready to subdue them ? No such thing is found in your letter. 
Nor had 1 any reason, from the previous Northern or Western wilderness 
movements of that officer, to anticipate any thing like a prompt move- 



657 \ 224 ] 

ment, on his part, into the wilds of Florida, longer than he should find 
himself and his forces and supplies propelled by steam-power. 

The now well-ascertained fact that General Scott confined his personal 
operations to the little interior and unmenaced places called Picolata, 
Volusia, Black creek, and Fort Drane, and the intervening country with- 
in the white settlements, occasionally on board the " little steamboat the 
Essayons" for near six weeks, viz : from about the middle of February 
until the 25th of March last, without any attempt on his part to search 
for the enemy, proves clearly — not that I should have abandoned my ex- 
pedition at Pensacola, at Tampa bay, at Fort King, or at the Withlaeoo- 
chee, without subduing the enemy — but that I should, if possible, have 
redoubled my efforts to accomplish this all-important object sooner than 
I did ; and, in place of leaving them under a pledge that hostilities on 
our part should cease, if, as they proposed, they would peaceably await 
the arrival of General Scott, and would attend to the terms he should be 
authorized by the President of the United States to offer them, [a pledge 
which appears to have been wholly disregarded by that officer,] I had 
taken them to Tampa bay, completed with them a treaty, in accordance 
with my own understanding of what was due to them and to the United 
States — a measure which, i am convinced, 1 could have accomplished 
had I not indulged in the fruitless expectation that General Scott would 
arrive soon after hearing I had found the enemy, and employ himself in 
the periormanc of the diplomatic and other duties assigned to him by the 
Secretary of War — 1 have no doubt that I should by such a movement 
have relieved the Florida frontier for ever from all further disturbance on 
the part of these Indians, and should have placed them in a position cal- 
culated, in time, to change their inveterate hostility, desperation, and dis- 
tress, to peace and comfort, if not to a sense of respect and gratitude to 
our Government and country, for the humanity, care, and kindness ex- 
tended to them on their having sued for peace. I am well assured that 
every officer, and every intelligent soldier of the Louisiana volunteers 
and United States troops, then with me upon the Withlacooch.ee, will 
concur in the opinion just now expressed. 

From the foregoing views it may possibly be inferred that I may have 
been disposed to attach blame to General Scott for his readiness again 
and again to solicit or accept a command which he might imagine was 
calculated to awaken in my mind sentiments of personal ill-will towards 
him, such as he had some years past labored, through many acrimonious 
pages, to produce ; but which time, with that sort of reflection whicli 
naturally results from a rational use of time, had so mitigated as to in- 
duce me, on the receipt of your letter notifying me that he was ordered 
into my department, so far from feeling dissatisfied with him, to resolve 
upon availing myself of the occasion to co-operate with him [though ju- 
nior to me] in a manner which I felt convinced, if he did his duty cor- 
rectly, would be the means of enabling us at the proper theatre of action 
to settle our disputes for ever, by our joint efforts in battle, to show 
which of us could do the enemy the most harm and our country the most 
good; and thus, hi the best possible way of terminating personal enmi- 
ties, restore between us that harmony which a proper sense of public 
duty should prompt every high-minded public functionary to extend to 
each other, so that the public service should suffer no detriment from 



I 221 J 60S 

their intemperate controversies. I knew General Scott too well to imagine 
he had ever solicited such a command, in the swamps of a wilderness, 
an I against an enemy such as he had long held in contempt ; and 1 had 
long since ceased to cherish towards that officer any feeling of hostility. 
I had triumphed in the controversy which he had forced upon me. I was 
gratified at my triumph, not so much that General Scott teas vanquished, 
as that the law of the land ivas maintained and preserved inviolate by 
the part which I had taken in that controversy. I shall again triumph — 
not that I have any claim to that peculiar talent of which some of my 
reckless enemies may boast — the talent of " making the ivorse appear 
the better cause" but that I have law of the land to sustain me. It is my 
present purpose to show that the facts of the case were such as to prove 
that I was constantly within the pale of military law; I cannot, therefore, 
but prove myself to have been in the right, and that all who are opposed 
to me are in the wrong. 

It will he seen, by referring to my letter of the 22d of February, that 
I expresed my purpose cordially to co-operate ivith General Clinch, or 
the officer commanding the forces then assembling in the northeast border 
of East Florida, or at Fort Drane. (I have no copy of my letter near 
me, and write now from my recollection of its contents, in which I am 
sure that I am substantially correct.) I also expressed in that letter my 
hope that our joint efforts might tend speedily to terminate the war. This 
sentiment had been often expressed by me to my staff, and to the field 
officers of my command. True it is that my letter of the 22d, 2Sth, and 
29th of February, and 3d of March, were all addressed to General Clinch, 
or the officer commanding at Fort Diane. They were, however, prop- 
erly so addressed, and they were obviously intended for the information 
and'government of any officer at Foit Drane in command of the force 
assembling at or near that post, for the defence of that section of the na- 
tional frontier. Soon after the date of my letter of the 22d of February, 
1 had seen, at Fort King, a letter from General Scott, in which he ex- 
pressed a desire to know where the principal force of the enemy could 
be found ; that letter was addressed to General Clinch, and dated at 
Picolata about the 17th or 18th of February. Not doubting the sincerity 
of General Scott's wish to learn where to find the enemy, I was truly grat- 
ified to have it in my power to say that I would search for and endeavor 
to find their principal force, and would report accordingly. My superior 
knowledge of the country, and of the enemy, justified me in the hope and 
expectation that I should be able soon to relieve General Scott's suppo- 
sed anxiety upon this point : for my movement by the way of the Alalia, 
and the battle-ground of the lamented Major Dade, where there was most 
reason to believe the enemy would make their boldest stand, (that hav- 
ing been deemed to be the place of their "greatest good luck," as the 
interpreters had termed it,) having proven that their principal force was 
not in that quarter, I could not doubt but that I should find them lower 
down on the Withlacoochee ; and I therefore determined to continue my 
search in that direction — that being in the direction to Fort Brooke, the 
only certain point from which I cotdd replenish my supplies of subsistence 
and" ammunition ; the great supply which should have been at Fort King 
having been withheld from that place — whether intentionally to embar- 
rass my operations, or from ignorance of the country, with its wasted re- 



659 [ 224 ] 

sources, or ignorance of llieir duty on the part of General Scott and his 
Quartermaster General, I am yet to learn. It is sufficient for me at pres- 
ent to affirm that large supplies ought to have been, and might have been, 
deposited at Fort King and at Fort Diane before the 22d of February, and 
that I was unable to obtain at those posts more than eight days' rations of 
subsistence, with scarce one hour's supply of powder and shot or car- 
tridges. Nor could I take this slender supply without leaving those posts 
with a short allowance, that could not have been justified, but upon the 
expectation of other supplies being on the road near them, and that my 
movement would contribute to divert from them the attention of the ene- 
my. My plan of operations, embraced in my letter of the 22d of Febru- 
ary, was, under all the circumstances of the case, necessary and proper ; 
and it was also proper for me to address my letters intended for General 
Scott, who, I was aware, was not in my department, to General Clinch^ 
an officer known to be on duty within my department, or the officer com- 
manding the troops assembling at Fort Drane, where General Scott was 
expected to arrive in the course of a few days — where, indeed, he ought 
to have been before the middle of February. General Clinch, who per- 
fectly understood his duty, lost no time in forwarding my letters, or copies 
of them, to General Scott, at Picolata, who, in place of a prompt response, 
meeting in the spirit in which it was offered my proposition cordially to 
co-operate with him in bringing the war to a speedy termination, indul- 
ged himself in unwarranted animadversions — imputing to me the worst of 
motives for my movements, and wasting, in unavailing murmurs, that pre- 
cious moment for action, by co-operation with me, as I had proposed, or, 
if he preferred it, by taking the field, and there relieving me ; he ap- 
pears to have chosen rather to occupy himself in writing accusations 
against me, and endeavoring to convince the President of the United 
States that, in my letter of the 22d of February, above referred to, I had 
been guilty of some criminal interference with his (General Scott's) au- 
thority, as stated in your letter of the 10th of March, and more fully stated 
in the publications dated at Picolata, Black creek, Fort Diane, and more re- 
cently at other places, purporting to be from General Scott and other offi- 
cers of the army, all referring to " the plan of operations," and opinions 
of General Scott, but so artfully mixed up with plausible./jc/ion and reck- 
less calumny, slightly tempered with a few grains of truth, as to render 
it impossible to determine the source whence the mass of matter origin- 
ated, or to discriminate between the official, the semi-official, and mere 
hireling slanders contained in this mass of matter. I would not willingly, 
in an official communication to your office, to be submitted to the Pres- 
ident of the United States, take any notice of any thing contained in those 
publications that is not strictly official. If I err in my attempt to discrim- 
inate in this particular, I will thank you to enable me to rectify myself, 
by favoring me with all the official statements referring to my conduct in 
relation to the war in Florida, as I may deem it to be essential to my vin- 
dication to show to all who may have entertained a doubt, as I trust I 
have already shown to the satisfaction of every man of military mind who 
has heard me, or seen my vindication, upon the following points : 

1. That the proper time and place for me to have suspended my move- 
ment, and for General Scott to have entered upon the command assigned 
to him in my department, was when he should appear in person near me, 
- 43 



[ 224 ] 660 

at the known theatre of the war, and no where else, while the war con- 
tinued. 

2. That, until he thus made his personal appearance near me, at the 
theatre of the war, he had no right whatever to assume the control of a 
soldier, a public horse, or a public ration, within the limits of my de- 
partment. 

3. That it was my bounden duty to retain the control of every soldier, 
every horse, every ration, and every other species of public property, 
necessary to the success of my operations against the enemy, connected 
with the command of the Western Department ; and, above all, to retain 
and exercise the command, honestly and faithfully on the part of the 
United States, " against their enemies or opposers, whomsoever ;" and 
( in the language of the 62d article of war ) give " orders for what is need- 
ful to the service, unless otherwise specially directed by the President 
of the United States, according to the nature of the case," and the Pres- 
ident had never specially directed it to be otherwise. The Adjutant 
General's notification of orders given through him by the Secretary oj 
War was insufficient. This was, to say the least, a loose way of carry- 
ing into effect a solemn provision ol law, embracing a subject of great 
delicacy and importance to the service. — (See the 62d article of war.) 
When the law expressly forbids a change of command, as in this article 
of war, without the special direction of the President, it is obvious that 

.the spirit of the law cannot be fulfilled without the direction is given by 
the President, or in his name, by a person known to be authorized to 
communicate the orders or directions of the President. The Adjutant 
General wrote by order of the Secretary of War. Nevertheless, if the 
President himself had given the order that General Scott should enter 
upon the duties of the command against the Indians in the Western De- 
partment, whilst I was in the field, 1 contend that neither myself nor 
any other officer engaged as I was in the immediate protection of the 

frontier, in the pursuit of the enemy, or in action, holding the enemy in 
check, could, with any propriety, or without a crime, abandon the com- 
mand merely on receipt of the order, and before the arrival at the place 
of pursuit, or of action, of the new commander, unless specially directed 
by the President so to abandon the command ! A direction such as I 
venture to affirm has never been given in any civilized nation whose 
military history is known in this country. The theatre of the war was the 
place, the only proper place, for General Scott to enter upon and for me 
to abandon the command assigned to him, at any time before the enemy 
was subdued ; but that officer did not choose to make his personal ap- 
pearance at the Withlacoochee, though cordially and repeatedly invited 
by me, and challenged by the reiterated reports of my cannon, and by 
the war-whoop and rifle of the Indians, (as announced to him by General 
Clinch,) to partake of the professional banquet which was regularly 
spread before me every day, from the 27th of February to the 5th of 
March inclusively. I did not choose to urge or entreat him to come, 
because I have never desired to see an officer or soldier near me in action 
who did not come cheerfully and promptly, or who has habitually vexing 
himself in fastidious scruples about his rank; and because I had reason 
to apprehend, from the tardiness of his movement, that a disease which 
General Scott contracted towards me, in August, 1814, had not been 



661 [ 224 ] 

completely cured. It was, probably, that sickness of the spleen, which 
the best of doctors say " finds ease only in the misery of others ;" a sick- 
ness which a rapid march to the VVithlacoochee, with the animating 
scenes, the martial music, pure air, and simple food of that region of the 
wilderness has never, to my knowledge, failed to improve the health of 
troops afflicted with disease of any kind, including cholera. That (Gen- 
eral Scott was retarded in his movement to the VVithlacoochee by some 
secret griefs, I could not doubt. What they were, I know not. They 
will doubtless be disclosed in due time. He appears to have been con- 
tent, for a time, with the notion that I had most improperly and prema- 
turely interfered with his command, and disturbed his plan of operations 
before it had been brought to maturity ! — that it was my duty to consider 
him as entitled to the command, and the entire control of my troops and 
supplies, before he arrived in person within the limits of my department ! 
— that my subduing the Indians ought to pass for nothing, because he was 
especially authorized, and I ivas not especially authorized, to subdue 
them! Childish conclusions, these — too trifling to merit any notice — 
nor should I have noticed them but for the call made on me to explain 
and vindicate my conduct ; and from the hope that my vindication may 
be read by the well-meaning officers and men of the volunteers, and the 
army, who doubt, if indeed any doubt the propriety of my conduct — 
who, I am convinced, will readily yield their hasty opinions to the con- 
viction which mature reflection on the subject cannot but produce. They 
will agree with me that my path of public duty was plain — too plain to 
be mistaken by any honest soldier or citizen not blinded by the spirit of 
party, or some other diabolic prejudice or passion — it was, without wait- 
ing for new orders, to fly as rapidly as possible, with whatever disposable 
force and supplies might appear to me necessary and proper to arrest the 
progress of the apparent growing evil of the late disasters; strengthen 
the feeble military posts, and, if possible, put an end to the war by a 
vigorous co-operation with any forces found in that quarter, or otherwise, 
as circumstances should dictate, according to my own plan of operations, 
contained in my letters of the 2d, 22d, 28th, and 29th of February, above 
referred to. The sum and substance of my design was to afford prompt 
and complete protection, that sort of protection which is guarantied by 
the constitution of the United States to the people of the United States — 
including the pioneer, the widow, the orphan, inhabitants of the frontier 
camp or cabin, as well as the polished and wealthy citizen of the great 
emporium of party politics, of commerce, and fashion ; that completepro- 
lection, the work of which should, if possible, commence before the work 
of destruction upon the frontier is finished, or even begun — protection to 
the living citizen rather than to the ashes of the slain ! My plan of 
operations was expressed as concisely as I could express it, in my letter 
of the 22d of February — it was " to search for the enemy until I should 
find them, and then beat them, as otherwise he would beat me." 

4. In carrying into effect this plan of operations, I could suffer no offi- 
cer to interfere with my troops, military posts, or supplies of any kind, within 
the limits of my department, until he should appear in person within those 
limits, duly authorized, and apparently ready and willing to meet the 
enemy and protect the people of the United States within my department 
" against their enemies or opposers, ivhomsoever ;" or until I had met 
and beaten the enemy, and compelled them to sue for peace. 



[ 224 J 662 

5. I did meet the enemy, and did several times beat them, and finally 
compelled them to sue for peace. How this was accomplished, I need 
not now undertake to describe. Grave doubts have been expressed, in 
some of the publications to which I have referred, as to the sincerity of 
the Indian chiefs in suing for peace, upon which is suppossed to rest the 
fact of their having been subdued. I am willing to leave the issue of 
these questions to the testimony of the officers, and the intelligent volun- 
teer and regular soldiers who served with me, pledging my honor to abide 
by their concurrent testimony. But I am not willing to be tried and con- 
demned without a hearing, and by persons who were not only not near 
me, but who have given me good reason to believe they would have been 
better pleased at my downfall than at the triumph obtained by me over the 
enemy ; persons who know full well that the final decree at which every 
enlightened citizen and soldier who investigates the subject must sooner 
or later arrive, establishing the correctness of my conduct, must virtually 
fix the seal of condemnation upon theirs. Hence it was that many hours 
and days of precious time, which should have been devoted to active 
operations against the Indians, were sacrificed at Picolata and Fort Diane, 
and other places, to the fabrication of slanderous essays, to forestall and 
mislead public opinion — to condemn my movements, and cover me 
with the vilest detraction. The editors of newspapers, hitherto profess- 
ing friendliness towards me, have been employed as the leading vehicles 
of this atrocious scheme of slander. Why is this so? I answer, that it 
is because I disdain to be the man of a political party ! I owe allegiance 
to the United States of America, and not to a party. It may be that I 
did not require my officers and men at the YVithlacoochee to take from 
the enemy as many lives as they had, by their savage'eonduct, forfeited — 
but where was the bond, or the principle of the laws of war, or of na- 
tions, binding them to give or me to take the life of any oneof them after 
they had raised the white flag, and sued for peace ? Their first proposi- 
tion was made on the evening of the 5th of March. They were then 
told that if their chiefs would come in the next day they would be heard. 
They accordingly came with a white flag, on the morning of the 6th of 
March, when they said, in the most subdued tone and manner, " We do 
not wish to fight any more ; we have lost many of our warriors killed, 
and others disabled by wounds — we do not wish to lose any more in 
this way, or otherwise than by sickness, or by the falling of trees ; and 
we desire to make peace." They were told, in reply, that I was not 
authorized to treat with them, but that I had learned that an officer was 
on his way, and would soon be there with authority to treat with them ; 
that, it they wished for peace, they must lay down their arms, or cease 
to make any further use of them, and stay beyond the Withlacoochee 
until the officer authorized to treat with them should arrive, and that 
they must then go wherever he should require them; but that if they should 
commit any more hostilities, our troops, of which we had many, would 
kill all of them found with arms in their hands. They then counselled 
among themselves and their warriors until 4 or 5 o'clock in the evening. 
The chiefs then returned, and freely assented to my answer to their prop- 
ositions — the last sentence of which my acting inspector general was, 
for the second time, explaining to them, when General Clinch arrived in 
sight, with the troops of his immediate command from Fort Drane, some 



663 \ 224 

of whom fired in the direction of the Indians, but at too great a distance 
to hurt them. They then hastily retreated to the adjoining hammock. 
They, however, manifested no disposition to violate their engagement, 
nor do I believe there was an officer or soldier with me who had wit- 
nessed their conduct, who entertained a doubt but that they were sub- 
dued, and perfectly sincere in the desire they expressed to abstain from 
further hostilities, and meet General Scott in council whenever and 
wherever he might direct. I remained in command, in order to satisfy 
myself of their sincerity, until the 9th of March, during which time some 
hundreds of my men were allowed to amuse themselves fishing, for a 
mile or two up and down the liver, without discovering any indication 
of further hostility on the part of the Indians, some of whom were seen 
on the opposite side of the river. I, on the 9th of March, turned over 
the command of the troops then with me to General Clinch, as will be 
seen by my orders of that date, with a view to repair to this frontier. It 
is proper here to remark that, in order to obtain accurate information as 
to the position of the chiefs and warriors, and whether their pacific views 
remained unchanged, after being fired on by the volunteers with General 
Clinch, I approved the suggestion of General Clinch to send a black in- 
terpreter across the river to their camp. He set out on the 8th and re- 
turned on the evening of the 10th of March. He reported that the chiefs 
and warriors had gone up the Withlacooehee, near thirty miles above 
Camp Izard, to where their families were stationed ; and that the chiefs 
told him they were waiting agreeably to my directions ; and that they 
would be ready in five days to hold a council with the officer expected 
on for that purpose. General Scott was that officer — who, in place of 
meeting them in council, and directing them what to do to enable them 
to obtain peace, and conform to the wishes of the President of the United 
States — General Scott openly avowed (as 1 have been informed, and his 
official letters imply) a determination to pay no regard to my arrange- 
ment with the Indians, but to obtain an overwhelming force, and then 
annihilate them. His blustering threats, to this effect, were probably 
known to every person, white and black, in and about the house of Gen- 
eral Clinch at Fort Drane ; and, as some of the black domestics were in the 
habits of intimacy with the black interpreters, it was more than probable 
that in this way the threats of the gallant General reached the ears of the 
Seminole chiefs. Nothing, therefore, could be more natural than that 
they should prepare for self-defence, and self-preservation, against a 
commander regardless of the pledge made to them by me, his immediate 
predecessor in command, and his senior ; a pledge which could not be 
diregarded without a gross violation of the laws of nature and of war, 
which no nation can tolerate, without a positive disregard of the most 
sacred of her obligations of good faith towards her neighbors. The se- 
quel has proven the fallacy of such threats, and the truth of the proverb 
that " the battle is not always to the strong, nor the race to the swift." 

6. It may be that I did not expose my officers and soldiers, volunteers 
and regulars, to as much risk and loss as some of my accusers deem, ne- 
cessary to give eclat to a triumph ! Heaven preserve me, I pray, from 
that eclat which is won by the useless or wanton sacrifice of those placed 
under my command ! If my accusers have reason to believe, from the testi- 
mony of those who ventured to accompany and co-operate with me in 



[ 221 ] 664 

battle, that I neglected any important duty to save my own life, or the 
life of any of my officers or men, it would be strictly correct in them to 
establish, if possible, such a charge. But, upon this point, as upon all the 
imputations of General Scott and his franking and writing friends, I hold 
towards them the attitude of honest defiance. Had the constitution or any 
other law of the land required it, or had I ordered it, I have not a doubt 
that every officer and soldier with me at the Withlacoochee would cheer- 
fully have agreed, " if the enemy would stand," to desire them to take the 
first shot ; and would, moreover, have declined the comfort and security of 
sleeping or fighting behind a breastwork, had not this method of occa- 
sional action and rest been consecrated by the example of our own beloved 
Washington, and all other great and good men who have signalised 
themselves in the defence of our country. I think it more than probable 
that my brave little army would have subdued the enemy a lew days 
sooner than we did, had I directed them to make a few rapid sorties ; 
but I had promised General Clinch to make no sorties until I should hear 
from him, from an apprehension that a sortie would have dispersed and 
driven off the Indians before the arrival of mounted force — the only de- 
scription of force with which a sortie could have been made with full ef- 
fect, at the place which I occupied. With the aid of the anticipated 
mounted force, I had calculated on taking or destroying most of the In- 
dians, and terminating the war in the course of a few days. They were 
however subdued, and sued for peace near twenty hours before I heard 
from General Clinch. — (See my letter to that officer, under date the 29th 
of February, in which I promised to abstain from making a sortie until I 
should hear from him.) On the subject of a sortie, however, I was con- 
vinced that I should not have succeeded in rendering it effective without 
the loss of from 50 to 100 of my officers and soldiers ; and I have no hes- 
itation in saying that I would not have had twenty of my excellent Lou- 
isiana volunteers or regulars recklessly sacrificed, whilst momently ex- 
pecting the arrival of mounted force, to have had laid at my feet in chains 
ail the Indians in Florida ? The troops were, for several days, held in 
readiness for a sortie, and it would have been made on hearing from 
General Clinch, or in co-operation with his command, had not the Indians 
sued for peace before he was heard from. 

7. Among the numerous calumnies, official and unofficial, I have seen 
none more absurd than that I was actuated in my movement to Florida 
by no higher motive than that of a desire to obtain " laurels," to which 
General Scott had superior claims ! I feel convinced that those who 
know me best know, and will testify, that I have ever been incapable, 
even while a young subaltern, of that over- weening vanity and officious- 
ness which sometimes prompt the weak or the vicious to attempt to rob 
their brother soldiers of what may be justly their due. Laurels, indeed ! 
The idea of obtaining laurels in an Indian war, I have long deemed to 
be as a vision, never to be realized by any known system of operations 
embraced in the art of war in its supposed improved slate, nor otherwise 
than by watching the movements of the enemy, and profiting by his ex- 
ample of vigilance, rapidity of movement , and privation of food and rest. 
J\o man acquainted with the sufferings of the frontier people of Florida, 
possessed of a spark of patriotism or humanity, could, for a moment, be 
ignorant of the great and only inducement which ought or could have 



605 | 224 | 

prompted me lo make the movement in question. It was obvious to me 
that protection must be afforded, and quickly afforded, to the bleeding 
frontier of that neglected Territory, or that her late flourishing settlements 
would be destroyed, and that delightful region of our national frontier 
rendered a scene of devastation, disgraceful to the military character of 
our country, and doubly disgraceful to the officer intrusted with its 
defence. 

I have shown, as I doubt not, to the satisfaction of every man of mili- 
tary mind who will take the trouble to read this letter, that it was my 
bounden duty, under the circumstances of the case, to collect together 
the forces embarked at New Orleans on the night of the 3d and the morn- 
ing of the 4th of February, and, with them, to repair promptly, as I did, 
to East Florida, and there to employ my best efforts in subduing or hold- 
ing in check the enemy until the arrival of General Scott at the theatre 
of the war. This being admitted, my right to the entire control of the 
subsistence, and horses, and other means of transportation found within 
the limits of my department, or such as was on their passage thither, is 
established beyond the shadow of doubt. Upon what ground, then, could 
General Scott assert that I interfered with and retarded his operations by 
taking rations and horses belonging to his command ? I affirm that his 
excuse is baseless, and his assertion untrue. 1 affirm, moreover, that if 
the horses and rations which he falsely accuses me of having wrongfully 
taken, had been forcibly seized by me from one of the posts within the 
Eastern Department, and to which I could have no claim — the number of 
rations and number of horses in question tvas too small to delay the move- 
ment of General ScoWs grand army for more than three days'' time. The 
whole number of rations taken by me from the day of my arrival at Fort 
King, the 22d of February, to the day I turned over the command to 
General Clinch, the 9th March, 1836, inclusively, amounted to less than 
twelve thousand complete rations, and the number of horses, I am assu- 
red, was not more than eight or ten, taken from Forts King and Drane, 
(posts of my department,) and less than this number of miserable ponies 
from Fort Brooke, not one of ivhich had beenplaced at either of those posts 
by General Scott, as I have been informed and believe. 

His assertion, therefore, that his operations were greatly embarrassed 
or retarded by my having taken the rations and horses provided for his 
command, is not only not true, but is marked with a reckless malignity, 
disgraceful to an officer and dishonorable to a man — not to say a gen- 
tleman. 

All which is submitted for the information of the President of the 
United States. 

With profound respect, 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General, commanding. 

To Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army, 

Washington City. 



[ 224 ] 666 

No. 34. 

Jackson, Louisiana, 

October 29, 1836. 

Dear Sir : I have the honor of informing you that I received your 
letter containing a wish that I would make a statement of facts concern- 
ing the treaty at the Withlacoochee, in Florida, during our campaign 
under Major General Gaines. 

I will now give you what 1 understood at that talk. 

We, General Gaines's troops, were to cease hostilities, and they, the 
Seminoles, were to observe a like course of conduct ; that we had no 
right to make a treaty with them, nor they with us, (as their chief was 
not present,) but that they were tired of the war, and did not wish to 
continue it; and they would meet any authorized agent of our Govern- 
ment at the Withlacoochee, at any time they were notified to do so, and 
hold themselves and warriors in readiness to take into effect any treaty 
then and so made ; they were to recross the river, and await any mes- 
sage sent them, and not to fire a gun until they heard from General Scott, 
or his agent ; and, so far as I know, they kept their part of the agreement. 
There never was (in my presence) a word said about any line or bound- 
ary, and they were informed that the whole country must be left, and 
that if not peaceably they would be exterminated ; and it was the opin- 
ion of every officer with whom I had any conversation, that the war was 
over, and the Indians willing to remove. 

My own opinion is, if General Scott had not moved down on them with 
his force, they would now have been over the Mississippi. 
Believe me, sir, vours, 

F. MARKS, 
Captain of the Bayou Sara Blues, from Louisiana. 

E. A. Hitchcock, Esq., U. S. Army. 



No. 35. 



New Orleans, October 9, 1836. 

Dear Sir : I received your letter in due course of mail, in which you 
direct my attention to a communication published in the New York Eve- 
ning Star of the 2d ultimo, addressed to M. M. Cohen, Esq., author of 
a book called " Notices of Florida and the Campaigns." I have not 
seen the work alluded to, but, previous to receipt of your favor, I had 
perused the article referred to, cursorily ; since then it has claimed my 
particular notice. It gives me great pleasure, sir, to haVe it in my power, 
from a fresh recollection of all that passed at the council whereat I was 
present with yourself and another officer, to state with confidence, that 
in every particular in the said communication you have observed a studied 
accuracy, especially with regard to some leading facts at issue, to wit, 
that the Indians stipulated to maintain the country with the Withlacoochee 
river as a boundary line. So far from this being the case, I recollect 
distinctly that when it was proposed by the Indian chiefs on our first 
meeting them, that we should " go home where we came from," that you 



667 [ 224 ] 

directly remarked that we intended to maintain our position at all haz- 
ards, and continue to fight them, if necessary. This, sir, must certainly 
look like any thing else hut yielding to them " the maintenance of the 
country." 

For fear however of prolixity, I will briefly state what took place at 
the council held by these chiefs in our presence, and leave it for others 
to draw conclusions. On the occasion of the meeting in council, our 
camp was hailed the evening previous in a very audible and clear man- 
ner, by one of the enemy, which awakened the attention of all. After 
being answered by Colonel Twiggs, who desired to know what he want- 
ed, the person replied, " We want to make peace with the white men." 
The Colonel directed him to come in the morning, and bear a white flag 
if the red men wanted to hold a talk ; that he would then hear what they 
had to say. He consented, departed, and bade us good night. 

The morning lollowing the Indians were seen collecting in groups in 
the rear of our breastwork, and soon after, a deputation from them was 
discovered advancing slowly and cautiously, displaying a white flag. 
Adjutant Barrow was ordered to exhibit a white flag from the breast- 
work in answer, as a token of our promise made the night before, and 
as an assurance of their safe advance towards the camp. You then sir 
received instructions from General Gaines to go out to meet them, ac- 
companied by the adjutant and myself, and learn what they had to say. 
About one hundred and fifty yards distant we received seven chiefs, and 
seated ourselves on a dry log with them. Jumper, called also the Law- 
yer, opened and conducted the talk through Abraham, a black chief and 
interpreter, in a grave and respectful manner, while Oceola and the 
others were listening with the greatest attention. They said they had 
lost many warriors, and did not wish to fight any more ; they wanted 
peace. They wished time to consult together, and agreed to meet us 
again in the afternoon. Preparatory to that meeting you had reduced to 
writing certain stipulations, which, section by section, Abraham the in- 
terpreter explained to the others in an earnest and impressive manner, 
the amount of which was, that they should agree to meet commissioners 
from the United States, and abide their decision ; in the mean time there 
should be a cessation of hostilities. All present agreed to the terms 
proposed in a manner which satisfied us of their sincerity, but asked time 
to see their Governor, who was some miles distant, which they would 
do that night, and meet us with him the next day. They then inquired 
if we had not more men coming ; if so, they wished them to be informed 
of what had taken place, as they had also many warriors on their way 
to join them : it was then proposed that a certain number of white and 
red men should go out together, to prevent a hostile meeting between 
the advancing parties. About this time, the Indians who were seated on 
the ground at a distance rose up, and began to fly, informing their chiefs 
who were then in council with us, that the white men were coming. We 
directed them to take their men into a hammock on our right ; but before 
they had all entered General Clinch came up with his command, and 
fired a few shots upon them, before he could be informed what had been 
done in council. The next morning they did not appear ; but so much 
confidence had you and I, sir, in their sincerity the day before, that we 
left the camp together for a walk of observation on the bank of the river. 
Our men after that amused themselves fishing and bathing in. the river, 



[ 224 ] 668 

without the least apprehension ; and while we remained there, and durin 
the two weeks in camp near Fort Drane, not a rifle was fired. In truth 
sir, there was nothing like treachery on their part; and I believe ever 
officer and private considered them sincere, and looked for a speedy ter 
ruination of the war. 

I am, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

GEORGE E. HARRAL, 
Late Surgeon, Louisiana Volunteers. 
Captain E. A. Hitchcock. 

P. S. — I have given you a hasty sketch from memory what took place 
at the meeting we had with the chiefs ; you are at liberty to do with it 
as you please, either in part or as it now stands. I did hope before this 
to have had the pleasure of paying my respects to General Gaines, as it 
has been reported that he was coming to our city. I look back with much 
pleasure on some portion of our campaign together, and shall always en- 
tertain the highest respect for the General and his staff, as well as many 
others. I hope that my communication contains all you require ; if not, 
write me again, and I may supply any omissions now made. 

H. 



Nos. 36 and 37. — Maps of Florida and Camp Izard. 



No. 38. 



[From the New York Courier akd Inquirer op April 2, 1836.] 

Affairs in Florida. — The Savannah Georgian contains an Order issued 
by General Gaines, giving a history of his campaign in Florida, from 
which we make the following extracts : 

" These troops, in the short space of thirty-six days, have marched by 
land and water nearly eight hundred miles — one hundred and forty 
through the country occupied by the enemy, whose principal force they 
have met, beaten, and forced to sue for peace. • 

" All did their duty cheerfully and gallantly ; and when it became ne- 
cessary to meet the question, whether to eat their own horses, or to 
abandon an important position, all cheerfully preferred this unpleasant 
subsistence to any movement that would endanger the frontier. The 
horse-meat was accordingly eaten by officers and men, until the enemy 
was beaten and sued for peace." 

He further says — 

"The object for which I set out from Louisiana being accomplished 
I resign the command of the Louisiana troops to General Clinch, until 
the arrival of the forces under the officer charged with the diplomatic ar- 
rangements by the War Department. Whenever and so soon as that 
officer shall mature his plan of operations, and accomplish the duties 
assigned to him, the forces from Louisiana will return to New Orleans. " 

The manner in which the war with the Seminole Indians has been 



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669 [ 22.4 ] 

mducted, and the injury which the country has sustained in conse- 
uence of the jealousy which General Gaines has exhibited towards 
.eneral Scott, are subjects of general conversation ; and although we 
ave ever entertained a high respect for General Gaines, and justly ap- 
reciated his services, we should be wanting in our duty as public jour- 
nalists if we did not pointedly condemn his conduct while at the head of 
he troops which have been so disgracefully kept at bay on the banks of 
he Withlacoochee by an enemy inferior in numbers and without any 
tretension to discipline. 

We will not stop to inquire into the motives which induced General 
iaines to proceed into the Indian country, after he had received official 
nformation at Pensacola that General Scott had been selected to conduct 
he war against the Seminoles, and that his services were required on 
he Mexican frontier. Any person who will read the extract from his 
jeneral orders, must at once perceive, that while patriotism may have 
>een one of the causes for such conduct, yet the moving principle of 
iction with him was a desire to deprive General Scott of any laurels 
vhich a successful issue to the campaign might secure to him. We do 
lot say, nor do we believe that he intended to render the campaign un- 
successful ; but we have not a doubt that he was determined to make an 
effort to put an end to the struggle by a forced march of his own, even 
it the hazard of thereby frustrating for a time the plans of his superior 
)fficer. In this it is now certain he might have succeeded if he had acted 
vith vigor ; and if so, he probably would have been held excused by 
;he public, who always look more to the results of military movements 
;han to the objects with which they are undertaken and the foresight and 
;ilent displayed in their execution. 

That General Gaines proceeded into the heart of the Indian country 
with nearly five hundred volunteers, and upwards of six hundred regular 
;roops, well disciplined, and commanded by as brave and intelligent offi- 
cers as can be found in any army, is already matter of history; and it is 
squally matter of history, that although the Indian enemy did not in fact 
nuster so large a body of warriors, yet at no time did the General himself 
estimate them at more than fifteen hundred ! Admitting for a moment 
that they were fifteen hundred strong ; has it ever happened in the his- 
tory of our Indian wars — has it ever entered the mind of the most igno- 
rant, to believe it possible that with this force, eleven hundred regulars 
and volunteers should have been held in check, beaten day after day, and 
finally compelled to act upon the defensive and starve within a breast- 
work which they had reared for defensive instead of offensive warfare ? 
The very conception of such a contingency being within the scope of 
possibility, would, but a few weeks since, have been considered evidence 
of gross ignorance if not partial derangement ; and yet such an event 
has occurred, and the people in astonishment look at each other and ask 
in vain for an explanation ! They look too, in vain, for any explanation 
in the letters from the seat of war, or in the orders of the commanding 
General ; unless indeed they are to find such explanation in his boast 
that his command had " met, beaten, and forced the enemy to sue for 
peace ! " 

We would respectfully ask — Are such the facts of the case ? Do not 
the official reports of Generals Scott and Clinch, corroborated by all the 



[ 224 J 670 

letters written from the theatre of events, distinctly proclaim that the 
enemy has not been beaten or forced to sue for peace, but that he is now 
in force on the Withlacoochee, flushed with victory, and ready to make 
another desperate effort, in consequence of the encouragement he has 
received in his contests with General Gaines's command ? It is noto- 
rious that day after day General Gaines was met and held in check by 
an inferior force of Indians ; and that instead of sweeping them from the 
face of the earth and putting an end to the war at once, as he could have 
done by a gallant attack upon them, he intrenched himself in a hastily 
constructed breastwork, and there resolved to starve in presence of his 
enemy unless relieved by General Clinch. If his men were too short 
of provisions to fight, how happens it that they succeeded in sustaining 
themselves for several days in succession within their breastwork ? It is 
not contended that when they entered their breastwork they were in a 
starving state and too much enfeebled by hunger to meet the enemy ; and 
we cannot but believe that the labor and energies expended in fortifying 
themselves against the very enemy they sought for the purpose of chas- 
tising, would have been far better applied in a brisk pursuit of that enemy 
and his annihilation. Why, we venture to assert that there was not a 
solitary officer of the army with the General at the time, who did not 
condemn his proceeding as most extraordinary and calculated to cover 
their detachment with dishonor ; and we are very sure that there can- 
not be found in service an officer of any rank or standing, who will have 
the hardihood to defend this proceeding. We do not doubt the courage 
of General Gaines — that is as unquestionable as are his former services 
to the country ; but never has it fallen to our lot since the days of Hull, 
to record such disreputable prudence at the very moment when an oppor- 
tunity offered to accomplish the great object of the expedition — the total 
destruction of his foe. There is not — there cannot be a doubt, that if 
Gaines had continued to operate on the offensive instead of ingloriously 
retiring into a breastwork, Oceola and his warriors would now have been 
effectually put down, if not exterminated ; and that too without his troops 
suffering as much from hunger as they did in their intrenchments. Had 
he beaten the enemy, as he says he did, and as he most assuredly could 
and should have done, he would have been able to supply his command 
from their stores, for they had an abundance of stolen beeves with them, 
two of which Oceola offered him when he treated with and dictated 
terms to his conqueror ! 

But enough of this disgraceful affair. General Gaines was. fortunate- 
ly rescued from his perilous situation by the timely arrival of General 
Clinch ; and even then, instead of forcing his enemy to yield, he fled 
from him with precipitation, and published the account of his glorious 
campaign, which has caused his brother officers to blush for the conduct 
of the third in rank in the army, and at the same time greatly perplexed 
the people at large ; who cannot exactly understand why an enemy which 
has been " beaten and compelled to sue for peace," should still bid de- 
fiance to the army under General Scott. 

But, extraordinary as has been the conduct of General Gaines in (he 
field, the detail of that conduct as given by himself, is equally open to 
censure. At Pensacola, General Gaines was officially apprized that Gen- 
eral Scott had been selected to conduct this war ; he subsequently met 



671 [ 224 J 

that officer and saw his arrangements to accomplish what he had failed 
in ; and yet he published to the world not only that the enemy had been 
" beaten and forced to sue for peace," but speaks of his commanding 
General as "the officer charged with tbe diplomatic arrangements by the 
War Department." Now, if this means any thing, it means that General 
Scott was only sent to Florida in a civil capacity — as a negotiator, a min- 
ister extraordinary or plenipotentiary, for the purpose of treating with 
King Oceola, while he ( General Gaines) was selected to do the lighting ; 
, had accomplished the object of his visit, paved the way for a gracious 
reception of Mr. Scott the diplomatist, and bravely borne away the hon- 
ors of a gallant and chivalrous achievement ! Alas, " how are the mighty 
fallen ! " how unfortunate is it that poor human nature cannot resist the 
ravages of time, and that the noblest of our species, if permitted to re- 
main too long on earth, necessarily relapse into a second childhood. 

The following is the intelligence from the seat of war received yester- 
day : 

[Fhom the Globe ov March 31.] 

" Despatches were received on Tuesday evening at the Adjutant Gen- 
eral's office dated Fort Drane, March 14, which state that General Clinch, 
with some means of subsistence, and about six hundred men, of whom 
one hundred and fifty were mounted Floridians, joined General Gaines 
on the Gth instant. The force under the latter had already been reduced 
I to the necessity of commencing on horses and dogs for their subsistence. 
The troops remained in their position until the 10th. General Gaines 
relinquished the command to General Clinch on the 9th, and departed 
for Louisiana. The troops under General Clinch fell back to the vicinity 
of Fort Drane. 

" It appears that at the moment of the junction of the troops under 
General Clinch with General Gaines, some communication had been 
opened with the Indians. The Indians, however, were fired upon by 
the advancing troops, and afterwards disappeared. 

" General Scott reports that he has reason to believe the Indians in 
the same position they have occupied for some time. General Scott con- 
tinues, ' I have instructed Brigadier General Eustis, after scouring the 
country through which he would have to pass to some extent, to place his 
column in position somewhere in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha, about 
the 25th instant. Colonel Lindsay, by the same day, is to be with his 
force at Chickuchatty, about two marches from Tampa, and means are 
suggested to each in order to multiply the chances of communication with 
each other. The right wing will move hence, say on the 24th instant, 
to attack in front. This column will pass through Withlacoochee, about 
half a mile below the late intrenched camp, where there is a good ford, &c. 

" ' The 25th instant is appointed in order that I may be certain of giving 
Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay time to put themselves in 
positions respectively, and further to give time to the harassed troops 
lately under the command of Major General Gaines, to recruit themselves 
for effective operations. The same interval is equally important to en- 
able Brigadier General Clinch to receive from Picolata, or Garey's ferry, 
a quantity of subsistence indispensable to give confidence to the move- 
ments of the right wing.' " 



[ 224 J 672 

Extract of a letter from General Clinch to General Scott, dated 

" Fort Drane, March 12. 

" I returned last night from the Withlacoochee, with the troops com- 
posing the right wing, Florida army. The troops turned over to me by 
Major General Gaines are stationed four miles in advance of this post; 
and, with a little rest and recruiting, will be a very efficient force, and 
will add much to the strength of the army of Florida. 

" The principal force of the Indians is still on the Withlacoochee, and 
it is my opinion they will remain there until driven from their stronghold 
by force." 

The following is an extract from a letter received from Dr. Nourse, dated 
"Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, March 16, 1836. 
" We march in a few days for Fort King, for the purpose of joining 
General Scott. Colonel Lindsay, of the army, arrived since my last, with 
eight hundred Alabama volunteers, making the force at this post at pres- 
ent about one thousand two hundred. 1 ' 

[Fjiom the Richmond Enq,tjirek March 16.] 

" There is every reason to believe that Powell (Oceola) remains with 
his people in the same neighborhood. This is most fortunate for Scott's 
operations. On the 25th, Eustis, with 1,700 men, would be at Pelakli- 
kaha, on the road from Tampa to Fort King; and Colonel Lindsay had 
been expected to be at Chickuchatty, nearer to Tampa, with about 800 
men. There is too much reason to fear that the dispersion of the 700 
troops from Alabama would embarrass this part of the arrangement. 
General Scott could not, by the 16th, have heard of this unfortunate 
contre-temps. Clinch, on the same day, (the 25th,) would be back on 
the Withlacoochee, with about 1,800 men. About 400 of Clinch's wing 
had been left by General Scott on the St. John's, but they would be up 
in time. Whilst Scott attacks them in front, on the one side, Eustis and 
Lindsay were to close in the rear — not only to aid in the engagement, 
but to prevent the escape to the southeast. If the Indians remain in their 
present position, and everybody believed that they would, the great stroke 
was expected to be given about the 28th, (yesterday,) and some smaller 
bodies would then remain to be picked up. The delay till the 28th was 
to make it certain that Eustis and Lindsay were in position, and to enable 
Clinch to receive from Picolata and Garey's ferry the necessary subsist- 
ence. All the wagons have gone to those places. The army was in 
fine spirits, and Gaines's troops recovering fast from their recent suffer- 
ings. If General Scott should succeed in his operations, he expected to 
be at Tampa bay by the 7th April. 

" How far the disappointment in receiving the Alabama volunteers will 
embarrass the operations of (he campaign, it is impossible for us to deter- 
mine. We have every confidence, however, in the genius and resources 
of General Scott." 



073 [ 224 J 

No. 39. 

Office of the Com. Gen. of Subsistence, 

Washington, July 1, 1836. 

Sir: Yours of the 11th ultimo is received. I feel confident that no 
exertions on your part have been spared to meet the wishes of this de- 
partment ; and I have to express my entire approbation of all you have 
done in the performance of your important and arduous duties. 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

G. GIBSON, C. G. S. 
To Lieut. P. Morrison, 

A. C. S.. Neiv Orleans. 



No. 40. 
Office of Com. Gen. of Subsistence, 
[Extract.] Washington, September 23, 1836. 

I cannot close this communication without expressing to you my 
thanks for the prompt, correct, and very efficient manner in which you 
have conducted the arduous duties confided to you by this department 
for the last eleven years. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

G. GIBSON, C. G. S. 
To Lieut. P. Morrison, 

A. C. S., Neiv Orleans. 



No. 41. 



Statement oj subsistence stores in the harbor of Tampa bay, on the 

31s/ of March, 1836. 

Rations of pork, -----. 216,750 

Rations of flour and hard bread, - 304,423 

Rations of coffee, ------ 340,250 

Rations of sugar, ------ 212,875 

The amount of small rations on hand, viz : beans, soap, candles, salt 
and vinegar, exceeds this statement, and no additional supplies of those 
articles will be required. 

The commanding General no doubt will give you a statement of the 
number of troops in the field, and the quantity of rations which will be 
required at this depot. Should, however, an estimate be made for ad- 
ditional complete rations, it will only be necessary for you to furnish 
pork and flour, or bread. 

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, 

First Lieutenant, § A. C. S. 
To First Lieut. P. Morrison, 

A. C. S., New Orleans, La. 



[ 221 ] 674 

No. 42. 

[From tkf. New Orleans Bulletin of September 26, 1836.] 

HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN DEPARTMENT, 

Camp Sabine, July 4, 1836. 

Sir : I received, on the 25th, at Pensacola, on my way to this place, 
your letter of the 10th of March. 

I have delayed replying until now, from a firm conviction that my let- 
ters of the 15th and 25th of January, and 6th of February, to you, with 
those of the 2d, 22d, 28th, and 29th of February, and 2d of March, to 
General Clinch, with my orders and special orders of the 18th of Janu- 
ary to the 9th of March, 1836, inclusively, reported to you by my acting 
assistant adjutant general, for the information of the proper authorities, 
would fully exculpate me from the imputations of General Scott, that I 
had " interfered tvith his command " or " disturbed his plan of opera- 
tions ," &c. ; more especially as the complainant's accusations were not 
deemed to be of sufficient importance for me to be furnished with a copy. 
But, having recently seen the attacks made on me, through the newspa- 
per called the " Globe," and some other papers of equal respectability, 
and of all political parties, since the 1st of April last, purporting to be 
from the pen of that officer, or from his dictation or sanction, aided by 
the Quartermaster General, a franking bureau officer of the War Depart- 
ment — these insidious publications assure me that I am again wantonly 
assailed. These combined attacks suggest to me the propriety of making, 
for the information of the proper authorities, the remarks and explana- 
tions which follow, and which I deem necessary and proper, in vindica- 
tion of my conduct, my movements, and measures, in connexion with the 
war in East Florida, between the 15th of January and 9th of March 
last — a task which I was more than willing to abstain from, or leave to 
others, as I could not, consistenly with my own self-respect, and justice 
to my command, repel the calumnious accusations, without calling in 
question the opinions of high public functionaries whose judgment and 
patriotism I had long sincerely respected ; nor, indeed, without seeming 
disposed to join in an acrimonious controversy, which nothing short of 
an order from the President, or the absolute necessity of self-defence, 
could prompt me to do. 

The Order No. 7 of the present year, requiring General Seott to repair 
to the left wing of my department, was never seen by me until my arri- 
val at Fort King, the 22d of February. 1 state this fact simply because 
it is a fact hitherto, I apprehend, unknown at your office — but it is a fact 
to which I attach little or no importance. Had I received this order at 
Pensacola, I should have viewed it as a measure of the Secretary of War, 
taken without a full knowledge of the progress of the war upon that fron- 
tier, and of the circumstances which had rendered my movement to Flo- 
rida proper ; and that, therefore, my movement thither ought to continue 
until I should feel assured that the President was apprized of all the ma- 
terial facts bearing upon the subject ; and more especially until the offi- 
cer authorized to enter upon that part of my command assigned to him, 
and ivhich farmed the principal theatre of the ivar, should make his ap- 
pearance in person upon that theatre of the ivar, unless, indeed, my atten- 



675 [ 224 ] 

tion had been called to other and apparently more important military opera- 
tions, also in actual war, than those which called me to East Florida. 

This view of the subject is based upon an essential principle of mili- 
tary law, derived from the laws of nature, and incorporated in our insti- 
tutions—a principle sustained by the ablest writers of all enlightened 
nations to whose works 1 have had access — a principle without the strict 
observance of which no nation whose geographical limits exceed twenty 
miles square could be successfully defended — a principle deeply inter- 
woven with the highest attributes of sovereignty and oi self-government, 
namely, self-defence and self-preservation, as a nation or a state ; or, in 
other words, protection — immediate, instantaneous protection, to 
the exposed feeble members of the community from savage war. Yes, sir, 
immediate, instantaneous protection by the military officer intrusted with 
the command of the particular section of country threatened with savage 
attack, until relieved before the enemy by the new commander. 

Let us look into a few of the principal features of the case in question, 
and see what would probably have been the effect of a contrary rule of 
conduct on my part. in command of the Western Department, I had met 
at New Orleans intelligence of a great and unlooked-for disaster having 
occurred upon the left wing of my department, far distant from the seat 
of the Federal GoVernment, from whence alone could I hope to receive 
new orders, or special instructions more applicable to the case, in all its 
bearings, than the orders of the President embraced in my commission 
to serve the United States diligently as a general officer — with the orders 
which he had given me to command the Western Department. An impor- 
tant white settlement within my department was reported to be overrun, 
sacked, and burnt — a United States agent of Indian affairs, and eight val- 
uable officers, and ninety-eight faithful soldiers, with many worthy frontier 
citizens killed, and their property stolen or destroyed. And I was aware 
that most of the neighboring military posts, namely, Forts Brooke, King, 
Drane, and Key West, all within my military department, were without 
any other works of defence than such as an efficient force of 500 men 
might have taken and destroyed in a few hours, with little loss or risk on 
their part — the garrisons of two of those posts ( Fort King and Key West) 
being insufficient for their defence. I was, moreover, apprized that there 
were but about 600 troops of the regular army at that time in Florida, and 
these were separated by a wilderness, supposed to be occupied by the ene- 
my, comprehending near 20,000 square miles, extending nearly 250 miles 
from north to south, and from 120 to 40 miles from east to west, with our 
600 regulars stationed at the opposite angles and sides of this extensive wil- 
derness, without disposable force sufficient to ensure a concentration at 
any one important vulnerable point, from one side of the wilderness in 
question to the other, without the most imminent danger of having such 
force destroyed in its movement to the point of concentration. The de- 
struction of the brave but unfortunate Major Dade, witli his heroic officers 
and men, affords an impressive lesson upon this view of the subject which 
no prudent American, soldier or citizen, should ever lose sight of. Un- 
der these circumstances, what was the duty of the commander of the 
Western Department ? What, 1 ask, was the proper course for me to pur- 
sue ? These questions may be most readily answered by asking another, 
What had 1 promised upon my oath to do ? I had promised, upon my 
oath prescribed by law, " to bear true faith and allegiance to the United 
44 



[ 224 ] G76 

States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against their 
enemies or opposers whomsoever, and to observe and obey the orders 
of the President of the United States, and the orders of the officers ap- 
pointed over me according to the Rules and Ai'ticles of War." 

I had with me my sword and my commission, with the orders of the 
President of the United States to "command" this department. Now, 
it is well known, that for me to command a military department, or 
any particular section of country upon the frontier, great or small, is, in 
a plain military sense, so to order and employ the men and means confi- 
ded to my direction as to protect our own people of the United States 
upon that section of frontier " against their enemies or opposers whomso- 
e ," as set forth in the afore-mentioned oath ; and, if it be in time of 
war, to continue so to command until duly relieved by the new com- 
mander, in his own proper person, and on the theatre of the war. 

In failing to comply with this sacred injunction, I well knew that 1 
might thereby have suffered the enemy to kill great numbers of the citi- 
zens and troops, in addition to those already slain within the limits of my 
command, and burn their houses, and take their property. It was my 
bounden duty, therefore, without waiting for new orders, or special in- 
structions, to collect together any disposable force found within my de- 
partment which I might deem sufficient to enable me promptly to strike 
at the enemy, and, if possible, subdue them, or check their devastations, 
until the President should have notice of them, and of my efforts to arrest 
them, and then give such new orders as he might think fit. 

But it is contended, principally indeed by those who have proven them- 
selves to be better qualified for the quiet vocation of a writing-desk than the 
turbulent scenes of an Indian war, that I ought to have abandoned the ex- 
pedition at Pcnsacola, because I received, on my arrival at that city, your 
letter notifying me — not that General Scott had actually arrived at the 
theatre of the war in Florida, but that he had been ordered thither by the 
Secretary of War ! But little reflection is necessary to see the fallacy 
of this closet-view of the subject. I had embarked, pursuant to my letter 
of the 2d of February, addressed " to General Clinch, or the officer com- 
manding the forces assembling on the northeast border of East Florida," 
with a view to co-operate with that officer in subduing the enemy. I had, 
moreover, given a pledge to the principal force then with me (the Lou- 
isiana volunteers) that 1 would not require them to go further than I 
would myself go, and that I would stand by them as long as they would 
stand by me, in bringing the war to an honorable close. I had thus 
promised, on the 2d of February, with a force of 700 men, so to co-op- 
erate ; this force had been fortunately increased, before the embarkation 
was effected, to near 1,100 men. With this very respectable force em- 
barked, and in its movement for Tampa bay, and within two days' march 
(by steam) of that place, I received at Pcnsacola the notification from 
you that General Scott had been ordered by the Secretary of War to that 
part of my command to which I was, under the above-mentioned circum- 
stances, destined. But what assurance could I have had that he was 
there ? Did you notify me that he was at the post of honor assigned to 
him by the Secretary of War ? or that such arrangements had been made 
as afforded reasonable ground to hope that General Scott would be pre- 
pared soon to breast the storm of savage desolation, and protect from the 
scalping-knife and firebrand the helpless citizens of both sexes, and of all 



677 [ 224 ] 



ages, in that region, who had looked to me as their protector ? Did you 
tell me that Oceola and his war-chiefs had given to the President satis- 
factory assurance that they would suspend their massacres and conflagra- 
tions until General Scott should complete his plan of operations, and be 
quite ready to subdue them? No such thing is found in your letter. 
Nor had I any reason, from the previous Northern or Western wilderness 
movements of that officer, to anticipate any thing like a prompt move- 
ment, on his part, into the wilds of Florida, longer than he should find 
himself and his forces and supplies propelled by steam-power. 

The now well-ascertained fact that General Scott confined his personal 
operations to the little interior and unmenaced places called Picolata, 
Volusia, Black creek, and Fort Drane, and the intervening country with- 
in the white settlements, occasionally on board the " little steamboat the 
Essayons" for near six weeks, viz : from about the middle of February 
until the 2oth of March last, without any attempt on his part to search 
for the enemy, proves clearly — not that 1 should have abandoned my ex- 
pedition at Pensacola, at Tampa bay, at Fort King, or at the Withlacoo- 
chee, without subduing the enemy — but that 1 should, if possible, have 
redoubled my efforts to accomplish this all-important object sooner than 
I did ; and, in place of leaving them under a pledge that hostilities on 
our part should cease, if, as they proposed, they would peaceably await 
the arrival of General Scott, and would attend to the terms he should be 
authorized by the President of the United States to offer them, [a pledge 
which appears to have been wholly disregarded by that officer,] 1 had 
taken them to Tampa bay, completed with them a treaty, in accordance 
with my own understanding of what was due to them and to the United 
States — a measure which, 1 am convinced, I could have accomplished 
had I not indulged in the fruitless expectation that General Scott would 
arrive soon after hearing I had found the enemy, and employ himself in 
the peiformanc of the diplomatic and other duties assigned to him by the 
Secretary of War — I have no doubt that I should by such a movement 
have relieved the Florida frontier /or ever from all further disturbance on 
the part of these Indians, and should have placed them in a position cal- 
culated, in time, to change their inveterate hostility, desperation, and dis- 
tress, to peace and comfort, if not to a sense of respect and gratitude to 
our Government and country, for the humanity, care, and kindness ex- 
tended to them on their having sued for peace. I am well assured that 
every officer, and every intelligent soldier of the Louisiana volunteers 
and United States troops, then with me upon the Withlacoocb.ee, will 
concur in the opinion just now expressed. 

From the foregoing views it may possibly be inferred that I may have 
been disposed to attach blame to General Scott for his readiness again 
and again to solicit or accept a command which he might imagine was 
calculated to awaken in my mind sentiments of personal ill-will towards 
him, such as he had some years past labored, through many acrimonious 
pages, to produce ; but which time, with that sort of reflection which 
naturally results from a rational use of time, had so mitigated as to in- 
duce me, on the receipt of your letter notifying me that he was ordered 
into my department, so far from feeling dissatisfied with him, to resolve 
upon availing myself of the occasion to co-operate with him [though ju- 
nior to me] in a manner which I felt convinced, if he did his duty cor- 



[ 221 ] 67S 

rectly, w ould be (he means of enabling us at the proper theatre of aciior? 
to settle our disputes for ever, by our joint efforts in battle, to shove 
which of us could do the enemy the most harm and, our country the most 
good; and thus, in the best possible way of terminating personal enmi- 
ties, restore between us that harmony which a proper sense of public 
duty should prompt every high-minded public functionary to extend to 
each other, so that the public service should suffer no detriment from 
their intemperate controversies. 1 knew General Scott too well to imagine 
he had ever solicited such a command, in the swamps of a wilderness , 
and against an enemy such as he had long held in contempt ; and I had 
long since ceased to cherish towards that officer any feeling of hostility. 
I had triumphed in the controversy which he had forced upon me. I was 
gratified at my triumph, not so much that General Scott was vanquished, 
as that the law of the land was maintained and preserved inviolate by 
the part which 1 had taken in that controversy. I shall again triumph — 
not that I have any claim to that peculiar talent of which some of. my 
reckless enemies may boast — 'the talent ol " making the ivorse appear 
the better cause," but that I have law of the land to sustain me. It is my 
present purpose to show that the facts of the case were such ;;s to prove 
that I was constantly within the pale of military law; I cannot, therefore, 
but prove myself to have been in the right, and that all who are opposed 
to me are in the wrong. 

It will be seen, by referring to my letter of the 22d of February, that 
I exprcsed my purpose cordially to co-operate ivith General Clinch, or 
the officer commanding the forces then assembling in the northeast border 
of East Florida, or at Fort Diane. (I have no copy of my letter near 
me, and write now from my recollection of its contents, in which I am 
sure that 1 am substantially correct.) I also expressed in that letter my 
hope that our joint efforts might tend speedily to terminate the tear. This 
sentiment had been often expressed by me to my staff, and to the field 
officers of my command. True it. is that my letter of the 22d, 2Sth, and 
29th of February, and 3d of March, were all addressed to General Clinch 7 
or the officer commanding at Fort Drane. They were, however, prop- 
erly so addressed, and they wore obviously intended for the information 
and government of any officer at Fort Drane in command of the force 
assembling at or near that post, for the defence of that section of the na- 
tional frontier. Soon after the date of my letter of the 22d of February, 
1 had seen, at Fort King, a letter from General Scott, in which he ex- 
pressed a desire to know where the principal force of the enemy could 
be found ; that letter was addressed to General Clinch, and dated at 
Picolata about the 17th or 18th of February. Not doubting the sincerity 
of General Scott's wish to learn where to find the enemy, \ was truly grat- 
ified to have it in my power to say that 1 would search for and endeavor 
to find their principal force, and would report accordingly. My superior 
knowledge of the country, and of the enemy, justified me in the hope and 
expectation that I should be able soon to relieve General Scott's suppo- 
sed anxiety upon this point : for my movement by the way of the Alafia, 
and the battle-ground of the lamented Major Dade, where there was most 
i 9on to believe the enemy would make their boldest stand, (that bav- 
in:;- been deemed to be the place of their "greatest good luck," as the 
had termed it,) having proven that their principal force w r as 
not i,i that quarter, I could not doubt but that I should find them lower 



679 [ 224 ] 

down on the Withlacoochee ; and I therefore determined to continue my 
search in that direction — that being in the direction to Fort Brooke, the 
only certain point from which I could replenish my supplies of subsistence 
and ammunition ; the great supply which should have been at Fort King 
having been withheld from that place — whether intentionally to embar- 
rass my operations, or from ignorance of the country, with its wasted re- 
sources, or ignorance of their duty on the part of General Scott and his 
Quartermaster General, I am yet to learn. It is sufficient for me at pres- 
ent to affirm that large supplies ought to have been, and might have been, 
deposited at Fort King and at Fort Drane before the 22d of February, and 
that I was unable to obtain at those posts more than eight days' rations of 
subsistence, with scarce one hour's supply of powder and shot or car- 
tridges. Nor could I take this slender supply without leaving those posts 
with a short allowance, that could not have been justified, but upon the 
expectation of other supplies being on the road near them, and that my 
movement would contribute to divert from them the attention of the ene- 
my. My plan of operations, embraced in my letter of the 22d of Febru- 
ary, was, under all the circumstances of the case, necessary and proper ; 
and it was also proper for me to address my letters intended for General 
Scott, who, I was aware, was not in my department, to General Clinch, 
an officer known to be on duty within my department, or the officer com- 
manding the troops assembling at Fort Drane, where General Scott was 
expected to arrive in the course of a few days — where, indeed, he ought 
to have been before the middle of February. General Clinch, who per- 
fectly understood his duty, lost no time in forwarding my letters, or copies 
of them, to General Scott, at Picolata, who, in place of a prompt response, 
meeting in the spirit in which, it was offered my proposition cordially to 
co-operate with him in bringing the w r ar to a speedy termination, indul- 
ged himself in unwarranted animadversions — imputing to me the worst of 
motives for my movements, and wasting, in unavailing murmurs, that pre- 
cious moment for action, by co-operation ivith me, as I had proposed, or, 
if he preferred it, by taking the field, and there relieving me; he ap- 
pears to have chosen rather to occupy himself in writing accusations 
against me, and endeavoring to convince the President of the United 
States that, in my letter of the 22d of February, above referred to, I had 
been guilty of some criminal interference with his (General Scott's) au- 
thority, as stated in your letter of the 10th of March, and more fully stated 
in the publications dated at Picolata, Black creek, Fort Diane, and more re- 
cently at other places, purporting to be from General Scott and other offi- 
cers of the army, all referring to " the plan of operations," and opinions 
of General Scott, but so artfully mixed up with plausible./jc/ion and reck- 
less calumny, slightly tempered with a few grains of truth, as to render 
it impossible to determine the source whence the mass of matter origin- 
ated, or to discriminate between the official, the semi-official, and mere 
hireling slanders contained in this mass of matter. I would not willingly, 
in an official communication to your office, to be submitted to the Pres- 
ident of the United States, take any notice of anything contained in those 
publications that is not strictly official. If I err in my attempt to discrim- 
inate in this particular, I will thank you to enable me to rectify myself, 
by favoring me with all the official statements referring to my conduct in 
relation to the war in Florida, as I may deem it to be essential to my vin- 
dication to show to all who may have entertained a doubt, as I trust I 



f 224 ] C80 



have already shown to the satisfaction of every man of military mind who 
his heard me, or seen my vindication, upon the following points : 

1. That the proper time and place for me to have suspended my move- 
ment, and for General Scott to have entered upon the command assigned 
to him in my department, was when he should appear inptrson near me, 
at the known theatre of the war, and no where else, while the war con- 
tinued. 

2. That, until he thus made his personal appearance near me, at the 
theatre of the war, he had no right whatever to assume the control of a 
soldier, a public horse, or a public ration, within the limits of my de- 
partment. 

3. That it was my bounden duty to retain the control of every soldier, 
every horse, every ration, and every other species of public property, 
necessary to the success of my operations against the enemy, connected 
with the command of the Western Department ; and, above all, to retain 
and exercise the command, honestly and faithfully on the part of the 
United States, u against their enemies or opposers, whomsoever;" and 
( in the language of the 62d article of war) give " orders for what is need- 
ful to the service, unless otherwise specially directed by the President 
of the United States, according to the nature of the case," and the Pres- 
ident had never specially directed it to be otherwise. The Adjutant 
General's notification of orders given through him by the Secretary of 
War was insufficient. This was, to say the least, a loose way of carry- 
ing into effect a solemn provision of law, embracing a subject of great 
delicacy and importance to the service. — (See the 62d article of war.) 
When the law expressly forbids a change of command, as in tin's article 
of war, without the special direction of the President, it is obvious that 
the spirit of the law cannot be fulfilled without the direction is given by 
the President, or in his name, by a person known to be authorized to 
communicate the orders or directions of the President. The Adjutant 
General wrote by order of the Secretary of War. Nevertheless, if the 
President himself had given the order that General Scott should enter 
upon the duties of the command against the Indians in the Western De- 
partment, whilst I was in the field, 1 contend that neither myself nor 
any other officer engaged as I was in the immediate protection of the 

frontier, in the pursuit of the enemy, or in action, holding the enemy in 
check, could, with any propriety, or without a crime, abandon the com- 
mand merely on receipt of the order, and before the arrival at the place 
of pursuit, or of action, of the new commander, unless specially directed 
by the President so to abandon the command ! A direction such as I 
venture to affirm has never been given in any civilized nation whose 
military history is known in this country. The theatre of the war was the 
place, the only proper place, for General Scott to enter upon and for me 
to abandon the command assigned to him, at any time before the enemy 
was subdued ; but that officer did not choose to make his personal ap- 
pearance at the Withlacoochee, though cordially and repeatedly invited 
by me, and challenged by the reiterated reports of my cannon, and by 
the war-whoop and rifle of lb'> Indians, (as announced to him by General 
Clinch,) to partake of the professional banquet which was regularly 
spread before me ever}' day, from the 27th of February to the 5th of 
March inclusively. 1 did not choose to urge or entreat him to come, 
because I have never desired to see an officer or soldier near me in action 



681 [ 224 ] 

who did not come cheerfully and promptly, or who has habitually vexing 
himself in fastidious scruples about his rank; and because I had reason 
to apprehend, from the tardiness of his movement, that a disease which 
General Scott contracted towards me, in August, IS 14, had not been 
completely cured. It was, probably, that sickness of the spleen, which 
the best of doctors say " finds ease only in the misery of others ;" a sick- 
ness which a rapid march to the VV'ithlacoochee, with the animating 
scenes, the martial music, pure air, and simple food of that region of the 
wilderness has never, to my knowledge, failed to improve the health of 
troops afflicted with disease of any kind, including cholera. That Gen- 
eral Scott was retarded in his movement to the Withlacoochee by some 
secret griefs, I could not doubt. What they were, i know not. They 
will doubtless be disclosed in due time. He appears to have been con- 
tent, for a time, with the notion that i had most improperly and prema- 
turely interfered with his command, and disturbed his plan of operations 
before it had been brought io maturity ! — that it was my duty to consider 
him as entitled to the command, and the entire control of my troops and 
supplies, before he arrived in person within the limits of my department ! 
— that my subduing the Indians ought to pass for nothing, because he was 
especially authorized, and I was not especially authorized, to subdue 
them ! Childish conclusions, these — too trifling to merit any notice — 
nor should I have noticed them but for the call made on me to explain 
and vindicate my conduct; and from the hope that my vindication may 
be read by the well-meaning officers and men of the volunteers, and the 
army, who doubt, if indeed any doubt the propriety of my conduct — 
who, I am convinced, will readily yield their hasty opinions to the con- 
viction which mature reflection on the subject cannot but produce. They 
will agree with me that my path of public d'^iy was plain — too plain to 
be mistaken by any honest soldier or citizen not blinded by the spirit of 
party, or some other diabolic prejudice or passion — it was, without wait- 
ing for new orders, to fly as rapidly as possible, with whatever disposable 
force and supplies might appear to me necessary and proper to arrest the 
progress of the apparent growing evil of the late disasters ; strengthen 
the feeble military posts, and, if possible, put an end to the war by a 
vigorous co-operation with any forces found in that quarter, or otherwise, 
as circumstances should dictate, according to my own plan of operations, 
contained in my letters of the 2d, 22d, 28th, and 29th of February, above 
referred to. The sum and substance of my design was to afford prompt 
and complete protection, that sort of protection which is guarantied by 
the constitution of the United States to the people of the United Slates — 
including the pioneer, the widow, the orphan, inhabitants of the frontier 
camp or cabin, as well as the polished and wealthy citizen of the great 
emporium of party politics, of commerce, and fashion ; that complete/wo- 
tection, the work of which should, if possible, commence before the work 
of destruction upon the frontier is finished, or even begun — protection to 
the living citizen rather than to the ashes of the slain ! My plan of 
operations was expressed as concisely as I could express it, in my letter 
of the 22d of February — it was " to search for the enemy until I should 
find them, and then beat them, as otherwise he would beat me." 

4. In carrying into effect this plan of operations, I could suffer no offi- 
cer to interfere with my troops, military posts, or supplies of any kind, within 



f 221 J 682 

the limits of my department, until he should appear in person within those 
limits, duly authorized, and apparently ready and willing to meet the 
enemy and protect the people of the United States within my department 
" against their enemies or opposers, whomsoever;" or until I had met 
and beaten the enemy, and compelled them to sue for peac°. 

5. 1 did meet the enemy, and did several times beat them, and finally 
compelled them to sue for peace. How this was accomplished, I need 
not now undertake to describe. Grave doubts have been expressed, in 
some of the publications to which I have referred, as to the sincerity of 
the Indian chiefs in suing for peace, upon which is supposed to rest the 
fact of their having been subdued. I am willing to leave the issue of 
these questions to the testimony of the officers, and the intelligent volun- 
teer and regular soldiers who served with me, pledging my honor to abide 
by their concurrent testimony. But I am not willing to be tried and con- 
demned without a hearing, and by persons who were not only not near 
me, but who have given me good reason to believe they would have been 
better pleased at my downfall than at the triumph obtained by me over the 
enemy ; persons who know full well that the final decree at which every 
enlightened citizen and soldier who investigates the subject must sooner 
or later arrive, establishing the correctness of my conduct, must virtually 
fix the seal of condemnation upon theirs. Hence it was that many hours 
and days of precious time, which should have been devoted to active 
operations against the Indians, were sacrificed at Picolata and Fort Diane, 
and other places, to the fabrication of slanderous essays, to forestall and 
mislead public opinion — to condemn my movements, and cover me 
with the vilest detraction. The editors of newspapers, hitherto profess- 
ing friendliness towards me, have been employed as the leading vehicles 
of this atrocious scheme of slander. Why is this so ? I answer, that it 
is because I disdain to be the man of a political party ! I owe allegiance 
to the United States of America, and not to a party. It may be that I 
did not require my officers and men at the Withlacoochee to take from 
the enemy as many lives as they had, by their savage conduct, forfeited — 
but where was the bond, or the principle of the laws of war, or of na- 
tions, binding them to give or me to take the life of anyone of them after 
they had raised the white flag, and sued for peace ? Their first proposi- 
tion was made on the evening of the 5th of March. They were then 
told that if their chiefs would come in the next day they would be heard. 
They accordingly came with a white flag, on the morning of the 6th of 
March, when they said, in the most subdued tone and manner, " We do 
not wish to fight any more ; we have lost many of our warriors killed, 
and others disabled by wounds — we do not wish to lose any more in 
this way, or otherwise than by sickness, or by the falling of trees ; and 
we desire to make peace." They were told, in reply, that I was not 
authorized to treat with them, but that I had learned that an officer was 
on his way, and would soon be there with authority to treat with them ; 
that, il they wished for peace, they must lay down their arms, or cease 
to make any further use of them, and stay beyond the Withlacoochee 
until the officer authorized to treat with them should arrive, and that 
they must then go wherever he should require them ; but that if they should 
commit any more hostilities, our troops, of which we had many, would 
kill all of them found with arms in their hands. They then counselled 



683 \ 224 | 

among themselves and their warriors until 4 or 5 o'clock in the evening. 
The chiefs then returned, and freely assented to my answer to their prop- 
ositions — the last sentence of which my acting inspector general was, 
for* the second time, explaining to them, when General Clinch arrived in 
sight, with the troops of his immediate command from Fort Drane, some 
of whom fired in the direction of the Indians, but at too great a distance 
to hurt them. They then hastily retreated to the adjoining hammock. 
They, however, manifested no disposition to violate their engagement, 
nor do I believe there was an officer or soldier with me who had wit- 
nessed their conduct, who entertained a doubt but that they were sub- 
dued, and perfectly sincere in the desire they expressed to abstain from 
further hostilities, and meet General Scott in council whenever and 
wherever he might direct. I remained in command, in order to satisfy 
myself of their sincerity, until the 9th of March, during which time some 
hundreds of my men were allowed to amuse themselves fishing, for a 
mile or two up and down the river, without discovering any indication 
of further hostility on the part of the Indians, some of whom were seen 
on the opposite side of the river. I, on the 9th of March, turned over 
the command of the troops then with me to General Clinch, as will be 
seen by my orders of that date, with a view to repair to this frontier. It 
is proper here to remark that, in order to obtain accurate information as 
to the position of the chiefs and warriors, and whether their pacific views 
remained unchanged, after being fired on by the volunteers with General 
Clinch, I approved the suggestion of General Clinch to send a black in- 
terpreter across the river to their camp. He set out on the 8th and re- 
turned on the evening of the 10th of March. He reported that the chiefs 
and warriors had gone up the Withlacooch.ee, near thirty miles above 
Camp Izard, to where their families were stationed ; and that the chiefs 
told him they were waiting agreeably to my directions ; and that they 
would be ready in five days to hold a council with the officer expected 
on for that purpose. General Scott was that officer — who, in place of 
meeting them in council, and directing them what to do to enable them 
to obtain peace, and conform to the wishes of the President of the United 
States — General Scott openly avowed (as I have been informed, and his 
official letters imply) a determination to pay no regard to my arrange- 
ment with the Indians, but to obtain an overwhelming force, and then 
annihilate them. His blustering threats, to this effect, were probably 
known to every person, white and black, in and about the house of Gen- 
eral Clinch at Fort Drane ; and, as some of the black domestics were in the 
habits of intimacy with the black interpreters, it was more than probable 
that in this way the threats of the gallant General reached the ears of the 
Seminole chiefs. Nothing, therefore, could be more natural than that 
they should prepare for self-defence, and self-preservation, against a 
commander regardless of the pledge made to them by me, his immediate 
predecessor in command, and his senior ; a pledge which could not be 
diregarded without a gross violation of the laws of nature and of war, 
which no nation can tolerate, without a positive disregard of the most 
sacred of her obligations of good faith towards her neighbors. The se- 
quel has proven the fallacy of such threats, and the truth of the proverb 
that " the battle is not always to the strong, nor the race to the swift." 

6. It may be that I did not expose my officers and soldiers, volunteers 
and regulars, to as much risk and loss as some of my accusers deem ne- 



[ 224 ] 684 

cessary to give eclat to a triumph ! Heaven preserve me, I pray, from 
that eclat which is won by the useless or wanton sacrifice of those placed 
under my command ! If my accusers have reason to believe, from the testi- 
mony of those who ventured to accompany and co-operate with me in 
battle, that I neglected any important duty to save my own life, or the 
life of any of my officers or men, it would be strictly correct in them to 
establish, if possible, such a charge. But, upon this point, as upon all the 
imputations of General Scott and his flanking and writing friends, I hold 
towards them the attitude of honest defiance. Had the constitution or any 
other law of the land required it, or had I ordered it, I have not a doubt 
that every officer and soldier with me at the Withlacoochee would cheer- 
fully have agreed, " if the enemy would stand," to desire them to take the 
first shot; and would, moreover, have declined the comfort and security of 
sleeping or fighting behind a breastwork, had not this method of occa- 
sional action and rest been consecrated by the example of our own beloved 
Washington, and all other great and good men who have signalised 
themselves in the defence of our country. I think it more than probable 
that my brave little army would have subdued the enemy a lew days 
sooner than we did, had I directed them to make a few rapid sorties ; 
but I had promised General Clinch to make no sorties until I should hear 
from him, bom an apprehension that a sortie would have dispersed and 
driven off the Indians before the arrival of mounted force — the only de- 
scription of force with which a sortie could have been made with full ef- 
fect, at the place which I occupied. With the aid of the anticipated 
mounted force, I had calculated on taking or destroying most of the In- 
dians, and terminating the war in the course of a few days. They were 
however subdued, and sued for peace near twent}' hours before I heard 
from General Clinch. — (See my letter to that officer, under date the 29th 
of February, in which I promised to abstain from making a sortie until I 
should heai- from him.) On the subject of a sortie, however, I was con- 
vinced that I should not have succeeded in rendering it effective without 
the loss of from 50 to 100 of my officers and soldiers ; and I have no hes- 
itation in saying that I would not have had twenty of my excellent Lou- 
isiana volunteers or regulars recklessly sacrificed, whilst momently ex- 
pecting the arrival of mounted force, to have had laid at my feet in chains 
all the Indians in Florida ? The troops were, for several days, held in 
readiness for a sortie, and it would have been made on hearing from 
General Clinch, or in co-operation with his command, had not the Indians 
sued for peace before he was heard from. 

7. Among the numerous calumnies, official and unofficial, I have seen 
none more absurd than that 1 was actuated in my movement to Florida 
by no higher motive than that of a desire to obtain " laurels" to which 
General Scott had superior claims ! 1 feel convinced that those who 
know me best know, and will testify, that I have ever been incapable, 
even while a young subaltern, of that over-weening vanity and officious- 
ness which sometimes prompt the weak or the vicious to attempt to rob 
their brother soldiers of what may be justly their due. Laurels, indeed ! 
The idea of obtaining laurels in an Indian war, I have long deemed to 
be as a vision, never to be realized by any known system of operations 
embraced in the art of war in its supposed improved state, nor otherwise 
than by watching the movements of the enemy, and profiting by his ex- 



685 | 224 J 

ample of vigilance, rapidity of movement, and privation of 'food and rest. 
No man acquainted with the sufferings of' the frontier people of Florida, 
possessed of a spark of patriotism or humanity, could, for a moment, be 
ignorant of the great and only inducement which ought or could have 
prompted me to make the movement in question. It was obvious to mo 
that protection must be afforded, and quickly afforded, to the bleeding 
frontier of that neglected Territory, or that her late flourishing settlements 
would be destroyed, and that delightful region of our national frontier 
rendered a scene of devastation, disgraceful to the military character of 
our country, and doubly disgraceful to the officer intrusted with ita 
defence. 

I have shown, as I doubt not, to the satisfaction of every man of mili- 
tary mind who will take the trouble to read this letter, that it was my 
bounden duty, under the circumstances of the case, to collect together 
the forces embarked at New Orleans on the night of the 3d and the morn- 
ing of the 4th of February, and, with them, to repair promptly, as I did, 
to East Florida, and there to employ my best efforts in subduing or hold- 
ing in check the enemy until the arrival of General Scott at the theatre 
of the war. This being admitted, my right to the entire control of the 
subsistence, and horses, and other means of transportation found within 
the limits of my department, or such as was on their passage thither, is 
established beyond the shadow of doubt. Upon what ground, then, could 
General Scott assert that I interfered with and retarded his operations by 
taking rations and horses belonging to his command ? I affirm that his 
excuse is baseless, and his assertion untrue. 1 affirm, moreover, that if 
the horses and rations which he falsely accuses me of having wrongfully 
taken, had been forcibly seized by me from one of the posts within the 
Eastern Department, and to which 1 could have no claim — the number of 
rations and number of horses in question was too small to delay the move- 
ment of General Scoffs grand army for more than three days' 1 time. The 
whole number of rations taken by me from the day of my arrival at Fort 
King, the 22d of February, to the day 1 turned over the command to 
General Clinch, the Oth March, 1836, inclusively, amounted to less than 
twelve thousand complete rations, and the number of horses, I am assu- 
red, ivas not more than eight or ten, taken from Forts King and Drane, 
(posts of my department,) and less than this number of miserable ponies 
from Fort Brooke, not one of which had been placed at either of those posts 
by General Scott, as I have been informed and believe. 

His assertion, therefore, that his operations were greatly embarrassed 
or retarded by my having taken the rations and horses provided for his 
command, is not only not true, but is marked with a reckless malignity, 
disgraceful to an officer and dishonorable to a man — not to say a gen- 
tleman. 

All which is submitted for the information of the President of the 
United States. 

With profound respect, 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 

Major General, commanding. 

To Brigadier General R. Jones, 

Adjutant General U. S. Army, 

Washington City. 



[ 224 J 686 

No. 43. 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

Camp Sabine, September 18, 1S36. 

Gentlemen: The occurrences in East Florida during the last winter 
and spring, and more especially the acrimonious and calumnious publi- 
cations from the pen of General Scott, or from his sanction or dictation, 
taken in connexion with the silence of the War Department, or, in other 
words, the suppression of my orders and communications in reference to 
the operations in that quarter under my direction, have combined to place 
me at that point of moral responsibility or moral action, at which longer 
silence on my part would be criminal. 

I am therefore compelled, in self-defence, publicly to vindicate my 
conduct — not to seek a paper war, or any other description of war ; but 
never to shun a war of any kind when necessary in defence of the legacy 
of honor and of principle, bequeathed to me by our fathers of the revo- 
lutionary war, in the midst of which I was born, (March 20, 1777.) But 
I think I have seen and done too much good service in battle against the 
enemies of our country, to war with the tools or understrappers of my 
principal foe. I will do that honor only to the head of the cabal arrayed 
against me, and he only, whoever he is, if he desires it, and will step out 
of his place of shelter and concealment. 

For the purpose of my vindication I desire to have access to the columns 
of an independent paper, with an editor who has the moral courage to 
speak and to write what truth and justice demand. That you can find 
such an editor near you, I have no doubt — to whom, I pray you, hand the 
accompanying copy of the first part of my vindication. The residue will 
be sent to you soon as it can be copied. 

I am, with affectionate respect, 

Your friend, 
EDMUND PENDLETON GAINES. 

To Messrs. General P. F. Smith and 

Colonel William Christy, 

City of New Orleans. 



No. 44. 
Questions by General Gaines to Surgeon General Thomas Lawson. 

Question 1st. Did you serve with the Louisiana volunteers in the army 
under command of Major General Gaines in Florida, in February and 
March, 183G ; and, if so, in what capacity ? 

Answer. I served with the Louisiana volunteers in the army under 
command of Major General Gaines in Florida, in February and March, 
1836, and in the capacity of lieutenant colonel. 

Question 2d. Did you have a conversation with Captain McCall (then 
aid-de-camp to Major General Gaines) at Pensacola, on the 6th of Feb- 
ruary, 1836, on the subject of the pledge General Gaines had given to 



687 [ 22 1 ] 

the Louisiana volunteers, and his continuing in command of the troops 
then on their march (by steam) to Tampa bay ; and, if so, did you state 
to him that the Louisiana volunteers would be dissatisfied if General 
Gaines relinquished the command ? 

Answer. I had a conversation with Captain McCall, with Captain Hitch- 
cock, and with General Gaines himself, at Pensacola, on the Cth of Feb- 
ruary, 183G, in relation to a communication just then received by General 
Gaines from the Adjutant General's office, notifying him ( General Gaines) 
that General Scott had been ordered to conduct the military operations 
against the hostile Seminole Indians, and that his (General Gaines's) 
services might soon be required on the Mexican frontier ; and directing 
him to await further orders in New Orleans. Being the senior officer 
present with General Gaines, and in the immediate command of the troops 
with him, I felt myself authorized to give my views touching the obli- 
gations incurred by General Gaines's promise of co-operation with Gen- 
eral Clinch, and his pledge to accompany the Louisiana volunteers to the 
scene of action. And I did so to Captain McCall, as well as to Genera! 
Gaines, in language to the following import: 1 said that the communica- 
tion from the Adjutant General's office did not make it imperative on 
General Gaines immediately to withdraw from the command ot the troops; 
that the order for General Scott to conduct the war in Florida no doubt 
had been given without any knowledge of the arrangements that had been 
made or were making by General Gaines to take the field ; and that, in- 
asmuch as he had, on his own responsibility, raised a respectable military 
force for the purpose of relieving the threatened military posts and fron- 
tier settlements, he ought to press forward to the theatre of the war. In 
the course of this conversation, I said that General Gaines could lead on 
his men until he accomplished the object for which he set out, or at least 
until he met the officer commanding the troops advancing from the eastern 
side of the peninsula. I moreover stated that, inasmuch as he had pledged 
himself to the Louisiana volunteers to lead them on to the theatre of the 
war, they would expect him to accompany them, and would be dissatisfied 
if he withdrew from the command of the expedition. 

Question 3d. Did General Gaines, on his passage from Pensacola to 
Tampa bay, communicate to you his purpose to co-operate with General 
Scott, in the event of that officer being found in the field ? 

Answer. On more than one occasion, I believe, General Gaines ob- 
served that his personal feelings towards General Scott should not inter- 
fere with his public duties. He stated that he would meet General Seott 7 
if he found him in the field, in a spirit of conciliation, and would cordially 
co-operate with him in bringing the war to a close. 

Question 4th. Would, in your opinion, any advantage have been gained 
by a sortie upon the Indians, had one been made from Camp Izard, at any 
time between the 29th of February and the 5th of March, 1836? 

Answer. The concentration of three or four hundred men on any point 
of the enemy's line would have driven them .from their position, and dis- 
persed them, without any material advantage resulting to our cause. 

Question 5th. What is your opinion as to the sincerity of the Indians 
in suing for peace on the 6th of March, 1836, at Camp Izard, on the 
Withlacoochee? 



f m j 688 

Answer. It is my opinion, and I believe it was the opinion of the army 
generally, that the Indians were sincere in their proposition for peace. 

Question Gth. Please to state on what grounds your opinion is founded. 

Answer. I judge that they were sincere from the manner in which they 
made the overture, and their conduct during the progress of the negotia- 
tion — from the fact that they permitted, for two or three days afterwards, 
the officers and men to fish and hathe in the river, and to cross to the 
opposite bank and wander for some distance into the woods — from the 
message sent by Primus to General Gaines, reiterating their desire to 
make peace, and their willingness, in five days, to meet him on the With- 
iacoochee — from the fact that the troops remained in three or four sepa- 
rate encampments for two or three weeks, the men individually passing 
between the several commands day and night, without molestation — and 
again, from the appearances of Camp Izard and the grounds around, on 
the return of the troops under General Scott, when we found every thing 
in pretty much the same state in which it was left, viz : the canoes that 
had been made by General Gaines's command uninjured ; the slabs gotten 
out for the bridge or other purposes untouched ; and the bodies of the 
dead undisturbed, which was very uncommon with the Indians. 

THOMAS LAWSON. 

Sworn to before 

S. Cooper, Judge Advocate, 

Recorder of the Court. 



No. 45. 



Headquarters, Western Department, 
Camp Sabine, July 20, 1336. 

Sir: I did not receive, until last night, the Order No. 37, of which I 
think myself in duty bound to send you a copy enclosed herewith, marked 
A, being convinced that you have not been apprized of the fact that this 
Order, issued, as it appears, by your direction, was suffered, by the person 
to whom you confided the trust of preparing the Order for the office of 
distribution, to contain the extra-judicial opinion of General Scott in ref- 
erence to the command of Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee. 

That General Scott should employ lawless means to palliate his own 
unofficer-like conduct, to condemn me without even the color of author- 
ity, and attempt thus indirectly to foist into an order issued under the 
supreme sanction of the Executive department of the United States, the 
malignant fictions of his own fancy, was to be expected, and was calcu- 
lated to excite in my mind neither surprise nor concern — as all the evil 
of such an intrigue on his part would recoil upon himself, and the ill-de- 
signed attempt would redound to my honor rather than to my injury. I 
cannot suppose it to be possible that you have given your sanction to that 
part of the Order in question referring to the command of Camp Izard, 
and therefore I am convinced I need only to solicit your attention to the 
subject to ensure its correction, and my relief before the army and my 



689 [ 224 ] 

countrymen from the odium which the Order, in its present shape, under 
your sanction, would imply. 

Had I been charged with a crime, and put in an est, pursuant to the 
77th article of war, and tried according to law, and found guilty of having 
committed a crime in connexion with my command at Camp Izard, or if 
my official report had been disproved, General Scott and any other officer 
might very properly refer to the record of the settled case, embracing 
such crime, and hold it up to the army in terrorem, oi in palliation of 
some other established case of crime. But to prejudge me without my 
having had any intimation from the proper authorities that my conduct at 
Camp Izard had been called in question, and to obtrude the extra-judicial 
judgment into Orders for the information and government of the army, 
and thus to forestall the opinion of the army and the nation against me, 
and in a manner calculated (o pollute the streams of public justice, and 
not only disqualify General Scott himself from sitting in judgment in any 
such case against me, but tending to bias, mislead, and disqualify such 
officers of the army as may be disposed to yield to the opinion of General 
Scott — an opinion, however, as I have before intimated, from which I 
should feel no concern where that opinion is disconnected, as I trust it 
will be disconnected from the apparent support given it by the sanction 
of the President of the United States, as the Order in question, in its 
present form, implies. 

My letter of the 4th of this month to the Adjutant General, to be sub- 
mitted to you in reply to his letter of the 10th of March, written by your 
direction, and written long before I had any knowledge of the existence 
of the Order in question, or of the inquiry in the case of Major Gates, 
will show that it was an essential part of my plan to hold the Indians in 
check and to prevent their dispersion, preparatory to their entire defeat, 
on the arrival of the mounted men from Fort Diane, that I should abstain 
from a sortie until their arrival, or until I should hear from them. In my 
letter of the 28th of February to General Clinch, I say, " I shall prepare 
means for crossing the river, but shall not attempt to cross until I hear 
from you ;" and in my letter of the 29th of February to General Clinch, 
I say, " I have abstained and shall continue to abstain from a sortie until 
I hear from you." These letters were intended for General Clinch, and 
for General Scott whenever he should arrive within the limits of my de- 
partment. He was furnished by General Clinch, as he informed me, with 
copies. It is evident, therefore, that he made the allusion to my com- 
mand at Camp Izard with a full knowledge of the fact that I was under a 
pledge to General Clinch not to make a sortie until I heard from him. 
My having, however, beaten the enemy and forced them to sue for peace 
twenty hours before I heard from General Clinch, happily superseded the 
necessity of making a sortie, which could not have been made without 
great loss on my part, with but little loss on the part of the enemy. 
I have the honor to be, 

With profound respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES, 
Major GenH by Brevet, U. S. Army. 

To Andrew Jackson, 

President of the United States. 



\ 224 J 690 

A. 

Headquarters of the Army, 
Adjutant General's Office, Washington, June 1 1, 18S6. 

General Order, No. 37. 

I. The Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held at St. Augustine, East 
Florida, on the 6th day of May, 1836, and continued until the 7th, as- 
sembled by order of Major General Scott, at the request of Major Wil- 
liam Gates, and of which Court Lieutenant Colonel Crane, of the United 
States army, was President, have been laid before the President of the 
United States. 

The Court, at the request of Major Gates, was directed to investigate 
the conduct of that officer during and subsequent to the attack on the mil- 
itary post at Volusia, on the St. John's river in Florida, embracing the 
14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of April, of this year. 

The Court of Inquiry having been directed to give its opinion on the 
whole case, came to the following conclusion : 

Opinion. 

II. " The Court, after mature deliberation on the testimony before 
them, are of opinion, from the evidence of Adjutant Patterson, Dr. Gra- 
ham, and Lieutenant Pettes, that the effective force under the command 
of Major Gates was much greater than the estimated force of the Indians 
who attacked him on the morning of the 14th of April, 1836 ; and that, 
therefore, he was capable of meeting the enemy in the field, if necessary ; 
also, that the bodies of two volunteers, killed, were improperly left ex- 
posed, and ought to have been brought in on the morning when they were 
killed — such exposure necessarily operating injuriously on the garrison." 

On which Proceedings and Opinion, Major General Scott, commanding 
the troops in Florida, made the following remarks: 

"It is clear from the evidence that the garrison of Fort Barnwell was, 
at the time it was attacked, at least twice as numerous as the assailing 
party: a vigorous sortie, with two-thirds of the garrison, should, there- 
fore, have been promptly made. The moral effect of such movement 
would have been great on both sides. Many of the enemy would, prob- 
ably, have been killed or captured, and the garrison thereby inspired with 
a just confidence in the superior prowess of the white man. 

"If for no other object, a strong detachment ought instantly to have 
been sent out to bring in the bodies of the sergeant and private who were 
seen to fall near the wood, at the beginning of the attack. This imperious 
duty was neglected for more than forty-eight hours — a delay that is curi- 
ously slurred over in the major's official report. 

" It is most painful to remark the fatal charm that seems to have hung 
over every commander in this war who has been attacked behind breast- 
works or pickets. From the leading case, at Camp Izard, to the last that 
has been reported, not a sortie — certainly not one of vigor — has been 
made by any garrison, however inferior the assailing force. Several 
mortifying cases of this sort have duly followed ; and Major Cooper alone, 
with his Georgia battalion, has ventured for a moment beyond a line of 



691 [ 224 ] 

defences to receive or to repel an attack. The series of examples al- 
luded to have inspired the enemy with hardihood, repressed the zeal of 
our troops, and may slightly excuse the conduct of Major Gates. Cer- 
tainly a gallant effort is yet to be made by some future commander of a 
post to break the charm and to check Indian audacity." 

III. The President of the United States, on a full consideration of the 
conduct of Major William Gates, of the 1st regiment of artillery, as dis- 
closed by the evidence before the Court of Inquiry, has directed that the 
name of that officer be stricken from the rolls. Major William Gates, 
therefore, ceases to be an officer of the army. 

By order of Alexander Macomb, major general commanding in chief. 

R. JONES, 

Adjutant General. 



General Gaines to the Secretary of War, enclosing letter from Major 

Graham. 

Headquarters, Western Department, 

Frederick, Maryland, February 28, 1837. 

Sir : I have to request your attention to the enclosed letter from Major 
Graham, in connexion with the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry of 
which Major General Macomb is President. It was received too late to 
lay before the Court. Upon reflection, however, I find it constitutes the 
only evidence known to me as likely to repel one of the many foul slanders 
alleged against me, namely, that I spoke of the order assigning General 
Scott to the Florida frontier in terms of disrespect towards the President 
of the United States. It is on this account I desire you to lay before the 
President Major Graham's letter. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

EDMUND P. GAINES. 
To the Secretary of War. 



Pensacola, Florida, February 15, 1837. 

General : I have recently heard, with much surprise and regret, that 
there was a rumor (which I have reason to apprehend may have reached 
you) that I had stated or intimated, in speaking of an interview I had 
with you at this place on or about the 6th of February last, that I knew 
of your having received an order from the War Department assigning the 
command of the army in Florida to another general officer, and that you 
had treated the order in a manner disrespectful to the authority from 
whence it emanated. It is a duty I owe to myself to state to you that if 
any such rumors have been abroad, they are entirely incorrect, and not 
warranted by any thing I have ever expressed or intimated to any one ; 
nor have I ever made a single statement or intimation, in allusion to that 
interview, tending to your disparagement. On the contrary, whenever 
45 



[ 224 ) 692 

inquired of by those who knew I was in Pensacola when you touched 
here, in reference to your movement with the troops, I always stated, 
fairly and emphatically, the high sense of duty by which you appeared 
to me actuated in going to the relief of a portion of your countrymen 
who you believed would fall victims to savage butchery, if not relieved 
in a shorter time than could reasonably be counted on by any other force 
than that which you had organized, and brought thus far on the route to 
the scene of hostilities. 

On the day above alluded to, I called on board the steamboat in which 
you had come with the troops, in order to pay my respects to you, as a 
superior officer. I had that morning observed a paragraph in a newspa- 
per, ( 1 think the National Intelligencer,) stating that " it was rumored" 
that General Scott had been ordered to the command of the Florida 
army, and yourself to hold yourself in readiness to repair to the Mexican 
frontier, or something to that effect. As the subject appeared to be of 
universal interest here, I ventured to ask you the question, if you intend- 
ed to proceed on with the army ? To this question you replied, that you 
had, since your arrival at this place, received from the post office a letter 
from the Adjutant General, informing you that an order had been issued 
by the direction of the War Department, placing Major General Scott in 
command of the Florida army, and directing that you should remain in 
New Orleans (as well as I remember) until further orders were sent 
you. You remarked that you had no intention whatever of interfering 
with the officer mentioned in the letter of the Adjutant General, but 
added, that you found yourself surrounded by circumstances, which the 
great distance of the seat of Government from the scene of Indian hos- 
tilities rendered it impossible for the War Department to appreciate fully, 
that situated as you were, you believed it was a duty you owed your 
country to continue on with your army at least as far as might be neces- 
sary to arrest the depredations which it was understood the Indians were 
still committing upon our defenceless citizens, and that you conceived you 
had a right to rely upon the approbation of the War Department, when 
all the circumstances should be known. You then took a rapid view of 
the probable period that must elapse before General Scott could, even 
with the greatest possible activity, have his army in the field, and the 
mischief which the Indians would be enabled to commit in the mean 
time, if not arrested by the force you had already organized and marched 
thus far towards the seat of war — mentioned the instructions you had 
sent to General Clinch, at Fort King, to make a movement in order to 
co-operate with you in your contemplated march from Tampa bay ; that 
it was now too late to countermand this order with any ceitainty of its 
reaching General C., for the newspapers contained rumors that the In- 
dians were collected in force around Fort King, (where General Clinch 
was then supposed to be,) either with a view of storming the picket, or 
of preventing any supplies reaching it ; that if these rumors were true, 
General C, with his small force, something like 130 or 140 regulars fit 
for duty, and nearly one-half that number of wounded to take care of, 
ought to be relieved without any loss of time ; that if the rumors alluded 
to were not true, then General C. would probably make a movement in 
accordance with the instructions which had been forwarded to him, and 
counting upon your co-operation, which, U not rendered according to 



693 [ 224 ] 

the understanding, might expose him to attack from the united force of 
the Indians, which was known to be far superior to his in number; that 
when the Louisiana volunteers (or some of them, for I do not remember 
whether the remark applied to all or to a part) came to be mustered into 
the service of the United States, a question arose among them as to what 
commander they were to serve under; that, in order to give confidence 
and produce unanimity of feeling among them, you had declared to them 
that you would not require them to march farther into the enemy's coun- 
try than you should go yourself, having, at the time, no reason to appre- 
hend you would receive any orders adverse to this assurance ; and that 
if you were then to quit them, before they had proceeded half way to the 
post where their useful services were to commence, it would probably 
create dissatisfaction among them ; in which event, constituting as they 
did a large majority of your force, the whole object of the expedition 
would probably be thwarted. These, I think you remarked, were all cir- 
cumstances of so imperious a nature, and which it was impossible the 
War Department could have been acquainted with when the letter from the 
Adjutant General was written, that you considered it your duty to your 
country to yield to them, and, in doing so, felt you had a right to calculate 
upon the approbation of the Executive or the War Department. 

I have given you, general, in the foregoing statement, the true import 
of all I have ever said in reference to this subject, and I leave it to your- 
self to judge whether or not I have misrepresented you. I will only add 
that, on my return to the North a year ago, I had occasion to allude to 
this subject, in answer to inquiries which were made of me by several 
distinguished individuals in Washington, in New York, and in Boston, 
in which (as I can appeal to them to testify, if necessary) I uniformly 
gave the view which I have here presented. 

I am, General, with much respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

J. D. GRAHAM, 
Major , U. S. Topographical engineers. 

To Major General Gaines, 

United States army. 



[ 224 J 



694 



No. 4. 



PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY, 



IN REFERENCE TO 

PUBLICATIONS OF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY, 



LIST OF DOCUMENTS. 



No. 1. The Globe of 

2. Do do - - 

3. Do do - - 

4. Army and Navy Chronicle of 

5. Do do do 



April 2, 
April 8, 
June 4, 


1836. 
1836. 
1836. 


August 11, 
September 29, 


1836, 
1836. 



PROCEEDINGS 

Of a Court of Inquiry, held at the city of Frederick, Maryland, by 
virtue of the following Orders, viz : 

War Department, 
Adjutant General's Office, Washington, October 3, 1836. 

General Order No. 65. 

The following Order is published for the information of all concerned : 

By direction of the President of the United States, a Court of Inquiry, 
to consist of Major General Macomb, President, and Brevet Brigadiers 
General Atkinson and Brady, members, is hereby ordered to assemble 
at the city of Frederick, in Maryland, as soon as the state of the military 
operations against the Indians Avill permit the witnesses to attend, (of 
which the President of the Court is to judge and determine, and to give 
notice to all concerned,) to inquire and examine into the causes of the 
failure of the campaigns in Florida against the Seminole Indians, under 
the command of Major General Gaines and of Major General Scott, in 
1836 ; and the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the cam- 
paign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians, in the 
year 1836 ; and into every subject connected with the military operations 



695 f 224 ] 

in the campaigns aforesaid : and, after fully investigating the same, the 
Court will report the facts, together with its Opinion on the whole 
subject, for the information of the President of the United States. 

Captain Samuel Cooper, of the 4th regiment of artillery, is hereby ap- 
pointed to act as Judge Advocate and Recorder of the Court. 

LEWIS CASS. 
War Department, 

October 3, 1836. 

R. JONES, Adjutant General 



Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, October 14, 1836. 
General Order No. 68. 

The following Order has been received from the War Department, and 
is published for the information of all concerned : 

War Department, 

October 13, 1836. 

1. It appearing by the public prints that the official report of Brevet 
Major General Gaines, dated " Headquarters, Western Department, 
Camp Sabine, 4th July, 1836," made to the Adjutant General of the 
army, has been published, and the said publication being without the 
sanction of the War Department, or other proper authority, the Court of 
Inquiry of which Major General Alexander Macomb is President, will, in 
addition to the duties already assigned to it, inquire into the facts as to the 
manner, and by whose authority, the said official report was made public. 

2. The Court will also report its Opinion as to the violation of the 
rules of the service by such publication ; and as to the character of said 
report, in reference to all its bearings and consequences, as it concerns 
general military propriety and the discipline of the army. 

3. And, further, the Court will examine and inquire into any other re- 
ports and publications made by Brevet Major General Gaines, or by any 
other officer of the army, having reference to military affairs, and pub- 
lished without the sanction of the War Department, or other proper 
authority, and give its Opinion on the tendency of such reports and pub- 
lications, in the same manner as it is herein required to do in the case 
referred to in the foregoing paragraph of this Order. 

C. A. HARRIS, 
Acting Secretary of War. 
By order of Major General Macomb : 

R. JONES, Adjutant General. 



Frederick, February 13, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment of Saturday. 

Present : Major General Macomb, President, Brigadier General 



[ 224 J 696 

Atkinson and Brigadier General Brady, members, Captain Cooper, 
Judge Advocate and Recorder. 

The Court was sworn in presence of the parties interested in the 
present investigation, who had stated that they had no objections to offer 
to any member of the Court. 

The Judge Advocate then proceeded to open the investigation hav- 
ing reference to the unathorized Publications of Officers of the Army, 
on the subject of military affairs, and the tendency of such publications. 
He presented to the Court a letter from Captain Hitchcock, of the 1st in- 
fantry, addressed to the honorable F. S. Lyon, dated Fort Drane, March 
11, 1836, and published in the Globe of the 2d of April, 1836; also, a 
communication from Major General Jesup to the editors of the Globe, 
and published in that paper of the 8th of April ; and, further, a letter from 
Captain Hitchcock to the editors of the same paper, dated Washington, 
June 2, 1836, and published in the Globe of the 4th of June, (see docu- 
ments Nos. 1, 2, 3.) 

After the reading of these letters, Captain Hitchcock asked leave, and 
addressed the Court to the following effect : 

" Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court : 

" As among the duties assigned to this Court, that of passing an opinion 
upon the tendency of publications by officers of the army is one ; and 
there being before the Court two letters over my signature — one ad- 
dressed to the honorable F. S. Lyon, dated at Fort Drane, in March last, 
and the other addressed to the editors of ' The Globe,' dated in June 
last, both of which I acknowledge to have written — I request that the 
facts and views which I am about to state may receive the attention of 
this Court. 

" The letter addressed to Mr. Lyon was written under the following 
circumstances : 

"While marching from the Withlacoochee to Fort Drane, the 11th of 
March, I observed to my friend and associate, Captain McCall, that 'all 
manner of stories would be put in circulation about the movements of 
the army, and that unless some one acquainted with the facts would un- 
dertake to state them, the newspapers would be all at fault; that much 
interest must be excited in the country on the subject, and, said I, I am 
disposed to prepare a statement and send it to some editor.' Accord- 
ingly, on arriving at Fort Drane, I wrote the letter in question. After 
completing it, and being desirous of publishing nothing but the truth, I 
requested General Gaines to permit me to read it to him ; he at first de- 
clined, but on my urging it he gave me his attention while I read the 
letter ; and at the conclusion, he expressed a wish that his nephew, Mr. 
Lyon, might have a copy of it. Not being disposed to prepare a copy, I 
determined to send the original to Mr. Lyon, and did so, telling him in 
a note, that I had not written the letter for the purpose of placing my 
name before the public, but that if he thought it worth while to authen- 
ticate the facts with my name, he was at liberty to do it. 

" It is my wish, of course, that, before passing any opinion that may 
touch the letter, even indirectly, the Court will hear it read, and consider 
whether the following observations are not perfectly just and sustained 



697 [ 244 ] 

by the letter. It purports in its first paragraph to be a statement of facts. 
There is nothing in it at variance with that declared object. There 
are no discussions in it designed or calculated to aid or direct public 
opinion upon the rights or duties or responsibilities of individuals con- 
nected with the movement of General Gaines, or of individuals affected 
by that movement. There is nothing personal in the letter; nothing 
directly or remotely designed or intended to awaken or control any con- 
troversy of any sort. There is not a single remark in the whole letter 
in compliment to General Gaines, except where I record the confidence 
of the officers in his judgment, &c, and that itself was the mere state- 
ment of a fact, attested by the signature of every officer but one in the 
camp, in a letter to the General after the command was turned over to 
General Clinch. The principles governing the General in going to 
Florida are not discussed, nor are there, in the letter, any discussions 
upon the expediency of any of the numerous specific determinations re- 
solved upon or executed by him while in Florida; but the letter is what 
it purports to be — a statement of facts, and had it been my pleasure to 
have put it forth anonymously it would have been as silently passed by 
as hundreds if not thousands of similar statements have been since the 
commencement of the Florida difficulties. 

" I need not call the attention of the Court to the fact that the public 
is principally informed of the movements of the army by paragraphs in 
newspapers, headed by the editors with this announcement, " We have 
been politely favored with information from the army by a letter from 
an officer," &c. There is scarcely a paper of the present day that does 
not contain some such announcement, and no one sees any thing im- 
proper in this, considered in itself. Every newspaper copies these 
statements, even without a responsible name, and they are thankfully 
received all over the country, and often furnish materials for history. 

" In a recent publication of official correspondence called for by Con- 
gress relating to a change of commanders in Florida, the acting Secre- 
tary of War, in one of his letters, refers especially to an article in the 
Florida Herald, prepared, as he had understood, by an aid-de-camp of 
Governor Call, and expressly states that the facts disclosed in the article 
relative to the operations of Governor Call, formed the principal ground 
of action by the Department. The article was not even signed; and if 
the present acting Secretary of War, a man of great legal ability, of 
scrupulous integrity, and of irreproachable delicacy of character, so far 
from condemning the article, adopted it as among the sources of informa- 
tion upon which to base an important order; and if the Court should think 
otherwise in reference to a publication of my own, in all respects similar, 
except that I made myself responsible for the facts I stated by my signa- 
ture, I shall be compelled to feel the truth of a striking observation of 
Tacitus — that, in early ages, men suffered from the vices of the times ; 
they afterwards suffered from the snares of the law — for, in writing the 
article, I did not imagine I was violating any law or rule, or that any law 
or rule was necessary in the case. 

" 1 deem it not improper here to allude to the fact of there being a 
weekly paper published in the city of Washington, immediately under 
the observation of the Government, and apparently encouraged and sup- 
ported by officers of all grades in both the army and navy, and that the 



[ 224 ] 698 

pages of this journal are principally employed in inviting, distributing, 
and preserving for future instruction, all manner of communications 
touching matters of high interest to the service and to the country. 
Among these communications will be found discussions upon military 
principles, suggestions for improvements in all imaginable ways, and 
very numerous letters from officers in foreign countries and at distant 
posts, giving accounts of military and naval movements beyond the 
reach of the Post Office Department. In all this no one is for a moment 
at a loss in drawing a line between the fact of communicating and the 
matter communicated. 

" It would appear, therefore, that there is no necessary evil in the 
fact of publishing information. 

"It might be well to consider that, in time of war, the country must 
and will have accounts, more or less accurate, of military movements ; 
that editors will get at these accounts by mingling even with the privates 
of an army returned from the field ; that officers and privates cannot be 
expected to be silent, but will talk in the hearing of those who will 
write, of where they have been and what they have done ; that many 
will write to their friends and relatives, who have been perhaps weeks 
or months in suspense and anxiety on account of the war. The Court 
cannot, I apprehend, entertain the question whether it be desirable to 
prevent the publication of facts so communicated, in relation to a cam- 
paign. All who are not wilfully blind must see that this is utterly im- 
practicable, absolutely impossible. There is no power on earth that can 
control this in a country like our own, where the liberty of speech is 
secured, the public mail is sacred, and the freedom of the press unshack- 
led. In monarchies, or despotic governments, some control may be ex- 
erted ; but in this country, yet new in its discovery, and still more new 
in its institutions, it every day becomes necessary to modify and often to 
reverse the usages of foieign nations. It is our boast to improve upon 
the institutions of other countries, and, without intending any disrespect 
to the old Regulations of the Army, annulled by General Order, Decem- 
ber 31, 1S3G, I cannot but think that a rule of Mr. Jefferson's, on a 
topic ot far deeper interest, is strictly applicable in the matter I am con- 
sidering — that error is not dangerous when truth is left free to combat it. 
Prohibit publications in the abstract, and the consequence will be, that 
anonymous and false statements will Hood the country, and oftentimes 
become so widely circulated and so universally received, as to enter into 
the regularly-compiled histories of the times, when it will be next to 
impossible to separate the false from the true. These statements, how- 
ever, may, in a great measure, be deprived of their mischief, when those 
over a responsible name are subjected only to that supervision which has 
regard, not to the fact of publication, but to the matter published. 

" If my harmless, and I must say, unambitious letter, in which my 
name only appears in the signature, to authenticate the statements I ' 
made, be supervised with reference to the views here expressed, I shall 
have no reason to apprehend that many years of hitherto irreproachable 
public life are now in danger from my having given my name volunta- 
rily to facts I thought the public would receive with thanks. I will ob- 
serve, that not a single individual in the country has been misled by my 
letter. The Court cannot but see that, although it was written in haste, 



699 [ 224 ] 

and is utterly destitute of affectation of fine writing, still it bears the 
impress of 'studied accuracy' as to facts, which no subsequent events 
have in any manner invalidated. I stated facts merely, and expressly 
cautioned readers to wait events, as the last paragraph of the letter will 
show. 

" I am reluctant to allude to the circumstance of my having made no 
mention of General Scott in the letter, but as remarks have been made, 
as if I had some sinister design in that omission, it is my duty to explain, 
that the first paragraph promises only a statement in relation to the 
movement of General Gaines. Down to the date of the letter, I had no 
personal knowledge of the operations of General Scctt. I had only seen 
certain letters, and heard certain rumors and reports in relation to him, 
not likely to be commented upon with much satisfaction, and the Court, 
on bearing in mind the testimony showing my knowledge of those let- 
ters and reports, cannot fail to see a virtue in my silence. It made no 
part of my object to call the attention of the public to a source of con- 
flicting feelings about to become conspicuous between two distinguished 
commanders. I have never fostered, aided, or assisted in any manner 
in angry controversies in the army, either among officers of high rank 
or those of more humble claims to the notice of their government or 
country. It accords neither with my disposition or piinciples to lose 
sight of the paramount claims of the army to the individual exertions of 
its every member to sustain its reputation as a whole, which must be 
sacrificed by espousing personal altercations or quarrels. 

" I may be excused doing justice to myself at this time by stating that, 
so far was I from entertaining a disposition to do injustice to General 
Scott, or to enliven the causes of irritation between himself and General 
Gaines, that I sought three of his staff officers, Lieutenants Chambers 
and Temple, and Captain Van Buren, and conversed with them at Fort 
Drane, with the express view of healing the difficulties between the two 
Generals, and sought the same object through Colonel Gadsden, desiring 
him to aid me in that object. I will also state that, on the Withlacoochee 
river, I urged upon General Clinch the propriety of withholding from 
General Gaines the letter from General Scott of the 1st of March, ob- 
serving to General Clinch that its exhibition could have no other effect 
than to widen the breach between the Generals ; and acting consistently 
with my conduct at that time, I made no allusion to that letter in all my 
intercourse with General Gaines from that day until the order for the 
Court of Inquiry made silence on the subject both unnecessary and im- 
possible. I doubt not it will be in the recollection of the Court that 
General Gaines himself, on hearing the letter read in Court, declared in 
the most emphatic manner his previous ignorance of its existence. In 
the same spirit on my part, I did not even mention the existence of the 
letter to Captain McCall, although associated with him for weeks and 
months, on the most intimate terms, and through scenes when, if ever, 
the heart is warmed to the disclosure of whatever a man of honor may 
communicate to his friend. 

" For the truth of these facts and principles, I appeal to my past life 
and to the testimony of all who know me : but will add, that apart from 
public considerations, I had private reasons, all-important with mjself, 
that influenced me in abstaining, not only in my letter to Mr. Lyon, but 



[ 224 J 700 

on all occasions, from bringing the measures of General Scott into ques- 
tion, in relation to Florida affairs. 

" If these remarks seem too much extended, and out of proportion to 
the importance of the letter to which they refer, I beg the Court will 
consider that the principles involved in the matter are the same, my 
letter to Mr. Lyon occupying but a couple of columns, as if it had filled 
a whole newspaper — that I am not advised of the precise scope of the 
inquiry touching the letter ; but above all, I trust that mere kindness 
will make great allowance for an endeavor to avoid a censure from this 
honorable Court, composed of three distinguished officers, an unfavor- 
able opinion from either of whom would be regarded with the most 
extreme mortification. 

" In reference to the letter of the 2d of June, published in ' The 
Globe' of the 4th of that month, I would observe that the facts stated 
in it are strictly in accordance with the testmony before the Court in the 
case of both General Gaines and General Scott, and that the manner of my 
making the statement was necessary and is not liable to exception. I desire 
the Court to consider that the letter purporting to come from General 
Jesup, to which mine was a reply, was not called for by my letter to the 
honorable Mr. Lyon. I appeal to my letter and to the natural and un- 
prejudiced impressions upon reading it, to sustain me in declaring that 
nothing contained in the letter was the legitimate cause of the letter 
having the name of General Jesup to it, and, therefore, I must presume 
the Court will not hold me accountable for that letter, and I trust will 
find no objection to the explanation it called for of the 2d of June. I 
have no complaint to make of General Jesup, supposing him to have 
written the letter to which mine is a reply, and I am ignorant of the ex- 
istence of any evil as resulting from either of the letters."'' 

The Court here adjourned to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock A. M. 

February 14, 1837. 
The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Judge Advocate presented to the Court a letter from Captain 
McCall, of the 4th infantry, dated " Camp Sabine, May 18, 1836," ad- 
dressed to the " Editor of the New Orleans Bulletin," and published in 
the Army and Navy Chronicle of the 1 1th of August, 1836 ; also, a post- 
script to said letter, addressed to the Editor of the Army and Navy 
Chronicle, and published in that paper of the 29th of September, 1836. 
(Docs. 4, 5.) 

After the reading of these letters, Captain McCall, asked leave, and 
addressed the Court to the following effect : 

" Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court : 

" As the attention of the Court has been directed to the publication, 
by officers of the army, of certain letters relating to the campaigns form- 
ing the subject of its investigation, with a view to obtaining its opinion 
as to the tendency of those letters ; and, as a letter under my signature 



701 [ 224 ] 

has been laid before the Court, I have to request that the following re- 
marks, in connexion therewith, may be taken into consideration. 

" At the time my letter was written the public prints were teeming 
with misrepresentations of the opeiations in Florida as injurious to the 
character of the army as gross and indecorous in themselves. Paper 
after paper was filled with either a strange perversion of facts or a 
tissue of harsh reflections upon the officers and troops who had been 
engaged in arduous service in Florida. 

" In this state of things I was desirous, by a faithful representation of 
the principal events of the campaign in which I had served, to remove 
the stigma which I conceived had been wantonly cast upon the arms of 
the country. 

" I addressed a letter on the subject of the campaign to a gentleman 
who had always manifested a deep interest in the honor and welfare of 
the army. Before sending this letter I read it to General Gaines, and 
expressed a hope that my statement might tend to remove the injurious 
impressions likely to be made by the various reports then in circulation. 
With his permission I afterwards sent a copy of the letter to the editor 
of the 'New Orleans Bulletin,' likewise with a view (as appears from 
my note to the editor) to correct the errors which had already found 
their way to the press. 

" My letter purports to be a sketch of the principal features of the 
campaign in Florida, under Major General Gaines, which terminated on 
the 9th of March, 1836. The letter was written on the 18th of May, 
1836, and did not appear in the Bulletin until the 21st of June follow- 
ing. No army regulation, therefore, was violated by its publication. 

" The 650th paragraph of the ' General Regulations for the Army,' 
(1825,) prohibits the publication of letters or reports relative to military 
marches and operations, without special permission, ivithin one month 
after the termination of the campaign to which such letters or reports 
relate. My letter relates only to the campaign under Major General 
Gaines, and was not published until more than three months after the 
termination of that campaign. 

"In writing the letter I studiously avoided expressions that might 
reflect upon any officer, in any way connected with the campaign to 
which my narrative was confined, or any other campaign. 

" Had I published the letter anonymously, I should have avoided the 
responsibility of authorship, as has been the case with great numbers who 
have written to editors and others, since the commencement of hostilities 
in the South ; but conscious of the integrity of ray motives, and con- 
firmed in the correctness of my narrative ; and, moreover, satisfied that 
I should violate no known regulation of the army, nor any principle of 
right or propriety, I did not hesitate to give my name to the contradic- 
tion of foul and calumnious statements, which were greedily swallowed 
by the public, and some of which have even been admitted into a work 
purporting to be a history of the war. 

"In the United States, where the liberty of the press is enjoyed in 
the fullest sense of the word, the rapid dissemination of every descrip- 
tion of accounts of military marches and operations, even while the 
army is in the field, may be expected. Where the militia constitutes 
the principal numerical force of an army, the novelty of the life and the 



[ 224 ] 702 

interest of the scenes through which the young soldier passes, together 
with a desire to gratify the curiosity or relieve the anxiety of distant 
friends, offer temptations too great to admit a doubt that the accounts sent 
from the seat of war to every part of the Union will be as numerous and 
perhaps as various as the individuals composing the forces in the field. 
These accounts are circulated in a thousand ways, and tend to impress 
improperly the public mind. This fact has been fully illustrated during 
the last twelve months. 

" The Court needs no argument to satisfy it of the impossibility of pre- 
venting this evil. It was with a view of applying, as far as in my power 
lay, a remedy to this evil, that my plain narrative of the campaign was 
written, and my name attached to it ; for the country was flooded with 
anonymous accounts of the operations in Florida, sometimes as intem- 
perate and abusive in their expressions as imperfect and fallacious in 
their details. Amongst the most violent of these productions was the 
article that has been laid before the Court by General Gaines. And 
when I state that this article was received at Camp Sabine a few days 
before my letter was written, I feel confident the Court, so far from 
seeing an impropriety in the honest desire I manifested to place the 
events of the campaign in their true light, will rather be surprised at 
the calmness and moderation which marked the tone and language of 
my letter. 

" As Major General Scott, in his defence before this Court, has quoted 
a passage from my letter, and has deduced an argument therefrom which 
may tend as much to prejudice others as to benefit himself, I must, with 
all respect to General Scott, remark, that the interpretation given this 
passage (which has been singled out of along letter, and is in itself 
comparatively of minor importance) is a more liberal interpretation than 
was contemplated by the writer. 

" It was never my intention to convey an idea that ' the Louisiana 
volunteers were a body of vassals, who owed allegiance to a particular 
chief,' (see General Scott's defence,) nor can 1 think it would be infer- 
red from my letter. Nor do I think it would be inferred from my let- 
ter that they evinced a determination to violate their engagement with 
the United States ; or that they would have been guilty of mutiny had 
General Gaines relinquished the command. 

" It is well known that these troops had been regularly mustered into 
service for three months; had received a bounty of thirty dollars, and 
were to receive the pay of ten dollars per month : they were, therefore, 
bound to obey all officers properly placed over them. 

" I stated in my letter, and on the authority of General Gaines, myself, 
that '■he had pledged himself to accompany the Louisiana volunteers 
whithersoever they went, <§-c.' In alluding to this fact as the least im- 
portant of several reasons General Gaines expressed for continuing his 
movement from Pensacola, I said the volunteers were (owing to this 
pledge) unwilling to proceed without him. Had I said they were un- 
willing to part ivith him, I should have expressed my meaning more 
clearly; and that fact is fully established on your record. Even gram- 
matically criticising the sentence, the freest construction to be put upon 
it is, that the volunteers would have proceeded unwillingly without Gene- 
ral Gaines, who had pledged himself to accompany them. Although no 



703 [ 224 ] 

one doubts that this fine regiment was bound to proceed, and would have 
proceeded without General Gaines, had he so directed, yet they were 
unwilling to part with him ; and this is the only proper construction that 
can be put upon the passage. For, if the other interpretation is given 
it, 1 must appear to cast upon the Louisiana volunteers, a reflection al- 
together inconsistent with the terms of encomium used towards them in 
other parts of the narrative. 

" The slight verbal difference I have noticed I cannot believe has 
misled the public, for my meaning is clearly conveyed in the spirit and 
context of the letter. 

" As I am not advised of any particular point in my letter to which 
the attention of the Court is directed ; and as I am noc aware of having 
violated any known law or order in the production of that letter, 1 have 
confined myself, in the first place, to laying open to the Court the motives 
which induced the writing and the publication of the letter, and which I 
cannot doubt will be found good and sufficient, and, in the second 
place, to explaining to the Court a passage in my letter which has re- 
ceived an interpretation different from that which was contemplated 
in penning it. This explanation, I trust, is satisfactory, for a thought 
that a different opinion was entertained by any member of this high 
and honorable Court, would be to me a source of the most painful 
humiliation." 

The Court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock A. M. 
February 15, 1837. 

The Court met, pursuant to adjournment. All present. 

The Court proceeded to pronounce its Opinion on the foregoing cases, 
as follows: 

The Court took into consideration a communication from Captain 
Hitchcock, of the 11th of March, 1836, to the honorable Mr. Lyon, of 
Alabama, published in the "Globe" of the 2d of April, 1 836, detailing 
the operations of Major General Gaines in his campaign against the 
Seminole Indians in Florida in 1836, and find that its publication was 
made with the approbation of Major General Gaines, and does not vio- 
late any regulation or rule of service ; that it appears to be a narrative 
of facts assumed by the writer, without any comments or reflections in- 
jurious to the public service ; and the Court cannot, therefore, see that 
there is any necessity for further investigation into the subject. 

The Judge Advocate laid before the Court a number of " The Globe" 
of the 8th of April, 1836, containing a publication purporting to be from 
the pen of Major General Jesup, commenting on the letter of Captain 
Hitchcock of the 11th of March ; also, a letter of the 2d of June, address- 
ed by Captain Hitchcock to the editors of" The Globe," and published 
in that paper of the 4th of June, in reply to the publication having the 
signature of Major General Jesup. In viewing the contents of the let- 
ter of Captain Hitchcock of the 2d of June, it purports to be a justifica- 
tion of the premises assumed in his letter to Mr. Lyon of the 11th of 
March, and contains nothing contrary to the regulations of the army. 



[ 224 J 704 

The Court was called to consider a publication made by Captain 
McCall, addressed to the editor of the New Orleans " Bulletin," under 
date the 18th of May, 1836, and published in the " Army and Navy 
Chronicle," of the 11th of August, 1836; also, a postscript or notes to 
said letter, published in the " Army and Navy Chronicle" of the 29th 
of September, 1836. The purport of the letter and postscript is a detail 
or narrative of the campaign of Major General Gaines against the Semi- 
nole Indians in Florida in 1836. But as the publications were made 
more than a month after the campaign was closed, the army regulations 
were not violated thereby, 

ALEX. MACOMB, 
Major General, President of the Court. 
S. Cooper, Judge Advocate, 

Recorder of the Court. 



705 [ 224 ] 

PUBLICATIONS OF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY. 



No. 1. 

[From the Globe of April 2, 1836.] 

Fort Drane, Florida, March 11, 1836. 

Sir : The following statement of facts in relation to the recent move- 
ment of troops from Louisiana, under the immediate command of Major 
General Gaines, you may rely upon, and if you think proper, may use for 
the information of the public. 

General Gaines left his permanent headquarters at Memphis, (Ten- 
nessee,) on a tour of inspection, and arrived at New Orleans about the 
15th of January, where he heard, for the first time, of serious disturb- 
ances in Florida, and particularly of the melancholy massacre of Major 
Dade and his command, which occurred on the 28th of December. He 
immediately communicated with the Governor of Louisiana, and request- 
ed him to call upon and hold in readiness a body of volunteers for service 
in subduing the Seminole Indians, and proceeded to Pensacola to solicit 
the co-operation of the naval force on that station. At Pensacola he 
found his wishes had been anticipated — Commodores Dallas and Bolton, 
and Captain Webb, having already directed their attention towards 
Tampa bay, and other inlets of Florida, whither they had ordered marines 
and munitions of war. 

The General, on his way to Pensacola, feeling called upon to take the 
most prompt and decisive measures to sustain the military post within his 
command, and secure the peace of the frontier, issued his orders to Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Twiggs to receive into service eight companies of the 
volunteers requested of the Governor of Louisiana, and, together with 
the regular force at Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and other stations in the 
immediate vicinity of New Orleans, to hold himself in readiness for a 
movement to Tampa bay. The whole force amounted to about eleven 
hundred men, including about seven hundred volunteers. This order 
was dated at Mobile the ISth of January. 

The General visited Pensacola, as stated, and then proceeded to New 
Orleans, where he arrived about the 26th. He organized and equipped 
his force, and moved, on the 4th of February, in three steamboats. He 
reached Tampa bay on the 9th, and on the 13th took the field in the 
enemy's country. It was first designed to search for and defeat a body 
of Indians reported to have been recently in the neighborhood of Fort 
Brooke — said to have been in battle only a day or two before the arrival 
of the General with the friendly Indians. Accordingly, the General 
marched in an easterly direction upon the Alalia river, but, at the end of 
two days, having found two or three fields of turnips and other vege- 
tables, as also fodder-stacks, not destroyed by the enemy, it was readily 
concluded he could not have been in that vicinity in any considerable 
force, and the General directed his march towards Fort King. He had 
taken ten days' rations only, but had reason to suppose that a large sup- 
ply of stores was at Fort King, the quartermaster having shown him an 



I 224 J 706 

official letter from the Quartermaster General, advising him that one hun- 
dred and twenty thousand rations had been ordered to that post. The 
letter was dated the 21st of January. 

The march was continued to Fort King, passing, on the 20th of Feb- 
ruary, the battle-ground of the gallant band cut off under Major Dade on 
the 28th December, where we interred the bodies of 106 heroes. No 
language can do justice to the scene. The remains of our mutilated 
brothers in arms were found where they had fallen — at their posts ; the 
very position of the advance guard being clearly indicated. Our troops 
marched to solemn music around the little breastwork which had been 
hastily thrown up, and where the last of the party were destroyed ; each 
individual lying at the breastworks, where, beyond a doubt, he fell in the 
execution of his duty. We continued our march a short distance that 
day, and on the 22d, as if to celebrate the birth of him who was "first 
in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen," we ar- 
rived at Fort King, and gave an agreeable surprise to one company of 
artillery, the garrison of that post, which, from its isolated and exposed 
situation, had been reported in the presses of the country as having been 
assaulted and destroyed by the Indians. The garrison had indeed been 
exposed, but was well prepared to give the enemy a warm reception. 
The guard, on the approach of General Gaines, was paraded, and the 
customary honor paid in due form ; but where were the hearts of all at 
that moment ? The writer of this confesses " he turned aside to wipe 
away a tear." 

The General, contrary to his reasonable expectations, found no suffi- 
cient supply of stores of any kind. The next morning, the 23d, all the 
horses were sent to Fort Diane, (22 miles northwest,) with a suitable 
convoy, for a supply of provisions. The 24th brought us all that could 
be procured, and it was ascertained to be but seven days' rations, which, 
with two days' supply found at Fort King, made up all that could be 
looked for in that quarter. The General had then to decide upon his 
next movement. To remain at Fort King without supplies, was out of 
the question ; to proceed further north might embarrass the operations of 
another officer then ascertained to be employed at Picolata in preparing 
force and supplies to penetrate the enemy's country. After much and 
mature deliberation, the General decided to move south again, by the 
battle-ground of General Clinch. If the enemy should not be found, the 
General would, at all events, reach supplies at Tampa bay. His move- 
ments would occupy, and, perhaps, concentrate the enemy, and tend 
greatly to give security to the frontier, and enable families to return to 
their deserted plantations, and in safety recommence their peaceful avo- 
cations ; which was considered of very great importance, the season 
having arrived for the commencement of planting operations. Lastly, but 
not the least of the considerations, we might find and beat the enemy. 

The General moved from Fort King on the 26th of February, and on 
the 27th, at 2 o'clock, we were on the right bank of the Withlacoochee, 
at the place where General Clinch crossed the river the 31st December 
preceding. The troops had advanced from Tampa bay, and, to this time, 
the same order of march has been preserved, in three columns, a right, 
centre, and left, respectively, about 100 yards distance from each other, 
with a strong advance and rear guard ; the baggage being in the rear of 



707 [ 224 ] 

the centre column. In this order, it followed that we struck the river at 
three points; the advance guard as the centre, being at the usual cross- 
ing-place. The baggage and the rear had been ordered to halt, as the 
General only designed examining the crossing-place. Up to this time 
no attack or annoyance had been offered us since we left Tampa bay, and 
but few of us expected it at the Withlacoochee. We were, therefore, 
many of us, fully exposed while sounding and examining the river, and 
our exposure was matter of jocular remark, when, for the first time, op- 
posite our left flank, a spirited fire was heard, accompanied by the en- 
livening war-yell of the savage. The fight was continued about half an 
hour, the enemy being on the left bank of the river, when the General 
ordered the troops to encamp near the river. We lost one killed, and 
eight wounded. On the 28th we moved down the river about two miles, 
where the banks were less covered with thicket, and the advance-guard 
was here fired upon, and Lieutenant Izard, of the United States dragoons, 
mortally wounded. He fell, but partially recovering himself, commanded 
his men, with the utmost composure, to "keep their positions, and lie 
close ;" a command scarcely less remarkable than that of the lamented 
Lawrence, " don't give up the ship." Lieutenant Izard, after five days 
of suffering, died on the 5th of March, and was buried on the banks of 
the Withlacoochee — himself a loss too great for the savage foe ever to 
compensate. 

The fight was continued on the 28th, with little or no intermission, 
from about 9 o'clock until 1 o'clock, P. M., when we encamped again. 
During this period the Indians kept up a continuous yell, except during 
an interval, when they retreated for a short time. We lost this day, be- 
sides Lieutenant Izard, one killed, and Captain Sanders, commanding 
the friendly Indians, and Captain Armstrong, of the United States schoo- 
ner Motto, both volunteers, wounded, the latter slightly. In the evening 
of this day an express was sent to Fort Drane to report to the officer 
commanding in that quarter that the enemy had been found in force, and 
to recommend an immediate movement, crossing the Withlacoochee some 
distance above, and thence to fall down upon the enemy's rear, which it 
was hoped would terminate the war. 

On the 29th, in the morning, the enemy was silent, but the experience 
of the General looked upon it as ominous, and he ordered one-third of 
the command to remain at the breastworks, the remainder of the force 
being employed in preparing timber and canoes for crossing the river. 
At about 9 o'clock our working-parties were fired upon, and simultane- 
ously a vigorous fire poured into camp from three sides — that nearest the 
liver being the only one not assailed. The firing continued a little over 
two hours, during which we lost one man killed, and three officers and 
thirty non-commission and privates wounded. The force of the enemy 
was estimated at twelve hundred or fifteen hundred. General Gaines 
was wounded by a small rifle ball, which passed through his lower lip, 
making a very slight wound, but knocking out one lower tooth and slightly 
fracturing two upper teeth. This was a most startling incident to all as 
soon as known, but affected everybody more than the gallant hero him- 
self, who, with the most heart-cheering good humor, observed, that it 
was extremely unkind for the enemy to take a tooth from him which he 
valued so highlv. Lieutenant Duncan, of the artillery, was slightly 
46 



[" 224 J 708 

wounded, and Lieutenant E. Smith, of the Louisiana volunteers, was 
wounded no less than three times. The enemy at length retired in some 
haste, for, contrary to their custom, they left one of their dead, after 
dragging the body some distance ; they took his rifle, but we found him 
well supplied with powder and about sixty bullets. 

The enemy, contrary to expectation, having crossed the river, it was 
evidently unnecessary for the troops from Fort Diane to go higher up, 
and accordingly General Gaines sent another express that evening, sug- 
gesting the expediency of a movement directly to Camp Izard, (the 
name he had given his own camp,) requesting, as he had done by the 
previous express, a supply of six thousand rations of pork, flour, and su- 
gar. On the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th days of March, the enemy fired at in- 
tervals, both day and night, upon our camp, which we secured by breast- 
works of pine logs, within which most of the command enjoyed them- 
selves in conversation, and speculating upon probabilities as to whether 
supplies would reach us, while our sharp-shooters were amusing them- 
selves in picking off the Indians from behind the trees. 

As our provisions diminished we began to inquire into the virtues of 
roots and the comparative excellence of horse-meat. At a meeting of 
officers all the corn was thrown into the public crib, and an issue of a 
pint made to those men whose bread had been exhausted. At length 
bread, com, and meat disappeared, and some of the men were two days 
without food. What was then the feelings in camp ? Let it be recorded 
to the honor of every man, and let no one, from false modesty, hesitate 
to yield his feelings to the gratification of noble pride, when he recollects 
that not a murmur was heard, and not a whisper of retreat circulated 
from any quarter. Far from it. Some horses were killed, and a very 
delicate piece was brought to the General at his tent, who found it re- 
markably tender and well flavored. We felt very well able to maintain 
ourselves at least three weeks, if necessary ; and by that time, at least, 
the force from above must certainly come down, and the Indians would 
assuredly be taken. These were our reflections on the night of the 5th, 
when, at about 10 o'clock, we heard some one calling from the woods, 
and wishing to speak with us. The officer of the guard answered the 
man, and demanded his designs ; he distinctly stated that the Indians 
were tired of fighting, and wanted to make peace. The General order- 
ed the officer of the guard to answer that if he wanted to say any thing 
to come in the morning with a white flag, and he should not be fired 
upon. He replied, " very well," repeating his desire to come in and 
have a friendly talk, and to shake hands. This was soon circulated 
throughout the camp, but, from the well-known treachery of the Indians, 
we were ordered to be particularly on our guard, and continued so all 
night. 

During the day of the 5th we lost one man killed, and had two wound- 
ed, the only casualties which had occurred since the 29th. On the morn- 
ing of the 0th, at about 10 o'clock, about 300 of the Indians filed out 
from the river and took up a position in our rear, about 500 yards distant. 
They were armed, and we were fully in the belief that this was a 
mere feint, supposing the residue of their force in a neighboring ham- 
mock ; and we were confident of a desperate assault from some other 
quarter. We were at a stand, waiting their movements, some minutes. At 



709 f 224 ] 

length one or two advanced a short distance, and, after considerable hes- 
itation on their part, the result of their fears lest we should entrap them, 
they approached near enough to be heard, and, after being joined by three 
or four others, came within about 200 yards, and repeated what had been 
declared the night before. The General then directed a staff otficer to 
go out to them, and hear what they had to say. It was soon reported to 
the General that the Indians did not wish to tight any more, but they 
wanted him to retire from the VVithlacoochee. The staff officer was 
then ordered to return to them, and, in the plainest language, to tell 
them the exact truth, as to the force ordered into the country to subdue 
them ; that additional force was expected every day ; that the time was 
near when every Indian found with a rifle in his hand would be shot 
down. This was communicated with such explanations as were deemed 
necessary to give it force ; and they then said they would go and hold a 
council, and would assemble again in the afternoon to give an answer. 
In the afternoon they came as before, including, as in the morning, the 
celebrated Powell, and scarce less celebrated Jumper, with several 
others, and with the interpreter Abram. The General's staff officer had 
with him two or three others from our camp to the talk. The Indians 
repeated much of what they had said in the morning — that they had lost 
many men by death and wounds, and were tired of the war and wanted 
peace ; but as their Governor, as they called him, Micanopy, was not 
with them, they wanted time to consult him. They, therefore, asked a 
cessation of the war. The staff officer, having been previously instructed 
by the General, told them that, if they would engage to cease from all 
acts of hostility, retire south of the Withlacoochee, and promise to attend 
a council when called upon by the United States commissioners, they 
should not for the present be molested. They answered, that, for 
themselves, they would, and did promise all that was required. At that 
moment a noise was heard from that portion of the Indians at a distance, 
and they were seen running towards the river. It was easy to conjecture 
the cause. Immediately afterwards, General Clinch, with 500 men and 
supplies, came gallantly on ; and his advance guard of mounted men see- 
ing Indians, and not knowing the purpose of their being where they 
were, formed a line promptly to the left, and fired, but the fleetness of 
the Indians saved them — they were beyond the reach of gun-shot, and 
were soon out of sight and over the river. 

Then followed one of the most delightful greetings imaginable. Gen- 
Clinch's force moved onward, and was soon within hail of friends ; and 
were we not all friends indeed ? The new-comers were soon divested 
of their surplus bread, &c, until their haversacks were emptied, and our 
command feasted. General Clinch brought two days' supply of pork 
and bread, with sugar, besides about forty head of cattle, many of which 
did not live out that night. 

On the 8th a negro man was sent over the river, who had a wife among 
the hostiles, with orders to account for his appearance among them in 
any way he might choose ; to see and talk with them ; to ascertain their 
location and wishes. The 9th he did not return, and much doubt pre- 
vailed as to the position and disposition of the enemy. On this day, the 
9th, General Gaines thought proper to deliver the command over to Gen- 
eral Clinch. We all regretted, and yet were pleased with the change : 



[ 224 ] 710 

regretted to lose the presence of a tried, experienced, and gallant Gen- 
eral, whose deportment commanded respect, whose judgment ensured 
confidence, and whose mild and amiable manners won the affectionate 
regard of every one ; but if a change was deemed a public duty, to whom 
could the command be assigned with so much satisfaction to his troops, as 
to General Clinch, who came nobly to their aid, with all the despatch 
and all the assistance in his power, and whose manners were an index of 
his generous and heart-ennobling qualities. 

General Clinch, for reasons assigned in orders, directed a movement to 
this place, to commence on the 10th instant, at JO o'clock. In the midst 
of a heavy rain the march commenced, and the troops moved about seven 
miles and encamped. In the evening the negro man who had been sent 
among the foe came in, and to our great satisfaction confirmed, in the 
most precise manner, the truth and sincerity of all the Indians had pro- 
fessed. He went among them, and found they had moved some fifteen 
or twenty miles up the river, and had dispersed over a space of some 
two miles or more, in several encampments. They gave the negro every 
assurance of a pacific disposition on their part, stating that they had or- 
dered their young men to abstain from war, and that they had seen our 
men fishing in the river, and had abstained from firing upon them. They 
stated that thirty had been killed in the several battles on the Withla- 
coochee within the 27th of February and 5th of March. It must be ob- 
served that no terms have been offered the Indians ; and, although there 
can be no doubt of their having been broken in spirit, it is yet to be 
seen whether they will suffer the dictation of terms which it is understood 
are to be imposed on them. It is certainly known through the negro 
man that they do not wish to go west, and they may refuse to comply 
with a requirement to do so. 

General Gaines arrived at this place to-day in good health. 
I have the honor to be, &c. 

E. A. HITCHCOCK, 

Captain U. S.A. 

Hon. Francis S. Lyon, M. C, 

Washington city. 



No. 2. 

[From the Globe of April 8, 1836.] 

Messrs. Blair <$• Rives: 

Gentlemen : I have read the letter of Captain Hitchcock, late acting 
Inspector General in Florida, published in your paper of Saturday, and 
regret to observe that, in the warmth of his zeal for his chief, he attempts 
to throw the responsibility of the movement on Fort King, with inade- 
quate supplies, upon the officers of the Quartei master's department. 
Now most men have as much as they can do to bear the burden of their 
own errors ; I find it so at least, and I confess, my shoulders are not 
quite broad enough to bear the additional weight which the gallant in- 
spector seems kindly disposed to transfer to them. But let him speak for 
himself. He says, " the General directed his march towards Fort King ; 



711 f 224 ] 



he had ten days'* rations only, but had reason to suppose that a large 
supply of stores ivas at Fort King, the quartermaster having shoivn 
him an official letter from the Quartermaster General, advising him that 
one hundred and tiventy thousand rations had been ordered to that post;" 
and in a subsequent paragraph he says : " the General, contrary to his 
reasonable expectations, found no sufficient supply of stores of any kind." 
It is a maxim in Avar, as old as the science itself, that a General should 
never separate himself from his supplies without taking care to secure 
his communications; but it is the high attribute of genius to be able to 
dispense with those rules which are necessary for the government of or- 
dinary mortals; the commander, however, who disregards them, assumes 
a responsibility which nothing short of complete success can justify : 
reasonable grounds for supposing that supplies would be found at Fort 
King may palliate, but cannot justify a movement contrary to rule, which 
resulted in failure as this did. 

But let us examine the grounds for the supposition of the General. 
Captain Shannon, the senior quartermaster in Florida, had been advised 
in a letter of the 19th January, from the Quartermaster General's office, 
that a large supply of provisions had been ordered from New York to 
Fort King. The following is an extract from that letter of all that re- 
lates to the subject : " Large supplies of provisions have been ordered 
from New York to Fort King." By comparing this extract with Cap- 
tain Hitchcock's letter, it will be seen that he has omitted the material 
fact, that the supplies were ordered from New York. Now he must 
pardon me, if not satisfied with the precise quantum of truth which he 
has chosen to tell, I claim for the department the benefit of the ivhole 
truth. 

General Gaines, we are told, moved from Tampa bay on the 13th of 
February, just twenty-four days subsequent to the date of the letter to 
Captain Shannon; a time not sufficient to have placed the supplies in 
depot at Fort King, even in the most favorable season of the year, and 
with the land communication entirely free from the interruptions of the 
enemy. Besides, General Gaines must have known that all the settle- 
ments in Florida, from near St. Augustine to Fort King, had been bro- 
ken up, or were kept in constant alarm by the enemy, and that the whole 
line of the Ochlawha, as well as the roads from Palatka and Picolata, 
were liable to be seized and held by him : it must also have been know 
that General Scott was in the field, and the least reflection must have 
led any one to perceive that he would hardly allow his supplies to go, 
without protection, in advance of his force. The date of the letter, the 
place whence the supplies were necessarily drawn, the state of the roads 
in Florida, the condition of that country, and the position of General 
Scott, should all have been considered. Viewing these circumstances 
together, what grounds were there to justify the supposition that supplies 
would be found at Fort King ? What reasonable expectation of the 
General could have been disappointed, unless indeed he supposed Gene- 
ral Clinch had obtained supplies before General Scott arrived in the 
country ? But if he, at the head of a thousand men, was obliged to in- 
trench himself on the Withlacoochee, and was neither able to open the 
communication with his own depot at Tampa bay, nor to keep open that 
with Fort King, how could he expect General Clinch, with less than 



\ 224 ] 712 

half that force, even if the supplies had arrived at Picolata, to keep open 
the communication, and furnish protection for them on the route, when 
every brigade of wagons or pack-horses required a military escort? 

The fact is, there was no just grounds for the supposition, if it was 
ever entertained, that supplies would be found at Fort King more than 
sufficient for its garrison. Tampa bay was the proper depot for General 
Gaines's division. When he left that post for Fort King, the supplies 
were abundant ; if he chose to leave them there, and allow the enemy 
to cut him off from them, he no doubt had reason sufficient, in his own 
opinion, to justify the measure ; but the responsibility, as well as the 
honor, is all his own. I must be excused from sharing either. 

THOMAS S. JESUP. 



No. 3. 

[From the Globe of June 4, 1836.] 

Washington City, D. C.,June 2, 1836. 
Messrs. Blair §■ Rives : 

Gentlemen : I avail myself of the first opportunity to notice the er- 
rors contained in a letter from General Jesup of the 8th April, referring 
to my letter to the honorable Mr. Lyon, previously published in the 
Globe. 

General Jesup says that General Gaines had no reasonable expectation 
of finding supplies at Fort King, after seeing a letter from the Quarter- 
master General's office to the assistant quartermaster in Florida, dated 
the 19th of January, informing him that large supplies had been oidered 
from New York to Fort King ; and the General charges me with omitting, 
in my letter to Mr. Lyon, the " material fact," as he calls it, that the 
supplies were ordered from New York, and claims " the benefit of the 
whole truth." 

Notwithstanding the self-complacent formality of the General's prin- 
ciple, as " old as the science itself," I shall set him right very abruptly. 
He urges three points : 1st, the want of time to send supplies from New 
York to Fort King ; 2d, that the roads in Florida were liable to be seized 
and held by the enemy, and that every wagon-train therefore required 
an escort; 3d, that " the least reflection" would have told any one that 
General Scott would hardly allow his supplies to go in advance of his 
force without protection. 

1st. As to time. The General having claimed the benefit of the whole 
truth should not have withheld it himself, particularly in the delicate sit- 
uation of being interested ; and, therefore, to the " twenty-four days" 
from the date of the letter of advice from his office to Captain Shannon, 
the 19th of January, to the departure of General Gaines from Tampa 
bay, the loth of February, (all the time General Jesup "chooses" to 
consider,) he should have added the ten days for which General Gaines 
took rations on his march to Fort King, more especially as he quoted the 
fact itself from my letter, and thus passed it manually before his eyes; 
and he should also have considered that every post, as a matter of course, 
has some days' supply always on hand ; in the present case, nine which 
General Gaines took from, and several that he left at Forts King and 
Dranc. So that, in fact, instead of "just twenty-four days," the Quar- 



713 [ £24 ] 



terraaster General had forty-three, and perhaps fifty days allowed him ; 
and yet the supplies were not placed in depot. No one can deny but that 
here was time enough to forward the supplies, even from New York, and 
therefore my omitting to state the place whence they were drawn was 
not ; ' material." 

2d. As to roads and escorts, the only road required was that from Pi- 
eolata to Fort Diane. This road was entirely under the control of the 
army, and almost daily passed b\, expresses ; and General Scott's main 
force was at Picolata ready to furnish all necessary escorts. 

3d. As to sending the supplies in advance. General Scott's plan made 
it a most important object to send supplies in advance to Fort Drane. 
For this he labored weeks in succession, embarrassed constantly for the 
want of transportation due from the Quaitermaster's department; and in 
order to ensure this very desirable object, he even detained his force at 
Picolata to avoid consuming the supplies at the depot in advance. 

Thus, it appears, there was time ; the road was protected, and the sup- 
plies were required in advance. Why, then, were they not forwarded ? 

It is not true, as General Jesup partly states and partly implies, that 
General Gaines was driven to his breastworks, there besieged and unable 
to move. General Gaines had the example, if example were necessary, 
of the present Chief Magistrate and other distinguished commanders, 
and habitually intrenched his cam]) at night in Florida. He was in one 
of these breastworks when the Indians presented themselves on the 29th 
February. He had the day before declared, in a letter to Foit Diane, 
that he would not leave his position until he should hear from Fort Drane, 
hoping for the means of striking a blow that would terminate the war in 
" ten days," without the hazard of dispersing the Indians, or driving 
them to the Ever-glades. He was not besieged, for after about 12 M. of 
the 29th of February, not an Indian was seen or heard of about camp 
until the afternoon of the 2d of March, when a small party threw in a 
volley and ran away; and on the subsequent days, for hours in succes- 
sion, the country was equally open, and could have been cleared at any 
time. 

General Clinch went down with five hundred men ; General Gaines 

had a thousand to move with, had he been disposed to move at all; but 

dispersing, or merely driving the Indians farther off, would have been 

' worse than suffering a defeat," and to retire, never once occupied his 

thoughts. 

I will conclude by expressing a hope, that when General Jesup wishes 
again to vent his spleen against General Gaines, he will not attempt it 
over my ''shoulders." E. A. HITCHCOCK. 



[From the Army and Navt Chronicle of August 11, 1836.] 

No. 4. 

Camp Sabine, near the Sabine River, 

May 18, 1836. 
Dear Sir: I take the liberty to enclose, herewith, a copy of a letter 
to a friend, on the subject of the late movements in Florida under Gen- 
eral Gaines. 



[ 224 ] 714 

I had written nothing relative to that campaign with a view for publi- 
cation, nor should I now send the enclosed, had I not lately seen in some 
ot' the papers, strange misrepresentations of facts which should not be 
permitted to pass unnoticed. 

I have had time only roughly to sketch the principal features of the 
campaign ; but the letter is at the service of the public, and I shall be 
obliged by your giving it an insertion in your paper. 
1 am, with great respect, &e., 

GEO. A. McCALL. 

To the Editor of the N. O. Bulletin. 



My Dear Sir: A rapid change of position and almost constant occu- 
pation during the last four months, have prevented until now, my making 
the Florida war the subject of a letter. The first intelligence of " actual 
hostilities" in that section of his military department, was received by 
General Gaines at New Orleans, whilst on a tour of inspection to the 
Gulf posts. The news of the massacre of Dade's detachment had burst 
like a thunder-clap upon the inhabitants of the great Southern emporium. 
On receiving the official report of this sad disaster, General Gaines im- 
mediately addressed to the Adjutant General at Washington, a letter, In 
which he urged that no time should be lost in applying to the savages on 
that frontier, the last and obvious means of correction — at the same 
time declaring, from his knowledge of the Seminole Indians and the 
country they inhabited, his conviction that the only sure means of speedily 
and effectually terminating the difficulties in that quarter, would be to 
bring into the field an army of at least 4,000 men, aided and supported 
by a strong naval force. Under this impression, he recommended that 
the 6th and part of the 1st and 7th regiments of infantry be ordered to 
Florida, to reinforce the United States troops on the Gulf, and such vol- 
unteers from the adjoining States as the emergency might call forth. On 
the same day he made a requisition on the Governor of Louisiana for a 
regiment of riflemen or infantry ; and soon after requested of Commo- 
dore Bolton, at Pensacola, the co-operation of such naval force as he 
might feel authorized to order on that service. Some days subsequent 
to this, the receipt of intelligence that Fort Brooke (Tampa bay) was 
invested by the Indians and negroes, and the garrison in danger of being 
cutoff, determined General Gaines to proceed at once to their relief with 
what force he might be able to collect at New Orleans. He accordingly 
wrote by express to General Clinch, who commanded in Florida, and 
was at that time at Fort King, 100 miles north of Fort Brooke, that he 
(General Gaines) would be at the latter post on the 8th of February, 
with 700 men. General Clinch, it was understood, would have, by that 
time, a respectable force (volunteers) from Georgia and the upper coun- 
ties of Florida. He was accordingly ordered, if strong enough to take 
the field, to march to the southward in time to effect a junction with 
General Gaines at or near Fort Brooke. Under these circumstances, 
General Gaines embarked at New Orleans on the night of the 3d of Feb- 
ruary, with a brigade of about eleven hundred men — to which number 
his force had fortunately increased — consisting of six. companies of the 



715 [ 224 J 



4th infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, and a regiment of Louis- 
iana volunteers, under the command of General P. F. Smith, adjutant 
general of the State. The transports, being steamboats, were obliged to 
touch at Pensacola for wood ; and here it was that General Gaines met 
the Adjutant General's letter of the 22d January, which purported to 
cover the " Order No. 7," directing General Scott to repair to Florida 
" and take command of the troops operating against the Indians in that 
quarter." This Order No. 7 was not enclosed, nor did General Gaines 
see it until his arrival at Fort King, sixteen days afterwards. This fact 
may be a matter of no great import ; but, as the continuance of the move- 
ment from Pensacola to Tampa, after his being notified that such an or- 
der had been issued, is one of the two prominent features of the cam- 
paign that has been very unhesitatingly criticised and condemned in some 
of the popular prints, it may be well to examine what might have been 
the consequences, had he abandoned the expedition at that advanced 
stage of its progress. 

In command of a military department, he had received, at a point far 
distant from the seat of Federal Government, whence alone special or 
new instructions could be sent him, the intelligence of a great and un- 
looked-for disaster having occurred on the extreme Southern frontier of 
the country, occupied by the left wing of his division ; he learned the 
melancholy news that a large white settlement had been overrun, sacked, 
and burnt, and many of the inhabitants killed ; the United States agent 
of Indian affairs murdered ; eight valuable officers and ninety-eight 
brave soldiers of his division cut to pieces by an overwhelming savage 
foe ! and he was aware that the military posts on the borders of the In- 
dian country, viz : Forts Brooke, King, and Drane, with the station at 
Key West, all within his military department, were without any other 
work of defence than such as a daring leader, with 500 men, might, at 
the risk of a little loss, take and destroy in a few hours, the garrisons of 
three of those posts being insufficient for their defence. What then was 
the duty of the commander of the department? Had he hesitated one 
single moment, he would indeed have merited the stern opprobrium of 
his fellow-citizens. He did not hesitate. He collected what force he 
could, and marched immediately for the theatre of war. On the route, 
and within two days' march (by steam) of the Indian borders, he re- 
ceived a notification that General Scott had been ordered to repair from 
the city of Washington to Florida, "and take command of the troops 
operating against the Indians in that quarter." At the same time he was 
informed that " the state of affairs west of the Mississippi might soon re- 
quire his attention, if not his presence, in that quarter;" and he was di- 
rected to await further orders in the city of New Orleans. Had hostili- 
ties actually existed on the Louisiana frontier, and General Gaines re- 
ceived an order to repair thither immediately, it is difficult to say whether 
the historian would have approved or condemned his conduct at that 
stage of the game, had he obeyed the order, and, by so doing, left Gen- 
eral Clinch, in expectation of a promised co operation, to extricate him- 
as he could from any difficulty into which the failure on the part of 
General Gaines in preconcerted movements, might peradventure throw 
him. And ivithout General Gaines, the volunteers, his principal force, 
were unwilling to proceed ; for, before they left New Orleans, he had 



[ 224 ] 716 

pledged himself to accompany them whithersoever they went, and to 
stand by them as long as they would stand by him, in repressing the ris- 
ing spirit of savage devastation. Moreover, he was firmly persuaded that 
the instructions from the War Department, requiring him to wait further 
orders in the city of New Orleans, were forwarded before that Depart- 
ment could possibly have received a detail of the circumstances which 
rendered the immediate movement to Florida not only proper but im- 
perative. 

A little reflection determined him to continue the movement until the 
President should be apprized of all the particular circumstances attend- 
ing it ; or until the officer authorized to operate in his department should 
make his appearance in person in that part of the country which consti- 
tuted the principal theatre of the war, or the Indians be subdued and the 
security of the frontier re-established. This view of the subject is based 
upon a sound principle of military law, and is supported by the ablest 
writers of all enlightened nations, whose arms have been crowned with 
success. Had General Gaines failed to comply with this wise precept — 
had he disregarded this sacred injunction, he well knew that he might 
suffer the enemy to defeat a body of troops expecting his co-operation, 
and consequently leave the citizens, dwelling within the limits of his 
command, quivering beneath the upraised tomahawk and the blood- 
stained scalping-knife. 

Was it his duty, under such circumstances, to abandon an expedition 
on the prosecution of which the safety of the border people possibly 
hung ; or was it his duty to strike promptly at the enemy, if possible sub- 
due him, or at all events endeavor to check his devastations until the 
President should have notice of his strength, and the determined spirit 
with which he seemed prepared to carry on the war? 

General Gaines proceeded to Tampa bay. On his arrival at Fort 
Brooke, he learned that the day previous a party of about 100 of the 
friendly Indians had been attacked near the fort, and driven in by a su- 
perior force. The country occupied by the hostile tribes lying between 
Forts Brooke and King, no communication had been kept up between 
those posts since the massacre of Major Dade's command ; and, conse- 
quently, General Gaines, on arriving at the first-named station;, was una- 
ble to gather any information from which he could form even a tolerable 
conjecture of General Clinch's strength or movements. But relying on 
the co-operation of that officer, he determined, as soon as his horses could 
be landed, to place a sufficient garrison in the pickets, and, with the re- 
mainder of his force, march out to meet him. 

Owing to the expense and difficulties attending the transportation of 
horses from New Orleans by sea, the baggage-train brought with the 
brigade was necessarily small, and the expectation that the requisite 
number to complete the train might be procured at Tampa, was not real- 
ized ; the horses and cattle in that vicinity having been stolen or lost 
during the alarm, which broke up the settlement and drove the families 
for protection to the fort. Some half dozen Indian ponies Avere, I believe, 
all that the quartermaster could procure, to add to the number brought 
from New Orleans. The question then, among both officers and sol- 
diers, was, not " what they might get along with," but " what they 
could do without on their majrch?" Ten days' rations were issued to the 



717 [ 224 ] 

troops, (five of which were to be carried in the haversacks ;) and on the 
morning of the 13th, the brigade took the field. The order of march was 
three columns, with an advance, and a strong rear-guard. The right was 
four companies of the second artillery, acting as infantry, commanded by 
Major Belton ; the centre seven companies of the fourth infantry, under 
Lieutenant Colonel Foster; the left and rear being composed of the 
Louisiana volunteers, under Colonel Smith and Lieutenant Colonel 
Lawson, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs acting as brigadier. 

The friendly Indians, who to the number of seventy-seven, accompa- 
nied the brigade, having reported their belief that the war party which 
attacked them a few days before was not only formidable, but was prob- 
ably still encamped on the Alafia river, at a point some fifteen miles from 
Fort Brooke, and seven from the main road to Fort King, General Gaines 
made a detour to the right for the purpose of breaking it up, and driving 
before him this band of marauders. On the second day's march, how- 
ever, it was ascertained that the enemy had not been at Alafia in any 
strength ; and the troops, having received two additional rations, which 
had been directed to meet them by water at Warren's, proceeded on their 
route. On approaching the Withlacoochee, on Dade's line of march, 
and some thirty miles above Clinch's battle-ground, the friendly Indians 
expressed their firm belief that a vigorous attack would be made the fol- 
lowing day, and urged strenuously that they might be permitted to return 
home, i. e. to Fort Brooke. This faltering on the approach of battle cre- 
ated some surprise, not unmingled with distrust of their fidelity. A half- 
hour's talk, however, reassured them, and they moved on without evin- 
cing any further timidity. 

The expected attack, however was not made ; and the brigade arrived 
without annoyance at Dade's battle-ground, where funeral honors were 
paid to the gallant band, who had left on the trees around, abundant 
proof of a field nobly contested against an overwhelming foe. The sad 
scene can never be erased from the memory of those who witnessed it, 
but its images, still vivid in the mind, recall feelings too painful to per- 
mit me to dwell longer upon a scene which has already been described 
by many. 

Up to this time, the eighth day since he marched from Fort Brooke, 
General Gaines had been in hourly expectation of meeting Clinch ; and 
the fall of a towering pine, which in those extensive wilds produces a 
sound it is difficult to distinguish from the report of distant artillery, and 
was on two occasions the cause of long and animated discussion among 
all ranks, whilst at the end of every mile some further indication of 
Clinch's approach was looked for. Knowing the promptness of that offi- 
cer, General Gaines could not now but apprehend that some serious ob- 
stacle had arisen to prevent the desired junction. Being only about 
forty miles from Fort King, the General felt bound to proceed thither to 
ascertain the situation of Clinch's command, and if possible gain some 
information with regard to the movements of the enemy. His only doubt 
with regard to the expediency of proceeding thither was on the score of 
provisions. This he mentioned to me, on Dade's battle-ground, while a 
party detailed for the purpose was collecting the bodies of the slain to 
burial. He concluded by saying that the men had with them enough to 
carry them back to Tampa, if he returned immediately, and that there 



[ 224 ] 718 

were abundant supplies: but that if he proceeded to Fort King, he might 
not find a sufficient provision to make that position the basis of his opera- 
tions, without embarrassing General Clinch, with whom he desired to co- 
operate, or General Scott, should he have arrived. I then remarked 
that an officer had just mentioned to me that the quartermaster had re- 
ceived, before he left Fort Brooke, a letter from the Quartermaster 
General, notifying him that 120,000 rations had been ordered to Foit 
King in January preceding. This letter was immediately called for. It 
was from the Quartermaster General's office, and dated the 1 9th (nine- 
teenth) of January. The passage that had been referred to was as 
follows : 

" Large supplies ot provisions have been ordered from New York, for 
Fort King, and 30,000 rations to St. Augustine, from the same place." 

This was the first time General Gaines saw the letter in question, or 
knew that a large additional supply had been ordered from New York to 
Fort King. He had brought a large supply of subsistence and forage 
to Tampa bay, and had written to General Clinch to that effect from New 
Orleans, intending to make Tampa the basis of his operations. But now, 
unable to gain the least information of General Clinch's strength, or 
movements, or those of the enemy, in any other way than by proceeding 
to Fort King, the acquisition of the information above detailed removed 
the only doubt he had entertained with regard to the expediency of the 
measure. He decided to push on without delay, and the order to march 
was given the moment the simple but solemn funeral rites of the band of 
heroes was concluded. I have been thus precise in this part of my nar- # 
rative, because a want of knowledge of the circumstances attending this 
measure has caused the whole movement to be so misconstrued as to 
lay General Gaines liable to the charge of dashing heedlessly into the 
wilderness without any plan of operations ; suffering himself to be sepa- 
rated by a wide district of the enemy's country from the depot of his 
supplies, and thus exposing his men to hardships and privations as un- 
necessary as profitless. 

But this is the second principal feature of the campaign that has been 
most unhesitatingly criticised, of which more anon — to return to the 
thread of my narrative. 

The troops reached Fort King on the 22d of February, without meet- 
ing with any accident worthy of remark. A single company of the 3d 
artillery constituted the garrison of this station. General Clinch, with 
his principal force, was at Fort Diane, twenty-two miles to the N. W. 
With great regret General Gaines now learned that Clinch had not re- 
ceived the expected reinforcements from the northern borders of the 
Territory, but two volunteer companies having joined him from that 
quarter. His force was four companies of artillery, and one of infantry, 
and the two companies of volunteers I have mentioned. General Gaines 
was not less disappointed when he was told that the supply of provisions 
at these two posts (King and Diane) was little more than sufficient for 
their support. Whether this disappointment was consequent to a reason- 
able expectation or not, I shall not pretend to determine. The simple 
facts, from which must be determined the reasonableness or unreason- 
ableness of the conclusion drawn from the information received by Gen- 
eral Gaines, on the battle-ground, are these : The troops had marched 



719 [ 221 | 

from Fort Brooke on the 13th, with ten days' rations. At the Alafia 
they received two days' rations, brought thither by water, making in all 
twelve. That is, they were provisioned to include the 24th of February. 
On the 20th February, General Gaines Saw the letter of the 19th Janu- 
ary, already alluded to. From the date of the letter to the day he saw 
it, inclusive, is 32 days, and to the 24th February, the day to which his 
troops had been provisioned, is 36 days. The supplies had been ordered 
on the 19th — how long before that, he knew not. The facilities of water- 
transportation from New York to the mouth of the St. John's river, and 
up that river by steam, to Picolata, whence it is about 70 miles to Fort 
Diane, and 92 to Fort King, led to the conclusion that, in 3G days, the 
supply would have reached its destination. The roads the troops had 
travelled were in fine order, the season having been remarkably dry. 
We were told no rain had fallen from some time in September, till the 
day before we reached Dade's battle-ground, when there was a slight 
rain. 

At Fort King it was learned that preparations were making for the 
campaign at Picolata, under direction of General Scott. It was thought, 
however, that he would not be enabled to take the field with any consid- 
erable force for some time. 

Finding he could expect no immediate co-operation from a quarter 
where he had expected to meet a considerable force — Clinch's command 
being barely sufficient to supply the necessary escorts to the provision 
wagons between Picolata and Fort Diane, and unwilling to draw upon 
the nucleus of supplies here collecting, General Gaines decided on re- 
turning immediately to Tampa bay, and making that the basis of his op- 
erations. He informed General Clinch of this, and requested barely a 
sufficient supply to last him on the march. He had marched from Fort 
Brooke to Fort King by the main route, the common wagon-road. This 
road is longer by a day's march than the route by Chocochater. He, 
therefore, determined to return by the latter. It was, indeed, the opin- 
ion at Fort King, that the Indians had established themselves near the 
point at which this trace crosses the Withlacoochee, viz : Clinch's battle- 
ground. If so, so much the better — he might beat them by the way ; at 
any rate the movement of 1,000 men through the country occupied by 
the Indians would have the effect of keeping them concentrated, and, 
therefore, relieve the frontier from petty depredations. Of the 77 friend- 
ly Indians who accompanied the brigade from Fort Brooke, ten returned 
with it, the balance remaining with General Clinch. These men, who 
acted as guides, promised to find a ford somewhere near the point at 
which General Clinch had crossed. 

On the 27th, General Gaines reached the Withlacoochee, at this point ; 
and a half hour or more had been passed in searching for the ford, when 
the enemy opened a fire from the opposite bank. The stream is about 
forty yards wide, but deep and rapid. A few companies were immedi- 
ately brought into action, and very soon the fire became general, Irom 
the left to the centre. This skirmish, the first bush-fighting the men had 
seen, lasted half an hour. The loss of the troops was one killed and 
seven wounded. The troops encamped near the river, and the guides 
declared the ford must be about three miles below, where a trail leading 
to the right struck the river. The next morning by sunrise the three 



[ 221 ] 720 

columns marched for the point indicated, on reaching which a spirited 
fire was immediately opened from the opposite bank ; it was quickly re- 
turned, and continued, with occasional intermissions, till one o'clock. In 
the early part of this action, Lieutenant Izard, a gallant soldier, was 
mortally wounded. The loss this day was one killed and three wounded. 
The stream at this point also proved too deep to be forded ; and the 
guides, who had been accustomed to hunt in the lower country, and had 
not been in this section for many years, were totally at fault. The banks 
of the stream, however, at this point, were less thickly clad with the 
customary undergrowth, and the General determined to cross. A detail 
was accordingly made to prepare canoes, and the flooring of a pontoon 
bridge ; and the cheerful sound of the axe was soon mingled with the 
crack of the rifle and the animating war-cry. At four o'clock, P. M. a 
distant, but very loud, whooping was heard, which indicated the approach 
of a large reinforcement to the enemy, from the opposite side. The 
friendly Indians immediately declared it to be Micanopy, whose force 
they estimated at 800 warriors. 

General Gaines, then satisfied that the whole force of the enemy was 
in the field, considered the opportunity of bringing the war to a close too 
favorable to be lost. Under this impression he sent an express to Gen- 
eral Clinch, recommending an immediate movement of the force under 
his command, with an additional supply of ammunition and provisions. 
Clinch was desired to cross the river some ten miles above, and move 
down on the left bank. General Gaines added that he would, in the 
mean time, endeavor to amuse the enemy, prepare his boats, &c. for 
crossing, but would not cross until he heard from Fort Drane, where 
General Clinch expected by this time some accession to his force. 

By this movement it was believed the two brigades would be enabled 
to attack the enemy in front and rear at the same time, and probably ter- 
minate the war in a few days. The customary log breastwork was thrown 
up, about three feet high, and the troops slept undisturbed that night. 
The following morning an attack was thought not improbable from some 
quarter, and one-third of the men were kept on duty at the breastwork. 
At 10 o'clock, A. M. the working-parties were fired upon, and immedi- 
ately afterwards a dashing attack was made on three sides of the camp. 
The Indians advanced boldly and fired with great rapidity, but not with 
precision. At one time they set fire to the high grass and palmetto on 
the windward side of the camp, and made a bold dash under cover of the 
smoke, which, mingled with flame, came rolling towards the breastwork 
like a heavy sea. The fire was coolly extinguished, and the audacity of 
the assailants punished by Louisiana riflemen. The fight lasted till a few 
minutes past 12 o'clock M., when the enemy withdrew. Their numbers 
were estimated, by those considered the best judges, at 1,500. The 
troops having the advantage of the slight breastwork before mentioned, 
lost this day only one sergeant killed and 34 officers and men wounded. 
Among the latter was General Gaines himself. The loss of the enemy 
was considerable, the troops firing with a coolness and precision that 
would do honor to veterans. Nor should the 29th of February be passed 
without bestowing a word of praise on the marked gallantry of these red 
assailants, who fought — many an old Indian fighter present said, " as 
Indians never fought before." 






721 [ 221 ] 

As the Indians had crossed the river, a runner was sent that night to 
General Clinch, informing him of the occurrences of the morning. In 
concluding this letter, General Gaines said, " I have abstained and shall 
abstain from a sortie till I hear from you, in expectation that this course 
will tend to keep them together, whilst a sortie might contribute to dis- 
perse them. I am now satisfied that a direct movement to this place is 
more desirable than to cross the river higher up, as I suggested in my 
letter of yesterday. I am moreover of opinion that, if mounted men can 
be obtained in a few days, your force should not move from Fort Drane 
without that description of troops." The Indians move with too much 
celerity to be pursued in that country, with any chance of success, by any 
other than mounted men. The following day, March 1, there was light 
skirmishing, and occasional shots were fired at those who passed out of 
camp. 

On the morning of the second of March, an attack was made nearly as 
vigorous as that of the 29th, and was kept up for one hour ; but the troops 
having raised the breastwork, sustained little loss. It was possible that 
General Clinch might arrive this afternoon, and many of the men, who 
were getting hungry, began to look eagerly for his appearance ; though, 
when they were told that, if he should be detained by the non-arrival of 
the mounted men, it might yet be some days before they received a sup- 
ply of provisions, in which case they must be content to dine on horse- 
meat until they could do better, I do not think there was a man but de- 
clared his willingness to do so, as long as there was a prospect of bring- 
ing the war to a successful termination by so doing. All the corn in 
camp was turned in, as common stock, and afforded about a pint per man, 
and afterwards some horses were killed, and the meat regularly issued. 
The 3d, 4th, and 5th of March did not produce any incidents greatly dif- 
fering from those of the preceding days. The Indians were frequently 
firing into the camp, by night as well as by day, generally selecting the 
hour of guard-mounting, or parade, when the men were most exposed. 
Our sharp-shooters, however, kept them at long shots, and their bullets 
whistled through the camp without doing much execution. On these oc- 
casions, as usual, the woods rung with the animating war-cry. During 
this time the troops lost but one man killed and two wounded. 

At 10 o'clock, P. M., on the 5th, some one was heard hailing the camp. 
It was at first supposed to be a return express from Fort Drane, who was 
thus giving notice of his approach, lest he should be fired on by the senti- 
nels. He was told to advance. In a few moments a negro called out at 
the top of his voice, " The Indians are tired of fighting, and wish to 
come in to-morrow to shake hands." He was told that if they had any 
thing to say they might come in the morning with a white flag, and they 
would be heard ; whereupon he retired, bidding us a hearty " good 
night." At ten o'clock, A. M. on the 6th, 300 warriors, or thereabout, 
drew up in line facing the rear of the camp, at the distance of 450 or 
500 yards. After some delay and apparent hesitation on their part, two 
or three advanced about half way with a white flag. Here they were 
met by Adjutant Barrow, to whom they communicated their desire to 
have a talk with General Gaines. Captain Hitchcock, acting inspector 
general, was then sent to hear what they had to say. He returned and 
reported that the Indians did not wish to fight any more, but that they 



[ 224 J 722 

were desirous that (he troops should withdraw from the Withlacoochee. 
They said they had lost a great many warriors, and were unwilling to 
lose any more, except in the course of nature, or perchance by the fall 
of a forest tree. The celebrated Oceola was much dejected and appar- 
ently subdued in spirit. Captain Hitchcock was directed to return and 
tell them that a large force would soon be in the field, and the inevitable 
consequence of their refusing to come to terms would be the destruction 
of a great portion of the nation. They expressed a desire to treat with 
General. Gaines, and said they would hold a council on the subject, and 
give their answer in the afternoon. They returned at the appointed 
time, and again expressed their desire to make peace with General 
Gaines, but said their act could not be binding without the sanction of 
Micanopy, the principal chief, who had gone to his town. They said 
they would send for him and then sign a treaty. Captain Hitchcock then 
communicated to them what he had been instructed to say, viz : that 
General Gaines had no authority to treat with them, but that if they would 
return to the south side of the Withlacoochee, and remain there without 
molesting the inhabitants of the country, until the United States com- 
missioners should appoint a time and place to meet them, they should not 
for the present be disturbed. The chiefs present gave their promise to 
do so. At this moment General Clinch's advance came in sight of the 
party that had accompanied the chiefs, and not knowing what was pass- 
ing at the camp, wheeled into a line and poured a volley upon the Indians, 
who immediately fled and crossed the river, as did the chiefs who were 
with Captain H., fearing no doubt they would be shot down. This broke 
up the conference. 

The brigade with Clinch were met with heartfelt greetings. He 
brought the greater part of the garrison from Fort Drane, and a squad- 
ron of mounted men, raised in the counties immediately north of Fort 
Drane ; and with them all the supplies his slender means of transporta- 
tion would allow, together with 40 head of beef-cattle. From this time 
up to the 9th March, the Indians remained true to their promise to abstain 
from hostilities, our men having frequently during these days fished and 
bathed in the river without molestation. Micanopy, however, did not 
arrive, and General Gaines decided this day (see Order No. 7) to place 
the troops under the command of General Clinch, whose gallantry and 
decision had proved him so worthy of the trust, and prepared to return 
immediately to New Orleans, in pursuance of the instructions he had re- 
ceived at Pensacola. 

On the 10th, General Clinch took up the line of march for Fort Drane. 
That night a negro, who had a wife among the hostile Indians, and among 
whom he had been sent on the 8th, returned and reported that they as- 
sured him of their intention to adhere to their promises ; and told him 
they would meet the whites on the Withlacoochee in five days, and bring 
with them all the principal chiefs. They said they had seen our men 
fishing, but desiring to be at peace, did not fire on them. 

The troops encamped about three miles south of Fort Drane ; thither 
General Gaines proceeded, and soon after set out on his return to New 
Orleans, by the way of Tallahassee and Pensacola. At New Orleans he 
received the instructions from the War Department relative to this fron- 
tier, and immediately proceeded to Fort Jcsup. 



723 [ 224 I 

Tiiis is a rough sketch, hut you may rely on the facts, and you are at 
liberty to make use of the letter, if you think proper, for the information 
of the public. 

With constant regard, 

I am your most obedient servant, 

GEO. A. McCALL, 
Acting Assistant Adjutant General. 



No. 5. 

[From the Army and Navy Chronicle of Skttembkr 29, 1856] 

General Gaines and the Seminole Campaign. 

We have received a letter from Captain G. A.. McCall, aid-de-camp 
to General Gaines, requesting us to insert in the Chronicle the letter from 
him to a friend, which appeared in the New Orleans Bulletin, and fur- 
nishing a few additonal paragraphs by way of a postscript. 

By reference to the Chronicle of the 11th ultimo, it will be seen that 
the hist part of this request had been anticipated. We have, therefore, 
only to comply with the other portion, by publishing the following 

POSTSCRIPT. 

Although the promptness with which General Gaines repaired to 
Florida has been very generally commended ; and his determination to 
strike boldly at the enemy whilst the season was favorable for rapid 
movements has been approved ; the very pertinent question has lately 
often been asked, " Why did he remain idle for several days on the 
Withlacoochee, while the Indians were within striking distance ; why 
did he not make asortie?" To this question, the answer is plan. He 
did not wish, by a premature move, (the effect of which would have been 
comparatively unimportant.) to frustrate the ulterior object of the cam- 
paign — the complete subjection and removal of the Indians. 

There were numbers at Fort Izard, on the 29th of February, who 
would have sprung like the young war-horse, to head a sortie, or lead a 
charge against the Mickasukee and the Seminole ; but the General was 
convinced that a sortie at that time would be productive of consequences 
that would retard the successful termination of the campaign, by disper- 
sing the Indians, and possibly driving them into a part of the country in- 
accessible to the troops, namely, the Everglades. 

One decisive victory over the Mickasukee and Seminole tribes, would 
perhaps have resulted in their complete overthrow. But any one ac- 
quainted with the country, and the Indian mode of fighting, knows that 
this would have been the work of several days. In an engagement be- 
tween well-disciplined troops, who will stand to it, and take hard knocks 
upon hard knocks, until one or other of the parties is fairly beat down, 
a splendid and decisive victory may be achieved in a few hours ; but 
an engagement with these Indians, to result in permanent advantages, it 
was well known, must be a succession of running fights from hammock 
47 



[ 224 J 724 

to swamp, and must be kept up for days. The troops at Fort Izard had 
neither ammunition nor provisions for perhaps a ten days' pursuit, and a 
sortie would have been worse than useless, had it not been rigorously 
and uninterruptedly prosecuted to a successful termination. 

As has already been stated, General Gaines received at Fort King a 
supply barely sufficient to carry him to Tampa. But as soon as it was 
ascertained that the united Mickasukee and Seminole tribes were in full 
force in the vicinity, he informed General Clinch of the fact, and re- 
quested a further supply, stating his belief that, by a combined movement 
of the two forces, the war might be terminated in ten days. 

Having despatched this letter, General Gaines resolved to do nothing 
that would tend to disperse the Indians ; but quietly to await Clinch's 
arrival, and then make a sortie that would carry him several days' march 
into the fastnesses of the enemy's country, where it was believed the 
women and children were secreted. For he was satisfied that the com- 
plete subjugation of the savages could be accomplished only by a decisive 
victory, followed by the capture of the women and children. In the 
mean time, the Indians were wasting their ammunition without doing ma- 
terial injury. They were almost constantly at it, and fired at least one 
hundred shots to our one; the men at the breastworks having positive 
orders not to fire a single shot without good aim at a distant object, with- 
in fair striking distance. 

These are the reasons a sortie was not made during the time the brig- 
ade remained on the bank of the Withlacoochee waiting Clinch's arrival. 
But, before General Clinch arrived, the Indians sued for peace, and 
promised to remain quiet until the United States commissioners should 
appoint a time and place to treat with them. And General Gaines hav- 
ing promised that they should not be disturbed if they remained quiet on 
the south side of the river until they heard from the commissioners, felt 
bound to observe towards them the same strict regard to his word that 
he would have observed to the most powerful people on earth. The In- 
dians complied strictly with their promises ; for although the troops were 
afterwards encamped at different points within five or six miles of Fort 
Drane, the Indians never fired a rifle until they found accumulated forces 
in hostile array advancing on the Withlacoochee in their different direc- 
tions. 

In conclusion, I will merely remark that the idea of the brigade at Fort 
Izard having been beleaguered and unable either to advance or fall back 
is ridiculous and without foundation. General Gaines would hardly have 
ordered General Clinch to move down with five hundred men, had he 
considered himself unable to drive the Indians before him with one 
thousand. 

G. A. M. 



725 [ 224 J 



GENERAL ORDER, No. 13. 

Headquarters of the Army, 
Adjutant General's Office, Washington, March 21, 1837. 

The following Order has been received from the War Department, 
and is published for the information of all concerned. 
By order of Major General Macomb: 

R. JONES, 
Adjutant General. 



War Department, March 21, 1837. 

A Court of Inquiry, of which Major General Macomb is President, 
convened at the city of Frederick, Maryland, on the 28th of Novem- 
ber, 183G, pursuant to General Orders Nos. 65 and 68 of that year, for 
the purpose of inquiring and examining into the causes of the failure of 
the campaigns in Florida against the Seminole Indians, under the com- 
mand of Major General Gaines and of Major General Scott, in 1836 ; 
and the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign, in 
Georgia and Alabama, against the hostile Creek Indians in 1836, and 
into every subject connected with the military operations of those cam- 
paigns ; also, to inquire and examine into the unauthorized reports and 
publications of officers of the army. 

The Court, after duly examining all the testimony offered in the several 
cases, pronounced the following opinions thereon : 

1st. Opinion of the Cowl in reference to the failure of the campaign in 
Florida, conducted by Major General Scott, in 1836. 

"The Court finds, from a review of the testimony, that Major Gene- 
ral Scott was ordered, on the 21st of January, to take the direction of the 
Florida war, with full authority to organize a regular and volunteer 
force sufficient in his judgment, with a view to bring the war to a speedy 
termination. That under this order he proceed to Augusta, Georgia, 
where he arrived near the last of January, and commenced organizing 
the service. That he proceeded thence to Milledgeville, for the pur- 
pose of consulting with the Governor of Georgia on the subject of the 
Creek difficulties, and in hastening the preparations for operations in 
Florida. That he returned to Augusta on the 6th of February, and ar- 
rived at Savannah on the 9th, where he was occupied in regulating the 
supplies and movements of the troops for Florida until the 20th. That 
he arrived at Picolata on the 22d, and was detained there until the 9th 
of March, awaiting the arrival of troops, both regular and volunteers, 
also transportation and supplies, and in forwarding the same to Fort 
Diane and Volusia ; his plan of campaign being to move in three divis- 
ions simultaneously from Fort Diane, Volusia, and Tampa, upon the 
Withlacooch.ee, the strong hold of the enemy. That, on the 9th of March, 



[ 224 J 726 

General Scott proceeded to Fort Drane, with a small escort with sup- 
plies for the relief of General Gaines's forces on the Whhlacoochee, and 
arrived at Fort Drane ahout the 14th, where he was detained until the 
25th, to give time for the left wing and the centre of his army to put 
themselves in position, and also in awaiting the arrival of supplies, to 
enahle him to commence operations. These supplies were delayed for 
the want of additional means of transportation, momentarily expected 
from Savannah ; the few teams already in use heing nearly exhausted by 
the bad state of the roads, and the constant and heavy labor imposed on 
them. On the 26th of March, General Scott commenced his movement 
from Fort Drane for the Withlacoochee with the right wing of his com- 
mand, consisting of about 1,968 regular and volunteer troops, and with 
eighteen days' rations ; that he reached Camp Izard, on the Withlacoo- 
chee, on the morning of the 28th, where the Indians, from the opposite 
bank of the* river, fired into the camp. Preparations being made, the 
troops commenced crossing the river the next morning at 4 o'clock ; dur- 
ing the crossing, the rear division was attacked, but the enemy was 
driven. On the morning of the 30th, the army, having crossed, pro- 
ceeded up the river in search of the enemy, whom they discovered about 
10 o'clock in small parties on an island in a chain of lakes; the troops 
advanced to the attack, when the Indians retired, and were pursued 
about four miles, but not overtaken. The next morning the Indians were 
again discovered on another island, surrounded by broad and wet savan- 
nahs, and so boggy that it was with difficulty the troops could struggle 
through them. The Indians were attacked, dislodged, and pursued three 
or four miles, when they eluded the pursuit by crossing the river. In 
this pursuit the troops became several times engaged, but the enemy was 
always dislodged and driven from the hammocks. Finding it impossible 
to pursue the enemy across the river, and being twenty-four hours with- 
out provisions, the troops returned to their baggage-train and encamped. 
On the 1st of April the troops proceeded on the march, and established 
a post of observation called Fort Cooper, at the southeastern extremity 
of a chain of lakes, leaving there a part of the force, with seventeen 
days' provisions, and reserving only enough subsistence to carry the re- 
mainder to Tampa bay, where they arrived on the 5th of April, after a 
fatiguing and difficult march, making the road the whole distance. The 
loss of the troops in the several rencounters was four killed and nine 
wounded. 

" The left wing, under General Eustis, after scouring the country be- 
tween St. Augustine and Volusia, via Tomoca, commenced crossing the 
St. John's at Volusia on the 22d of March, when it was attacked by the 
enemy, who was repelled at all points, and retreated to his fastnesses, 
after a loss on the part of the troops of three killed and nine wounded. 
One Indian was found dead, and evidences of four others being thrown 
into the river. On the 24th, a subaltern's command of mounted men 
fell in with a party of twelve or fifteen Indians, and killed two. On the 
25th, the left wing, consisting of four companies of United States artille- 
ry, Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment, Colonel Brisbane's regiment 
of loot, and Elmore's volunteers, concentrated, and, on the 26th, com- 
menced the march for Pelaklikaha, by the upper crossing of the Ochlawa- 
ha, with 1,400 men, and thirteen days' rations, leaving at Volusia two of 



727 | 224 ] 

Brisbane's companies. The route being difficult, the troops made only 
seven miles by the evening of the 27th, and were obliged to build bridges 
over the Qchlawaha, the Withlacooch.ee, and one intermediate stream. 
On the 29th, after crossing the Ochlawaha, an Indian of note, Ayah Ha- 
jah, was killed by Colonel Shelton, who was wounded. On the 30th the 
advance was attacked at Oakahumpky swamp, and three men killed ; 
the hammocks were scoured, and the Indians discovered, and driven into 
a swamp inaccessible to the troops, one of whom was wounded. The 
enemy retreated whenever the troops approached to within 200 hundred 
yards. On reaching Pelaklikaha, the villages were found to have been 
abandoned, perhaps for several weeks ; cattle and ponies were abundant 
in the neighborhood ; the bouses and fences were burned by the troops. 
It being impossible to obtain provisions from Fort King, and the horses 
being too much exhausted to draw provisions from Volusia, and General 
Scott having crossed the Withlacoochee south, on the 28th, with the right 
wing, the left wing moved on the main road from Fort King to Tampa, 
where the horse of that wing arrived on the 5th of April, leaving the foot 
at a position fifteen miles from that place. 

" The centre, under Colonel Lindsay, consisting of from 1 ,000 to 1 ,200 
men, organized at Tampa about the 13th of March. Large fires being 
discovered in the direction of the Alafia, the battalion of Florida volun- 
teers was sent in that direction, where they surprised a party of Indians, 
killing three, and capturing six ponies. On the 15th, the centre moved 
upon the Hillsborough, on the main road to Fort King, and on the 20th 
established a post called Fort Alabama, with a view of bringing supplies 
near to the scene of hostilities in the direction of the Withlacoochee, 
leaving there the Florida battalion under Major Read, the remainder of 
the troops marching back to Fort Brooke, (Tampa,) where a despatch 
was received from General Scott, giving the plan of the campaign, and 
requiring the centre to be at Chickuchatty by the 25th to co-operate. 
On the 22d the march was commenced, the battalion at Fort Alabama 
was taken up, leaving at that post one company, and thirty sick. The 
route lay through a hilly country, abounding in hammocks. After pass- 
ing Elochuto, the Indians, taking advantage of their eoverts, began to 
annoy the rear and flanks of the column : a flanker was killed, and ano- 
ther wounded, whilst passing a dense hammock. The hammock was 
scoured, and the Indians driven out. During the night, at the encamp- 
ment, parties of the troops were fired on by the Indians from a hammock 
contiguous to a pond which furnished water for the troops : the Indians 
were dispersed by a round of canister. On the 27th, the Indians still 
continuing their annoying attacks, always firing from ambush, one of our 
men was killed, and two wounded. The column halted at noon, when 
an attack was made upon the rear, but, upon a brisk return of the fire, 
the Indians disappeared. On the 2Sth, when encamped at Fort Brod- 
nax, near the Chickuchatty, the Indians commenced a fire on the horses, 
and the party guarding them. A detachment was sent out, whieh drove 
the enemy without loss to the troops. On the 30th, provisions being 
scarce, two parties of mounted men were sent in pursuit of cattle, cov- 
ered by a force of two hundred and fifty men ; they brought in a supply 
sufficient for four days. During that day the friendly Indians attached 
to the command killed a chief called Charley Fixico, a leader of about 



[ 224 ] 728 

eighty-five men. That night the sentinels were fired upon occasionally, 
and also on the 31st, but without injury. On the same day an attempt 
was made to procure more beef. Being sixty miles from the depot, with 
barely enough provisions to reach it, without any prospect of being able 
to keep the field, for the purpose of co-operation, and having obtained 
no response to the signals made for eight days in succession, Colonel 
Lindsay deemed it advisable to return to Tampa, where he arrived on 
the night of the 4th of April. In the interval between the departure 
from, and return to, Fort Alabama, that post was attacked by a force of 
between three and four hundred Indians, which resulted in a loss on the 
part of the troops, after an action of two hours and twenty minutes, of 
one killed and two wounded ; the supposed loss of the enemy was fifteen 
killed. The enemy continued to lie around the work in considerable 
force, both day and night, until the return of the centre column. 

" The several columns which arrived at Tampa about the 5th of April, 
remained at that place until the 14th, for the purpose of recruiting the 
men and horses, which had become much exhausted from the heat of the 
weather, and the fatiguing and difficult marches. The army was here 
divided into five detachments. Colonel Smith, with the Louisiana vol- 
unteers, was detached to Charlotte harbor and up Pease creek, accom- 
panied by a naval force, w4ien, after operating some days up the country, 
and discovering no Indians, he returned to Tampa, and thence to New 
Orleans, where the volunteers were discharged. 

" The Florida volunteers, under Major Read, were sent to the mouth 
of the Withlacoocb.ee, to operate up that river. The object of this ex- 
pedition was not effected, and the troops were conveyed to St. Mark's and 
Tallahassee, where they were discharged. 

" The right w r ing, under General Clinch, consisting of 27S artillery, 
43 dismounted dragoons, 202 infantry, 139 Augusta volunteers, and 140 
mounted men, marched for Fort Diane, via Fort Cooper, on the Withla- 
coochee, making short marches, in consequence of the heat of the wea- 
ther and the debilitated condition of the horses. On the 18th, (three 
miles from Fort Cooper,) General Clinch despatched two companies 
with light wagons, with instructions to Major Cooper to join him. The 
detachment was fired upon from a hammock, and one lieutenant and a 
private severely wounded. The enemy fled. Fort Cooper had been 
invested from the 5th to the 17th of April, with a loss of one killed and 
five wounded : the force of the enemy estimated at 250. On the 22cl, 
one of the flankers was fired on from a hammock ; when prompt pursuit 
was made, but without effect, the Indians retiring through a thick under- 
growth. The troops reached Fort Diane on the 25th, the men and horses 
much exhausted by sickness, and the heat of the weather. Another 
day's march would have occasioned the abandoning the train. Fifteen 
horses and mules died on the road, and eight were turned out that could 
not be got along by leading. The term of service of the volunteers hav- 
ing expired, they returned to their homes. On the 20th the enemy 
made an attack on Fort Drane, but were repulsed by the garrison : they 
carried off some negroes and horses. 

" The left wing, accompanied by General Scott, moved, via Pelakli- 
kaha and the upper crossing of the Ochlawaha, for Volusia. On the 
night of the 22d of April, the camp was fired upon by a party of six or 



729 f 224 1 



eight Indians. They were pursued at daylight, without any result. On 
the 24th a party of the enemy was met, but with no other result than 
the capture of their horses and packs, the enemy escaping into the ham- 
mocks. A body of the left wing reached Volusia on the 25th. All the 
volunteers of the left wing marched under Colonel Goodwyn for St. 
Augustine on the 28th, via Tomoca. The regulars were left to garrison 
Volusia and superintend the evacuation of the post, which had become 
very sickly. 

" The centre column, under Colonel Lindsay, moved for the forks of 
the Withlaeooeh.ee. Passing over the Hillsborough, a wagoner was kill- 
ed by the Indians, and on that night the Alabama regiment was fired on, 
and a sentinel wounded. The remainder of the march was effected with- 
out annoyance from the enemy. No signs of Indians were discovered 
on the YVithlacoochee. Being encumbered with the sick, the troops re- 
turned to Fort Alabama. The wagon-train was insufficient for the re- 
moval of the sick alone to Tampa, and the absorption of the post of Fort 
Alabama was necessarily deferred until the army could return with its 
transportation from Tampa, relieved from the encumbrance of the sick. 
The march to Tampa was uninterrupted by the enemy ; and, after rest- 
ing a day and a half, Colonel Chisholm, with the Alabama regiment, and 
four companies of infantry and twenty artillery, returned to remove 
all the public property and stores from Fort Alabama. The troops 
reached Fort Alabama, and, on their return march, were attacked about 
three o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th, as the advance guard was pre- 
paring to cross Thlonotosassa creek ; the Indians firing from a dense 
covert on the front and both flanks of the column. The fire was vigor- 
ously returned by the troops, and, after twelve or thirteen rounds from a 
field-piece, Colonel Foster, at the head of the infantry, charged into the 
hammock, attacked, and drove the Indians, estimated at three hundred, 
and thus put an end to the conflict, which had been kept up for an hour, 
resulting in a loss, on the part of the troops, of five killed and twenty- 
four wounded. The troops reached Tampa the next day, and the vol- 
unteers returned to their homes ; the rainy season having set in, and the 
weather so hot as to render it impossible to keep the field without a greal 
sacrifice of life. 

" The strength of the enemy during the campaign is estimated by 
General Scott not to exceed 1,200 fighting men; and he is of opinion 
that not more than 500 had at any time, since the commencement ol 
hostilities, been brought within the same ten miles square ; and that in 
all his operations for thirty days, no party larger than 130 had been 
found ; but that parties from 10 to 30 had been encountered almost ever} 
where. 

" After the return of the troops from Tampa to their several positions. 
General Scott deemed it necessary, in consequence of the extreme heal 
of the weather, and the sickness of the troops, to put them into summei 
quarters, which was approved by the Secretary of War, in a letter oi 
the 5th of May from the Adjutant General ; and thus closed the campaign 

" The Court, after a full consideration of the foregoing facts, and the 
testimony from which they are drawn, comes to the following Opinion : 

" The Court, after a careful review of the great mass of testimony 
taken in the foregoing investigation, finds that Major General Scott was 



224 



730 



amply clothed with authority to create the means of prosecuting the 
Seminole war to a successful issue ; but is of opinion that, at the time 
he was invested "with the command, the season was too far advanced for 
him to collect, appoint, and put in motion his forces, until a day too late 
to compass the object. It appears that after using great diligence and 
energy, he was not in a condition to take the field, and enter the enemy's 
strongholds, before the 28th of March, and then without sufficient means 
for transporting the necessary supplies to enable him to remain there 
long enough to seek out the scattered forces of the enemy. 

" The Court, therefore, ascribe the failure of the campaign to the want 
of time to operate, the insalubrity of the climate after the middle of April, 
the impervious swamps and hammocks that abound in the country occu- 
pied by the enemy, affording him cover and retreat at every step, an ab- 
sence of all knowledge by the General, or any part of his forces, of the 
topography of the country, together with the difficulty of obtaining, in 
time, the means of transporting supplies for the army. 

" The Court is further of opinion, from the testimony of many officers 
of rank and intelligence, who served in the campaign, that Major Gene- 
ral Scott was zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of his duties; 
and that his plan of campaign was well devised, and prosecuted with en- 
ergy, steadiness, and ability." 

2d. Opinion of the Court in reference to the delay in opening and pros- 
ecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama, against the hostile 
Creek Indians , in 1836. 

" The Court finds, from a careful review of the testimony, the follow- 
in"- facts : That, under instructions from the War Department of the 16th 
May, General Scott arrived at Augusta from Florida on the 25th May, 
on his way to take the direction of the Creek campaign, having, previ- 
ously to leaving Florida, ordered essential stores from Picolata, St. Au- 
gustine, Charleston, and Savannah, to Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, 
within seventy-five miles of Fort Mitchell; and had also ordered 250,000 
complete rations from New Orleans to the highest navigable point on 
the Chattahoochie ; that he despatched ten wagons with subsistence from 
Augusta on the 28th May for Columbus, and appointed an agent, and 
sent him to Hawkinsville, to hasten on supplies and purchase subsist- 
ence ; that he proceeded himself to Columbus, where he arrived on (he 
30th May, and directed the Georgia volunteers, already assembled there, 
about 1,500, to be mustered into service, and distributed over a line of 
40 miles on the river above and below Columbus, to prevent the escape 
of the Indians towards Florida, and also the employment of two armed 
steamers cruising up and down the river for the same purpose. That on 
the first of June he ordered General Jesup to Montgomery, to take com- 
mand of the Alabama troops, and to operate up the country from a point 
below Irwinton. That he was engaged in organizing the Georgia militia, 
and collecting supplies and arms, up to the 23d June. That on the 12th 
of June there had arrived at Columbus 3,300 Georgia volunteers, but not 
more than one-third were armed. That General Moore arrived at Ir- 
winton about the 14th June, with 750 mounted Alabamians, with a view 
of commencing operations forthwith ; but that he was instructed by Gen- 



731 [ 224 J 

eral Scott to await his arrival in that quarter. That General Jesup, un- 
expectedly to General Scott, arrived about the 17th June in the neigh- 
borhood of Fort Mitchell, with the Alabama forces from Tuskegee, call- 
ing on General Scott for supplies, which had not then arrived from New 
Orleans. That on the night of the 20th June, 1,000 muskets arrived, 
and were distributed to the Georgia volunteers on the 21st June, who 
were immediately ordered to the mouth of Cowaggee creek on the 
Chattahoochie, below the enemy. That companies of the regular troops 
commenced arriving on the 14th, and to the 20th, when two battalions 
were marched down the river. The first detachment of marines arrived 
on the 23d, and marched immediately below ; the last detachment of ma- 
rines arrived some days after. 

" That General Scott left Columbus on the 23d, to commence opera- 
tions below, and was actively engaged from that time until the 6th of 
July, when he was recalled from his command by the instructions of the 
President of the 28th of June ; and that he turned over the command to 
General Jesup on the 8th of July. 

" The Court, after a full consideration of the foregoing facts, and of 
the testimony from which they are drawn, comes to the following 
Opinion: 

" Upon a careful examination of the abundant testimony taken in the 
foregoing case, the Court is of opinion that no delay, which it was prac- 
ticable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott, in opening 
the campaign against the Creek Indians. On the contrary, it appears 
that he took the earliest measures to provide arms, munitions, and pro- 
visions for his forces, who were found almost wholly destitute ; and as 
soon as arms could be put into the hands of the volunteers, they were, in 
succession, detached and placed in positions to prevent the enemy from 
retiring upon Florida, and whence they could move against the main 
body of the enemy, as soon as equipped for offensive operations. 

" From the testimony of the Governor of Georgia, of Major General 
Sanford, commander of the Georgia volunteers, and many other witnesses 
of high rank and standing, who were acquainted with the topography of 
the country, and the position and strength of the enemy, the Court is of 
opinion that the plan of campaign, adopted by Major General Scott, was 
well calculated to lead to successful results, and that it was prosecuted 
by him, as far as practicable, with zeal and ability, until recalled from 
the command." 

3d. Opinion of the Court in reference to the failure of the campaign in 
Florida, conducted by Major General Gaines, in 1836. 

" The Court took up the testimony in reference to the campaign in 
Florida under Major General Gaines, and, after a careful examination, 
finds that Major General Gaines, on receiving at Mobile, about the 17th 
of January, 1836, information of the massacre of Major Dade and his 
command by the Seminole Indians in Florida, repaired with promptness 
to the city of New Orleans, where he, with great zeal, organized a force 
of regular and volunteer troops, amounting to about 1,100 men, and 
proceeded without delay to Tampa bay, where he arrived about the 10th 
of February, and, after making preparations for the field, marched on 
48 



[ 224 J 732 

the Fort King road on the 1 3th, and reached Dade's battle-ground on the 
20th, where he buried the meritorious dead with the honors of war. He 
then proceeded for Fort King, where he arrived on the 22d. After draw- 
ing nine or ten days' supply of subsistence from Fort Diane, and receiv- 
ing a small supply of ammunition, he marched on the Withlacoochee, 
where he arrived on the 27th, and encountered the same day the enemy 
across the river, in a sharp conflict of half an hour, when the troops 
withdrew for the night, after a loss of one killed and six wounded. 
On the morning of the 28th, the troops marched down the river to 
a point two and a half miles below, where it was understood the 
crossing was practicable. Here the advance of the army was fired 
upon from across the river, and an action ensued, which continued 
until twelve or one o'clock, in which Lieutenant Izard was mortally 
wounded. The army here encamped that afternoon, and an express was 
despatched by Major General Gaines to General Clinch, or the officer 
commanding at Fort Drane : the troops in the mean time throwing up a 
slight breastwork of logs. On the morning of the 29th, at 9 or 10 o'clock, 
the enemy, in force estimated at about 1,000 or 1,500 men, made an at- 
tack on three sides of the fortified camp, which was continued for two 
hours, when he withdrew, leaving one of his dead on the field. On this 
day another despatch was sent by Major General Gaines to Fort Drane. 
From the 2d of March to the 5th, the enemy made more or less spirited 
attacks upon the camp ; in which several conflicts, the loss on the part 
of our troops amounted to some three killed and about forty wounded. 

" On the night of the 5th of March, a proposition was made from the 
woods, by the enemy, for peace. On next day, a strong party of Indians 
appeared within five hundred or six hundred yards of the camp ; a few 
of whom advanced with a flag to within one hundred and fifty to two 
hundred yards, and Adjutant Barrow, of the volunteers, was sent out to 
confer with them, when they informed him they did not wish to fight 
any more, but wanted General Gaines to go away ; upon which informa- 
tion, General Gaines sent out Captain Hitchcock, who was accompanied 
by two or three officers, to hold a further conference with them. The In- 
dians repeated to him their proposition for peace, and stated they had 
lost a great many of their men. Before the conference was finally closed, 
the advance of the troops under General Clinch came up, and com- 
menced a fire upon the Indians standing in the rear, when they and the 
chiefs in council fled, and covered themselves in the hammocks, and 
were no more heard of up to the 10th of March, when the army (the 
command of which had been turned over by Major General Gaines to 
General Clinch the day preceding) fell back upon Fort Drane, where it 
arrived on the 1 1th. 

"The Court, after carefully reviewing and collating the testimony of 
Captains Hitchcock and McCall, Colonel Twiggs, General Smith, and 
others, in reference to the operations and peculiar situation of the army 
at Camp Izard, finds it difficult to come to a conclusion as to the real 
causes of the failure of the campaign. It appears, although the army 
was surrounded and repeatedly assailed by the enemy in its fortified po- 
sition from the 29th of February to the 5th of March, and straitened in 
the means of subsistence, that, however important to the chivalry and 
reputation of the troops, no sally was made to test the result of such a 



733 [ 22 t ] 

movement, which it is possible might have issued in the defeat and sub- 
ion of the enemy, and have brought the war to a close. But the 
Court, however, judging from subsequent events in prosecuting the war 
under other commanders, and the indomitable spirit of hostility evinced 
by the enemy, is of opinion that, had a sortie been made by Major Gen- 
eral Gaines, though he might have been able to beat and drive the enemy 
into the surrounding hammocks and swamps, they would have eluded 
pursuit and retired to their more remote fastnesses. But, if such had 
been the result of a sortie, Major General Gaines had not the means of 
subsistence to have enabled him to remain long enough in or about the 
cove of the YVithlacoochee to seek out the enemy and press the war to a 
successful conclusion. Still, the Court, without impugning the motives 
that influenced Major General Gaines, is of opinion that a sortie, under 
all the circumstances of the case, should have been made. 

" The Court, therefore, in taking a full and impartial view of all the 
circumstances appertaining to the operations of Major General Gaines at 
Camp Izard, is of opinion that the failure of the campaign should rather 
be attributed to the want of the means of subsistence to prosecute the 
war, than to the contingent result of a sortie. 

"The attention of the Court was next called to a consideration of the 
publication of Major General Gaines's official report of the 4th of July, 
1S3G, to the Adjutant General, in the public prints. The fact of its pub- 
lication in the " New Orleans Bulletin" of the 27th of September, is 
admitted by Major General Gaines (as will appear in (he Proceedings of 
the Court) as authorized by him, and without any authority but his own 
action. The Court is not aware that its publication in the public journals 
as late as the 29th of September, is in violation of any rule or regulation 
of the service : but is of opinion that all publications in the public prints 
tending to excite public opinion, or to produce recriminations between 
officers, are prejudicial to the interests of the public service and injurious 
to the discipline of the army. The publication of the official report of 
Major General Gaines, of the 4th of July, to the Adjutant General, is 
considered by the Court as falling under publications of this description, 
by its personal allusions. 

" The Court cannot close its proceedings without adverting to the strain 
of invective and vituperation used by .Major General Gaines, in the lan- 
guage generally of his summary of the evidence touching the operations 
of the Seminole campaign; particularly the part of it couched in the 
following terms: " the atrocious machinations of the second United 
Stales general officer who has ever dared to aid and assist the open enemy 
■of the republic in their operations against United States forces em- 
ployed in the protection of the frontier people . The first great offender was 
Major General Benedict Arnold, the second, as your finding will show, is 
Major General Win field Scott." Assertions without facts or circumstan- 
ces to sustain them, and unbecoming his, Major General Gaines's, high 
rank and station — remarks and assertions which the Court condemns in 
the most decided terms of reprehension. 

The Court, in continuation, feels itself compelled to notice the censure 
in the official letters of Major General Scott (spread upon the record of 
these Proceedings) cast upon Major General Gaines, in reference to his 
operations in Florida ; and in a tone of language that could not be 



[ 224 ] 7 34 

otherwise than offensive to the latter General; and in terms, the Court 
ra o opinion, not called for under the circumstances of the case and 
ought not to have been indulged in." ' 

4tB. Opinion of ihe Court in reference to unauthorized reports and pub- 
lications of officers of the army. 

'•The Court took into consideration a communication from Captain 
Hitchcock, of the 1th of March, 1836, to the honorable Mr. Lyon, of 
Alabama, published in the Globe of the 2d of April, 1S36, detailing the 
operations oi Major General Gaines in his campaign against the Semi- 
no e ndians in Honda, in 1S36, and finds that its publicity was made 
Kith The approbation oi Major General Gaines, and does not violate any 
regulation or rule of service ; that it appears to be a narrative of facts as- 
sumed by the writer, without any comments or reflections injurious to the 
public service ; and the Court cannot, therefore, see that there is any 
necessity tor further investigation into the subject 

''The Judge Advocate laid before the Court a number of < The Globe' 
of the 8th of April 1836, containing a publication purporting to be from 
the pen oi Major General Jesup, commenting on the letter of Captain 
Hfffchcack of the 11th of March ; also, a letter of the 2d of June ad- 
dressed by Captain Hitchcock to the editors of < The Globe ' and pub- 
lished in that paper of the 4th of June, in reply to the publication 
having the signature of Major General Jesup. In viewing the con- 
tents of the letter of Captain Hitchcock of the 2d of June, it purports to 
be » Justification of the premises assumed in his letter to Mr. Lyon of 
the 11 lb oi March, and contains nothing contrary to the regulations of the 



army 



» The Court was called to consider a publication made by Captain Mc- 
Ca 1 addressed to the editor of the ISew Orleans ' Bulletin,' under date 

°l f I 8 ' ?£*% J ***> and Published in the ' A ™J ™* Navy Chron ! 
cle of the 11th o August, 1836; also, a postscript or notes to said letter, 

Fooi ,She 4 ,D 6 Arn P? m **Tt Chronicle' of the 29th of September 
1836. 1 he purport of the letter and postscript is a detail or narrative of 
Uie campaign of Major General Gaines against the Seminole Indians in 
Honda in 1836. But as the publications were made more than a month 

thereb e » Campalgn *** ^^ ^ ^^ re S u,ations wer f not violated 

The Proceedings and Opinions in the foregoing cases have been sub- 
mitted to the President, and are approved. 
The Court of Inquiry is dissolved. 

J.R.POINSETT, 

Secretary of War. 



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